1NC

Solvency
EPA won’t enforce regulations even if they exist – the plan is meaningless.
Kristina Marusic Fractured: Distrustful of frackers, abandoned by regulators March 1 2021
https://www.ehn.org/fractured-fracking-regulation-neglect-2650594611/latkanich-video

Even where federal regulations do exist, meaningful enforcement has been lacking, especially in
recent years—the Trump Administration oversaw a 70 percent decrease in criminal prosecutions
under the Clean Water Act and more than a 50 percent decrease in prosecutions under the
Clean Air Act.

Fracking operations have other environmental loopholes the plan doesn’t solve.
They will still massively pollute.
Melissa Denchak (National Resource Defense Council) “Fracking 101” April 19, 2019
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fracking-101#whyis

The oil and gas industry enjoys an exemption for certain exploration and production wastes
from regulation as “hazardous wastes” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Such
oil and gas exploration and production wastes could include used fracking fluids, produced
water, and many other types of waste. The industry also enjoys a loophole in the Clean Air Act
that exempts oil and gas wells, compressor stations, and pump stations from aggregation as
major sources that would otherwise have to implement pollution controls once emissions hit a
certain threshold. As to the Clean Water Act, Congress exempted stormwater runoff from oil
and gas exploration, production, processing, or treatment operations or transmission facilities
from certain permitting requirements, provided that such stormwater is not contaminated. Bills
seeking to close these and other statutory loopholes and exemptions were introduced in
Congress in 2017 but have made little progress .

Several laws exempt fracking – so the plan doesn’t do enough to protect the
environment.
Susan Phillips DECEMBER 5, 2011 | 12:00 PM Burning Question: What Would Life Be Like
Without the Halliburton Loophole?
https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2011/12/05/burning-question-what-would-life-be-
like-without-the-halliburton-loophole/

And it’s not just the Clean Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act that exempt the oil and
gas industry. The Clean Air Act, passed by Congress in 1970, exempts oil and gas wells from
aggregation. That means, each well site is considered an individual source of pollutants, and
does not take into account all of the well sites in a specific area.
When it comes to the handling of waste water, or frack water, that too is exempt from a federal
statute called the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The RCRA tracks industrial wastes
from “cradle to grave.” But when it comes to the oil and gas industry, as long as the waste water
is on the drill site, or being transported, it is not considered hazardous. This also applies to
drilling mud. That’s why trucks carrying waste water, which contains high levels of salts, toxic
chemicals, as well as radioactive material, may be labeled “residual waste.”
 1NC Plan collapses fracking
Plan will cause a collapse of the fracking industry – that will revive coal, which
is worse.
Jessica Durden, Staff Member April 8, 2012 Fracking’s Dynamic Impact on the Energy
Economy: Winners and Losers http://www.kjeanrl.com/full-blog/2012/04/frackings-dynamic-
impact-on-energy.html

However, this dynamic swing of interest, which has prompted coal companies like Alpha Natural
Resources to back off production in much of central Appalachia,[6] may not be a long-term
economic event. Fracking has problems of its own, primarily in the form of intense
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) scrutiny. Hydraulic fracturing is currently state-
regulated, but the EPA and the environmental lobby have teamed up to close the loophole that
exempts fracking from federal regulation under the Safe Drinking Water Act.[7] If legislation like
the FRAC Act (HR 1084) passes in the near future, the entire fracking industry could be subject
to much harsher federal regulations that could stymie or even temporarily stop active fracking
operations.[8] The EPA’s first section of its forthcoming 2014 study on fracking’s environmental
impact has garnered mixed reviews.[9] However, the initial report emerged from Wyoming,
while the major players in fracking are eastward in Texas and the Appalachian Basin, and the
EPA has indicated Wyoming is not indicative of the rest of the country.[10] So while coal has felt
the blow of a burgeoning natural gas industry, the natural gas companies face a tough road
ahead to remain state regulated: coal has lost the battle, but not the war, and the long term
economic effects of the fracking boom remain unclear. In an unexpected twist, an
environmental crackdown could actually salvage the struggling coal industry.

Coal destroys the environment

Union of Concerned Scientists “Coal Power Impacts” Jul 9, 2019
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/coal-power-impacts

Coal impacts: air pollution When coal is burned it releases a number of airborne toxins and
pollutants. They include mercury, lead, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, particulates, and various
other heavy metals. Health impacts can range from asthma and breathing difficulties, to brain
damage, heart problems, cancer, neurological disorders, and premature death. Although limits
set by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have helped prevent some of these
emissions, many plants don’t have the necessary pollution controls installed. The future of these
protections remains unclear. Coal impacts: water pollution When you burn charcoal in your grill
at home, ash is leftover. The same is true for coal-fired power plants, which produce more than
100 million tons of coal ash every year. More than half of that waste ends up in ponds, lakes,
landfills, and other sites where, over time, it can contaminate waterways and drinking water
supplies. Other water impacts include acid rock drainage from coal mines, the obliteration of
mountain streams and valleys by mountain top removal mining, and the energy-water collisions
that occur when coal plants rely too heavily on local water supplies. Climate Change and
Wildfires Wildfire activity in the US is changing dangerously, as conditions become hotter and
drier due to climate change. Coal impacts: global warming Climate change is coal’s most serious,
long-term, global impact. Chemically, coal is mostly carbon, which, when burned, reacts with
oxygen in the air to produce carbon dioxide, a heat-trapping gas. When released into the
atmosphere, carbon dioxide works like a blanket, warming the earth above normal limits.
Consequences of global warming include drought, sea level rise, flooding, extreme weather, and
species loss. The severity of those impacts is tied directly to the amount of carbon dioxide we
release, including from coal plants. In the United States, coal accounts for roughly one-quarter
of all energy-related carbon emissions.

Coal is bad for the economy

Fred Pearce “As Investors and Insurers Back Away, the Economics of Coal Turn Toxic” March
10, 2020 https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-investors-and-insurers-back-away-the-economics-
of-coal-turn-toxic

Any day now, New York State will be coal-free. Its last coal-fired power station, at Somerset on
the southern shore of Lake Ontario, will shut for good as the winter ends. Remember when
Donald Trump promised to bring back coal? Well, three years on, coal’s decline is accelerating —
in the United States and worldwide. With the fuel unable to compete in most places with
natural gas, nuclear, and renewables, the mining and burning of coal is increasingly toxic
economically as well as environmentally. Coal mines are becoming “stranded assets” — unlikely
ever to pay off the costs of their development. The risks for financiers are becoming too great.
Now, even insurance companies are refusing to underwrite coal-fired power plants and coal
mining ventures. And without insurance, say gleeful climate campaigners, coal is dead. Coal
burning worldwide fell a further 3 percent last year, the biggest decline yet from a peak in 2013.
That trend is unlikely to change. The number of new coal plants that began construction
worldwide fell by 84 percent between 2015 and 2018, according to NGOs tracking the demise.
Across the developed world, coal’s contribution to keeping the lights on is in freefall. Despite the
Trump administration’s dismissal of the climate crisis, the U.S. is proving no exception. Twelve
years ago, 45 percent of U.S. electricity was generated by burning coal. The figure is now 24
percent and falling fast. Since Trump arrived in the White House, 39,000 megawatts of coal-
burning power plants have been retired across the U.S. and none commissioned. Starved of
markets, eight U.S. coal mining companies filed for bankruptcy last year. They included the
largest surviving private company, Murray Energy, owned by Robert Murray, a prominent Trump
backer.

Additional congressional restrictions will kill the fracking industry.

Jane Van Ryan New Study On Hydraulic Fracturing Posted June 9, 2009
https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2009/06/09/new-study-on-hydraulic-
fracturing

More dramatic decreases in production of both natural gas and oil could occur if Congress
enacts restrictions on hydraulic fracturing fluids. And elimination of the use of this technology
would nearly shut down the development of unconventional domestic resources, where oil and
natural gas are being produced in shale, tight sands and coalbed formations. More than 95
percent of these wells are routinely treated using fracturing. Ron Hyden of Halliburton explained
the importance of hydraulic fracturing in a recent podcast.
Adv. 1
 1NC – Plan allows env damage from fracking
Fracking causes emissions that overwhelm any decline in emissions from a
reduce use of coal.
JULIA PYPER JANUARY 27, 2020 Where Does the Natural Gas ‘Bridge’ End?
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/natural-gas-bridge-nearing-end

A recent study published in the scientific journal Environmental Research Letters found that
natural-gas use has grown so quickly that emissions from gas over the past six years have
surpassed the decline in emissions resulting from a reduced use of coal. The study found that
fossil fuel emissions grew at a slower rate in 2019 than in previous years but did not account for
methane emissions from fossil fuel production and shipping. Economic and environmental
factors are now prompting a number of U.S. cities and utilities to impose bans on new natural-
gas infrastructure. Last week, the California Public Utilities Commission launched a new
regulatory proceeding “to manage the state’s transition away from natural-gas-fueled
technologies to meet California’s decarbonization goals."

Natural gas is not an effective or clean bridge to renewables.

Jeremy Deaton By Nexus Media Published March 8, 2021 The Future Of U.S. Natural Gas
https://cleantechnica.com/2021/03/08/the-future-of-u-s-natural-gas/

Governments are hastening the shift to renewables with tax breaks and clean-energy mandates,
as calls to wean off gas grow louder amid revelations that the so-called “bridge fuel” may not be
as clean as advertised. Researchers have shown that pipelines and drilling sites are leaking huge
sums of unburned natural gas, which consists mostly of methane, an extremely potent heat-
trapping substance. The leaks are so pernicious that, in the final accounting, natural gas may
actually be as bad for the climate as coal.

Air pollution from fracking is devastating. Methane release is 80 times worse

than carbon-based emissions. Surrounding communities and people who work
in fracking see an increase in air related illnesses
Melissa Denchak (National Resource Defense Council) “Fracking 101” April 19, 2019
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fracking-101#whyis

Air Pollution. Air pollution from oil and natural gas production, including fracking activities, is a
serious problem that threatens the health of nearby communities. Flaring (a controlled burn
used for testing, safety, and waste-management purposes), venting (the direct release of gas
into the atmosphere), leaking, combustion, and release of contaminants throughout the
production, processing, transmission, and distribution of oil and natural gas are significant
sources of air pollution. Natural gas is made up mostly of methane, a potent greenhouse gas
that traps more than 80 times as much heat as carbon dioxide. The oil and gas sector is the
largest domestic industrial source of methane pollution. When gas is flared, vented, or
accidentally leaked, it accelerates the costly health impacts of climate change. Oil and gas
operations, such as hydraulic fracturing, also release numerous toxic air contaminants: benzene,
toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene; fine particulate matter (PM2.5); hydrogen sulfide; silica dust;
and nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds, which produce smog when combined. In
rural northeastern Utah, researchers estimated that the amount of smog-forming compounds
coming from oil and gas operations each year was equivalent to the emissions of 100 million
cars. A broad range of health effects are associated with exposure to these air pollutants,
including mild to severe respiratory and neurological problems, cardiovascular damage,
endocrine disruption, birth defects, cancer, and premature mortality. Meanwhile, industry
workers face even greater risks from on-site exposure to toxic chemicals and other airborne
materials, including silica (the main component of frac sand), which can lead to lung disease and
cancer when inhaled.

Fracking exacerbates global warming by releasing methane which is 84 times

more toxic than carbon dioxide.
Melissa Horton “What Are the Effects of Fracking on the Environment?” May 08, 2019
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/011915/what-are-effects-fracking-
environment.asp

One of the main pollutants released in the fracking process is methane. Research indicates the
U.S. oil and gas industry emits 13 million metric tons of methane annually, for a leak rate of
2.3% of all production. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), by contrast, estimates the
fugitive emission rate at 1.4 percent.5 6 Methane is a major greenhouse gas. Its global warming
potential is 84 times that of carbon dioxide on a 20-year horizon, and 25 times on a 100-year
horizon.7 In addition to fracking's global impact, there are harmful effects to those living near
extraction sites. A host of ancillary components released at well sites can lead to health
problems such as irritation of the eyes, nose, mouth and throat. Local air pollution can
aggravate asthma and other respiratory conditions. Regionally, fracking-related processes
release nitrogen oxides and volatile organic compounds, forming smog that can deprive workers
and local residents of clean air.8

Air and soil pollution are intrinsic to fracking – the long-term environmental
impacts are not worth the cost.
Melissa Horton “What Are the Effects of Fracking on the Environment?” May 08, 2019
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/011915/what-are-effects-fracking-
environment.asp

Fracking Effects on Water Supply and Quality On a national and state level, the fracking process
uses billions of gallons of water each year. On a local level, the median volume of water
consumed is 1.5 million gallons per well, according to the EPA. This consumption reduces the
amount of fresh water available to nearby residents, particularity in areas where water
availability is low.9 When water is not available to fracking sites locally, it may be transported
from other regions, ultimately drawing down available water from lakes and rivers across the
country. Another major concern is water contamination, as there is risk chemicals used in the
fracking process might leak back into local water supplies. In a 2015 report, the EPA
documented 151 spills of hydraulic fracturing fluid. In thirteen of those cases the spill reached
surface water supplies.10 The byproduct of fracking's water consumption is billions of gallons of
wastewater, only small portions of which are re-used in the fracking process.11 The majority of
wastewater is injected into underground wells, and what isn't injected is transported for
treatment. The EPA highlights potential leakage from wastewater storage pits, or accidental
releases during transport, as risks to drinking water supplies.12 Other Environmental Concerns
In addition to air and water pollution, fracking can have long-term effects on the soil and
surrounding vegetation. The high salinity of wastewater spills can reduce the soil's ability to
support plant life.13 In addition, the injection wells used in the storage of hydraulic fracturing
wastewater can cause earthquakes.14 The Bottom Line Even though fracking has the potential
to provide more oil and gas resources to consumers, the process of extraction has long-lasting
negative impacts on the surrounding environment. Air pollution and water contamination due
to the toxic chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing are the greatest concerns within fracking
sites, while the need for wastewater disposal and shrinking water supplies are also pressing
issues directly related to the procedure.

Fracking bad for the environment and air pollution

Melissa Denchak (National Resource Defense Council) “Fracking 101” April 19, 2019
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fracking-101#whyis

Wastewater Mismanagement Every year, the oil and gas industry generates billions of gallons of
wastewater, a potentially hazardous mixture of flowback (used fracking fluid), produced water
(naturally occurring water that is released with the oil and gas), and any number of other
naturally occurring contaminants ranging from heavy metals, salts, and toxic hydrocarbons like
benzene to radioactive materials such as uranium. This wastewater can enter and contaminate
the environment in myriad ways: when transported (in 2015, for example, a broken North
Dakota pipeline carrying produced water spilled about three million gallons of contaminants
into a nearby creek), when stored (open pits that hold wastewater aboveground can spill, leak,
and emit air pollution), or when treated (wastewater treatment facilities unable to properly
handle pollutants found in fracking waste can release contaminants into surface waters). Even
the recycling of wastewater poses a threat as it generates concentrated waste products,
including a by-product called TENORM (technologically enhanced naturally occurring radioactive
material), which must then be properly managed. Recycled wastewater must also be
appropriately treated for its intended end use, which can be challenging when companies do not
fully disclose all the chemical contents.
 1NC---Water Pollution
Fracking doesn’t hurt ground water
The Academy of Medicine, Engineering and Science of Texas (TAMEST)
“Environmental and Community Impacts of Shale Development in Texas” 2017
http://tamest.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Final-Shale-Task-Force-Report.pdf

Water Availability and Supply • Research and testing to enable the use of brackish groundwater
and produced waters for hydraulic fracturing should be encouraged. • Recent Railroad
Commission of Texas rules to encourage recycling should be tracked, and their effectiveness for
promoting increased use of produced water should be evaluated. • Aquifer investigations
including pumping tests and chemical analyses should be used to better characterize the
productivity and chemical composition of brackish groundwater, and variability of these
properties, in oil and gas producing areas. • Further research on the broad life-cycle risks related
to water management decisions should be conducted. This research should recognize trade-offs
among water use sectors, and provide a basis for balancing increased use of poor-quality waters
with freshwater use for new hydraulic fracturing activities. Subsurface Contamination by
Fracturing or Formation Fluid • Direct migration of contaminants from targeted injection zones
is highly unlikely to lead to contamination of potential drinking water aquifers. The collection
and sharing of pressure data relevant to communication between water-bearing and producing
strata—including non-commercial flow zones—or across wells could help identify and avoid
potential concerns. Spills of Flowback Water, Drilling Fluid, and Formation Water at the Surface
• Statewide leak and spill reporting requirements for produced water 22 ENVIRONMENTAL AND
COMMUNITY IMPACTS OF SHALE DEVELOPMENT IN TEXAS should be considered. For all spilled
substances, reporting requirements should be improved to aid identification of the primary
sources of leaks and appropriate management responses. • Texas regulators and industry
should continue to develop and apply best management practices relative to well casing design
and construction, and surface management of oil and gas operations, to reduce inadvertent
release of fluids. Wastewater Treatment and/or Disposal • Research on techniques for cost-
effectively treating produced water, particularly for uses that have minimal quality
requirements, such as for hydraulic fracturing, should be continued. • Additional research to
evaluate potential negative impacts of any such uses also should be undertaken.
Fracking doesn’t hurt water – contaminants are naturally occurring
Jennifer Harkness et al “The geochemistry of naturally occurring methane and saline
groundwater in an area of unconventional shale gas development” July 2017
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0016703717302004

Since naturally occurring methane and saline groundwater are nearly ubiquitous in many
sedimentary basins, delineating the effects of anthropogenic contamination sources is a major
challenge for evaluating the impact of unconventional shale gas development on water quality.
This study investigates the geochemical variations of groundwater and surface water before,
during, and after hydraulic fracturing and in relation to various geospatial parameters in an area
of shale gas development in northwestern West Virginia, United States. To our knowledge, we
are the first to report a broadly integrated study of various geochemical techniques designed to
distinguish natural from anthropogenic sources of natural gas and salt contaminants both
before and after drilling. These measurements include inorganic geochemistry (major cations
and anions), stable isotopes of select inorganic constituents including strontium (87Sr/86Sr),
boron (δ11B), lithium (δ7Li), and carbon (δ13C-DIC), select hydrocarbon molecular (methane,
ethane, propane, butane, and pentane) and isotopic tracers (δ13C-CH4, δ13C-C2H6), tritium
(3H), and noble gas elemental and isotopic composition (helium, neon, argon) in 105 drinking-
water wells, with repeat testing in 33 of the wells (total samples = 145). In a subset of wells (n =
20), we investigated the variations in water quality before and after the installation of nearby
(<1 km) shale-gas wells. Methane occurred above 1 ccSTP/L in 37% of the groundwater samples
and in 79% of the samples with elevated salinity (chloride > 50 mg/L). The integrated
geochemical data indicate that the saline groundwater originated via naturally occurring
processes, presumably from the migration of deeper methane-rich brines that have interacted
extensively with coal lithologies. These observations were consistent with the lack of changes in
water quality observed in drinking-water wells following the installation of nearby shale-gas
wells. In contrast to groundwater samples that showed no evidence of anthropogenic
contamination, the chemistry and isotope ratios of surface waters (n = 8) near known spills or
leaks occurring at disposal sites mimicked the composition of Marcellus flowback fluids, and
show direct evidence for impact on surface water by fluids accidentally released from nearby
shale-gas well pads and oil and gas wastewater disposal sites. Overall this study presents a
comprehensive geochemical framework that can be used as a template for assessing the sources
of elevated hydrocarbons and salts to water resources in areas potentially impacted by oil and
gas development.

While fracking does have risks, it is overwhelmingly safe and does not affect
ground water negatively
Craig Welsh “Fracking Pollutes Some Water, But Harm is Not Widespread, EPA Says” June 04,
2015 https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/150604-fracking-EPA-water-wells-
oil-gas-hydrology-poison-toxic-drinking

The most sweeping review ever of hydraulic fracturing found that it has not caused widespread
harm to U.S. drinking water. But the controversial method of extracting oil and gas from
underground rocks still poses many threats to water, officials with the Environmental Protection
Agency said Thursday. The EPA’s long-awaited analysis is considered important because it is a
nationwide assessment of the risks to water supplies posed by fracking. The intent is to give
states and local governments an idea of what pollution and other effects to expect and help
them decide how to regulate the growing industry. The EPA acknowledged "specific instances"
around the country where fracking and related activities had polluted or depleted groundwater,
drinking wells, and streams. But the agency maintained in its draft assessment that those
situations involved a tiny fraction of the more than 25,000 oil and gas wells that are being
drilled every year nationwide. "We found that hydraulic fracturing processes are being carried
out in a way that has not led to widespread, systemic impacts on drinking water," says Thomas
Burke, science advisor and deputy assistant administrator of EPA’s Office of Research and
Development. "The number of documented impacts is fairly low compared to the number of
wells."

Don’t buy the hype – fracking doesn’t pollute water

Harris 2012 (Colin Harris, attorney with 20 years of experience in matters pertaining to the
Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, May 8, 2012, “Why Anti-Fracking Groups Are Shifting Their
Story From Water To Air Quality,” http://goo.gl/4H1TW)

Mark Twain said “never let the truth stand in the way of a good story.” A common hydraulic
fracturing narrative is that the technology pollutes water supplies. The story goes that
fracturing is a mysterious and untested practice, that fracturing fluids are a secret, “chemical
cocktail,” that there are innumerable incidents of aquifer and drinking water contamination,
resulting even in tap water catching fire, and that “Big Oil” has pressured Congress into
exempting the technology from any environmental laws. The truth is not as exciting. Hydraulic
fracturing involves the injection of fluid consisting of approximately 99.5% water and sand (the
rest consists of common industrial or even household chemicals or materials) through wells
constructed with protective casing and cement, into producing shale formations. The
formations are thousands of feet below drinking water aquifers, separated by impervious rock.
While the technology has evolved and is used more frequently, fracturing is not new, is heavily
regulated at the state level, and enjoys no blanket exemption from environmental laws. There
is no credible data indicating that fracturing of shale formations has ever contaminated
drinking water. Fracturing proponents have struggled to gain the high ground in the debate on
water quality, even as they debunked the myths time and again with facts and data.
Fortunately, the groundwater issue may be losing traction, at least concerning some high-
profile cases where the regulators recently have retracted allegations or reconsidered data.

Best study concludes no groundwater contamination

Stokstad 2012 (Erik Stokstad, February 16, 2012, “Mixed Verdict on Fracking,” Science NOW,
a publication of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, http://goo.gl/BybsZ)

A controversial method of drilling for natural gas, called fracking, has boomed in recent years
—as have concerns over its potential to cause environmental contamination and harm human
health. But a major review of the practice, released today, uncovered no signs that it is causing
trouble below ground. “We found no direct evidence that fracking itself has contaminated
groundwater,” said Charles Groat of the University of Texas (UT), Austin, who led the study.
The report, released here at the annual meeting of the American Association for the
Advancement of Science (which publishes ScienceNOW), doesn't give this form of natural gas
extraction a clean bill of health. Rather, it suggests that problems aren't directly caused by
fracking, a process in which water, sand, and chemicals are pumped into wells to break up
deep layers of shale and release natural gas. Instead, the report concludes, contamination
tends to happen closer to the surface when gas and drilling fluid escapes from poorly lined
wells or storage ponds. Groat, a former director of the U.S. Geological Survey, emphasized that
the $380,000 report was independent from the natural gas industry and conducted only with
university funds. Underlying white papers were peer-reviewed, he told ScienceNOW, and the
Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) was consulted on the overall scope and design of the
study. As part of the review, 16 researchers at UT Austin in a variety of fields including air
quality and hydrology reviewed the scientific literature and regulatory documents for three
major areas of fracking in Texas, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania and New York. They could not
find evidence of drilling fluids leaking deep underground, and methane in water wells in some
areas is probably due to natural sources. The team did not see a need for new regulations
specific to fracking, but for better enforcement of existing regulations of drilling in general—
such as those covering well casing and disposal of wastewater from drilling. (Fracking in 2005
was specifically exempted from the Clean Water Act.)
 1NC---Soil Pollution
Alt causes---farming and pesticides
FAIRR, 05-10-2019, (The FAIRR Initiative holds that intensive animal production poses material
risks to the global financial system and hinders sustainable development.), “Land environmental
damage as a result of intensive farming”, Farm Animal Investment Risk and Return,
https://www.fairr.org/article/land-pollution-as-a-result-of-intensive-farming//ceng/msdi21

Pesticides and fertilisers Pesticides and fertilisers used on crops fed to animals are a major contributor
to land pollution. Inevitably, a portion of fertilisers washes into waterways along with eroded
sediments and this can lead to the creation of dead zones that kill aquatic life. Additionally, use of
artificial fertilizers in place of manure can eventually deplete soils, making them lose their ability to hold
water and makes them subject to erosion. Improper disposal of waste With its vast size and scale the intensive farming industry is a
major contributor of waste. The high concentration of livestock in factory farms inevitably results in a build-up of animal waste.
When factory farms spray liquid manure onto fields, the amount of waste applied often exceeds what the crops can take up, leaving
the rest to escape into the air or runoff into surface waters. This improper collection and disposal of untreated animal waste can
harm soil health local water supplies and human health. If antibiotic-resistant bacteria are present in manure, this can also spread to
the wider environment with applied as manure. Livestock & agricultural deforestation and logging Livestock
production already consumes 83% of global arable land and consequently there is a clamour to reallocate forests into agricultural
land. It’s estimated that between 1991-2005, 70% of deforestation in the Amazon Basin could be attributed to the beef industry.
Meanwhile, global forests, once a crucial carbon sink, have been cut down at such an alarming pace that they are now a net
contributor to GHG emissions.
 1NC---Biodiversity
Humans can survive post-collapse and there’s no relationship between survival
and biodiversity – their authors use flawed data analysis
Hough 14 [Rupert, Environmental Scientist with Expertise in Risk Modelling and Exposure Assessment and PhD from
Nottingham University, February, “Biodiversity and human health: evidence for causality?” Biodiversity and Conservation, Vol.
23 No. 2, pg. 272-3/AKG]

Large country-level assessments (e.g. MEA 2005; Huynen et al. 2004; Sieswerda et al. 2001) must be
interpreted with some caution. Data measured at country-level are likely to mask regional and
local-level effects. Apart from the fact that there are limitations to regression analysis in
providing any proof of causality, least squares regression models assume linear relationships between
reductions in biodiversity and human health and thus imply a linear relationship between loss of biodiversity and
the provision of relevant ecosystem goods and services. A number of authors, however, have suggested that
ecosystems can lose a proportion of their biodiversity without adverse consequences
to their functioning (e.g. Schwartz et al. 2000). Only when a threshold in the losses of biodiversity is reached does the
provision of ecosystem goods and services become compromised. These models also tend to assume a positive relationship
between socio-economic development and loss of biodiversity. One problem with this expectation is that the loss
in
biodiversity in one country is not per definition the result of socio-economic developments in that
particular country, but could also be the result of socio-economic developments in other parts of
the world (Wackernagel and Rees 1996). Furthermore, the use of existing data means researchers can
only make use of available indicators. Unlike for human health and socio-economic development, there are
no broadly accepted core-set of indicators for biodiversity (Soberon et al. 2000). The lack of
correlation between biodiversity indicators (Huynen et al. 2004) shows that the selected indicators do not
measure the same thing, which hinders interpretation of results. Finally, there is likely to
be some sort of latency period between ecosystem imbalance and any resulting health consequences.
To date, this has not been investigated using regression approaches. Finally, it is thought that provisioning services are more
crucial for human health and well-being that other ecosystem services (Raudsepp-Hearne et al. 2010). Trends in measures of
human well-being are clearly correlated with food provisioning services, and especially with meat consumption (Smil 2002).
While *60 % of the ecosystem services assessed by the MEA were found to be in decline, most of
these were regulating and supporting services, whereas the majority of expanding services
were provisioning services such as crops, livestock and aquaculture (MEA 2005). Raudsepp-
Hearne et al. (2010) investigated the impacts on human well-being from decreases in non-food ecosystem services using
national-scale data in order to reveal human well-being trends at the global scale. At the global scale, forest cover, biodiversity,
and fish stocks are all decreasing; while water crowding (a measure of how many people shared the same flow unit of water
placing a clear emphasis on the social demands of water rather than physical stress (Falkenmark and Rockstro¨m 2004)), soil
degradation, natural disasters, global temperatures, and carbon dioxide levels are all on the rise, and land is becoming
increasingly subject to salinization and desertification (Bennett and Balvanera 2007). However, across countries,
Raudsepp-Hearne et al. (2010) found no correlation between measures of wellbeing and the
available data for non-food ecosystem services, including forest cover and percentage of
land under protected-area status (proxies for many cultural and regulating services), organic pollutants (a
proxy for air and water quality), and water crowding index (a proxy for drinking water availability, Sieswerda et al.
2001; WRI 2009) This suggests there is no direct causal link between biodiversity decline
and health, rather the relationship is a ‘knock-on’ effect. I.e. if biodiversity decline affects mankind’s ability to produce
food, fuel and fibre, it will therefore impact on human health and well-being. As discussed in the introduction, the fact that
humans need food, water and air to live is an obvious one. All these basic provisions can be produced in a
diversity-poor environment. Therefore, to understand whether there is a potential causality relationship
between biodiversity in its own right and human health, we need to move beyond the basic provisioning services.
 1NC---Food
Either the food supply chain is resilient
James Tefft works for the FAO Investment Centre in Rome, Italy. He spent a number of years as
the Centre’s liaison officer to the World Bank, 2020,
https://foodtank.com/news/2020/04/local-government-resilience-of-agrifood-systems-covid-
19/, Foodtank, How Local Government Are Strengthening the Resilience of Agrifood Systems to
COVID-19, Xoxo 5/26/2020

The current COVID-19 pandemic is unprecedented. Local governments across the globe are working with
agrifood business groups, farmer organizations, civil society networks and communities to make
sure food systems function effectively. The nature of the pandemic is giving rise to new challenges to food system
actors at every level – disruptions to food supply chains and logistics, rapid changes in consumer food behavior,
more worker safety measures. The situation calls for stronger public, private and community safety nets to feed the increasing
number of people who have lost jobs or income. Local governments, in direct contact with communities, also have a critical
role to play in adapting and supporting food systems to conform to COVID-19 health directives while ensuring the local population’s
food security. Local responses Local responses throughout the world point to the increasingly important role of local government in
food system performance. Experiences in several countries show how leadership
and functional relationships with
local actors contribute to proactive and agile responses by local government and promote
innovative action tailored to local contexts. Action taken at provincial, district/county and
municipal levels can help strengthen the governance and continuity of food systems. Governors,
mayors and local authorities are close to the populations they serve. They understand their needs. Following school closures in the
Republic of Korea and the country’s innovative Eco-Friendly Free School Meal Program, numerous governors and mayors took to
social media. They worked with agrifood promotion agencies and collaborated with producer and food company associations to
adapt marketing plans or facilitate the direct sale of surplus supplies of potatoes, fresh fruit, vegetables and fish. In Italy, local
government worked with farmers and food businesses to address housing and health issues of the migrant workers needed to
harvest fruit and vegetables. In North America and Europe, local government officials have helped food banks,
community kitchens and community-supported agriculture to respond to the huge demand for
their food. Local private sector food industry groups, producer and informal food sector associations, civil society
organizations and citizen groups are playing equally prominent roles to ensure supply chains function, workers are
protected and vulnerable populations reached. Residents in apartment blocks in China and Italy use group chat apps
for joint food purchases and spaced delivery to household doorsteps. China’s “love cabbage” campaign – in which
Chinese “netizens” sent cabbages to Wuhan – used such a system. Functioning food markets Local governments are providing
leadership to local actors to address food system bottlenecks caused by the health crisis. Functioning food markets are essential to
meet the food needs of local populations, providing jobs and fiscal revenues. Local governments in China’s Hubei Province worked
with wholesale food market officials on measures to ensure the safety of workers, transporters, market operations and local food
supplies. In
India, traditional local government assemblies and food market and health officials
worked with state agriculture officials to develop containment c ompliant measures to keep agriculture and
food markets working. They marked trading floors to maintain spacing, set trading times, issued e-passes to market traders, workers
and transporters, controlled truck deliveries and vehicle traffic, set up farmer-to-consumer stalls across cities, allowed
farmer-to-trader sales outside markets to avoid congestion and mandated compulsory masks, hand sanitization and regular market
disinfectant sprays.
Or alt causes make collapse inevitable
Jason Hickel, August 21, 2019, [Jason Hickel is an anthropologist, author, and a fellow of the
Royal Society of Arts], The Global Food Crisis Is Here, Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/21/the-global-food-crisis-is-here/, Xoxo 5/27/2020

Consider the mighty Himalayan glaciers. When we think about melting glaciers, we mourn the loss of a natural wonder and
worry about sea level rise. We don’t think much about what glaciers have to do with food. But that’s where the real crunch is
coming. Half of Asia’s population depends on water that flows from Himalayan glaciers—not only for drinking and other household
needs but, more importantly, for agriculture. For thousands of years, the runoff from those glaciers has
been replenished each year by ice buildup in the mountains. But right now they’re melting at a much
faster rate than they are being replaced. On our present trajectory, if our governments fail to accomplish radical
emissions reductions, most of those glaciers will be gone within a single human lifetime. This will rip the heart out of the
region’s food system, leaving 800 million people in crisis. And that’s just Asia. In Iraq, Syria, and much of the rest
of the Middle East, droughts and desertification will render whole regions inhospitable to
agriculture. Southern Europe will wither into an extension of the Sahara. Major food-growing regions in China and the
United States will also take a hit. According to warnings from NASA, intensive droughts could turn the American plains and
the Southwest into a giant dust bowl. Today all of these regions are reliable sources of food. Without urgent climate action, that will
change. As David Wallace-Wells reports in The Uninhabitable Earth, scientists estimate that for every degree we heat the planet, the
yields of staple cereal crops will decline by an average of about 10 percent. If we carry on with business as usual, key staples are
likely to collapse by some 40 percent as the century wears on. Under normal circumstances, regional food shortages can be covered
by surpluses from elsewhere on the planet. But models suggest there’s a real danger that climate breakdown could trigger shortages
on multiple continents at once. According to the IPCC report, warming more than 2 degrees Celsius is likely to cause “sustained food
supply disruptions globally.” As one of the lead authors of the report put it: “The potential risk of multi-breadbasket failure is
increasing.” Climate change is projected to drive up hunger rates, malnutrition, and child stunting. But we’d be kidding ourselves if
we think this is just a matter of not having enough food to eat. It also has serious implications for global political stability. Regions
affected by food shortages will see mass displacement as people migrate to more arable parts of the planet or in search of stable
food supplies. In fact, it’s happening already. Many of the people fleeing places like Guatemala and Somalia right now are doing so
because their farms are no longer viable. Political systems are already straining under the weight of a refugee
crisis: Fascist
movements are on the march, and international alliances are beginning to fray. Factor in a 40 percent
loss of global agricultural yields and multi-breadbasket failure, and there’s no predicting what
conflagrations might occur. There is a troubling irony here. Climate change is undermining global food
systems, but at the same time our food systems are a major cause of climate breakdown. According to the IPCC, agriculture
contributes nearly a quarter of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Of course, it’s not just any
kind of agriculture that’s the problem here—it’s specifically the industrial model that has come to dominate farming over the past
half-century or so. This approach relies not only on aggressive deforestation to make way for large-scale monoculture, which alone
generates 10 percent of global greenhouse gases; it also depends on intensive plowing and heavy use of chemical fertilizers, which is
rapidly degrading the planet’s soils and in the process releasing huge plumes of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. This might
appear to be an insurmountable problem, on the face of it. After all, we need to feed the world’s population, and intensive farming
seems like the most efficient way to do it. If anything, given that around a billion people don’t get enough food to eat as it is, we
should probably be doing more of it. And if that’s the case, it
seems virtually impossible to meet our climate
goals while at the same time producing enough food to feed the world. Read More The economist
William Nordhaus will receive his profession’s highest honor for research on global warming that’s been hugely influential—and
entirely misguided. Fortunately, there’s an easy solution. It hinges on recognizing that a significant amount of industrial agriculture is
in fact unnecessary for human needs. Consider this: According to the IPCC, around 30
percent of global food production
is wasted each year, mostly in high-income countries. By ending food waste and distributing food surpluses more fairly, we
can put an end to hunger while actually reducing global agricultural output. Scientists estimate that this could liberate several million
square miles of land and cut global emissions by 8-10 percent, taking significant pressure off the climate. This is not difficult to
achieve. In South Korea, households are required to pay a fee for every kilogram of food they toss. France and Italy have banned
food waste by supermarkets. The same thing could be done for farms, going further upstream to the point of production. Dealing
with food waste
is a crucial first step toward making agricultural systems more climate-rational. But
there’s another, perhaps even simpler intervention that needs to be on the table.
 1NC---Disease
Natural pandemics won’t cause human extinction
Sebastian Farquhar 1/23/2017, director at Oxford's Global Priorities Project, Owen
Cotton-Barratt, a Lecturer in Mathematics at St Hugh’s College, Oxford, John Halstead, Stefan
Schubert, Haydn Belfield, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, "Existential Risk Diplomacy and
Governance", GLOBAL PRIORITIES PROJECT 2017,
https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf
1.1.3 Engineered pandemics For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global
fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to
cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database
has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since
1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals
and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious
disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which
is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is
very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that
highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is
a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal . Therefore, pathogens are
likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts .39
 1NC---Yellowstone
Super volcanoes won’t erupt and even if they did—no extinction
Katharine Lackey, 08-21-2018, (Writer for USA Today), “Why you can stop worrying
Yellowstone's supervolcano is about to end the world”, USA Today, Why you can stop worrying
Yellowstone's supervolcano is about to end the world/ceng
Wyoming – You can’t miss the heat coming from beneath the surface here. It’s visible everywhere you look, from the steaming
geysers to the bubbling mud puddles and the colorful hot springs. All that activity is fueled by a smoldering supervolcano, a heat
engine buried deep underground that has produced some of the largest eruptions in the world. The
last supereruption
about 631,000 years ago spewed 240 cubic miles of pulverized rock and ash into the atmosphere, covering nearly half the
country in the powdery residue. “It’s an active volcano. It will erupt again,” said Michael Poland, scientist-in-charge at the
Yellowstone Volcano Observatory, a consortium of eight organizations led by the U.S. Geological Survey. But don’t go changing your
vacation plans just yet – or potentially ever. Scientists who study Yellowstone's 45-by-30-mile caldera,
roughly the size of Rhode Island, say the underground system probably will give decades of
warning before it blows – and that isn't likely to happen for thousands of years. Despite the seismic
orchestra of "snap, crackle and pop" that goes on underground, there are no signs it's about to become more
explosive. “Geological events are stunning in their power, but they’re infrequent in human
terms,” said Jerry Fairley, a professor of geological sciences at the University of Idaho who has studied Yellowstone’s
supervolcano for the past nine years. “We live on a very active planet, but it's rare that we get to see the
kind of power from the Earth that it is capable of generating.” 'It's the story that never dies' That long
view has been partially drowned out in the past decade by a fever pitch of documentaries,
online articles and amateur video clips that point to Yellowstone's frequent minor earthquakes –
it averages 1,500 to 2,500 a year – or blatantly false rumors that the ground is swelling upward
as signs the volcano’s time bomb is ticking down. The result, the most extreme of these conspiracy theories say,
would be the end of the world. Such warnings draw conclusions from the volcano's past eruptions to
model what it could spew next – a faulty connecting of dots that ignores key information on
how volcanoes operate, experts say. Yet those theories have continued to pop up over the past
decade on Facebook, YouTube and other social media services and often are revived when a new study
emerges or a swarm of earthquakes hits the park. The park service fields calls every year from would-be vacationers who want to
know if visiting the national park, which receives more than 4 million people a year, would put them in danger. “We see people who
are thinking about changing their plans because of the stuff they’re reading,” said Neal Herbert, a spokesman for the park. “ It’s
the story that never dies.” The signs just aren't there Visitors to the park come for the unusual geological activity: They
bustle through the heavy summer crowds to feel the steam coming off the geysers and see the brilliant colors of the hot springs –
shades of burnt orange, bright blue and vivid green – created by the microorganisms that thrive in the extreme heat. Regular
earthquakes are usually too subtle, at magnitude 2 or far less, to jolt them. Those rumblings are one of the giveaways a giant
volcano slumbers below the surface. But
the quakes don't indicate a big eruption is coming soon. In fact,
the frequent earthquakes may be acting as a safety valve to release pressure before it builds up,
similar to how a pressure cooker releases steam so it remains safe. “They may be a sign of safety
rather than a sign of impending doom,” Fairley said. Any warning signs would occur well before
an eruption, and they just aren't there right now. Multiple, large earthquakes would rattle the
park, the ground would move up or down by tens of feet over months or years as the magma
underneath shuffled around, gases would be emitted from the ground, the chemicals in the springs would
change, and more heat would be generated, Poland said. It’s simply business as usual for the park right now, Fairley
said. “Yellowstone, in a sense, is breathing,” he said. When the volcano does erupt, it's likely to be on
a smaller scale that would more closely resemble Hawaii's Kilauea volcano eruption this
summer, which caused a lava flow that forced evacuations and submerged neighborhoods but
didn't result in the cataclysmic destruction of Yellowstone's past supereruptions. The last time
Yellowstone experienced a lava flow was about 70,000 years ago. What’s more, we’d probably have decades of warning between
the first sign of an eruption and Yellowstone actually blowing its top, said Christy Till, a
geologist and assistant professor
at Arizona State University who has researched the volcano for the past six years. “That's the kind of
time scale where we think something could happen to trigger an eruption,” she said. “ It's not like it would happen
tomorrow.” The magma underneath Yellowstone would also need to be heated up – a lot: Right
now seismic studies indicate it’s mostly solidified, not the hot liquid required for an eruption.
“You would need to collect a huge volume of magma all in the same place, and then you'd need to generate enough pressure to get
it moving up to the surface,” Poland said. “And we see neither of those conditions in place right now.” It’s entirely possible those
conditions may never exist again: The supervolcano may be dying, said Ilya Bindeman, a University of Oregon geology
professor who has been working on Yellowstone's caldera for 20 years. Each supereruption melts part of the crust, hardening it and
making it more difficult to generate enough heat to remelt the material. “After a certain point, you remelt the entire crust and now
it’s sturdier,” Bindeman said. The melting temperature rises and the heat below can’t break through the tough outer skin formed by
previous eruptions. Essentially: “It just cannot get hot enough to erupt again,” he said.
 1NC---Methane
Methane has no contribution to warming
Loris, 2015, - Herbert and Joyce Morgan fellow at The Heritage Foundation Nicolas, "4 Reasons
Obama’s New Methane Emission Regulations Don’t Make Sense," Aug 18,
dailysignal.com/2015/08/18/4-reasons-obamas-new-methane-emission-regulations-dont-make-
sense/

4. It’s another component to a costly, ineffective climate agenda. The

proposed methane regulation is only
one part of the administration’s climate plan, which, taken as a whole, will drive up prices in the
United States yet achieve no meaningful impact on global temperatures. The EPA recently finalized
regulations for new power plants as well as its Clean Power Plan, with carbon dioxide emission reduction targets for each state
(excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and Vermont) in hopes of reducing overall power plant emissions to 32 percent below 2005 levels
by 2030. The federal government has also implemented climate regulations for light- and heavy-duty vehicles and has taken
steps to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from airplanes. Cumulatively, the regulatory onslaught sounds like a lot. And it is,
economically speaking. The overwhelming majority of America’s energy needs are met through coal, natural gas, and oil.
Each regulatory blow inflicted by the administration raises compliance costs and
consequently raises energy prices for American families and businesses. Environmentally
speaking, the cumulative regulatory impact will not amount to much, if anything at all. The U.S.
could grind the economy to a halt and cut all of its emissions, and the averted global
warming would still be less than two tenths of a degree Celsius over the next 85 years. The
federal government’s proposed methane regulations is clearly a targeted attack on
affordable energy source, where the costs will be borne by all Americans —and with nothing to
show for it.
 1NC---Warming
Extinction from warming requires 12 degrees, far greater than their internal
link, and intervening actors will solve before then
Sebastian Farquhar, 2017 leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective
Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,”
https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The
existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability
of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk . It is impossible to say
with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has
suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would
completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of
around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an
existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the
timescales over
which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid
extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual
greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major
emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of
extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than
they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how
the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast
amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The
economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops
such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if
we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions
pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around
3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action
against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is
warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between
CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the
atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by
reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong
incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.
 1NC---HR Cred
Turn---Can’t gain human rights credibility and plan appears hypocritical which
decks credibility
Ted Galen Carpenter, April 26, 2018., [Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in defense and
foreign policy at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The American Conservative, is
the author or coauthor of 10 books on international affairs, including Perilous Partners: The
Benefits and Pitfalls of America’s Alliances with Authoritarian Regime.], Too Many Foreign Policy
Double Standards Hurt U.S. Credibility, Cato institute,
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/too-many-foreign-policy-double-standards-
hurt-us-credibility, Xoxo 6/5/2020

American leaders like to portray the United States as an exemplar of ethical conduct in the
international system. The reality is far different, and it has been for decades. Throughout the Cold War, the United
States embraced extremely repressive rulers, including the Shah of Iran, Nicaragua’s Somoza family, Taiwan’s Chiang
Kai‐shek, and Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, all the while portraying them as noble members of the “Free World.” Such blatant
hypocrisy and double standards continue today regarding both Washington’s own dubious behavior and the U.S.
attitude toward the behavior of favored allies and friends. The gap between professed values and actual policy is especially evident
in the Middle East. U.S. officials routinely excoriate Syria and Iran, not only for their external behavior, but for manifestations of
domestic abuse and repression. Some of those criticisms are valid. Both Bashar al-Assad’s regime and Iran’s clerical government are
guilty of serious international misconduct and human‐rights violations. But the credibility of Washington’s expressions of outrage is
vitiated when those same officials remain silent, or even excuse, equally serious—and in some cases, more egregious—abuses that
the United States and its allies commit. Following the Syrian regime’s alleged use of chemical weapons in early April, President
Trump painted Assad as an exceptionally vile enemy. He immediately issued a tweet describing the Syrian leader as “an animal” who
gassed his own people. In his subsequent address to the American people announcing punitive air and missile strikes, Trump
charged that the incident confirmed “a pattern of chemical weapons use by that very terrible regime. The evil and despicable attack
left mothers and fathers, infants and children thrashing in pain and gasping for air. These are not the actions of a man. They are
crimes of a monster instead.” The president also blasted Russia and Iran for their longstanding sponsorship of Assad. “To Iran and to
Russia, I ask: What kind of a nation wants to be associated with the mass murder of innocent men, women and children?” TAC’s
Daniel Larison provided an apt response to that question. “Trump should know the answer, since he just hosted one of the chief
architects of the war on Yemen that the U.S. has backed to the hilt for the last three years. Britain welcomed the Saudi crown prince
earlier on, and France just hosted him in the last few days. All three have been arming and supporting the Saudis and their allies in
Yemen no matter how many atrocities they commit.” Indeed, the United States has been an outright
accomplice in those atrocities, which among other tragic effects, has led to a cholera epidemic in
Yemen. The U.S. military refuels Saudi coalition warplanes and provides intelligence to assist them in their attacks on Yemen—
attacks that have exhibited total indifference about civilian casualties. A recent revelation implicates Washington in even more
atrocious conduct. Evidence has emerged that Saudi forces have employed white phosphorous munitions, and that the United
States supplied those foul weapons that inflict horrible burns on their victims. For U.S. leaders to criticize Syria for using chemical
weapons in light of such behavior may reach a new level of hypocrisy. U.S. leaders need to be candid with the American people and
acknowledge that their decisions are based on cold calculations of national interest, not ethical considerations. Washington’s double
standard also is evident regarding the international conduct
of another U.S. ally: Turkey. U.S. officials reacted with a
vitriolic denunciation of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but the reaction was—and remains—very different
regarding Ankara’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the occupation of that country’s northern territory. Washington’s
criticism was tepid even at the beginning, and it has become more so with the passage of time. Indeed, there is greater U.S. pressure
on the government of Cyprus to accept a peace settlement that would recognize the legitimacy of the puppet Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus that Ankara established (and has populated with settlers from the Turkish mainland) and countenance the
continued presence of Turkish troops. Although the United States initially imposed mild sanctions on Turkey for invading and
occupying its neighbor, they were soon lifted. Sanctions imposed against Russia are stronger, and there is little prospect that they
will be lifted, or even eased, in the foreseeable future. Washington’s criticism of Turkey’s repeated military incursions into
northern Iraq and northern Syria likewise have been barely audible. That has been the case even though the targets in
Syria are Kurdish forces that aided the United States and its allies in their war against ISIS. The flagrant U.S. double standard also is
apparent in the disparate assessments of the domestic conduct of Iran and such U.S. allies as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. UN
Ambassador Nikki Haley verbally eviscerates Tehran at every opportunity for repressing its population. When anti‐government
demonstrations erupted in several Iranian cities earlier this year, Haley was quick to embrace their cause. “The Iranian regime’s
contempt for the rights of its people has been widely documented for many years,” she stated during a Security Council session.
Haley added that the United States stood “unapologetically with those in Iran who seek freedom for themselves, prosperity for their
families, and dignity for their nation.” Iran
certainly does not resemble a Western‐style democracy, but its
political system is vastly more open than either Egypt’s or Saudi Arabia’s. Although the clerical Guardian
Council excludes any candidate for office that it deems unacceptable, competing elections take place between individuals with often
sharply contrasting views. President Hassan Rouhani won a new electoral mandate over a decidedly more hardline opponent in the
May 2017 presidential election. Compared to some U.S. allies in the Middle East, Iran resembles a Jeffersonian
democracy. The Saudi royal family does not tolerate even a hint of domestic opposition. People have been imprisoned or
beheaded merely for daring to criticize the regime. Saudi Arabia’s overall human‐rights record is easily one of the worst in the world,
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have documented. It is a measure of just how stifling the system is that the
government finally allowing women to drive is considered a radical reform. A similar suffocating miasma of repressionexists in Egypt,
where President Abdel Fattah el‐Sisi has imprisoned thousands of political opponents, executed hundreds, and wins rigged elections
by absurd margins reminiscent of those in Soviet satellite countries during the Cold War. Yet, President Trump and other
U.S. officials express little criticism of those brutal, autocratic allies. Trump’s demeanor during his state visit
to Riyadh last year bordered on fawning. Washington approves multi‐billion‐dollar arms deals for both Saudi Arabia
and Egypt, despite their legendary human‐rights abuses. As noted, the United States even
continues to assist Saudi Arabia in its atrocity‐ridden military intervention in Yemen. There may be
plausible geo‐strategic reasons for persisting in such double standards. Iran, for example, has been openly hostile to the United
States and its policy objectives since the fall of the Shah. It is not illogical for Washington to be intent on countering the influence of
Tehran and its Syrian ally, even if that requires making common cause with other repressive regimes in the region. But U.S. leaders
need to be candid with the American people and acknowledge that their decisions are based on cold calculations of
national interest, not ethical considerations. They should at least spare us their pontificating and the pretense that
they care about the rights or welfare of Middle Eastern populations. Washington’s policies indicate otherwise.
 1NC Enough Regulations Now
Fracking still is regulated by several laws including the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.
Susan Phillips DECEMBER 5, 2011 | 12:00 PM Burning Question: What Would Life Be Like
Without the Halliburton Loophole?
https://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2011/12/05/burning-question-what-would-life-be-
like-without-the-halliburton-loophole/

In his recent testimony to Congress, Secretary Krancer argued that current rules do a good job
overseeing oil and gas production, which makes the Frac Act irrelevant. “The Energy Policy Act
of 2005 has no impact whatsoever on the state and federal laws that prohibit oil and gas
extraction operations from causing surface water or ground water pollution. The whole of oil
and gas operations are subject to the federal Water Pollution Control Act and is prohibited from
causing pollution to the waters of the United States. In Pennsylvania, all aspects of oil and gas
exploration and extraction, including drilling and fracing operations, are regulated by the state’s
Oil and Gas Act, the Clean Streams Law and our water protection regulations. The fact is that the
so-called and misnamed “Halliburton Loophole” in no way diminishes the statutory and
regulatory coverage of our laws as applied to gas extraction.”
Adv. 2
 1NC---Fracking Good
They have the link backwards---fracking boosts economic activity
Michael Greenstone, 02-20-2018, (Michael Greenstone is the Milton Friedman Professor in
Economics, the College, and the Harris School, as well as the Director of the interdisciplinary
Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago. He previously served as the Chief Economist
for President Obama’s Council of Economic Advisers, and currently serves on the Secretary of
Energy's Advisory Board. Greenstone also directed the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project,
which studies policies to promote economic growth, and has since joined its Advisory Council.
He is an elected member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and editor of the
Journal of Political Economy. Before coming to Chicago, Greenstone was the 3M Professor of
Environmental Economics at MIT.), “Fracking Has Its Costs And Benefits -- The Trick Is Balancing
Them”, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ucenergy/2018/02/20/fracking-has-its-costs-and-
benefits-the-trick-is-balancing-them/?sh=5b69b83019b4/ceng/msdi21

On the benefits side, fracking increases economic activity, employment, income and housing prices .
But, it also brings more truck traffic, increases in crime and potential health impacts possibly due to air and/or water pollution. In
some recent work, we’ve added it all up. We
discovered that for the average household living in a
community where fracking takes place the benefits exceed the costs—indeed, it is worth about
$2,000 per year to them. That calculation of $2,000 per year is based on people’s current understanding of the health
impacts at the time of our study. If people’s understanding of the health impacts were to change, it is likely that this would alter the
net benefits of allowing fracking.
 1NC---Renewables Bad
Clean energy drives global land and resource competition – global wars.
Freeman 18. Freeman* and Bazilian**, 18 - research associate for energy and U.S. foreign policy at the
Council on Foreign Relations and an energy and environment fellow with Young Professionals in Foreign
Policy*, executive director of the Payne Institute and a professor of public policy at Colorado School of
Mines, non-resident fellow at the Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy, non-resident senior
associate with the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies** (Madison* and Morgan**, ‘How Renewable Energy Could Fuel Future Conflicts’, October 8
2018, https://www.georgetownjournalofinternationalaffairs.org/online-edition/2018/10/8/how-
renewable-energy-could-fuel-future-conflicts)/ceng/msdi21

Renewable energy technologies promise to help our world avert some of the worst impacts of climate change. However, some of the minerals and metals they require
could contribute to conflict. In the past, fossil fuels were the primary link between energy and conflict, as control and transport of oil and gas drove political unrest, wars over
territory, and interventions by powerful countries concerned with securing their supply chains. However, the energy landscape is changing rapidly, with cleaner sources of electricity swiftly replacing fossil fuels.
The energy transition now seems inevitable, with renewable energy technologies forecasted to constitute almost half of global electricity generation by 2050. While the global transition to clean energy promises a
more sustainable energy future, the switch also creates new challenges through the control of critical minerals used for clean energy technology. Investment in clean energy technologies totaled over $330 billion

the global lithium-

in 2017 and is expected to accelerate over the coming decades, which will cause the demand for minerals critical to these technologies to change accordingly. For example,

ion battery market could more than quadruple to $93 billion by 2025. Driven by the booming
electric vehicle market and expanding energy storage sector, demand will increase for lithium,
cobalt, and magnesium. Clean energy minerals and metals, similar to fossil fuels, are concentrated in certain
geographic areas, and may be subject to similar contests over their control. As the world continues to transition from
oil, gas, and coal to solar and wind, policymakers must take careful steps to ameliorate the risk of negative

externalities from the changing landscape of mineral extraction. Clean Energy Risks Multiple Forms of Conflict Growth of
clean energy technologies may increase the risk of at least three types of conflict: outbreaks of
violence in states with weak institutions, competition over global resource commons, and
weaponization of minerals essential to these technologies in trade disputes . First, reserves of
metals and minerals for clean energy technologies can motivate violent conflict in states with
weak institutions and rule of law. Similar to the “resource curse” of many oil-rich states, developing nations with large natural
resource endowments often experience corruption and violence as different groups vie to
control wealth-generating extractive operations. For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) produces more than 60 percent of the
world’s cobalt, a key component of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles and electricity storage. The country already suffers from widespread violent conflict,

perpetuated by mining wealth, that has driven the creation of at least seventy armed groups,
resulted in massive humans rights violations, and displaced millions. An increase in demand for
cobalt for electric vehicles and grid-scale battery storage could further intensify conflict in the
country. Second, these minerals could also increase competition among states over the global
commons. The Arctic Ocean and the South China Sea, two contested maritime areas, both
contain considerable mineral and metal deposits along undersea fault lines. As ice retreat opens
up more of the Arctic Ocean, exploration for deep-sea deposits of minerals useful for clean
energy technology could drive countries that claim territory in the region to assert their claims
more forcefully. In the South China Sea, Beijing has begun to develop deep sea mining capacities, which will contribute to its effort to establish control of the mineral-rich seabed. China
has demonstrated its willingness to flaunt international law and violate other countries’
sovereign claims to the seabed. Conflict over deep-sea minerals would aggravate these disputes.
Finally, China’s hegemony over the global mining operations of many of these critical minerals

creates a risk that it will use these elements as trade weapons. China produces 95 percent of rare earth elements and leads production in
many other minerals and metals critical to clean energy technologies. This control is highly centralized within specific Chinese companies – one Chinese firm, Tianqi Lithium, controls nearly half of the world’s

lithium. As part of China’s strategy to become the “center of the clean energy universe,” these minerals are integral to its economic future. Past trade disputes, including
China's withholding of rare earths from Japan in 2010, should cause concern, as they show
Beijing is willing to ignore international trade norms surrounding critical metals and minerals . As
the trade war between the United States and China escalates, there is a risk that China may
leverage these minerals’ geopolitical power and restrict their export to the United States.

