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PUBLICATIONS
OF THE
Vol. 170
Edited by
JOHN BEELER, Ph.D.
Professor of History, University of Alabama
PUBLISHED BY ROUTLEDGE
FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
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VICE PRESIDENTS
N.D. Black, M.A., Ph.D.
V. Preston, M.A., Ph.D.
C.S. Beck, M.A., Ph.D.
Professor R. Harding, M.A., Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S.
COUNCILLORS
Professor N.A.M. Rodger, M.A.,D.Phil., M. Schotte, A.B., M.A., Ph.D.
F.B.A., F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S. Professor E. Charters, M.A., D.Phil.,
A. James, M.A., Ph.D. F.R.Hist.S.
P.B. Hellawell, M.A., Ph.D. J. Davey, B.A., M.St., Ph.D.,
Capt K. Rowlands, Ph.D., R.N. F.R.Hist.S.
Professor A.D. Lambert, M.A., Ph.D., N. Blake, M.A.
F.R.Hist.S. M. Duffy, M.A., Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S.
M. Wilcox, M.A., Ph.D. Professor C.M. Bell, M.A., Ph.D.
L. Halewood, B.A., M.A. T. Dougall, M.A., Ph.D.
E. Jones, M.A., Ph.D. M. Crumplin, F.R.C.S., F.R.Hist.S.,
Professor J. Beeler, A.B., M.A., M.L.I.S., F.I.N.S., F.H.S.
Ph.D., F.R.Hist.S. A. Bond, M.A.
J. Dancy, M.A., D.Phil. L.-J. Giles, B.A., Res.M., A.F.H.E.A.
C. Lambert, B.A., M.A., Ph.D. M. Willis, B.A., M.A.
Page
Introduction................................................................................... ix
This volume is the sequel to The Milne Papers, Volume 2, which cov-
ered the first two years of Alexander Milne’s command of the Royal
Navy’s North America and West India Station (1860–62).1 This one
covers the final two, Milne having been retained in command a year
beyond the customary three-year commission owing to the British
government’s trust in his judgment.2 The Milne Papers, Volume 2,
attempted to provide readers with a representative, if not comprehen-
sive, picture of the range of duties undertaken by the Royal Navy dur-
ing the Pax Britannica, and thus included much material regarding
routine matters: sailing orders, letters of proceedings from officers on
detached duty, accounts of refloating grounded vessels, and the like.3
Owing to space limitations, this volume’s scope is much more circum-
scribed. Gone are the sailing orders, reports on fisheries protection,
navigational surveys, accounts of shipboard yellow fever outbreaks,
and most of the letters of proceedings from officers on detached duty
along the Caribbean littoral. Instead, the topical emphasis in this vol-
ume is Milne’s thoughts and doings – and those of his correspon-
dents – regarding the American Civil War, and most of its contents
are private, rather than public, letters.4 Moreover, the introduction of
The Milne Papers, Volume 2 deals in some detail with the circum-
stances surrounding Milne’s appointment to the North America and
West India command and the station’s geographic limits, command
structure, responsibilities, and communications. Those in search of
such background information are referred to the introduction of that
volume.
1
For Milne’s family and service background, see The Milne Papers, vol. 1 (Aldershot,
Hampshire, 2004), pp. ix–xvii, 3–7, 53–9, 157–62, 205–13, 379–88, 605–12.
2
The Secretary of the Admiralty to Milne, 2 Feb 1863, National Maritime Museum
(hereafter NMM), MLN/114/4. See also Docs Nos 104 and 190.
3
See The Milne Papers, vol. 2 (Farnham, Surrey, 2015), pp. xxvii–xxxiii, xl–xlvii and the
documents referred to therein.
4
For the distinction between public and private correspondence, see ibid., pp. xlviii–lvii.
