Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Moral Foundations of Public Funding for the Arts Michael Rushton full chapter instant download
The Moral Foundations of Public Funding for the Arts Michael Rushton full chapter instant download
The Moral Foundations of Public Funding for the Arts Michael Rushton full chapter instant download
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-moral-foundations-of-
parenthood-joseph-millum/
https://ebookmass.com/product/innovative-funding-and-financing-
for-infrastructure-addressing-scarcity-of-public-resources-
delmon/
https://ebookmass.com/product/foundations-of-astronomy-
fourteenth-edition-michael-a-seeds/
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-politics-of-spatial-
transgressions-in-the-arts-gregory-blair-editor/
The Most Important Job In The World Gina Rushton
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-most-important-job-in-the-
world-gina-rushton/
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-specter-of-hypocrisy-testing-
the-limits-of-moral-discourse-raphael-sassower/
https://ebookmass.com/product/geometric-patterns-with-creative-
coding-coding-for-the-arts-1st-edition-selcuk-artut/
https://ebookmass.com/product/kinesiology-of-the-musculoskeletal-
system-foundations-for-rehabilitation/
https://ebookmass.com/product/survival-of-the-virtuous-the-
evolution-of-moral-psychology-1st-edition-dennis-krebs/
NEW DIRECTIONS IN CULTURAL POLICY RESEARCH
Series Editor
Eleonora Belfiore
Department of Social Sciences
Loughborough University
Loughborough, UK
New Directions in Cultural Policy Research encourages theoretical and
empirical contributions which enrich and develop the field of cultural pol-
icy studies. Since its emergence in the 1990s in Australia and the United
Kingdom and its eventual diffusion in Europe, the academic field of cul-
tural policy studies has expanded globally as the arts and popular culture
have been re-positioned by city, regional, and national governments, and
international bodies, from the margins to the centre of social and eco-
nomic development in both rhetoric and practice. The series invites con-
tributions in all of the following: arts policies, the politics of culture,
cultural industries policies (the ‘traditional’ arts such as performing and
visual arts, crafts), creative industries policies (digital, social media, broad-
casting and film, and advertising), urban regeneration and urban cultural
policies, regional cultural policies, the politics of cultural and creative
labour, the production and consumption of popular culture, arts educa-
tion policies, cultural heritage and tourism policies, and the history and
politics of media and communications policies. The series will reflect cur-
rent and emerging concerns of the field such as, for example, cultural
value, community cultural development, cultural diversity, cultural sus-
tainability, lifestyle culture and eco-culture, planning for the intercultural
city, cultural planning, and cultural citizenship.
Michael Rushton
The Moral
Foundations of Public
Funding for the Arts
Michael Rushton
O’Neill School of Public/Env. Affairs
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN, USA
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For Maggie, Paul, and John
All students of man and society who possess that first requisite for so
difficult a study, a due sense of its difficulties, are aware that the besetting
danger is not so much of embracing falsehood for truth, as of mistaking
part of the truth for the whole. It might be plausibly maintained that in
almost every one of the leading controversies, past or present, in social
philosophy, both sides were in the right in what they affirmed, though
wrong in what they denied; and that if either could have been made
to take the other’s views in addition to his own, little more would have
been needed to make its doctrine correct.
—John Stuart Mill, “Coleridge”
Acknowledgments
This book was formed out of years of teaching the course in Public Policy
and the Arts to students at the O’Neill School of Public and Environmental
Affairs at Indiana University Bloomington, and I am grateful to my stu-
dents for their participation and discussion as we considered and probed
the various ideas that are presented here. I also thank participants over the
years in the O’Neill School’s Center for Cultural Affairs Workshop where
early versions of chapters were presented. My Center colleagues Karen
Gahl-Mills and Joanna Woronkowicz each gave careful readings and com-
ments to various chapters, for which I am very grateful. Support from the
O’Neill School, and from Indiana University’s Presidential Arts and
Humanities Program, enabled me to travel to Ireland and England during
2022 to present various parts of this work. I am very thankful to the
School of Art History and Cultural Policy at University College Dublin,
the Centre for Cultural Policy and Leadership, and the Centre for Cultural
Value, at the University of Leeds, The Institute for Cultural Practices at
the University of Manchester, and the Sheffield Methods Institute, and
the Cultural Industries Research Network, at the University of Sheffield,
for the chance to present, discuss, and be rigorously challenged on these
ideas, as well as for their very generous hospitality during my visit. I thank
Eleonora Belfiore, the Editor of the Palgrave New Directions in Cultural
Policy Research series, for her support of this project, and for two anony-
mous referees whose suggestions greatly improved the book. Jenny Noble-
Kuchera supported me in this project from the beginning; no words are
adequate for the depths of my gratitude.