Coal plants and fossil fuel production won’t go away or disappear. They just
shift production to the global South where there are no regulations and cause
greater harm
Wapner 97. Paul Wapner is an assistant professor in the School of International Service at
American University in Washington, D.C. He is the author of Environmental Activism and World
Civic Politics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996)Environmental Ethics and Global
Governance: Engaging the International Liberal Tradition. Pollution and Displacement Across
Space/ceng/msdi21

Tip O'Neill is famous for saying that all

politics is local. Many environmentalists have taken this to heart
through efforts to keep dangerous activities or materials out of their local communities. The most
expressive form of this is the Not-In-My-Backyard (NIMBY) movement, which consists of communities
organizing to resist the siting of nuclear power plants, landfills, incinerators, and toxic-waste
dumps in their neighborhoods and districts. While NIMBY efforts have been prevalent for years, many observers
locate the beginnings of widespread NIMBY environmentalism with Lois Gibbs and her community's battle against contamination of
Love Canal, New York, in the early 1980s. 11 NIMBYS have been crucial to sounding the environmentalist alarm insofar as they have
highlighted the dangers associated with incinerators, landfills, and so forth. Nonetheless, they inadvertently support
displacement. The vast majority of NIMBYS fight to keep environmental harm out of their own
backyards but often do little to prevent such harm from falling in someone else's community.
NIMBYism is not simply an activist strategy but captures the character of much environmentally significant activity. It supports
the effort to move environmental harm away from one's own community to someone else's .
On a global scale, for reasons not too difficult to identify, this orientation forces environmental harm "South ."
It pushes pollution and the most egregious pollution-causing industries to the poorer and less
politically powerful parts of the globe. One early instance of such displacement across space was thc practice in the
early part of this century of building higher smokestacks to addrcss local air pollution in London. Higher smokestacks spewed soot
and particulates outside the city into the countryside and the English Channel, and eventually to the Continent. In fact, this practice
is still very much at work today, as many European nations, including the United Kingdom, release dangerous emissions beyond their
borders, leading to increased levels of acid rain throughout the Continent. 12 Sweden and Norway, in particular, have been
complaining since the late 1960s that most of their acid deposition originates from pollutants outside their own borders. 13 Much of
this kind of displacement is addressed through the Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention (LRTAP) along with
associated protocols and actions. The
problem still persists, however, and represents a type of practice worthy of ethical
reflection. An even more pernicious example of displacement is the international toxic-waste
trade, which, until the relatively recent Basel Convention, sent millions of tons of poisonous
substances across the globe to the developing world. Communities unwilling to pay the price of
reducing or absorbing their wastes domestically sent them to places where the immediate
financial costs were lower. Much of this traffic, predictably, went from the North to the South. According to one figure,
between 1986 and 1988, Northern waste traders shipped 3.6 million tons of toxic materials to developing countries. 14 Countries in
Africa bore the brunt of the practice, leading one observer to state that, "if European industrial powers could have built a pipeline
across the Mediterranean Sea towards Africa for thedischarge of their hazardous effluents, they would have most probably done
SO."15 The
reason toxic materials moved from the North to the South is not difficult to assess.
Developing countries have fewer controls and often find the financial rewards of disposal
irresistible. In one case, Guinea-Bissau was offered four times its gross national product (GNP)
and twice its national debt to accept over fifteen million tons of toxic waste over a fifteen-year
period. 16 The Basel Convention did much to curb the international toxic-waste trade, especially between Northern and Southern
countries. But it has significant loopholes and continues to be violated. It is, however, an important step in addressing a case where
environmental-justice issues arise. Displacement across space, by the way, is not limited to international activities; indeed, much of
it takes place within the borders of a single country. Consistent, however, is the direction in which displacement occurs. In almost all
cases, it flows from the affluent and privileged to the poor and underprivileged. In its now famous study of 1987, the United Church
of Christ found that the chief predictor of where toxic-waste dumps and commercial hazardous-waste landfills in the United States
were located was skin color'!? And to the degree that skin color correlates with privilege in the United States, it indicates the
dynamics of displacement. This has been confirmed by numerous studies that show that a disproportionate number of incinerators
and hazardous activities are in low income, predominantly minority neighborhoods,!8 The
practice of "dumping" our
ecological woes on the less privileged has led many to talk about a "global south" to indicate
that there are pockets of the underprivileged everywhere. Thus, there is a "south of the South,"
which bears the brunt of most ecological assaults in the developing world, and a "south of the
North," which experiences the bulk of environmental degradation in the developed world . 19 At
work in each of these instances is the choice to ignore the people who live where we dump our environmental problems-or at least
to discount the value of their lives compared to our own. A similar general tendency is to disregard those who live in regions that we
value for their natural beauty and bounty. Hecht and Cockburn make this point forcefully in their study of Brazilian rain forest
politics. They demonstrate that, time and again, developers, rangers, and even many environmentalists from the North refuse to
notice that actual people live in the rain forests and that the fate of the forests should, perhaps, rest in these people's hands.2o
Displacement across space is about refusing to see the so-called other. It
entails ignoring those who are different or
minimizing the quality of their lives in such a way that we can regard them as somehow more
deserving of our ecological assaults. This was expressed with particular poignancy by Lawrence Summers, chief
economist for the World Bank, when he wrote in an internal memorandum, leaked to the public, "Just between youand me,
shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging more migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs [less-developed countries]?"21 In short,
when people export their wastes to other parts of the world, they avoid pollution and thus postpone the experience of confronting
ecological limits. What is often lost in such calculation, however, is that others must then bear the brunt of waste assimilation.
Others must live with the output side of environmental degradation. The international
community has focused to a certain extent on this dimension of environmental issues. The
LRTAP Convention and the Basel Convention represent significant attempts to develop regimes
concerned with the well-being of others. Much more, of course, needs to be done. The
normative commitment to enhance such efforts rests on the moral sensitivity associated with
seeing the exportation of waste as a matter of displacement. It rests on seeing that others are
implicated in one's own attempts to avoid environmental harm.

The aff would create a shift to renewables will require massive destruction of
the planet. AND, the pursuit of alternative energy will itself become another
market for racial capitalism that secures individual consumption
Morningstar 16 Cory Morningstar is an independent investigative journalist, writer and
environmental activist, focusing on global ecological collapse and political analysis of the non-
profit industrial complex. Her recent writings can be found on Wrong Kind of Green, The Art of
Annihilation, Political Context, Counterpunch, Canadians for Action on Climate Change and
Countercurrents. The Art of Annihilation, McKibben’s Divestment Tour – Brought to You by Wall
Street [Part XIV of an Investigative Report] [Environmentalism is Dead – Welcome to the Age of
Anthropocentrism], 4-22/ceng/msdi21
To revisit the concept of stranded assets in regard to conventional fossil fuels, this notion is based upon the
premise that conventional infrastructure and the associated commodity will become stranded following
governments soon/eventual implementation of specific climate legislation [2] and/or increasingly stringent
climate policies that would result in the commodity no longer being able to turn a profit– thus it would become stranded. Yet a
stronger argument could be made for “clean” energy” infrastructure becoming stranded since it
is also carbon based/dependent although this inconvenient truth remains unacknowledged in
environmental circles. Consider the fact that climate science aside, humans are rapidly
exhausting all Earth’s natural resources. (October, 2010: “…our demand on natural resources
has doubled since 1966 and we’re using the equivalent of 1.5 planets to support our activities. If
we continue living beyond the Earth’s limits, by 2030 we’ll need the equivalent of two planets’
productive capacity to meet our annual demands.”) And although this sounds ludicrous to the privileged who
take most every aspect of the Earth’s life sources for granted, the warning is taken very seriously by the heads of NASA. Consider the
response by Administrator of NASA, Charles Bolden speaking at the Humans to Mars summit: “If this species is to survive indefinitely
we need to become a multi-planet species. We need to go to Mars, and Mars is a stepping stone to other solar systems.” (Note that
the quest to place greenhouses on and colonize Mars is well underway. Thus, let
us assume that to start, by 2020, just 4 short
years away, the 60 trillion (needed for “clean” infrastructure alone) is raised . The task then becomes the
companies creating this infrastructure fulfilling the promise of return on these investments by now building/creating the new global
infrastructure. Unparalleled
quantities of rare earth metals must be mined (by machines dependent on crude).
The steel, copper, glass, as well as the energy required (and fossil fuels) to build infrastructure of
this scale will be unprecedented. And it will generate massive growth as our Earth continues to
be plundered. But what of the Earth’s resources being completely depleted by 2030 as predicted by scientists – what then of
the sixty trillion dollar investment – with monetary returns no longer insight? These uncompleted infrastructures, due to depleted
resources, will be, without doubt, stranded assets. It’s hard to believe we are going to use what little of Earth’s finite resources that
remain to fulfil the promise of climate wealth, by building a new “clean energy” infrastructure, rather than radically conserving and
attempting to nourish, what remains. Consider that a mere half of 1% of the total energy consumed in the U.S. is generated by wind,
solar, biofuels, or geothermal heat. Despite much touted efforts in Germany, Spain, and China, globally, in 2013, 1.1% of the world’s
total energy was provided by wind with only 0.2% by solar.[Source | Source] Thus, imagine
the magnitude of
infrastructure required to increase the world’s total energy from renewables up to even 50%. It
is unfathomable. It is this promise of unparalleled growth (under the guise of sustainability)
that has the insatiable capitalists circling the climate crisis like voracious vultures. Rubbing salt in the
wound is the fact that this new infrastructure will serve the same people that have always had the
energy – the same 1% (anyone who can afford to get on a plane) responsible for 50% of the global GHG emissions. To put
this into perspective, consider that only 5% of the world’s population has ever flown. [Source] While many scientists, including NASA,
note that the prospect that “global industrial civilisation could collapse in coming decades due to unsustainable resource
exploitation and increasingly unequal wealth distribution”, the fact that sought after renewable systems such as solar thermal panels
will not only push us towards this collapse but also, cannot exist outside of an industrialized civilization, appear to non-existent. The
proverbial 8000 lb. elephant in the room is documented in a 2009 paper by professor of Atmospheric Studies at the University of
Utah, Tim Garrett. Nov. 22, 2009: “In
a provocative new study, a University of Utah scientist argues that
rising carbon dioxide emissions – the major cause of global warming – cannot be stabilized
unless the world’s economy collapses….” “But most centrally, alternative energy spectacles protect us
from considering our own growth, in consumption and population, which could not otherwise come to a
peaceful end within the logic of the current expansionist milieu.” — Conjuring Clean Energy: Exposing Green Assumptions in Media
and Academia, February 13, 2015 Let’s Pretend But let’s pretend that Earth’s resources are infinite. It is assumed (foolishly) that
fossil fuel power plants will be shut down once adequate solar and wind energy infrastructure is established. To
date, there
appears to be not a single example of a fossil fuel power plant that has closed, due to solar and
wind. Under the industrialized capitalist system, logic conveys that this fact will not change in
the future. In real life (not foundation financed campaigns that pander to public) the energy
producers understand that all/any additional energy that may be produced via “renewables” will
result in more energy to use/sell/waste and feed the engine of industrialized growth. This is the naked truth, which
speaks to the very inconvenient truth upheld by the capitalist system. system. In a world built upon both denial and fantasy, techno-
fetish made vogue, is the preferred choice. All
non-ambient energy creates pollution and destruction,
including renewables which are carbon based and dependent on carbon resources from cradle
to grave – coupled with built-in obsolescence by design. Even when small or local in scale, renewable energy
aids and abets growth, accelerates global warming, and contributes to further ecological
destruction. Further ecological damage is caused by rare earth mining, as well as the acid
drainage type mining for the necessary materials and special metals such as copper and lead. Added to this ecological
devastation are the fossil fuels required/used for the mining and manufacturing of the renewable products and infrastructure.
After the manufacturing they are transported using large-scale industrial equipment also
dependent on crude. Finally, all these same resources are non-renewable. These very
inconvenient facts are ignored. In a perfect world, in another time, perhaps renewable energies will
be made of butterfly kisses and rare, precious Earth minerals will fall from the sky. University of
California physics professor Tom Murphy has calculated that “the batteries required to store this electricity in the
U.S. alone (otherwise no electricity at night or during cloudy or windless spells) would require about three times as
much lead as geologists estimate may exist in all reserves, most of which remain unknown. If you count only
the lead that we’ve actually discovered, Murphy explains, we only have 2% of the lead available for our national battery project. The
number are even more disheartening if you try to substitute lithium ion or other systems now only in the research phase.” [Source]
To not consider renewable energy infrastructures, global in scale, as equally contributing to
growth, ecological destruction and climate change is willful blindness [EDIT: ignorance].. Such willful
blindness is sought after and fervently embraced by the same 1% of the population that creates 50% of all global greenhouse gas
emissions today. Considering the magnitude of the task before us, it
is little wonder we prefer stories, in which we
write the script with a storyline of our liking. Our frail egos do not accept there are consequences to having
plundered our planet in which the outcome will be dictated by nature. “Debord wrote that “the society which rests on modern
industry is not accidentally or superficially spectacular, it is fundamentally spectaclist.” Perhaps he could have spoken similarly about
modern energy or modern environmentalism. Debord’s spectacle is a divine deity around which duty-bound citizens gravitate to
chant objectives without reflecting upon fundamental goals. It’s
all too easy for us to miss the limitations of
alternative energy, Debord might say, as we drop to our knees at the foot of the clean energy
spectacle, gasping in rapture. This oracle delivers a ready-made creed of ideals and objectives that are convenient to
recite and that bear the authority of science. These handy notions of clean energy reflexively work into environmental discourse.
And as we have seen here, productivist
environmentalists enroll media to tattoo wind, solar and
biofuels into the subcutaneous flesh of the environmental movement. In fact, these novelties
come to define what it means to be an environmentalist.

The adoption of green tech in the nations of the global north will result in
dispossession, ecological destruction and state violence in the global south
Eric Bonds University of Mary Washington Liam Downey University of Colorado at Boulder
2012
“Green” Technology and Ecologically Unequal Exchange: The Environmental and Social
Consequences of Ecological Modernization in the World-System 2012, American Sociological
Association, Volume 18, Number 2, Pages 167-186 ISSN 1076-156X/ceng/msdi21

Popular and academic environmental discourses often endow technology with heroic powers. According to such accounts,
contemporary societies have the capacity to develop and commercialize new eco-efficient technologies that utilize significantly
fewer natural resources and produce much less pollution per unit compared to previous generation technologies. Green technology,
these discourses assert, is developed and made broadly available through market forces and/or government policies, and has the
ability to pull societies back from the brink of environmental and economic decline (see Salleh 2012). For instance, the president of
the Environmental Defense Fund, a large U.S. environmental organization, writes that a new industrial revolution is on the horizon
that “will almost certainly create the great fortunes of the twenty-first century. But this new industrial revolution holds a more
important promise: securing the world against the dangers of global warming” (Krupp and Horn 2008: 1). Voicing a similar
sentiment, U.S. President Barack Obama stated, “all of us are going to have to work together in an effective way to figure out how
do we balance the imperatives of economic growth with very real concerns about the effect we're having on our planet. And
ultimately, I think this can be solved by technology” (CBC 2009). Putting it more strongly, New York Times columnist Thomas
Friedman claims that the development of a “clean energy system” will “allow us to grow the world’s economy—not only without
exacerbating energy supply and demand issues, petrodictatorships, climate change, biodiversity loss, and energy poverty—but by
actually reducing them at the same time” (Friedman 2008: 186). Such treatment of technology does not only exist in popular
environmental discourse, but in certain academic discourses as well, particularly in ecological modernization theory. According to
one of the perspective’s founders, “the pivotal component of ecological modernization is advanced technology” (Huber 2008: 360).
Academic proponents of ecological modernization argue that state regulation and tax regimes, market forces, consumer
preferences, and environmental movements propel technological innovation and implementation in ways that
diminish society’s impacts on the environment (Mol 2002; Mol and Spaargaren 2002; Buttel 2003; Cohen 2006;
Schlosberg and Rinfret 2008). In this way, increasingly self-aware and reflective modern societies have, according to ecological
modernization theorists, the technical ability to achieve long-term environmental sustainability and can do so without dramatically
altering or reforming today’s predominant social structures and processes (Mol 1996; Mol and Janicke 2009). This
central
argument of ecological modernization theory rests on the unacknowledged assumption that
“green” technologies—developed and commercialized in core nations—will benefit, or at least
have the capacity to benefit, all people universally. Expectations from a world-systems
perspective are very different. Theorists drawing from this perspective would conceptualize “green”
technologies as commodities. As such, they are derived from particular natural resources that
exist in finite quantities in specific places across the globe (Smith 2005). And, from a world-systems
perspective, because “green” technologies are commodities, they imply relations of inequality and
exploitation (Marx 1994 [1867]). The social relations of particular concern here are of those between
the comparatively wealthy core and the comparatively poorer periphery and the semi-
periphery. To world-systems analysts, the economic development of the core came at the cost of the
underdevelopment, social disruption, and environmental degradation of the periphery (Bunker
1984). Taken together, this means that while the widespread development of “green” technologies may
create real benefits in core nations, it may also produce further environmental degradation,
violence, and social disruption in peripheral zones. In other words, “green” technologies, like
other commodities 169 Journal of World-Systems Research whose production and consumption spans the
globe, are part and parcel to processes of ecologically unequal exchange (see, for instance, Jorgenson
2006, 2009; Foster and Clark 2009). In order to assess these different expectations, we examine three cases of technological
development in the automotive industry: catalytic converters, biofuels, and hybrid cars. In so doing, we ask to what extent the
utilization of “green” technologies in the cars and trucks of wealthier nations inadvertently displaces, or might displace in the future,
environmental harms onto others. In a series of case studies we demonstrate that many
“green” automotive technologies
require raw materials derived from the Global South and that the extraction of these raw
materials regularly results in devastating amounts of environmental destruction. Due to the
structure and operation of the world-economic system in which core nations have a privileged
capacity to obtain such materials for their own domestic use, ecologically unequal exchange can
occur even through processes of ecological modernization. The advancement of “green” technologies
therefore can produce very different outcomes for the core, periphery, and semiperiphery in today’s world. To further consider the
actual or potential impacts of ecological modernization, we also contribute to a growing literature that attends to the ways state
violence and repression facilitate uneven global relationships. States act to violently dispossess
people from their land, violently suppress environmental protest movements, and otherwise
curtail basic human rights in order to promote and protect access to the natural resources —such
as minerals, oil, and timber—that constitute the basis of industrial technologies (Downey, Bonds, and Clark 2010).
We contribute to this literature by arguing that the widespread adoption of “green” technologies in core
nations would require significant amounts of raw materials derived from the Global South ,
facilitated through continued violence and human rights abuses, thereby resulting in the further
underdevelopment of less wealthy countries.

Aff can’t solve – empirics prove that fossil fuel companies invest billions to
secure their wealth and limit the effects of laws. Too many warrants. Our
impact turn outweighs.
Bonds 16 [Eric, Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Mary
Washington, PhD in Sociology from the University of Colorado, “Upending Climate Violence
Research: Fossil Fuel Corporations and the Structural Violence of Climate Change.” Human
Ecology Review, 22: 3-22.]/ceng/msdi21

Despite these consequences, major fossil fuel companies are fighting hard to preserve their business
model, and have exerted considerable political influence to defeat or weaken efforts to limit
carbon emissions around the world. Within the United States alone, oil, gas, and coal mining
companies spent more than US$141 million on lobbying to influence Congress and federal agencies in 2014,
which works out to more than US$386,000 per day, according to the Center for Responsive Politics (2016). This figure does
not include the federal lobbying of electricity utilities, which in the United States have also
vigorously opposed carbon emission limits. This figure also leaves out the vast amounts of
money these companies have paid to promote oil, gas, and coal extraction at the state level of
government. Beyond lobbying to fight carbon emissions, large oil, gas, and coal companies are major campaign contributors to
United States elections. The Center for Responsive Politics estimates that these companies gave close to US$74 million to bankroll
the campaigns of political candidates in the 2014 election. Clearly, large fossil fuel companies give contributions for a number of
reasons. An empirical investigation by Long et al. (2012) for instance finds that coal
companies increase political
donations to weaken or avoid enforcement of environmental laws. It also stands to reason that
they spend large sums to decrease political support for climate change legislation. This would
certainly go a long way to help explain the United States Congress’s recalcitrance on the issue, despite public support for steeper
emissions reductions. Importantly, lobbying
and campaign finance also help secure tens of billions of
dollars in subsidies every year for major fossil fuel companies. To be exact, governments around the world
spent a total of US$88 billion to subsidize exploration for new oil, gas, and coal reserves in 2013 (Bast et al., 2014). But this is only a
portion of the total amount of capital that fossil fuel companies invest to search out new reserves. In 2012 alone, the world’s largest
200 fossil fuel companies spent US$674 billion to hunt for new sources of oil, gas, and coal (Carbon Tracker, 2013). In other words,
even as the largest fossil fuel companies in the world possess more than enough carbon
underground to push atmospheric temperatures far beyond 2 degrees Celsius—which will result
in death, displacement, and suffering—they are making huge investments to find yet more
reserves. In addition to lobbying and providing campaign contributions to help defeat or weaken climate change legislation,
fossil fuel companies and their individual owners/shareholders have played a major role in
funding think tank–driven climate change denialism. In the United States, think tanks have mounted years long
campaigns to convince the public that the science on global warming is unsettled or wrong (Freudenburg et al., 2008; Jacques et al.,
2008; McCright & Dunlap, 2000). Elite-drive
climate denialists further argue that, even if the science is
correct, efforts to reduce carbon emissions would do more harm than good in terms of
economic well-being (McCright & Dunlap, 2000). Climate change denialism has had the effect of
“institutionalizing delay” on climate change mitigation by effectively polarizing the issue of
climate change and by giving elected officials the political cover they need to vote against
emission-reduction legislation (Brulle, 2014; McCright & Dunlap, 2011). In summary then, major oil, gas, and coal
corporations have played, and continue to play, a critical role in the unfolding crisis of climate change by both extracting and selling
the fossil fuels that are driving global warming, but also by successfully working to defeat or water down public efforts to reduce
fossil fuel dependency. Because this behavior will contribute to the deaths, displacement, and untold suffering climate change will
ultimately cause, it can be seen as a form of structural violence. Of course, none of this is to say that
major publicly traded fossil fuel companies are the only powerful organizations responsible for
the structural violence of climate change. For instance, state-owned oil, gas, and coal companies
—such as Saudi Aramco and major Chinese-controlled coal enterprises—and the governments of wealthy nations
that are leading producers of fossil fuels—like Saudi Arabia, Canada, the United States, and Australia—play
a role in contributing to climate violence as well (see for instance Mulvaney et al., 2015). In making the link to
structural violence, I also want to stress that large publicly traded fossil fuel companies are not
intentionally working to cause harm and suffering. In fact, given the prevailing legal, political,
and economic structure of neoliberal capitalism, it would be extremely difficult—if not
impossible—for them to act otherwise. These companies’ efforts to extract the fullest amount of fossil fuels that
technological and market conditions will allow is economically rational, at least in the short term. If any large oil, gas, or coal
company failed to do so, it would, after all, be outcompeted by other companies in cutthroat global markets. And given
that it
is legal to fund elections in order to influence law-making, in this case to defeat or weaken
climate change legislation, it again is rational for these companies to take advantage of such
opportunities. Clearly then, these companies have limited agency within the prevailing political economy. Getting
different outcomes will require systemic changes. But this is a very large goal, and it is difficult to know where to
begin.
 1NC – Renewable shift hurts economy
Shift to renewable energy has massive up-front costs and is unpredictable – no
economic advantage
David Timmons, Jonathan M. Harris, and Brian Roach “The Economics of Renewable Energy”
2014 https://www.bu.edu/eci/files/2019/06/RenewableEnergyEcon.pdf
Renewable solar and wind energy sources have low operating costs—once generating facilities
are built, there is little additional cost for producing energy each year. While this is an operating
advantage over fossil fuels, it comes at the cost of higher capital expenditure. Building a
renewable energy plant is similar to building a fossil energy plant plus buying all the fuel that
the fossil plant will use over its lifetime. Few homeowners would purchase a gas furnace and at
the same time purchase all the gas the furnace would use over its life. Yet by their nature, this is
what is expected for most renewable energy sources. The high capital cost of most renewable
energy sources means that renewable electricity cost is sensitive to interest rates. High interest
rates make renewable sources significantly less attractive when compared to fossil fuels, while
low interest rates make renewables more attractive. Changing interest rates effectively changes
the cost of renewable energy, since interest rates determine the cost of borrowing for initial
capital investment.

Increased renewables hurt economic growth

Venkatraja “Does renewable energy affect economic growth? Evidence from panel data
estimation of BRIC countries” International Journal of Sustainable Development & World
Ecology Volume 27, 2020 - Issue 2

Since the Kyoto Protocol Agreement 1997, the global community is striving towards
implementing renewable energy practices and thereby contribute to the sustainability of
growth. Committing to this cause, developed and emerging economies have been increasing the
production and consumption of renewable energy in absolute terms. The growth hypothesis
states that economic growth of the country is negatively affected when the share of renewable
energy to total energy mix increases. While other hypotheses contradict with this notion and
such contradiction has created a vacuum in the literature. This paper has the objective to study
the impact of changes in the share of renewable energy to the total energy mix and test the
validity of growth hypothesis applying to the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries. The
study uses the secondary data covering the period 1990–2015. Share of renewable energy
consumption in total energy consumption and share of renewable electricity output in total
energy output have been taken as proxies to renewable energy, and economic growth is
measured by GDP per capita. A panel regression model has been estimated and the result finds
evidence to support the growth hypothesis. It is found that the decreasing share of renewable
energy to the total energy might have contributed to the faster economic growth in BRIC region.
It implies that in BRIC countries, if the share of renewable energy to total energy increases, the
economic growth will have negative impact.
 1NC – No renewable shift
Economic factors outside the scope of the aff prevent a transition to
renewables
Gupta et al “Breaking barriers in deployment of renewable energy” January 2019
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6351575/

4.2. Economic barriers Factors influencing economic and financial barriers are high initial capital,
lack of financial institutes, lack of investors, competition from fossil fuels, and fewer subsidies
compared to traditional fuel (Raza et al., 2015). These factors have prevented renewable energy
from becoming widespread. Tough competition from fossil fuel: Fossil fuels will remain a
dominant player in supplying energy in the future. A report by EIA's International Energy
Outlook (2016) suggests that fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal) are expected to supply 78 per
cent of the global energy used in 2040. Investment in fossil fuels (including supply and power
generation) still accounts for 55 per cent of 2016 global energy investment, compared with 16
per cent for renewable energy. Coal is still a dominant fuel source in most counties because of
its abundance, which makes it cheap and accessible (Dulal et al., 2013). There have been huge
changes in energy since summer 2014. Oil, as measured by the Brent crude contract, which was
priced at $115.71/barrel in June 2014, fell to $27.10 on 20 January 2016, a huge drop of 76 per
cent. Similarly, the ARA coal contract dropped from $84/tonne in April 2014 to $36.30 in
February 2016. There was a huge decline in the price of natural gas, which slid from around
$4.50/MMBtu in June 2014 to $1.91 in mid-February 2016. Due to falling prices and fossil fuel
still emerging as a cheaper alternative to renewable energy, it is able to offer tough competition
to renewable energy projects. Government grants and subsidies: The amount of government
subsidies provided to conventional energy is much higher than the subsidies awarded to
renewable energy. This keeps renewable energy at a disadvantage. The subsidies provided by
governments to generate electricity from fossil fuel sources is overshadowing the wide use of
low emission technologies. For example, coal companies in Australia and Indonesia still receive
government subsidies for mining and exploration (Dulal et al., 2013). Fewer financing
institutions: Renewable energy developers and producers face severe difficulties in securing
financing for projects at rates which are as low as are made available for fossil fuel energy
projects (Ansari et al., 2016). There are limited financial instruments and organizations for
renewable project financing. This reflects that the investments are considered somewhat risky,
thus demotivating investors (Ohunakin et al., 2014). High initial capital cost: Renewable energy
projects require high initial capital cost and, because of the lower efficiency of renewable
technology, the net pay back period is high, which in turn pushes investors on to the back foot
(Ansari et al., 2016). Both the users and the manufacturers may have very low capital and to
install a plant they require capital financing. This problem is further highlighted by the strict
lending measures that restrict access to financing even when funding is available for traditional
energy projects (Suzuki, 2013). High cost of capital, often lack of capital and most important with
high payback period projects often becomes un-viable (Painuly. J, 2001). Intangible costs:
Currently, in almost all countries, the total cost of fuel includes the cost of exploration,
production, distribution and usage, but it does not include the cost of the damage it does to the
environment and society. Despite severe effects on health and on the atmosphere, the unseen
costs (externalities) which are connected with traditional fuels are not included in their price
(Arnold, 2015). Understanding these impacts is essential for evaluating the actual cost of
utilizing fossil fuels for energy generation. H3 Economic barriers have a significant influence on
the deployment of renewable energy.
 1NC --- Renewables already viable
The bridge from fracking is no longer needed. Renewable energy sources are
already viable.
JULIA PYPER JANUARY 27, 2020 Where Does the Natural Gas ‘Bridge’ End?
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/natural-gas-bridge-nearing-end

But while a transition to natural gas is already underway, it’s unclear what the future of that
fossil fuel will look like as policies shift and other, cleaner resources become more competitive.
Adnan Amin, former director-general of International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) and
current senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, argued that the role of
natural gas is being overstated in most forecasts. “We have been talking about, for the last few
years, gas as the bridge,” Amin said during Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week. “There is an
inevitability about bridges, which is that sooner or later you get to the end of the bridge." The
combination of artificial intelligence, smart grid technologies and energy storage is undermining
the argument that gas is needed to manage the intermittency of renewable energy resources,
Amin noted. The geopolitics of natural gas and rising global emissions are also challenging
previously held assumptions around what the optimal energy mix should be.

Renewable energy competitive now and getting better

International Energy Agency “Low-carbon generation is becoming cost competitive, NEA
and IEA say in new report” December 09, 2020 https://www.iea.org/news/low-carbon-
generation-is-becoming-cost-competitive-nea-and-iea-say-in-new-report

Despite differences in regional, national and local conditions, the report finds that low-carbon
generation is overall becoming increasingly cost competitive. Renewable energy costs have
continued to decrease in recent years and the costs of wind and solar PV are now competitive
with fossil fuel-based electricity generation in many countries. Electricity from nuclear power
plants is also expected to have lower costs in the near future. Due to cost reductions stemming
from the lessons learnt from first-of-a-kind projects in several OECD countries, new nuclear
power will remain the dispatchable low-carbon technology with the lowest expected costs in
2025. The report also finds that prolonging the operation of existing nuclear power plants,
known as long-term operation (LTO), is the most cost-effective source of low carbon electricity.
Hydroelectric power can provide a similar contribution at comparable costs, however remains
highly dependent on the natural endowments of individual countries.

Natural gas is no longer needed as a bridge. Renewable energy is effective on

its own.
International Renewable Energy Agency “Renewables Increasingly Beat Even Cheapest
Coal Competitors on Cost” June 02, 2020
https://www.irena.org/newsroom/pressreleases/2020/Jun/Renewables-Increasingly-Beat-Even-
Cheapest-Coal-Competitors-on-Cost

Renewable power is increasingly cheaper than any new electricity capacity based on fossil fuels,
a new report by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) published today finds.
Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2019 shows that more than half of the renewable
capacity added in 2019 achieved lower power costs than the cheapest new coal plants. The
report highlights that new renewable power generation projects now increasingly undercut
existing coal-fired plants. On average, new solar photovoltaic (PV) and onshore wind power cost
less than keeping many existing coal plants in operation, and auction results show this trend
accelerating – reinforcing the case to phase-out coal entirely. Next year, up to 1 200 gigawatts
(GW) of existing coal capacity could cost more to operate than the cost of new utility-scale solar
PV, the report shows. Replacing the costliest 500 GW of coal with solar PV and onshore wind
next year would cut power system costs by up to USD 23 billion every year and reduce annual
emissions by around 1.8 gigatons (Gt) of carbon dioxide (CO2), equivalent to 5% of total global
CO2 emissions in 2019. It would also yield an investment stimulus of USD 940 billion, which is
equal to around 1% of global GDP. “We have reached an important turning point in the energy
transition. The case for new and much of the existing coal power generation, is both
environmentally and economically unjustifiable,” said Francesco La Camera, Director-General of
IRENA. “Renewable energy is increasingly the cheapest source of new electricity, offering
tremendous potential to stimulate the global economy and get people back to work. Renewable
investments are stable, cost-effective and attractive offering consistent and predictable returns
while delivering benefits to the wider economy.

Renewable energy is cost competitive, and sometimes cheaper, than fossil

fuels. No bridge needed.
Adnan Z. Amin “How Renewable Energy Can Be Cost-Competitive” 2015
https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/how-renewable-energy-can-be-cost-competitive

The cost-competitiveness of renewable power generation has reached historic levels. Biomass
for power, hydropower, geothermal and onshore wind can all now provide electricity
competitively compared to fossil fuel-fired power generation where good resources and cost
structures exist. Solar PV module prices in 2015 are 75 per cent to 80 per cent lower than their
levels at the end of 2009. Between 2010 and 2014 the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) of
utility-scale solar PV has fallen by half. The most competitive utility-scale solar PV projects are
now regularly delivering electricity for just US $0.08 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) without financial
support, compared to a range of US $0.045 to US $0.14/kWh for fossil fuel power. But even
lower costs are being contracted for 2017 and beyond. A recent tender in Dubai of US
$0.06/kWh ably demonstrates this shift, even in a region with abundant fossil fuels. Onshore
wind is now one of the most competitive sources of electricity available. Technology
improvements, occurring at the same time as installed costs have continued to decline, mean
that the cost of onshore wind is now within the same cost range, or even lower, than for fossil
fuels. Wind projects around the world are consistently delivering electricity for US $0.05 to US
$0.09/kWh without financial support, with the best projects costing even less. Concentrated
solar power (CSP) and offshore wind are still typically more expensive than fossil fuel-fired
power generation options today, with the exception of offshore wind in tidal flats. But these
technologies are in their infancy in terms of deployment. Both represent important renewable
power sources that will play an increasing role in the future energy mix, as their costs will
continue to come down. Costs for the more mature renewable power generation technologies—
biomass for power, geothermal and hydropower—have been broadly stable since 2010.
However, where untapped economic resources remain, these mature technologies can provide
some of the cheapest electricity of any source. Given the installed costs and the performance of
today’s renewable technologies, and the costs of conventional technologies, the fact is this:
renewable power generation is increasingly competing head-to-head with fossil fuels, without
financial support.
 1NC – Fracking delays renewable transition
Plan extends the life of fracking further – which will only delay a transition to
renewables.
JULIA PYPER JANUARY 27, 2020 Where Does the Natural Gas ‘Bridge’ End?
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/natural-gas-bridge-nearing-end

Alverà noted on stage in Abu Dhabi that IRENA’s own reports put renewable energy penetration
at just over 50 percent in 2050 under the most ambitious deployment scenario. That means
roughly half of the global energy mix will still come from hydrocarbons, according to the
renewable energy agency’s research.

“That bridge to 2050 is not a short bridge,” said Alverà. “And it’s not a complete bridge.”

“There’s no model out there that assumes a minimal role for gas, even in 2050, [despite what]
some people in the audience have vouched for or expect,” he added.

Fatih Birol, executive director of the International Energy Agency, said at another conference
that the IEA sees an enormous increase in natural-gas use in future, fueled by an abundance of
supply and high demand from China and India.

Also, while investors are shifting their focus to cleaner energy resources, few have been willing
to fully abandon natural gas. Despite committing to shift BlackRock’s capital allocation to more
climate-friendly solutions earlier this month, CEO Larry Fink expressed reservations about
ditching hydrocarbons entirely.

No economic shift for a long time – new tech to extract oil prolongs its life
David Timmons, Jonathan M. Harris, and Brian Roach “The Economics of Renewable Energy”
2014 https://www.bu.edu/eci/files/2019/06/RenewableEnergyEcon.pdf
Renewable energy will be adopted when fossil fuels have become scarce enough that they are
more expensive than renewables, i.e. when fossil fuels are economically depleted. In Figure 8,
increasing fossil-fuel extraction cost is indicated by the upward-sloping price path for fossil fuel
(MCfossil). Economic depletion of fossil fuels could take a very long time. There is still a large
stock of liquid oil in the ground, and new technologies make it cheaper to extract oil from shale
formations. We also have close substitutes for oil from oil wells, like oil from tar sands and
synthetic oil made from coal. Greater supplies of natural gas are also available using hydraulic
fracturing (“fracking”) technologies, and extensive reserves of coal remain to be exploited. But
many of these new technologies do involve higher costs, so an upward trend in fossil fuel prices
over time is likely.
 1NC Fracking restrictions hurt econ
Restricting fracking will have ripple effects into other industries, collapsing the
economy.
ZEKE HAUSFATHER director of climate and energy at the Breakthrough Institute and ALEX
TREMBATH deputy director of the Breakthrough Institute 10/19/2020 04:30 AM EDT Opinion
| Could Fracking Actually Help the Climate?
https://www.politico.com/news/agenda/2020/10/19/could-fracking-help-the-climate-429929

Restricting natural gas development would have knock-on effects on other industries that also
need to be considered. The electric power sector only consumes about a third of the natural gas
produced in the United States. Another third goes to industrial applications, such as synthetic
fertilizer and petrochemicals production. Unlike electric power, there are currently few
affordable and scalable technological alternatives to natural gas in these industries. Ending
natural gas consumption in our factories will require technological innovation of similar scale
and scope to what we’ve achieved in the electric power sector. Limits on supply will have limited
effect until that point given the lack of alternatives.

Restrictions on fracking kill economy

Dan Brouillette (Department of Energy) “Economic and National Security Impacts under a
Hydraulic Fracturing Ban” January 2021
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2021/01/f82/economic-and-national-security-impacts-
under-a-hydraulic-fracturing-ban.pdf

Abundant American oil and natural gas reserves are a strategic asset in driving sustained, long-
term economic growth, achieving environmental goals, and enhancing the national security
interests of the United States. Over the past two decades, due to technological advancements in
the combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology, 1 the United Statesis
now firmly the world’s largest producer of both natural gas and crude oil. This emergence of
American energy leadership, tied directly to increasing production from shale gas, tight gas, and
tight oil formations, supports high-paying jobs across multiple sectors of the economy, delivers
meaningful home energy savings, and gives American manufacturers a competitive advantage.
Production from these formations also dramatically enhances American energy security by
reducing dependence on foreign sources of oil and natural gas and drives progress in meeting
clean air goals. Domestically produced oil and natural gasis an essential component of modern
life and all sectors of the United States economy realize the benefits of sustained domestic
production, as an October 2020 U.S. Department of Energy report 2 concluded. American
energy leadership rests in the private-sector’s operational freedom to innovate and deploy a
range of modern technologies that safely, responsibly, and efficiently extract natural gas and oil
hydrocarbons from public and private lands. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling
technology are the most commonly used techniques for oil and natural gas extraction, which, as
noted in theOctober 31 Presidential Memorandum, 3 “are vital not just to our domestic
prosperity but also to our national security.” Since the domestic “shale revolution” began in
earnest in 2008, the use of horizontal drilling with highvolume hydraulic fracturing has become
highly prevalent – 75 percent of the domestic natural gas and 63 percent of the domestic crude
oil produced in 2019 relied on this combination of technologies. 4 Commonly referred to as
“unconventional” production, 5 the use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technology
has enabled oil and natural gas to be economically produced from reservoirs once seen as too
unprofitable to develop, resulting in exponential production increases in the nation’s top 10
energy-producing states: Texas, Pennsylvania, Wyoming, Oklahoma, West Virginia, North
Dakota, Colorado, Louisiana, New Mexico and Ohio (listed in order of total energy production in
British Thermal Units). 6 Future policies will dictate the direction and extent of American natural
gas and oil production, export, and use. The economic and national security consequences of
one such potential policy, a United States ban on high-volume hydraulic fracturing technologyon
any new or existing onshore wells starting in 2021, was assessed at the President’s direction.
Such a ban would render the development of unconventional onshore oil and natural gas
resources uneconomic, and the drilling of new wells for these resources would effectively cease.
A hydraulic fracturing ban would reverseUnited States oil and natural gas production growthand
return the country to a net-importer of oil and natural gas by 2025. With declining domestic
production, the analysis suggests natural gas price implications under a hydraulic fracturing ban
would be considerable, with an estimated 244 percent increase from the 2019 level, reaching
$8.80 per million British Thermal Units (MMBtu) by 2025. iii These price hikes would have a
crippling economic effect through increased household energy bills, higher fuel costs for
industrial and commercial customers, higher andmore frequent electricity price spikes, and
deteriorating competitiveness of the United States energy supply in the global market. The
broader economic impact of the hydraulic fracturing ban would be substantial. Compared to a
world with hydraulic fracturing, in 2025, the United States economy would have 7.7 million
fewer jobs, $1.1 trillion less in gross domestic product (GDP), and $950 billion less in labor
income. A hydraulic fracturing ban would result in increases in energy costs for electricity, motor
fuels, and natural gas; would burden American families, small businesses, hospitals,
manufacturers; would have negative impacts on virtually all other sectors of the economy; and
would inevitably stunt the post-pandemic economic recovery. Furthermore, America’s
environment would be worse off without hydraulic fracturing because less natural gas would be
available for electricity generation. The U.S. Energy Information Administration(EIA) concluded
in a November 2020 note, “U.S. electric power sector emissions have fallen 33 percent from
their peak in 2007 because less electricity has been generated from coal and more electricity has
been generated from natural gas and non-carbon sources.”7 Natural gas serves as an important
enabler for integrating, low-carbonintermittent renewables like wind and solar. Inthe first year
of a ban, the country would see a year-over-year increase in carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen
oxides (NOx), and sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions with these emissions rising 16 percent, 17
percent, and 62 percent respectively. This outcome undermines the considerable progress the
United States power generation sector has made in cutting emissions by 30 percent, 76 percent,
and 91 percent respectively for CO2, NOx, and SO2 during the 2005 to 2019 time period. Finally,
from a national security and foreign policy perspective, significantly curtailing American natural
gas and oil production removes an important tool for American diplomacy while increasing
global energy dependence on Russia and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) nations. Eliminating the primary technology responsible for the growth in United States
oil and natural gas production would increase natural gas, transportation fuel and electricity
prices initiating a ripple effect of severe consequences to the Nation’s economy, environment,
and geopolitical standing.

Companies are on the brink of bankruptcy now – additional restrictions will

collapse the industry.
New York Times July 13, 2020 4:23 pm Fracking firms fail, rewarding executives and raising
climate fears

The industry’s decline may be just beginning. Almost 250 oil and gas companies could file for
bankruptcy protection by the end of next year, more than the previous five years combined,
according to Rystad Energy, an analytics company. Rystad analysts now expect oil demand will
begin falling permanently by decade’s end as renewable energy costs decline, energy efficiency
improves, and efforts to fight climate change diminish an industry that has spent the past
decade drilling thousands of wells, transforming the U.S. into the biggest oil producer in the
world.

Industry believes additional federal regulation could cost thousands and lead to
well closures. / that would hurt economy.
Tom Kenworthy June 25, 2009, 9:00 am Frack Attack Drilling Technique Under Scrutiny
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2009/06/25/6149/frack-attack/

Fracking poses no threat to drinking water, the industry argues, because it takes place
thousands of feet below groundwater supplies and because steel and cement well casings
prevent the chemicals that are used and then largely recovered from escaping. Federal
regulation would cost up to $150,000 per well and would force the closure of 57 percent of
domestic oil wells and 35 percent of gas wells, according to the industry. Existing state oversight
is adequate and there have been no documented cases of contamination of drinking water
supplies, claims the industry.

Federal regulations will collapse the fracking industry – turning the econ
impacts because of loss of jobs and government revenue.
Jane Van Ryan New Study On Hydraulic Fracturing Posted June 9, 2009
https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/blog/2009/06/09/new-study-on-hydraulic-
fracturing

API urged Congress to consider the ramifications of applying new regulations to the process
of hydraulic fracturing today, just as members of the House and Senate introduced legislation to
regulate the process under the Safe Drinking Water Act.

According to a study commissioned by API and conducted by Global Insight, new federal
regulations could cause a sharp drop in U.S. oil and natural gas production.