Of the 370 documents in this collection, 100 are public letters, the remaining 270 private.
ix
x THE MILNE PAPERS
The Context
The Milne Papers, Volume 2, concluded with the Trent affair and its
immediate aftermath – the United States government’s release of the
emissaries of the so-called Confederacy removed from the RMS Trent
on 8 November 1861 – and with British preparations, in conjunction
with France and Spain, for armed intervention in Mexico owing to that
state’s suspension of payments to foreign bondholders. The former inci-
dent brought the US and Great Britain closer to war than any other cri-
sis during the American Civil War, and, given the devolved system for
war planning used by the British government, Milne himself was largely
responsible for devising the course to be followed in the event of hostili-
ties, as revealed in several of his letters, in particular that of 24 January
1862 to First Lord of the Admiralty the Duke of Somerset.1 The Trent
Affair also prevented Milne from commanding the Mexico expedition.
Commodore Hugh Dunlop2 went in his stead and quickly exceeded the
scope of his instructions.3 The current volume begins at the start of Febru-
ary 1862. By that point the Trent Affair’s denouement had played out: the
Southern emissaries had arrived in Britain and Milne’s preparations for
hostilities with the US had ceased. Yet new grounds for Anglo-American
discord soon appeared.
Most pertained to US efforts to stem the flow of goods in and out of
the blockaded ports of the South. The British government had initially
instructed Milne to reconnoitre and report upon the blockade’s effective-
ness, and ships from his squadron had done so during the summer and
autumn of 1861,4 but by November the cordon was effectual enough to
satisfy the British government that it met the criteria set forth in the 1856
Declaration of Paris, which had established formal standards to which
blockades had to conform in order to be adjudged legitimate.5 Yet while
1
Edward Adolphus Seymour (later St Maur), 12th Duke of Somerset, K.G. (1804–85).
M.P. 1830–31, 1834–55; Junior Lord of the Treasury, 1835–39; Secretary to the Board of
Control (1839–41; Undersecretary of State for Home Affairs, 1841; First Commissioner
of Woods and Forests, 1850–51; First Commissioner of Works, 1851–52; First Lord of the
Admiralty, 1859–66. Milne’s letter is Doc. No. 501 in The Milne Papers, vol. 2.
2
Hugh Dunlop, C.B. (c.1809–88). Entered, 1821; Lt, 1828; Cmdr, 1842; Capt, 1850;
Rear-Adm, 1866; Rear-Adm (Ret.), 1870; Vice-Adm (Ret.), 1873; Adm (Ret.), 1878.
3
See below, pp. xl–xlii.
4
See The Milne Papers, vol. 2, pp. xxxiii–xxxiv and the documents there referred to.
5
The Union had at least one vessel off the nine most important ports of the so-called
Confederacy by July 1861, and by the end of the year had 264 vessels in commission, a
large proportion of which were engaged in blockade duty. See Nathan Miller, The U.S.
Navy: An Illustrated History (New York and Annapolis, MD, 1977), p. 156 and William
H. Roberts, Now for the Contest Coastal and Oceanic Naval Operations in the Civil War
(Lincoln, NE and London, 2004), p. 33.
INTRODUCTION xi
it might have met de jure requirements, for the first two and a half years
of the war the US blockade was very porous, and a substantial majority
of vessels attempting to evade it succeeded.1
Whether porous or not, however, the mere existence of the blockade
created enormous economic incentives for shippers, for the South lacked
almost all of the infrastructure needed to wage a modern industrial war,
and thus was largely dependent on imported matériel to do so. At the same
time, the textile mills of Lancashire, Larnark, and elsewhere in Britain
were equally dependent on Southern cotton. Little surprise, therefore, that
as early as the summer of 1861 enterprising ship owners and captains, lured
by the glittering prospect of enormous profits, were preparing to run the
blockade.2 And since the so-called Confederacy had virtually no merchant
marine of its own, almost all blockade runners until late in the war, when
the Southern government started to purchase vessels, were foreign-flagged.
