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Representation and Reality in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Representation
and Reality
in Wittgenstein’s
Tractatus

José L. Zalabardo

1
1
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Acknowledgements

I have benefited from conversations or correspondence with Don Berry, María

Cerezo, Kit Fine, Marcus Giaquinto, Peter Hanks, Colin Johnston, Mark Kalderon,
Michael Kremer, Mike Martin, Michael Morris, and Stephen Read. I am also grate-
ful to three anonymous referees for Oxford University Press for their tremen-
dously helpful comments.
I have presented some of this material at the following conferences and work-
shops: “Wittgenstein and the Transcendental,” Essex University and Institute of
Philosophy, London; “Reading Wittgenstein,” UCL and Institute of Philosophy,
London; “Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Perception,” King’s College, London;
“The Viability of Metaphysics,” Durham; “Inferentialism in Epistemology and the
Philosophy of Science,” UNED, Madrid, and “The World as I Found It,” University
of Fribourg. I have also presented these ideas in my Early Wittgenstein lectures at
UCL and in a postgraduate seminar at the University of Valencia. I am grateful to
all these audiences for their comments.
Chapter 3 and Appendix I use material from “Wittgenstein’s Nonsense
Objection to Russell’s Theory of Judgment,” in Michael Campbell and Michael
O’Sullivan (eds), Wittgenstein and Perception (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
Appendix II uses material from “Reference, Simplicity and Necessary Existence in
the Tractatus,” in José L. Zalabardo (ed.), Wittgenstein’s Early Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012). I am grateful to these publishers for permission to
reproduce this material.
Contents

Introduction 1
1. Russell’s Theories of Judgment 13
2. Wittgenstein and Forms 37
3. The Vanishing Subject 87
4. Propositions and Facts 108
5. The Limits of Representation 149
6. Logic and Analysis 185
Conclusion 228

Appendix I: Other Readings of the Nonsense Objection 233

Appendix II: The Empty-Name Reading of the Substance Passage 243
References 255
Index 261
 Introduction

I.1. Wittgenstein’s Programme
A book is an act of communication. Its author intends to produce with it a certain
effect in the mind of her readers. The precise effect that that an author intends to
produce with her book varies widely from genre to genre. The authors of novels,
poetry volumes, self-help books, and scientific manuals, for example, seek to affect
their readers in very different ways.
Scientific manuals and other pieces of academic writing tend to follow a par-
ticularly straightforward pattern. These books present facts, theories, or expla-
nations that their authors believe to be correct. The authors’ goal is to get their
readers to accept their claims. Success will come about when the reader accepts the
claims expressed in the book. If the claims are correct, the reader will have learnt
something about the world from the book.
Many philosophy books follow this pattern. They present philosophical doc-
trines that their authors believe to be correct, with the intention of making their
readers accept these doctrines. The author succeeds when the reader accepts the
doctrines presented in the book. When this happens, if the doctrines are correct,
the reader will have learnt something about the world from the book.
Readers of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, especially those
who skip the preface, can easily get the impression that it is this kind of book.
For the most part, the Tractatus seems to be devoted to presenting philosophical
doctrines—about the structure of the world, linguistic and mental representation,
the nature of logic and mathematics, and other traditional philosophical subjects.
Readers then naturally assume that Wittgenstein believes these doctrines to be
correct, and that his goal is to get them to accept these doctrines—that, according
to Wittgenstein, we will learn something about the world from the Tractatus if we
accept the doctrines that are expressed in it.
2 Introduction

However, right at the end of the book, in its penultimate section, Wittgenstein
offers an explanation of how he expects his readers to benefit from it that is radi-
cally at odds with these assumptions:
6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands
me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb
up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

Wittgenstein, like the authors of other philosophy books, thinks that his read-
ers can learn something about the world from the Tractatus: the book can ena-
ble us to ‘see the world aright’. However, the way in which he expects us to attain
this goal is not by accepting the doctrines presented in the book. What he wants
us to do instead is to ‘transcend’ the propositions that seem to express these
doctrines. This process of transcendence will result in the recognition that the
propositions of the Tractatus are nonsensical, and hence, in effect, that they
don’t actually express any doctrines. This recognition is what will enable us to
see the world aright.
These instructions for how to learn from the Tractatus are highly perplexing,
and have often failed to make readers abandon the assumption that the book pre-
sents philosophical doctrines that Wittgenstein accepts and wants us to accept.
Upholding this assumption, without simply ignoring 6.54, requires a creative read-
ing of Wittgenstein’s claim that his propositions are ‘nonsensical’. On this reading,
Wittgenstein’s point is not that they are utterly devoid of meaning, but that they
don’t express their meanings in the standard way. When read along these lines, the
claim is compatible with treating the propositions of the Tractatus as expressing,
in some other way, philosophical doctrines that Wittgenstein accepts and wants us
to accept.
But surely this line should be taken only as a measure of last resort—if we find
ourselves incapable of taking Wittgenstein’s explicit instructions at face value.
Hence the first question that we need to pose is this: how would the recognition
of the propositions of the Tractatus as nonsensical enable us to see the world
aright? Over the last couple of decades, this has been one of the most active areas
of research in early-Wittgenstein scholarship but is not the subject matter of the
present book.1 Here I only want to make a few basic points about the procedure
that Wittgenstein wants us to follow in order to benefit from his book. I shall refer
to this procedure as Wittgenstein’s programme. I am not going to defend the details
of my construal of the programme. My goal is simply to show that there is at least