The study, "Measuring the Economics and Energy Impacts of Proposals to Regulate Hydraulic
Fracturing," found that the number of new U.S. wells drilled would plummet 20.5 percent over a
five-year period, and natural gas production would potentially be reduced by about 10 percent
from 2008 levels by 2014. As a result, jobs could be lost, government revenues from energy
production would fall and the United States would become more reliant on imported sources of
oil and natural gas.
 1NC---Competitiveness
Economic competitiveness is not real
Paul H. Rubin, November 2013, an American economist and the Samuel Candler Dobbs
Professor of Economics at Emory University. “Emporiophobia (Fear of Markets): Cooperation or
Competition?” Page 5-7 “Competiton”,
https://techpolicyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/emporiophobia-fear-of-markets-
2007636.pdf //EP
The emphasis on competition has been important in economics since 1871 (Stigler, 1957). But while it is old and traditional,
and universal, there are several senses in which the emphasis on competition is odd. First,
there is no economic act
that is itself competitive. Second, the prototypical economy, the “purely competitive”
economy involves no competition. Third, in other market structures acts may sometimes be
viewed as competitive, but not always. Fourth, principles of cooperation (through
specialization and division of labor) are at least as important to economists as competition.
Fifth, competition is a tool, not the end purpose of the economy . Sixth, competition is
ubiquitous in human interactions, and so competition is not a way of distinguishing market
economies from other economies. Consider each point. In their economic lives, people produce goods and services
and exchange these goods and services for others. Both the production of goods and the exchange of goods for other goods are
cooperative acts. There
is no competition in these actions. The motive for some acts may be
competitive, but the actions themselves are cooperative . Consider the most heinous economic act,
predation for the purpose of obtaining a monopoly. (Forget for now that this behavior is rare or nonexistent; assume that it
actually exists.) What does a predator actually do? He produces goods (a cooperative act) and sells them for below cost prices,
or purchases goods at above market prices in order to deny them to a competitor. But the sale or purchase of goods are also
cooperative acts. The purpose may be nefarious (to bankrupt a competitor) but the act itself, a sale or purchase, is cooperative.
An outside observer cannot tell this from a normal transaction. (Courts also have difficulty in making this determination, even
though they have access to lots of information, often provided by economists.) Unless an agent is willing to engage in illegal
actions (for example, burning a competitor’s factory) or willing to go outside the market (e.g., complaining to the FTC about a
competitor), any competitive act is actually performed through cooperative behavior. Second, it is a truism that in the “purely
competitive” model there is no competition. Many
have stated this; see, for example, Buchanan, (1964),
citing Frank Knight. In this model all sellers take price as given and none pays any attention
to behavior of others. This is the fundamental canonical model of competition in an
economy, and there is no competition here. Again, there is cooperation through buying and
selling. Third, in monopoly, there is again no competition . There may be competition to become the
monopolist, but this is either competition through being a better cooperator or political competition, for example, by lobbying
for exclusive licenses. In Cournot competition, firms decide how much to sell to buyers – again, a cooperative act. In Bertrand
competition, firms decide the price at which to sell. Again, motives may be competitive but the actions themselves are
cooperative. Fourth, Adam Smith is the father of competitive analysis. But he is also the father of cooperative analysis.
Specialization is the mother of cooperation. The pin factory is a masterful analysis of cooperation. Somehow we economists
have made the competitive analysis in Smith the basis for our discipline, and made cooperation into something of a stepchild.
In EconLit, there are only about 4700 mentions of specialization. Fifth, competition itself is not the purpose or goal of an
economy. The purpose of an economy is to generate consumer surplus, which occurs through cooperative acts such as
transactions and exchanges. Competition is a powerful tool for improving the functioning of transactions by making sure that
in each case the transactors are the best possible partners and that transactions take place on the best possible terms. That is
the purpose of competition. In other words, the competition that occurs in an economy is competition for the right to
cooperate. The gain comes from the cooperation, not from the competition. Of course, competition is essential as it leads to the
optimum terms for cooperation, and selects the best parties to cooperate, but nonetheless competition is a tool whose function
is to facilitate cooperation. Society is willing to tolerate markets because of their cooperative benefits, not because they are
competitive. Finally, economic competition is sometimes compared to biological or Darwinian competition. But the point of
Darwinian analysis is that humans (and other living creatures) are continually engaged in an implicit competitive race for
success, called “fitness” by the biologists. Evolution is driven by competition. Such competition occurs among all humans all
the time. In a market economy, success is measured by wealth, and wealth is accumulated by successful cooperation with
trading partners. Economies based on custom also have competition. For example, more successful hunters in a hunter-gather
economy reap benefits, including access to women. In an exploitive economy success may be measured by successfully
exploiting the population and rising through the oppressive hierarchy. This is much more “competitive” than the path to
success in a market economy. The
unique feature of an economy organized through markets is that
the competition which exists is competition for the right to cooperate; but it is the
cooperation which is the defining feature of the market economy.
 1NC---Heg
No heg impact
G. John Ikenberry, 2018, professor of Politics and International Affairs in the Woodrow
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, “Why the Liberal World
Order Will Survive”, Carnegie Ethics and International Affairs,
https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/why_the_liberal_world_order_will_s
urvive.pdf
In this essay I look at the evolving encounters between rising states and the post-war Western international order. My starting
point is the classic “power transition” perspective .
Power transition theories see a tight link between
international order—its emergence, stability, and decline—and the rise and fall of great powers. It is a
perspective that sees history as a sequence of cycles in which powerful or hegemonic states rise up and build order and
dominate the global system until their power declines, leading to a new cycle of crisis and order building. In contrast, I offer a
more evolutionary perspective, emphasizing the lineages and continuities in modern international order. More specifically, I
argue that although America’s hegemonic position may be declining, the liberal international
characteristics of order—openness, rules, multilateral cooperation—are deeply
rooted and likely to persist. This is true even though the orientation and actions of the
Trump administration have raised serious questions about the U.S. commitment to liberal
internationalism. Just as importantly, rising states (led by China) are not engaged in a
frontal attack on the American-led order. While struggles do exist over orientations,
agendas, and leadership, the non-Western developing countries remain tied to the
architecture and principles of a liberal-oriented global orde r. And even as China seeks in
various ways to build rival regional institutions, there are stubborn limits on what it can
do. Power Transitions and International Order There is wide agreement that the world is witnessing a long-term global
power transition. Wealth and power is diffusing, spreading outward and away from Europe and
the United States. The rapid growth that marked the non-Western rising states in the last
decade may have ended, and even China’s rapid economic ascendency has slowed . But the
overall pattern of change remains: the “rest” are gaining ground on the “West.” While there is
wide agreement that the world is witnessing a global power transition, there is less agreement on the consequences of power
shifts for international order. The classic view is advanced by realist scholars, such as E. H. Carr, Robert Gilpin, Paul Kennedy,
and William Wohlforth, who make sweeping arguments about power and order.  These hegemonic realists argue
that international order is a by-product of the concentration of power . Order is created by a
powerful state, and when that state declines and power diffuses, international order weakens or breaks apart. Out of these
dynamic circumstances, a rising state emerges as the new dominant state, and it seeks to reorganize the international system
to suit its own purposes. In this view, world politics from ancient times to the modern era can be seen as a series of repeated
cycles of rise and decline. War, protectionism, depression, political upheaval—various sorts of crises and disruptions may
push the cycle forward. This narrative of hegemonic rise and decline draws on the European and, more broadly, Western
experience. Since the early modern era, Europe has been organized and reorganized by a succession of leading states and
would-be hegemons: the Spanish Hapsburgs, France of Louis XIV and Napoleon, and post-Bismarck Germany. The logic of
hegemonic order comes even more clearly into view with Pax Britannica , the nineteenth-century
hegemonic order based on British naval and mercantile dominance. The decline of Britain was followed by decades of war and
economic instability, which ended only with the rise of Pax Americana. For
hegemonic realists, the debate
today is about where the world is along this cyclical pathway of rise and decline. Has the
United States finally lost the ability or willingness to underwrite and lead the post-war
order? Are we in the midst of a hegemonic crisis and the breakdown of the old order? And are rising states, led by China,
beginning to step forward in efforts to establish their own hegemonic dominance of their regions and the world? These are the
lurking questions of the power transition perspective. But
does this vision of power transition truly
illuminate the struggles going on today over international order? Some might argue no
—that the United States is still in a position, despite its travails, to provide hegemonic
leadership. Here one would note that there is a durable infrastructure (or what Susan Strange has
called “structural power”) that undergirds the existing American-led order .Far-flung
security alliances, market relations, liberal democratic solidarity, deeply rooted geopolitical
alignments—there are many possible sources of American hegemonic power that remain
intact. But there may be even deeper sources of continuity in the existing system. This
would be true if the existence of a liberal-oriented international order does not in fact require hegemonic domination. It might
be that the power transition theory is wrong: the stability and persistence of the existing
post-war international order does not depend on the concentration of American
power. In fact, international order is not simply an artifact of concentrations of power . The
rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and
contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power. This is true in two respects. First,
international order itself is complex: multilayered, multifaceted, and not simply a political
formation imposed by the leading state. International order is not “one thing” that states
either join or resist. It is an aggregation of various sorts of ordering rules and institutions .
There are the deep rules and norms of sovereignty. There are governing institutions,
starting with the United Nations. There is a sprawling array of international institutions,
regimes, treaties, agreements, protocols, and so forth. These governing arrangements cut across
diverse realms, including security and arms control, the world economy, the environment and global commons, human rights,
and political relations. Someof these domains of governance may have rules and institutions that
narrowly reflect the interests of the hegemonic state, but most reflect negotiated outcomes
based on a much broader set of interests. As rising states continue to rise , they do not simply
confront an American-led order; they face a wider conglomeration of ordering rules, institutions, and
arrangements; many of which they have long embraced. By separating “American
hegemony” from “the existing international order,” we can see a more complex set of
relationships. The United States does not embody the international order; it has a
relationship with it, as do rising states. The United States embraces many of the core global
rules and institutions, such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade
Organization. But it also has resisted ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (it being the only country not to have ratified the
latter) as well as various arms control and disarmament agreements. China also embraces
many of the same global rules and institutions, and resists ratification of others . Generally
speaking, the more fundamental or core the norms and institutions are—beginning with the Westphalian norms of
sovereignty and the United Nations system—the more agreement there is between the United States and China as well as
other states. Disagreements are most salient where human rights and political principles are in play, such as in the
Responsibility to Protect. Second,
there is also diversity in what rising states “want” from the
international order. The struggles over international order take many different forms. In some instances, what rising
states want is more influence and control of territory and geopolitical space beyond their borders. One can see this in China’s
efforts to expand its maritime and political influence in the South China Sea and other neighboring areas. This is an age-old
type of struggle captured in realist accounts of security competition and geopolitical rivalry. Another type of struggle is over
the norms and values that are enshrined in global governance rules and institutions. These may be about how open and rule-
based the system should be. They may also be about the way human rights and political principles are defined and brought to
bear in relations among states. Finally, the struggles over international order may be focused on the distribution of authority.
That is, rising states may seek a greater role in the governance of existing institutions. This is a struggle over the position of
states within the global political hierarchy: voting shares, leadership rights, and authority relations.  These
observations cut against the realist hegemonic perspective and cyclical theories of power
transition. Rising states do not confront a single, coherent, hegemonic order. The
international order offers a buffet of options and choices. They can embrace some rules and
institutions and not others. Moreover, stepping back, the international orders that rising states
have faced in different historical eras have not all been the same order . The British-led order that
Germany faced at the turn of the twentieth century is different from the international order that China faces today. The
contemporary international order is much more complex and wide-ranging than past
orders. It has a much denser array of rules, institutions, and governance realms . There
are also both regional and global domains of governance. This makes it hard to imagine an epic moment
when the international order goes into crisis and rising states step forward—either
China alone or rising states as a bloc—to reorganize and reshape its rules and
institutions. Rather than a cyclical dynamic of rise and decline, change in the existing American-led order
might best be captured by terms such as continuity, evolution, adaptation, and negotiation.
The struggles over international order today are growing, but it is not a drama best
told in terms of the rise and decline of American hegemony.
 1NC---Nuke Terror
Groups can’t obtain nukes and even if they did they would never deploy them.
Christopher McIntosh, and Ian Storey, November 20, 2019, [Christopher McIntosh is an
Assistant Professor of Political Studies at Bard College. His research addresses terrorist groups,
state responses, and the potential use of nuclear weapons, Ian Storey is an associate fellow at
the Hannah Arendt Center for Politics and Humanities, Bard College. He has previously taught at
Harvard University and Northwestern University], Would terrorists set off a nuclear weapon if
they had one? We shouldn’t assume so, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,
https://thebulletin.org/2019/11/would-terrorists-set-off-a-nuclear-weapon-if-they-had-one-we-
shouldnt-assume-so/, Xoxo 6/1/2020

This is all the more true for the hypothetical that concerns us: Only a large, well-organized, and heavily funded group
would be able to attain operational nuclear capability. Regardless of what one thinks about the debates regarding
terrorist organizations and their ability to acquire these weapons—either by theft or gift— acquisition and maintenance is
going to be resource-intensive and difficult. So, it stands to reason that if a group is able to cross this
threshold and obtain a weapon, it will weigh all of its options seriously. And these options are not limited to a
binary choice of attack or hold. In reality there are a slate of options for how to “use” a nuclear weapon, and we can divide these
into five categories, only one of which is detonation. For the other four options, there are two critical variables: whether to go public
with the new capability or to remain covert, and whether to publicly communicate how they intend to use it as a strategic bargaining
chip or leave their red lines unstated. While we isolate these for clarity’s sake, in practice strategic options interact with each other
in important ways. The first option—one we see in movies and television—is to reveal the new capability and publicly state under
what conditions it would be used. In essence, this is nuclear “blackmail”: The organization declares that it has a weapon and
will use it unless certain conditions are met. Alternatively, the organization could make its new capability public, but not lay out
terms for its use. This is the second option, which we term “opacity.” Pursuing this strategy has the virtue of instilling fear in the
organization’s enemies without committing the organization to a definite strategic path. While it may seem counterintuitive, it is
equally possible for an organization to keep its new capability a secret while continuing its campaign of violence. So, as a third
option, an organization could pursue a strategy of “latency” by keeping their bomb a secret, yet simultaneously making statements
and threats about what it would do if it had one. Such an approach has been the core of Israel’s strategic posture for years. Finally,
given the high uncertainty that the first nuclear-armed nonstate actor in the world would face, the organization might just initially
opt for “dormancy,” keeping the bomb “in the basement” until it decided that strategic conditions were ripe
for global revelation. Each option has its advantages and disadvantages depending on the context, but all of them entail strategic
opportunity costs for the organization. For instance, once a group goes public as nuclear (and is presumably verified), it
becomes
nearly impossible to meaningfully return to a strategy of either latency or dormancy. Similarly, once
conditions for use are articulated, going back on them would erode the credibility of the organization as a strategic bargaining
partner, something of constant concern for these organizations. With states, we may fear a “use it or lose it” situation, but for
an
organization looking to get the most out of a limited, non-iterable capability, the reality is almost the opposite. The
organization faces the traps of an escalation ladder: Each potential benefit it might accrue by
adopting a more aggressive posture (declaring their weapons, making demands on their
opponents) comes at a parallel cost to the group’s bargaining and strategic flexibility. If these kinds
of questions appear to be thoroughly familiar terrain for the history of nuclear strategy, that’s (part of) the point. Even more than for
states, they take on an acute, existential significance for a terrorist organization. Because these organizations are engaged
in asymmetric warfare against states that usually wield orders of magnitude more military might, terrorist organizations are
forced to be even more exacting and calculating in their strategic decisions. Terrorists might lose more than they gain
by detonating a nuclear bomb. While terrorist organizations vary widely in their internal organization and structure, almost
all are highly sensitive to benefits and costs, both external and internal. By examining these, it will
become clear that terrorists might have more to lose than gain by proceeding directly to an attack. Doing so might alienate
their supporters, cause dissent among the ranks, and give away a bargaining chip without getting anything in return.
Externally, terrorist groups rely on the support of the society in which they are embedded. As a result, they are deeply intertwined
with the local population. Hezbollah
is a paradigmatic example: In addition to possessing a quasi-
independent political arm, it operates an extensive network of schools, hospitals, and other
social services. These extended administrative networks provide a source of recruits, public support, and crucial cover for their
financiers. They also engender a risk—what they have put so much effort into building can
ultimately be undone by poor strategic decision-making. Beyond the inevitable military response, committing a
nuclear attack would represent an existential threat to an organization of this form. The unprecedented death toll of transgressing
the nuclear taboo would have a predictably devastating effect on the support networks on which these organizations depend.
Afterwards, maintaining the kind of large-scale external finance necessary to sustain them would
become virtually impossible, particularly in the context of predictably heightened international
law enforcement. In short, the organization would face radical alienation from its public base,
as well as, where it exists, its state sponsorship. From the outside looking in, it’s tempting to presume that the
kind of public and even the kind of fighters who support Al Qaeda or the Islamic State simply don’t care about the level of violence
those groups perpetrate. Empirically, however, this is simply untrue. Sustained
analysis of the history of terrorist
campaigns—even among those organizations willing to commit large-scale attacks—evinces a delicate balancing act
between highly symbolic violence and concerns with stepping over invisible lines. Equally,
detonating a nuclear weapon in an attack would create intense strains on the internal dynamics
of the organization itself. The sheer magnitude of the decision to proceed with a nuclear attack takes previously available
opportunities off the table—returning to small-scale conventional attacks would appear to be a weakening of the organization’s
position post–nuclear attack. The opportunity costs presented by the weapon have a significant potential to splinter organizations
already concerned about command and control. As the last 20 years have demonstrated, terrorist organizations factionalize and
splinter over goals and tactics under even conventional pressure. Post-attack,
that pressure would increase
exponentially and potentially reorder the international environment in ways that risk the
organization’s continued existence. This reality is only magnified by the fact that most terrorist
organizations exist in a political landscape in which they are not the only show in town; both the
Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, for example, face a constant competition with the Islamic
State over recruits, bases of operation, and resources. The result is a paradoxical effect on the
calculations of terrorist leaders: Obtaining new capacity (even well shy of nuclear weapons) creates powerful incentives
toward organizational centralization to prevent unauthorized activity, but such centralization could sideline or alienate certain
factions, making it more difficult to hold the organization together. A nuclear
attack, then, is the worst possible
option for organizational leadership from the perspective of internal politics. This is because it
risks setting in motion a series of events that could unravel the organization as a whole at
precisely the moment when it needs unity to survive what will (likely) be an overwhelming reaction by the target
state and its allies. Finally, it must be remembered that what victory and defeat mean for the archetypal organization engaged in a
terrorist campaign is significantly different than in interstate warfare. In conventional war, surrender is followed by capitulation to
the opposition’s demands, even if exact terms must be worked out at the peace table. In conflicts between terrorist organizations
and states (as well as other nonstate actors), determining what exactly constitutes “victory” or “capitulation” for either side is
terminally ambiguous. Even a complete victory for the terrorist group on its own terms, such as the withdrawal of state forces from
a region, will likely still be followed by reprisals—such as airstrikes or financial sanctions against the group. As a result, terrorists are
inevitably circumscribed in what “success” could look like. Even with a nuclear
attack, they could neither threaten the
extinction of their opponent (as under the doctrine of mutually assured destruction, or MAD), nor threaten to
further escalate costs, having already jumped straight to the top of the escalation ladder. Having
played the entirety of its hand to bloody effect, a post–nuclear attack terrorist organization
would face a hardened opposition and the prospect of a massive increase in costs, with little in
hand to match.
 1NC---Prolif
Prolif impact is wrong
Stephen Walt, 2012, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard
University, Foreign Policy, “The mother of all worst-case assumptions about
Iran”, http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/30/the_mother_of_all_worst_case_assump
tions_about_iran

Yetthis "mother of all assumptions" is simply asserted and rarely examined . The obvious question to ask is
did prior acts of nuclear proliferation have the same fearsome consequences that Iran
this:

hawks now forecast? The answer is no. In fact, the spread of nuclear weapons has
had remarkably little impact on the basic nature of world politics and the ranking of
major powers. The main effect of the nuclear revolution has been to induce greater
caution in the behavior of both those who possessed the bomb and anyone who had to deal
with a nuclear-armed adversary. Proliferation has not transformed weak states into
influential global actors, has not given nuclear-armed states the ability to
blackmail their neighbors or force them to kowtow, and it has not triggered far-reaching
regional arms races. In short, fears that an Iranian bomb would transform regional or global
politics have been greatly exaggerated; one might even say that they are just a lot of hooey. Consider
the historical record. Did the world turn on its axis when the mighty Soviet Union tested its
first bomb in 1949? Although alarmist documents like NSC-68 warned of a vast increase in Soviet influence and
aggressiveness, Soviet nuclear development simply reinforcedthe caution that both superpowers were already displaying towards each other. The United States already
saw the USSR as an enemy, and the basic principles of containment were already in place. NATO was being formed before the Soviet test and Soviet dominance of
Eastern Europe was already a fait accompli. Having sole possession of the bomb hadn't enabled Truman to simply dictate to Stalin, and getting the bomb didn't enable
Stalin or his successors to blackmail any of their neighbors or key U.S. allies. It certainly didn't lead any countries to "reorient their political alignment toward Moscow."
Nikita Khrushchev's subsequent missile rattling merely strengthened the cohesion of NATO and other U.S.-led alliances, and we now know that much of his bluster was

Having a large nuclear arsenal didn't stop the anti-commnist

intended to conceal Soviet strategic inferiority.

uprisings in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Poland, and didn't allow the
Soviet Union to win in Afghanistan. Nor did it prevent the USSR from eventually collapsing entirely. Did British and
French acquisition of nuclear weapons slow their decline as great powers? Not in the
slightest. Having the force de frappe may have made De Gaulle feel better about French prestige and having their own deterrent made both states less dependent
on America's security umbrella, but it didn't give either state a louder voice in world affairs or win them new influence anywhere. And you might recall that Britain
couldn't get Argentina to give back the Falklands by issuing nuclear threats -- even though Argentina had no bomb of its own and no nuclear guarantee -- they had to go

Did China's detonation of a bomb in 1964 suddenly make them a

retake the islands with conventional forces.

superpower? Hardly. China remained a minor actor on the world stage until it adopted market principles, and its rising global influence is due to three
decades of economic growth, not a pile of nukes. And by the way, did getting a bomb enable Mao Zedong--a cruel megalomaniac who launched the disastrous Great Leap
Forward in 1957 and the destructive Cultural Revolution in the 1960s -- to start threatening and blackmailing his neighbors? Nope. In fact, China's foreign policy

What about Israel? Does Israel's nuclear arsenal allow it to

behavior after 1964 was generally quite restrained.

coerce its neighbors or impose its will on Hezbollah or the Palestinians? No. Israel uses its
conventional military superiority to try to do these things, not its nuclear arsenal. Indeed, Israel's bomb didn't even
prevent Egypt and Syria from attacking it in October 1973, although it did help convince them to limit their aims to regaining the
territory they had lost in 1967. It is also worth noting that Israel's nuclear program did not trigger a rapid arms race either. Although states like Iraq and Libya did
establish their own WMD programs after Israel got the bomb, none of their nuclear efforts moved very rapidly or made it across the finish line. But wait, there's

The white government in South Africa eventually produced a handful of bombs, but
more.

nobody noticed and apartheid ended anyway. Then the new government gave up its nuclear
arsenal to much acclaim. If anything, South Africa was more secure without an arsenal than it was before. What about India and
Pakistan? India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974 didn't turn it into a global
superpower, and its only real effect was to spur Pakistan -- which was already an avowed
rival -- to get one too. And it's worth noting that there hasn't been a large-scale war between
the two countries since, despite considerable grievances on both sides and occasional skirmishes and other provocations. Finally, North
Korea is as annoying and weird as it has always been, but getting nuclear weapons didn't transform
it from an economic basket case into a mighty regional power and didn't make it more
inclined to misbehave. In fact, what is most remarkable about North Korea's nuclear program
is how little impact it has had on its neighbors. States like Japan and South Korea could go
nuclear very quickly if they wanted to, but neither has done so in the six years since
North Korea's first nuclear test. In short, both theory and history teach us that getting a
nuclear weapon has less impact on a country's power and influence than many believe, and
the slow spread of nuclear weapons has only modest effects on global and regional
politics. Nuclear weapons are good for deterring direct attacks on one's homeland, and they induce greater caution in the minds of national leaders
of all kinds. What they don't do is turn weak states into great powers, they are useless as tools of

blackmail, and they cost a lot of money. They also lead other states to worry more about one's intentions and to band together for self-
protection. For these reasons, most potential nuclear states have concluded that getting the bomb isn't

worth it. But a few states-and usually those who are worried about being attacked-decide to go ahead. The good news is that when they do, it has remarkably
little impact on world affairs.
 1NC---Prolif Good
It’s good – empirics and models go neg
Shellenberger, 2018 (Michael, cofounder of Breakthrough Institute and founder of
Environmental Progress + energy/environment contributor @ Forbes, "Who Are We To Deny
Weak Nations The Nuclear Weapons They Need For Self-Defense?,"
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2018/08/06/who-are-we-to-deny-weak-
nations-the-nuclear-weapons-they-need-for-self-defense/#2e81b15b522f)

The widespread assumption is that the more nations have nuclear weapons, the more
dangerous the world will be. But is that really the case? I don’t ask this question lightly. I come from a long line of
Christian pacifists and conscientious objectors and earned a degree in peace studies from a Quaker college. I have had nightmares about nuclear
war since I was a boy and today live in California, which is more vulnerable to a North Korean missile than Washington, D.C. — at least for now.
But it is impossible not to be struck by these facts: No nation with a nuclear weapon has ever been
invaded by another nation. The number of deaths in battle worldwide has declined 95
percent in the 70 years since the invention and spread of nuclear weapons; The number of
Indian and Pakistani civilian and security forces’ deaths in two disputed territories
declined 95 percent after Pakistan’s first nuclear weapons test in 1998. In 1981, the late political
scientist Kenneth Waltz published an essay titled, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better.” In it he argued that nuclear
weapons are revolutionary in allowing weaker nations to protect themselves from more
powerful ones. International relations is “a realm of anarchy as opposed to hierarchy… of self-help… you’re on your own,” Waltz
explained. How do nuclear weapons work? Not “through the ability to defend but through the ability
to punish...The message of a deterrent strategy is this ,” explained Waltz. “‘Although we are defenceless, if you
attack we will punish you to an extent that more than cancels your gains.’” Does anybody believe
France should give up its nuclear weapons? Certainly not the French. After President Barack Obama in 2009 called for eliminating nuclear
weapons, not a single other nuclear nation endorsed the idea. All of this raises the question: if
nuclear weapons protect weak
nations from foreign invasion, why shouldn’t North Korea and Iran get them? Why Nuclear Weapons
Make Us Peaceful On January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush denounced Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil.” North Korea was
“arming with missiles,” he said. Iran “aggressively pursues these weapons” and the “Iraqi regime has plotted to develop...nuclear weapons for
over a decade.” One year later, the U.S. invaded and occupied Iraq. The ensuing conflict resulted in the deaths of over 450,000 people — about
four times as many as were killed at Hiroshima — and a five-fold increase in terrorist killings in the Middle East and Africa. It all came at a cost of
$2.4 trillion dollars. Now, 16 years later, U.S.
officials insist that North Korea and Iran need not fear a U.S.
invasion. But why would any nation — particularly North Korea and Iran — believe them?
Not only did the U.S. overthrow Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein after he gave up his nuclear weapons program, it also helped overthrow Libyan
President Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 after he too had given up the pursuit of a nuclear weapon. North Korean President Kim Jong-un may, quite
understandably, see his own life at stake: Hussein was hanged and Gaddafi was tortured and killed. Both hawks and doves say North Korea and
Iran must not be allowed to have a weapon because both regimes are brutal, but nuclear
weapons make nations more
peaceful over time. There were three full-scale wars before India and Pakistan acquired
the bomb and only far more limited conflicts since. And China became dramatically less
bellicose after acquiring the bomb. Why? “History shows that when countries acquire the
bomb, they feel increasingly vulnerable,” notes Waltz, “and become acutely aware that their
nuclear weapons make them a potential target in the eyes of major powers. This
awareness discourages nuclear states from bold and aggressive action .” Is it really so
difficult to imagine that a nuclear-armed North Korea and Iran might follow the same path
toward moderation as China, India, and Pakistan? Nuclear weapons are revolutionary in that they require the ruling
class to have skin in the game. When facing off against nuclear-armed nations, elites can no longer
sacrifice the poor and weak in their own country without risking their lives.
2NC
Adv. 1
 2NC---Biodiversity
No extinction from BioD loss – their studies are based on limited regression
analysis – ecosystems lose portions of their population all the time without
drastic consequences – lack of correlation hinders their interpretations – there
is no direct link between BioD decline and health decline – presumption should
be on the side of skepticism – that’s 1NC Hough

IPPC concedes no risk of species extinctions – their own simulations disprove

the impact
Bojanowski, 2014, Graduate Geologist and writer at Spiegel Online, 14 [Axel, “UN
Backtracks: Will Global Warming Really Trigger Mass Extinctions?,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-un-climate-report-casts-doubt-on-
earlier-extinction-predictions-a-960569.html, 7/1/14, TYBG]

The last remaining passenger pigeon, Martha, died a century ago in a Cincinnati zoo. The bird's downfall was having tender,
tasty meat so pleasing to the human palate. Hundreds of species have suffered the same fate in modern times. The last
Tasmanian wolf died in an Australian zoo in 1936. Two years later, the final remaining Schomburgk's deer met its end as a pet
in a Thai temple. The Chinese river dolphin hasn't been sighted for years either. In total, 77 species of mammal, 130 birds, 22
reptiles and 34 amphibians have vanished from the face of the earth since 1500, according to the IUCN Red List of Threatened
Species. Humans have shrunk the habitats of many life forms, through unsustainable agriculture, fishing or hunting. And it is
going to get even worse. Global warming is said to be threatening thousands of animal and plant species with extinction. That,
at least, is what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been predicting for years. But the UN
climate
body now says it is no longer so certain. The second part of the IPCC's new assessment report is due to be
presented next Monday in Yokohama, Japan. On the one hand, a classified draft of the report notes that a further "increased
extinction risk for a substantial number of species during and beyond the 21st century" is to be expected. On the other hand ,
the IPCC admits that there is no evidence climate change has led to even a single species
becoming extinct thus far. 'Crocodile Tears' At most, the draft report says, climate change may have played a role in
the disappearance of a few amphibians, fresh water fish and mollusks. Yet even the icons of catastrophic global
warming, the polar bears, are doing surprisingly well. Their population has remained stable
despite the shrinking of the Arctic ice cap. Ragnar Kinzelbach, a zoologist at the University of Rostock, says essential data is
missing for most other life forms, making it virtually impossible to forecast the potential effects of climate change. Given
the myriad other human encroachments in the natural environment , Kinzelbach says, "crocodile
tears over an animal kingdom threatened by climate change are less than convincing." The
draft report includes a surprising admission by the IPCC -- that it doubts its own computer
simulations for species extinctions. "There is very little confidence that models currently
predict extinction risk accurately," the report notes. Very low extinction rates despite considerable climate
variability during past hundreds of thousands of years have led to concern that "forecasts for very high extinction rates due
entirely to climate change may be overestimated." In the last assessment report, Climate Change 2007, the IPCC predicted that
20 to 30 percent of all animal and plant species faced a high risk for extinction should average global temperatures rise by 2 to
3 degrees Celsius (3.6 to 5 degrees Fahrenheit). The current draft report says that scientific uncertainties have "become more
apparent" since 2007.
 2NC---Food
There is a double bind here- either the food supply is resilient because local
governments can transfer the supply chain to reduce threats or glacial melting,
nations hoarding food, trade agreements collapsing, food waste, deforestation,
and climate change all make it inevitable that 1NC Hickle and Tefft

No extinction from ag collapse

Allouche, 2011, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for
Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11 (Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience
of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security,
resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p.
S3-S8, January)
The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates
on whether scarcity (whether of food or water)
will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars
comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of
natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases
exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth
of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result.
Nonetheless, it seems that most
empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian
arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour
productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last
two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.
Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number
of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with
wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith,
2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’
(Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising
water/food as key policy priorities at the international level. In
the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and
foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the
Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the
sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a
principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or
King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action. The
governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global
food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The
likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience
of global food systems. None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show
water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the
University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where
water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of
the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the
electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18). As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of
over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into
account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United
Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and
1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties , and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management
or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984). The fear around water
wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however
no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to
agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian
states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water
rich countries have been
involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan
or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary
water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available
water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that
scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and
Gleditsch, 2006). In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity
does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war
rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national
water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable. The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have
again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening
ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn
cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of
Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that
water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite
growing concern that
climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate
the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).
 2NC---Disease
No disease impact –
1 – empirical record proves –only 4% of species extinction were caused by
disease, and they were all weak and localized plant or animal species – none of
them were globally dispersed or had the capacity to resist like humans
2 – burnout – if a pathogen is highly lethal, it kills the host before it has time to
spread – that creates evolutionary pressure towards less lethal diseases
That’s Farquhar

Their evidence assumes a level of virulence that has literally never occurred
Wendy Orent, 2015, anthropologist and freelance science writer whose work has appeared in
The Washington Post, The LA Times, The New Republic, Discover, and The American Prospect,
instructor in science journalism @ Emory, Ignore predictions of lethal pandemics and pay
attention to what really matters, LA Times, 1/3/15, http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-
oe-orent-pandemic-hysteria-20150104-story.html

Prophets of doom have been telling us for decades that a deadly new pandemic — of bird flu, of SARS or
MERS coronavirus, and now of Ebola — is on its way. Why are we still listening? If you look back at the furor raised at many distinguished publications

— Nature, Science, Scientific American, National Geographic — back in, say, 2005, about a potential bird flu (H5N1) pandemic, you wonder what planet they were on. Nature ran a

special section titled — “Avian flu: Are we ready?” — that began, ominously, with the words “Trouble is brewing in the East” and
went on to present a mock aftermath report detailing catastrophic civil breakdown . Robert Webster, a famous influenza virologist, told ABC News in
2006 that “society just can't accept the idea that 50% of the population could die. And I think we have to face that possibility.” Public health expert Michael T. Osterholm of the University of Minnesota, at
a meeting in Washington of scientists brought together by the Institute of Medicine, warned in 2005 that a post-pandemic commission, like the post-9/11 commission, could hold “many scientists …
accountable to that commission for what we did or didn't do to prevent a pandemic.” He also predicted that we could be facing “three years of a given hell” as the world struggled to right itself after the
deadly pandemic. And Laurie Garrett, author of what must be the urtext for pandemic predictions, her 1994 book “The Coming Plague,” intoned in Foreign Affairs that “in short, doom may loom.”

hysteria still goes on:

Although she followed that with “But note the may,” the article went on to paint a terrifying picture of the avian flu threat nonetheless. And such

Whether it's over the MERS coronavirus, a whole alphabet of chicken flu viruses, a real but not very deadly
influenza pandemic in 2009, or a kerfuffle like the one in 2012 over a scientist-crafted ferret flu that also
was supposed to be a pandemic threat. Along the way, virologist Nathan Wolfe published “The Viral Storm: the Dawn of a New Pandemic Age,” and David
Quammen warned in his gripping “Spillover” that some new animal plague could arise from the
jungle and sweep across the world. And now there's Ebola. Osterholm, in a widely read op-ed in the New York Times in September, wrote about the possibility that
scientists were afraid to mention publicly the danger they discuss privately: that Ebola “could mutate to become transmissible through the air.” “The Ebola epidemic in West Africa has the potential to
alter history as much as any plague has ever done,” he wrote. And Garrett wrote in Foreign Policy, “Attention, World: You just don't get it.” She went on to say, “Wake up, fools,” because we should be
more frightened of a potential scenario like the one in the movie “Contagion,” in which a lethal, fictitious pandemic scours the world, nearly destroying civilization. But there were fewer takers this time.
Osterholm's claims about Ebola going airborne were discounted by serious scientists, and Garrett seemingly retracted her earlier hysteria about Ebola by claiming that, after all, evolution made such

The scientific world has changed since 2005. Now, most scientists understand that
spread unlikely.

there are significant physical and evolutionary barriers to a blood- and fluid-borne
virus developing airborne transmission, as Garrett has acknowledged. Though Ebola virus has been detected in human alveolar cells, as Vincent
Racaniello, virologist at Columbia University, explained to me, that doesn't mean it can replicate in the airways enough to allow transmission. “Maybe … the virus can get in, but can't get out. Like a roach
motel,” wrote Racaniello in an email. H5N1, we understand now, never went airborne because it attached only to cell receptors located deep in human lungs, and could not, therefore, be coughed or
sneezed out. SARS, or severe acute respiratory syndrome, caused local outbreaks after multiple introductions via air travel but spread only sluggishly and mostly in hospitals. Breaking its chains of

transmission ended the outbreak globally.There probably will always be significant barriers preventing the easy
adaptation of an animal disease to the human species. Furthermore, Racaniello insists that there are no
recorded instances of viruses that have adapted to humans, changing the way they are
spread. So we need to stop listening to the doomsayers, and we need to do it now.
Predictions of lethal pandemics have — since the swine flu fiasco of 1976, when President Ford vowed to
vaccinate “every man, woman and child in the United States” — always been wrong. Fear-mongering wastes our time and our

emotions and diverts resources from where they should be directed — in the case of Ebola, to the ongoing tragedy in
West Africa. Americans have all but forgotten about Ebola now, because most people realize it isn't coming to a school or a shopping mall near you. But Sierra Leoneans and Liberians go on dying.
 2NC---Yellowstone
1---there are no geological signs indicating a soon eruption---and even if it did it
wouldn’t cause cataclysmic destruction
2---frequent earthquakes release pressure making super volcanoes safer
3---fears of explosion are grounded in faulty hype and Facebook conspiracy
theories
That’s 1NC Lackey
 2NC---Methane
Methane reductions only serve as a targeted attack on the energy sector---it
makes up less than two tenths of a degree of overall warming---that’s 1NC Loris
No impact
Justin Gillis, 2011, citing William S. Reeburgh, emeritus scientist at the University of California,
expert on methane, The New York Times—Environment, 12/20/11, “Arctic Methane: Is
Catastrophe Imminent?”, http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/arctic-methane-is-
catastrophe-imminent/

The basic worry is that as the climate changes, the ocean temperature could rise enough to destabilize
many of these offshore methane deposits, sending them into the atmosphere. If you go beyond the Arctic and count
deposits that exist off the margins of all the continents, there’s probably enough methane that a rapid release could turn the
earth into a hothouse. But senior scientists I spoke with told me they considered any such rapid release to be
highly unlikely, at least for the deeper deposits. A United States government report came to basically
the same conclusion a few years ago. While examples can already be found of warmer ocean
currents that are apparently destabilizing such deposits—for example, at this site off Spitsbergen, an island in the
Svalbard archipelago in the Arctic—the scientists explained that a pervasive ocean warming sufficient to
destabilize a lot of methane hydrates would almost certainly take thousands of years. And even if that
happened, many scientists say that the methane released would largely be consumed in the sea
(by bacteria that specialize in eating methane) and would not reach the atmosphere. That is what seems to be happening
off Svalbard. “I think it’s just dead wrong to talk about ‘Arctic Armageddon,’ ” said William S.
Reeburgh, an emeritus scientist at the University of California, Irvine, who spent decades studying such matters and says the
likely consumption of methane within the ocean should not be underestimated. “Most of
this methane is never going to see the atmosphere.”

Japan makes inevitable

Lynda Williamson, 2013, – Journalist at NewNet – Cites U.S.G.S.; Prof. Nisbet @ Royal
Holloway, London; Dr. Dixon Dir. at World Wildlife Fund and PhD in Astrophysics
Environmentalists urge caution over Japanese Ice Gas breakthrough, Thursday, 14 March 2013,
Lynda Williamson, http://newsnetscotland.com/index.php/scottish-news/6944-
environmentalists-urge-caution-over-japanese-ice-gas-breakthrough

The US G eological S urvey estimates that methane hydrates deposits could contain twice as much
carbon as all other fossil fuels on earth but warns that the ecological impact is "very

poorly understood. "¶ Methane hydrate is a naturally occurring form of methane gas combined with water which produces a
crystalline substance containing very high concentrations of methane. It is found extensively throughout the world, among other places in major
river deltas such as the Amazon Delta as well as in ocean sediments and in the sediments in and beneath areas of permafrost. ¶ Methane gas

is approximately 20 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than CO2 so any leakage of methane into the

atmosphere would raise global temperatures by considerably more than an equivalent amount of CO2. Methane is
faster acting and shorter lived than CO2, remaining in the earth's atmosphere for only 10 years as opposed to CO2 which remains for
approximately 100 years.¶ Some climate scientists believe that methane played a major role in the Paleocene – Eocene thermal maximum which
represents one of the most rapid and extreme warming events in geological history. Core samples taken from old ocean sediment layers
point to short periods of rapid warming of up 8 degrees centigrade on top of longer term
rises of between 5 and 7 degrees centigrade. The most likely cause of this rapid global warming
over a short period is the release of methane into the atmosphere.¶ Temperature and pressure conditions determine
methane hydrate stability so global warming can have the effect of releasing more naturally occurring methane into the air. Some scientists have
pointed to plumes of methane rising from the floor of the Arctic Ocean as evidence that increased global temperatures could trigger the release

of large quantities of methane.¶ The worry is that positive feedback could lead to a tipping point , a kind of
vicious circle where the release of methane raises temperatures and the raised temperatures stimulate methane release. Professor Euan Nisbet
from Royal Holloway, London, explains that:¶ "The Arctic is the fastest warming region on the planet, and has many methane sources that will
increase as the temperature rises. This is yet another serious concern: the warming will feed the warming." ¶ Other scientists point to storms and
fluctuations in weather systems, which could produce changes in ice coverage, as an explanation for Arctic gas plumes. ¶ Speaking to Newsnet
Scotland, Dr Richard Dixon, Director of Friends of the Earth Scotland said:¶ "The last thing we need is more fossil fuels. It is deeply ironic that

methane hydrates are becoming more accessible because of climate change, since burning them would set us on a course to truly
disastrous climate change . The planet cannot afford Japan or anyone else to extract gas
from methane hydrate deposits ."
 2NC---Warming
No extinction from warming – extreme warming generating risks are incredibly
low. Human adaption prevents the impacts even in worst case scenarios and
tech and intervening actors solve – that’s Farquhar 17

Preventing the 1.5 threshold is impossible

Thomas Hornigold, 19, 5-22-2019, "How Realistic Are the Global Climate Change Targets?
New Research Weighs In", [https://singularityhub.com/2019/05/22/how-realistic-are-the-
global-climate-change-targets-new-research-weighs-in/], AVD
In 1896, Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius pointed out that “the development of human industry” could introduce carbon dioxide to the atmosphere,
trapping infrared radiation and warming the climate. It took until 2015, when CO2 concentration had increased from 295ppm to 400ppm since
Arrhenius’ time, for the Paris Agreement to set a target for the upper limit of warming that would be allowed: two degrees centigrade, with an
aspirational target of 1.5 degrees centigrade. This level of warming, once considered the threshold for “dangerous climate change,” is now our goal.
Even getting there won’t be easy. A recent paper from Nature, in arguing that the 1.5C target is not yet impossible, demonstrated just how challenging
it will be to hit that target. 1.5C Is (Probably) Possible, But Only Just Imagine
that, starting in 2019, all carbon-emitting
infrastructure is phased out at the end of its lifetime. Any power plant that closes down, any car
that breaks down or is sold, any plane, or any ship is either replaced by a zero-emitting
alternative, or not replaced at all. Deforestation is stopped instantly (in reality, it’s still accelerating). Any
industry that currently emits carbon dioxide finds green alternatives or buries its emissions over the next few
decades. Perhaps most dramatically, within a few years years all those methane-emitting livestock (cows and sheep) are either slaughtered, or their
emissions are offset somehow. If
all of this is done, everywhere—and it would represent the most radical industrial transformation
the world had ever seen—the paper argues wewould have a 64 percent chance of hitting the 1.5C target. Carbon
Law: Exponential Reductions This plan is not a realistic attempt to hit 1.5C; it’s just a demonstration that this is still physically
possible. Most of the more realistic plans are based on Integrated Assessment Models, which take into account both climate and economic changes.
They also tend to lean more heavily on negative emissions, which would essentially entail creating an industry similar in size to the fossil fuel industry
just to clean up its waste. Some researchers have suggested a “carbon law”: halving emissions every decade, leading to an exponential decline in
emissions and carbon neutrality by 2050 as carbon capture is ramped up. Carbon emissions would have to fall by six to seven percent. The record is 1.4
percent decline, set in 2009, mostly due to the financial crisis. Last year, emissions increased by 2.7 percent. The IPCC’s 1.5C report, which has helped
to trigger the recent and inspiring wave of climate activism, demonstrated that every fraction of a degree makes issues worse: extreme weather events
become more frequent, agriculture becomes more difficult, and the risk of triggering harmful climate feedback becomes more and more likely. The
closer we can get to these targets, the better. Fair Share? Behind
these ambitious global goals, the situation for individual countries
can be even harder. That’s the message from a new study published in Earth’s Future. The authors imagined that China, the
EU28, and the United States all adopted the Carbon Law as national policy, slashing carbon
emissions in half each decade and reaching carbon neutrality. Even if this is done, the rest of the
world must cut its carbon emissions to zero by 2020 (assuming no major negative emissions are deployed), or 2030 if
negative emissions are permitted, to hit the Paris Agreement target of 2C. Given that many of these countries, like India

and Brazil, are developing economically and are likely to have higher energy demand in the
future, this leaves them barely any room for that growth, unless it is all green growth. The paper also
notes that while renewables are getting cheaper than their fossil fuel alternatives and exciting

technological breakthroughs are around the corner, deployment hasn’t moved the needle much. If you look at all the
energy humans produce—including the large amounts that are wasted when fossil fuels are burned, converted into waste heat—then the

renewable revolution from 2000-2016 means renewables account for just 2.6 percent of total energy. The Paris
Agreement is intended to operate by a “ratchet” mechanism. Rather than imposing top-down emissions targets for each country, countries are instead
free to make their own pledges and decide their own levels of ambition. The aim is that, as mitigation efforts continue, countries will contribute more
and more ambitious pledges to do their own part. This avoids the thorny issues of imposing rules on countries (with, presumably, fines or sanctions if
they fail to meet their targets) and how to divide up the world’s remaining carbon budget. Previous attempts
at global climate
agreements fell apart over precisely these issues. Issues of global equity in climate change are stark. After all, rich
nations have profited the most from burning fossil fuels, contributed most to the problem, and
in most cases still have the highest emissions in the world. At the same time, the impacts and damages are
disproportionately felt by poorer nations. Rich nations are also in more of a position to act. Yet when you look at the Paris Agreement goals set so far,
divided up with some notion of fairness, it is arguably only developing countries that are pulling their weight.

The director of the EPA agrees

Snyder 16 (2016, Carolyn, Director, Climate Protection Partnerships Division at US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “Evolution of global temperature over the past two
million years,” http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html)

Reconstructions of Earth’s past climate strongly influence our understanding of the dynamics
and sensitivity of the climate system. Yet global temperature has been reconstructed for only a few isolated windows
of time1, 2, and continuous reconstructions across glacial cycles remain elusive. Here I present a spatially weighted
proxy reconstruction of global temperature over the past 2 million years estimated from a
multi-proxy database of over 20,000 sea surface temperature point reconstructions. Global
temperature gradually cooled until roughly 1.2 million years ago and cooling then stalled until the present. The cooling trend
probably stalled before the beginning of the mid-Pleistocene transition3, and pre-dated the increase in the maximum size of ice
sheets around 0.9 million years ago4, 5, 6. Thus, global cooling may have been a pre-condition for, but probably is not the sole causal
mechanism of, the shift to quasi-100,000-year glacial cycles at the mid-Pleistocene transition. Over the past 800,000 years, polar
amplification (the amplification of temperature change at the poles relative to global temperature change) has been stable over
time, and global temperature and atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations have been closely coupled across glacial cycles. A
comparison of the new temperature reconstruction with radiative forcing from greenhouse
gases estimates an Earth system sensitivity of 9 degrees Celsius (range 7 to 13 degrees Celsius,
95 per cent credible interval) change in global average surface temperature per doubling of
atmospheric carbon dioxide over millennium timescales. This result suggests that stabilization at
today’s greenhouse gas levels may already commit Earth to an eventual total warming of 5
degrees Celsius (range 3 to 7 degrees Celsius, 95 per cent credible interval) over the next few millennia
as ice sheets, vegetation and atmospheric dust continue to respond to global warming.
 2NC---HR Cred
Human rights credibility gains are outweighed by US propping up brutal
regimes in turkey, Egypt, Taiwan, and Nicaragua. And the turn still remains.
Criticizing other countries while helping out other abusers makes the US appear
hypocritical and reduces credibility. And no impact National security can still be
preserved ad cooperation still has even with no credibility that’s 1NC
Carpenter.