‘Foreign-flagged,’ was, in this instance, virtually synonymous with
‘British’. This fact should come as little surprise: as of 1860 more than a
third of the world’s merchant tonnage was British.3 Equally important, as
the ‘workshop of the world’, Britain was the chief supplier of the muni-
tions and other goods on which the so-called Confederacy’s war effort
depended. Finally, the design characteristics of successful blockade run-
ners – large engines, high speed, huge coal consumption, and limited
stowage – mandated that they operate from ports close to the blockaded
coastline. Those ports were Nassau and Bermuda, both of them British
colonial possessions.4 As a consequence, not only were most blockade
runners British-flagged: they were also usually captained and crewed by
British mariners.
1
James McPherson states that about 3/4ths of all blockade runners during the entire
course of the war completed their voyages. Lest readers conclude as a consequence that it
was failure, McPherson cautions that the real measure of the blockade’s effectiveness was
not the number of vessels that got through, but the number that did not attempt to run it
in the first place, and points to the 90 per cent reduction in the volume of cotton leaving
Southern ports during the war as compared to the four years preceding it. See McPherson,
War on the Waters: The Union and Confederate Navies, 1861–1865 (Chapel Hill, NC,
2012), p. 225.
2
See The Milne Papers, vol. 2, p. xxxv and Docs Nos 310 and 371. See also Stuart
L. Bernath, Squall Across the Atlantic: American Civil War Prize Cases and Diplomacy
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 4–5. Bernath notes that a merchant captain who
might have made $150 a month prior to the Civil War could by 1864 earn as much as
$5,000 a month by running the blockade.
3
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Mili-
tary Conflict, 1500–2000 (New York, 1987), p. 151.
4
The one exception was Havana, which became the chief staging port for trade with
Mobile, Alabama and the Mexican port of Matamoros. See below, pp. xxi–xxv for discus-
sion of that topic.
xii THE MILNE PAPERS
1
A copy of the proclamation can be found in MLN/114/15.
2
Frederick William Grey, C.B., K.C.B., G.C.B. (1805–78). Entered, 1819; Lt, 1825;
Cmdr, 1827; Capt, 1828; Rear-Adm, 1855; Vice-Adm, 1861; Adm, 1865; First Naval Lord,
1861–66.
3
See Docs Nos 83, 91, 95, 101, 154–5, 161 and 255 relative to Nassau, and Docs Nos
228, 233, 251, 296, and 327–28 regarding Bermuda. See also Regis A. Courtemanche, No
Need of Glory: The British Navy in American Waters, 1860–1864 (Annapolis, MD, 1977),
pp. 92–3, 95–6.
4
See Docs Nos 114–15, 122, 137, 139, 154–5, 160, and 161, and below, pp. xxii-xxviii.
INTRODUCTION xiii
Continuous Voyage
The seizure of the British merchant vessel Adela off Abaco Island in the
Bahamas on 7 July 1862 appeared to manifest both the first and second
of those US initiatives, for the ship was bound from Liverpool to Nas-
sau via Bermuda and its Master claimed that it was detained in British
territorial waters [78]. The case was fraught less for the location of its
detention – the US claimed that it had taken place more than three miles
from Abaco – than for it having occurred when the Adela was bound
from one British (i.e., neutral) port to another, a fact which raised the
contentious doctrine of ‘continuous voyage’.
Thanks to the monopolistic and autarchic tenets of the economic theo-
ries and premises today known as mercantilism, during the early modern
era imperial powers such as Britain, France, and Spain barred outsiders
from participating in trade between metropole and colonies. The British
Navigation Acts might be regarded as ‘Exhibit A’ of this policy. Owing
to British naval supremacy during the conflicts of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, however, continental states, chief among
them France, along with cooperative, if not downright eager, neutral
countries sought to circumvent British naval blockades which impeded
the flow of goods to and from overseas possessions by transshipping
goods from colony to parent country, or vice versa, in neutral vessels
and via neutral ports. Most prominently, during the French Revolution-
ary and Napoleonic Wars the American merchant maritime – then the
world’s second largest – was deeply involved in carrying French colonial
produce to France itself, and the US government steadfastly maintained
that, by sailing first to a neutral port and from thence onward to their
final destination, American merchant ships were not subject to detention
and adjudication.