1
These issues have been brought to prominence by the work of Cora Diamond and James Conant,
among others. See e.g. Diamond 1991; Conant 2002.
 Introduction 3

one way in which we might in principle learn something important from the book
by coming to see its propositions as nonsensical.
Let’s suppose then that we have succeeded in recognizing the propositions of the
Tractatus as nonsensical. What, if anything, could we learn from this recognition?
One thing we would undoubtedly learn is that certain propositions that seemed to
express philosophical doctrines achieve no such thing—that, contrary to appear-
ances, they are complete nonsense. The propositions of the Tractatus seem to us at
first sight to make sense. Hence, if they are actually nonsensical, we certainly learn
something by recognizing them as such. However, this is hardly a worthwhile dis-
covery for the average reader of the Tractatus who, prior to reading the book, is
unlikely to have come across its propositions, or other propositions that strike her
as expressing the same doctrines. It is hard to see how we are significantly better off
after having been introduced to a set of propositions and then learning that they
are nonsensical than before coming across them in the first place.
It is clear, however, that Wittgenstein expects that the recognition of the prop-
ositions of the Tractatus as nonsensical will teach us something, not only about
these particular propositions, but about the general enterprise to which they seem
to contribute before their nonsensicality is recognized. The propositions of the
Tractatus seem to provide answers to philosophical questions and solutions to
philosophical problems. By recognizing these propositions as nonsensical we are
expected to learn something, not just about these answers and solutions, but about
the questions and problems they address, and about the enterprise of seeking
answers to philosophical questions and solutions to philosophical problems. The
recognition of the nonsensicality of the propositions of the Tractatus is expected
to expose this enterprise as illegitimate. It will enable us to see that philosophi-
cal questions aren’t genuine questions and philosophical problems aren’t genuine
problems.
It is not immediately obvious how the recognition of the nonsensicality of the
propositions of the Tractatus could have this consequence. We can give nonsensi-
cal answers to perfectly legitimate questions and nonsensical solutions to perfectly
legitimate problems. So in order to see how Wittgenstein’s strategy is supposed
to work we need to consider why in this particular case the nonsensicality of the
answers and solutions succeeds in undermining the enterprise of asking the ques-
tions and posing the problems.
On this point one thing seems clear: if we haven’t come to accept the proposi-
tions of the Tractatus as providing the only correct answers and solutions to the
philosophical questions and problems they address, then recognizing them as
nonsensical will have no tendency to undermine the status of these questions and
problems.
4 Introduction

Let’s suppose then that we have come to accept the propositions of the Tractatus
as providing the only correct answers and solutions to the philosophical questions
and problems they address. It’s not obvious how even now the recognition of these
propositions as nonsensical will taint the enterprise of philosophy. If we thought
that the propositions of the Tractatus provided correct answers and solutions to
philosophical questions and problems, and we now come to the conclusion that
they are actually nonsensical, wouldn’t we simply revise our initial positive verdict
and resume our search for the correct answers and solutions?
Suppose, however, that after recognizing the propositions of the Tractatus as
nonsensical we remain convinced that they are designated by the rules that define
the enterprise of philosophy—of seeking answers to philosophical questions and
solutions to philosophical problems—as the correct answers and solutions to the
questions and problems they address. This will amount to a discovery about the
rules—that they compel us to regard nonsense as correct. It is this discovery that is
supposed to undermine the enterprise of philosophy. We start off thinking of phil-
osophical questions and problems as perfectly legitimate and, following the rules
of the enterprise, we find the correct answers and solutions. But then we discover
that what we regarded as correct answers and solutions are nothing but nonsense.
We remain convinced, however, that in endorsing these ‘answers’ and ‘solutions’
we didn’t make any mistakes in applying the rules of the enterprise: these pieces
of nonsense are the ‘answers’ and ‘solutions’ that the rules designate as correct.
The only way out of this impasse is the rejection of the rules and of the enterprise
they define, and this is the outcome that Wittgenstein’s programme is intended to
produce.
It seems to me that this general approach provides the most plausible construal
of Wittgenstein’s communicative intentions, but defending this claim is not among
the goals of the present book. As we are about to see, my main claims will not
depend on the correctness of this approach, and should also be of interest to those
who believe that the goal of the Tractatus is to impart philosophical doctrines
somehow expressed by its propositions.