Human rights leadership is impossible---alt causes overwhelm and the US won’t

exercise its influence
Alemayehu Mariam, 08/18/2013, PhD, JD, teaches political science at California State
University, San Bernardino “Is America Disinventing Human Rights?,”
http://www.ethiopianreview.us/48632

In a New York Times op-ed piece in June 2012, Carter cautioned, “At a time when popular revolutions are sweeping the globe, the
United
States should be strengthening, not weakening, basic rules of law and principles of justice
enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But instead of making the world
safer, America’s violation of international human rights abets our enemies and alienates our
friends.Ӧ Carter also raised a number of important questions: Has the U.S. abdicated its moral leadership in the
arena of international human rights? Has the U.S. betrayed its core values by maintaining a detention facility at
Guantá namo Bay, Cuba, and subjecting dozens of prisoners to “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” and leaving
them without the “prospect of ever obtaining their freedom”? Does the arbitrary killing of a person suspected to be an enemy terrorist
in a drone strike along with women and children who happen to be nearby comport with America’s professed commitment to the rule of law and
human rights?¶ In 1948, the U.S. played a central leadership role in “inventing” the principal instrument which today serves as the bedrock
foundation of modern human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the UN General Assembly in December
1948, set a “common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations” in terms of equality, dignity and rights. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, the
widow of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, chaired the committee that drafted the UDHR. Eleanor remains an unsung heroine even though she
was the mother of the modern global human rights movement. Without her, there would have been no UDHR; and without the UDHR, it is
doubtful that the plethora of subsequent human rights conventions and regimes would have come into existence. Remarkably, she managed to
mobilize, organize and proselytize human rights even though she had no legal training, diplomatic experience or bureaucratic expertise. She
used her skills as political activist and advocate in the cause of freedom, justice and civil rights to work for global human rights. ¶ Is America
disinventing human rights?¶ It
seems the U.S. is “disinventing” human rights through the pursuit of
double (triple, quadruple) standard of human rights policy wrapped in a cover of diplocrisy .
In Africa, the U.S. has one set of standards for Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe and Omar al-
Bashir’s Sudan. Mugabe and Bashir are classified as the nasty hombres of human rights in Africa. The U.S. has targeted
both regimes for crippling economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure . The U.S. has frozen
the assets of Mugabe’s family and henchmen because the “Mugabe regime rules through
politically motivated violence and intimidation and has triggered the collapse of the rule of
law in Zimbabwe.”¶ The U.S. calls “partners” equally brutal regimes in Africa which serve as
its proxies. Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Yuweri Museveni of Uganda and the deceased leader of the
regime in Ethiopia are lauded as the “new breed of African leaders” and crowned “partners”.
Uhuru Kenyatta, recently elected president of Kenya and a suspect under indictment by the
International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against humanity is said to be different than
Bashir who faces similar ICC charges. In 2009, Ambassador Susan E. Rice, then-U.S. Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, demanded Bashir’s arrest and prosecution: “The people of Sudan have suffered too much for too long, and an end to their anguish will
not come easily. Those who committed atrocities in Sudan, including genocide, should be brought to justice.” No official U.S. statement on
Uhuru’s ICC prosecution was issued.¶ The U.S. maintains excellent relations with Teodoro Obiang Nguema
Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea who has been in power since 1979 because of that country’s
oil reserves; but all of the oil revenues are looted by Obiang and his cronies. In 2011, the U.S. brought legal action in
federal court against Obiang’s son to seize corruptly obtained assets including a $40 million estate in Malibu, California overlooking the Pacific
Ocean, a luxury plane and a dozen super-sports cars worth millions of dollars. The U.S. has not touched any of the other African Ali Babas and
their forty dozen thieving cronies who have stolen billions and stashed their cash in U.S. and other banks. ¶ Despite
lofty rhetoric in
support of the advancement of democracy and protection of human rights in Africa, the
United States continues to subsidize and coddle African dictatorships that are as bad as or
even worse than Mugabe’s. The U.S. currently provides substantial economic aid, loans, technical and security assistance
to the repressive regimes in Ethiopia, Congo (DRC), Uganda, Rwanda and elsewhere . None of
these countries holds free elections, allow the operation of an independent press or free
expression or abide by the rule of law. All of them are corrupt to the core, keep thousands of
political prisoners, use torture and ruthlessly persecute their opposition. Yet they are
deemed U.S. “partners”.¶ “Principled disengagement” as a way of reinventing an American
human rights policy?¶ If the Obama Administration indeed has a global or African human
rights policy, it must be a well-kept secret. In March 2013, Michael Posner, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor said American human rights policy is based on “principled engagement”: “We are going to go to the United
Nations and join the Human Rights Council and we’re going to be part of it even though we recognize it doesn’t work… We’re going to engage
with governments that are allies but we are also going to engage with governments with tough relationships and human rights are going to be
part of those discussions.” Second, the U.S. will follow “a single standard for human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and it
applies to all including ourselves…” Third, consistent with President “Obama’s personality”, the Administration believes “change occurs from
within and so a lot of the emphasis… [will be] on how we can help local actors, change agents, civil society, labor activists, religious leaders trying
to change their societies from within and amplify their own voices and give them the support they need…” ¶ On August 14, according to Egyptian
government sources, 525 protesters, mostly members of the Muslim Brotherhood, were killed and 3,717 injured at the hands of Egyptian
military and security forces. It was an unspeakably horrifying massacre of protesters exercising their right to peaceful expression of grievances. ¶
On August 15, President Obama
criticized the heavy-handed crackdown on peaceful protesters with
the usual platitudes. “The United States strongly condemns the steps that have been taken by Egypt’s interim government and
security forces. We deplore violence against civilians.” His message to the Egyptian people was somewhat disconcerting in light of the massacre.
“America cannot determine the future of Egypt. We do not take sides with any particular party or political figure. I know it’s tempting inside
Egypt to blame the United States.”¶ In July 2009, in Ghana, President Obama told Africa’s “strongmen”, “History offers a clear verdict:
governments that respect the will of their own people are more prosperous, more stable, and more successful than governments that do not….
No person wants to live in a society where the rule of law gives way to the rule of brutality… Make no mistake: history is on the side of these
brave Africans [citizens and their communities driving change], and not with those who use coups or change Constitutions to stay in power.
Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.”¶ President Obama has a clear choice in Egypt between “those who use coups to stay
in power” and the people of Egypt peacefully protesting in the streets. Now he says, “We don’t take sides…” By “not taking sides”, it seems he has
taken sides with Egypt’s strongmen who “use coups to stay in power”. So much for “principled engagement”! ¶ Obama reassured the Egyptian
military that the U.S. does not intend to end or suspend its decades-old partnership with them. He cautioned the military that “While we want to
sustain our relationship with Egypt, our traditional cooperation cannot continue as usual while civilians are being killed in the streets.” He
indicated his disapproval of the imposition of “martial law” but made no mention of the manifest military coup that had ousted Morsy. He
obliquely referred to it as a “military intervention”. He made a gesture of “action” cancelling a symbolic military exercise with the Egyptian army.
There will be no suspension of U.S. military aid to Egypt and no other sanctions will be imposed on the Egyptian military or government. ¶ I am
not clear what Obama’s human rights policy of “principled engagement” actually means. But I have a lot of questions about it: Does it mean moral
complacency and tolerance of the crimes against humanity of African dictators for the sake of the war on terror and oil? Is it a euphemism for
abdication of American ideals on the altar of political expediency? Does it mean overlooking and excusing the crimes of ruthless dictators and
turning a blind eye to their bottomless corruption? Does “principled engagement” mean allowing dictators to suck at the teats of American
taxpayers to satisfy their insatiable aid addiction while they brutalize their people? ¶ The facts of Obama’s “principled
engagement” tell a different story. In May 2010, after the ruling party in Ethiopia declared it had won 99.6 percent of the
seats in parliament, the U.S. demonstrated its “principled engagement” by issuing a Statement expressing “concern that international observers
found that the elections fell short of international commitments” and promised to “work diligently with Ethiopia to ensure that strengthened
democratic institutions and open political dialogue become a reality for the Ethiopian people.” There
is no evidence that the
U.S. did anything to “strengthen democratic institutions and open political dialogue to
become a reality for the Ethiopian people.Ӧ When two ICC indicted suspects in Kenya
(Kenyatta and Ruto) won the presidency in Kenya a few months ago, the U.S. applied its
“principled engagement” in the form of a robust defense of the suspects . Johnnie Carson, the former
United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, said the ICC indictments of Bashir and Uhuru/Ruto are different. “I don’t want to
make a comparison with Sudan in its totality because Sudan is a special case in many ways.” What
makes Bashir and Sudan
different, according to Carson, is the fact that Sudan is on the list of countries that support
terrorism and Bashir and his co-defendants are under indictment for the genocide in Darfur .
Since “none of that applies to Kenya,” according to Carson, it appears the U.S. will follow a
different policy.¶ President Obama says the U.S. will maintain its traditional partnership with
Egypt’s military, Egypt’s “strongmen”. At the onset of the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, Obama and his foreign policy team
froze in stunned silence, flat-footed and twiddling their thumbs and scratching their heads for days before staking out a position on that popular
uprising. They could not bring themselves to use the “D” word (dictator as in Hosni Mubarak) to
describe events in Egypt then. Today Obama cannot bring himself to say the “C” word (as in
Egyptian military coup).¶ Obama is in an extraordinary historical position as a person of color to
advance American ideals and values throughout the world in convincing and creative ways.
But he cannot advance these ideals and values through a hollow notion of “principled
engagement.”¶ Rather, he must adopt a policy of “principled disengagement” with African
dictators. That does not mean isolationism or a hands off approach to human rights. By
“principled disengagement” I mean a policy and policy outcome that is based on measurable
human rights metrics. Under a policy of “principled disengagement”, the U.S. would establish clear, attainable and measurable
human rights policy objectives in its relations with African dictatorships. The policy would establish minimum conditions of human rights
compliance. For instance, the U.S. could set some basic criteria for the conduct of free and fair elections, press and individual freedoms, limits on
arbitrary arrests and detentions, prevention of extrajudicial punishments, etc. Using its annual human rights assessments, the U.S. could make
factual determinations on the extent to which it will engage or disengage with a particular regime. “Partnership” status and the benefits that
come with it will be reserved to those regimes that have good and improving records on specific human rights measures. Regimes that steal
elections, win elections by 99.6 percent, engage in arbitrary arrests and detentions and other human rights violations would be denied
“partnership” status and denied aid, loans and technical assistance. Persistent violators of human rights would be given a compliance timetable
to improve their records and provided appropriate assistance to achieve specific human rights goals. If regimes persist in a pattern and practice
of human rights violations, the U.S. could raise the stakes and impose economic and diplomatic sanctions. ¶ The ‘‘Ethiopia Democracy and
Accountability Act of 2007’’ contained many important statutory provisions that could serve as a foundation for “principled disengagement”. ¶
Obama’s “principled engagement” seems to be a justification for expediency at the cost of
American ideals. Until he decides to stand for principle, instead of standing behind the
rhetoric of “principled engagement”, he will continue to find himself on a tightrope of moral,
legal and political ambiguity. The U.S. cannot “condemn” and “deplore” its way out of its
human rights obligations or global leadership role. Yes, the U.S. must take sides! It must
take a stand either with the victims of human rights abuses throughout the world or the
human rights abusers of the world. If Obama wants to save the world from strongmen with boots and in designer suits with
briefcases full of cash, he should pursue a policy of “principled disengagement”. But he should start by reflecting on the words he spoke during
his first inauguration speech:

And here is the point in this debate where we list off all of the things the US has
done that probly thump the aff. Here we go: Guantanamo, Abu graihb, any
number of drone attacks from any administration in the past 40 years, locking
kids in cages, tear gassing migrants at the border, police brutality probably isn’t
great for credibility, 43% of what trump tweets, for profit prisons, leaving the
UN human rights council, and leaving the Kurds to be slaughtered.
Adv. 2
 2NC---Competitiveness
Economic competitiveness isn’t real, everything is based off of cooperation.
Competition may be a tool used but in actuality it is all based on cooperation
and cooperation is how we do things in economies. “competitive” economies
aren’t a way to base economies or to see how good economies are -Rubin 13

No impact to competitiveness---fallacy of composition and sheltering

Nicholas Shaxson, 05/07/2015, the author of Treasure Islands, an award-winning book about
tax havens, citing the work of Martin Wolf, the Financial Times’ chief economics commentator,
"Optimistic about the state: Martin Wolf’s searing attack on the Competitiveness Agenda", Fools
Gold, foolsgold.international/optimistic-about-the-state-martin-wolfs-searing-attack-on-the-
competitiveness-agenda/

Introduction: the problem with ‘competitiveness’ Wolf’s arguments, exploring what it might mean for a country
to be ‘competitive’, can be summed up briefly. In short, he supports our own optimistic view that you needn’t bow
down to the competitiveness agenda. “Competitiveness” , he explains, is Fools’ Gold – and in pretty
much the same way that we argue it is. The chapter contains a related argument, which Wolf summarises: “The notion of
the competitiveness of countries, on the model of the competitiveness of companies, is
nonsense.” He points out, as we often have, that what so often lies behind all the woolly thinking out there is the
‘fallacy of composition’ (or, in his geeky formulation, the application of “‘partial equilibrium’ reasoning to a ‘general
equilibrium’ question.”) In other words, what’s good for one company or sector isn’t necessarily good
for the whole economy. Wolf covers ground we’ve already explored recently via Paul Krugman and Robert Reich –
but he gives it a much more comprehensive treatment than either of them, exploring a greater range of ways that one might
talk about competitiveness. All of the possible tests for ‘competitiveness’ crumble to dust in his hands – as they should. Part of
our raison dê tre here at Fools’ Gold is to expose and debunk exactly these commonly held arguments, and Wolf has done a lot
of heavy lifting for us here. Must social democratic states bow before omnipotent markets? The chapter “Sad about the State”
begins by quoting the English philosopher John Gray, who argued that “the chief result of this new competition is to make the
social market economies of the post-war period unviable.” Similarly, Thomas Friedman famously said that the world is ‘flat’:
every country in the world would have to become like the US or die. Wolf points out that this is a view held on both the right
(beneficient markets force evil governments not to fleece their people) and on the left (beneficient governments can’t shield
their people from nasty global forces). He summarises: “Policies matter to the extent that they adversely affect performance.
The notion of competitiveness is irrelevant.” “Both agree that impotent politicians must now bow before omnipotent markets.
This has become one of the cliché s of the age. But it is (almost) total nonsense.” And this is, if you think about it, a very
optimistic view. We like to put it this way: politicians think they are in a global race (and thus feel obliged to slash taxes on
capital, weaken labour rights and so on) – but they are labouring under false consciousness. A country can tax mobile
corporations and protect workers – and suffer no overall economic penalty for doing so. International co-ordination on these
things is useful, for sure, but another way is possible: countries can unilaterally opt out of the race. To engage can be to indulge
in self-harm. It is all about trade-offs. For example, a more ‘competitive’ (devalued) exchange rate may benefit exporters, but it
will hurt consumers buying dearer imported goods. Is this an overall benefit? Perhaps, perhaps not. Corporate tax cuts benefit
corporations, but the lost revenues hurt taxpayers elsewhere and consumers of public services. To call these moves a priori
‘competitive’ is silly. But people do it all the time. For example, the pre-eminent Oxford-based think tank advising the UK
government on corporate tax policy, was apparently set up to give the UK a more “competitive” tax system. Wolf looks briefly
at corporation tax, noting in passing that countries show a huge range of corporation tax as a share of GDP (then between 1.8
percent in Germany to 6.5 percent in Australia in 2000; today the range is 1.2 percent in Slovenia to 8.5 percent in Norway),
without any obvious effect on growth despite this enormous sevenfold range. As a first general source of reassurance about
unstoppable global forces, Wolf notes that thereare large swathes of the economy sheltered from
global forces: immovable domestic services, healthcare and education , for instance. (This seems to
correspond to what the Manchester Capitalism project formerly known as CRESC calls the ‘Foundational Economy’.) And
the sheltered parts of the economy are huge: in most high-income countries, Wolf says,
relatively non-tradable services like this amount to two thirds of GDP or more. No need to
get ‘competitive’ here.
 2NC---Heg
No heg impact – ILO will persist. Transition conflict theory is wrong. Doesn’t
take into account other nation stability. Institutions are decreasing reliance
now to ensure collapse won’t have an impact – that 1NC Ikenberry

Structural factors make hegemonic collapse inevitable and peaceful -- even

restricting Trump can't reverse decline
Amitav Acharya, 2018 (Amitav, Professor of International Relations at the School of
International Service, American University, UNESCO Chair in Transnational Challenges and
Governance, Chair of its ASEAN Studies Initiative. The End of American World Order: Second
Edition. Polity Press, Medford MA. Accessed via iBooks.)

In this new edition, I make the following arguments: 1. The global outpouring of concerns
surrounding Trump's election as US President vindicate the book's analysis in 2014, that
the US-led liberal international order or the American World Order (AWO) was in decline, even if the US
itself was not. 2.Trump is the consequence, not the cause of the decline of the US-led liberal
order. 3.Despite Trump's pledge to make “America great again,” he cannot reverse the decline of the US-
led world order. 4. The global power shift from the West to the Rest continues despite
recent economic slowdown and political crisis in several BRICS nations. 5. While the liberal
order is imploding in the West, China and India are likely to pursue globalization , albeit in a way
different from the earlier Western-led globalization. China in particular is taking on a more assertive role in reshaping
globalization and global governance. 6.
The architecture of global cooperation developed under the
liberal order is fracturing and regionalism in Europe is facing a moment of crisis with
Brexit, but new forms of international cooperation are emerging, such as China's Belt and
Road Initiative. 7. While there are signs of growing conflict and violence in the world,
these are not necessarily due to the decline of the American World Order . Many of the
sources of violence are not new, and some are directly the result of policy choices made by
Western powers led by the US (Iraq, Libya, and Syria). Some global challenges such as terrorism are actually highly
localized, and there are long-term and newer sources of stability in the world that can be
further developed through renewed cooperation and shared leadership with the emerging
powers." A multiplex world will not be free from conflicts and disorder . But absolute peace is
illusory. The goal should be to achieve relative stability, preventing major power wars and genocide and managing regional
conflicts to minimize human suffering. Just
because the West is losing its hegemony does not mean
the world is doomed to chaos, without leadership or cooperation. The nature of
leadership is changing. A multiplex world presents both challenges and opportunities for
global and regional cooperation. This would require the Western nations to shed their free-riding on the US and
accept shared leadership with the rising and regional powers. It would require greater partnership between global and
regional bodies, public, private and civil-society groups. This is a G-Plus World and requires a reformed system of global
governance that accords genuine recognition to the voices and aspirations of the Rest. America
and its Western
allies must give up exclusive privileges in return for their trust and cooperation in order to
make the system work. If this is the view of an optimist, then let me be one.
No hegemony impact---empirics and political psychology prove US posture is
unrelated to great power peace
Christopher Fettweis, 2017, associate professor of political science at Tulane University.
5/8/17, “Unipolarity, Hegemony, and the New Peace”
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2017.1306394?needAccess=true

After three years in the White House, Ronald Reagan had learned something surprising:
“Many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and
Americans,” he wrote in his autobiography. He continued: “Perhaps this shouldn’t have surprised me, but it did … I’d
always felt that from our deeds it must be clear to anyone that Americans were a moral people who starting at the birth of our
nation had always used our power only as a force for good in the world…. During
my first years in Washington, I
think many of us took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it
unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them .” 100 Reagan is
certainly not alone in believing in the essential benevolent image of his nation. While it is
common for actors to attribute negative motivations to the behavior of others, it is
exceedingly difficult for them to accept that anyone could interpret their actions in
negative ways. Leaders are well aware of their own motives and tend to assume that their
peaceful intentions are obvious and transparent . Both strains of the hegemonic-stability
explanation assume not only that US power is benevolent, but that others perceive it that
way. Hegemonic stability depends on the perceptions of other states to be successful; it has
no hope to succeed if it encounters resistance from the less powerful members of the
system, or even if they simply refuse to follow the rules . Relatively small police forces
require the general cooperation of large communities to have any chance of establishing
order. They must perceive the sheriff as just, rational, and essentially nonthreatening. The lack
of balancing behavior in the system, which has been puzzling to many realists, seems to support the notion of widespread
perceptions of benevolent hegemony.101 Were they threatened by the order constructed by the United States, the argument
goes, smaller states would react in ways that reflected their fears. Since internal and external balancing accompanied previous
attempts to achieve hegemony, the absence of such behavior today suggests that something is different about the US version.
Hegemonic-stability theorists purport to understand the perceptions of others, at times
better than those others understand themselves. Complain as they may at times, other countries know that
the United States is acting in the common interest. Objections to unipolarity, though widespread, are not “very seriously
intended,” wrote Kagan, since “the truth about America’s dominant role in the world is known to most observers. And the
truth is that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the United States is good for a vast portion of the world’s population.” 102
In the 1990s, Russian protests regarding NATO expansion—though nearly universal—were
not taken seriously, since US planners believed the alliance’s benevolent intentions were
apparent to all. Sagacious Russians understood that expansion would actually be beneficial, since it would bring stability
to their western border.103 President Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher were
caught off guard by the hostility of their counterparts regarding the issue at a summit in
Budapest in December 1994.104 Despite warnings from the vast majority of academic and
policy experts about the likely Russian reaction and overall wisdom of expansion itself, the
administration failed to anticipate Moscow’s position. 105 The Russians did not seem to
believe American assurances that expansion would actually be good for them. The United
States overestimated the degree to which others saw it as benevolent. Once again, the
culture of the United States might make its leaders more vulnerable to this misperception.
The need for positive self-regard appears to be particularly strong in North American
societies compared to elsewhere.106 Western egos tend to be gratified through self-promotion
rather than humility, and independence rather than interdependence . Americans are more
likely to feel good if they are unique rather than a good cog in society’s wheel, and uniquely
good. The need to be perceived as benevolent, though universal, may well exert stronger encouragement for
US observers to project their perceptions onto others. The United States almost certainly frightens others
more than its leaders perceive. A quarter of the 68,000 respondents to a 2013 Gallup poll in
sixty-five countries identified the United States as the “greatest threat to world peace,”
which was more than three times the total for the second-place country (Pakistan).107 The
international community always has to worry about the potential for police brutality, even
if it occurs rarely. Such ungratefulness tends to come as a surprise to US leaders. In 2003, Condoleezza Rice was
dismayed to discover resistance to US initiatives in Iraq: “There were times,” she said later, “that it appeared that American
power was seen to be more dangerous than, perhaps, Saddam Hussein.” 108 Both liberals and neoconservatives probably
exaggerate the extent to which US hegemony is everywhere secretly welcomed ;
it is not just petulant resentment,
but understandable disagreement with US policies, that motivates counterhegemonic
beliefs and behavior. To review, assuming for a moment that US leaders are subject to the
same forces that affect every human being, they overestimate the amount of control
they have over other actors, and are not as important to decisions made elsewhere as they
believe themselves to be. And they probably perceive their own benevolence to be much
greater than do others. These common phenomena all influence US beliefs in the same
direction, and may well increase the apparent explanatory power of hegemony beyond
what the facts would otherwise support. The United States is probably not as central to the
New Peace as either liberals or neoconservatives believe. In the end, what can be said about the
relationship between US power and international stability? Probably not much that will satisfy partisans, and the pacifying
virtue of US hegemony will remain largely an article of faith in some circles in the policy world. Like most beliefs, it will remain
immune to alteration by logic and evidence. Beliefs rarely change, so debates rarely end. For those not yet fully converted,
however, perhaps it will be significant that corroborating evidence for the relationship is
extremely hard to identify. If indeed hegemonic stability exists, it does so without leaving
much of a trace. Neither Washington’s spending, nor its interventions, nor its overall grand
strategy seem to matter much to the levels of armed conflict around the world (apart from those
wars that Uncle Sam starts). The empirical record does not contain strong reasons to believe that
unipolarity and the New Peace are related, and insights from political psychology suggest
that hegemonic stability is a belief particularly susceptible to misperception. US leaders probably
exaggerate the degree to which their power matters, and could retrench without much risk to themselves or the world around
them. Researchers will need to look elsewhere to explain why the world has entered into the
most peaceful period in its history. The good news from this is that the New Peace will probably persist
for quite some time, no matter how dominant the United States is, or what policies President
Trump follows, or how much resentment its actions cause in the periphery. The people of the twenty-first
century are likely to be much safer and more secure than any of their predecessors, even if
many of them do not always believe it.
 2NC---Nuke Terror
Terror groups cant get nukes means its irrelevant but even if they could they
would never deploy them. It would cause massive strife in the organization,
calculous weighs no cuase of backlash, and Terror groups by nature don’t want
to escalate would only use it for blackmail that’s 1NC McIntosh and Storey.

Covid means no chance of terror attack.

Jessica Davis, April 28, 2020, [Jessica Davis (@jessmarindavis) is the president of Insight Threat
Intelligence, an international consultant on counter-terrorism and intelligence, a former senior
strategic analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and the author of Women in
Modern Terrorism (2017).], Terrorism During a Pandemic: Assessing the Threat and Balancing
the Hype, Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/69895/terrorism-during-a-pandemic-
assessing-the-threat-and-balancing-the-hype/, Xoxo 6/1/2020

The COVID-19 pandemic also creates mitigating conditions for the terrorist threat in much of the
world. Around the globe, people are implementing physical distancing measures and, therefore, removing
a significant terrorist target: crowds. Physical distancing measures make tactics such as vehicle rammings,
stabbings, and bombings far less effective. Without the crowds that usually allow these relatively simple attacks to
generate casualties, terrorists may determine that their plans are best perpetrated once physical
distancing measures are no longer in place. While it may be convenient to think of terrorists as relatively
omnipotent, my work in counter-terrorism has demonstrated that this is far from the case. Terrorists, like everybody else, can
and do get sick, as do their family and friends, creating a burden on care. At the same time, the
economic devastation caused by the virus has likely left many would-be terrorists without a
source of income. They may be struggling with daily subsistence, meaning devoting additional
resources (both in time and money) to attack planning and weapons/component procurements
may take a back seat to more immediate needs. The intense media focus on COVID-19 may also
dissuade some would-be terrorists from engaging in attacks during the pandemic. Most terrorists seek recognition
for their attacks, with the ultimate goal of sowing fear in a population. This is difficult to do if no one is paying
attention to you. A recent attack in France demonstrates how little media attention some attacks are generating. Even for a
COVID-19 attack (involving an infected individual), this tactic also does not guarantee media
attention. The reality is that anyone we come into contact with could be a virus carrier – determining responsibility would be
difficult and far from instantaneous, minimizing one of terrorism’s objectives: instilling fear. This fear would also likely be
mitigated by the current environment, which is one where fear is already pervasive due to the
global pandemic.
 2NC---Prolif
There is no impact – the Soviet Union, china, Israel, South Africa, India and
Pakistan, North Korea and Iran all disprove proliferation cascades and
instability – that’s 1NC Walt

Won’t cascade – multiple warrants

-empirics
-US agreements solve
-timeframe
-no incentive – regional tension

Colin H. Kahl, 2013, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an associate
professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School
of Foreign Service, Melissa G. Dalton, Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security,
Matthew Irvine, Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security, February, “If
Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia Be Next?”
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AtomicKingdom_Kahl.pdf

*cites Jacques Hymans, USC Associate Professor of IR***

I I I . LESSONS FROM HISTOR Y Concerns over “regional proliferation chains,” “falling nuclear dominos” and “nuclear tipping points” are nothing new; indeed, reactive proliferation fears date back to the dawn of the nuclear age.14 Warnings of an
inevitable deluge of proliferation were commonplace from the 1950s to the 1970s, resurfaced during the discussion of “rogue states” in the 1990s and became even more ominous after 9/11.15 In 2004, for example, Mitchell Reiss warned that “in ways
both fast and slow, we may very soon be approaching a nuclear ‘tipping point,’ where many countries may decide to acquire nuclear arsenals on short notice, thereby triggering a proliferation epidemic.” Given the presumed fragility of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime and the ready supply of nuclear expertise, technology and material, Reiss argued, “a single new entrant into the nuclear club could catalyze similar responses by others in the region, with the Middle East and Northeast Asia the

most likely candidates.”16 Nevertheless, predictions of inevitable prolif eration cascades have historically proven false (see The
Proliferation Cascade Myth text box). In the six decades since atomic weapons were first developed, nuclear restraint has proven far more common than nuclear proliferation, and cases of reactive proliferation have been exceedingly rare. Moreover, most

countries that started down the nuclear path found the road more difficult than
have have

imagined, leading the majority to reverse course.

both technologically and bureaucratically, of nuclear-weapons aspirants Thus, despite frequent warnings of
an unstoppable “nuclear express,”17 William Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova astutely note that the “train to date has been slow to pick up steam, has made fewer stops than anticipated, and usually has arrived much later than expected.”18 None of
this means that additional proliferation in response to Iran’s nuclear ambitions is inconceivable, but the empirical record does suggest that regional chain reactions are not inevitable. Instead, only certain countries are candidates for reactive
proliferation. Determining the risk that any given country in the Middle East will proliferate in response to Iranian nuclearization requires an assessment of the incentives and disincentives for acquiring a nuclear deterrent, the technical and bureaucratic
constraints and the available strategic alternatives. Incentives and Disincentives to Proliferate Security considerations, status and reputational concerns and the prospect of sanctions combine to shape the incentives and disincentives for states to pursue

Analysts predicting proliferation

nuclear weapons. emphasize the incentives for prolif cascades tend to reactive eration

while downplaying the disincentives. Yet

ignoring or instances of prolif , as it turns out, nuclear eration (including reactive proliferation)

have been so rare because this road risks insecurity, reputational damage and
going down often

economic costs that outweigh potential benefits. the 19 Security and regime survival are especially important motivations driving state decisions to proliferate.
All else being equal, if a state’s leadership believes that a nuclear deterrent is required to address an acute security challenge, proliferation is more likely.20 Countries in conflict-prone neighborhoods facing an “enduring rival”– especially countries with
inferior conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis their opponents or those that face an adversary that possesses or is seeking nuclear weapons – may be particularly prone to seeking a nuclear deterrent to avert aggression.21 A recent quantitative study
by Philipp Bleek, for example, found that security threats, as measured by the frequency and intensity of conventional militarized disputes, were highly correlated with decisions to launch nuclear weapons programs and eventually acquire the bomb.22
The Proliferation Cascade Myth Despite repeated warnings since the dawn of the nuclear age of an inevitable deluge of nuclear proliferation, such fears have thus far proven largely unfounded. Historically, nuclear restraint is the rule, not the exception –
and the degree of restraint has actually increased over time. In the first two decades of the nuclear age, five nuclear-weapons states emerged: the United States (1945), the Soviet Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964).
However, in the nearly 50 years since China developed nuclear weapons, only four additional countries have entered (and remained in) the nuclear club: Israel (allegedly in 1967), India (“peaceful” nuclear test in 1974, acquisition in late-1980s, test in
1998), Pakistan (acquisition in late-1980s, test in 1998) and North Korea (test in 2006).23 This significant slowdown in the pace of proliferation occurred despite the widespread dissemination of nuclear know-how and the fact that the number of states
with the technical and industrial capability to pursue nuclear weapons programs has significantly increased over time.24 Moreover, in the past 20 years, several states have either given up their nuclear weapons (South Africa and the Soviet successor
states Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine) or ended their highly developed nuclear weapons programs (e.g., Argentina, Brazil and Libya).25 Indeed, by one estimate, 37 countries have pursued nuclear programs with possible weaponsrelated dimensions

the number of nuclear reversals has grown

since 1945, yet the overwhelming number chose to abandon these activities before they produced a bomb. Over time,

while the number of states initiating programs has declined. with possible military dimensions markedly 26 Furthermore – especially
since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) went into force in 1970 – reactive proliferation has been exceedingly rare. The NPT has near-universal membership among the community of nations; only India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea currently
stand outside the treaty. Yet the actual and suspected acquisition of nuclear weapons by these outliers has not triggered widespread reactive proliferation in their respective neighborhoods. Pakistan followed India into the nuclear club, and the two have
engaged in a vigorous arms race, but Pakistani nuclearization did not spark additional South Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the North Korean bomb did not lead South Korea, Japan or other regional states to follow suit.27 In the
Middle East, no country has successfully built a nuclear weapon in the four decades since Israel allegedly built its first nuclear weapons. Egypt took initial steps toward nuclearization in the 1950s and then expanded these efforts in the late 1960s and
1970s in response to Israel’s presumed capabilities. However, Cairo then ratified the NPT in 1981 and abandoned its program.28 Libya, Iraq and Iran all pursued nuclear weapons capabilities, but only Iran’s program persists and none of these states
initiated their efforts primarily as a defensive response to Israel’s presumed arsenal.29 Sometime in the 2000s, Syria also appears to have initiated nuclear activities with possible military dimensions, including construction of a covert nuclear reactor
near al-Kibar, likely enabled by North Korean assistance.30 (An Israeli airstrike destroyed the facility in 2007.31) The motivations for Syria’s activities remain murky, but the nearly 40-year lag between Israel’s alleged development of the bomb and
Syria’s actions suggests that reactive proliferation was not the most likely cause. Finally, even countries that start on the nuclear path have found it very difficult, and exceedingly time consuming, to reach the end. Of the 10 countries that launched nuclear
weapons projects after 1970, only three (Pakistan, North Korea and South Africa) succeeded; one (Iran) remains in progress, and the rest failed or were reversed.32 The successful projects have also generally needed much more time than expected to

the average time required to complete a

finish. According to Jacques Hymans, program has increased nuclear weapons

from seven to 17 years even as the hardware, knowledge and industrial

years prior to 1970 about after 1970,

base required for prolif has expanded eration to more and more countries.33 Yet throughout the nuclear age, many states with potential security incentives to develop nuclear
weapons have nevertheless abstained from doing so.34 Moreover, contrary to common expectations, recent statistical research shows that states with an enduring rival that possesses or is pursuing nuclear weapons are not more likely than other states
to launch nuclear weapons programs or go all the way to acquiring the bomb, although they do seem more likely to explore nuclear weapons options.35 This suggests that a rival’s acquisition of nuclear weapons does not inevitably drive proliferation
 leaders
decisions. One reason that reactive proliferation is not an automatic response to a rival’s acquisition of nuclear arms is the fact that security calculations can cut in both directions. Nuclear weapons might deter outside threats, but

have to weigh these potential gains against the possibility that seeking nuclear weapons
would trigger a regional arms race or
make the country or regime less secure by ing attack by outside powers. a preventive

pursuing nuclear weapons will strain

Countries also have to consider the possibility that relations with allies produce s in strategic hips key and
security patrons. If a state’s leaders conclude that their overall security would decrease by building a bomb, they are not likely to do so.36 Moreover, although security considerations are often central, they are rarely sufficient to motivate states to
develop nuclear weapons. Scholars have noted the importance of other factors, most notably the perceived effects of nuclear weapons on a country’s relative status and influence.37 Empirically, the most highly motivated states seem to be those with
leaders that simultaneously believe a nuclear deterrent is essential to counter an existential threat and view nuclear weapons as crucial for maintaining or enhancing their international status and influence. Leaders that see their country as naturally at
odds with, and naturally equal or superior to, a threatening external foe appear to be especially prone to pursuing nuclear weapons.38 Thus, as Jacques Hymans argues, extreme levels of fear and pride often “combine to produce a very strong tendency to
reach for the bomb.”39 Yet here too, leaders contemplating acquiring nuclear weapons have to balance the possible increase to their prestige and influence against the normative and reputational costs associated with violating the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). If a country’s leaders fully embrace the principles and norms embodied in the NPT, highly value positive diplomatic relations with Western countries and see membership in the “community of nations” as central to their
national interests and identity, they are likely to worry that developing nuclear weapons would damage (rather than bolster) their reputation and influence, and thus they will be less likely to go for the bomb.40 In contrast, countries with regimes or
ruling coalitions that embrace an ideology that rejects the Western dominated international order and prioritizes national self-reliance and autonomy from outside interference seem more inclined toward proliferation regardless of whether they are
signatories to the NPT.41 Most countries appear to fall in the former category, whereas only a small number of “rogue” states fit the latter. According to one count, before the NPT went into effect, more than 40 percent of states with the economic
resources to pursue nuclear programs with potential military applications did so, and very few renounced those programs. Since the inception of the nonproliferation norm in 1970, however, only 15 percent of economically capable states have started
such programs, and nearly 70 percent of all states that had engaged in such activities gave them up.42 The prospect of being targeted with economic sanctions by powerful states is also likely to factor into the decisions of would-be proliferators. Although
sanctions alone proved insufficient to dissuade Iraq, North Korea and (thus far) Iran from violating their nonproliferation obligations under the NPT, this does not necessarily indicate that sanctions are irrelevant. A potential proliferator’s vulnerability to
sanctions must be considered. All else being equal, the more vulnerable a state’s economy is to external pressure, the less likely it is to pursue nuclear weapons. A comparison of states in East Asia and the Middle East that have pursued nuclear weapons
with those that have not done so suggests that countries with economies that are highly integrated into the international economic system – especially those dominated by ruling coalitions that seek further integration – have historically been less inclined
to pursue nuclear weapons than those with inward-oriented economies and ruling coalitions.43 A state’s vulnerability to sanctions matters, but so too does the leadership’s assessment regarding the probability that outside powers would actually be
willing to impose sanctions. Some would-be proliferators can be easily sanctioned because their exclusion from international economic transactions creates few downsides for sanctioning states. In other instances, however, a state may be so vital to
outside powers – economically or geopolitically – that it is unlikely to be sanctioned regardless of NPT violations. Technical and Bureaucratic Constraints In addition to motivation to pursue the bomb, a state must have the technical and bureaucratic
wherewithal to do so. This capability is partly a function of wealth. Richer and more industrialized states can develop nuclear weapons more easily than poorer and less industrial ones can; although as Pakistan and North Korea demonstrate, cash-
strapped states can sometimes succeed in developing nuclear weapons if they are willing to make enormous sacrifices.44 A country’s technical know-how and the sophistication of its civilian nuclear program also help determine the ease and speed with
which it can potentially pursue the bomb. The existence of uranium deposits and related mining activity, civilian nuclear power plants, nuclear research reactors and laboratories and a large cadre of scientists and engineers trained in relevant areas of
chemistry and nuclear physics may give a country some “latent” capability to eventually produce nuclear weapons. Mastery of the fuel-cycle – the ability to enrich uranium or produce, separate and reprocess plutonium – is particularly important because
this is the essential pathway whereby states can indigenously produce the fissile material required to make a nuclear explosive device.45 States must also possess the bureaucratic capacity and managerial culture to successfully complete a nuclear

rulers take a coercive

weapons program. Hymans convincingly argues that many recent would-be proliferators have weak state institutions that permit, or even encourage, to , authoritarian

management approach to their nuclear programs. This undermines approach, in turn, politicizes and ultimately

nuclear projects by gutting the autonomy of the scientists, experts and and professionalism very

organizations needed to build the bomb. successfully 46 Alternative Sources of Nuclear Deterrence Historically, the availability of credible security guarantees by outside
nuclear powers has provided a potential alternative means for acquiring a nuclear deterrent without many of the risks and costs associated with developing an indigenous nuclear weapons capability. As Bruno Tertrais argues, nearly all the states that
developed nuclear weapons since 1949 either lacked a strong guarantee from a superpower (India, Pakistan and South Africa) or did not consider the superpower’s protection to be credible (China, France, Israel and North Korea). Many other countries
known to have pursued nuclear weapons programs also lacked security guarantees (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Libya, Switzerland and Yugoslavia) or thought they were unreliable at the time they embarked on their programs (e.g.,

potential prolif candidates

Taiwan). In contrast, several have abstained from developing the bomb
eration appear to at

partly because of
least extended deterrence guarantees from the U S
formal or informal nited tates (e.g., Australia, Germany, Japan,

security assurances have empirically reduced

Norway, South Korea and Sweden).47 All told, a recent quantitative assessment by Bleek finds that significantly

prolif eration proclivity among recipient countries.48 Therefore, if a country perceives that a security guarantee by the United States or another nuclear power is both available and credible, it is less likely to pursue nuclear weapons in reaction
to a rival developing them. This option is likely to be particularly attractive to states that lack the indigenous capability to develop nuclear weapons, as well as states that are primarily motivated to acquire a nuclear deterrent by security factors (as
opposed to status-related motivations) but are wary of the negative consequences of proliferation.
 2NC---Prolif Good
Prolif is good – no nation with nukes has ever been invaded. Deaths in battle
worldwide has decreased by 95% since the spread of nukes. They are able to
protect weak nations from invasion and force great powers to think twice –
that’s 1NC Shellenberger

Prolif reduces conflict – prefer our stats because they are systemic
Akisato Suzuki, 2015, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, 15 (Akisato, “Is
more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random
Forests,” DOI: 10.1177/2053168015589625)

The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear
proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states
on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no
clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity
for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability
of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for,
that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above
model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer
disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a
recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear prolife ration
decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear
symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is
possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects
of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention , to the extent that
these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads . Thus,
dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear
proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics
deserve attention. The findings of this paper also have significant policy implications. The international community is sensitive to
nuclear proliferation, and with Iran well on the way to developing full nuclear capabilities, it is crucial to understand the implications of nuclear
proliferation for international security. This paper suggests that, at least in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, nuclear
proliferation might be welcomed – although, given that nuclear asymmetry can provoke dyadic conflict, reducing this
side effect of nuclear proliferation by some other measure will be desirable. Finally, this paper should not be seen as decisive evidence that
nuclear proliferation contributes to international security in general. Nuclear proliferation may increase risks of nuclear weapons being leaked
to terrorist groups (Bueno de Mesquita and Riker, 1982: 304) or used accidentally (Intriligator and Brito, 1981). It is untenable to assess the
merits and demerits of nuclear proliferation only in terms of a systemic propensity for conflict. Additional research should examine these risks.
Nonetheless, this
paper makes a significant contribution to the literature by adding new
empirics for a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship between nuclear
proliferation and interstate conflict.

Prolif decreases chance of conflict sparking

Tyler Sagerstrom, April, 2019, [Tyler Sagerstrom is a Graduate student for the William and
Mary college with bachelor with international relations, This thesis was submitted as a
conglomerate on the thesis of proliferation], Proliferation & Instability: How Nuclear Weapons
Acquisition Alters Inter-state Relations, William and Mary,
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2346&context=honorstheses, xoxo
6/6/2020

When China commenced its nuclear weapons program in 1956, the United States was initially
distressed.1 Before China had even acquired a nuclear weapon the US already perceived itself as
threatened by the reality of a nuclear China, and therefore felt compelled to consider a strike against China’s nuclear weapons
program.2 However, within ten years of China becoming a nuclear state, the Sino-American relationship was more
stable than it had been in decades.3 So how does a nuclear weapons state go from an unstable
relationship with a state developing nuclear weapons to a stable relationship with that same
state once it has acquired nuclear weapons? What process occurs to bring stability into that relationship and when does
it develop? Does a state’s development of nuclear weapons increase its insecurity in the early stages of development? The reaction
of a nuclear weapons state to another state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons has important policy implications for how the US and other
nuclear weapons states should respond, for example, to Iran if it re-starts its nuclear program. As well, this paper will provide deeper
insights into at what time in a state’s development of nuclear weapons its relationship with other nuclear states will be the most
unstable. It will also weigh in on the debate over whether nuclear acquisition is stabilizing because it enhances
deterrence or whether it is destabilizing since it upends the security environment by attempting to merge these separate ideas
into one cohesive theory. In this paper, I will attempt to explain how tensions between a state developing nuclear weapons, also
referred to as a new nuclear state, and a state that has acquired nuclear weapons before the new nuclear state has, also referred to
as a status quo nuclear state, change over time. I will do this by dividing
the timeline of a new nuclear state’s
development of nuclear weapons into multiple phases based on how I would anticipate a status
quo nuclear state to respond to each milestone the new nuclear state reaches. For example, how will a
new nuclear state’s first nuclear test affect the status quo nuclear state’s response, or how will a new nuclear state’s deployment of
ICBMs affect the status quo nuclear state’s response? Specifically, my theory seeks to understand how much tension the status quo
state is directing toward the new nuclear state based on the milestones and stages that the new nuclear state reaches in its nuclear
development. Within this relationship, I will focus on the threat perception of the status quo nuclear state as the driver of its actions
towards the new nuclear state. Specifically, I theorize that tensions will rise as the new nuclear state continues its nuclear weapons
program up until its first nuclear test or it becomes a nuclear weapons state, and then tensions will begin to fall. I test my hypothesis
using both logit regressions and case studies. Mixing quantitative and qualitative methodologies allows me to test the entire
population of cases with regressions and test intervening variables through process tracing of a diverse set of cases. Ultimately, I find
mixed support for my hypothesis. The regressions show little support for my hypothesis; however, the exact composition of the data
With regards to the cases, there is
used may be why support is lacking for my 4 hypothesis in the quantitative section.
much stronger support for my hypothesis, especially for the intervening variable of threat
perception. Some cases, like the China-US dyad, show overwhelmingly strong support for my hypothesis. In all, the results of my
regressions and cases provide some support for my hypothesis. This thesis is an important contribution to the literature because it
will provide a new understanding of how nuclear weapons proliferation
affects inter-state stability. Previously,
there was very little focus on the intersection of how nuclear weapons states respond to each
other and how nuclear weapons states develop over time. This research will fill this gap in the scholarship and
contribute to a greater understanding of the effects of nuclear weapons by looking at the intersection of those two issues. This
research also seeks to combine some previous studies that look only at the instability created by a nuclear weapons program, but do
not study how stability emerges as the relationship between the new nuclear state and status quo nuclear state changes over time
(Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010; Beardsley and Asal 2013; Sobek, Foster and Robinson 2012). My theory and findings are useful for
policymakers on nuclear weapons because they will help elucidate when the most unstable time of a relationship is for a new
nuclear state. Understanding the evolution of a relationship between two nuclear states, particularly
between a state
that has nuclear weapons and a state that is in the process of acquiring them, is useful and
necessary because it will allow policymakers to recognize what period of development in the
new nuclear state’s arsenal is the most prone to a crisis or dispute. The acquisition of nuclear weapons is a
tumultuous and volatile process, so it is imperative to have a clear understanding of when the nuclear dyadic relationship is most at
risk of spiraling into conflict, so that a crisis can be avoided. 5 In this thesis, I will first discuss the literature on nuclear weapons
proliferation and acquisition, and then whether acquisition is stabilizing or destabilizing. In this section, I will review papers that have
examined a question similar to the one examined in this paper. Next, I will propose my theory and then discuss the methodology of
this thesis. Finally, I will conduct both a quantitative study of my hypothesis as well as use case studies to test my hypothesis.
Literature Review How does a status quo nuclear state react to a new nuclear state’s acquisition of nuclear weapons? What effect
does nuclear weapons acquisition have on a state’s behavior? How do tensions between a state developing nuclear weapons and a
state that has nuclear weapons change over time? To
understand these questions, I will review the literature
on these topics. First I will begin with why states pursue nuclear weapons, focusing on security,
domestic politics, and norms as the key drivers. This is relevant because the reason for a state’s acquisition of
nuclear weapons informs how the status quo nuclear state will respond. Next, I will review how nuclear weapons acquisition
changes relationships between states. Then, I will examine how deterrence
is thought to arise in the literature.
Finally, I will review what similar studies to mine have found about the effect of nuclear
acquisition on state behavior. I. Drivers and Determinants of Proliferation My theory examines the effects of the
acquisition of nuclear weapons on state behavior, so it is necessary to first begin with a discussion of the drivers and determinants of
proliferation. The foundational component of the demand-side literature on this topic is Sagan (1996), which offers three broad
models that explain why a non-nuclear weapons state will upset the status quo, and seek nuclear weapons. In
the security
model, a state seeks nuclear weapons due to perceived 6 threats to national security.4 The
domestic politics model theorizes that a state is not unitary, but rather that there are different
cliques with parochial aims that each believe they will be served by a nuclear weapons
program.5 The norms model argues that nuclear weapons will be sought as a “symbol of a
state’s modernity and identity.”6 These models provide insight into how the new nuclear state will interact with the
status quo nuclear state. As well, the status quo nuclear state may be more likely to raise tensions with a state that seeks nuclear
weapons in the norm model. The status quo state may think that it will be better able to coerce a state that does not view nuclear
weapons as a necessity, as the security model does. Jo and Gartzke (2007), using a quantitative methodology, find attributes that
affect whether a state will seek nuclear weapons, which fit into Sagan’s three models. Jo and Gartzke (2007) find that a
state is
more likely to be driven by security interests to seek nuclear weapons if it has a conventionally
superior adversary or is a major or regional power.7 As well, a state that is threatened by a nuclear power is less likely to
pursue a nuclear weapons program, and they hypothesize that this is potentially due to fear of a preemptive strike, another security
driver.8 They
also find no difference between democracy and autocracy in propensity to pursue
nuclear weapons, which is some evidence against a domestic politics argument.9 This information
provides important insight into the context and attributes of a state that affect whether a nonnuclear weapons state pursues a
nuclear weapons program. The specific drivers discussed here are also useful since they add context to how tensions between the
two nuclear states in my theory will develop. Balance of power and democracy, for example, will affect not just a state’s drive for
nuclear weapons, but how a new nuclear state interacts with the status quo state once is has nuclear weapons. Also, the point about
a state threatened by a nuclear power being less likely to seek nuclear weapons is relevant because it would encourage status quo
nuclear states to take preventive action. Finally, drivers of proliferation are important because they allow for a more comprehensive
picture of the effects of proliferation on state behavior, and allow us to understand whether nuclear weapons acquisition meets its
intended purpose. II. Effects of Proliferation on Inter-state Relations It
is useful to understand how nuclear states
interact and what effect proliferation has on conflict between nuclear states. The effects of
proliferation can be seen clearly in how a crisis unfolds when it involves two nuclear powers .
For example, a nuclear crisis was more likely to end peacefully as the number of nuclear actors
in the crisis rose (Asal and Beardsley 2007).10 This suggests that moving from an asymmetric nuclear dyad to a
symmetric one will actually lead to crises that have a greater chance of being resolved
peacefully. This process is not immediate though. Rather, it takes time for a new nuclear state to understand its newfound
power and how to build stable relationships, and for other states to adjust to the new balance of power (Horowitz 2009; Gartzke and
Jo 2009).11 Specifically, Horowitz (2009) finds that new nuclear weapons states respond to militarized challenges at significantly
higher rates.12 However, this effect reverses the longer the state has nuclear weapons, states eventually adjust their
decision making when determining whether to engage in these showdowns and how often to
concede.13 This insight is useful because it demonstrates that there is a learning curve that new nuclear states face. They
must adjust their actions before they find stability in inter-state relationships. However, it is not just the
new nuclear state that must adjust its behavior before stability can emerge, the status quo, or existing, nuclear weapons state must
also learn how to interact with the new nuclear weapons state given its change in status. There is evidence that in an asymmetric
nuclear dyad, the nuclear state achieves greater gains in a crisis than in a symmetric nuclear dyad (Beardsley and Asal 2009).14
Therefore, a status quo nuclear state that now has a relationship with a new nuclear state would need to adjust to a world where it
has less power. The literature suggests that there is support for the view that stability in a nuclear
dyad can emerge, but it requires adjustments in behavior and the understanding of the
relationship by both parties.

Even if it increases the likelihood of low-level skirmishes, it massively decreases

the risk of full-scale conflict
Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, 2007, *Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—SUNY Albany. **Assistant
Prof. Pol. Sci.—Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis
Behavior,” 44:2, Sage

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our
primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative
relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the
argument that nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior, as stated in H1. It should be
noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors—Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur
War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992)—and five nuclear actors—Gulf War (1990)—only two are not full-scale wars. While this
demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not
necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the
variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear
actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no
surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors—by extension, many general actors as well—experienced war.
Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping
the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the
proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will
decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in
Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical
significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have
nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear
actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. All
actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent,
regardless of their own capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as
a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this
article that nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear
opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal
relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4
demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change
the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which
lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be
presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during
the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than
others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and
restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when
nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases
in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the
number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number
of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the
impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors
is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear
actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we
continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the
probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than
the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor
clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of
serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more
optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear
actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly
reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers
involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by
Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable
to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante
assessment of the outcomes. To
account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated
sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis
cases are a subset and then run Heckman type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of
a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While
dyadyear datasets have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the
unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of
this analysis.
If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons
downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate
share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent.
Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens
the case for the explanations provided in this study.

Limiting prolif raises the transaction costs and causes a de-fact shift to CBWs
Neil Narang, 04/06/2016. Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the
University of California, Santa Barbara, Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense for Policy on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. “All
Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and
Biological Weapons Proliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review. Volume 22. Issue 3-4. pp. 457-
468. Taylor and Francis.