The British strenuously disagreed. The British prize rule of 1756 –
the notorious ‘Rule of 1756’ – unilaterally barred neutral vessels from
engaging in wartime in trade from which they were excluded in peace-
time.2 From it followed the concept of ‘continuous voyage’, for the Brit-
ish government maintained that touching at a neutral port en route did
1
See Docs Nos 78, 259, 261, and 296.
2
On the Rule of 1756, see Bernard Semmel, Liberalism and Naval Strategy: Ideology,
Interest, and Sea Power during the Pax Britannica (Boston, 1986), pp. 14–16.
xiv THE MILNE PAPERS
not render a vessel travelling from one enemy port to another exempt
from seizure. As an ancillary, Britain (and other states, for that matter)
prohibited neutral vessels from conveying anything designated ‘con-
traband of war’ to an enemy. ‘Contraband of war’ was an elastic term,
capable of almost unlimited redefinition, but to the US government it
clearly encompassed not only munitions but other goods of potential
military value, including steam engines, railroad iron, boots, and even
grey-coloured cloth, which could be used for army uniforms.
In 1856 the British, for reasons still not wholly clear, abandoned the
Rule of 1756 and the concomitant doctrine of continuous voyage and
instead acceded to the 1856 Declaration of Paris, which enshrined in
international law the concept that ‘free ships make free goods’ or, put
another way, ‘the flag covers the goods’.1 Of equal irony, just the British
had until 1856 been the chief (perhaps sole) advocates for the doctrine
of continuous voyage, until the American Civil War the US was, along
with the Netherlands, one of the most vocal proponents of the argument
that ‘the flag covers the goods’.2 From 1861 to 1865, however, their roles
were reversed, and the British became the most vociferous defenders of
neutral rights as the US appeared to expand the doctrine of continuous
voyage well beyond that which Britain had employed in the past.3
Therefore, Milne’s initial response to the Adela’s seizure focused on its
having taken place when bound from one neutral port to another which,
as he told Somerset, ‘is certainly a violation of the Law of Nations’,
although he acknowledged that ‘there can be no doubt that this Trade is
for the purpose of giving indirect aid to the Southern States’, and thus
that international laws relative to contraband of war might be applicable
[79].4
What most troubled Milne about the capture, however, was informa-
tion he subsequently received from one of his subordinates, Commander
William Hewett5 of HMS Rinaldo. Following the Adela’s detention,
1
On Britain’s adherence to the Declaration of Paris, see Semmel, Liberalism and Naval
Strategy, pp. 56–9. Various explanations have been put forward for Britain’s volte-face,
among them the widespread belief that the adoption of free trade and other tenets of liber-
alism would reduce, if not eliminate outright, the causes of wars, and the realisation that
Britain was becoming increasingly dependent on food imports to feed its rapidly growing
population, for which recourse to neutral shipping might be necessary in a future conflict.
2
In a further irony, the US was not a signatory to the Declaration of Paris.
3
The expansion was more apparent than real, as the following paragraphs make clear.
4
The Adela’s detention is also addressed in Docs Nos 78, 82–5, 89–90, 92, 94–5, 99,
113, and 123.
5
William Nathan Wrighte Hewett, V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I. (1834–88). Entered, 1847;
Lt, 1852; Cmdr, 1858; Capt, 1862; Rear-Adm, 1878; Vice-Adm, 1884. Naval Lord of the
Admiralty, 1885.