I.2. Within the Diegesis

On the construal of Wittgenstein’s programme that I am recommending, although
its intended outcome is the rejection of the enterprise of philosophy, the first step
that we need to take in this direction consists in engaging in this enterprise—in
doing philosophy. Wittgenstein’s intended audience consists of readers who regard
the enterprise of philosophy as legitimate—who accept its rules as effective pro-
cedures for selecting the correct answers to genuine questions and the correct
 Introduction 5

solutions to genuine problems. His goal is to make his readers abandon this enter-
prise, but for this purpose they first need to accept, by following the rules that
govern the enterprise, that the propositions of the Tractatus express correct philo-
sophical doctrines. If philosophy is the ladder that we need to throw away in order
to see the world aright, Wittgenstein programme requires that we first climb up
it: we need to do philosophy in order to rid ourselves of it.2
In fact, if we don’t come to accept the propositions of the Tractatus as express-
ing correct philosophical doctrines we won’t be able to recognize them as nonsen-
sical either. Wittgenstein doesn’t establish the nonsensicality of his propositions
on independent grounds. What he shows is that they entail their own nonsensi-
cality, since the limits that he defends on what propositions we can produce are
grounded in his theory of propositions.3 But clearly this amounts to showing that,
if the propositions of the Tractatus express correct doctrines, then they are non-
sensical. Unless we come to accept the antecedent of this conditional we will be
under no obligation to accept its consequent. We will be able to treat the proposi-
tions of the Tractatus as perfectly meaningful, even if the false doctrines that they
express entail their nonsensicality.
Notice, furthermore, that the recognition of the propositions of the Tractatus
as nonsensical is supposed to come about as a result of philosophical reasoning.
Hence, the outcome that will rid us of philosophy is not that its rules compel us
to accept as expressing correct philosophical doctrines propositions that are as a
matter of fact nonsensical, but rather that its rules compel us to accept, concern-
ing the propositions of the Tractatus, both that they express correct philosophi-
cal doctrines and that they are nonsensical. The second result (the nonsensicality)
doesn’t enjoy a more permanent status than the first (the correctness). Both will be
left behind once the ladder has been thrown away. In fact, even the claim that the
rules yield these results may have to be left behind. At this point the construal of
Wittgenstein’s programme raises fundamental issues that the present book will not
address.
If Wittgenstein believes that his readers will be able to follow his programme, he
must expect that its propositions will strike us as expressing correct philosophi-
cal doctrines. Why did he think that his propositions could generate this illusion?

2
See, in this connection, Cora Diamond’s insightful remarks on the imaginative activity involved
in understanding the demands that the Tractatus makes on its readers (Diamond 2000: 156–8).
3
On this construal of Wittgenstein’s strategy, the realization that the propositions of the Tractatus
are nonsensical is supposed to result from arguments for the conclusion that this is so. Resolute read-
ers of the Tractatus have identified other, more subtle ways in which Wittgenstein seeks to promote
this realization. See e.g. Goldfarb 1997. My construal could be easily modified to accommodate
this point.
6 Introduction

What we know about the evolution of Wittgenstein’s thought in the period of ges-
tation of the Tractatus lends strong support to the following answer to this ques-
tion: Wittgenstein thought that his readers would be likely to see his propositions
as expressing correct philosophical doctrines because he himself was once a vic-
tim of this illusion. The rejection of philosophy that the Tractatus seeks to promote
was not Wittgenstein’s original attitude towards the enterprise. He once thought
that philosophical questions and problems were perfectly genuine, and devoted
himself to addressing them. Many of the propositions of the Tractatus are very
close descendants of propositions that he first formulated as contributions to the
philosophical enterprise—as his answers to philosophical questions and his solu-
tions to philosophical problems.
This circumstance is potentially very valuable to those who intend to follow
Wittgenstein’s programme. This requires, as we have seen, seeing the proposi-
tions of the Tractatus as expressing correct philosophical doctrines, but this is not
an easy thing to do. The propositions of the Tractatus are often terse and cryp-
tic. They rarely offer clear arguments in favour of the doctrines that they seem
to express, and even the content of these doctrines is sometimes hard to fathom.
The Tractatus offers insufficient support to readers who seek to complete the first
stage of Wittgenstein’s programme. We need all the additional help we can get.
And one possible source of help is Wittgenstein’s own experience as a victim of
the illusion he now expects us to fall for. If we could understand the reasons that
led Wittgenstein to the conviction that the propositions of the Tractatus expressed
correct philosophical doctrines, we might find that they have the same effect on
us that they had on him. In fact, it would be a remarkable coincidence if we could
reach this point by any other route: our only realistic chance of coming to see the
propositions of the Tractatus as expressing correct philosophical doctrines is to
identify the virtues that Wittgenstein once saw in them.
This means, in effect, that those who want to complete the first stage of
Wittgenstein’s programme will need to adopt the same approach as those for
whom the book expresses philosophical doctrines that Wittgenstein accepts and
wants us to accept. This approach doesn’t correspond to Wittgenstein’s concep-
tion at the time of completing the book of what his propositions achieve, but it
does correspond to his conception of his achievement at an earlier point, as well
as giving us our best chance of completing the first stage of his programme. This
is the approach that I propose to adopt in the present book. In accordance with
this approach, I will no longer refer to the doctrines that the Tractatus ‘seems’ to
express. At the ladder-climbing stage of the programme, this distance is out of
place. I shall simply speak, without reticence, about the doctrines of the Tractatus.
Likewise, instead of asking why Wittgenstein thought that we could come to see
 Introduction 7

the propositions of the Tractatus as expressing correct doctrines, I will simply ask
why he thought that the doctrines of the Tractatus are correct.