The first inference that one may be tempted to draw from past findings is that a
policy focused on achieving
reductions in the global nuclear stockpile could cause a rise in chemical and biological weapons
proliferation as more states view them as a “poor man's atomic bomb.” As noted above, our findings
suggested that states appear to seek chemical and biological weapons for many of the same reasons
as they pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that states that do not possess
nuclear weapons appear to be systematically more likely to pursue chemical and biological
weapons than states that do possess them. When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, conditional
on some level of demand for one of these types of weapons, reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons
could cause some states to pursue chemical and biological weapons as “imperfect substitutes”
for the deterrence and compellence benefits of nuclear weapons. A second inference that one may be
tempted to draw is that a strengthened NPT may increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Understood in
the terms of our study, policies
and institutions designed to monitor and sanction the unilateral pursuit
or dissemination of nuclear weapons material and technical expertise—like the NPT or the Nuclear
Suppliers Group—might be understood as supply constraints that effectively increase the transaction
costs of nuclear weapons acquisition. Furthermore, previous research has shown that the supply of sensitive nuclear
assistance and civilian nuclear assistance are both positively associated with the risk of nuclear weapons pursuit and acquisition
across states and over time.17 When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, given
some demand for a
“weapon of mass destruction,” chemical and biological weapons could seem like relatively
cheaper pursuits under a more robust global nuclear nonproliferation regime that further
regulates the supply of nuclear weapons. A third inference that one may be tempted to draw is that reductions
in the global supply of nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation
regime could increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons pursuit by terrorist groups. If
one is willing to assume terrorist groups aim to influence governments by threatening to impose
costs in order to achieve concessions— whether this be through strategies like coercion, provocation, spoiling, or
outbidding—then it may seem reasonable to suppose that limiting the availability of nuclear weapons might
shift the demand to other coercive instruments such as chemical or biological weapons .18

Outweighs nuclear war

Clifford Singer, Spring 2001. Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and
International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive
the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International
Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1,
http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P_XIII/Singer.htm
In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western
culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would
survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward.
However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the
admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The
destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct
consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a
rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a socalled nuclear winter,
substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above
mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or
civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive
fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a
metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well
over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate
fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale
nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the
variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human
populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical
environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as
a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years. There are, however, two
technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The
first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is
the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade,
global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this
disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be
at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of
an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the
damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries.
With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient
of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely
ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development
of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be
engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to
overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of
this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be
in question when and if this is 1achieved.

1
States CP
 Solvency
Fracking is regulated now by the state governments and has been. The
Halliburton Loophole didn’t change anything and regulation should remain at
the state level.
Scott Nyquist Published on February 8, 2018 Four myths about fracking—and why they are
wrong (The Fracking Debate, Part 2) By https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/four-myths-
frackingand-why-wrong-fracking-debate-part-scott-nyquist

Fracking is unregulated. This myth comes up a lot, and it’s hard to kill because it is in fact true
that oil and gas exploration is exempted from parts of such major US federal legislation as the
Safe Water Drinking Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act (RCRA). In 2005, Congress passed legislation that specifically exempted
fracking from federal water rules (a provision that became known as “the Halliburton
Loophole”). This all sounds terrible. Reasonable people can disagree on whether the role of the
feds should be bigger, smaller, or stay the same. But the facts are clear. The oil and gas industry
is and has throughout its history been actively regulated, but largely at the state level. As for the
Halliburton Loophole, argues Raimi, “it effectively changed nothing. Oil and gas companies had
used fracking for decades, regulated by states and not the federal government. They did not
have to receive fracking permits from the EPA before 2005, and the Halliburton Loophole did
not change that.” In addition, the industry does have to get permits for water discharges at the
surface under the Clean Water Act, and to comply with the RCRA on hazardous wastes. The
Clean Air Act regulates pollutants from oil and gas wells. The industry is also subject to other
laws on toxic controls and insectisides. Development on US federal lands has to follow all federal
and state laws, and there have also been specific rules created for such sites. There certainly is a
case to be made that the industry should, like others, be subject to federal regulation on
common practices, such as construction run-off or methane emissions, for example. But it is also
true that because local conditions vary widely, state regulation can make more sense regarding
things like how far wells should be sited away from homes or schools. But it is simply not true to
say that fracking in particular, or the oil and gas industry in general, is unregulated in the United
States.
EPA Tradeoff DA
 Link
Fracking is too much for the EPA to handle---tradeoff link AND terminal
solvency deficit
DAR, 10-11-2012, (Downwinders at Risk has been the leading advocate of clean air in North
Texas since 1994. Founded to defeat the burning of hazardous waste in the Midlothian cement
plants, we won that fight and grew to become a regional force.), “GAO: Fracking is
Overwhelming EPA, has many Unknown Risks”, Downwinders at risk,
https://www.downwindersatrisk.org/2012/10/gao-fracking-is-overwhelming-epa-has-many-
unknown-risks//ceng/msdi21
GAO stands for Government Accountability Office. We bet you didn't think there was such a thing. The GAO is in business to issue
reports on how government works and doesn't work. It's the audit and investigative arm of the Congress. Today
comes news
that the Office has issued two new reports on fracking – one on how federal regulators are
coping with the new responsibility of overseeing so much new drilling in so many new places all
at once, and one on the possible risks posed by fracking to the public health and the
environment. GAO says fracking is overwhelming the resources of the federal agencies assigned
to watchdog the process and industry: "Federal and state agencies reported several challenges
in regulating oil and gas development from unconventional reservoirs. EPA officials reported that
conducting inspection and enforcement activities and having limited legal authorities are
challenges. For example, conducting inspection and enforcement activities is challenging due to
limited information, such as data on groundwater quality prior to drilling. EPA officials also said
that the exclusion of exploration and production waste from hazardous waste regulations under
RCRA significantly limits EPA’s role in regulating these wastes. In addition, BLM and state officials reported
that hiring and retaining staff and educating the public are challenges. For example, officials from several states and
BLM said that retaining employees is difficult because qualified staff are frequently offered more
money for private sector positions within the oil and gas industry." And the GAO says there are a lot of unknown risks to
fracking based on the evidence so far: Oil and gas development, whether conventional or shale oil and gas, pose inherent
environmental and public health risks, but the
extent of these risks associated with shale oil and gas
development is unknown, in part, because the studies GAO reviewed do not generally take into
account the potential long-term, cumulative effects. For example, according to a number of studies and
publications GAO reviewed, shale oil and gas development poses risks to air quality, generally as the result of (1) engine exhaust
from increased truck traffic, (2) emissions from diesel-powered pumps used to power equipment, (3) gas that is flared (burned) or
vented (released directly into the atmosphere) for operational reasons, and (4) unintentional emissions of pollutants from faulty
equipment or impoundments–temporary storage areas. Similarly, a number of studies and publications GAO reviewed indicate that
shale oil and gas development poses risks to water quality from contamination of surface water and groundwater as a result of
erosion from ground disturbances, spills and releases of chemicals and other fluids, or underground migration of gases and
chemicals. For example, tanks storing toxic chemicals or hoses and pipes used to convey wastes to the tanks could leak, or
impoundments containing wastes could overflow as a result of extensive rainfall. According to the New York Department of
Environmental Conservation's 2011 Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement, spilled, leaked, or released chemicals or
wastes could flow to a surface water body or infiltrate the ground, reaching and contaminating subsurface soils and aquifers. In
addition, shale oil and gas development poses a risk to land resources and wildlife habitat as a result of constructing, operating, and
maintaining the infrastructure necessary to develop oil and gas; using toxic chemicals; and injecting fluids underground. However,
the extent of these risks is unknown. Further, the extent and severity of environmental and public health risks identified in the
studies and publications GAO reviewed may vary significantly across shale basins and also within basins because of location- and
process-specific factors, including the location and rate of development; geological characteristics, such as permeability, thickness,
and porosity of the formations; climatic conditions; business practices; and regulatory and enforcement activities." So now we have
the Director of the US Centers for Disease Control's Environmental Health agency saying that, "We do not have enough information
to say with certainty whether shale gas drilling poses a threat to public health," along with the GAO saying the extent of the risks
posed by fracking to our air, water, and land are largely unknown. How many more red flags do you need?
Politics DA
 Link
Plan is controversial. Previous attempts to do the plan have died in committee.
CAROLYN DAVIS House Democrats’ FRAC Act Taking Aim Once Again to Boost Unconventional
Drilling Oversight March 23, 2021 https://www.naturalgasintel.com/house-democrats-frac-act-
taking-aim-once-again-to-boost-unconventional-drilling-oversight/

What Congress has primarily focused on in previous versions of the legislation is the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, which exempted fracking from federal water laws, aka the Halliburton
loophole. Fracking uses copious amounts of water to unlock tight reservoirs. Previous attempts
to enact similar FRAC Acts all have failed to advance in the House or Senate. An initial 2009
proposal would have defined fracking as a federally regulated activity under the Safe Drinking
Water Act and required the industry to disclose the chemical additives used. A similar package
was introduced in 2011 and in 2017, both of which died in committee.
LNG DA
 1NC
Current LNG investment assures US export leadership
Tsvetana Paraskova, 1-23-2020, https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/US-LNG-
Booms-As-Natural-Gas-Prices-Crash.html, "U.S. LNG Booms As Natural Gas Prices Crash,"
OilPrice, Acc:1-23-2020 (ermo/sms)

This development shows how the LNG industry has evolved over the past half-decade and how the surge in U.S. natural gas production and export capacity
expansion is upending the market. Just a few years ago, Qatar dominated the global LNG supply. Now its main rivals, Australia and the U.S. are set to surpass the tiny but mighty Middle
Eastern LNG producer as the world’s biggest suppliers of the super-chilled fuel. Australia’s lead is likely to be short-lived as the U.S. will continue to expand liquefaction and export capacity. According to data and

analytics company GlobalData, the United States will be the global leader in newly built LNG liquefaction capacity between 2019 and
2023. The U.S. also leads the global growth in actual LNG supply to the market, IHS Markit data shows. Global LNG supply totaled 373.0 million tons (MMt) in 2019, up by 11.8 percent from 2018, with the
United States the leader in new supply, followed by Russia and Australia. 2019 was a record-breaking year for the LNG industry globally, with six records smashed in both supply and demand, according to IHS
Markit’s data. Suppliers sanctioned a record level of new capacity as 70.4 million tons per year (MMtpa) were approved for development—a whopping 40-percent jump over the previous record year for final

The
investment decisions (FIDs), 50.4 MMtpa back in 2005. The United States, Russia, and Mozambique each set individual record highs for levels of annual FIDs in 2019, according to IHS Markit. “

ongoing pace of new investment is especially noteworthy considering a market context of weak global prices,” Michael Stoppard, chief strategist, global gas at IHS Markit,
said in a statement. “Not only did LNG grow at an unprecedented rate in 2019, but the industry also laid the foundations for continued strong growth

into the middle of the decade,” Stoppard added. According to Wood Mackenzie’s Global upstream investment outlook for 2020, “LNG is on a major growth spurt. The market is
heavily oversupplied at present, but the industry needs to develop new LNG supply to meet growing demand.” Spending on upstream LNG projects this year is

expected to jump by 50 percent compared with 2019 to more than US$30 billion, excluding non-integrated plant spend, according to WoodMac. Half of the new capacity approved for

development in 2019 was in the United States, according to Wood Mackenzie.

Alternative investments undermine LNG development

EUCI, 7-9-2019, Electric Utility Consultants Inc. "LNG global building boom faces risk from
renewable energy, climate policies, report says". Accessed 9-28-2019
[https://www.euci.com/lng-global-building-boom-faces-risk-from-renewable-energy-climate-
policies-report-says/]/mnw

The natural gas industry is making $1.3 trillion in infrastructure investments to create a global liquefied
natural gas (LNG) market but those capital expenditures may be at risk from competitive renewable
energy prices and the prospect of climate regulations, according to Global Energy Monitor. The San Francisco-based
nonprofit, which tracks worldwide fossil-fuel infrastructure, said that the investments could transform the sector in its report The
New Gas Boom. “Through a massive increase in portside infrastructure, floating offshore terminals, and oceangoing LNG vessels, the
natural gas industry is seeking to restructure itself from a collection of regional markets into a wider and more integrated global
system,” the report said. The risk is that natural gas could be out-competed by renewable generation, which
is already cheaper in many parts of the world, and be hit with tougher efforts to curb manmade greenhouse gas
linked to climate change, the report said.

US LNG exports diversify European energy – prevents Russian adventurism into

the Baltics
Chuck Devore, 5-14-2018, Vice President of National Initiatives at the Texas Public Policy
Foundation. "U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports Just Quadrupled -- It's Good For The Economy &
National Security" Forbes. Accessed 9-28-2019
[https://www.forbes.com/sites/chuckdevore/2018/05/14/u-s-liquefied-natural-gas-exports-just-
quadrupled-its-good-for-the-economy-national-security/#b41fb4127b57]/mnw

A growing share of American LNG exports are expected to go to Europe as EU member states
look to diversify from their growing dependence on Russian gas. NATO members Poland and Lithuania in
particular have built LNG import terminals to offset their reliance on Russian fuel amidst ongoing unease over Russia’s return to
territorially expansionist policies. By
making Europe less vulnerable to Russian energy extortion,
European policymakers can more confidently confront Russian attempts to destabilize nations
on their periphery that used to be part of the old Soviet Union, such as the Baltic States, or
bound to the Soviet Union during the Cold War as Warsaw Pact nations, such as Poland.

Adventurism into the Baltics cause nuclear miscalculation

Davis 17
Senior Analyst at ASPI, PhD in Military Strategic Studies, University of Hull. “Russia, military
modernisation and lowering the nuclear threshold” The Strategist. Published 1-18-2017,
Accessed 7-24-2018. [https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-military-modernisation-lowering-
nuclear-threshold/]/mnw

Three developments suggest a willingness by Russia to use nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks in a manner
that lowers the threshold of nuclear war. First, the concept of preventative de-escalation is important. A recent IISS analysis explained de-escalation in which limited nuclear war could be used to: ‘…de-escalate
and terminate combat actions on terms acceptable to Russia through the threat of inflicting unacceptable damage upon the enemy. Such limited nuclear use may deter both nuclear and conventional aggression.’

in the
Second, the integration of conventional pre-nuclear and nuclear forces reinforces Russia’s coercive power against NATO in the pre-war ‘Phase Zero’ in a future regional crisis—for example,

Baltics. And third, the Russians are clearly conscious of that coercive power given their recent nuclear signalling that suggests Russia
continues to see such weapons as a means of national strength. Russia has undertaken sabre rattling through simulated
nuclear strikes in large-scale exercises and aggressive probing of NATO airspace with nuclear-capable bombers. It has demonstrated the dual-
role Kalibr NK sea-launched cruise missile in deadly strikes against Syria, and deployed dual-role Iskander short-range ballistic missiles into Kaliningrad in a manner that was highly threatening to NATO. That has

even explicit nuclear threats to NATO states, notably Denmark. Russian

been backed by public statements which reinforce Russia’s nuclear weapons capability and

nuclear forces are being swiftly upgraded with the focus on ICBM modernisation, based on introducing the SS-27 ‘Yars’ road-mobile missile, and from 2018 the
silo-based RS-28 ‘Sarmat’ heavy ICBM. Yars and Sarmat replace much of Russia’s aging Soviet strategic rocket forces with significantly more capable delivery systems. Russia’s Navy is transitioning to modern Sineva
and Bulava sea-launched ballistic missiles, on the modern Borei class SSBNs, while the Russian Air Force is restarting the Tu-160 Blackjack production line to produce the updated Tu-160M2 bomber that eventually
will be complemented by the ‘PAK-DA’ advanced bomber sometime in the 2020s. The strategic nuclear force modernisation is important but it’s the integration of Russia’s conventional pre-nuclear forces with its
large ‘non-strategic nuclear forces’ that’s of greatest significance. That’s shaping Russian thinking on the use of nuclear weapons, particularly during Hybrid Warfare, in a way that makes the risk of a crisis with
Russia much more dangerous. Russia is increasingly focusing on the use of its nuclear forces to enhance its ability to undertake military adventurism at the conventional level in a manner that’s highly threatening

reliance on nuclear signalling, the changing operational posture of dual-role forces and concepts like ’preventative de-escalation’, increases
to NATO. However the

the risk of miscalculation in a crisis that could lead to an escalation through the nuclear threshold.
2NC
 O/V
The aff undermines the LNG export boom by undercutting costs through
regulating fracking---effectively boosts renewables and triggers a tradeoff---LNG
exports are key to diversifying European energy supple prevent Russian
meddling in the Baltics – that ensures nuclear miscalculation by Russian
reliance on nuclear signaling

The DA outweighs the case on three metrics;

A. Magnitude – Russia war in the Baltics draws in NATO and ensures full on
US-Russia nuclear war
Dave Majumdar, 3-31-2019, defense editor for the National Interest. "Europe's Worst
Nightmare: Here's What a NATO-Russia War Would Look Like" National Interest. Accessed 9-28-
2019 [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/europes-worst-nightmare-heres-what-nato-russia-
war-would-look-50047]/mnw

If a war were to breakout in the Baltics between Russian and NATO, it might ultimately be
irrelevant what the conventional balance is on the ground. “The other problem with the fixation on
conventional deterrence in the Baltic fight is that just as in the old standoff between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, this battle is
fraught with opportunities for nuclear escalation,” Kofman wrote. “Most
Russian experts I know in the military
analysis community, including those in Russia, don’t see much of a chance for conventional
battle with NATO to stay conventional.” If NATO forces cross into Russian territory, that might provoke a nuclear
response from Moscow. “There is a possibility that if Russian forces are sufficiently degraded or
defeated in Kaliningrad that Moscow may resort to or threaten nuclear first use,” Kofman wrote.
“Nuclear escalation is not assured, but given the impact of such an outcome, perhaps the best strategy is to make decisions that
afford the most opportunities for managing escalation dynamics. That means a force posture oriented toward strategic flexibility,
not entrenchment.” Such
a war will almost certainly escalate into a full-up nuclear war between the
planet’s only two nuclear superpowers—which means everyone loses.

B. Probability – Russian adventurism is empirically proven – Ukraine and

Georgia prove Russia is expansionist

C. Timeframe – Russian adventurism is happening now – absent European

energy diversification, the Baltics will escalate quickly
DA outweighs and turns the case- decline of US-led alliance system causes
global great power war- the Kagan evidence says spheres of influence
destabilize hotspots and lead to lashout- escalates tensions in places like
Taiwan and East Europe

It’s the most probable scenario for conflict---Russian aggression goes nuclear
Loren B. Thompson 7/20/16, Chief Operating Officer of the Lexington Institute, Chief
Executive Officer of Source Associates, former Deputy Director of the Security Studies
Program at Georgetown University, former professor at Harvard University’s Kennedy
School of Government, "Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To
Begin", The National Interest, nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-
are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044
History may one day record that the greatest strategic blunder in history was the failure of U.S. leaders to take the possibility
of nuclear war between America and Russia seriously once the Cold War ended. Initially, U.S. leaders thought the ideological
motivation for East-West nuclear tensions had disappeared with the collapse of communism. But even after Vladimir Putin
began rebuilding Russia's military forces and signaling a desire to regain lost influence, Washington continued to treat the
prospect of nuclear conflict as remote. Successive administrations failed to take any steps toward providing the U.S. with
active defense against even a modest Russian attack. Plans to replace aging deterrent forces were repeatedly deferred, until
some portions of the nuclear complex had become decrepit. And Washington continued to make security commitments in
Russia's "near abroad" areas -- countries once satellites or integral parts of the Soviet Union -- as if the likelihood of nuclear
conflict was close to zero. However, the possibility of nuclear war between America and Russia not
only still exists, but is probably growing. And the place where it is most likely to begin is in a
future military confrontation over three small Baltic states -- Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
Since those nations and several other Eastern European states joined NATO in 2004, the
United States has been committed to defending their freedom and territorial integrity under
Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Because NATO from its inception was aimed at containing the
expansion of a nuclear country -- Russia -- a vital part of the U.S. security commitment to
Europe consists of Washington's willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in defense of allies.
The formal name for that strategy is "extended deterrence," and since 2004 it has included the Baltic states. Simply stated,
the United States seeks to deter aggression or blackmail against NATO allies from a nuclear-
armed Russia by threatening to use atomic weapons. The Obama Administration's 2010
Nuclear Posture Review confirmed that extended deterrence remains a pillar of U.S. global strategy. Although the
credibility of extended deterrence ultimately resides in the U.S. strategic "triad" of long-range bombers and missiles, the
posture review explicitly
stated that the U.S. would preserve the ability to deploy nuclear
weapons with suitably equipped tactical fighters in places like Europe . According to Hans Kristensen
of the Federation of American Scientists, the U.S. currently deploys about 200 B61 nuclear gravity bombs in Europe for use by
American or allied forces in a future East-West war. The weapons are receiving life-extension modifications that will allow
their use for decades to come, first on F-16 fighters and later on the stealthy F-35 fighter. Russia also deploys a sizable number
of so-called "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in the European theater, although like the U.S. it does not disclose numbers or
locations. While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple
reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons. First,
both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition
of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the
centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for
devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles
-- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic
states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important
alliance. Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states . For
instance, in
2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three
countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London."
That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than
that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian
heartland. Third, there
is a disconnect between the rhetoric that Washington applies to Baltic
security and the tactical situation that would likely obtain in a future war . Russia has massive local
superiority in every form of military force, and the topography of the three states presents few obstacles to being quickly
overrun. The RAND Corporation reported earlier this year that in a series of war games, Russian forces were always able to
overcome indigenous defenders and reach Baltic capitals within a few days. The forces of other NATO nations had little time to
respond. Fourth, for all of its talk about reinforcing NATO at the recent alliance summit ("we will defend every ally" President
Obama said), there is scant evidence the U.S. is willing to make the kind of commitment of
conventional forces needed to blunt a Russian invasion in the Baltic region. The proposed
placement of NATO-led battalions in each state totaling about 1,000 soldiers each is widely
described as a "tripwire" defense, meaning it might trigger a bigger alliance response
but would not be able to prevent Moscow from reaching its military objectives quickly . Fifth,
any counter-attack by NATO in the Baltics could easily be misconstrued by Moscow as a
threat to its core interests, in part because some strikes against attacking forces would
occur on Russian territory, and in part because Russia's fragile reconnaissance system
would quickly be overwhelmed by the fog of war. Anthony Barrett of the RAND Corporation has recently
produced a worrisome analysis detailing how an East-West conventional conflict along the Russian
periphery could escalate to nuclear-weapons use through miscues or misjudgments. Sixth,
both sides in any such conflict would have military doctrine potentially justifying the use
of nuclear weapons to prevent defeat. In the case of Russia, it has stated repeatedly that it needs non-strategic
nuclear weapons to cope with the superiority of NATO conventional forces, that it would use such weapons in order to protect
its core assets and values, and even that nuclear weapons might sometimes be useful tools for de-escalating a conflict.
Successive U.S. administrations have stressed that nuclear weapons underpin alliance commitments. Seventh, both sides
have non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater ready for quick use if tactical
circumstances dictate. For example, Hans Kristensen noted the presence of several nuclear-capable military systems
in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad located between Lithuania and Poland. Although the Russians have not disclosed
whether nuclear warheads are also located in the district, there is little doubt that hundreds could quickly be
deployed to areas around the Baltic states in an escalating conflict . Nuclear-capable NATO jets could
reach the area within hours. Eighth, new technologies are gradually being incorporated into forces on
both sides that could accelerate the pace and confusion of a local conflict. For instance, the F-35
fighter that will replace F-16s in the tactical nuclear role cannot be tracked by Russian radar. The integrated air defenses that
Russia has deployed in Kaliningrad and elsewhere on its territory could severely impede NATO use of local air space in
support of ground forces, and Russian electronic-warfare capabilities could impede coordination of ground maneuvers. The
bottom line is that all
the ingredients are present in the eastern Baltic area for an East-West
conflict escalating to nuclear weapons use. Neither side understands what actions might
provoke nuclear use by the other, and once war began both sides would likely have a
tenuous grasp of what was happening. The high stakes assigned to the outcome of such a
conflict and the ready availability of "non-strategic" nuclear weapons in a context where
either side might view their use as strategic in consequences is a prescription for
catastrophe. This situation calls for a reassessment by Washington. While losing the Baltic states would undoubtedly be a
blow to NATO, their location makes them of far greater importance to Russia than America. It simply makes no sense to tie
America's security to countries of such modest importance that are situated in such unpromising tactical circumstances. If the
Obama Administration took the threat of nuclear war more seriously, it would find a way of loosening the commitments it has
made.
Nuclear simulations prove extinction
Ellen Ioanes and Dave Mosher, 01-23-2020, (Ellen Ioanes is the Military & Defense Editorial
Fellow at INSIDER. She is a graduate of Columbia Journalism School and Davidson College. Her
work appears in the Guardian, the Center for Public Integrity, the Daily Dot, HuffPost India, and
more. Dave Mosher reports news and features stories about science and technology, with
human and robotic spaceflight as the primary focus of his 15-year multimedia journalism
career.), “A terrifying new animation shows how 1 'tactical' nuclear weapon could trigger a US-
Russia war that kills 34 million people in 5 hours”, Business Insider,
https://www.businessinsider.com/tactical-nuclear-weapons-escalation-us-russia-war-animated-
strike-map-2019-9/ceng

More than 91 million people in Russia, the US, and NATO-allied countries might be killed or
injured within three hours following a single "nuclear warning shot," according to a terrifying
new simulation. The simulation is called "Plan A," and it's an audio-visual piece that was first posted to to YouTube
on September 6. (You can watch the full video at the end of this story.) Researchers at the Science and Global Security lab at
Princeton University created the animation, which shows how a battle between Russia and NATO allies that
uses so-called low-yield or "tactical" nuclear weapons — which can pack a blast equivalent to
those the US used to destroy Hiroshima or Nagasaki in World War II — might feasibly and
quickly snowball into a global nuclear war. "This project is motivated by the need to highlight the potentially
catastrophic consequences of current US and Russian nuclear war plans. The risk of nuclear war has increased
dramatically in the past two years," the project states on its website. The video has an ominous, droning soundtrack
and a digital map design straight out of the 1983 movie "WarGames." The Cold War-era movie, in which a young Matthew Broderick
accidentally triggers a nuclear war, "was exactly the reference point," simulation designer Alex Wellerstein told Insider. But while
simulations can be frightening, they can also be incredibly helpful: governments can use them to develop contingency plans to
respond to nuclear disasters and attacks in the least escalatory way, and they can also help ordinary citizens learn how to survive a
nuclear attack. "Plan
A" comes as tensions between Russia and NATO allies ratchet up. Both Russia
and the US are testing weapons previously banned under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
treaty, often called INF. Russian bombers have also cruised into US airspace repeatedly, and the
US recently sent its B-2 Spirit stealth bomber on a mission in the Arctic — right in Russia's
backyard. This is how a NATO-Russian confrontation could quickly escalate into nuclear war. The
simulation starts with a conventional war between NATO and Russian troops. Conventional
warfare — namely all conflict short of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons — escalates into nuclear warfare
when Russia launches a nuclear "warning shot" from a base near Kaliningrad to stop NATO
advancement. Russia doesn't have a "no first use" policy — it dropped it in 1993. NATO forces respond by
launching a tactical nuclear strike. The US already has tactical nuclear weapons, such as B61-12
gravity bombs, and more planned under US President Donald Trump's 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review. Included in the plan is a low-yield warhead intended for use in a submarine-launched
ballistic missile, as well as a sea-launched cruise missile. These kinds of weapons are designed
for targets on the battlefield, like troops or munitions supplies, as opposed to long- or
intermediate-range nuclear missiles that are fired from one country to another, for example,
targeting an enemy's bombers and ICBM silos — or even cities. Tactical nuclear strikes up the
ante. If the nuclear threshold is crossed, the simulation finds, then both the US and Russia would
respond with tactical nuclear weapons. Russia would send 300 warheads to NATO targets,
including advancing troops, in both aircraft and short-range missiles — overwhelming force that
would obliterate tanks, fortified positions and soldiers unlike anything ever seen in battle
before. Supporting forces and civilians not immediately killed would be susceptible to painful
and even fatal radiation exposure. NATO would respond by sending about 180 tactical nuclear
weapons to Russia via aircraft in equally devastating retaliation. The simulation was constructed using
independent analysis of nuclear force postures in NATO countries and Russia, including the availability of nuclear weapons, their
yields, and possible targets, according to the Science and Global Security lab. The tactical phase of the simulation shows about 2.6
million casualties over three hours. Instead of the tactical weapons de-escalating the conflict, as
proponents claim they would, the simulation shows conflict spiraling out of control after the
use of tactical weapons. Russia's tactical weapons would destroy much of Europe, the simulation
posits. In response, NATO would launch submarine- and US-based strategic nuclear weapons
toward Russia's nuclear arsenals — 600 warheads in total. Strategic nuclear weapons have a
longer range, so Russia, knowing that NATO nukes are headed for its weapons cache, would
throw all its weight behind missiles launched from silos, mobile launchers, and submarines. The
casualties during this phase would be 3.4 million in 45 minutes. This leads to 85.3 million additional
casualties in the final phase of the nuclear war simulation. In the wake of previous attacks, both Russia and NATO would launch
warheads toward each other's 30 most populous cities in the final stage of of the scenario, using five to 10 warheads for each city
depending on its size. This phase would cause 85.3 million casualties — both deaths and injuries. But the total casualty count from
the entire battle (of less than 5 hours) would be 34.1 million deaths and 57.4 million injuries, or a combined 91.3 million casualties
overall. But
that's just the immediate conflict: The entire world would be affected by nuclear
disaster in the months, years, and decades to come. The radioactive fallout from the nuclear
disaster would cause additional deaths and injuries. Studies also suggest that, even with a
limited nuclear engagement, Earth's atmosphere would cool dramatically, driving famine,
refugee crises, additional conflicts, and more deaths.

Nuclear war causes extinction

Starr 17 [Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri's Clinical Laboratory Science
Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility, 1-9-2017,
"Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies," FAS,
https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-
winter-studies]

The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of three to
five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a war fought with
100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War
II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. However, the long-term
environmental effects of the war could significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade,
which would likely result in a vast global famine. The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the
burning cities would cause at least five million tons of black carbon smoke to quickly rise above cloud level into the
stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a
global stratospheric smoke layer that would remain for more than a decade. The smoke would absorb warming
sunlight, which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses of 20 to
50 percent over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-
latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human [humyn} history. In North America and
Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-
skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s surface, it would
produce the
coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists calculated that global food production
would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year period following such a war. Medical experts
have predicted that the
shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in agricultural
production could cause up to two billion people to perish from famine. The climatologists also
investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the
United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s
were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic”
nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and
Russia is seven to 80 times more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest strategic
nuclear weapon has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of
15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a
standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square miles. A war
fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite immense nuclear
firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. The scientists calculated that these
fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot and smoke, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke
layer. The smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, and it would block as much as 70 percent of sunlight from
reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be
blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight. Under such conditions, it would only
require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the
largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of
between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced 18,000 years ago
at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing
seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would be too cold and dark
to grow food crops, which would doom the majority of the human [humyn] population. NUCLEAR
WINTER IN BRIEF The profound cold and darkness following nuclear war became known as nuclear winter and was first predicted in
1983 by a group of NASA scientists led by Carl Sagan. During the mid-1980s, a large body of research was done by such groups as the
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S. National
Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; their work essentially supported the initial findings of the 1983 studies.
The idea of nuclear winter, published and supported by prominent scientists, generated extensive public alarm and put political
pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to reverse a runaway nuclear arms race, which, by 1986, had created a global
nuclear arsenal of more than 65,000 nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this created a backlash among many powerful military and
industrial interests, who undertook an extensive media campaign to brand nuclear winter as “bad science” and the scientists who
discovered it as “irresponsible.” Critics used various uncertainties in the studies and the first climate models (which are primitive by
today’s standards) as a basis to criticize and reject the concept of nuclear winter. In 1986, the Council on Foreign Relations published
an article by scientists from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, who predicted drops in global cooling about half as large
as those first predicted by the 1983 studies and described this as a “nuclear autumn.” The nuclear autumn studies were later shown
to be deeply flawed, but the proof came too late to stop a massive smear campaign that effectively discredited the initial studies.
Nuclear winter was subject to criticism and damning articles in the Wall Street Journal and Time magazine. In 1987, the National
Review called nuclear winter a “fraud.” In 2000, Discover Magazine published an article that described nuclear winter as one of “The
Twenty Greatest Scientific Blunders in History.” The endless smear campaign was successful; the general public, and even most anti-
nuclear activists, were left with the idea that nuclear winter had been scientifically disproved. REJECTION BY LEADERS Yet the
scientists did not give up. In 2006, they returned to their labs to perform the research I have previously described. Their new
research not only upheld the previous findings but also found that the earlier studies actually underestimated the environmental
effects of nuclear war. Dr. Robock of Rutgers and Dr. Toon of the University of Colorado have spent years attempting to bring official
attention to their work and get follow-up research studies done by appropriate agencies in the federal government. In a recent
(2016) interview, Dr. Toon stated: The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense, which should be investigating this
problem, have done absolutely nothing. They have not published a single paper, in the open literature, analyzing this problem … We
have made a list of where we think the important issues are, and we have gone to every [federal] agency we can think of with these
lists, and said “Don’t you think someone should study this?” Basically, everyone we have tried so far has said, “Well that’s not my
job.” In the same interview, Dr. Robock also noted: The Department of Homeland Security really should fund this. They will fund you
to study one terrorist bomb in New York City. When you explain to them that a war between India and Pakistan is a much greater
threat to the U.S. homeland than one terrorist bomb, as horrible as that is, they respond with “Oh, well that’s not my job, go talk to
some other program manager” — who, of course, doesn’t exist. After the more recent series of studies were published in 2007 and
2008, Drs. Robock and Toon also made a number of requests to meet with members of the Obama administration. The scientists
offered to brief Cabinet members and the White House staff about their findings, which they assumed would have a great impact
upon nuclear weapons policy. Their offers were met with indifference. Finally, after several years of trying, Drs. Robock and Toon
were allowed an audience with John Holdren, Senior Advisor to President Barack Obama on Science and Technology. Dr. Robock also
eventually met with Rose Gottemoeller, then Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Robock has
written to me that, after these meetings, he and Dr. Toon were left with the impression that neither Holdren nor Gottemoeller think
the nuclear winter research “is correct.” But it is not only Holdren and Gottemoeller who reject the nuclear winter research. Greg
Mello, of the Los Alamos Study Group, cites a source who confirms that the group that determines the “full range of activities
related to the development, production, maintenance (upkeep) and elimination (retirement, disassembly and disposal) of all United
States nuclear weapons — the members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council — have stated that “the predictions of nuclear winter
were disproved years ago.” The members of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Council include: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics Vice Chairman [Chairperson} of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the
Department of Energy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Commander of the United States Strategic Command It is important to
understand that some members of this group — especially the Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) — also
develop the policies that guide the use of nuclear weapons. Perhaps General John Hyten, Head of USSTRATCOM, who is in charge of
the U.S. nuclear triad, and General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman [Chairperson] of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the second highest ranking
officer in the United States, have never seen or heard of the 21st century nuclear winter studies. Perhaps when they hear a question
about “nuclear winter,” they only remember the smear campaigns done against the early studies. Or, maybe, they just choose not to
accept the new scientific research on nuclear winter, despite the fact that it has withstood the criticism of the global scientific
community. Regardless, the rejection of nuclear winter research by the top leaders of the United States raises some profoundly
important questions: Do U.S. military and political leaders fully understand the consequences of nuclear war? Do they realize that
even a “successful” nuclear first-strike against Russia could cause most Americans to die from nuclear famine? In 2010, Drs. Toon
and Robock wrote in Physics Today: We estimate that the direct effects of using the 2012 arsenals would lead to hundreds of
millions of fatalities. The indirect effects would likely eliminate the majority of the human [humyn] population. In 2013, Drs. Toon
and Robock wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that: A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the
arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal,
resulting in Self-Assured Destruction. RENEWED COLD WAR Although president-elect Trump appears to favor a return to the policy
of détente with Russia, many if not most U.S. political leaders appear to support the Obama administration’s policies of direct
confrontation with Putin’s Russia. Mainstream corporate media, including the editorial boards of The New York Times
and The Washington Post, routinely engage in anti-Russian and anti-Putin rhetoric that surpasses the hate speech of the McCarthy
era. Under President Obama, the United States has renewed the Cold War with Russia, with little or no debate or protest,
and has subsequently engaged in proxy wars with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as threatening
military action against China in the South China Sea. In response to what NATO leaders describe as Russia’s
“dangerous and aggressive actions,” NATO has built up a “rapid-response force” of 40,000 troops on the
Russian border in the Baltic States and Poland. This force includes hundreds of tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy
artillery. NATO troops stationed in Estonia are within artillery range of St. Petersburg, the second largest city of
Russia. The United States has deployed its Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system in Romania and is
constructing another such BMD system in Poland. The Mark 41 launch system used in the Aegis Ashore
systems can be used to launch a variety of missiles, including long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles. In
other words, the United States has built and is building launch sites for nuclear missiles on the
Russian border. This fact has been widely reported on Russian TV and has infuriated the Russian public. In June, Russian
President Putin specifically warned that Russia would be forced to retaliate against this threat. While Russian officials
maintain that its actions are normal and routine, Russia now appears to be preparing for war. On October 5, 2016,
Russia conducted a nation-wide civil defense drill that included 40 million of its people being directed
to fallout shelters. Reuters reported two days later that Russia had moved its Iskander nuclear-capable missiles
to Kaliningrad, which borders Poland. While the United States ignores the danger of nuclear war, Russian scholar Stephen
Cohen reports that the danger of war with the United States is the leading news story in Russia. Cohen states: Just as there is no
discussion of the most existential question of our time, in the American political class — the possibility of war with Russia — it is the
only thing being discussed in the Russian political class . . . These are two different political universes. In Russia, all the discussion in
the newspapers, and there is plenty of free discussion on talk show TV, which echoes what the Kremlin is thinking, online, in the elite
newspapers, and in the popular broadcasts, the number 1, 2, 3, and 4 topics of the day are the possibility of war with the United
States. Cohen goes on to say: I conclude from this that the leadership of Russia actually believes now, in reaction
to what the United States and NATO have said and done over the last two years, and particularly
in reaction to the breakdown of the proposed cooperation in Syria, and the rhetoric coming out
of Washington, that war is a real possibility. I can’t remember when, since the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the
Moscow leadership came to this conclusion in its collective head. Perhaps this narrative will change under president-elect Trump.
However, he is inheriting a situation fraught with danger, which retains the possibility of direct
military conflict with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as increasingly militarized confrontation with
China in the South China Sea.

Even a small Russia war causes extinction

Abigail Higgins, 10-18-2018, (Abigail Higgins covers international development, global health,
poverty, and gender. Before Vox she was a foreign correspondent and researcher in East Africa
writing for The Washington Post, The Guardian, and Foreign Policy, among others.), “10 ways
the world is most likely to end, explained by scientists”, Vox, https://www.vox.com/future-
perfect/2018/10/18/17957162/nuclear-war-asteroid-volcano-science-climate-change/ceng

The good news for us is that scientists think the world will be habitable for at least a few hundred million more years. The bad
news is there’s a lot that could change that. The risk of the threats highlighted in the report actually causing mass
casualties are still small, but that doesn’t mean they’re not important to pay attention to — especially when the worst-case scenario
means human extinction. Here’s what should be keeping you up at night and what, realistically, might cause humans to go the way
of dinosaurs. 1) Nuclear war A nuclear detonation from one of today’s more powerful weapons
would cause a fatality rate of 80 to 95 percent in the blast zone stretching out to a radius of 4
kilometers — although “severe damage” could reach six times as far. But it isn’t just the immediate deaths
we need to worry about — it’s the nuclear winter. This is when the clouds of dust and smoke released shroud the planet
and block out the sun, causing temperatures to drop, possibly for years. If 4,000 nuclear weapons
were detonated — a possibility in the event of all-out nuclear war between the US and Russia,
which hold the vast majority of the world’s stockpile — an untold number of people would be
killed, and temperatures could drop by 8 degrees Celsius over four to five years. Humans
wouldn’t be able to grow food; chaos and violence would ensue. A big worry here is the arsenal of nukes.
While numbers have fallen over several decades, the United States and Russia have just under 7,000 warheads each, the largest
collections in the world. The UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel all have nuclear weapons. Hundreds
of
nuclear weapons are ready to be released within minutes, a troubling fact considering that the
biggest threat of nuclear war may be an accident or miscommunication. A few times since the 1960s,
Russian officers (and, in 1995, the president) narrowly decided not to launch a nuclear weapon in response to what they’d later find
out were false alarms.
 AT: Renewables coming now
Renewable transition is not inevitable, use is declining—higher costs, high
variability, and environmental detriments are killing the industry
Michael Shellenberger, 9-4-2019, "Why Renewables Can't Save the Climate", Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelshellenberger/2019/09/04/why-renewables-cant-save-
the-climate/#3327f46e3526, ke
Democratic presidential candidates may disagree on a lot, but they all agree that the solution to climate change is the expansion of renewable energy, particularly solar and
wind. Some candidates see a role for nuclear. Sen. Cory Booker and businessman Andrew Yang have called for new plants, while former Vice President Joe Biden and South Bend
Mayor Pete Buttigieg want to maintain existing plants. Sen. Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris haven’t taken a position on nuclear, while Sen. Bernie Sanders favors closing
existing plants. But the centerpiece of all the Democratic candidates is renewables, upon which the candidates propose spending trillions. Doing so, they all claim, will be good

. But around the world, renewables are in crisis

for the economy and the natural environment, including by preventing climate change

because they are making electricity more expensive, subsidies are expiring, and projects are
being blocked by wildlife conservationists and local communities. In Germany, the world leader in renewables, just 35 wind
turbines were installed this year. The country needs to install 1,400 per year to meet its climate change targets. “While climate activist Greta Thunberg is sailing with wind power
to the Sustainability Summit in New York,” wrote Die Welt, “the German wind power industry is sailing into the doldrums.” The halting of wind deployment in Germany has

It’s not clear Germany can handle much more wind. Its
resulted in the industry shedding 25,000 jobs over the last year.

electricity grid operator increasingly has to cut off electricity from industrial wind farms on
windy, low-demand days, to avoid blow-outs. The same is happening in California. The grid
operator increasingly must pay neighboring states to take the state’s excess solar electricity, and
cut off power coming from solar farms, on sunny, low-demand days. Experts say the deployment of industrial wind
energy in the United States is likely to stall when the key wind energy subsidy, known as the production tax credit or PTC, expires on December 31 of this year.

Renewables advocates say that costs will eventually come down, subsidies will be renewed, and
state mandates will kick in enough to save the industrial wind and solar industries. But those
efforts are unlikely to be successful enough politically to make much difference to the
economics of renewables. In Ohio, lawmakers recently scaled back renewable energy mandates due to their high cost, choosing to instead to subsidize
nuclear plants. Around the world, renewables are making electricity more expensive, despite years of

promises by advocates that prices would come down. “German electricity consumers will again have to pay higher subsidies to
producers of green electricity in the next two years,” reported Die Welt last month. In Australia, the “increasing regularity with which wholesale power prices are sinking below
$0 during sunny and windy days is being more than canceled out by more frequent high prices, defying expectations of a softening in levels overall,” noted The Australian
Financial Review on Sunday. “While I am an advocate for renewable energy, my motivation is driven by economics, not by warm and fuzzy feelings,” a renewable industry leader
emailed me recently to say. “I’ve drawn out the long term macroeconomics and come to the conclusions that you do. Essentially, the math doesn’t pencil out for wind, solar, and
water,” he said. The University of Chicago found earlier this year that renewable energy mandates "significantly increase average retail electricity prices.” Thanks to the heavy
deployment of renewables, electricity prices in California between 2011 and 2018 rose seven times more (28%) than they did in the rest of the country (5%), while electricity

prices have risen 50% in Germany since 2006. Today, Germany spends nearly twice as much for electricity that produces 10 times more carbon emissions than France. Just
14% of Germany’s energy and 35% of its electricity in 2018 came from renewables. And
Germany’s carbon emissions haven’t declined significantly since 2009. Many of the best wind sites have already been
taken in the US and Europe, leaving developers with places that offer weaker wind, and further from major cities and industrial centers. Some renewables advocates claim
hopefully that construction of transmission lines will make wind energy more viable in windy states like Kansas and Nebraska, but environmental opposition in those places is

In Nebraska, local residents and conservationists have filed a lawsuit to block the local
growing.

utility from building a transmission line that will cut through 95% of the migratory flyway of the
endangered whooping crane. Despite much fanfare, the whooping crane has struggled mightily to recover from extinction, and the main cause of
whooping crane death from humans is transmission lines. In Australia, a former Green Party head denounced a proposed wind farm for threatening the extinction of endangered
bird species. “Wind turbines kill birds,” wrote conservationist Bob Brown. “Multiple species of international migratory, endangered and critically endangered shorebirds use the
wetlands… For which of these species will the wind farm be the thousandth cut?” The wind industry has long denied that it has much impact by pointing out that house cats kill
more birds than wind turbines. But house cats can’t and don’t kill the large, slow-to-reproduce endangered and high-conservation value species like bald eagles, whooping

. Industrial wind and solar

cranes, and the European red kite, a raptor. Dealing with environmental lawsuits and grassroots resistance is expensive

developers have to hire lawyers, public relations specialists, and scientists willing to testify that
this or that project poses only a modest threat to endangered birds and bats. The evidence is
mounting that industrial wind farms are having significant impacts. In 2017, leading bat scientists warned that if wind
turbines continued to expand, they would make the hoary bat extinct. Germany’s leading technology assessment research institute published a study last October concluding
that industrial wind turbines are causing a “loss of about 1.2 trillion insects of different species per year” which “could be relevant for population stability.” The news media in
Germany is finally covering the issue. Geo magazine, the National Geographic of Germany, published a cover story about the threat wind turbines pose to the endangered
European red kite. Germany’s industrial wind developers say endangered species protections are an “absolute planning obstacle” and are seeking to be exempt from
 And like Germany and the US, Australia will face more trouble in the future given
prohibitions on killing them.

the difficulty of building long new transmission lines. Germany gets nearly as much of its
renewable electricity from solar as it does from biomass, which a growing body of science
suggests is actually more polluting and carbon-intensive than fossil fuels. There was a natural experiment globally,
just like there was between Germany and France. Between 1965 and 2018 the world spent $2.1 trillion to get 31% more electricity from nuclear than it got for the $2.6 trillion it
spent on solar and wind. Nuclear is the only energy source that has proven capable of fully replacing fossil fuels at low-cost in wealthy nations. While hydro-electric dams can

The underlying problem with

sometimes play that role, they are limited to nations with powerful rivers, many of which have already been dammed.

solar and wind is that they are too unreliable and energy-dilute. Solar and wind farms require
between 400 and 750 times more land than nuclear and natural gas plants. As we approach the limits of
renewables, it seems inevitable that, over time, Democratic politicians will increasingly point to nuclear energy as the centerpiece of their plans for saving the climate, not solar
panels and wind turbines.
 Uniqueness
Changing weather ensure increased demand in US exports
Reuters, 6-2-2020 "U.S. natgas flat as higher air-conditioning offsets fall in LNG exports"
Financial Post. Accessed 6-6-2020 [https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/u-s-
natgas-flat-as-higher-air-conditioning-offsets-fall-in-lng-exports]/mnw/MSDI2020

U.S. natural gas futures were little changed on Tuesday as rising demand for the fuel from power
generators to keep air conditioners humming offset a drop in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports to
Europe and Asia, where prices recently fell to record lows due to coronavirus demand destruction. Front-month gas futures rose 0.3
cents, or 0.2%, to settle at $1.777 per million British thermal units. U.S. LNG exports drop more than a third as pandemic shrinks
demand Coronavirus demand destruction cuts U.S. LNG exports to 13-month low Natgas flows to U.S. LNG export plants sink to 9-
month low due to coronavirus Data provider Refinitiv said average gas output in the U.S. Lower 48 states fell to 88.2 billion cubic
feet per day (bcfd) so far in June, down from a one-year low of 89.3 bcfd in May and an all-time monthly high of 95.4 bcfd in
November. With
the coming of warmer summer weather, Refinitiv projected demand, including
exports, would rise from 80.1 bcfd this week to 82.2 bcfd next week.