INTRODUCTION xv
Hewett paid a visit to Key West, where its fate was to be determined by
the American Prize Court sitting there. While at Key West he spoke with
Commodore James L. Lardner,1 commanding the US Navy’s East Gulf
of Mexico Blockading Squadron, who informed him that US warships
‘had orders to seize any British vessels whose names were forwarded
them from the Government at Washington, and that being bound from
one British port to another would not prevent United States’ officers from
carrying out these orders’.2
Numerous Union agents – spies might be a more apposite descriptor –
were active in Britain, keeping tabs on, among other things, orders
placed with British firms by suspected Southern agents, and the ship-
ment thereof. Their reports, including the names of vessels suspected of
carrying contraband of war to Nassau and Bermuda for transshipment
through the blockade, were sent to Washington and a list of them com-
piled for the information of US Navy officers. The captor of the Adela, as
Lardner’s admission made clear, was acting on such information. More-
over, the seizure was evidently made without first having ascertained, by
examining the ship’s manifest and bill of lading and by inspecting the
cargo itself, whether contraband was actually on board, and it was this
precipitous, not to say reckless, a priori manner of proceeding that most
aroused Milne’s concern [79].
That concern was set forth in a public letter to chargé d’affaires Wil-
liam Stuart,3 then heading the British Legation in Washington in the tem-
porary absence of Ambassador Lord Lyons.4 In it Milne observed that the
instructions under which US Navy officers were acting were ‘so entirely
at variance with the recognized principles of international law’ that he
put Stuart in possession of them without delay. Moreover, while defer-
ring to the latter’s judgment as to whether to raise the matter with the US
government, he made clear his own opinion: that the chargé should make
‘an early representation … with a view to these orders, if really issued to
their cruizers, being at once recalled, and serious complications possibly
1
James L. Lardner (1802–81). American naval officer. Entered, 1820; Lt, 1828; Cmdr,
1851; Capt, 1861; Cdre, 1862; Rear-Adm (Ret.) 1866.
2
Hewett to Milne, 1 Aug 1862, printed in ‘North America. No. 5. (1863.) Correspon-
dence respecting instructions given to naval officers of the United States in regard to neu-
tral vessels and mails’, Parliamentary Papers [hereafter cited as PP], 1863, vol. 72, p. 450.
3
William Stuart, K.C.M.G., C.B. (1824–96). Diplomatist. Secretary of the Legation to
Brazil, 1856–59; to Naples, 1859–61; to Greece, 1861–62; to the US, 1862–64; to the Otto-
man Empire, 1864–66; to Russia, 1866–68; minister to Argentina, 1868–72; to Greece,
1872–77; to the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 1877–88.
4
Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons, 1st Viscount Lyons, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.C.L.
(1817–87). Diplomatist. Minister to Tuscany, 1858; Ambassador to the United States,
1858–64; to France, 1867–87.
xvi THE MILNE PAPERS
1
Milne to Stuart, 2 Aug 1862, printed in ‘North America. No. 5. (1863.) Correspondence
respecting instructions given to naval officers of the United States in regard to neutral ves-
sels and mails’, PP, 1863, vol. 72, p. 450.
2
Ibid. In his original letter to Stuart he added ‘Should therefore a collision be unhap-
pily brought about, the US Government would alone be responsible from having issued
instructions to their Cruizers to seize Neutral Vessels under circumstances which the law
of nations does not justify.’ This sentence was not printed in the Parliamentary Papers. See
Milne to Stuart, 2 Aug 1862 in ADM1/5787.
3
William Henry Seward (1801–72). American lawyer and politician. Member of the
Senate of New York, 1830–34; Governor of New York, 1839–42; US Senator for New
York, 1849–61; US Secretary of State, 1861–69.
4
Abraham Lincoln (1809–65). American lawyer and politician. Member of the Illinois
House of Representatives, 1834–42; US Representative for Illinois, 1847–49; US Presi-
dent, 1861–65.
5
Gideon Welles (1802–78). American lawyer, journalist, and politician. Member of the
Connecticut House of Representatives, 1827–35; Connecticut State Controller of Public
Accounts, 1835; Chief of the US Navy’s Bureau of Provisions and Clothing, 1846–49;
Secretary of the Navy, 1861–69.