I.3. Tractarian Account of Representation and

Reality (TARR)
I am going to ask this question specifically with respect to a cluster of doctrines
providing a systematic account of the structure of language and reality and of how
the former represents the latter. I am going to refer to this account as the Tractarian
Account of Representation and Reality (TARR). We can characterize TARR as
involving three main components.
The first component of TARR is the view that everyday propositions don’t rep-
resent the world directly: they represent the world through the mediation of a class
of postulated propositions, known as elementary propositions (Elementarsätze).
Everyday propositions represent the world by being truth-functions of elementary
propositions.
The second component of TARR is an account of the nature of elementary
propositions and of how they represent the world. On this account, an elemen-
tary proposition is a combination of items known as names. Names are referential
expressions. An elementary proposition represents the referents of its names as
combined with one another in the same way in which the names are combined in
the proposition. The proposition is true if the referents are so combined; false if
they are not. The referents of names are simple items known as objects. The combi-
nations of objects that elementary propositions represent as obtaining are known
as states of affairs4 (Sachverhalte).
The third component of TARR is an account of the structure of reality, accord-
ing to which a possible state of the world is constituted by the states of affairs that
obtain in it. Two states of the world differ from one another only if there are states
of affairs that obtain in one and not in the other. And for every set of states of affairs
there is a possible state of the world in which the states of affairs that obtain are
precisely the elements of the set.
Thus, according to TARR, elementary propositions and states of affairs provide
the interface between language and the world. Propositions represent the world
by their truth-functional dependence on elementary propositions. These, in turn,
represent states of affairs. This enables propositions to represent the whole of real-
ity, since everything that is the case, and everything that can be the case, consists

4
This is Pears and McGuinness’s translation and the term I shall use. Ogden uses atomic fact
(Wittgenstein 1922).
8 Introduction

in the obtaining and non-obtaining of states of affairs—what truth-functions of

elementary propositions represent.
Taken as an intuitive model, TARR is fairly easy to understand—we can form
a conception of what things would have to be like in order for TARR to be cor-
rect. A precise, literal understanding of the view is much harder to achieve. And
it is even harder to grasp why anyone would think that this is how things are in
actuality—that language and reality have the structure that TARR attributes to
them and that the former represents the latter as TARR says it does. Specifically, it
is hard to understand why Wittgenstein thought this.
Addressing these questions is the main goal of the present book. I am going to
put forward a hypothesis as to why Wittgenstein thought that TARR had to be
correct. My central contention on this point will be that TARR is the combined
result of three separate argumentative strategies for solving different philosophical
problems.
First, TARR provides Wittgenstein’s solution the problems that Russell had
tried to solve with his theories of judgment and understanding. The strategy
that Wittgenstein adopts for solving these problems is based on the strategy that
Russell was developing in the period between 1911 and 1913 when Russell and
Wittgenstein were in direct contact. Wittgenstein came to the conclusion that
Russell’s strategy faced fatal objections. However, he thought he had found a way
to avoid these objections while preserving some of the main insights of Russell’s
approach. This proposal is the central idea of the Tractarian account of how ele-
mentary propositions represent states of affairs.
Second, TARR offers a solution to the problem of understanding how the
unity of a fact is produced out of the multiplicity of its constituents, and the
correlative problem of how the unity of a proposition is produced out of the
multiplicity of its constituents. Wittgenstein’s main contention in this regard is
that facts, not their constituents, are the basic units of reality and propositions,
not their constituents, are the basic units of representation. I shall argue that this
aspect of TARR can be seen as an extension of an idea of Frege’s. The account of
the relationship between facts and their constituents also provides a solution to
the problem of the metaphysical status of possibilia. According to TARR, what
can be the case arises from recombinations of the items involved in what is actu-
ally the case.
Third, TARR offers a solution to the problem of our knowledge of logical prop-
erties and relations—specifically of how we know that a proposition is a logi-
cal consequence of other propositions. The Tractatus contends that whether a
proposition follows from other propositions can be seen from their structure.
Wittgenstein’s account of how this is possible involves several crucial aspects of
 Introduction 9