ix
Praise for The Moral Foundations of Public Funding
for the Arts
“This book is an essential contribution to our field; it offers both a synthesis of the
moral foundations of arts funding through different philosophical traditions, and
an original outlook and interpretation of the subject matter.”
—Jonathan Paquette, University of Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Contents
1 Introduction 1
5 Communitarianism 93
6 Conservatism115
7 Multiculturalism141
8 Keynes’s Grandchildren169
Index181
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
come to be called the “rust belt.” The local arts funding body, Cuyahoga
Arts and Culture (named for the county in which Cleveland is situated)
came into existence through a voter referendum in 2006, and was renewed
in 2015. Its revenues come from a tax on cigarettes, of 30 cents per pack.
There are significant public health benefits to reducing the incidence of
smoking, and a tax on cigarettes aids in the effort to get smokers to quit,
and to deter young people from starting the habit. But it is also true that
cigarette taxes are regressive, which is the term used for a tax that collects
a lower proportion of income for higher-income taxpayers than it does for
lower-income taxpayers. Cigarette taxes are regressive for two reasons:
first, because taxes on consumption in general tend to be regressive, since
the rich spend a lower proportion of their income, and save a higher pro-
portion, than the poor do; and second, because cigarettes in particular are
consumed at a higher rate by lower-income people (Remler 2004; note
that governments which use the profits from state-run lotteries to finance
public expenditures on the arts are similarly using a regressive tax, as
spending on lotteries is disproportionately by lower-income individuals).
How can one justify using taxes to transfer funds to the operating bud-
get of the Cleveland Orchestra? This book examines different ways one
could try to answer that question. It will broaden its scope by considering
all manner of tax-financed state support not just of prestigious orchestras,
but also smaller, community-based arts presenters, state-run arts organiza-
tions, individual artists, and arts consumers. But I begin with the case of
the Cleveland Orchestra for a reason, that it presents starkly, although not
uniquely, the difficulty: individuals, many of them low income, and who
will never in their lives attend a concert or listen to a recording from the
Cleveland Orchestra, paying more in taxes, and so having less discretion-
ary spending power, to fund a wealthy orchestra and provide a benefit to
its generally wealthy patrons. To seriously address what is perhaps the core
question of arts policy—why should the state fund the arts?—it will be
worth keeping the example of the Cleveland Orchestra in mind.
basic form (see Upchurch (2016) for the history of these councils). Their
prime mover was the economist John Maynard Keynes, the first chair of
the Arts Council of Great Britain, who sought a means of providing public
funds to support the arts while avoiding what might be the stifling bureau-
cracy of a government department, although recognizing that ultimately
the policies of the arts council would be answerable to the elected legisla-
ture. In practice, “arm’s length” means that within the goals and param-
eters set for the arts council, the council makes its recommendations for
funding based upon the judgment of panels of artists, arts administrators,
and laypersons, through the directorship of the council, without political
interference from the elected government, although those goals and
parameters must be set with the consent of the government. Elected gov-
ernments always have the power to simply end the existence of the arts
council, which must be remembered in any discussion of independence.