6
Seward to Welles, 8 Aug1862, printed in ‘North America. No. 5. (1863.) Correspon-
dence respecting instructions given to naval officers of the United States in regard to neu-
tral vessels and mails,’ PP, 1863, vol. 72, p. 452.
7
This ‘backsliding’ was almost certainly the consequence of Gideon Welles’s deep-
rooted hostility towards Great Britain for making no effort to prevent flagrant violations
of the proclamation of neutrality. See for instance, Welles, The Civil War Diary of Gideon
INTRODUCTION xvii
the spring of 1863 in letters regarding the seizure of the merchant ves-
sels Dolphin [225, 228, 229, 238, 251, 253, 259]1 and Peterhoff [225,
229, 251, 259].2 Again, he warned Lord Lyons that should US warships
persist in seizing British merchantmen ‘merely because their names are
included in a list of suspected vessels … they can hardly fail to give
rise to very serious complications, the responsibility of [sic: ‘for’] which
would rest with the United States Government…’ [enclosed in 225].3
And again the warning was sufficient for the US government to reit-
erate the instructions issued the previous August, thus averting a crisis
between the two countries on this account.4
As for the larger issue of continuous voyage, however, Milne himself
was under no illusions. On 15 October 1862 [115] he informed Frederick
Grey that in his opinion both vessels and cargoes outward bound from
blockaded ports were ‘liable to capture until they complete their voy-
age[,] that is [reach] their destination[,] which is England’.5 Grey dis-
agreed [111], but the Law Officers of Crown unequivocally sided with
Milne [143].6 Not only were vessels breaking the blockade liable to sei-
zure and condemnation until they reached their final destination: cargoes
transshipped to another vessel at an intermediate neutral port remained
equally liable to that fate, as did vessels receiving such cargoes. Finally,
vessels breaking the blockade were liable to seizure and condemnation
until reaching their bona fide destination even if their cargo was removed
at an intermediate port and transshipped in another vessel.
Territorial Limits
While a crisis over seizures of ‘blacklisted’ British vessels was averted,
there was, however, no shortage of other accounts on which one might
have erupted. First of all, as demonstrated by the Adela’s detention within
sight of Abaco Lighthouse, it was widely alleged by British colonial offi-
cials and commercial interests that US Navy warships routinely violated
Welles, Lincoln’s Secretary of the Navy, ed. William E. and Erica L. Gienapp (Urbana and
Chicago, 2014), pp. 163–4.
1
The Dolphin is also mentioned incidentally in one of the enclosures in Doc. No. 252.
2
The Peterhoff is also mentioned in passing in Docs Nos 231, 246, 249, 283, 289, and
342.
3
See also Doc. No. 233.
4
The issue of seizing vessels without first conducting a search of the cargo resurfaced
with the US detention of the British vessels Sir William Peel, Science and Dashing Wave
off Matamoros, Mexico in Nov 1863 (Doc. No. 354 and its enclosures), but those instances
also involved several other points of international law, and are discussed below in the sec-
tion dealing with British trade to and from Matamoros.
5
See also Doc. No. 117, in which Milne asked officially for the Law Officers’ judgment
on the question, and Docs Nos 123 and 142.
6
Their opinion was also summarised by Grey in Doc. No. 128.
xviii THE MILNE PAPERS
1
Charles John Bayley, C.B. (c.1815–73). Colonial administrator. Governor of the Baha-
mas, 1857–64.
2
Lord John Russell, from 1861 1st Earl Russell, K.G., G.C.M.G. (1792–1878). Whig/
Liberal politician. MP 1813–17, 1818–19, 1820–30, 1831–61; Paymaster of the Forces,
1830–34; Home Secretary, 1835–39; Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 1839–
41; Prime Minister, 1846–52, 1865–66; Foreign Secretary, 1852–53, 1859–65; Lord Presi-
dent of the Council, 1854–55; Colonial Secretary, 1855. Russell’s letter appears in ‘North
America. No. 1. Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North
America’, PP, 1862, vol. 62, pp. 148–9.