TARR—that propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions, that for

every set of states of affairs the obtaining of the members of the set is a possible
state of the world, and that the constituents of states of affairs are simple. Their role
in this account of logical knowledge is the main justification for these components
of TARR.
My central contention is that Wittgenstein saw these three lines of reasoning
as the main sources of support for TARR. Language and the world have to have
the structure that TARR ascribes to them, and the former has to represent the
latter as TARR says it does, because otherwise these lines of reasoning wouldn’t
work. And these lines of reasoning have to work because otherwise, according to
Wittgenstein, the problems that they address would go unsolved.
I believe that the basic ingredients of my reading receive considerable support
from the available evidence. However, I often develop the arguments that I attrib-
ute to Wittgenstein at a level of detail that goes beyond what the evidence could
sustain. My justification for taking this licence is that my ultimate goal is not to
provide a faithful interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought, but to complete the
first stage of Wittgenstein’s programme, using as a guide what we know about
Wittgenstein’s reasons for endorsing TARR. For this purpose I develop the lines
of reasoning endorsed by Wittgenstein in ways that facilitate their assessment,
even when these developments take us beyond what we are entitled to attribute to
Wittgenstein in light of the evidence at our disposal.

I.4. Nonsense
Once we have convinced ourselves that the propositions of the Tractatus express
correct philosophical doctrines, we are ready to move on to the second stage of
Wittgenstein’s programme—recognizing that these propositions are nonsensi-
cal, and hence that they don’t express any doctrines at all, let alone correct ones.
As I have suggested, Wittgenstein doesn’t establish this result on independent
grounds. What he shows is that it follows from philosophical doctrines that the
propositions of the Tractatus seem to express that these propositions are nonsensi-
cal. The doctrines that play this role in Wittgenstein’s strategy are all constituents
of TARR.
If linguistic representation works as TARR says it does, then there are impor-
tant limitations to what language can represent. In some cases, the solutions
to the problems that TARR addresses arise from these limitations. Thus, for
example, as we shall see in due course, the problems that Russell encountered
with some paradoxical propositions are solved for Wittgenstein by the fact that,
if linguistic representation works as TARR says it does, then it’s not possible to
10 Introduction

produce the propositions that would raise the problem. A subsidiary goal of the
present book is to understand the aspects of TARR that impose limits on what
language can represent. I am going to argue that these limits have two main
sources in TARR. One is its account of how elementary propositions represent
states of affairs. The other is its account of the relationship between proposi-
tions and their constituents. The limits that TARR imposes on what language
can represent are ultimately responsible for the nonsensicality of the proposi-
tions of the Tractatus, but the resulting implosion of Wittgenstein’s ‘doctrines’
lies outside the scope of this book.

I.5. The Structure of the Book

The book is divided into six chapters, a conclusion, and two appendices.
In Chapter 1, I present the problems that Russell was trying to solve with his the-
ories of judgment and the strategies that he was exploring for dealing with these
problems when Wittgenstein came into contact with him. I ascribe a central role
to what I call the mode-of-combination problem, the problem of explaining how
the judging subject grasps the way in which objects in the world would have to be
combined with one another in order for the judgment to be true. I argue that this is
the problem that Russell was trying to solve by introducing forms in the theory of
judgment/understanding that he presented in his manuscript of May 1913, Theory
of Knowledge.
In Chapter 2, I present the Tractarian account of how elementary propositions
represent as Wittgenstein’s attempt to solve the difficulties that had made Russell’s
project stall. I argue that the claim that pictures in general, and propositions in
particular, are facts, is Wittgenstein’s solution to the difficulties that Russell had
encountered when trying to deal with the mode-of-combination problem. I then
consider Wittgenstein’s claims that a picture cannot depict its own pictorial form
and that propositions cannot represent logical form.
In Chapter 3, I consider why Wittgenstein’s account of how propositions repre-
sent makes no mention of a representing subject. I argue that the reason for this
is Wittgenstein’s conviction that it’s not possible to represent cognitive relations
between a subject and the world—to represent a subject as representing the world
as being a certain way. I contend that the source of this conviction is a version
of the argument that made Russell despair of providing a satisfactory account of
judgment or understanding, and that a crucial step in this argument is provided
by Wittgenstein’s complaint that Russell’s theory of judgment doesn’t rule out the
possibility of nonsense judgment.
 Introduction 11