Decades ago, Karen King and Mark Blaug (1976) asked “Does the Arts
Council know what it is doing?” They were referring to the Arts Council
of Great Britain, and they used the technique known as cost-effectiveness
analysis: suppose one wishes to evaluate whether a policy is worthwhile,
but cannot weigh the costs and benefits because while costs are easy to
identify, in terms of expenditures, benefits are very difficult to value in
monetary terms. Unmeasurable benefits are common across policy areas:
national defense, for example, or different means of improving public
health. And so, with cost-benefit analysis ruled out since benefits are
immeasurable, cost-effectiveness analysis takes policy goals as given, and
asks about the effectiveness of the means employed to reach the goals,
often comparing the chosen means with alternatives. Could the goals have
been obtained at less cost? King and Blaug take Arts Council annual
reports dating back to its founding to ask whether the rhetoric and stated
goals in the reports align well with actual expenditures, and whether
changes in stated goals lead to changes in patterns of the allocation of
funds (not surprisingly, given the inevitable inertia in allocations, rhetoric
might change for purposes of relations with stakeholders while the alloca-
tions themselves do not shift so much).
I am taking one further step back from King and Blaug, and looking
into how the broad goals of public arts funding could be shaped from dif-
ferent perspectives in moral philosophy. King and Blaug, as economists,
see that public arts funding can be justified in terms of market failure;
markets on their own will not provide the right amount, or the right sort,
of arts production and consumption. The economic method,
4 M. RUSHTON
The Culture Pass debate involves a challenging question, one that has
been debated for a very long time (as we shall see later in this book): is it
the role of the state to try to guide people (and I am treating 18-year-olds
as adults here, not schoolchildren) toward what it judges is most worthy
in culture, or should arts policy follow the existing tastes of individuals,
financing whatever is their preference? Is pushpin as good as poetry? Is
manga as good as Flaubert? If pleasure is the only thing that matters, then
we must ask: why restrict a transfer of funds to teenagers to culture in the
first place? What if they would rather have 300 Euros for railway tickets, or
some new clothes, or for some proper kitchen utensils for their first apart-
ment? If the concern is that only teenagers from wealthier and/or more
formally educated families will take part in culture, what of it, if other
teenagers would really rather have funds to spend on something else?
And this is the narrow path arts policy must tread: on the one side it
wants to say the arts matter in a very specific way to people’s well-being.
But it also as far as possible wants to avoid being too prescriptive. What
King and Blaug wrote in the 1970s remains true:
6 M. RUSHTON
[T]he Council has never openly assumed the dynamic role of catalyst in the
Arts. Repeated references in the Annual Reports suggest that the conflict
between a hands-off policy and one of ‘effective leadership’ has never been
decisively resolved. The problem is that of avoiding the Scylla of laissez-faire
while likewise avoiding the Charybdis of artistic paternalism. (1976, p. 103)
I hope that this book can help shed at least some light on this longstand-
ing issue, among others, and in the process provoke discussion of the
foundations of arts policy.
Before giving an outline of the book, let me first say what I will not be
doing. While I will be presenting descriptions of different ways of thinking
about applying moral philosophy to arts funding and will note what criti-
cisms have arisen for the different approaches, I will not be advocating for
one approach or another in particular; rather, my goal is to try to articulate
what people working in applied moral philosophy have said and how fol-
lowing their ideas leads to ways of thinking about arts funding. I will try
to find where there is some overlapping consensus on arts funding between
approaches, and where there are irreconcilable differences, such that mak-
ing a choice cannot be avoided. This book neither advocates for a particu-
lar moral philosophy, nor does it advocate for a particular policy of arts
funding. It is descriptive, comparative, and focuses on the implications of
different ways of thinking about the arts. There is no deep critique here of
any of the strands of moral philosophy discussed, since that would demand
far more pages than can fit; I try in the references to each chapter to point
readers to more detailed treatments. I do not assume much prior knowl-
edge of what is discussed, and hopefully I can provide a useful introduc-
tion for students, as well as scholars, of cultural policy.