3
For other documents on dealing with the limits of authority in waters around British
territories, see Nos 78–79, 81–84, 91, 95, 99, 103, 113, 115, 117, 127, 134, 141, 152–5,
160–61, 163, 165, 167–8, 173, 180, 186, 255, 258–9, 266–7, 269, 277, and 354.
4
The Secretary of the Admiralty to Milne, 16 Feb 1863, MLN/114/3. As a means of
reducing the potential for friction regarding British territorial waters, Milne later suggested
that the US government might be furnished with a copy of Russell’s 31 Jan 1861 letter with
an eye to apprising its naval officers of British regulations. See Docs Nos 161 and 168.
INTRODUCTION xix
first of these was the blockade runner Herald, which was fired upon by
the USS Adirondack off Nassau at the end of July 1862. Milne, how-
ever, quickly ascertained that the report was erroneous, the Herald hav-
ing been more than five miles from the shore of New Providence Island
when Adirondack ceased firing at it. Indeed, he was irritated with his
subordinate, Commander Henry Hickley,1 and by extension, Governor
Baylay for their mistaken belief that the increased range of modern artil-
lery had ipso facto altered international law regarding the three marine
mile limit of territorial jurisdiction [82].2 Indeed, Milne was sufficiently
concerned that such mistaken views were widely held by his subordi-
nates that he took the precaution on 8 August 1862 of issuing a memo-
randum for the guidance of the senior officer at Nassau [81].
Another sort of ambiguity surrounded the next instance of alleged
American violation of neutral waters. On 7 October 1862 the US warship
Montgomery fired upon, boarded, and apparently set fire to a merchant
ship, the Blanche, 300 yards off the coast of Cuba. That the vessel was
destroyed in Spanish waters was beyond dispute, and the US Navy offi-
cer commanding the Montgomery was court martialled, convicted, and
dismissed from the service for his actions.3 Whether or not the vessel,
although sailing under British colours, was bona fide British property
was not. Indeed, while William Stuart’s initial response to news of the
Blanche’s destruction was that it ‘appears to exceed all other outrages
in aggravation’, it eventually emerged that it was an American vessel
captured by the so-called Confederacy and illegally transferred to British
registry [123].4
On 22 May 1863, the captain of the British blockade runner Sirius
wrote to Milne, claiming that the US warship Rhode Island pursued his
vessel into British waters off Nassau [enclosed in 255]. According to
1
Henry Dennis Hickley (1826–1903). Entered, c.1840; Lt, 1847; Cmdr, 1858; Capt,
1864; Rear-Adm, 1880; Vice-Adm, 1886; Adm (Ret.), 1892.
2
For other documents on the Herald incident, see Nos 78, 81, 83, 111, 113, and 115. For
the Herald’s blockade running, see Docs Nos 154 and 199.
3
Charles Hunter (d. 1873). American naval officer. Entered, 1831; Lt, 1841; Cmdr, 1862;
Capt (Ret.), 1866. The court recommended executive clemency in view of his long service
and zeal for the Union cause, but President Lincoln refused to accede. He was subsequently
reinstated by Act of Congress. For Hunter’s court martial and the circumstances surround-
ing it, see Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebel-
lion (hereafter cited as ORN) (Washington DC, 1903), ser. 1, vol. 19, pp. 268–77. For an
historical take, see Albert Gleaves, ‘The Affair of the Blanche (October 7, 1862)’, in US
Naval Institute Proceedings, vol 40 no 10 (Oct 1922), pp. 1661–76.
4
For other documents pertaining to the Blanche, see Nos 134 and 164. The question of its
nationality is raised in the latter. For a summary of the Blanche affair, see Bernath, Squall
Across the Atlantic, pp. 100–107.
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Case 10 was that of a labourer, named Samuel Bennett. It occurred
on February 20th, 1849, at a dispensary in Westminster. The patient
inhaled chloroform for amputation of one of the toes. Half an ounce
of chloroform was “sprinkled on a handkerchief, and held over the
mouth and nose.... This quantity of the agent failed, however, to
produce anæsthesia, having caused only the ordinary excitement and
struggling.” After a delay of two hours, more chloroform was
procured, and half an ounce was again applied on a handkerchief,
“care being taken to allow the entrance of air at short intervals.”