In Chapter 4 I move on to the second problem that Wittgenstein expected TARR

to solve. I argue that Wittgenstein solved the problems of how propositions and
facts are formed from their constituents by rejecting the view that they are com-
posite items. According to Wittgenstein, propositions, not their constituents, are
the basic units of representation, and facts, not their constituents, are the basic
units of reality. Facts and propositions, on this account, do not arise from the com-
bination of more fundamental items. Nothing is more fundamental. What we
think of as their constituents are common features that different propositions and
different facts share with one another, always the result of a process of abstraction.
I then argue that, with the claim that objects contain their possibilities of combina-
tion, Wittgenstein provides a two-step reduction of possible states of affairs, first
to the possibilities of combination of objects, and then to the actually obtaining
states of affairs in which we encounter these. I consider next how, according to the
Tractatus, language makes contact with reality. The chapter closes with a discus-
sion of Wittgenstein’s claim that the world has to have substance and his argument
in support of this claim.
In Chapter 5, I consider how Wittgenstein’s account of the relationship between
propositions and their constituents imposes further limitations on what propo-
sitions can represent. I look at how these ideas result in Wittgenstein’s treat-
ment of Russell’s paradox, in his rejection of self-referential propositions, and in
his claim that everything that’s thinkable is also possible. I also consider in this
light Wittgenstein’s discussion of formal properties and relations and of formal
concepts.
In Chapter 6 I turn to the third family of difficulties that Wittgenstein hoped
to address with TARR. I argue that Wittgenstein’s claim that propositions are
truth-functions of elementary propositions is motivated by his account of logical
knowledge—of how we know that a proposition is a logical consequence of other
propositions. We can motivate in the same way some of his main claims concern-
ing states of affairs: that they are independent of one another and that their constit-
uents are simple. I then consider the question of the nature of the truth-functional
structure that Wittgenstein postulates for everyday propositions. I develop the
proposal that these facts about truth-functional composition are nothing but the
precipitate of our ‘logico-linguistic employment’—of our inclinations concerning
the logical relations between everyday propositions. I end by considering the dif-
ficulties that Wittgenstein encounters when trying to extend to non-elementary
propositions his account of how propositions represent. I argue that the difficulties
that he faces here provide an important link with some of the central ideas of his
later philosophy.
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Tabitha and told her the bad news, which personally did not alarm
her. She inquired where Dick was, and he replied that he had gone
on a hunting expedition, but luckily left his medicine book behind him
open at the article which gave him a clue. Next she asked to see the
letter which Dick had written to Rupert, and taking it from his pocket,
he handed it to her. Tabitha read it attentively.
“I see, Rupert, you have quarrelled with him at last,” she said.
“Ach! what a coward that man is!” then a light flashed in her eyes,
and she added: “No, I understand now. It is a little trick of dear
Dick’s; he knows it is the plague, he runs away, he sends for you, he
hopes that you will catch it. Mein Gott! he is not only a coward, he is
a murderer; you quarrel with him—what you say?—you beat him?
Well, he hit you back with the plague, or try to.”
Rupert began to laugh, then checked himself and said: “No,
Tabitha, he would scarcely be such a brute as that. Why!
assassination is nothing to it. Anyhow, I am not afraid; I do not catch
things.”
“You do not know the dear Dick; I do,” she replied grimly. “Go
home, Rupert, at once, burn the clothes you are wearing, sit in
smoke, wash yourself all over with soaps, do everything you can.”
“All right,” he answered, “don’t frighten Edith; I will take
precautions.”
He did, with the result that it was past two o’clock before he could
find time for food, he who had eaten nothing since seven on the
previous night.
For the next three days, knowing her terror of infectious diseases,
every morning he sent a message to Edith that she must not see
him, but with Tabitha and, of course, with Mea, he associated as
before, since neither of them would listen to his warnings. There had
been no further cases amongst Dick’s people, or elsewhere, and
although his camels were now ready, Dick himself had not yet
returned. It was reported that he was enjoying excellent sport on the
hills.
Rupert thought very little more about the plague, however, for he
had other things on his mind. Within four days the month would be
up, and he must give his answer to the great question. Edith, whom
for her own sake he still refused to see, had taken a desperate step;
she had sent him a letter.

Why do you keep me away from you? (she wrote). Of

course I know that I used to be afraid of illnesses, but I
don’t care any more about them now. Sometimes I
think it would be a good thing if I did catch the plague
and it made an end of me and my wretched life.
Rupert, I know you forbade me to speak to you about
these matters until next week, but you never said that I
mightn’t write, and I will write upon the chance that you
may read. Rupert, I am a miserable woman, as I
deserve to be, for I have been very wicked. I
acknowledge it all now. Dick has been my curse. When
I was still quite a child, he began to make love to me;
you know how handsome and taking he was then, and
I fell under his influence, which for years I could never
shake off. I tried to, for I knew that he was bad, but it
was no good, he attracted me, as a magnet attracts a
bit of iron. Then you came home, and I really did
admire you and respect you, and I was very flattered
that you should care for me. Also, I will tell you all the
truth, I thought that you were going to be a peer and
wealthy, and that you had a great career before you,
and I wished to be the wife of such a man. Dick of
course was furiously jealous; he insulted me upon the
very day that you proposed to me, and because I
would not be turned from my purpose, he set to work
to avenge himself upon us both. It was he who gave
the War Office the idea of sending you out on that
wretched mission, and who afterwards took away your
good name.

But, Rupert, I did not know all this at the time when you
were supposed to be dead. I let Dick, who seemed to
be turning out better then, regain his influence over
me. That day on which you came home I had become
secretly engaged to him. This will help to explain what
followed. Really, I was out of my mind and not
responsible. Afterwards, in my distress, I wrote Dick
some foolish letters, which he has held over my head
ever since I refused to have anything more to do with
him. Also, I would have asked your pardon and tried to
make it up with you if I had known where you were
gone. But I did not know, and I was afraid to inquire for
fear of betraying the shameful facts.