Alternative moral frameworks tend to emphasize one specific goal over
others, but I take the approach of Isaiah Berlin (1990) in recognizing that
the various ideals we might wish to pursue nearly always involve trade-offs
of one over another, such that there is no formula for an optimal policy. All
we can hope for is a balance we can live with. To illustrate, suppose we
think (and as it turns out, I do think) that all of the following are good
things to have: an efficient use of our scarce resources to satisfy the prefer-
ences of individuals over public and private goods; the freedom of indi-
viduals to form their own conception of a life worth pursuing, without the
government trying to steer them into this or that direction; greater equal-
ity between individuals in their quality of life; and excellent and lasting
achievement in artistic creation. But the economist’s goal of the efficient
1 INTRODUCTION 7
use of resources can mean interference in people’s liberty, as they are made
to pay taxes for things they do not wish to fund, it might mean policies
that work against greater equality between individuals, and there is no
guarantee at all that following the preference of the population on arts
funding is the route to excellence. A strict pursuit of “neutrality” by the
state, and not undertaking any funding of the arts unless there is near
unanimity in the populace, can prevent policies that would satisfy the cri-
terion of efficiency, and prevent any support for the pursuit of excellence
in the arts. A government committed to excellence might well be going
against what the general population thinks is worth spending money on.
And so on. While I hope this book is able to stimulate thinking in new
ways about public funding for the arts, it does not arrive at a solution to
the problem.
The book is limited in its scope of applied moral philosophy, working
almost exclusively within the Anglo-American tradition. This is not
because it is more worthy than other philosophical traditions, but simply
reflects the limitations of the author: I am writing about philosophers I
know better than I know others. I realize that this fact about me itself
raises questions about diversity and inclusion in cultural education, but I
hope that others will take up the challenge to discuss arts funding in philo-
sophical traditions where I am not qualified to do so.
In Chap. 2, “The Economic Method,” I examine the economic
approach to public funding for the arts. The goal here is to bring to the
fore the moral assumptions that guide mainstream economic analyses of
public policy in general, and arts policy in particular. Specifically, the eco-
nomic method is solely concerned with the aggregate consequences of
policy, notwithstanding concerns about, for example, individual liberties,
and restricts the consideration of the consequences of policy to the effect
on people’s welfare; like utilitarianism, it is welfarist. Further, individual
welfare is judged by people’s own conceptions of well-being, and changes
in well-being are measured by how much a person would be willing to pay
to achieve it. So, for example, the value to Abi of a new work of public art
in her neighborhood is measured by the amount she would be willing to
pay in taxes for it to be installed, and the value to the community is the
sum of the willingness-to-pay by all affected individuals. If the value to the
whole community is greater than the cost of the installation, then eco-
nomic policy analysis would recommend the project go forward. This is
true even if there are some people who will be paying higher taxes even
though they do not like the proposed artwork at all, and is true even if the
8 M. RUSHTON
Participants in his social contract would fear that the state could choose to
pursue goals quite at odds with their own personal goals. Can a liberal
state support the arts? There are different ways to approach this. One is to
see if there is a way that mild forms of perfectionism can be consistent with
Rawls’s principal goal of fairness, that is, a social framework on which all
participants could basically agree. For example, people might agree that
there are forms of excellence, in science and the arts, that deserve respect,
and in turn support, even if they do not personally understand them or
feel much interest in trying to understand. Or it might be that the arts,
with the support of public funding, enhance the mutual respect we give to
one another, noting that having the bases of self-respect is considered by
Rawls to be a “primary good” that would be valued by all and ought to be
distributed equally. A different way to try to reconcile liberal neutrality
with public funding for the arts is Ronald Dworkin’s approach, which is to
consider equality between generations: we have an obligation to provide
to future generations a cultural heritage at least as rich as the one we inher-
ited from prior generations, such that future generations have a set of
cultural opportunities that would enable them to imagine and reflect upon
different conceptions of a life worth leading. The difficulty here is in the
details. If we were concerned about future generations having a rich cul-
tural inheritance, then what specifically ought we to subsidize? Would it be
the canon of Western “high art,” leaving popular and folk art to the com-
mercial sector? Would it be to protect art genres particularly at risk of
extinction if not otherwise supported, and if so, would this apply to all
such art genres or only those that pass some test of timeless value? The
unavoidable question in arts policy is whether it is right to permit state
funders of the arts to be non-neutral, and to make value judgments on the
arts that might be at odds with the preferences of the public.