Insensibility was induced, and the toe was amputated; the
chloroform being applied, as I was told, during part of the time of the
operation. At the close of the operation, no blood escaped when the
pressure was removed from the arteries; the patient was in fact
dying, and in a short time expired. “A few inspiations were noticed
after the pulse had ceased at the wrist.”[80]
The lungs were of a dark venous hue throughout, a large quantity
of blood escaping from them when cut into. Mucous membrane of
trachea and bronchi congested. Heart rather large but flabby;
auricles empty; each ventricle contained about an ounce of semi-
fluid blood (the lungs had been inflated). Head: sinuses and veins
contained blood, but not to any remarkable amount. But few bloody
points occurred in cutting into the cerebral mass. Kidneys congested.
The failure of the first attempt to cause insensibility in this case,
when so large a quantity of chloroform was used, illustrates very
forcibly the uncertainty and irregularity of the way in which it was
administered. On the first occasion only excitement and struggling
were produced, and on the next the patient died suddenly.
Case 19. The subject of this case was Alexander Scott, aged thirty-
four, a police constable, who died in Guy’s Hospital in June 1850,
whilst undergoing an operation for the removal of a portion of the
right hand. Mr. Cock, the operator, said that he was certain there was
no disease about the patient. He described the accident as follows:
—“The ordinary machine was used, and, as it had not the effect,
witness directed that a napkin should be folded into the shape of a
cone, which was applied with chloroform. The occupation of
removing a portion of the bone occupied one minute and a half, but
before it was completed, the blood which was gushing out, suddenly
stopped, when witness directed Mr. Lacy to feel the pulse of
deceased, and they found that deceased had expired.”[87]
The sudden stopping of the hæmorrhage shews that, in this case,
as in the others, the action of the heart was suddenly arrested. The
first attempt to cause insensibility failed in this as in some other
cases.
Mr. Cock tried to dissuade his patient from having chloroform,
severe as the operation would have been without it. In Guy’s Hospital
and St. Thomas’s the medical officers had a strong objection to
narcotism by inhalation for the first two or three years after the
practice was introduced, and chloroform was used much less
generally in these institutions than in any other of the hospitals of
London; yet it was precisely in these two hospitals that two deaths
from chloroform occurred, before any such accident had happened in
any other hospital in this metropolis. This circumstance is worthy of
the consideration of those who propose to limit the accidents from
chloroform by restricting its use to a few great operations.
In this case the lungs were reported to be extremely congested.
Heart flabby, not particularly distended; about two ounces of fluid
blood on the right side; not more than half an ounce on the left.
Head.—Much congestion of the dura mater; the grey matter of the
brain was dark and congested; fluid was found in the subarachnoid
space; and a considerable quantity of it in both ventricles. Kidneys
congested.[88]
Case 28. On August 10th, 1852, a Mr. Martin, a cattle dealer died
near Melrose, in Scotland, after inhaling chloroform for the
application of potassa fusa to some ulcers of the leg. Dr. W. M.
Brown, who relates the case, says:—“Before proceeding to apply the
caustic I gave him chloroform. He was not easily affected by it, and
struggled a good deal. After beginning to apply the caustic I found he
was not sufficiently insensible to pain, and gave him a little more
chloroform, which had the desired effect. I then proceeded with the
application of the caustic, and was just finishing, when I observed a
sort of catch in his breathing. I immediately stopped, and, on looking
at him, I saw the mouth and eyes open, the breathing irregular, the
face pale, the eyes slightly turned upwards, and the pupils dilated.”
Dr. Brown tried artificial respiration and other means to resuscitate
the patient, but without effect. He says, “in a few minutes the man
died.” The pulse is not mentioned, nor the age of the patient.[97]