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VIOLENCE, IMAGE AND
VICTIM IN BATAILLE,
AGAMBEN AND GIRARD
John Lechte
Cover image: Detail from Arthur Boyd, The Australian Scapegoat (1988), National
Gallery of Victoria, Department of Australian Prints/Australian Prints and
Drawings. Arthur Boyd’s work reproduced with permission of Bundanon Trust.
Cover design: riverdesignbooks.com
A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library
The right of John Lechte to be identified as the author of this work has been
asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988,
and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498).
Preface vi
Acknowledgements x
Note xi
INTRODUCTION 1
1. VICTIM AND VIOLENCE: BATAILLE VERSUS NIETZSCHE 20
2. BATAILLE: IMAGE AND VICTIM 50
3. RETHINKING AGAMBEN ON VIOLENCE 78
4. RETHINKING AGAMBEN ON THE IMAGE 108
5. GIRARD ON VIOLENCE AND THE VICTIM 133
6. IMAGE, VIOLENCE, VICTIM AND THE CRUCIFIXION:
GIRARD’S VERSION 163
CONCLUSION: UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE,
IMAGE AND VICTIM 183
References 207
Index 223
To begin, let us look briefly at the bigger picture within which the
following study is situated. In this regard, the world today is riven by
violence and flooded with images. But what is this thing called vio-
lence and what exactly is an image? Perhaps some will say that a for-
mal definition of violence and the image is unnecessary because when
these terms are invoked in everyday discourse the context makes it
clear as to what is meant. However, if it is a matter of who is a victim
of violence, or of the deleterious effects of images on the psyche or of
the sense in which an image is a medium, then something approaching
a definition of the terms in question would seem to be indispensable.
When victims of violence, especially in a domestic situation, claim –
as is often the case – that the violence against them is symbolic or
psychological and not just physical, is this truly violence? Can words
be made into vehicles of violence? We need to know the answer to
these questions. The dilemma is that once the significance of symbolic
violence is fully appreciated, the way is opened for almost any form of
human action to become violent under certain circumstances. And if
the rights of victims are to be protected, violence – despite the difficul-
ties involved – needs to be precisely defined.
Similarly, understanding the effects of the image in society – including
the image as it occurs in a religious context – presupposes that it is pos-
sible to define an image exactly. And yet, if one thinks about it, it seems
that almost any entity can, in equal measure, be a thing and an image. To
think of a chair, for example, is to have an image of a chair in mind.
of the death of the other. A key point in Agamben’s take on the victim
is that homo sacer cannot be sacrificed (which raises the question of
whether homo sacer can truly be a victim), while Girard is keen to
claim that Christ showed that sacrifice in sacrificial societies depends
on the killing of a scapegoat, something repressed and hidden in the
societies in question.
At play, when it comes in each case to the image as such, will be
whether the image is understood to be opaque (the image as object
and as ‘media specific’), or whether it is understood to be transparent.
In this regard, it will become clear that Agamben treats the image as
opaque (as a ‘pure means’, as an object), while the transparency of the
image – as will be shown in Chapter 2 – is important for Bataille. Girard
also implicitly subscribes to a version of the image as transparent.
Of course, to report on the image in the work of the three thinkers
in this way does not at all exhaust what is at stake here. For it is the
approach to the image as it is differently articulated in the writing of
the three thinkers that is central. Consequently, it will be less a matter
of how the image is theorised in the corpus at issue, and more a matter
of showing the mode of significance that the image assumes in each
individual oeuvre.
Closely linked to the latter point is the relationship between vio-
lence and the image, not just as this is consciously theorised (if indeed
it is at all) by each of the thinkers but also as it emerges in their work.
For example, without being the basis of a theorisation, the relation
between violence and the image emerges in Girard’s treatment of the
Crucifixion and the question of Christ’s divinity. Christ Himself is the
image to the extent that He is divine.
In its broadest terms, then, the study will have been a success if the
reader acquires a deeper and broader understanding of violence and
the image – not only in general but as these terms work to give a more
profound appreciation of the work of Bataille, Agamben and Girard.
No doubt it is worth noting – as a further justification of my focus –
that each of the thinkers under investigation has thrown out a chal-
lenge as to how Western culture and politics operate. Agamben, for
instance, has famously argued that the sovereign power in the West
originates with the killing of the one who is outside of all law and
moral action and as such is nothing but bare life – a killing that is
neither a murder nor a sacrifice. Agamben has also proposed that the
acclamation of power in the ‘society of the spectacle’ is essential to way
Unless otherwise stated, all translations from the original French texts
are my own.
The key terms of this study are ‘violence’, ‘victim’ and ‘image’.
Each may be interpreted as they occur in the context specified. Broadly
speaking, for the inflection Agamben wishes to place on them – largely
in light of the thought of Walter Benjamin – the most important aspect
of both violence and the image is covered by the term, ‘mediality’, which
can rendered as ‘pure means’ in relation to violence, and as ‘acclama-
tion’ in Agamben’s study of government based on Guy Debord’s notion
of the ‘society of the spectacle’ (Debord 2006), where social relations
are said to be mediated by images. As will become evident, it is the
place and status of the victim that, with Agamben, remains ambiguous.