In Chap. 4, “Egalitarianism and Public Funding for the Arts,” I ask
whether public funding for the arts can serve egalitarian goals. The ques-
tion here is not “how can arts council spending be more egalitarian?”, but
rather “would an egalitarian support public funding for the arts at all?” An
egalitarian is someone who puts equality between individuals as a moral
priority, even if not the only goal of public policy. Any egalitarian must
consider the question of what sort of equality matters. Pursuit of equality
in income might in some cases work against equality of welfare, and vice
versa. In this chapter I consider three possible “currencies” of egalitarian
justice: resources, capabilities, and welfare. Resource equality is the usual
concern of economists, and also of liberal egalitarians such as Rawls and
10 M. RUSHTON
The eyes which occur in Polyclads may be divided into (a) a pair of
cerebral groups overlying the brain; (b) those embedded in the
tentacles (tentacular group); and (c) the marginal eyes, which in
Anonymus occur all round the margin. A complex form is sometimes
assumed by the cerebral eyes of Pseudoceridae, resulting probably
from incomplete fission (Fig. 11). Leptoplana otophora was obtained
by Schmarda on the south coast of Ceylon. On each side of the
brain is a capsule containing two otoliths. This is the only known
case of the occurrence of these organs in Polyclads.
The Triclads are most conveniently divided into three groups[39]: (i.)
Paludicola, the Planarians of ponds and streams; (ii.) the Maricola,
the Triclads of the sea; and (iii.) Terricola or Land Planarians. From
the Polyclads they differ in their mode of occurrence; in the
elongated form of their body and almost constant, mid-ventral
position of the mouth; in possessing a single external genital pore
(Monogopora); and in the production of a few, large, hard-shelled
eggs provided with food-yolk.
The skin of Triclads is full of minute rods or rhabdites, which are shot
out in great numbers when the animal is irritated, and doubtless
serve an offensive purpose. The Terricola possess two kinds of
these: (1) needle-like rods; and (2) in Bipalium kewense, flagellated
structures, bent into a V-form and with a slender thread attached to
one end (Shipley). In Geoplana coerulea these bent rods furnish the
blue colour of the ventral surface. The rhabdites arise in all Triclads
in cells below the basement-membrane, which they are said to
traverse in order to reach the epidermis, thus differing in origin, and
also in structure, from the rods of Polyclads.
There are two ovaries (ov) placed far forwards, between the third
and fourth pairs of intestinal coeca. The oviducts (ovd) lie just over
the lateral nerves, and have a slightly tortuous course, at each
outward bend receiving the duct (yo) of a yolk-gland (yg), so that ova
and yolk are already associated when the oviducts open by a short
unpaired tube into the genital atrium. The yolk-glands develop
rapidly,[57] and when fully formed are massive glands occupying the
spaces between the intestinal branches and the testes which are
then aborting. The so-called uterus (ut), apparently at first a
diverticulum of the genital atrium, expands behind the pharynx into a
receptacle lined by long glandular columnar cells, which, however,
are not all of the same kind. The uterine duct opens into the atrium
just above the aperture of a problematical, eversible, "musculo-
glandular organ" (mgr).
The genitalia of the Maricola (Fig. 14, F) and Terricola do not differ
very much from those of Planaria. The uterus (greatly reduced in the
Land Planarians) lies behind the genital pore, and several ova,
together with much milky yolk, are enclosed in a capsule which is
formed in the genital atrium.
PALUDICOLA.
Family. Genus and British Species.
Planariidae Planaria lactea O. F. M., P. punctata Pall., P.
polychroa Schm., P. torva M. Sch., P. alpina
Dana.
Polycelis nigra Ehr., P. cornuta Schm.
Anocelis.
Oligocelis, Procotyla. (Doubtful genera.)
Sorocelis.
Dicotylus.
MARICOLA.
Procerodidae Procerodes (= Gunda) ulvae Oersted, P.
(= Gundidae). littoralis van Beneden.
Cercyra.
Uteriporus.
Bdellouridae Bdelloura.
Syncoelidium.
TERRICOLA.
Bipaliidae Bipalium kewense Moseley (introduced).
Geoplanidae Geoplana.
Geodesmus.
Rhynchodemidae Rhynchodemus terrestris O. F. M.
Belonging to Dolichoplana.
undetermined Polycladus.
Families Microplana.
Leimacopsis.