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Italy at the Polls 2022
The Right Strikes Back
Fabio Bordignon
Luigi Ceccarini
James L. Newell
Italy at the Polls 2022
Fabio Bordignon · Luigi Ceccarini ·
James L. Newell
Editors
James L. Newell
Department of Economics, Society
and Politics
University of Urbino Carlo Bo
Urbino, Italy
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
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Foreword
v
vi FOREWORD
In the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the
First Republic, Silvio Berlusconi built a new but similar ‘wall’—the so-
called ‘muro di Arcore’ after the name of the small town in Lombardy
where he has his sumptuous residence—thereby becoming the main
representative of anti-communist voters. Meanwhile, on the initiative of
Romano Prodi and Arturo Parisi among others, the DC’s successors,
together with the left, came together beneath the branches of the Olive
Tree—the symbol adopted by the coalition of the centre-left from 1995 to
2004—subsequently giving birth to the Partito Democratico (Democratic
Party, PD).
But despite these dramatic changes, political traditions persisted.
Indeed, in 2008, electoral behaviour in almost three quarters of Italian
provinces was analogous to, if not identical with, the behaviour found
there in 1953 (Diamanti, 2009), oriented by the same anti-communist
fracture, because the party choices facing voters were inspired by deeply
rooted traditions and identities, by consolidated cleavages. In partic-
ular, the cleavages separating Church and state, centre and periphery,
employers and workers, still counted for much.
The PCI had been the party of manual workers and non-Church goers,
the DC the representative of Catholics, especially in those parts of the
country where the Church gave rise to social communities through its
networks of flanking organisations and the provision of services. This was
a role that was played by the parties of the left and especially by the PCI
in those parts of the country where they were most deeply rooted; for
both they and the DC were ‘mass parties’ with an organised presence,
on the ground, in the localities. It was no accident, therefore, that the
cleavages they sustained lasted for so long.
It was no accident either that the advent of Berlusconi coincided with
the emergence of a new ‘party model’, one whose raison d’être lay not in
ideological and historical traditions but in the requirements of its leader.
This was because Berlusconi helped to consolidate a new phenomenon:
the ‘personalisation of politics’. He himself was the founder of Forza
Italia (FI), a ‘personal party’ as Mauro Calise (2010) called it. This was
a party type that was imitated by other—indeed by all—parties, including
the most traditional ones, like the PD, which in 2013 was in its turn
‘personalised’ by Matteo Renzi. The party was profoundly changed as a
result, and at the time I re-defined it as the PDR: the Partito di Renzi
(or ‘Renzi’s Party’). Renzi was the main protagonist of another elec-
tion marking a turning point—the European election of 2014 when the
FOREWORD vii
called the ‘red belt’ because it had, historically, been distinguished by the
deeply rooted presence of the parties of the left.
It is difficult not to notice the profound changes, not only in electoral
behaviour but in its social and geographical foundations, reflected in the
results and in the personalities and the roles of the political leaders. These
are the roles that have become increasingly personal and presidential. In
the Italian Republic, the political personalities voters today consider most
credible and in whom they most believe are both presidents: the president
of the Republic and the president of the Council of Ministers (to use the
Prime Minister’s official title). Italy has become a ‘personalised democ-
racy’, one in which political participation is limited, or rather limited to
the media. It has above all become a digital, ‘immediate’, democracy, one
lacking both mediators and mediation (Diamanti, 2014).
Thus, it is that the country’s cleavages have been normalised. For the
book containing our analyses of the results of the 2013 election—analyses
based on the data provided by LaPolis (Università di Urbino Carlo Bo)
and the research institute, Demos—we had chosen the title, Un salto nel
voto (2013),1 to emphasise that citizens’ voting choices are no longer
structured or predictable in advance. The subsequent elections, held in
2018 and 2019, confirmed this idea, and in the light of the elections of
September 2022, we can once more reaffirm it—though with even greater
emphasis, for the emergence of new cleavages has become ‘normal’.
A final remark needs to be made about those who failed to vote,
because FdI’s victory was made possible, or rather accentuated, by
the very low turnout, which reached a historic low. The election of
September 2022 attracted the participation of less than two thirds of the
electorate—63.8%: the lowest proportion since 1948. In 1976, 93% of
the electorate had voted. More recently, in 2018, 73% had done so. This
means that in reality, FdI won the election with the support of 16% of
those with the right to vote. While this does nothing to undermine either
the party’s success or the legitimacy of the outcome, it does reinforce that
idea that recent years have seen a growing detachment of citizens from the
democratic institutions: a detachment that is expressed by ‘voting against’
or not voting at all.
1 Translator’s note: The title (meaning literally, ‘A leap into the vote’) is a play on the
similarity between the word ‘voto’ and the word ‘vuoto’ (meaning ‘void’).
x FOREWORD
And in the country where citizens vote to oppose parties rather than
to support them, the only genuine cleavage could ultimately turn out to
be one reflecting continuity, or otherwise, of electoral choices.
Bibliography
Calise, M. (2010). Il partito personale. I due corpi del leader. Laterza editori.
Diamanti, I. (2009). Mappe dell’Italia politica. Bianco, rosso, verde, azzurro… e
tricolore. Il Mulino.