‘Homo sacer’ – the one who can be killed without this being homicide
or a sacrifice – is never referred to by Agamben as a victim. Moreover,
the precise motivation for the homo sacer’s death is difficult to discern,
other than to clarify the nature of the absolute power of sovereignty.
If Nietzsche’s philosophy – supposedly so influential for Bataille –
links the status of the victim to morality in general and to Christianity
in particular, this is in order to show, it will be argued, that ‘saving’ the
victim from the persecutor is, for Nietzsche, to rally against life – under-
stood in the fullest sense as the biological, cultural and social being of
the human. With Bataille, by contrast, the victim looms large. Indeed,
Bataille’s thought is consumed by the being of the victim. Bataille is
thus to this extent against Nietzsche.
In the work of Bataille and Girard, by contrast with Agamben, vio-
lence becomes manifest because it has an object: the victim of violence.
arise: the first is that this is only one among countless possible examples
of actual, or literal violence. Secondly, rather than thinking violence, it
is an illustration of what is called violence. Even interpretation can be
called violent.5
Perhaps Nancy would not be in error by responding to the ques-
tion of violence with an example rather than attempting an exhaus-
tive definition. Perhaps violence as such might be unthinkable – that
philosophising about violence might well do violence to philosophy!
When confronting violence – when attempting to think violence – phi-
losophy, more often than not (and perhaps for good reason), is forced
to give up the quest by pointing to literal violence, to what is called
violence. However, Nancy, as if endeavouring to keep a philosophical
approach alive, but at the same time recognising the difficulty it poses,
says in part that, ‘violence does not participate in any order of reasons,
nor any set of forces oriented towards results. It denatures, wrecks, and
massacres that which it assaults. Violence does not transform what it
assaults; rather, it takes away its form and meaning’ (2005: 16). If the
latter is the case, how can violence operate effectively in the ritual of
human sacrifice and thus in relation to the sacred? Whether it does act
effectively will also be discussed in Chapter 1 in relation to the famous
study of sacrifice by Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss (1981), the study
that introduces the victim, the entity, as will be shown, so important to
Bataille. The victim is not only fundamental in Bataille’s thought but is
also the central figure – as homo sacer – in Giorgio Agamben’s political
philosophy In fact, this aspect – homo sacer as essentially a victim – has
hardly been given its due in the voluminous literature on this theme.6
Violence and the image are linked in Agamben to the extent that
both entities – in light of Walter Benjamin’s and Guy Debord’s think-
ing – constitute an extant ‘mediality’. Here mediality is the appear-
ance of the medium (or means) as such independently of any end. It
is neither a means to an end, nor an end in itself. Walter Benjamin’s
‘divine violence’ (see W. Benjamin 1986) is, according to Agamben, the
appearance of pure means. Language is the appearance of pure means,
especially in relation to politics, as will be confirmed in Chapter 4.7 For
its part, gesture confirms the idea of ‘pure means’,8 and the image is a
pure means for Agamben, as mentioned, in the ‘society of the spec-
tacle’. It remains, then, to investigate what to many would seem to be
the paradox the appearing of the medium – the medium being that
which, qua medium, does not appear.9
Pure violence, as pure means, constitutes a break from the law where
violence is always the means to an end and never a means as such. Pure
violence, then, is violence appearing qua violence and thus as pure means.
Whether or not it is possible to agree with Agamben, for him, pure
violence opens the way to a new form of revolutionary politics that is no
longer connected to the history of the formation of the state and the legal
system that gives it currency. Once the state has been ‘deactivated’ – as
Agamben would say – the way is open for the emergence of the human
as sabbatical animal – a form of the human not determined by work
or a project but by play, by doing for the sake of doing, all in the inter-
est of pure mediality. In this light, the ‘society of the spectacle’ (where
images are rampant) gives rise to the media acclamation that power
needs in order to maintain itself. ‘Acclamation’ is the term Agamben
uses to characterise modern-day political life. Political theology shows
that the term oikonomia is evocative of acclamation and can only be
validly interpreted in light of the history of Western theology, where it
assumes a meaning that is not related to utility – utility being the basis of
so much of modern political theory, most notably as exemplified by the
oikos in the thought of Hannah Arendt (see Arendt 1958).
Despite the emphasis on the appearing of mediality, Agamben, in a
number of texts, also seems to accept that the ‘taking place of language’
is equivalent to language’s disappearance (the disappearance of lan-
guage as medium) into what it expresses. Thus: ‘Language is very weak,
in the sense that it cannot but disappear in the thing it names’ (2018b:
9–10). Why is it that language, unlike the image, cannot become an
explicit mediality here – even if it could be argued that an explicit
mediality is, by definition, problematic? What distinguishes language
as such from the image as such is that, like language, the imaged could
not appear if the image appeared as such (i.e., if it were an object in
its own right). Seen this way, there does not seem to be any reason to
treat the image differently from language. However, as we will see later,
there is a difference between language and violence and the image and
violence. For while there can be an image of violence, Bataille’s insight,
as we have seen, is that there can be no language of violence.
But nothing had stopped the rush of the Italians (see page 158)
To face page 160
CHAPTER XIII