Rupert, it is true that I have grown to hate Dick, as

much as I once loved him, if I ever did love him. Since I
have found out how vile and treacherous he is, that it
was he who set to work to blacken your reputation, as
afterwards he has done by mine, and the rest of it, I
have loathed him; but he follows me like my shadow
and threatens me. I cannot cast him off, and if he says
things about me, and shows those letters, who will
believe that I am innocent—I with whom my own
husband will have nothing to do? I shall be a ruined
woman. Even here he has followed me; yes, and the
wicked wretch tried to murder you, I am sure, by giving
you that sickness. Well, thank Heaven! he seems to
have failed there.

Rupert, my husband, before the God that made me, I

tell you the honest truth. I love you now, body and soul;
it was only Dick that stood between us, and he is gone
from me for ever. I am miserable because I may not be
near you, and, if you will forgive all the past, and come
back to me, no man in the world shall have a better
wife, or one more obedient to his wishes. I know it is
much to ask; I know I do not deserve it, and I know,
too, that this beautiful lady Mea loves you, and that she
is as true and good as you are. Oh! Rupert, Rupert,
don’t break my heart; don’t turn me out to wander
again in the wilderness alone. If so, I do not know what
 will happen to me, but I think that I shall go to the bad,
like many another poor creature. At any rate, it may be
amusing while it lasts. Rupert, be merciful, as you
hope for mercy.—Your wife (for I suppose that I still
have a right to sign myself so),

EDITH.

This letter produced a great effect upon Rupert, as its writer had
hoped that it would do. When he received it he was already low-
spirited, but after reading it his depression became acute. The
piteous way in which Edith made the best of a bad case; her evident
and honest repentance, and the curious heart-change which, as she
declared and as he half believed, now inclined her towards himself,
all touched him deeply, especially the repentance.
Yet he could not but see that almost every argument she used
might be urged with even greater effect upon behalf of Mea, who
wrote no letters and made no prayer. Why should Mea’s heart be
broken? Why should Mea be left to wander in that lonely wilderness
whereof Edith spoke, or perhaps to take to those common courses of
despair—Mea, who had never offended, who had always played an
angel’s part towards him?
Of course the only answer was that he was married to Edith, and
that he was not married to Mea; that he had taken Edith for better or
for worse, and that to them applied the ancient saying: “Those whom
God has joined together, let no man put asunder.” He knew well
enough in which direction his own feelings lay. Yet, what right had he
to thrust her out, his wife, whom he had asked to marry him? On the
other hand, what right had he to desert Mea, the woman who had
saved and sheltered him?
Rupert was sore perplexed; he could find no answer to these
problems. He wrote a note to Edith thanking her for her letter, the
contents of which he said he was considering, adding that he was
quite well, but she had better still keep away from him for a while.
Then he took a sudden resolution. He would go to Mea, and lay the
whole matter before her.
 Once again they sat in that room in which, after weeks of
blindness, he had recovered his sight. His story had been told, the
letter had been read, there it lay upon the ground beside them.
“And now, Rupert,” asked Mea quietly, “what shall you do?”
“I don’t know,” he answered passionately. “I have come to ask
you.”
She looked at him and asked again: “Which is it that you love, your
wife or me?”
“You know well,” he replied. “It is you, and no other woman, you
now and for ever. Why do you make me tell you so again?”
“Because I like to hear it, Rupert,” she said, with her slow smile.
“But it does not make the choice easier, does it? On the one side,
love; on the other your law. Which will win, love or your law?”
“I have come to you to tell me, Mea.”
She looked upwards as though seeking an inspiration, then spoke
again.
“I will be no stumbling-block in your path of righteousness. Was it
for this that I was given to you? Love is longer than your law, Rupert,
and is not that doctrine which we practise named Renunciation? It
seems that those who would reap must sow.”
“What do you mean?” he asked.
“I mean, Rupert, that this woman who has behaved so ill repents,
and what says our Book—the Book you taught me to believe?
‘Judge not, that ye be not judged!’ I mean that since she has kept its
letter, that oath still stands between you and her.”
“Then I must leave you?” he muttered hoarsely.
“Yes, Rupert, I suppose so.”
“And what will become of you then?”
“I,” she replied, with another of her sweet smiles, “oh! what does it
matter? But if you wish to know, I will tell you. I think that I shall die,
and go to wait for you where love remains, and your law is finished.
Shall we agree that together, my Rupert?”
His hands trembled, and the veins swelled upon his forehead.
 “I can’t,” he said hoarsely, “God forgive me, I can’t—yet. You are
nobler than I, Mea.”
“Then, Rupert, what?”
“Mea,” he said, “we have still four days. Something might happen
in those four days. Perhaps God may be pleased to help us in some
manner unforeseen. If not, at the end of them I will accept your
counsel, however cruel it may be; yes, even if it kills us both.”
“Good!” she answered, with a flash of her eyes, “such words I
looked to hear you speak, for shall the preacher of a faith fly before
its fires? The sooner we are dead, the sooner will there be an end—
and a beginning.”
“Aye,” he echoed, breaking into English, “an end and a beginning.”