Recent deregulation is fueling an American LNG export boom

Rod Walton, 4-25-2019, content director for Power Engineering. "U.S. LNG moves pushing
domestic fuel toward global power generation mix" Power Engineering. Accessed 9-28-2019
[https://www.power-eng.com/2019/04/25/u-s-lng-moves-pushing-domestic-fuel-toward-global-
power-generation-mix/#gref]/mnw

Recent regulatory milestones are pushing American natural gas closer to fueling more European
and global power plants in the not too distant future. Last week, California-based Sempra Energy announced
that its Port Arthur LNG subsidiary received federal approval to build and operate its liquified natural gas export facility under
development in Jefferson County, Texas. The Port Arthur LNG project is expected to include two liquefaction trains, three LNG
storage tanks and the ability to export close to 11 million tonnes per year (Mtpa). In December 2018, Port Arthur LNG and the Polish
Oil & Gas Company signed a definitive 20-year sale-and-purchase agreement for two Mtpa of LNG from the Port Arthur LNG project,
subject to certain conditions. Last year, Sempra LNG selected Bechtel as the engineering, procurement, construction and
commissioning contractor for the project, subject to reaching a definitive agreement. “With
today’s FERC order and the
commercial momentum of the Port Arthur LNG project, we are one step closer to reaching a
final investment decision and delivering low-cost, reliable and clean U.S. natural gas to world
markets,” said Carlos Ruiz Sacristán, chairman and CEO of Sempra North American Infrastructure. “Port Arthur LNG should help
us achieve our goal to become one of the largest exporters of North American liquefied natural gas (LNG). We are grateful to all of
our stakeholders for supporting this important infrastructure project that is expected to create thousands of jobs and provide
economic benefits for years to come.” Port Arthur LNG received authorization from the Department of Energy (DOE) in August 2015
to export domestically produced natural gas to countries with which the U.S. has free trade agreements and has a pending
application to export natural gas to non-free trade agreement countries. Development of the Port Arthur LNG project is contingent
upon obtaining additional customer commitments, completing the required commercial agreements, securing all necessary permits,
obtaining financing, incentives and other factors, and reaching a final investment decision. In earlier LNG developments, Spanish
electric utility Endesa and Indonesia’s PT Pertamina Persero entered into sale and purchase agreements (SPA) for the Corpus Christi
LNG export facility owned by Cheniere Energy Inc.. First commercial delivery is expected by June. Iberdrola, also based in Spain,
signed the SPA for bridging volumes also expected to begin in June, according to the release. Thanks
in large part to the
shale gas revolution happening in Texas, Louisiana, Pennsylvania and elsewhere, U.S. LNG
exports quadrupled in 2017 and could be the majority of natural gas exporting by the early
2020s, according to the Energy Information Administration.
US LNG will get a huge boost from new trade deal with China, but investment in
the industry must hold
Kaibalya Pravo Dey, 1-17-2020, "Trade Deal Impacts the Energy Sector: LNG to Gain the
Most?", Yahoo Finance, https://finance.yahoo.com/news/trade-deal-impacts-energy-sector-
133601991.html, ke

Among the energy products such as liquefied natural gas (LNG), crude oil, natural gas, petroleum products, LNG is expected to gain the
most from the deal. Following the U.S. shale revolution, abundance of natural gas in the domestic market and growing demand for cleaner
energy sources globally have led to the development of several LNG terminal projects in the past few years. As such, the Washington-

Beijing deal can open up a huge market for the U.S. LNG industry. While China is set to become
the biggest LNG importer by the end of the decade, the United States is likely to be the largest
exporter by 2025, ahead of Qatar and Australia. This makes the two countries a perfect fit even though the whole vision is largely dependent
on the fate of the existing 25% Chinese LNG tariff. This was levied during the trade war and its future is still uncertain. The existing LNG

export facilities like Cheniere Energy, Inc.’s LNG Corpus Christi, TX terminal are poised to gain
from the renewed opening to the China market. Jack Fusco, chief executive officer of Cheniere was present at the trade deal
signing ceremony. He said, “The phase one agreement between the United States and China is a step in

the right direction that will hopefully restore the burgeoning U.S. LNG trade with China,”. Other
companies like ConocoPhillips COP with Freeport LNG, Sempra Energy SRE with Cameron LNG will likely grab a share of this market. Tellurian Inc. TELL,
a newcomer in the LNG game, is also expected to thrive from the recent developments.
 AT: Methane
US LNG exports are key to prevent flaring – solves warming
Mark Perry, 4-5-2019, Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and professor of economics
at the Flint campus of the University of Michigan. "LNG is key to reducing global warming"
Herald and News. Accessed 5-5-2019
[https://www.heraldandnews.com/members/forum/guest_commentary/lng-is-key-to-reducing-
global-warming/article_095c8f8c-2a3c-56fd-ba32-6e71e81c81a2.html]/mnw

The spectacular growth of U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas is going to do more than increase
employment, trade and geopolitical benefits. It is also likely to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions, in ways
we would not expect. As oil companies struggle to stop the rise in methane emissions from the
flaring of natural gas associated with oil production, they are investing in pipelines to transport
the natural gas from shale fields in the Permian Basin to new LNG terminals on the Gulf Coast. This combination
of advantages is drawing growing interest because of the role it could play in reducing global
warming. The era in which oil producers routinely flared natural gas to keep more profitable oil wells in production is ending. In
2017, Permian oil and gas producers burned enough gas to serve all the heating and cooking needs of Texas’ seven largest cities.
That’s $322 million of natural gas that went up in smoke. Today, producers have more options, and by selling the natural gas and
reducing flaring, they can increase profits and environmental benefits. And, in light of the current political debate, and contrary to
conventional wisdom, oil and gas companies also know they need to manage the implications of a new world of climate action.
Methane is an important bellwether because reducing methane emissions from oil and gas
operations is easier and less costly than controlling carbon but no less important. Methane is the
primary component of natural gas. While methane doesn’t stay in the atmosphere as long as carbon
dioxide, it is initially far more of a problem, however. In the first two decades after its release,
methane is 84 times more potent than carbon dioxide. The oil and gas industry accounts for about a third of
U.S. methane emissions. Several major oil companies, including Shell, BP and Exxon, have made
reducing methane emissions one of their top environmental priorities. What’s helping is that LNG
companies want to become an outlet for the record amount of methane being flared in the giant Permian Basin of West Texas and
Eastern New Mexico, where much of it has been burned off due to a lack of pipelines needed to move it to the Gulf Coast. Now,
Houston pipeline operator Kinder Morgan is building two pipelines, the first of which, the Gulf Coast Express Pipeline, is expected to
begin moving 2 billion cubic feet of natural gas a day in October. The second pipeline, the Permian Highway Pipeline, will transport
another 2 billion cubic feet a day to the Gulf Coast the following year. An
increase in pipeline capacity would bolster
pipeline shipments of gas to Mexico but most of the gas would be set aside for LNG exports. By
the end of this year, U.S. LNG capacity is expected to reach 9.6 billion cubic feet per day, making America the third largest LNG
exporter in the world, after Qatar and Australia. The
biggest customer for U.S. LNG is expected to be China,
which wants to use clean-burning natural gas instead of coal for electricity generation. Thanks to
LNG, possibly profound changes are taking place right now.

Methane emissions are exaggerated. Oil and gas emissions are low, and any
leaks fixed quickly – aff studies from Ingraffea are based on flawed assumptions
including about how and when the industry captures methane.
Isaac Orr is a research fellow for energy and environmental policy at The Heartland Institute.
Methane From Fracking: Not the Monster Bill McKibben Sniffs Out Sept 13 2016
http://spectator.org/methane-from-fracking-not-the-monster-bill-mckibben-makes-it-out-to-
be/
In reality, methane is not the monster it’s made out to be, because emissions from oil and gas
operations are generally low, and when leaks do occur, they are fixed quickly and easily .¶ One
study cited by McKibben was conducted by known anti-fracking activists Anthony Ingraffea and
Robert Howarth. This 2011 study claims to have found very high emissions, as high as 11 percent of total production, but
this study used unrealistic assumptions to effectively cook the books so the authors could arrive
at the alarming conclusions they wanted from the very start.¶ For example, when estimating methane
emissions, they assumed all methane from certain stages of the fracking process was simply
discharged, or vented, into the atmosphere with no attempt to control emissions. This is a poor assumption,
however, because oil and gas operators use special equipment to capture methane and volatile
organic compounds during the drilling and completion process to limit methane emissions.¶ Additionally, when methane cannot be
captured and put in a pipeline destined for market, it is burned, or flared, at the wellhead, producing carbon dioxide and water.
Pretending these technologies do not exist and that these mitigation procedures are not widely
practiced is a dishonest depiction of methane emissions. Recent scientific studies have found much lower
methane emissions than were reported by McKibben.

Methane emissions are exceedingly low. Oil and gas operators already have all
the incentive they need to decrease, the current financial incentive is enough
Isaac Orr is a research fellow for energy and environmental policy at The Heartland Institute.
Methane From Fracking: Not the Monster Bill McKibben Sniffs Out Sept 13 2016
http://spectator.org/methane-from-fracking-not-the-monster-bill-mckibben-makes-it-out-to-
be/

Other studies have found exceedingly low methane emissions. A fly-over study measuring methane emissions
in the Haynesville (Texas), Fayetteville (Arkansas), and northeastern Marcellus (Pennsylvania) shale formations found very low
emissions as a percentage of total production in each of these basins. Loss rates were estimated to be 1–2.1 percent of total
production from the Haynesville region, 1–2.8 percent from the Fayetteville region, and 0.18–0.41 percent from the northeastern
Pennsylvania area of the Marcellus region. Additionally,
when methane leaks do occur, they can be
effectively managed by using equipment that detect leaks in real time. A recent study published by the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences investigated sources of fugitive methane emissions in the Four Corners region in
the southwestern United States and found 250 point sources of methane emissions. Researchers found 49–66 percent of the
methane escaping into the atmosphere came from only 10 percent of the point-source emitters. This is good news, because it means
methane emissions can be cut by more than half by simply fixing the top 10 percent of leaking equipment. The study also
reported oil and gas operators fixed these leaks soon after they were made aware of their
existence, which isn’t surprising, because methane that leaks into the atmosphere cannot be
captured and sold to customers. Oil and gas operators have a strong financial incentive to
decrease leaks, much like dairy farmers would have a strong incentive to fix pipes that were leaking milk, the product they wish
to sell, onto the ground.

No emissions turns- Preponderance of comprehensive life cycle analyses

conclude aff
Fulton and Mellquist 2011 (Mark Fulton, Managing Director Global Head of Climate Change
Investment Research, and Nils Mellquist, Vice President and Senior Research Analyst, August 25,
2011, “Comparing Life-Cycle Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Natural Gas and Coal,”
Worldwatch Institute, http://goo.gl/NhfkG)
Natural gas has been widely discussed as a less carbon-intensive alternative to coal as a power sector fuel. In April 2011, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency released revised methodologies for estimating fugitive methane emissions
from natural gas systems. These revisions mostly affected the production component of the natural gas value chain (namely,
gas well cleanups), causing a very substantial increase in the methane emissions estimate from U.S. natural gas systems.12 This large
increase in the upstream component of the natural gas value chain caused
some to question the GHG advantage
of gas versus coal over the entire life-cycle from source to use. As a result of this renewed attention, while it
remains unambiguous that natural gas has a lower carbon content per unit of energy than coal
does, several recent bottom-up studies have questioned whether natural gas retains its greenhouse gas
advantage when the entire life cycles of both fuels are considered.3 Particular scrutiny has focused on shale
formations, which are the United States’ fastest growing marginal supply source of natural gas. Several recent bottom-up life-cycle
studies have found the production of a unit of shale gas to be more GHG-intensive than that of conventional natural gas.4
Consequently, if the upstream emissions associated with shale gas production are not mitigated, a growing share of shale gas would
increase the average life-cycle greenhouse gas footprint of the total U.S. natural gas supply. Applying the latest emission factors
from the EPA’s 2011 upward revisions, our top-down life-cycle analysis (LCA)5 finds that the EPA’s new methodology increases the
life-cycle emissions estimate of natural gas-fired electricity for the baseline year of 2008 by about 11 percent compared with its 2010
methodology. But even with these adjustments, we
conclude that on average, U.S. natural gas-fired electricity
generation still emitted 47 percent less GHGs than coal from source to use using the IPCC’s 100-
year global warming potential for methane of 25. This figure is consistent with the findings of all
but one of the recent life-cycle analyses that we reviewed. While our LCA finds that the EPA’s updated estimates of
methane emissions from natural gas systems do not undercut the greenhouse gas advantage of natural gas over coal, methane is
nevertheless of concern as a GHG, and requires further attention. In its recent report on improving the safety of hydraulic fracturing,
the U.S. Secretary of Energy’s Advisory Board’s Subcommittee on Shale Gas Production recommended that immediate efforts be
launched to gather improved methane emissions data from shale gas operations.6 In the meantime, methane
emissions
during the production, processing, transport, storage, and distribution of all forms of natural gas
can be mitigated immediately using a range of existing technologies and best practices, many of
which have payback times of three years or less.7 Such capture potential presents a commercial and investment opportunity that
would further improve the life-cycle GHG footprint of natural gas. Although the adoption
of these practices has been
largely voluntary to date, the EPA proposed new air quality rules in July 2011 that would require the industry to mitigate
many of the methane emissions associated with natural gas development, and in particular with shale gas development.8
 Turns Case: LNG solves warming
US LNG is necessary to mitigate the impacts of Russian revisionism, EU
fracturing, Middle East instability, and climate change
Grigas 17
Agnia Grigas, Nonresident Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council, PhD in International Relations
from Oxford. “A Natural Gas Diplomacy Strategy for the New US Administration” Atlantic
Council: Global Energy Center. Published 1-26-2017, Accessed 7-23-2018.
[http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/A_Natural_Gas_Diplomacy_Strategy_for_t
he_New_US_Administration_web_0126.pdf]/mnw

The budding US role as an energy superpower offers a number of opportunities for the new
administration and the American natural gas industry. At the same time, the United States faces a number of
challenges: a resurgent Russia, a vulnerable and potentially fracturing Europe, and an unstable
Middle East. How can Washington leverage its natural gas endowment for diplomatic aims under these circumstances? How
should the United States lead in the international gas markets given the new geopolitics of natural gas? The geopolitics of natural
gas is already undergoing a significant shift. The emergence of new gas resources and the growth of LNG
trade are challenging the half-century-long status quo of global gas relations. Traditional gas
suppliers like Russia are seeing their influence wane, while gas-importing states have more
flexibility and optionality in their import sources. US LNG exports add greater liquidity to the
global natural gas markets and thus can help secure and diversify Europe’s supplies. Direct deliveries
are also possible as per US early exports to Spain and Portugal. Moreover, US LNG can contain the influence of
Russian gas behemoth Gazprom and Moscow’s use of gas supplies as a foreign policy tool. It can
also court energy-hungry Asian powers like China, which has been trying to secure its natural gas
imports and has looked to Russia as a potential supplier. If properly leveraged, America’s
newfound energy prowess can be an invaluable tool of diplomacy and help ensure that US and
allied leadership continues to guide the twenty-first century. While over the past few years, US energy policy
has seen divisive partisan debate over energy production, exports, and how to address climate change, the benefits of the United
States’ natural gas boom offer room for bipartisan agreement. The
economic, climatic, security, and geopolitical
gains awarded by the rise of US domestic energy production offer many benefits for the next US
administration. While some would prefer to see more environmental regulation in domestic gas production, especially in
regards to fracking, and others would prefer to boost production to maximize economic and energy security benefits, at this point
neither the Democrats nor the Republicans would seek to block US LNG exports or hinder the American natural gas industry.
Moreover, in
light of climate change concerns, many regard gas as a cleaner fossil fuel that can
serve as a bridge to renewables, potentially reducing carbon dioxide emissions.

LNG exports reduce oil demand

Freeman 14 (Derrick, senior fellow and director of the Energy Innovation Project at the
Progressive Policy Institute, “Exporting U.S. Natural Gas: The Benefits Outweigh the Risks,”
Progressive Policy Institute, October 2014,
http://www.progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/2014.10-Freeman_Exporting-
Natural-Gas.pdf) PCS
The environmental community fears that growing use of natural gas will extend our dependence
on fossil fuel and delay the transition to climate friendly alternative fuels. At a climate march held in New
York City on September 21, protesters urged clean energy technology deployment. “The solution is so clear. It’s to get to a 100%
clean energy power society and economy,” stated Ricken Patel, the founding executive director of Avaaz, the march organizer.18 In
the here and now, however, it’s worth noting that the influx of natural gas has actually led to a
reduction of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions. We need to look no further than within the United
States to see the impact that fuel switching from coal to natural gas for power generation has on
greenhouse gas emissions. It is generally accepted that gas-fired generation produces about one half of
carbon dioxide emissions per kilowatt hour as coal-fired generation. The United States
experienced a decline in carbon dioxide emissions between 2011 and 2012 of 3.4%, according to the
EPA.19 Several factors accounted for this decline, but natural gas played a significant role as we’ve experienced an
almost even swap between natural gas-fired generation up by 212 billion kilowatthours (kwh) and coal-fired down by 215.20
However, U.S. carbon dioxide emissions rose 2.7% during the first half of 2014, with the largest increases coming from homes and
the commercial sector, which may be indicative of the economy picking up steam.21 Thus another promising benefit
from LNG exports is the potential reduction in global demand for oil and coal, leading to lower
greenhouse gas emissions worldwide. In a May 2014 draft report on Europe and Asia, the DOE
modeled the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions from shipping natural gas abroad to countries
that use it to replace coal-fired generation. “For most scenarios in both the European and Asian regions, the
generation of power from imported natural gas has lower life cycle greenhouse gas emissions
than power generation from regional coal.”22 The draft DOE study also looked at potential
increases in global warming as a result of U.S. LNG exports to Europe and Asia over both 20-year
and 100-year horizons. While the 100-year period was more favorable to LNG exports, the report concludes, “This
analysis has determined that the use of U.S. [liquefied natural gas] exports for power production
in European and Asian markets will not increase [greenhouse-gas] emissions , on a lifecycle perspective,
when compared to regional coal extraction and consumption for power production.” 23 Some
mainstream environmental groups, notably the Environmental Defense Fund, have flagged the risks of
methane releases from leaks and intentional venting that occurs in the natural gas supply chain. This is a serious concern
and requires close monitoring by regulators. However, it is also a soluble problem and should not be used as a
pretext to delay LNG exports. Although methane is an especially potent greenhouse gas, it is
short-lived in the atmosphere and cost-effective technologies exist that can minimize the
hazards of “fugitive methane.”24 In addition, EPA regulations for New Source Performance
Standards (NSPS) and National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) which
primarily target volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) will not only
improve air quality but assist in reducing methane emissions.25 A recently released EPA report on
greenhouse gas emissions shows that methane emissions from fracked natural-gas wells have reduced
73% from 2011 levels.26 Environmentalists are understandably worried that that low natural gas prices undercut incentives
to invest in renewable fuels and “green” technologies that can boost energy efficiency. The nuclear power industry no doubt has
similar qualms about the influx of cheap shale gas. Yet from this perspective, modest price rises due to LNG exports would actually
be welcome. In any event, rather than expend their energies in a vain effort to block LNG exports, environmental groups should
press for more public spending on research, in conjunction with the private sector, aimed at developing new low- and no-carbon
technologies.
 Link: Renewables
Cheaper renewables crowd out demand for North American LNG imports
Weiss et al., 15- * Principal at the Brattle Group, a climate change focused consulting firm
with a PhD in Business Economics from Harvard, ** Principal at the Brattle Group with over 20
years of experience in the field, *** Associate at the Brattle Group with a PhD in Engineering
Systems from MIT, **** Senior Associate at the Brattle Group with an MBA from MIT (*Jurgen
Weiss, ** Steven Levine, *** Yingxia Yang, **** Anul Thapa, 1/15/16, “LNG and Renewable
Power,” http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/249/original/
LNG_and_Renewable_Power_-_Risk_and_Opportunity_in_a_Changing_World.pdf?1452804455)
**ADA STARTER**

Ultimately, investments in North American LNG terminals2 require that the prices paid for LNG in
overseas markets are greater than or equal to the price of U.S. natural gas supplies (e.g., at Henry
Hub) plus the cost of all infrastructure necessary to liquefy and deliver LNG to overseas markets (including a
fair rate of return on that infrastructure). If the cost of renewable generation is low enough overseas (i.e.,
below the cost of new gas-fired generation burning LNG from North America), it could dampen the attractiveness of
North American-sourced LNG as a fuel for electric generation and the willingness of market participants
to continue to contract for LNG export infrastructure.

Improvements in renewable tech trigger the link

Weiss et al., 15- * Principal at the Brattle Group, a climate change focused consulting firm
with a PhD in Business Economics from Harvard, ** Principal at the Brattle Group with over 20
years of experience in the field, *** Associate at the Brattle Group with a PhD in Engineering
Systems from MIT, **** Senior Associate at the Brattle Group with an MBA from MIT (*Jurgen
Weiss, ** Steven Levine, *** Yingxia Yang, **** Anul Thapa, 1/15/16, “LNG and Renewable
Power,” http://www.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/249/original/
LNG_and_Renewable_Power_-_Risk_and_Opportunity_in_a_Changing_World.pdf?1452804455)
**ADA STARTER**

The above analysis shows that renewable energy may be able to compete with imported LNG under a
number of conditions in the near future and most likely during the lifetime of the longterm LNG contracts supporting new LNG
export infrastructure (i.e., contracts that have already been negotiated for new export terminals now under construction as well as
contracts being pursued by export terminals currently in the development phase). Advances in renewable energy
technology and related cost improvements, which are further helped by an increasingly mature supply chain,
economies of scale and increased competition, could result in renewables putting competitive pressure on
LNG as a source of fuel in the electric generation sector in many target markets for North
American LNG. Such competitive pressure could lead to lower demand for LNG relative to
current forecasts, and lower prices for LNG in world markets, all else equal.
 Impact: US-China war
LNG exports are coming now and solve European energy security and SCS
conflict---climate policies that hamper natural gas production tradeoff.
Perry, Michigan economics professor, 9-8-16 (Mark, “Maintain America's Energy Lead”,
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2016-09-08/smart-energy-policies-will-keep-america-
in-the-lead-on-natural-gas) **ADA STARTER**

U.S. liquefied natural gas exports are reshaping the global energy landscape. As U.S. LNG cargoes make their
way to Europe, South America, the Middle East and East Asia, once hard and fast assumptions about the future trade of LNG have been turned upside
down. Asa result, we are only just beginning to understand the benefits afforded by America's
shale revolution and our emergence as the world's largest natural gas producer. Not so long ago, the U.S.
was expected to rival Japan as the world's largest importer of LNG. Russia, Iran and Qatar seemed so dominant in the international natural gas
marketplace, it was feared they might form an LNG cartel along the lines of OPEC. Those fears have been put soundly to bed by the amazing shale
revolution. Instead
of being a major LNG importer, the U.S. is on track to become one of the world's
largest exporters. Once constrained, the global LNG marketplace is now booming. Although only
one U.S. LNG export terminal is currently in operation – several more are currently under
construction – Citigroup believes the U.S. Gulf Coast could soon become a major, if not the world's leading, LNG-trading hub. This development
is tremendously important for the U.S. economy and our commitment to global trade as well as the energy security of our allies. The construction of
new LNG export terminals is already pumping billions of dollars into U.S. ports. As U.S. LNG export volumes grow, it's likely that an increase in this
country's natural gas production will ensue, providing increased investment and economic activity along the Gulf Coast and in U.S. shale fields from
Pennsylvania to Texas to Alaska. The emergence of U.S. LNG exports is also creating a more transparent and
competitive global marketplace for LNG. That's a considerable win for consumers and a
significant blow to traditional gas exporters that used their tight hold on supply to exert undue
geopolitical power. Take Russia's stranglehold on Europe's natural gas supplies. Already, the
emergence of U.S. LNG in the global marketplace has increased our allies' bargaining power
with Gazprom, Russia's sole producer and exporter of natural gas. For example, Lithuania recently built an offshore LNG import terminal in a
move to diversify its sources of supply. Even the potential of LNG imports provided the Lithuanians leverage to

renegotiate gas supply contracts with Gazprom at a 25 percent discount. As a study from
Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy predicts, access to U.S. LNG will likely save
European gas consumers $20 billion per year and cost Russia roughly the same in reduced sales
revenues. Less revenue in Vladimir Putin's coffers and decreased Russian leverage on
European countries is certainly a most welcome development . As the global LNG marketplace
continues to grow, and gas importers gain increased faith in their ability to access needed supply
through the market, potential for conflict over energy supplies could be reduced. That is
certainly the hope as Beijing continues its island-building policy in the South China Sea. Just last month
the first U.S. LNG cargo arrived in China. An increasingly robust, affordable and reliable marketplace for LNG

could help convince Beijing it can achieve desired energy security through the market as
opposed to aggressive resource command-and-control policies . U.S. leadership in the world's LNG marketplace is
clearly in our national interest. We have in our hands the remarkable prospect to help reshape and guide global energy markets for decades to come.
Policymakers should recognize the historic opportunity America now has due to an abundance of shale resources that have only recently become
recoverable. Credit for this goes to the country's petropreneurs and made-in-the-USA drilling and extraction technologies. But
to facilitate
and maintain our new leadership position in world energy markets, we need to get domestic
energy policies right. That will likely mean having the wisdom to let U.S. natural gas producers
compete more easily with foreign producers who face less cumbersome regulatory
procedures. There's a lot at stake – jobs, national security and geopolitical power. More than
ever before, we need sensible energy policies in the pursuit of our goals.
SCS conflict goes nuclear
Polina Tikhonova 15, Russia expert at ValueWalk, citing Zhang Baohui, Prof @ Political Science
and Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies @ Lingnan, “US Faces Nuclear War Threat
Over South China Sea – Chinese Professor,” 11/28, http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/us-
nuclear-war-south-china-sea/ **ADA STARTER**

China is willing to start a nuclear war with the United States over the South China Sea, according to
a Chinese professor.¶ Beijing’s rhetoric after an incident with a U.S. warship sailed to the South China
Sea suggests that Chinese decision-makers could resort to more “concrete and forceful
measures” to counter the U.S. Navy, according to Zhang Baohui, Professor of Political Science and
Director of the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies at Lingnan University in Hong Kong. ¶ “If so, a face-
off between the two navies becomes inevitable. Even worse, the face-off may trigger an
escalation towards military conflicts,” the professor wrote in a piece for RSIS Commentary.¶ But, according to Baohui,
the U.S. military is “oblivious” to this scenario, since Washington decision-makers think
America’s conventional military superiority discourages China from responding to such
“provocations” in the South China Sea militarily. However, this “U.S. expectation is flawed, as
China is a major nuclear power,” the professor wrote.¶ “When cornered, nuclear-armed states
can threaten asymmetric escalation to deter an adversary from harming its key interests,” he
added.¶ Baohui then refers to the military parade in Beijing that took place on Sept. 3 and revealed that China’s new generation of
tactical missiles – such as the DF-26 – are capable of being armed with nuclear warheads. Moreover, according to the latest reports,
China’s air-launched long-range cruise missiles can also carry tactical nuclear warheads. ¶ U.S. could provoke nuclear war with China¶
And while the U.S. does not have its core interests in the South China Sea, the
disputed islands present China’s
strategic interests, which is why this kind of asymmetry in stakes would certainly give Beijing an
advantage in “the balance of resolve” over Washington, according to the professor. And if the South China Sea
situation escalates and starts spiraling into a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and China, Washington will face a choice of
either backing down first or fighting a nuclear-armed power and the world’s largest military force with a strength of approximately
2.285 million personnel.¶ “Neither option is attractive and both exact high costs, either in reputation or human lives, for the U.S.,”
Baohui wrote.¶ So it
would be unwise for the U.S. to further provoke China in the disputed area,
since China’s willingness to defend its interests, reputation and deterrence credibility could
easily escalate the conflict into a military confrontation that would ultimately harm U.S.
interests, according to the professor.¶ China will join Russia in nuclear war with NATO¶ With NATO member state
Turkey downing a Russian jet in its airspace, there is already a high risk of military confrontation in the world. And with China being
so close and allied with Russia, Beijing decision-makers could see the incident with the Russian warplane as an opportunity to
avenge the West for the South China Sea provocations.¶ The Turkish military said it had shot down a Russian jet on Tuesday,
triggering a furious response from Moscow and escalating the already hot tensions in the Syrian conflict. With Russian President
Vladimir Putin warning the West of “serious consequences,” analysts believe the Kremlin is willing to unleash a nuclear war over the
incident.¶ Despite the fact that Turkey is backed by NATO’s 5th Article, which states that an attack on one Ally shall be considered an
attack on all NATO members, the chances that Putin will start a nuclear war over the incident with the Russian jet are very “likely,”
according to Pavel Felgengauer, Russia’s most respected military analyst. ¶ Felgengauer said Turkey wants to protect a zone in
northern Syria controlled by the Turkmens, Ankara’s allies, while the downing of the Russian warplane in the region must prompt
the Kremlin to either accept the zone or “start a war with Turkey,” which means starting an all-out war with NATO. And the only way
Russia could win a war against NATO is by going nuclear, Felgengauer said.¶ “It is most likely that it will be war,” said Felgenhauer, as
reported by Mirror. “In other words, more fights will follow when Russian planes attack Turkish aircraft in order to protect our
[Russia’s] bombers. It is possible that there will be fights between the Russian and Turkish navies at sea.” ¶ U.S. provokes China to
respond militarily¶ The U.S. recently asserted its freedom of navigation in the disputed South China Sea. On Oct. 27, the USS Lassen
traveled inside the 12-mile nautical zone around Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands archipelago. This reef is one of seven reefs China has
artificially built in order to claim its sovereignty over the Spratly Islands and the sea around it. ¶ Even though Beijing did not take
immediate action to counter the U.S. vessel, such further
“provocations” could seriously destabilize the peace
and stability of the whole region, according to Baohui.¶ “They could touch off an unintended
escalation and push the two countries towards military conflict. The logic is quite obvious,” the
professor wrote.¶ The U.S. Navy’s further operations in the South China Sea could thus corner
Beijing and force China to respond militarily. After all, China cannot risk its national interests and
power reputation, according to the Chinese professor. Shortly after the incident, Vice-Admiral Yi
Xiaoguang, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) deputy chief of staff, warned that China “will use
all means necessary to defend its sovereignty” if the U.S. conducts similar provocations.
 Impact: Alliances
LNG exports are vital to the overall stability of the U.S.-led alliance system
Richard D. Kauzlarich 16, co-director of the Center for Energy Science and Policy at George
Mason University, 5/10/16, “Energizing U.S. Foreign Policy,” http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2016/05/10/energizing-u-s-foreign-policy/

Despite the turmoil of recent years, when U.S. allies find themselves in tight spots, they still
expect that America will come to their assistance. And despite the worries of dwindling military and
diplomatic resources, the U.S. government still has many other tools at its disposal—namely, market
forces. An emerging case in point is America’s newfound energy abundance, particularly in natural gas.
The U.S. natural gas market over the past several years has become a source of envy for other foreign powers. The United States
quickly became one of the world’s leading producers of natural gas and boasts the fourth-largest supply of recoverable shale gas
reserves in the world. Even with prices falling, total U.S. natural gas production in terms of dry gas volume averaged 6.3 percent
higher in 2015 versus 2014, according to the Energy Information Agency. How
can these assets at home help our allies
abroad? The answer could rest, in part, with exports of U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG). It’s no secret that as
U.S. production of natural gas continues to increase. Domestic stockpiles are about 25 percent above levels from one year ago and
about 23.4 percent above the five-year average, and domestic consumption is well below current production
levels. As a result, we are being increasingly woven into the international conversation on LNG
exports, so much so that, according to a March 11 Forbes article, “After Qatar and Australia, the U.S. could easily become the
world’s third-largest LNG supplier by 2020. We have a great advantage over other LNG exporters because
we can reconfigure our vast LNG import structure to export.” BP’s recently released Energy Outlook 2016
Edition also predicts that the United States will become a net exporter of gas “later this decade.” These are exciting forecasts,
especially following the first export of U.S. LNG earlier this year from the Sabine Pass LNG terminal in Louisiana to South America.
Excitement for these developments has begun to ripple throughout Europe, which currently imports
more than half of its energy from Russian gas supplies. East European countries such as Lithuania, Ukraine, Hungary, and
Bulgaria remain more than 80 percent dependent. BP projects that European dependence on imported
gas will increase further, which is cause for alarm because Russia has long viewed its energy abundance
as a weapon to assert political pressure and, occasionally, achieve dominance. Examples are the repeated
threats and actions by Russia to disrupt and cut off its natural gas supply to Ukraine in the midst of political conflict, and Gazprom’s
current cutback on pipeline gas to Turkey. By utilizing LNG facilities in the Baltic region and North-South
pipelines, U.S. LNG exports can begin to unshackle these countries’ reliance on Russian gas
supplies, bringing much needed security and U.S. commercial presence to the region . While it’s early
in the export process, and while building export terminals is expensive and time-consuming, there is little doubt that
American LNG will supply the European market. Cheniere Energy, the company that exported the first shipment of
U.S. LNG this year, estimates that half of its future LNG exports will go to Europe. The actual volume and pace
depend on Europe’s capacity to build additional regasification facilities, connecting pipeline, and storage capacity. A report released
in January by the Atlantic Council makes the point: “U.S. LNG export projects complement European Union (EU) gas policy and
energy security strategy…. LNG can provide for Europe’s energy security and could help LNG compete with pipeline gas in Europe
from Russia, Europe’s dominant supplier.” A similar situation could also unfold in Asia. According to the International
Energy Agency, more than half of the growth in demand for natural gas through 2020 will occur in Asia. This is
hardly surprising, considering that large economies in the region like South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan remain more
than 90 percent dependent on energy imports. Japan and South Korea are today the world’s largest importers of
natural gas, respectively, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA). But more than half of these two countries’
LNG import supplies move through the South China Sea, where military tensions and security threats
continue to build. This presents significant issues for these allies, to say the least, and has resulted in
Japan and South Korea echoing our European allies’ call for the United States to increase LNG exports to
the region to
foster stronger geopolitical momentum. The security implications of allowing more
U.S. LNG exports into the global marketplace are strong. But this story cannot be told in full without mentioning
another burgeoning resource that also showcases America’s power in shaping international diplomacy through its energy exports:
crude oil. In 1974, the U.S. outlawed exports of crude oil due to an environment consisting of record low production coupled with
overreliance on supplies from Saudi Arabia. But in December, Congress and President Obama reversed this forty-year-old Executive
Order as part of the 2015 omnibus spending bill. Why? Because last year the United States became the world’s top producer of oil
and natural gas, unseating Russia as top dog in fossil fuels. Of course, the recent decision to unbridle U.S. exports of crude oil in the
global marketplace was, in part, the result of capitalization on favorable market conditions. But, as with U.S. LNG exports, it was also
the realization of America’s ability to utilize this resource to strengthen security abroad, including for our European and Eastern
Asian allies who depend on crude oil from Russia and Iran. U.S.
policy is now and must remain connected to the
energy security of our allies abroad. The global energy market is a highly integrated system, and the welfare of the
system and its participants is something we should take a strong interest in protecting. U.S. LNG
exports are one of the tools we have to ensure its stability. The rewards are not just economic—
increased jobs and government revenue at home—but also political, with the ability to free U.S. allies from the
grip of threatening nations. The next President must use America’s extraordinary energy capabilities to help ensure
increased security abroad.

An effective alliance system prevents global great power war

James F. Jeffrey 16, the Solondz Fellow at The Washington Institute, former Deputy National
Security Advisor and Ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, 3/21/16, “The Obama Doctrine: Made for
the '90s, Disastrous Today,” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-obama-doctrine-made-the-
90s-disastrous-today-15557?page=show

But what if we are not in 1989’s optimistic world of upward trajectory? In his December 2013 essay “The
End of History Ends” in the American Interest, Walter Russell Mead argued that “ a coalition of great powers” (he named
Russia, China and Iran) “has long sought to overturn the Cold War Eurasian settlement that the
United States and its allies imposed after 1990; in the second half of 2013 that coalition began to gain ground.”
Certainly, subsequent developments—South China Sea militarized “islands,” Crimea, Ukraine, Syria—
undergird his argument. This does not mean we are now back in that period of extreme danger,
1940–90, when all foreign policy decisions had to be taken in the context of a Manichean struggle .
Neither China nor Russia has any intention of waging war against the United States or fully replacing the
global order. But they certainly are, as Mead says, trying to overturn that order in areas of interest
to them. The best analogy is the 1930s, when there was a risk that world order could collapse,
but no such inevitability. Under such circumstances, robust reactions to challenges to the system are not
"choices," so much as obligations to protect system integrity , as challengers gain strength—and
further temptation—by victories against the system's values, especially rule of law and collective
security.
Russia DA
1NC Shells
 1NC---Russia Adventurism
Fracking limits increases energy independence
Rachel Koning Beals, reporter, 9-9-2019, "Democrats’ fracking ban would hurt U.S. economy,
give edge to Russia: IEA’s Birol," MarketWatch,
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/democrats-fracking-ban-would-hurt-us-economy-give-
edge-to-russia-ieas-birol-2019-09-09 // lilw-msdi2021

Banning U.S. fracking ‘would have major implications on the market for the U.S. economy, for jobs growth and everything,
and [it’s] not good news for energy security...’ ” That’s the reaction from Fatih Birol, executive director of the
International Energy Agency, to major U.S. presidential candidate Sen. Elizabeth Warren’s proposal to ban the extraction practice
from day one if elected. A few of her party rivals have similar ideas about idling the controversial practice of fracking. The relatively
newly successful method of extracting fossil fuels has pushed the U.S. to near the top of global
oil CL00, -0.57% production, threatening to unseat Saudi Arabia. And it has limited a global reliance
on Russia for much of its natural gas NG00, -0.16% , which is also collected from the process. “Up to
recently, before the U.S. shale gas revolution, Russia was the country which was dominating alone the gas markets,” the Turkish
economist Birol told the cable channel. “With
the U.S. coming into the picture, there is a choice, there are
options for the consumers, better for energy security, for diversification.” Proponents of the method cite its
boost to U.S. energy independence and the risk to higher transportation costs if the technology goes away. Critics
point to land abuses, evidence of groundwater pollution and methane leakage, in addition to the climate effects of fossil-fuel use
overall. Birol told CNBC that a ban on fracking as proposed by Warren and Democratic competitors Sen. Bernie Sanders and Sen.
Kamala Harris would have “major implications” for the U.S. energy industry. More broadly, most candidates looking to challenge
Donald Trump in 2020 have said they’ll push to ban new fossil fuel leases on public lands. “Just banning [fracking] would
not be good news, not only for Americans but for Europeans,” Birol told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Europe” during the World
Energy Conference. His IEA works as a data firm and represents the market interests of 30 member countries. “I think climate
change is serious issue — the oil industry, gas industry have to be part of the solution, rather than being the problem or a barrier,”
he added.

Banning fracking means importing more oil from Russia

John Hofmeister and Paul Sullivan (John Hofmeister is the former president of Shell Oil. Paul
Sullivan is a professor at the National Defense University), 10-2-2020, "Fracking ban: Bad for
America, bad for Americans, but what to do?," TheHill, https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-
environment/519246-fracking-ban-bad-for-america-bad-for-americans-but-what-to-do // lilw-
msdi2021

More than 80 percent of our basic energy, electricity and mobility, comes from fossil energy (coal, oil and natural gas). More
than 60 percent of our oil and gas is produced by hydraulic fracturing, also known as fracking. What would
happen if certain extremists have their way and outright ban fracking? The shock to our American way of life would leave us
clamoring over energy outages, ever higher prices, increased job losses, a weakening economy with higher inflation, and for those
who can least afford it, deeper impoverishment. Energy transitions should not happen with “shock therapy” that costs so many so
much. If
we banned fracking, all the improvements made to our energy security in the last
decade would disappear. We turned from excessive imports of oil and gas a decade ago to being a top exporter of oil and
gas to the world. In addition to propping up our own energy security we have become the top global producer of oil and gas in the
world. This has tremendously strengthened our domestic economy, improved our balance of international trade over what it would
have been without fracking, strengthened the value of the dollar, lowered the price of energy and created millions of jobs. We
have built a liquified natural gas exporting industry that has enabled Europe, China and
numerous other nations to be less reliant on Russia or the Middle East for energy imports. Banning fracking
would emasculate our energy diplomacy and present a huge gift to Russian President Vladimir Putin, China’s Xi
Jinping and OPEC members who relish resuming their historic dominance.
Russia as a great power leads to expansionism and US-Russia war
Payne and Foster 2017. Keith B. Payne: President, National Institute for Public Policy and
John S. Foster, Jr.: Former Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.
“Chapter 6. Russian strategy: Expansion, crisis and conflict summary and way ahead” Russian
strategy Expansion, crisis and conflict, Comparative Strategy, 36:1 2017. // lilw-msdi2021

Russian President Vladimir Putin has a worldview that differs substantially from that of his Western counterparts and a
grand strategy to expand Russia’s power and control —necessarily at the expense of others. Putin’s
worldview is evident in his statement that the collapse and breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of
the twentieth century. Russia, in his view, was humiliated in the wake of that devolution. He views the West as the culprit and a
continuing threat to his vision for Russia. Putin has often used powerful and even spiritual imagery to convey his messages to the
Russian people. For example, in his 2014 annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly, Putin cited the religious significance of
Crimea—the place where “Grand Prince Vladimir [born in Kiev circa 956 AD] was baptized before bringing Christianity to Rus.” And,
he compared the significance of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia to the “sacral importance” of the “Temple Mount in Jerusalem for
the followers of Islam and Judaism.”1 Vladimir Putin and other like-minded Russian leaders appear determined to correct perceived
injustices done to Russia. This revisionist agenda is to be accomplished at the expense of the West—in particular, the United States
and allies. The evidence for this thesis is apparent from consistencies in Russian leadership statements and Russia’s behavior over
the past 20 years. As summarized by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter in October 2015: Russia has used political, economic, and
military tools to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries, flouted international legal norms, and
destabilized the European security order by attempting to annex Crimea and continuing to fuel further violence in eastern Ukraine.2
Russian Objectives. Moscow’s grand strategy and identified key objectives include: expanding its influence
and reestablishing its global role as a multi-regional great power and “Russification” of the near abroad. U.S.
leaders should be aware that these objectives are not achievable in an era of peace and stability, but
are highly revisionist and confrontational. Russian actions toward these goals, if unchecked, invariably
will lead to further crises and conflict with the West. The territorial expansion which is sought
by Moscow has been demonstrated clearly in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine, and future
incursions by Russian military forces could well erupt into a serious confrontation with the
West. In fact, with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Russian military operations in Syria, Russia has demonstrated the
potential threat to states from the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Balkans. Russia has declared
repeatedly that it views NATO as its enemy and large-scale military exercises conducted over the past decade have underscored the
seriousness of that Russian perspective of NATO. Russia’s expansion of influence and military buildup is not limited to its western
flank. Its military activities in the East—for example, in the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kuril Islands—have understandably alarmed
Japan, a key U.S. ally in the Pacific.3 Indeed, in 2014, Russia’s military seizure of the Crimean Peninsula and military forces in eastern
Ukraine prompted a phone call between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and U.S. President Obama. According to reports, the
two leaders agreed that Russia’s actions were “a threat to international peace and security.”4
 1NC---Putin Popularity
US LNG exports limit Russian influence and tank Putin’s approval ratings
Peek 21 (Liz Peek, former partner of major bracket Wall Street firm Wertheim & Company, 4-
21-2021, "Here's how Biden can gain the upper hand against Putin," TheHill,
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/549336-heres-how-biden-can-gain-upper-hand-
against-putin, accessed 6-16-2021) // lilw-msdi2021

**edited for language

President Biden is desperate – so desperate – to show that he is not Donald Trump. He especially wants to show the
world just how tough he can be on Russian President Vladimir Putin, whom he has called a “killer,” and on whose
regime he has recently imposed a second round of sanctions in as many months. Unhappily, Biden’s effort to [deter] stand
up to Russia’s leader has so far been a flop and an embarrassment. In his second telephone conversation with Putin, Biden
“made clear that the United States will act firmly in defense of its national interests in response to
Russia’s actions, such as cyber intrusions and election interference.” Tough talk, but Biden ended the conversation
with a surprise (and inappropriate) invitation to a summit. A summit that Putin has so far declined to accept, even as
he continues to mass troops along the Ukraine border and block seaways to that nation. This repudiation of Biden’s ill-
prepared offer to meet with the “killer” Putin is humiliating. As is Biden’s decision to recall two
U.S. warships that had been en route to the Black Sea as a show of force. Putin barked, warning
the U.S. to stay clear of the area “for their own good,” and Biden blinked. If Biden actually wants to
get tough with Putin – if he is serious about punishing the Kremlin – he should do everything possible to
ramp up U.S. oil production and to encourage more liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Such
measures would [devastate] cripple Russia’s financial clout and bolster America’s influence. But – my
guess – Biden is too weak to confront the climate zealots who dominate the Democratic Party. Oil and natural gas
production account for nearly 40 percent of Russia’s total output. In recent years the country’s
economy has been slammed by declining oil prices, driven lower largely by an unexpected rise in
U.S. production, thanks to fracking and more recently the encouragement of the Trump White House. Russia’s
economy contracted in six of the years between 2010 and 2019, and never grew by more than 2.2 percent.
During those years, U.S. oil production soared from 5.5 million barrels per day to 12.2 mb/d . The
average world crude price plummeted from $110 per barrel as of December 2010 to $63 in December 2019. Last year Russia’s
economy shrank by roughly 4 percent as COVID-19 led to reduced global economic activity and plunging oil demand. In April, oil
prices temporarily collapsed to a two-decade low of $19.46. Spurring the decline was Russia’s decision not to join other big OPEC +
producers in cutting output to bolster prices. It could not afford to do so, but its choice was a drastic mistake. Thanks
to COVID
and to sinking oil prices, Russia’s PMI dropped last year to the lowest level recorded since 1997,
when the series was first compiled. The downturn led to towering unemployment; meanwhile, the fiscally strapped
government was forced to delay large-scale spending meant to boost Putin’s approval ratings.
Some 40 percent of Russia’s state budget comes from its oil and gas revenues . In late May, the Wall Street
Journal reported, “Russia’s fiscal relief program totals around 2.8% of GDP whereas the U.S. measures make up around 11%,
according to the International Monetary Fund.” As a result of the hardship, Putin’s approval rating slipped, from a high of
89 percent in 2015 (keep in mind, this is Russia) to 69 percent in February of this year. While most western leaders would celebrate
such high polls, for Putin, who regularly receives admiring reviews from 80 percent or more of Russia’s population, the slide is
worrisome. Put simply, oil prices are important to Russia, and important to Putin. Biden could keep pressure on
global oil prices by backing increased U.S. output. He could also limit Russia’s influence and revenues by fast-
tracking our LNG exports. Instead, he and his Democratic colleagues are eager to drive down U.S. fossil fuel production,
sacrificing a critical geopolitical advantage on the altar of climate change.
Banning fracking quashes reforms
Kasparov 19—(is chairman of the Renew Democracy Initiative and the author of “Deep
Thinking: Where Machine Intelligence Ends and Human Creativity Begins). Garry Kasparov.
WASHINGTON POST, Democratic leaders need to stop sending all-is-forgiven messages to Putin.
2019. // lilw-msdi2021

When the West sends these all-is-forgiven messages to Russia, Putin immediately exploits them to
show Russian elites that he’s still the big man, that only he can get sanctions lifted — and that
he’s not going anywhere.nstead of deterring Putin from further acts of aggression, whether it’s election interference or invading a neighbor, such
appeasement tells him only that there’s no reason to change his ways. What is needed is a united front
of democratic nations declaring that Russia will never come in from the cold until it abandons its repression at home and its malign adventures abroad. I have helped organize an
open letter calling for such a response, with signatories prominent in politics, diplomacy, law, the arts and human rights, drawn from around the world and across the political

spectrum. The letter urges democratic leaders to deny Putin the international legitimacy he craves and to cut off the economic ties
that he uses to spread corruption and to fund his domestic repression, hybrid wars and global assassination campaigns.

Continued economic deterioration escalates

Stahl 15—(CEO of the Blue Institute, PhD in Business Studies and Economics from Uppsala
University, MA in International Relations from the University of Kent, and Johan Wiktorin,
Founder and CEO of the Intelligence Company Brqthrough, Licensed Master of Competitive
Intelligence and Former Member of the Swedish Armed Forces). Dr. Benjamin Ståhl. 2015.
“What’s At Stake?: A Geopolitical Perspective on the Swedish Economic Exposure in Northeast
Europe”, Swedish Growth Barometer, 7/1/2015,
https://blueinst.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/whats-at-stake_geopolitical-perspective.pdf
// lilw-msdi2021

If the Russian economy continues to deteriorate and the regime continue to

Scenario 1: Disintegration

distance themselves from the West, the centre may not be capable to maintain legitimacy and
keep the periphery together. Already, some regions and counties are highly indebted. In other parts, ethnic Russians are a minority. Regions in eastern
Russia, rich in raw materials, may look to China for funding. It is, however, probable that Beijing will not want to undermine the stability in Russia. Closer to the region in focus in
this report, Kaliningrad is an area that could distance itself from the Kremlin. Economic problems and security concerns form a background that could lead to a political uprising.
A “Kaliningrad-Maidan” development is at the heart of this scenario. Triggers could also come from outside Kaliningrad, in or in the immediate surrounding of the Russian
Federation, or from other factors such as severe pollution. The other countries in the region would in all probability remain cool in this situation, considering the county’s
military importance for the Russian government. However, a mutiny like the ones in Kroonstad in June 1917, March 1921 or on the frigate Storozjevoj in November 1975 cannot
be excluded. Economic and political tensions in Europe could weaken the EU and worsen the development at the same time. A Greek withdrawal from the EU, triggered by its
exit from the Eurozone, could set such a movement in motion. A Podemos-led government in Spain could undermine confidence for the single market, at a time when Europe
also faces the consequences of a highly unstable North Africa, with a large flow of migrants. Attempts by Russia to influence certain members in the EU, such as Hungary and
Cyprus, could sow further discord in the EU. At the most severe levels of disintegration, France could adopt policies effectively blocking EU and NATO response in a time of

In all varieties of
increased tensions. Britain may opt out of the union altogether, or be forced out if their demands for special status is rejected by the other member states.

disintegration, uncertainty concerning the control over the nuclear arsenals will increase. The US
will become involved both diplomatically and financially in order to bring clarity and establish control over the arsenals. Should
Russia, in that situation, ask for military support for this, it is highly probable that the US would acquiesce: such operations in other parts of the world were the object of joint

Scenario 2: Ultra-nationalism If Russian domestic and international policy continues to become more
US-Russian exercises just a few years ago.

As the economy deteriorates, wages fall and shortages become common, a focus on
radicalised, it might take ever more drastic forms.

nostalgic nationalism, using belligerent rhetoric and demonstrations of military power, could
be used to deflect growing discontentment. A logical target would be to “protect” zones which are perceived as Russian, e.g. where there are
Russian ethnic minorities or even just Russian-speaking areas. Such rhetoric was and is used in the Ukraine. The coming years will tell what the Russian ambitions are in the
Ukraine. Offensives to secure and expand their supply lines, and weakening those of the Ukraine, are probable, and more ambitious plans, such as the opening of new directions

in Kharkiv or Odessa, are possible. As a distraction, conflicts in Moldavia can be fuelled. If the West, primarily the US, UK
 support Ukraine with military means, the risk increases for further escalation of the
and Poland,

conflict. Remaining passive, on the other hand, runs the risk that Russia perceives that it could
act against other targets. A second country that could be the target of Russian nationalism is
Belarus. Judging by president Putin’s justification of the annexation of Crimea, Belarus would similarly be a legitimate candidate for “re-inclusion” in Russia. There are
indications that the regime in Belarus are worried about such a development and acting to thwart it. In late 2014, Lukashenko appointed a new government, and has increased
the emphasis on “Belorussian”. The fragmented (and thoroughly infiltrated) opposition has declared that it will not field candidates in elections this autumn, since they deem the
threat of president Putin to be greater than of Lukashenko himself. Belarus has also passed laws permitting prosecution of non-regular armed troops, as a consequence of the
Russian method employed in the annexation of Crimea. In the economic sphere, Russia has complained that Belarus is profiting from sanctions against Russia. Any attempts from
Russia to enter Belarus’ with military means would probably not be met by any effective resistance from the Belorussian security apparatus. The opportunities for Russia are in
some ways more favourable here than in Ukraine, due to the close cooperation between the countries’ armies and intelligence services. Passive resistance cannot be ruled out

but would not mean much in a short-term. However, tensions with other former Soviet Union republics, with the EU and with NATO would surely
increase. Polish and Lithuanian forces would probably mobilize to counteract spillover effects. EU
policy would be substantially revised. Belorussian citizens would attempt to flee, primarily to neighbouring Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The Russian government

would also threaten the Baltic states, in order to undermine their economies and try to influence
policy in these countries. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be in a precarious situation. While they need to strengthen their civil and military defence,
they must retain credibility with their allies and not be perceived as to exaggerate the Russian threat. The higher the tensions, the more sensitive the world is to psychological

influence.Russia would, in this scenario, also fan nationalism in other parts of Europe through political and financial
support. West Balkan is particularly vulnerable, as the EU and the US have invested considerable political capital in the region with only
mixed success. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia have stagnated in their political and economic development with high levels of

unemployment, political polarisation and even the establishing of Islamic fundamentalist cells: a fertile ground for nationalist movements.