Diamanti, I. (2014). Democrazia ibrida. Il Mulino.
Diamanti, I., Bordignon, F., & Ceccarini, L. (Eds.). (2013). Un salto nel voto.
Ritratto politico dell’Italia di oggi. Laterza editori.
Galli, G. (1966). Il bipartitismo imperfetto: comunisti e democristiani in Italia.
Il Mulino.
Lipset, S.M., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage structures, party systems and voter
alignments: An introduction. In S. M. Lipset & S. Rokkan (Eds.), Party
systems and voter alignments: Cross-national perspectives (pp. 1–64). Free Press.
xi
Notes on Contributors
xiii
xiv NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS
Chapter 2
Fig. 1 Results of the Italian general election of 2022: differences
as compared to the election of 2018—Chamber of Deputies
(% variations; absolute variations in parentheses) (Source
LaPolis Electoral Observatory, University of Urbino Carlo
Bo, based on data from the Ministry of the Interior) 26
Fig. 2 First coalition in the Italian provinces* 2018–2022 (*The
analyses do not include the provinces of Aosta and Bolzano,
due to their political-electoral peculiarities. Source LaPolis
Electoral Observatory, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, based
on data from the Ministry of the Interior) 39
Fig. 3 First party in the Italian provinces* 2018–2022 (*The
analyses do not include the provinces of Aosta and Bolzano,
due to their political-electoral peculiarities. Source LaPolis
Electoral Observatory, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, based
on data from the Ministry of the Interior) 40
Chapter 3
Fig. 1 When did you decide which party to vote for in the general
election? (%; 2006–2022) (Source Post-election poll, LaPolis
Electoral Observatory, University of Urbino Carlo Bo,
October 2022 [base: 1,315 cases]) 55
xvii
xviii LIST OF FIGURES
Chapter 4
Fig. 1 Political posts published on Facebook and Instagram
from 21 July to 25 September 2022 84
Fig. 2 Engagement related to political posts published on Facebook
and Instagram from 21 July to 25 September 2022 85
Fig. 3 Main topics and issues on Facebook in the 12 analysed peaks 90
Fig. 4 Main topics and issues on Instagram in the 14 analysed peaks 98
Chapter 5
Fig. 1 Left, Right, and Outside: the main parties in the ideological
space (2018–2022).* Source Post-election poll, LaPolis
Electoral Observatory, University of Urbino Carlo Bo,
October 2022 (base: 1,315 cases) 113
Fig. 2 Political space as defined by indicators of crisis (2018–2022).
Source Post-election poll, LaPolis Electoral Observatory,
University of Urbino Carlo Bo, October 2022 (base: 1,315
cases) 115
Fig. 3 Political space and the special measures related to the ‘two
wars’ (2022). Source Post-election poll, LaPolis Electoral
Observatory, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, October 2022
(base: 1,315 cases) 123
LIST OF FIGURES xix
Chapter 6
Fig. 1 Electoral abstention: the trend (%; 1948–2022) (Source
Lapolis Electoral Observatory on Ministry of the Interior
data) 137
Fig. 2 The geography of electoral abstention 2022 (% in 107 Italian
Provinces; ten groups based on deciles) (Source Lapolis
Electoral Observatory on Ministry of the Interior data) 139
Fig. 3 Non-voters by social group (%) (Source Lapolis Electoral
Observatory, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, estimates based
on a pooled file of three surveys September–October 2022
[base: 3,320 cases]) 141
Fig. 4 Self-reported reasons for non-voting (%, figures for 2018
in brackets) (Source Lapolis Electoral Observatory, University
of Urbino Carlo Bo, October 2022 [base: 1,315 cases]) 143
Fig. 5 The determinants of abstention (only significant effects)
(Note Predicted probabilities based on a series of logit
models presented in the online Appendix [see Table A6.1].
Only significant effects are displayed, based on the following
models: 2 Model 2; 3 Model 3; 4 Model 4; 5 Model 5; 6 Model
6 [levels: L = Low; H = High; N = No; Y = Yes; P
= placed; NP = not placed]. Source Lapolis Electoral
Observatory, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, October 2022
[base: 1,315 cases]) 147
List of Tables
Chapter 2
Table 1 2022 Italian general election results: votes and seats
in the Chamber of Deputies 30
Table 2 Party support by gender, age, education and occupation,
2022 42
Chapter 3
Table 1 Are the people with whom you talked about politics …
(2008–2022) 63
Table 2 Sources of information during the campaign by typology
of information consumers (column % replying ‘often’, 2022) 71
Chapter 4
Table 1 Top ten relevant topics on Facebook and Instagram
in the analysed period 88
xxi
CHAPTER 1
Abstract This chapter frames the 2022 election and its outcome within
the debate on the evolution of the Italian political system and its ‘n
Republics’. It first discusses the meaning of these (controversial) labels
using them to illustrate why, starting from the early 1990s, it is possible
to talk about a political transition towards a Second Republic and why
that political system was (at least partly) superseded in 2011. In doing
so, it considers what were the main unifying elements brought about by
the electoral events of this new, turbulent phase of Italian politics as they
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