Another two days had gone by, and once more Rupert and Mea
sat together. They were making arrangements for the forthcoming
gathering in the temple; also, he was giving her an account of his
stewardship, he who it seemed must so soon depart. He was ill; he
was troubled. He faltered in his speech, forgetting the Arabic words,
his head bent forwards over the book of accounts. Then suddenly he
placed his hands upon the edge of the table and raised himself with
a smothered exclamation of pain.
“What is it?” she asked wildly, as he sank back into his seat.
“Nothing,” he answered, in a faint voice. “It was as though a sword
passed through me, that is all.”
“Oh! Rupert,” she cried, “you are ill.”
“Yes, Mea,” he said presently, “I am ill. I think that God has shown
us a way out of our troubles, and for that blessed be His name. Mea,
I have the plague. Leave me; leave me at once.”
“Aye,” she answered, setting her lips, “when they take you from
me dead, but never before.”

Two more days and Rupert was dying with the dawn. By his side
knelt Mea, and in a chair at the end of the shadowed room, tears
streaming down her placid face, and the grey-haired Bakhita
crouched crooning at her feet, sat Tabitha. Edith was not there.
Rupert had refused to allow her to be admitted, lest she also should
contract the plague. Sometimes he was conscious, and sometimes
he sank into sleep. His eyes opened, he woke again and turned to
Mea.
“Beloved,” she whispered in his ear, “I have hidden it from all save
Bakhita, but I have that which I must tell you at last. Our merciful
God has called me—I die also. Before midday I follow on your road.
Wait for me, Rupert.”
He smiled, and whispered: “I understand. I will wait—surely,
surely!”
Then he stretched up his arms. She sank into them, and for the
first time their lips met. It was their kiss of farewell—and of greeting.
“Bakhita,” said Mea presently in a clear and ringing voice, “it is
done. Come; tire me in those robes that I have made ready, my
bridal robes. Be swift now, for my lord calls me.”
The stern-faced, aged woman rose and obeyed. Tabitha knelt in
prayer by the corpse of Rupert, and messengers swiftly spread the
news that Zahed had departed from his people. A while later, as high
and shrill the Eastern death-wail broke upon the silence, a door burst
open and in rushed Edith.
“Oh! is it true, is it true?” she sobbed.
Tabitha pointed to the shrouded form of Rupert.
“Come no nearer,” she said, “lest you should die also—you who
are not ready to die.”
The two women, Edith and Mea, stood face to face with each
other; Edith, dishevelled, weeping; Mea, a strange and glorious sight
in the rays of the rising sun that struck on her through the open
window-place. She was clad in silvery robes that flowed about her; in
her weak hand swayed the ancient sceptre of her race, upon her
breast lay a pectoral of Isis and Nepthys weeping over dead Osiris;
above her outspread hair was set that funeral crown worked in thin
gold and enamelled flowers which once she had shown to Rupert.
Her wide eyes shone like stars, and the fever that burned upon it
seemed to give to her mysterious face a richer beauty.
 “I greet you, lady,” she said to Edith. “Well have I nursed our lord,
but now he has passed from us—home, and I—I follow him,” and
she pointed over the shattered temple and the wall of mountains
upwards to the splendid sky.
“You follow him; you follow him?” gasped Edith? “What do you
mean?”
By way of answer, Mea tore open her white wrappings and
showed her bosom marked with those spots of plague that appear
only just before the end.
“It was his last and best gift to me,” she cried in Arabic.
“Soon, very soon we two shall have done with separations and
with griefs. Hearken you, his lady according to your law. He had
determined that to-morrow he would have gone back with you whom
he forgave, as I do. But we prayed, he and I—yes, knee by knee we
prayed to our God that He would save us from this sacrifice, and He
has answered to our prayer. Behold! we who have followed the way
of the Spirit inherit the Spirit; and we who renounced, renounce no
more. To me it was given to save his life; to me it is given to share
his death and all beyond it through light, through dark—forever and
forever.
“Way now, make way for Tama who comes to her lord’s bed!”
Then while they gazed and wondered, with slow steps Mea reeled
to the couch upon which the corpse of Rupert lay; uttering one low
cry of love and triumph, she cast herself beside him, and there she
died.
“Now,” said the quiet voice of Tabitha, as she looked upward to
heaven over the ruined temples of a faith fulfilled and the cruel
mountains of our world—“now, who will deny there dwells One
yonder that rewards the righteous and smites the wicked with His
sword?”

FINIS

WORKS BY H. RIDER HAGGARD

 PARLIAMENTARY BLUE-BOOK
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BOOK OF TRAVEL
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The People of the Mist
Heart of the World
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