Finally, Russian ultra-nationalism would also be directed inwards, with an escalated persecution of the domestic political opposition,

independent media, and nationalisation of foreign assets. This will be combined with attacks on minority groups , especially on Jews. This

scenario could happen separately or as a precursor to the final, and most dangerous, scenario. Scenario 3: Test of strength In this scenario, Russia would

attempt to break NATO through challenging of one or more of the Baltic states. The objective would be to demonstrate to
alliance members that NATO’s response is too late and too weak. A precondition for success is a distraction through a crisis by an intermediator, which would tie down especially
American attention and resources. The distraction could come in many forms, e.g. by partnering with North Korea, fanning war in the Middle East, or even hidden support for
terrorists. If the current polarisation in US domestic politics continues, any reaction will be obstructed and delayed. An especially vulnerable window of opportunity is in the
period between the presidential elections in November 2016 and the installation of the new president in January 2017, which could create a legitimacy problem for the
American political system when it comes to the possibilities of directly confronting Russia quickly. An attack on any Baltic state would directly affect Swedish territory and air
space. In the worst-case scenario, it will happen immediately before open conflict with NATO. The Baltic states each offer different opportunities for Russia, but they all have in
common that they lack any strategic depth, which means that an open invasion would be accomplished in a few days, unless support from other alliance members is
forthcoming. Estonia, which is the most powerful of the three, both economically and military, poses as a potential threat to the trade over St Petersburg. To control the
maritime traffic through the Gulf of Finland is an important motive for Russia to influence Estonian politics. The population of Estonia, with 25 percent ethnic Russians, could be
used to legimize action and as grounds for destabilisation, especially around the border town Narva where more than 90% of the population is ethnic Russian. Latvia is the most
vulnerable of the three states. The economy is weaker; the Russian minority is about the same as in Estonia; and Russian organised crime has a strong hold. Especially the
eastern parts of the country are vulnerable to Russian influence. Lithuania only have about six percent ethnic Russians and a stronger military tradition. On the other hand,
Lithuania offers access to Kaliningrad. Lithuania’s attempts to decrease their dependence on energy from Russia has annoyed the Russian regime, as is evident in the
harassments by the Russian navy of the cabling operation which will connect the Lithuanian grid to Sweden. There are also some tensions surrounding the Polish minorities in
the country which Russia could exploit. How fast Sweden will become involved depends on the extent of open, armed actions against one or all of the Baltic States. If a
confrontation occurs with non-regular or paramilitary means, maintaining dominance over Swedish territory and territorial waters will be in focus. The same will be the case for
Finland, but Finnish action could be influenced by Russian fabrication of tensions in Karelia, that Helsinki could be blamed for. NATO would try to respond in a controlled

manner, i.e. prioritizing transports by air and sea. This would mean greatly increased traffic in and over the Baltic Sea. Tensions will rise drastically,
with increased risks of miscalculations on both sides. Sweden and Finland are expected to act together with the rest of the EU and
the US. If no direct military threat emerges against Sweden, then Sweden cannot count on any enforcements from the rest of the world apart from mutual information
exchange. The instance that the citizens in the Baltic states perceive a risk of a Russian incursion, the probability is high that a flow of refugees will commence. From Lithuania,
the biggest flow will be to Poland while Latvian will flee to Sweden, mainly Gotland. Refugees from Estonia can be expected to flee towards Finland or Sweden depending on
where in the country they live and where they have relations or connections. In the worst-case scenario, Swedish and Finnish territory will become an arena for hostilities. As
Russian readiness exercises have shown, airborne and marine infantry could rapidly and with surprise occupy parts of Gotland and Åland. A possible option is also to mine the
Danish Straits in connection with this. By supplies of surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles, Russian forces can temporarily extend their air and coastal defence in the Baltic Sea,
protecting an incursion by land into the Baltic states. NATO would be faced with a fait accompli. The invasion does not need to happen in all three states nor include the entire
territory of a country. The only thing that is needed is a demonstration of NATO’s inability to defend alliance members. This would establish a new security order. Depending on
the level of conflict that Russia would be willing to risk, air and navy bases in Sweden and Finland could be struck with missiles from the ground, air and sea. It is, however, likely
that the governments would be issued an ultimatum to remain neutral, with only a few hours to comply. Public announcement of the ultimatum would put immense pressure
on the political system and weaken resistance. Such diplomatic tactics could be reinforced by forced cyber attacks on the electricity and telecommunication networks. During the
coldest months of the year, the vulnerability would be the highest. At the same time, Sweden would be expected to support their Western partners’ need for transports into the
theatre of action. If Russia would close the Danish Straits, any military support to the Baltic states would need to move over Swedish territory; such as air support Norwegian air
bases or aircraft carriers in the Norwegian Sea. There would also be demands to clear of mines in Oresund, and possibly for allowing equipment and troop transports to harbours
on the east coast for further transport across the Baltic Sea. The Swedish to such demands would have consequences for generations to come. If Gotland would not be occupied
by Russian forces, NATO would demand to set up bases on the island. The smallest indication of acquiescing to such demands would have the Russians racing to the island.
Furthermore, Russia would coordinate activities in the far north, with submarines of all kinds and possibly even direct action in northern Finland and even in northern Sweden, in
order to expand Russian air defence. Faced with the risk of direct confrontations between Russian and American forces, Russia could mount land-based as well as amphibian
operations in the north of Norway and on Svalbard, to improve the defence of Murmansk. Following a similar strategy, occupying parts of Bornholm would make it more difficult
for NATO to support their members. This is probably not necessary, but it is a possible option. In most people’s minds, there is a sharp line between the Baltic states’ eastern
borders and Russia, the crossing of which is unconceivable. By first gaining the control over Gotland and Åland, the Russian General Army Staff could circumvent a mental
Maginot line, in the same way as Germany attacked France through Benelux in May 1940. Russian success in this scenario hinges on speed and the ability to contain the conflict.
The first message to Washington will entail the understanding that this is not a direct conflict between the US. For Russia, the uncertainty is therefore how US interests are
perceived from an American perspective. For the US, it is not just the credibility of NATO that is at stake but also the unity of the EU. This has global
connotations since allies (and enemies) in the Middle East and Asia will also form assumptions
regarding the willingness and ability of the US to act in order to protect their alliesThe risk is
obviously that Russia miscalculates and underestimates the difference between, for instance, the departing presidential administration perceptions
of US security interests on the one hand with the wider US security establishment’s perception of these on the other. During the whole process, the threat of

nuclear strikes would hover over all decision makers, which increases the degree of uncertainty.
Nuclear tests in the period before a test of strength cannot be ruled out, especially since Russian emphasis on nuclear deterrence

could lose credibility over time. Direct threats of using the nuclear weapons is, however, completely excluded in this scenario.
2NC Stuff
Putin Popularity Extensions
 O/V
LNG exports from the US limit Russia’s influence and tanks Putin’s popularity – that’s Peek

Giving Russia a gift from the West abandons all hope for reform – that’s Kasparov

That escalates to war – that’s Stahl

 UQ
Putin needs a tangible concession to boost popularity—nothing else is working
Baev 3—22—(senior researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo). Baev,
Pavel. 2021. “Two Words That Shook Putin’s Regime.” Jamestown. March 22, 2021.
https://jamestown.org/program/two-words-that-shook-putins-regime/. // lilw-msdi2021

Putin has also tried to turn the heavily publicized but one-sided quarrel into a booster for popular
mobilization. On short notice, he ordered the staging of a large rally at Moscow’s Luzhniki Stadium, where he could deliver his
rebuttal while celebrating the seventh anniversary of the “reunification” with Crimea (Svoboda.org, March 19). The crowd of
specially selected loyalists who gathered on March 19 duly provided the appropriate background noises, but keen observers argue
that the general population remains, by and large, indifferent to the recent personal offense directed at the country’s
“irreplaceable” leader (Carnegie.ru, March 19). Although opinion polls show that only 12 percent of Russians believe the West
perceives Russia with respect, the share of respondents who think fear of Russia is the main perception has come down to 18
percent (Levada.ru, March 18). Putin’s popularity also continues to erode, caused by the sustained decline of incomes and pensions,
which cannot be attributed to Western hostility. Rather, the problems are increasingly blamed on the government’s reluctance to
use accumulated financial reserves for social support programs (Rosbalt, March 19). This
contrast between high
political rhetoric and low public attention puts Putin in a bind: he must prove that he means
business by his riposte and that can actually counter US pressure. Biden is overwhelmingly unlikely to
grant him the privilege of another conversation; whereas, the likely prospect of new sanctions is becoming ever harder to dismiss
(VTimes, March 20). Every tightening of the sanctions regime adds to the gloom of economic stagnation and to irritation among
business elites, who can neither expect returns on their investments in Russia nor move their liquid assets abroad (RBC, March 19).
The Moscow stock exchange registered only a modest drop last week, but the threat of sanctions against Russian state debt looms
large (Riddle, March 17). The European Union bureaucracy and key European leaders may be more circumspect in the fruitless
dialogue with Putin, yet new sanctions are in the cards from this direction as well (Izvestia, March 19). Few
useful
opportunities exist to counter the denigration coming out of Washington by maneuvering in the
international arena, but the Kremlin is set to explore each to the maximum (New Times, March 18).
Thus, Russian experts anxiously monitored the remarkably tense March 18–19 US-China talks in Alaska. However, they failed
to identify any opening that might allow Russia to beneficially inject itself into this competitive
interaction between the real world powers (Kommersant, March 19). The partnership with Turkey offers more promise,
particularly as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan praised Putin’s response to Biden’s “unacceptable” remarks (Rossiyskaya Gazeta,
March 19). Every complication in Turkey’s relations with the West, caused for instance by Ankara’s withdrawal from the Council of
Europe convention on preventing violence against women, is used by Moscow to add new substance to the high-level dialogue,
which now includes a possible sale of advanced Su-57 fighters (Izvestia, March 17). The problem is that Turkey remains a
difficult counterpart for Russia in Syria and keeps consolidating its military positions in the rebel-controlled Idlib province
(Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 16). Another target for asserting Russia’s ability to push back against US pressure could be Ukraine,
and politicians there have few doubts that Putin is, indeed, a killer (RBC, March 20).
 Link
This wave of discontent is recent—Putin needs a new win to re-energize his
image
Dixon 20—(Moscow bureau chief and foreign correspondent). Dixon, Robyn. 2020. “Russia’s
Khabarovsk Region Is 3,800 Miles from Moscow. But Protests Are Jolting the Kremlin. - The
Washington Post.” The Washington Post. August 5, 2020.
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:-hnPVp8e16MJ:https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-protests-far-east-putin-khabarovsk/
2020/08/04/84567d0a-d261-11ea-826b-
cc394d824e35_story.html+&cd=8&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us. // lilw-msdi2021

The Russian government official sounded concerned in comments to Sergei Furgal, the governor of
a province in Russia’s Far East: “Your rating is going up, and the president’s is falling.” The official was
President Vladimir Putin’s envoy to the Far East, Yuri Trutnev, according to an independent online news outlet, DVHAB, the first to publish the secret recording of Furgal’s
dressing-down in November in Khabarovsk province, bordering China in Russia’s southeast corner. Being more popular than Putin is not a recipe for political longevity. Furgal
was arrested last month, flown to Moscow and charged in connection with four killings in 2004 and 2005 — allegations that Putin’s opponents decry as a sham. Furgal denies the

Since early July, thousands of protesters in Khabarovsk have joined daily, leaderless marches supporting
charges.

the now-fired Furgal and calling for Putin to go — the sharpest regional challenge to Putin’s
20-year rule as president and prime minister. Khabarovsk has been a thorn in Putin’s side before. It was the only region where his
United Russia party lost its dominance in regional elections in September, winning just two seats in the local legislature. Then, in a nationwide vote last month on constitutional
amendments that paved the way for Putin to govern until 2036, Khabarovsk had one of the lowest turnouts in the nation, just 44 percent compared with the national average of

The Khabarovsk protests have sparked recent small rallies in support of Khabarovsk in some other cities,
68 percent.

including Moscow and St. Petersburg, easily dispersed by riot police. But they send an alarming message to the
Kremlin at a challenging time for Putin. The economy is battered by falling oil prices and the coronavirus pandemic, and
there is no clear path for authorities to re-energize Putin’s image.

Ukraine proves—wins against the West boost public support and distract from
econ problems.
Lloyd 18—(co-founded the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at the University of
Oxford, where he is senior research fellow, has written several books, including “What the
Media Are Doing to Our Politics” and “Journalism in an Age of Terror,” is also a contributing
editor at the Financial Times and the founder of FT Magazine). John Lloyd. March 19, 2018.
“Commentary: Why Putin is still – genuinely – popular in Russia.” Reuters.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lloyd-putin-commentary/commentary-why-putin-is-still-
genuinely-popular-in-russia-idUSKBN1GV25D. // lilw-msdi2021

Vladimir Putin won big on Sunday. According to the central election commission, the Russian president glides
into his fourth term after winning his biggest ever election victory, with nearly 77 percent favoring
him. His nearest rival was an affluent multi-millionaire communist who got more than 11 percent by presenting himself as a Putin-
plus, with a program of nationalizing the oligarchs’ property instead of merely controlling it. Ksenia Sobchak, the nearest candidate
to a liberal, had less than 2 percent support. Alexei Navalny, the boldest agitator against corruption, banned from standing, advised
Russians not to vote. But they did. Reports of ballot stuffing, harassment of observers and people coerced to go to the polls by their
employers abound. We can be sure they will not render the result void. This was a coronation. Putin’s popularity is a
mystery to many in the West. He has invaded Ukraine, grabbed its Crimean region for Russia and
sponsored a rebellion against the government in Kiev – while lying about the presence of Russian troops
fighting with the rebels even as their corpses were returned to Russia. He has committed Russian forces to assist Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad in suppressing his rebels with the utmost brutality. The economy turned sharply down in 2014, as
the oil price fell and as economic sanctions were imposed. The charge made by the British Prime Minister,
Theresa May, that Russia is likely to have sanctioned the use of a nerve agent against the Russian double agent, Sergei Skripal, and
his daughter Yulia in Salisbury earlier this month has been dismissed with sarcastic contempt, with no effort made to assist the
British authorities. Putin, in his victory speech said that the UK’s allegations added to his majority. He seems, at present,
invulnerable. At a gathering of mainly young Russian liberals which I attended last weekend, Lev Gudkov, the veteran pollster and
head of the
independent Levada Centre, showed the graphs which underpin the success: a loss of
popularity for Putin after his 2012 election and then, with the taking of Crimea and the Russian-
sponsored hostilities in Ukraine, a huge spike upwards to some 80 percent of support, a
doubling of the figures. In spite of declining incomes, rising prices and the viral videos showing
the luxury in which senior officials live, Putin has stayed at or near these heights, unthinkable
for a democratic politician. There has been, and remains, no alternative to Russia’s strongman. The common
wisdom about elections, since Bill Clinton’s adviser, James Carville, fashioned his famous “it’s the economy
stupid!” soundbite, is that voters punish politicians in power during hard times. But Russians aren’t
like democratic citizens. They prize – inevitably given their history – stability, and thus strength
at the top. Shorn of the Russian-dominated Soviet Union, they rejoice in the return of part of it. Gudkov observed to his
audience that many of the reflexes of the Communist period remained active in Russia a quarter of a century after the Soviet Union’s
demise. The noted political commentator Andrei Kolesnikov added that Stalin has, for some years, stood as a symbol of order:
people were not interested in large-scale protests, let alone revolution. Stability is all. This
appears to speak for a fourth
presidential term in which tough leadership, patriotic propaganda, the marginalization of liberal causes such as minority
rights and continuing defiance of a West pictured as both effete and threatening will continue to
be the major tropes. Yet Putin, not being stupid, must fear that the economy, mixed with youthful rejection of the rule of
aging and massively enriched top officials, may have its way in the end. In a briefing in London last week, Sergei Guriev, chief
economist at the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, gave a somber assessment of the economic state of Russia in
Putin’s coming term. Guriev left Russia in 2013, fearful for his freedom, as a new repression gripped the country. A world-class
economist, he is a symbol of the drain of Russia’s best brains – losses which, he told his audience, continue. The recession, now
ending, has cost the country some three percent of its GDP, most of which – up to 2.5 percent – is due to the fall in the oil price,
which descended to below $40 a barrel last summer, but has since climbed to $70. Russia’s economy grew by 1.5 percent in 2017 – a
rate Guriev expects to continue for the next 3-5 years. Growth of 1.5 percent is anemic for a country that should – like other middle-
income states – be growing much faster. Investment, domestic and foreign, is low; the energetic wooing of Chinese President Xi
Jinping has yielded results falling below Putin’s hopes. The Chinese, greatly expanding their interests throughout the world, are ultra
cautious in Russia. Last week, a planned $9 billion stake by a little-known Chinese energy company in the Russian oil giant Rosneft
was delayed, amid statements from the Chinese rating agencies of “uncertainties” around the purchase. The burden of the
recession, Guriev says, was borne by households that saw incomes shrink by 10 percent - a large drop for middle-income families
and a huge loss for the poor as commodities become more expensive. These middle - and low-income Russians, the majority, may
realize – it isn’t much featured in Russia’s news media - that the very rich are richer than they were before the recession. A recent
analysis shows Russian inequality rising faster than even in China, resulting in what Guriev said were huge increases in wealth for
0.001 percent of the population – a few tens of thousands of super-rich people. Russians are, by any standards, highly educated and
often ambitious. But the pattern of the Putin years has been one of low investment, and little development of modern industries
that would attract the clever and upwardly mobile young – and thus a corresponding growth of a brain drain which has benefitted
the West. With a low-growth economy, Russia’s claim to be a superpower pales before the continuing dominance of the United
States and the fast-rising economic and strategic power of China. Guriev’s analysis, devoid of political spin, points to Putin’s
new
term as being one of economic stagnation, which in turn will prompt continued aggression towards
the West, with needed reforms once more ignored. A surly beast from the east, and thus a dangerous one.
Putin’s triumph will not make him more inclined to cooperate with a West that will be, perhaps for
all of his last term, more useful as an enemy than a friend.
 Turns Case---Russia Impact
Link alone turns case—popularity emboldens Putin aggression.
Beliakova 19—(Ph.D. Candidate at the Fletcher School and Senior Ph.D. Research Fellow at
the Center for Strategic Studies at Tufts University, MA in Government from IDC Herzliya, BA in
Sociology from the International Solomon University). Polina Beliakova. “How Does The Kremlin
Kick When It’s Down?”. War on the Rocks. 8/23/2019.
https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/how-does-the-kremlin-kick-when-its-down/. // lilw-
msdi2021

Putin’s trust ratings are at historic lows. So are levels of popular satisfaction with
Russian President Vladimir

Russian government authorities and economic policy. This discontent recently spilled into the
streets with mass demonstrations against the Moscow’s authorities decision not to register the independent candidates for the City Duma elections.
The images of riot police beating the protesting Muscovites went viral. Popular Russian celebrities with millions of followers on social media called upon their subscribers to join
the protests. Dissatisfaction with the regime is not limited to the capital: In Russia’s European North, the citizens of Arkhangelsk oblast are fighting against the construction of a
massive landfill. Earlier this summer, in the Ural city of Yekaterinburg, people protested the local governor’s plan for building yet another church in place of a park. The Kremlin is

How will this domestic turmoil affect Russia’s

losing the public’s tolerance to the severe mismanagement of the state.

international behavior? Some commentators of Russian politics suggest that Putin uses international adventures
to compensate for his decreasing popularity at home. For example, former Georgian president and long-time Putin opponent Mikheil
Saakashvili recently pointed out that when Putin’s public support decreases, he escalates ongoing international conflicts or launches new ones to galvanize support at home. This

assumption is consistent witha diversionary war argument: To draw public attention away from problems at home, leaders start a war that boosts
popular support for the government. Interestingly, Putin’s track record suggests that the opposite is true: Russia

does not go to war when domestic support is at its lowest. Does this suggest that Putin will practice
restraint in foreign policy as he deals with discontent at home? That conclusion would be premature. Low public approval does not limit
the Kremlin’s ability to advance its foreign policy objectives using nonviolent means. Thus, Russia observers can likely expect covert and cyber operations as well as bold

First, relatively high levels of approval

diplomatic moves that will divert the public’s attention at cost lower than the use of force. Why is that?

for domestic and economic policy (See Figure 1) preceded previous major episodes of Russia’s
international offensives — Georgia in August 2008, the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, and the intervention in
Syria in September 2015. Moreover, despite an overwhelming increase in public support after the annexation of Crimea, a decrease in domestic
approval for the government’s performance followed Putin’s two other audacious moves. Thus, Russia’s aggressive
foreign policy does not correlate with public support for the government in a way consistent with the
diversionary war argument. Second, given the decreased level of approval for government authorities and economic policy,
expensive foreign endeavors may only exacerbate popular dissatisfaction, and there are signs
that Putin does pay attention to fluctuations in the public’s mood. For instance, Putin’s four-hour call-in show on June
20 focused mostly on the questions of inadequate salaries and poor infrastructure. He also underscored that the state’s greatness has to be reflected not in arms spending but in
the growing economy — the next strategic priority for Russia. Similarly, in a February 2019 speech he did not advertise Russia’s plans for the next great victories in the
international arena like in previous years, but emphasized the importance of welfare, education, and economic health. By contrast, in 2018, Putin started a similar address by
mentioning the conquering of new lands and space, and stressing the fatalistic importance of today’s choices for the future in which not all countries will be able to remain
sovereign. This should come as no surprise. In May 2019, Levada Center polls indicated that Russians’ willingness to bear the financial burden associated with the annexation of

Given the unprecedented low levels of approval for economic policy, it is

Crimea had significantly decreased over the past five years.

unlikely that another daring and expensive international bid will ignite enthusiasm at home and
produce the outcomes expected from diversionary use of force. With a diversionary war off the table, should we expect
Russia to keep a low international profile due to domestic troubles? Well, yes and no.
O/V
 O/V---Impact
US fracking has decreased US reliance on foreign oil imports –that’s Koning Beals

Banning fracking will force the US to increase their reliance on gas imports from Russia which
decreases our energy secruirt and increases Russia’s oil revenue –that’s Hofmiester and Sullivan

Russia’s new oil revenue allows them to expand their influence as a great power and inevitably
leads to war with the US –that’s Payne and Foster
 O/V---Russia Wants Fracking Ban
Russia engages in propaganda campaigns to ban fracking to protect their power
Dan Eberhart, 12-2-2019, "Impeachment Testimony Describes Putin’s Propaganda War On
American Fracking," Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/daneberhart/2019/12/02/kremlin-
meddling-shows-value-of-natural-gas-supplies-fracking/?sh=27416834462a // lilw-msdi2021
Among the many subplots to emerge from recent impeachment hearings, one, in particular, might have been unexpected: fracking.
In recent testimony to House lawmakers, Fiona Hill, John Bolton’s former direct report at the National Security Council and the
White House’s former top expert on Russia, reported that Russian propaganda was working to undermine the
use of hydraulic fracturing, aka fracking, in the United States. Such news was easy to overlook amidst a steady stream of
bombshells from the hearings, but lawmakers should take note. After all, fracking has been - and continues to be - an
essential part of America’s energy renaissance and an indispensable tool in ensuring energy
security. Why is Russia so interested in American natural gas production? In her testimony, Hill explained that Putin “saw
American fracking as a great threat to Russian interests” and that a fracking ban would “play into
strengthening Putin’s hands.” That’s because natural gas supplies are central to European economic markets. Not only do
more abundant gas supplies make the U.S. stronger, but they make us more capable of
supplanting Russia as a key supplier of European gas. Russia desires neither of those
outcomes, mainly since it has used its largest gas company, Gazprom, as a weapon of political
influence in Europe for years to significant effect. The evidence of Russian meddling in the fracking debate is
clear. For example, a 2017 report by the Director of National Intelligence, drafted in coordination with the CIA, FBI, and NSA–ODNI,
found that “as the threat of American energy continues to grow, so does the Kremlin’s incentive to influence energy operations in
Europe and the United States.” The report also noted that RT, the
“Kremlin’s principal international propaganda
outlet,” is engaged in an anti-fracking campaign in the U.S. as a way to combat American gas
production and the threat it poses to Russia’s projection of power in Europe through Gazprom.
 Turns Case---Russia Worse for Climate
Climate change gets worse if Russia increases production – turns case
Christopher M. Matthews (Christopher M. Matthews covers the oil and gas industry in Houston
for The Wall Street Journal.), 11-19-2019, "What Would Happen if the U.S. Banned Fracking?,"
WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-would-happen-if-the-u-s-banned-fracking-
11574208146 // lilw-msdi2021

The question is whether

a fracking ban is an effective policy choice for which the benefits will outweigh the costs. I am
extremely doubtful of that. It would impose large and sudden costs on the global economy that could perversely slow down
the very investments we need in clean energy. It would hurt U.S. consumers overall and especially households in states where the
industry is large. And what would we get in return? The
oil market would eventually rebalance. Large
producers like Saudi Arabia and Russia would step in to replace lost U.S. supplies. The net impact on
global carbon emissions would be negligible. They might even rise in the short term, because
production in those countries is much dirtier than in the U.S. Global prices would be somewhat higher—
suggesting there might be a good price signal to consumers to invest in more-efficient vehicles—but would also be quite a bit more
volatile, which could undermine that benefit. Over the short to medium term, higher global natural-gas prices could lead to a brief
rebound for coal, especially in Asia. This is bad news if you live in India or China, where air pollution is already taking years off your
life, and where cheap natural gas could produce major benefits for air quality. However, higher long-term gas prices are likely a good
thing for renewables and nuclear.

Fracking ban increases global reliance on Russia – that increases oil pollution –
turns case
Nicolas Loris, 2-21-2020, "A Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing? No Fracking Way," Heritage
Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/energy- economics/commentary/ban-hydraulic-
fracturing-no-fracking-way // lilw-msdi2021

Moreover, we've also helped our international friends by providing more energy choice .
Fracking has allowed the U.S.
to become the world's third largest liquefied natural gas exporter . By 2025, perhaps sooner, the
U.S. will likely be the world's largest exporter. Domestic energy producers are helping our
European allies by loosening Russia's grip of the natural gas market , which reduces their ability to
manipulate energy supplies for political purposes. Through energy exports, the U.S. will continue to bolster
economic and national security relationships worldwide. A fracking ban would also have adverse
effects on the environment. Policies that needlessly restrict energy supplies in the U.S. won't
stop consumers from using oil or natural gas, whether in the U.S. or elsewhere. Instead,
production will merely shift to places where the environmental standards aren't as rigorous .
Any decision to significantly curtail America's energy output will be a gift to Russia , Saudi Arabia
and the rest of OPEC.
 Turns Case and No Impact---Climate
EPA concludes no fracking impact with status quo regulations but the aff’s
reclassification of treatment plants puts toxins in the water
**also probably a states CP advocate 

Anderson 21 (Jessica Anderson, executive director of Heritage Action for America, 6-10-2021,
"The left's 'America Last' energy policy," TheHill,
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/557700-the-lefts-america-last-
energy-policy, accessed 6-16-2021)

Now, Biden boosters in Congress are joining the America Last agenda: they’ve cooked up a
scheme that would effectively shut down shale drilling operations within the United States
through legislation called the CLEAN Future Act.

This federal power grab would seize the authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing from the
states and place it in the hands of Biden’s activist Environmental Protection Agency. Not only is
that a federal power grab, but it’s redundant. Each of the oil- and gas-producing states has
comprehensive regulations in place to ensure safe operations and to safeguard drinking water
sources that have proven effective.

The legislation would also classify produced water and hydraulic fluids used in horizontal shale
drilling as “hazardous” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, an underhanded
tactic intended to kill the shale drilling industry. In truth, both the EPA and numerous peer-
reviewed studies have concluded that hydraulic fracturing does not pose a major threat to
ground water. Even the Obama administration’s EPA, in its comprehensive report on the
potential impacts of hydraulic fracturing on water resources, found further regulation at the
federal level was unnecessary.

In a twist, The CLEAN Future Act has the potential to create an environmental nightmare. More
than 180,000 non-hazardous waste wells are meeting disposal needs under the current, well-
established program. But just 800 wells are approved to handle legitimately hazardous waste.
The disparity caused by reclassification would inevitably lead to producers keeping more of this
waste at the surface, rather than securely and permanently disposing of it under the system
currently in place.

Finally, if the administration wants to reduce emissions, they’re going backwards by targeting
hydraulic fracturing. Carbon dioxide emissions in the United States fell by 2.6 percent in 2019,
and 96 percent of that reduction is thanks to low-cost natural gas. Hydraulic fracturing and
natural gas are also responsible for reducing American electric power emissions by 33 percent
since 2007. No “green” energy politician has ever achieved that.

The Biden administration and congressional Democrats are working together to dismantle the
U.S. oil and gas sector, making it harder to run current energy operations and banning new
drilling and pipelines. Meanwhile they are paving the way for Vladimir Putin to expand the
Russian oil and gas sector, undermining our national security and driving up energy costs to
every American consumer. These policies just don’t add up — the left is putting America
Last.
 Turns Case---Russia Impact
Biden gains leverage over Russia by high US oil production --- turns any Russia
scenario
Liz Peek,, 4-21-2021, "Here's how Biden can gain the upper hand against Putin," TheHill,
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/549336-heres-how-biden-can-gain-upper-hand-
against-putin // lilw-msdi2021

If Biden actually wants to get tough with Putin – if he is serious about punishing the Kremlin – he should do
everything possible to ramp up U.S. oil production and to encourage more liquefied natural gas
(LNG) exports. Such measures would cripple hurt Russia’s financial clout and bolster America’s influence.
But – my guess – Biden is too weak to confront the climate zealots who dominate the Democratic Party. Oil and natural gas
production account for nearly 40 percent of Russia’s total output. In recent years the country’s economy has
been slammed by declining oil prices, driven lower largely by an unexpected rise in U.S.
production, thanks to fracking and more recently the encouragement of the Trump White House. Russia’s economy
contracted in six of the years between 2010 and 2019, and never grew by more than 2.2 percent. During those years, U.S.
oil production soared from 5.5 million barrels per day to 12.2 mb/d. The average world crude
price plummeted from $110 per barrel as of December 2010 to $63 in December 2019. Last
year Russia’s economy shrank by roughly 4 percent as COVID-19 led to reduced global
economic activity and plunging oil demand. In April, oil prices temporarily collapsed to a two-
decade low of $19.46. Spurring the decline was Russia’s decision not to join other big OPEC + producers in cutting output to
bolster prices. It could not afford to do so, but its choice was a drastic mistake. Thanks to COVID and to sinking oil prices, Russia’s
PMI dropped last year to the lowest level recorded since 1997, when the series was first compiled. The downturn led to towering
unemployment; meanwhile, the fiscally strapped government was forced to delay large-scale spending meant to boost Putin’s
approval ratings. Some 40 percent of Russia’s state budget comes from its oil and gas revenues. In late May, the Wall Street Journal
reported, “Russia’s fiscal relief program totals around 2.8% of GDP whereas the U.S. measures make up around 11%, according to
the International Monetary Fund.” As a result of the hardship, Putin’s approval rating slipped, from a high of 89 percent in 2015
(keep in mind, this is Russia) to 69 percent in February of this year. While most western leaders would celebrate such high polls, for
Putin, who regularly receives admiring reviews from 80 percent or more of Russia’s population, the slide is worrisome. Put simply,
oil prices are important to Russia, and important to Putin. Biden could keep pressure on global oil
prices by backing increased U.S. output. He could also limit Russia’s influence and revenues by
fast-tracking our LNG exports. Instead, he and his Democratic colleagues are eager to drive down U.S. fossil fuel
production, sacrificing a critical geopolitical advantage on the altar of climate change.
UQ
 UQ---Russia Oil Output Low Now
Russia oil production low now
Vladimir Soldatkin, reporter, 1-2-2021, "Russian annual oil output falls for the first time since
2008 on OPEC+ deal, pandemic," U.S.,
https://www.reuters.com/article/oil-russia-output/russian-annual-oil-output-falls-for-the-first-
time-since-2008-on-opec-deal-pandemic-idUSKBN29704E // lilw-msdi2021

MOSCOW (Reuters) - Oil production in Russia declined last year for the first time since 2008 and reached
its lowest level since 2011 following a global deal to cut output and sluggish demand caused by the
coronavirus, statistics showed on Saturday. Russian oil and gas condensate output declined to 10.27
million barrels per day (bpd) last year, according to energy ministry data cited by the Interfax
news agency. In tonnes, oil and gas condensate output dropped to 512.68 million in 2020 from
a post-Soviet record-high of 560.2 million, or 11.25 million bpd, in 2019. The sharp decline was
almost in line with expectations. The 512.68 million tonnes reading for 2020 was the lowest
since 511.43 million tonnes in 2011, and the first annualised decline since 2008 amid the
global financial crisis and falling oil prices. Russia agreed to reduce its oil production in April last year by more than
2 million barrels per day, an unprecedented voluntary cut, along with other leading oil producers and the Organization of the
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The move was designed to bolster the oil market beset by the fallout from the COVID-19
pandemic. Since
the April agreement, a record for global supply reductions, the group known as OPEC+ has
progressively reduced the cuts and is expected to release an extra 500,000 bpd into the market in January. OPEC+ is due
to hold its next summit on Monday, Jan. 4. Russia has been expected to increase its oil output by 125,000 bpd from the New Year.
Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, in charge of Moscow’s ties with OPEC+, has said Russia would support a gradual
increase of the group’s output by another 500,000 bpd starting in February. Darya Kozlova, an analyst at VYGON Consulting, a
Moscow think tank that advises the government, said the market is in better shape now than it was in March or April, when oil
demand declined sharply at the height of the first wave of the pandemic. “There is a deficit of around 3 million barrels per day on
the market because of the actions by OPEC+,” she said. “Vaccination (against COVID-19) has started in many countries. So we will
probably see a tactical increase by another 500,000 bpd (agreed) in January. Further actions will depend on the market situation.

Russia cut estimated oil production for next 2 years

Tsvetana Paraskova, 04-06-2021, "Russia Slashes 2021-2022 Oil Production Forecasts," OilPrice,
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Russia-Slashes-2021-2022-Oil-Production-
Forecasts.html // lilw-msdi2021

Russia is slashing its estimates for domestic crude oil, gas , and coal production for 2021 and 2022,
according to the latest amendments in the government’s program for energy development. As per the latest forecasts from the Russian government,
oil production this year is set to stand at 517 million tons, down from a previous estimate of
560 million tons. The projection for Russia’s oil output in 2022 was also reduced, to 548
million tons, down from earlier estimates of production of 558 million tons, TASS news agency reports.
The estimates for the oil production for 2023 and 2024 remain unchanged, according to the document approved by the government. Natural gas
production is also estimated lower than previous projections, as is coal output. Yet, the Russian government kept its projection for liquefied natural gas
(LNG) production the same as in earlier forecasts, expecting LNG production at 30.1 million tons in 2021. Last month, Russia’s government approved a
long-term development program for LNG, expecting production capacity to rise threefold from current levels to 140 million tons per year by 2035.
Russia is also targeting increased LNG exports, considering the expectations of sustained growth in LNG demand and trade globally, Russia’s Prime
Minister Mikhail Mishustin said in March. Still, the reduced forecasts for oil production for this year and next likely reflect, in part, the ongoing OPEC+
agreement. Russia has fought for and won concessions from OPEC+ for small increases in its oil production every month since the start of the year. For
April, Russia was allowed to boost its production by 130,000 bpd, while the other members of the OPEC+ alliance have been asked to keep their
production flat. Even after the planned easing of the cuts as of May, Russia continues to be part of the OPEC+ pact, which, as it stands now, is set to still
have combined cuts of around 5 million bpd in place in July, when it will have eased 1 million bpd of cuts over the next three months.
 UQ---US Oil Production High Now
Fracking makes US oil production high
Isaac Orr,( Isaac Orr is a Policy Fellow at Center of the American Experiment, where he writes about energy and environmental
issues, including mining and electricity policy. Prior to joining Center of the America Experiment, Isaac served as a research fellow at
The Heartland Institute, where he specialized in energy and environmental policy. Before becoming a research fellow at The
Heartland Institute, he served as an aide in the Wisconsin State Senate. Isaac has written extensively on hydraulic fracturing, frac
sand mining and electricity policy, among other energy and environmental issues. His writings have appeared in The Wall Street
Journal, USA Today, the New York Post, The Hill, Orange County Register, The Washington Times, and many other publications. He
graduated from the University of Wisconsin Eau Claire with studies in political science and geology, winning awards for his
3-17-2020, "What Would a Joe Biden Fracking Ban Look Like? A Series,"
undergraduate geology research)
Center of the American Experiment, https://www.americanexperiment.org/what-would-a-joe-
biden-fracking-ban-look-like-a-series/ // lilw-msdi2021

**edited for language

It wasn’t long ago that Americans were convinced that our country was running out of oil and
natural gas, and that the ensuing shortages of these important fuels would lead to chaos. However, the Peak Oil crowd was proved
wrong, as the
innovative combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing, which are often collectively called
“fracking,” turned this idea on its head. Instead of the United States running out of oil and natural gas, we’ve never
produced more of these commodities than we are today. We’re also producing more oil than Saudi Arabia, and more natural gas
than Russia, as you can see in the graph from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), below. This is important, because it
means weare not as beholden to these countries for our energy needs, and it strengthens
America’s geopolitical power around the globe. Oil production in 2008 was just 5 million barrels per day, the
lowest it had been since 1947. It’s not surprising that Peak Oil is what all the “smart people” were talking about during this time.
However, as politicians like President George W. Bush were decrying America’s “addiction to oil,” wildcatters in North Dakota and
Texas were working to unlock millions of barrels of oil that had been previously inaccessible. By 2010, production began to increase
in these states, by 2015, fracking had doubled America’s oil production, with Texas, North Dakota, and New Mexico seeing the
largest increases in crude oil production. As
of 2018, fracking was responsible for 60 percent of all U.S. oil
production. The surge in production has caused U.S. oil imports to fall substantially, and there is
more good news. Not only have overall imports fallen, but imports from countries like Saudi Arabia and Venezuela have fallen the
most, while imports from Canada, our friendly neighbors to the north, have increased. This
means North America is less
dependent on other sources of oil today than we have been in a long time . On a side note, we would
see the amount of imports from Canada increase even more if former President Obama hadn’t delayed the construction of the
Keystone XL pipeline, and if Governor Walz had not delayed the replacement of the Line 3 oil pipeline. Because much of the crude oil
coming from Canada is heavier crude, it is more likely to displace Venezuelan and Saudi Arabian imports. According to EIA data, the
United States imported about about 500,000 barrels of oil per day from Saudi Arabia in 2019. The current Line 3 is pumping 390,000
barrels per day, and it will pump 760,000 barrels per day after the new and improved pipeline is installed. This means that the
additional capacity of Line 3 will be the equivalent of 74 percent of all the oil we import from Saudi Arabia, and in total, Line 3 will be
able to import 52 percent more oil than we currently buy from the entire country of Saudi Arabia. This is just one more reason why
Governor Walz should stop playing political games and get Line 3 built. Expanded American oil production has had
a profound impact on oil markets throughout the world, and America’s new found supply of natural gas has
been equally transformative. I’ve already discussed the enormous uptick in natural gas production as a result of fracking, but it bears
repeating: fracking is now responsible for 70 percent of all American natural gas production. This has provided Minnesota families
with enormous savings on home heating, and completely reversed the supply forecasts for natural gas production in the United
States. In fact, in 2003, Allan Greenspan, who was then the head of the Federal Reserve, said the United States must build facilities
to import natural gas from other countries to avoid volatile prices that hurt American companies. Today, many of the companies
that were building import facilities for natural gas have retrofitted them to be export facilities because the United States has become
completely independent for our natural gas needs. In fact, the International Energy Association predicts the United States will
become the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the world in the new few years. This
development seriously
hinders hurts
the power of Russia, which has traditionally used its vast natural gas supplies as
leverage to get its way in Europe, because now countries have the option of buying American gas
instead of importing it from Vladimir Putin. In this way, American energy production is a critical
check on the power of Russia and OPEC to restrict supply and increase prices. American energy has benefited the entire
world by lowering energy prices and diversifying the world’s energy supply. Hydraulic fracturing, not wind or solar, is the true energy
revolution of the early 21st century. It has enriched the lives of people around the globe by making it less difficult to afford to travel
to work and heat their homes. Additionally, fracking has put billions of dollars into the coffers of state governments, whereas wind
and solar are totally dependent upon government mandates and subsidies. Banning fracking would be an enormous step backward,
resulting in skyrocketing energy costs and abandoning America’s leadership role in the world’s energy markets.
Links
 Link---National Security
Energy dependence on Russia harms national security
Jonathan Garber, reporter, 1-28-2021, "Biden's energy moves strengthen Russia, US rivals,
undermine national security," Fox Business, https://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/biden-
energy-executive-orders-russia-national-security // lilw-msdi2021

President Biden’s executive orders that put the U.S. on a course to transition away from fossil fuels are a boon for
U.S. competitors Russia, Saudi Arabia and other adversaries and pose a threat to national security.
Biden on Wednesday signed an executive order that temporarily bans the issuance of new permits and leases for drilling and
fracking on federal lands. He also ordered federal agencies to eliminate fossil fuel subsidies. The actions followed other executive
orders that called on the U.S. to rejoin the 2016 Paris climate agreement and to temporarily halt drilling in the Arctic, among other
things. “Anything that blunts U.S. production growth and potentially blunts the ability of the U.S.
to pursue a coercive sanctions regime tied to American energy dominance” would benefit
Russia, said Helima Croft, managing director and global head of commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets. She noted the orders,
while telegraphed by Biden on the campaign trail, may have taken people by surprise due to the speed at which they were
implemented. Biden has promised to "transition" the U.S. away from oil. Deregulation
implemented by the Trump
administration helped the U.S. in 2017 become a net exporter of natural gas for the first time since the 1950s.
In 2019, the U.S. became a net exporter of energy. Being energy independent allowed the Trump
administration to levy sanctions against the Russian oil company Rosneft for its support of the Maduro regime in
Venezuela. Additionally, Russia’s stronghold on liquefied natural gas exports to the European market
was threatened as a strong U.S. presence gave those countries purchase optionality. Other
potential winners from Biden’s executive actions include the Gulf state producers like Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and
Kuwait, which produce the cheapest and cleanest oil. Just this month, the U.S. for the first time in 35 years did not import a single
barrel of crude oil from Saudi Arabia. Those countries could over a number of years again become the “dominant players” as market
dynamics take hold, Kroft said. Saudi Arabia and Russia in March battled over prices as both countries tried to assert their influence
on the market. As the price war raged on and the COVID-19 pandemic spread across the globe, West Texas Intermediate crude oil
prices briefly plunged below zero for the first time on record. Ultimately, the price war ended in April with a historic production-cut
agreement between OPEC and its allies, including Russia. Production has not yet been restored to pre-agreement levels as the world
economy remains subdued in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. While the executive order banning new permits and leases on
federal bans is temporary, it has "frozen regulatory decisions" of the Bureau of Land Management, Ryan Flynn, president of the New
Mexico Oil & Gas Association, said on a call with reporters. He fears the executive order could impact decision making in the
"months and years ahead." American Petroleum Institute President and CEO Mike Sommers said the order equates to an “ import
more oil policy” and undermines national security. He added the U.S. can either produce more energy or rely on
foreign countries that have lower environmental standards and are “hostile to America.” Fracking, horizontal drilling, the shale
play, new discoveries, and technology improvements have make America "energy secure," and give the
country “national security,” Texas Railroad Commissioner Wayne Christian, a Republican, told FOX Business. He pointed
to author Daniel Yergin’s “The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power,” which discusses how the vast majority of world
wars since 1850 were largely due to access to energy. “What we're giving up with the Keystone pipeline and with stopping this
fracking on federal properties and decreasing our output is we are putting our boys and girls, our veterans, our men and women
more in line to lose their lives because we are becoming less nationally secure,” he said.
 Link---Global Reliance
Fracking ban increases global reliance on Russia
Department of Energy, January 2021, “Economic and National Security Impacts Under a
Hydraulic Fracturing Ban” United States Department of Energy,
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2021/01/f82/economic-and-national-security-impacts-
under-a-hydraulic-fracturing-ban.pdf // lilw-msdi2021

The U.S. shale revolution has been the single most significant contributor to enhancing U.S. energy security. As
a result of U.S.
oil and natural gas production strength and resilience, the U.S. is far less impacted by global oil
price shocks, consumers and manufacturers enjoy the benefits of reliable, affordable power,
and energy is an important foreign policy tool. Instituting a ban on hydraulic fracturing would
introduce several national security uncertainties. Fundamentally, energy security can be defined in a national
security context using a three-tiered approach to national security itself. That is, national security as the functionality of military
capabilities and security services at the primary level; as the functioning of critical domestic energy supplies and services at the
secondary level; and as economic well-being and prosperity at the most removed, longest-term level. 66 A ban of HF would affect all
three levels of this national security paradigm. While the ban itself would not directly induce a lessening of the national
security posture, it would introduce more uncertainties, requiring additional scenario planning as the U.S. and
our allies’ reliance on foreign oil and natural gas would increase. On the most basic level, national security assets are
still largely dependent on liquid hydrocarbon fuel sources to power the engines of U.S. military vehicles and technologies. Aircraft
require the lion’s-share of these resources, meaning that the bulk of the U.S. military’s forward-projection capabilities are reliant
upon affordable and abundant fuel sources. Likewise, ground and sea-based military capabilities (except for nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers and submarines) are also dependent on ready access to these fuels. From a training and readiness perspective to
power-posture and actual combat operations, maintaining a steady and secure supply of fuels is necessary forthe modern military
and security apparatus. Activities, such as a ban, that would reduce the secure and reliable domestic source of these fuels would
insert uncertainty into the energy supply chain. Beyond the primary level, the safety and reliability of the broader energy supply
infrastructure and resources also plays a key role in overall national security. Severe
supply disruptions to the overall
economy, whether from natural disasters, confrontational tradecraft,or even open hostilities, could result in
domestic unrest. There are several potential chokepoints in international trade routes, largely shipping lanes
that could be used to cut off fuel supplies to the U.S. economy in the short-to-mid-term.
Additionally, and less dramatically, a trade embargo, like the 1970’s OPEC oil embargo, could
have a similar effect. While these outcomes would not directly result from a HF ban, increases in reliance on
foreign sources of fuel would expose and exacerbate vulnerabilities. Finally, a thriving and growing
economy provides the most significant and most enduring bulwark against national security threats. As was stated in the United
States Senate’s Global Economic Security Strategy of 2019, “the national security of the United States depends in large part on a
vibrant, growing, and secure United States economy;”67 As has been described in detail throughout the report, a potential HF ban is
projected to have an impeding effect on overall economic growth, and to ultimately reduce the number of jobs, wages and tax
revenues collected. These effects would compound over time, eventually weakening the economy and national security. Enacting a
nationwide ban on the technology that has unlocked America’s energy revolution jeopardizes newfound gains in energy security and
poses a significant threat to America’s national security. Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling are directly responsible for most
domestic oil and natural gas production. Taking away hydraulic fracturing technology from America’s oil and natural gas industry
removes the primary technique needed to efficiently and responsibly extract abundant U.S. energy resources. Without
new
wells brought online, U.S. natural gas and oil production would rapidly fall, reversing the past
decade's energy security gains. Importantly, the U.S. would lose its energy independence, and, since
demand for reliable, affordable energy would remain, America would again turn to the Middle East and Russia for
imports. An important asset in diplomacy would be sidelined and allies across the globe – from
Southeast Asia to Europe and South America – would be cut off from a valuable, trusted energy trading
partner.
Impacts
 Adventurism Extension
The Russian petrostate increases the likelihood for petro-aggression through
foreign policy adventurism
Jeff D. Colgan; an Assistant Professor at the School of International Service at American
University in Washington DC, where his research focuses on international security and global
energy politics. He has published work in several journals, including International Organization,
the Journal of Peace Research, the Review of International Organizations and Energy Policy, and
his article on petro-aggression in International Organization won the Robert O. Keohane award
for the best article published by an untenured scholar. Dr Colgan has previously worked with the
World Bank, McKinsey and Company, and The Brattle Group; 2013; “Petro Aggression: When
Oil Causes War”, pg 1-4; Cambridge University Press; ISBN: 1107029678,9781107029675 // lilw-
msdi2021

Oil is the single most valuable commodity traded on international markets . The total value of
its trade is many multiples larger than the trade of any other natural resource, including
natural gas, diamonds, timber, or coffee. Not surprisingly, its political effects are pervasive. Oil helps define the
relationship between the Persian Gulf countries and the rest of the world. It underlies the “resource curse” in oil-
producing states, the symptoms of which include poor economic growth, authoritarianism,
and civil war. It is a source of both tension and cooperation between China, Russia, India, and the West. It
affects the flows of foreign aid. And it shapes military alliances and troop commitments all over the world. As
oil supplies become more difficult to access in the future, the relationship between oil and
international security is increasingly important. This book makes the case that global oil consumption is
a significant cause of international war. Under certain conditions, oil income enables aggressive leaders to
eliminate political constraints, reduce domestic accountability, and take their countries to
war. I call this “petro-aggression.” This concept is quite different from the conventional notion of petro-competition:
i.e., the idea that states commonly go to war to own “the prize” of oil. Such wars do happen, but they are relatively rare. I argue that
petro-competition is only one way in which oil and international security are linked, and it is probably not the most important link.
Petro-aggression is a big part of what makes oil so dangerous for world politics. Petrostates
– states in which
revenues from net oil exports constitute at least 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) – are
among the most violent states in the world. 1 Such states show a remarkable propensity for
militarized interstate disputes (MIDs): on average, they engage in MIDs at a rate more than 50
percent higher than non-petrostates.2 This was not always true: until about 1970, petrostates were just about as
likely to get into international conflicts as non-petrostates. Yet the modern age of oil, which began in earnest after the Arab oil
embargo of 1973, created a world in which petrostates play an oversized role in global military affairs. Indeed, the relatively
small group of petrostates has accounted for almost a quarter of all of the world’s
international conflicts since 1970. This pattern of petrostate conflict generates two puzzles that lie at the heart of this
book. First, what explains petrostates’ propensity for aggression and international conflict? Second, what accounts for the variation
in that propensity among the petrostates? While some petrostates have repeatedly instigated conflicts, others such as Saudi Arabia,
Indonesia, or Nigeria, have had relatively peaceful international interactions over the past half-century (setting aside their domestic
violence). Large-scale oil income generates multiple political incentives that affect a petrostate’s foreign policy. One of the more
important but subtle incentives is that oil
facilitates risk-taking by petrostate leaders. Oil income is easily
controlled by the central government, thereby giving the leader an independent source of
financial resources that can be redistributed to buy political support. Consequently, a petrostate leader
often faces very little domestic political accountability, and thus a low risk of being removed from office for risky and potentially
unpopular actions. In non-petrostates, one of the reasons that leaders tend to avoid international
conflicts is because they know that if they lose, they are very likely to be removed from office,
either peacefully or violently. Yet a leader with huge financial resources to redistribute to purchase
political support can afford to take risks, including those involved in aggressive foreign policy
adventurism.

Banning fracking invites Russian aggression

Anderson 21 (Jessica Anderson, executive director of Heritage Action for America, 6-10-2021,
"The left's 'America Last' energy policy," TheHill,
https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/energy-environment/557700-the-lefts-america-last-
energy-policy, accessed 6-16-2021) // lilw-msdi2021

After the policies of President Trump’s administration boosted America to become the top energy exporter in the world, the Biden administration
and his congressional allies have decided to reverse course. The administration’s actions and laws making their way through committee
have made their goal clear: destroying America’s energy industry while boosting our enemies’
production.This goal has been clear since last year: even on the campaign trail, Biden told voters he wanted to eliminate fracking. He followed
through on his first day in office. Shortly after his inauguration, President Biden rescinded approval of the Keystone XL

pipeline with an executive order stating that the pipeline “would not serve the U.S. national
interest.” Of course, this move killed thousands of high-paying jobs and hurt one of our closest allies, Canada. Just a week later, Biden signed
another order to ban new permits for drilling on federal land and the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR). Despite the fact that drilling in ANWR
could create over 100,000 jobs and bring in over $400 billion in government revenue, the administration decided that being “Green” was more
important than American workers and taxpayers. Then last month, the administration surprised the nation by supporting a pipeline — but not an
American one. The Biden administration announced on May 19 that
it had waived congressional sanctions on the
Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, a system of offshore natural gas pipelines that will run from
Russia to Germany and will be operated by Gazprom, a corporate extension of the Kremlin.
Completion of the project will increase our western European allies’ dependency on Russia for
energy, placing them at the mercy of a regime that has already demonstrated a willingness to
shut down pipelines in the dead of winter for strategic advantage. The European Parliament recently called for a
halt to the project, yet the Biden administration cites “U.S. national interests” as part of its nebulous and murky justification for the waiver. The
justification is astonishing: the Biden administration believes U.S. pipelines and U.S. jobs are not in the national interest, but a Russian pipeline is in the
national interest. To most Americans, that sure sounds like America Last.
 Asia Add On
Increased production means Russia turns to Asia – that exacerbates climate
change and causes grey zone testing
Jakub M. Godzimiriski, 2021, “Russia Energy in the Asia-Pacific”, ANU Press,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctv1prsr27.9.pdf?
ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_search_gsv2%252Fcontrol&refreqid=excelsior
%3A9d4f629e5d8b47f8c4093b86c805e4c4 // lilw-msdi2021
Asian partners can play a significant role in securing an extended lifespan for Russia’s energy sector and in making it more
competitive in the global context, which is, as I have demonstrated, one of the grand strategic goals of the current regime. This could
involve co-financing various elements of critical infrastructure and/or providing access to vital technological solutions. In order to
supply Asian markets, Russia has to develop new gas and oilfields that require financial resources;
this presents another opportunity for Asian partners to play a role. Unlike the energy market in Europe,
the Asian energy market is expected to grow. Moreover, unlike European policymakers, Asian
policymakers are less likely to be influenced by climate concerns i n designing and implementing their
energy policies, all of which bodes well for Russia. The era of the so-called ‘low hanging fruits’ in Russia’s energy sector
seems to be over. The development of new fields will require significant investment and access to new technologies. Therefore,
securing mid- and long-term access to growing Asian energy markets is of paramount importance for securing the future of the
Russian energy sector, for making Russia less exposed to Western pressure and for securing Russia’s further cooperation with, and
influence in, the region emerging as the new global economic, political and normative powerhouse. *** What, then, is Asia’s role in
Russia’s grand strategic designs, and how should energy resources be viewed in this context? According to NSI, Russia
wants:
To portray itself as a reliable actor, a key regional powerbroker, and a successful mediator in order to
gain economic, military, and political influence over nations worldwide and to refine the liberalist rules
and norms that currently govern the world order.57 As stated above, the main goal is to establish a ‘Yalta 2.0’ system in which
Russia enjoys an uncontested sphere of influence in the post-Soviet region, broadcasts Russian voices and influence globally, and
establishes reliable constraints on American—or, more broadly, Western—globetrotting and regime-changing activities. According
to Person, the
key approach in Russia’s grand strategy is ‘asymmetric balancing’ through grey
zone challenges to prevent uncontested US influence from setting the global agenda. 58 In his
opinion, Russia’s means expanded with the oil boom, allowing critical investments and increases in defence spending to be made. At
the same time, energy has been a key source of Russian power and influence, as many countries have developed a strong energy
relationship with Russia. Russia’s turn to Asia seems to have clear strategic purposes. The country’s cooperation with Asia—and
especially with China—on energy is motivated by more than purely economic concerns and interest in market expansion and
diversification. It will reduce Russia’s strategic exposure 57 Arquilla, \ Russian Grand Strategy and Energy Resources vis-à-vis the
West by reducing the level of strategically constraining energy interdependence between Russia and the EU caused by the EU’s
dominant role in Russia’s export of energy commodities. It will also reduce Russia’s strategic exposure to possible consequences of
the green energy revolution, promoted and implemented by the EU, which could, in the mid- and long-term perspective, undermine
Russia’s role as the leading producer and exporter of fossil fuels. The
shift to Asia will also help Russia develop
new energy provinces and infrastructure financed, at least partly, by Asian partners who can also provide some
needed technological solutions and who seem to be interested in greater volumes of fossil energy imports from Russia as a way of
addressing their own energy dilemmas. This
in turn will contribute to extending the lifespan of the
Russian energy sector, which will most probably remain the backbone of the Russian economy
and the main source of state revenue in the foreseeable future. By developing stronger energy ties with a number of
Asian countries, Russia will also be able to project not only its economic and energy power but also
its political power, working with them on other issues of common interest, including construction of a new global order
based on a new set of nonWestern rules. This in turn could result in limiting the power of the West in the global context, which could
be viewed as a beneficial development from the Russian strategic point of view, but at the same time poses a new strategic
challenge to be dealt with by Russia—namely, how to avoid overexposure to the growing Chinese influence, locally and globally.
 Disease Add On
Fracking helps the economy 
Zhang et al 21 (Yu Zhang, Assistant Professor in the ECE Department of UC Santa Cruz, John A.
Rupp, clinical associate professor at the O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs @
Indiana University, and John D. Graham, former senior official in the George W. Bush
administration and the former dean of the Indiana University O'Neill School of Public and
Environmental Affairs, 6-10-2021, “Contrasting Public and Scientific Assessments of Fracking”
MDPI – Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, https://doi.org/10.3390/su13126650,
accessed 6-16-2021) // lilw-msdi2021

3.1.2. Strengthening the U.S. Economy

We discuss three potential effects of fracking on the U.S. economy. First, an

income effect results from a lower gas
price: the consumer saves on gas and can spend more on other goods. Consumers in the U.S. are
saving $20 to $40 billion per year on natural gas due to the lower gas prices induced by fracking
[30]. Those savings come primarily in the form of lower prices for electricity and other goods and services
that are derived from natural gas. Second, a substitution effect results from lower gas prices : cheap
gas reduces the cost of producing other goods (e.g., chemicals, plastics, steel and so forth). Published
reports have found positive substitution effects of fracking [31,32]. Nonetheless, because gas-intensive sectors
(such as chemicals, primary metals, and the paper and print sectors) account for only a small share of manufacturing and the overall
U.S. economy, the substitution effect may not be large on an economy-wide basis [33]. Third, a
stimulus effect results
from fracking activities: fracking will create jobs and increase the demand for inputs directly in
gas production and indirectly in the manufacture of gas-intensive goods. While a positive stimulus effect
is possible in 2007–2014, when the U.S. economy was operating below full employment, fracking may contribute little growth when
the economy is fully recovered because resources in the economy will simply be shifted from other industries towards shale gas
without producing a net growth in the economy [34]. Thus, in the long term, the stimulus effect of fracking is expected to diminish or
disappear entirely [35]. The size of the near-term stimulus effect is not clear. Several studies found a negligible positive (0.46–0.48%
of GDP) stimulus effect on the U.S. economy or a negligible to substantial positive effect on regional economies [36–40]. Most
economic reports employ IMPLAN input-output models that do not account for the fact that a growth in shale gas may cause a
reduction in the production of coal, nuclear, and renewables.

Economic growth key to check diesease

Peter Ferrara; Senior Advisor for Entitlement Reform and Budget Policy at the National Tax
Limitation Foundation, General Counsel for the American Civil Rights Union, and Senior Fellow at
the National Center for Policy Analysis, Harvard Grad; 01-14-2014; “Why economic growth is
exponentially more important than income inequality.”
https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2014/01/14/why-economic-growth-is-
exponentially-more-important-than-income-inequality/#4b4f36b91483 // lilw-msdi2021

Such economic growth has produced dramatic improvements in personal health as well . Throughout
most of human history, a typical lifespan was 25 to 30 years, as Moore and Simon report. But “from the mid-18th century to today,
life spans in the advanced countries jumped from less than 30 years to about 75 years.” Average life expectancy in the U.S. has
grown by more than 50% since 1900. Infant mortality declined from 1 in 10 back then to 1 in 150 today. Children under 15 are at
least 10 times less likely to die, as one in four did during the 19th century, with their death rate reduced by 95%. The maternal death
rate from pregnancy and childbirth was also 100 times greater back then than today. Moore and Simon further recount, “ Just
three infectious diseases – tuberculosis, pneumonia, and diarrhea – accounted for almost half of
all deaths in 1900.” Today, we have virtually eliminated or drastically reduced these and other
scourges of infectious disease that have killed or crippled billions throughout human history,
such as typhoid fever, cholera, typhus, plague, smallpox, diphtheria, polio, influenza, bronchitis,
whooping cough, malaria, and others. Besides the advances in the development and application
of modern health sciences, this has resulted from the drastic reduction in filthy and unsanitary
living conditions that economic growth has made possible as well. More recently, great
progress is being made against heart disease and cancer. Also greatly contributing to the well-
being of working people, the middle class, and the poor in America has been the dramatically
declining cost of food resulting from economic growth and soaring productivity in agriculture. As
Moore and Simon report, “Americans devoted almost 50 percent of their incomes to putting
food on the table in the early 1900s compared with 10 percent in the late 1900s.” While most of
human history has involved a struggle against starvation, today in America the battle is against obesity, even more so among the
poor. Moore and Simon quote Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation, “The average consumption of protein, minerals, and
vitamins is virtually the same for poor and middle income children, and in most cases is well above recommended norms for all
children. Most poor children today are in fact overnourished.” That cited data comes from the U.S. Census Bureau. As a result, poor
children in America today “grow up to be about 1 inch taller and 10 pounds heavier than the GIs who stormed the beaches of
Normandy in World War II.”

Disease causes extinction

Hindawi, 1-16-2013, "Infectious Disease, Endangerment, and Extinction," International
Journal of Evolutionary Biology, https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijeb/2013/571939/ // lilw-
msdi2021

Infectious disease, especially virulent infectious disease, is commonly regarded as a cause of fluctuation or decline in biological
populations. However, it is not generally considered as a primary factor in causing the actual endangerment or extinction

of species. We review here the known historical examples in which disease has, or has been assumed to have had, a major deleterious
impact on animal species, including extinction, and highlight some recent cases in which disease is the chief suspect in causing the
outright endangerment of particular species. We conclude that the role of disease in historical extinctions at the

population or species level may have been underestimated. Recent methodological breakthroughs may lead to a better
understanding of the past and present roles of infectious disease in influencing population fitness and other parameters. Although

lethal epi- or panzootics are obvious risk factors that can lead to population fluctuation or decline in particular circumstances, infectious diseases are seldom

considered as potential drivers of extirpation or extinction—that is, of the complete loss of all populations or subunits comprising a given biological species. For
example, in conservation biology, infectious disease is usually regarded as having only a marginal or contributory influence on extinction, except perhaps in unusual
circumstances (e.g., [1–4]). In their examination of 223 instances of critically endangered species listed by the IUCN (International Union for Conservation of Nature) as allegedly
threatened by infectious disease, Smith et al. [4] found that in the overwhelming majority of cases there was no conclusive evidence to support infectious disease as a
contributing threat. Although this record should improve with increasing awareness of the effects of infectious diseases on wildlife, as this paper illustrates progress has so far

been slow. Demonstrating that disease can produce endangerment and even extinction in species of invertebrates is not inherently more difficult than
demonstrating the same thing for vertebrates. However, because there tend to be far fewer specialists for individual invertebrate groups, save for those having some degree of
economic significance, the chances are high that disease impacts will frequently be missed. One case that was not missed was the loss of the last members of Partula turgida, a
snail from French Polynesia that succumbed to an infection of the microsporidian Steinhausia sp. [31]. Steinhausia is a known parasite of various taxa of bivalve molluscans,
infecting oocytes and thereby reducing fecundity (e.g., “mussel egg disease”; [32]). The decline of P. turgida received an unusual level of attention (for an invertebrate) because
of this species’ importance for studying evolutionary variation and niche occupation [33]. This snail and several of its close relatives were already considered extinct in the wild
due to predation by the introduced wolfsnail Euglandina when the last few known individuals were collected and kept as a captive colony. As is frequently the case with
unmanaged natural populations, there were no relevant baseline data for this species, and it cannot be excluded that Steinhausia was already present in the colony. Admittedly,
so small a coterie of individuals hardly constituted a viable species and could have been driven to extinction by other mechanisms as well. It should also be noted
that Steinhausia infections are not known to present a severe threat to any natural populations of bivalves, or at least any that have maintained normal populations.
 Arctic War Add On
Increase in Russian exports will increase Russia’s presence in the Arctic
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, Paul Stronski, 3-29-2021, "Russia in the Arctic—A Critical
Examination," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/29/russia-in-arctic-critical-examination-pub-84181 //
lilw-msdi2021
Russian involvement in the Arctic dates back several hundred years. Much of this historical activity was supported and encouraged
by successive governments and aimed at promoting trade and extracting natural resources. The discovery of oil and gas in Siberia—
below and above the Arctic Circle—in the twentieth century offered wealth and hard currency, enabled domestic consumption,
funded the Soviet military machine, and provided the economic foundation for the Soviet Union to pursue its foreign policy
objectives. The exploitation of Arctic riches accelerated in post-Soviet Russia. Oil and gas played
the pivotal role in
restoring the country’s economic fortunes in the early 2000s, underwriting domestic stability, fostering
Putin’s rise as the country’s undisputed leader, and returning Russia to the world stage as an aspiring great power intent upon
recouping its losses in Europe and reclaiming its rightful place in the international system. The
role of oil and gas in
Russia’s Arctic ambitions was highlighted in 2006 as part of the Kremlin’s agenda to establish the
country as an “energy superpower” and to justify its inclusion in the G8.3 Rising temperatures would
make those riches more accessible and ensure the Kremlin a steady source of revenues as well as market and
geopolitical influence in Europe and Asia. And without any contenders to challenge these ambitions, Russia had a shot at securing its
place as a major geopolitical presence in the Arctic. Even the high projected costs and technological difficulties associated with
exploration and recovery of Arctic offshore resources did not appear to pose a major obstacle to the Kremlin’s ambitions. Projects
would be open to participation by foreign energy companies with their technology and capital, and their participation would make
them powerful stakeholders that could influence Western governments’ policy choices toward Russia. Moreover, thanks to the
warming temperatures in the Arctic, the development of the NSR along Russia’s Arctic coastline would provide the Kremlin with an
opportunity to diversify its energy policy by eventually linking the Russian Arctic to markets in Asia, thus reducing the country’s
reliance on Europe as a critical energy market and on Ukraine as a critical conduit to that market.4 With
oil and gas
accounting for as much as 60 percent of Russia’s export revenues and upward of 30 percent of its federal
budget, the motive behind its Arctic ambitions is not difficult to discern. The revenue from these
projects would help sustain several critical priorities: further consolidation of Putin’s hold on political power as
the leader who returned Russia from the abyss and restored it to greatness, the accumulation of funds to hedge against future
economic or political adversity, and the rebuilding of the military, which had long suffered from neglect and was in need
of modernization.

That Causes War

Andrew E. Kramer, reporter for NYT in the Moscow Bureau, 5-22-2021, "In the Russian Arctic,
the First Stirrings of a Very Cold War," No Publication,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/22/world/russia-us-arctic-military.html // lilw-msdi2021

One goal of the Russian buildup is to seize the day economically as the ocean thaws. “Climate change
enables the appearance of new economic possibilities,” Moscow asserted in its Arctic plan, envisioning a new
Klondike. The Russian government and companies have developed various moneymaking ideas to take advantage of climate
change. Exploiting newly accessible reserves of oil, gas and coal — the very resources causing the problem in the
first place — is high on the list. Moscow also hopes to turn an Arctic Ocean seaway between Europe and Asia, the Northern Sea
Route, into essentially a toll road by requiring payments for pilots and icebreaker escorts. That
could become a flash
point because Washington sees the waterway as an international trading route. The Department of Defense says it reserves the
right to conduct freedom of navigation exercises in the Arctic, as it does now in the South China Sea.
A2
 A2: Russia Doesn’t Want Fracking Ban
Putin wants a fracking ban – he see’s fracking as a threat to Russia
Phillip Klein, 11-21-2019, "Fiona Hill says that she heard Putin describe American fracking as a
'great threat' to Russia ," Washington Examiner,
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/fiona-hill-says-that-she-heard-putin-describe-
american-fracking-as-a-great-threat-to-russia // lilw-msdi2021
Former National Security Council official and Russia expert Fiona Hill on Thursday testified that she heard Russian President Vladimir
Putin at a 2011 conference describe American fracking as a "great threat" to Russia, a position he has
emphasized ever since. The recollection came out at a point in the impeachment hearing when Rep. Mike Conaway of Texas was
asking Hill about Putin's propaganda efforts in the United States, at the center of which is the television channel RT, which pushes
anti-fracking messaging. Hill agreed that Russia
saw the growth of U.S. fracking as a threat given that it
undermines Russia's efforts to dominate the energy sector . “In November 2011, I actually sat next to
Vladimir Putin, at a conference, in which he made precisely that point," she said. "It was the first time that he had actually done so
to a group of American journalists and experts that were brought to something called the Valdai Discussion Club. So he started in
2011 making it very clear that he saw American fracking as a great threat to Russian interests. We were all struck by how much he
stressed this issue. And since 2011, and since that particular juncture, Putin
has made a big deal of this.” The
process of hydraulic fracking to extract oil and gas has led to an energy boom in the U.S. and has helped
make the U.S. the largest global producer of energy, with Russia ranking third.
 A2: No Buildup
Russia increases military spending with increased oil revenue – empirics prove
Jakub M. Godzimiriski, 2021, “Russia Energy in the Asia-Pacific”, ANU Press,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/j.ctv1prsr27.9.pdf?
ab_segments=0%252Fbasic_search_gsv2%252Fcontrol&refreqid=excelsior
%3A9d4f629e5d8b47f8c4093b86c805e4c4 // lilw-msdi2021

Petroleum-related revenue has allowed the regime to pursue a doubletrack strategy . The first
track of this strategy involved heavy investment in defence- and security-related matters —as
promised by Putin during his 2012 presidential campaign.33 This helped Russia increase its military capabilities
as well as its ability to project military power beyond its border s, thereby improving its clout in
international relations. The second track involved heavy investment in social programs that helped to secure the stability as well as
the survival of the current regime, which is one of the key objectives of what some have labelled ‘grand strategy’ and others
describe as ‘strange strategy’. To
illustrate how important petroleum-related revenue was in allowing
the regime to pursue this double-track strategy in the years after Putin’s return to power in 2012, it is enough to mention
that the share of petroleum revenue reached 50 per cent of the budget revenue in 2012, 50 per
cent in 2013, 51 per cent in 2014 and dropped to 43 per cent in 2015. The share of defence-
and security-related spending (combined) in the Russian state budget reached the level of 24.8
per cent in 2012, 31.3 per cent in 2013, 30.8 per cent in 2014 and 32.95 per cent in 2015 , while
the share of social spending reached slightly lower levels: 29.9 per cent in 2012, 28.7 per cent in 2013, 23.3 per cent in 2014 and
27.31 per cent in 2015. Therefore, one can ask a highly relevant, and not only rhetorical, question: how would Russian policymakers
be able to realise this type of double-track strategy without revenue generated by the country’s petroleum sector? The fact that
Russian policymakers announced a 20 per cent cut in spending on defence in 2016—in a year in which petroleum-generated revenue
formed only 36 per cent of the budget revenue—is a very convincing example of how important energy resources are as a means of
realising Russia’s grand strategic designs.
The very same energy revenue—or what is referred to as Russian oil and gas
rents—have also provided an important economic cushion that has helped Russia deal with
external pressures, as illustrated by Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes.3
 A2: Europe Dependence Thumps
Fracking has lessen Russia’s influence over Europe through gas---banning
fracking increases Europe dependence
Marc A. Theissen, 9-18-2020, "Fracking is on the ballot in November. Don’t listen to the left’s
calls to stop.," American Enterprise Institute - AEI, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/fracking-is-on-
the-ballot-in-november-dont-listen-to-the-lefts-calls-to-stop/ // lilw-msdi2021
Why is it that whenever the United States achieves strategic dominance in a critical area for our national security, the left wants to
disarm? In the 20th century, America’s emergence as a nuclear superpower made our victory in the Cold War possible. And what
was the left’s reaction? They opposed ballistic missile defense and championed nuclear disarmament. Today, one
of the great
geostrategic developments of the early 21st century has been the U nited States’ emergence as an
energy superpower. As recently as 2008, the United States was the world’s largest oil importer, but today, we are one of the
largest exporters of oil and the largest exporter of natural gas. What made that possible was the shale
revolution, which not only created millions of jobs, but also transformed the national security landscape in
America’s favor. And once again, this development is opposed by a disarmament movement on the left — this time energy
disarmament. Fearful of losing states like Pennsylvania, Joe Biden now insists he does not want to ban fracking. But when Sen.
Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) said during a primary debate in March, “I’m talking about stopping fracking as soon as we possibly can … no ifs,
buts and maybes about it,” Biden chimed in, “So am I. No more — no new fracking.” He also told a young woman at a New
Hampshire campaign stop, “Kiddo, I want you to look into my eyes. I guarantee you we’re going to end fossil fuel.” And his running
mate, Sen. Kamala D. Harris (D-Calif.), has said, “There’s no question I’m in favor of banning fracking.” In his new book, “The New
Map: Energy, Climate and the Clash of Nations,” Pulitzer Prize-winning author Daniel Yergin describes how the shale energy
revolution has benefited America — and the harm energy disarmament would do. In an interview, I asked him about
the calls on the left to end fracking. “When I hear some of the politicians say, ‘We want to ban fracking,’ ” Yergin replied, “I want to
say: ‘Why?’ The beneficiaries of banning fracking would be Russia and Saudi Arabia, who would fill the
gap that will be created in the market.” Yergin pointed out that “one of the major critics of US shale development is
somebody who lives in Moscow named Vladimir Putin, who doesn’t like shale because he sees it as bolstering
US foreign policy.” He explained that “when the Russians cut off the gas through Ukraine in 2006, the
Europeans were not in a good position.” But today, thanks to the shale revolution, Russia has
lost its leverage because our European allies can buy American natural gas or gas from other
countries.
 A2: No Russian Aggression/No Lash Out
High oil production means Russian adventurism—empirics prove
Daniel Gros (Daniel Gros is a German economist who currently serves as the Director of the
Centre for European Policy Studies, a European think tank. Gros worked for the CEPS from 1986
to 1988 and has worked there continuously since 1990), 1-16-2015, “The price of oil and
Soviet/Russian aggressiveness,” CEPS Commentary,
http://aei.pitt.edu/59748/1/DG_Oil_price_and_Russian_behaviour.pdf // lilw-msdi2021
There has been much speculation about the reasons that prompted President Putin’s increasingly hostile reaction in 2012-13 to the
negotiations on an EU-Ukraine association agreement. The chain of events is well known. Russian pressure led the then President of
Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, to decline to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, which sparked the Euro Maidan in Kyiv. These
protests were then used a pretext for the annexation of Crimea and the support for anti-Maidan rebels in the Donbass region, which
was then followed by an outright, even if covert, invasion. It is often argued that Russia is reacting to a perceived encroachment of
the EU/NATO on an area that it considers its own neighbourhood (and President Putin said as much during his annual end-of-the-
year press conference in December). However, history
suggests that the underlying reason for Russian
aggressiveness is simpler: A decade-long period of a steadily rising oil prices (and that of other raw materials)
created a feeling of strength, bordering on invulnerability, which made Russia more assertive, and ready to
use any opportunity to deploy its military power. The abrupt reversal of this trend since the summer of 2014 will thus be the
harbinger of a much less aggressive Russian stance as long as oil remains at present levels. One needs to go back only 40 years to
find a similar development. The
1970s had seen a similar increase in Soviet assertiveness which
culminated in the invasion of Afghanistan at the very end of the decade. This came also at the
tail of a decade of sharply increasing oil prices (and Soviet oil production). Between 1965 and
1980, the value of Soviet oil production went up by a factor of almost 20 ( from about $20 billion
annually in 1965 to almost $400 billion in today’s purchasing power in 1980). This was due in large part to the oil price increases
following the first oil embargo. But there was also a large increase in Soviet oil production. In the 1960s, Soviet oil production had
been lower than that of the US, but thanks to the discovery of some large fields it became much larger by 1980. This
combination provided the main growth elements of the Soviet economy, making its regime
much more credible, and not only in the eyes of its own population. The resulting increase in
the real resources available to the Soviet elites was spent to a large extent on the military
budget, allowing the Soviet Union to become a much more credible threat. The increase in
relative, and absolute, economic and military strength emboldened an ageing (and therefore
naturally not adventurous leadership) to become more assertive abroad. The invasion of Afghanistan
appeared also at first sight to be an improvised reaction to a local development (a putsch in Kabul). The parallel to Putin’s reaction to
the Euro Maidan is instructive. In both cases, a seemingly low-cost opportunity was seen as yielding a large strategic gain, at least in
the short run. The figures in the Annex shows the value of Soviet and Russian
oil production in constant dollars over the last
half century. It is apparent that high values are associated with foreign adventure, whereas Russia was much
more cooperative when the value of its oil exports was low . At the time of the Soviet take-over of
Afghanistan, it was often argued that this was a defensive reaction to the perceived encirclement of the Soviet Union. This motive
might have been latently present for a long time; but without the economic and military strength coming from higher oil prices the
Soviet Union would most probably not have acted on it. The end of the Afghan adventure is now known, but this was not clear at the
time, when it was interpreted as a major defeat of the West. It is often forgotten that a major element of the Soviet defeat in
Afghanistan was the weakening of the economic base of the Soviet Union as oil prices fell throughout the 1980s, cutting the value of
Soviet oil production to one-third of its peak level. This led to a period of extreme economic weakness in the entire Soviet space and
was a key factor (but of course not the only one) in the dissolution of the Soviet empire. The 1990s then saw a protracted period of
low oil prices and production during which time Russia was absorbed by its own internal problems given that the value of its oil
production had plummeted to less than $60 billion and did not object to EU (or even NATO) enlargement to the East. This changed
gradually during the early 2000s as the oil price (and production) recovered in Russia, again strengthening the economic base of an
increasingly autocratic leadership. The complaint that the US and its European allies had somehow given a pledge not to expand
NATO eastward came mostly after the fact as oil prices recovered from their low of $10/barrel in 1999-2000. The steady upwards
trend in oil prices during the early 2000s culminated in a first peak of the value of Russian oil
production in 2008 and the invasion of Georgia. The oil price collapsed briefly during the Great Recession of
2009, but it recovered quickly, and the value of Russian oil production reached another peak in 2012-13 when the value of its oil
production topped $500 billion. These were also the years during which the Russian position on the EU-Ukraine Association
Agreement hardened. The negotiations on this agreement had been going on since 2010 without eliciting any particular reaction
from Russia. And so, the objections suddenly voiced by Russia when the agreement was close to being concluded appeared to come
out of nowhere for the EU side. The swings in the oil price provide a telling background to the swings in Russia’s attitude towards its
‘near abroad’. A latent resentment is expressed in a more aggressive form, including military means, when the resources are
available. Moreover, a high oil price crowds out other export sectors that would be interested in open markets.
 A2: Russia Oil Production High Now
Russian Oil production low
Rosemary Griffin, 1-2-2021, "Russian oil output flat on month at 10 million b/d in December,"
No Publication, https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/010221-
russian-oil-output-flat-on-month-at-10-million-bd-in-december // lilw-msdi2021
Russia produced 42.46 million mt of crude and condensate in December, equivalent to around 10.04 million b/d, according to
preliminary data released by the central dispatching unit of the Russian energy ministry Jan. 2. Output was up slightly on the 41.03
million mt, or 10.03 million b/d produced in November 2020 .
Production was down 11% on the 47.65 million mt, or
11.27 million b/d produced in December 2019. This was due to deeper output cuts under the OPEC + agreement in
2020 compared with 2019. Total crude production reached 512.68 million mt in 2020 , equivalent to around
10.27 mil b/d, down 8% on year. Russia's quota for crude production under the agreement was 8.99 million b/d for August-
December, 2020. The deal does not include condensate. Russia has not released a breakdown for crude and condensate production
in December, but condensate usually accounts for around 8% of overall output. From January Russia's quota increases by 125,000
b/d. The group is now meeting on a monthly basis to discuss market conditions and potential changes to output quotas. The next
meeting is scheduled for Jan. 4. In late December, Russian deputy prime minister and lead OPEC+ negotiator Alexander Novak said
Moscow would support a further increase of 500,000 b/d in the total OPEC+ quota from February if market conditions are stable.
Uncertainty over the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and vaccine rollouts on demand in 2021 is complicating the group's long-
term planning. December exports of Russian oil were 17.03 million mt, or around 4.03 million b/d. Daily average shipments were
down 1.5% on the 4.09 million b/d exported in November 2020. Exports were down 16% on year, in line with lower
output quotas in 2020 compared to 2019 under the OPEC+ production cut agreement. Exports totaled 219.16 mil mt in 2020,
equivalent to around 4.39 mil b/d, down 11.8% on year In December, deliveries of crude and condensate to the domestic market
were 23.27 million mt, or around 5.5 million b/d. Daily average shipments were up 0.7% on November volumes of around 5.46
million b/d. Shipments were down 7% on the 25 million mt, or around 5.91 million b/d delivered to the domestic market in
December 2019. Domestic deliveries totaled 273.32 mil mt in 2020, equivalent to around 5.47 mil b/d, down 5.3% on year.
 A2: Russia Leverage High Now
Russia has no leverage over the US now—the plan changes that by increasing
the oil exported from Russia
Niklas H. Rossbach, November 2018, “The Geopolitics of Russian Energy: Gas, oil and the energy
security of tomorrow” FOI, file:///Users/laurenwoodall/Downloads/FOIR4623.pdf // lilw-
msdi2021

US-Russian relations have been deteriorating for some time and the energy relationship has
changed to the advantage of the US. A decade ago, crude oil exports from Russia to the US were
increasing notably.3 This is no longer the case. Accordingly, Russia has little direct leverage on the US
based on Russian energy exports. The American policy at the time was to ensure the flow of energy from Russia and the Caspian to
the world market.4 The overall American energy policy was to safeguard energy flows to ensure a stable price that benefited the
global economy and hence the US. When this interfered with Russian control over pipelines, this riled Moscow. However, the real
rupture in US-Russian energy relations – the shale revolution – had a commercial origin and was not the
result of foreign policy. The increase in American energy production changed global energy flows . One
inadvertent consequence of Russia’s adaptation to the new energy landscape is that in early 2018, despite the sanctions, Russian gas
was exported to the US through an intermediary.5 The imports were not a reflection of a lack of American gas, but demonstrate the
complexity of keeping track of shifting trade patterns. In the emerging energy landscape, both the US and Russia are exporters of oil
and gas. The US may become a competitor of Russia in markets that Russia wants to favour: Europe and Asia. In fact, 20 per cent of
the recently allowed American crude oil exports went to China in 2017.6
 A2: Biden Federal Land Ban Thumper
Federal ban proves the brink is now
Matt Egan, 1-27-2021, "No, Joe Biden didn't just ban fracking," CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/27/business/fracking-ban-biden-federal-leasing/index.html //
lilw-msdi2021
Still, Biden's early steps represent a sharp break from the Trump administration's mission to maximize fossil fuels production --
despite the worsening climate crisis. Hours after being sworn in, Biden moved to rejoin the Paris Agreement on climate change,
revoke a permit granted to the controversial Keystone XL Pipeline and place a temporary moratorium on oil and gas leasing in the
Arctic. "He is not kidding around when it comes to imposing tough new restrictions on the US petroleum sector," said McNally, a
former Energy Department official under President George W. Bush. Energy analysts dismissed the risk that these
steps would cause a sudden spike in oil prices, which have sharply rebounded from their pandemic lows. That's
because the world is still swimming in excess oil and many drilling companies stocked up on permits and leases in
the event Trump lost the election. "In the short-term, the market remains very well-supplied," said Ryan
Fitzmaurice, energy strategist at Rabobank. "In terms of immediate impacts, it's more symbolic than a real threat to
oil supplies." Longer term, less production at home means the United States may have to buy more oil from the Middle East
and elsewhere overseas. "The highpoint for US oil production is likely in the rearview mirror," Fitzmaurice said. Rapidan Energy
projects the United States will produce about 1 million fewer barrels per day in 2023 than if Trump had won a second term. Oil
production on federal lands and offshore areas grew steadily during the Trump administration, hitting nearly 1 billion barrels in fiscal
2019, according to the Interior Department.
 A2: OPEC+ Thumper
Thump denied—Russia either pressures to increase quota or goes rogue
Ashutosh Pandey, 2-11-2021, "Oil price rise risks OPEC+ cheaters returning to old ways," DW,
https://www.dw.com/en/oil-prices-opec-saudi-arabia-russia/a-56532592 // lilw-msdi2021

OPEC+ members, including Russia, have been diligently sticking to their production quotas amid
the extraordinary shock unleashed by the pandemic. Some of them might now be tempted to throw
compliance out of the window. Oil prices are having a dream run as traders bet on vaccine rollouts, boosting fuel
demand as economies reopen. Benchmark crude contract Brent North Sea is trading at a year high of $61 (€53.1) a barrel, having
soared over 60% since the emergence of successful coronavirus vaccines in November. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures, the
US benchmark, has risen to $58 a barrel. The increase in oil prices, however, could give Saudi Arabia, the de facto
leader of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a new headache; some of its fellow oil
producers, which have been complying with pledged output cuts in keeping with a deal to stabilize oil markets, might now
be tempted to go rogue. "OPEC+ producers are anxious to ramp up production and higher oil prices will
ultimately lead to massive cheating on production commitments," Edward Moya, senior market analyst at
OANDA trading group, told DW. "For OPEC+ members, it is all about market share and if demand improves along with prices, we will
see compliance go out the window." Poor compliance has beset OPEC+ — an alliance between the oil
cartel members and a handful of Russia-led producers — since its inception in 2016. Several
alliance members, including Russia, Iraq and Nigeria, have been notorious for producing more than their
pledged quotas, much to the annoyance of Riyadh, which has been left to do much of the heavy lifting. But when last year's
COVID-19 travel restrictions and sweeping lockdowns battered oil demand and caused oil prices to crash, even trading below $0 a
barrel in the US in April amid a severe shortage of storage space, oil producers didn't have much incentive to overproduce. OPEC+
has claimed that there was close to full compliance with oil production cuts between May and December under the terms of its
current deal, with even the so-called laggards receiving an impressive report card. Saudi Arabia has been strict in ensuring
compliance, even calling on those breaching targets to compensate in the following months. The alliance agreed to the biggest
coordinated cuts on record — 9.7 million barrels of oil per day (bpd), or 10% of total global supply — in April last year when the
COVID-19 pandemic brought the global economy to a screeching halt. That figure has gradually decreased to 7.2 million bpd amid
recovering fuel demand. In December the grouping committed to gradually bring back no more than 500,000 bpd on a monthly
basis. The increase in production was put on hold for February and March as many countries imposed new coronavirus lockdowns.
Saudi Arabia volunteered to cut its production by an extra 1 million bpd in the two months as part of the deal. With oil prices
breaching the $60 a barrel mark and crude stockpiles falling, Russia and some other OPEC+ members are calling for a faster ramping
up of production than was agreed in December, reigniting tensions with Saudi Arabia. The group will meet on March 4 to discuss the
production target for April. "I do think that this meeting is going to be more difficult for Riyadh to argue for restraint, even though
from a balanced perspective they [OPEC+] should restrain. So, make no mistake about that," Eugene Lindell from Vienna-based JBC
Energy told DW. "The demand has not come back. So, the price is in a way artificially high. It's gotten ahead of itself. It's pricing more
on future expectations than on current fundamentals." Russia, among the world's top three oil producers, has
been calling
on OPEC+ to ramp up production under pressure from its own producers, which are looking to cash in
on the price rise. Moscow, whose budget is more resilient to low oil prices than most major oil producers, is also worried that the
recent increase in oil prices could lead to US shale players making a comeback after taking a battering during the pandemic, leading
to further erosion in its market share. Rystad Energy estimates that if WTI stays in the $50-55 per barrel range, then at least 300,000
bpd in oil production will be added by US shale companies by year-end 2021. Moscow has already been receiving favorable
conditions within OPEC+. It was allowed to produce an extra 65,000 bpd in February and March even as others, barring Kazakhstan,
were told to hold output steady. Its undercompliance with pledged output cuts have also largely been ignored by Riyadh. "As the oil
price ticks up, they [Moscow and Riyadh] actually each have less leverage on one another. In a high market oil price environment,
the two countries become less dependent on one another for market regulation," Rystad Energy oil markets analyst Louise Dickson
told DW. "In a $60 per barrel world, Saudi's threat of releasing more than 1+ million bpd of spare capacity onto the market becomes
less of a threat. At the same time, as prices tick higher, Russia's participation in the deal also becomes less crucial." Saudi Arabia,
which has been forced to dive into its cash reserves to meet its budgetary needs, would like oil prices to rise even further to help
fund Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's ambitious spending plans as he looks to reduce the country's heavy reliance on oil. "As
long as this multi-billion project remains a top priority for the Kingdom, it may not have any better option than holding back oil
production to fund it. Even if it has to go at it alone, as was the case with the 1 million bpd cut in February and March 2021," Dickson
said. Even if Riyadh manages to pacify calls for a faster raising of production targets, it knows all too well that there are bigger
challenges waiting in the wings, not least the potential return of Iranian oil as the Biden Administration in Washington looks to bring
back Tehran to the negotiating table to revive the Iran nuclear deal. "It is amazing the production cut agreement
has lasted this long. 2021 could see the return of Iranian and Venezuelan oil and that will complicate how everyone gets
their fair share," Moya said. "Russia, Iraq, and Nigeria will likely be the ones everyone expects to break away
from the agreement."
 A2: We Wont Buy From Russia
Yes Russia
Tim Benson, 3-18-2021, "A Fracking Ban Would Devastate the U.S. Economy and Threaten
National Security, Says Energy Department Report," Heartland Daily News,
https://heartlanddailynews.com/2021/03/a-fracking-ban-would-devastate-the-u-s-economy-
and-threaten-national-security-says-energy-department-report/ // lilw-msdi2021

Beyond the economic impacts, the report warns a fracking ban would, in its first year alone, result in an increase in carbon
dioxide emissions of 16 percent, of nitrogen oxides by 17 percent, and of sulfur dioxide by 62 percent. “Taking away hydraulic
fracturing technology from America’s oil and natural gas industry removes the primary technique needed to efficiently and
responsibly extract abundant U.S. energy resources,” said Shawn Bennett, deputy assistant secretary for Oil and Natural Gas, DOE’s
press release. “Without new wells brought online, U.S. natural gas and oil production would rapidly fall, reversing the past decade’s
energy security gains.” The DOE report also warns banning fracking would result in significant, negative
geopolitical and national security effects for the United States.“Significantly curtailing American natural gas and oil
production removes an important tool for American diplomacy while increasing global energy
dependence on Russia and the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations,” the report states.
“[Since] demand for reliable, affordable energy would remain, [and] America would again turn
to the Middle East and Russia for imports.“An important asset in diplomacy would be sidelined and
allies across the globe – from Southeast Asia to Europe and South America – would be cut off from a valuable, trusted energy trading
partner,” the report says.
 A2: Fracking not key
Fracking is directly responsible for Russian’s decline in energy political
dominance
United States House of Representatives, 3-1-2018, “Russian Attempts to Influence U.S.
Domestic Energy Markets By Exploiting Social Media,” Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology, file:///Users/laurenwoodall/Downloads/808676.pdf // lilw-msdi2021

The United States has recently experienced an energy production boom that stands to “fundamentally
reshape the global energy landscape.”8 Although many factors have contributed to increased domestic production
capacity, record-breaking production in the United States is primarily “attributable to increased
production of natural gas and crude oil enabled by the use of hydraulic fracturing techniques,”
also referred to as fracking.9 Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing as a means for producing oil and natural gas began in the
early 2000s.10 At that time, there were “approximately 26,000 hydraulically fractured wells” in the United States, which accounted
for “less than 7%” of all U.S. marketed natural gas.11 By 2011, fracking had become the primary method for oil and natural gas
development in the United States. 12 Since 2014, fracked wells have “accounted for most of all new wells drilled and completed.”13
The number of fracked wells had climbed “to an estimated 300,000” by 2015, and were responsible for approximately 67 percent of
all U.S. natural gas output.14 Government and industry projections indicate that domestic production will continue to increase.
Trends from 2017 indicate that the U.S. has almost completed its transition from a net importer of natural gas to a net exporter.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), natural gas production will provide the greatest contribution to
overall production growth during 2018, with growth in crude oil production providing the greatest impact on overall output in
2019.15 Additionally, the EIA expects 2018 to be a record-breaking year for domestic crude oil and natural gas production and
government forecasts indicate that in 2019 domestic production will reach “a level that would rival Russia, the world’s top
producer.” 16 8 The
substantial increase in domestic production has resulted in an abundant
supply of American energy, which is increasingly making its way into the global marketplace. While this stands to
provide substantial economic benefits to the U.S., it simultaneously represents a direct threat to
Russian energy interests. First, an abundance of American supply in the global energy marketplace stands to reduce
Russian market share and thus revenues generated from oil and gas activities . Second, by
providing supply alternatives for European countries dependent on Russian supply and
infrastructure, American energy stands to disrupt the Kremlin’s ability to leverage energy
consumption for geopolitical influence. Russia provides roughly 75 percent of the natural gas imported by countries
in Central and Eastern Europe while the countries in Southeast Europe “receive almost all of their natural gas from Russia.”17
“Russia’s Gazprom has acknowledged for the first time a threat to its dominant position in European gas market from an expected
influx of liquefied natural gas (LNG) produced in the United States under [the Trump] administration.”18 Shortly after this
acknowledgment, U.S. LNG made its way to Poland19 and Lithuania. 20 In fact, Poland recently signed a five-year deal with the
United States to import liquefied natural gas into the country in an attempt to decrease dependency on Russian energy supplies.21
 Oil DA
I highly recommend reading either the LNG DA above or the Russia DA---a lot of
these cards are specific to the “effects” of the plan because most of the links
are predicated off the “perception” and are thus not as strong
 Oil DA
Clean energy transition collapses oil revenue---undermines Russian growth,
interdependence, Middle Eastern stability, and reverses solvency.
Champion 21, senior reporter for international affairs at Bloomberg. (Marc Champion, 3-16-
2021, "What Countries Will Fight Over When Green Energy Dominates", Bloomberg,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-03-16/what-countries-will-fight-over-when-
green-energy-dominates)/ceng/msdi21
World of Oil Choke points for oil shipments around the globe Source: U.S. Energy Agency Administration Note: Barrels of oil per day
in 2016 Changing such a fundamental driver of the global pecking order could have multiple
consequences. Vladimir Putin might struggle to sustain Russia’s rise as an “energy superpower.” An
implosion of the U.S. shale industry, combined with China’s dominance in renewables
manufacturing, could define the 21st century’s great superpower contest. The rationale for
American alliances and military bases in the Middle East would weaken. A sudden loss of oil
revenues could trigger Arab Spring-style revolts against the most brittle petrostate autocracies.
The one thing we know about transitions, Goldthau says, is that “they are never, never linear.’’ Think of the post-Cold War
Yugoslav conflicts, or the shift away from planned economies that the former communist bloc began
in the late 1980s. Many ex-republics, from Ukraine to Turkmenistan, remain in turmoil or
stalled well short of market democracy 30 years later. Nor do transitions necessarily end with a neatly tied bow. The
Canadian scientist Vaclav Smil has mapped out coal’s fall from 95% of primary energy use in 1900, to just 26% a century later. Yet in
absolute terms, global consumption rose from an estimated 800 million tons a year in 1900 to about 5.5 billion tons today. Though
the same might not happen to oil, the fuel is likely to burn much longer than most climate scientists would
prefer. Coal's Long Tail Oil provided a lower % of global primary energy consumption until 1960s Source: Vaclav Smil, Energy in
the 20th Century: Resources, conversions, costs, uses and consequences It’s hard to see a smooth, rapid energy
transition taking place in the current competitive and nationalistic environment, says Eirik Waerness,
chief economist of Norway’s state-owned energy giant Equinor ASA. He took part in Grimsson’s commission, and generally agrees
with its optimistic conclusions. “For
the energy transition to happen fully, we probably need a relatively
benign geopolitical climate,” Waerness says. “There is to some extent a virtuous circle we have to create here.” While the
sources of clean energy are available to everyone, the battle will be over who profits from the products used to harness them.
Solar panels, wind turbines and batteries will be in such demand that countries are already
jostling to make sure they get their share of the pie. Many will get left behind. The Solar-Powered Future Is Being
Assembled in China The production line at the Longi plant in Xi'an, China. Photographer: Qilai Shen/Bloomberg About 60% of
solar panels are manufactured by Chinese companies, a level of market influence the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries can only dream of when it comes to oil. That creates a big trade advantage, but not one
President Xi Jinping can easily leverage for geopolitical ends. “What are you worried about? You buy it, you run it and once you have
what you have they can’t take it away from you,” says Karen Smith Stegen, a professor of political science at Jacobs University in
Bremen, Germany, who has examined the potential of 165 countries to emerge from the transition as political winners and losers.
Global inequalities and rivalries will instead likely center on access to technology and finance, standard setting and control of key
raw materials. China
controls more than 90% of some of the rare earth metals needed for electric
vehicles and offshore wind turbines. It already used that monopoly power once, cutting off Japan’s
supply after a 2010 clash near islands both nations claim to own. Japan has since reduced the share of its rare earth imports that
come from China by more than a third to reduce its exposure. Rare Muscle In November, Johnson’s U.K. will host the COP26 climate
summit in Glasgow, Scotland, where countries will negotiate the rules for the road ahead. Leaders want to make sure everyone else
is doing their fair share to cut emissions, and that their countries don't lose out. That
fear could lead to what German
economist Hans-Werner Sinn has called the “green paradox.” He argues the transition could prompt oil
producers—especially those with high extraction costs or shallow reserves—to start pumping as fast as they can
while demand lasts. The increased supply would boost carbon emissions and also lower the price
of crude, making it more competitive with renewables and slowing the move to cleaner energy.
Cheap oil could also decimate the budgets of fragile regimes before they have time to find other
sources of revenue. A February study by U.K. think tank Carbon Tracker found that 40 fossil-fuel dependent
governments would suffer an average 51% drop in oil and gas revenues if global climate targets
are met. That could destabilize governments and leave the likes of Nigeria or Iraq unable to afford
security to deal with threats from terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram and Islamic State.
Hooked on Oil Oil and gas revenue as a percent of total government revenue, 2015-2018 average Source: Carbon Tracker A report
last month by the European Council on Foreign Relations concluded that rich countries will have to help plug the financial holes. The
EU’s Green Deal, in particular, it said could have as great an effect on regional geopolitics as on the Earth’s climate. The bloc
produces less than 10% of global CO₂ emissions, but neighborssuch as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey
depend on its market to buy a large share of their exports. Many of these are carbon intensive
and vulnerable to the EU’s planned carbon border tax. And there’s no guarantee that making nations
more energy self-sufficient will reduce conflict. Oil is the most actively traded commodity on
the planet, and any steep decline in demand would reduce those interactions. “What we know is
trade is a good thing,” says Goldthau at the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies. “When states are
interdependent they have a lower appetite for conflict.”
 Link---Generic
Climate policy destabilizes oil production---postpones extraction, undermines
income pillars, and changes investment strategies.
Marz and Pfeiffer 15 [Waldemar Marz and Johannes Pfeiffer, Center for Energy, Climate and
Resources, Ifo Institute, Germany; “Petrodollar recycling, oil monopoly, and carbon taxes”;
Journal of Environment Economics and Management, vol. 100; March 2020; ScienceDirect, DOI:
10.1016/j.jeem.2019.102263, Emory Libraries]/ceng/msdi21

Climate policy not only threatens fossil energy revenues, but it also has implications for the
capital market, as the recent stranded assets debate suggests. By accounting for the capital
market dimension as a second pillar of an oil monopolist's income and oil supply policy , we
identify a new transmission channel of climate policy in general equilibrium . In addition to oil rents, the
monopolist considers her [their] influence on returns on petrodollar-financed capital assets (“capital
asset motive”) which arises from the complementarity of oil and capital. Due to the introduction or
increase of a future carbon tax which devaluates the oil asset, the exporting country increases future capital
assets to smooth consumption. This strengthens the asset motive and can postpone extraction even
without extraction costs and/or oil substitutes in contrast to large parts of the literature on an
unintended acceleration of extraction (“Green Paradox”). Postponement particularly depends on the
sensitivity of the two income pillars to the carbon tax. This is determined 1) by the strength of the
savings reaction, 2) by the value of oil in production, and 3) by the strength of the link between the
capital market and the oil market. In the numerical analysis, postponement occurs for a wide range of parameter
settings. For the reference calibration, present extraction drops by 1.28 percent with the introduction of
an ad valorem tax which corresponds to 100 dollars per ton of carbon . By contrast, it changes by 0
percent if the monopolist neglects the new capital asset channel and increases by 0.52 percent for a competitive oil market. As
another parameter setting (with Cobb-Douglas production) illustrates, the effect of endogenizing the interest rate for an oil
monopoly in general equilibrium per se (i.e., without accounting for the new capital asset motive) is, by contrast, quite small (−0.03
percent of present extraction), similarly to the case of a competitive oil market as examined in van der Meijden et al. (2015). This
seems plausible since oil's
income share in global GDP is fairly small, too. The role of oil rents for the
income of OPEC countries is much larger. An impact of climate policy on oil rents, thus, may
trigger large relative shifts in savings and, given that oil supply (still) influences the returns on
these assets in the future, more significant adjustments of the extraction schedule than in the
competitive case. Overall, market power in the global oil market can be of fundamental
importance for the effects of climate policies. To put the extreme assumption of monopoly power into perspective,
we briefly discuss a setting with a competitive fringe with an exhaustible oil stock. Due to our two-period setting, this leads to
polarized supply regimes with, in principle, quite different supply responses. But for
a sufficiently strong tax increase
the monopolist may prefer to switch supply regimes, and again to more openly use her market
power thereby even inducing a postponement of overall extraction. Future research with regard to the
capital asset motive could account for the internal dynamics of OPEC, for instance in a more oligopolistic market structure. To
examine the implications of the asset motive in a setting with clean or dirty substitutes and/or a limit pricing regime, which is
beyond the scope of the present framework with a finite time horizon, is another potential avenue for future research. Finally, due
to the redistribution of resource rents between countries and the induced savings reactions , the
future share of the oil-rich country in the global capital stock increases , raising the potential capital
market influence of “petrodollars” as a topic for future research.
Climate policies cause runs on oil markets, diminishing their value.
Barnett 19 [Michael Barnett, Ph.D. candidate in the Joint Program in Financial Economics, the
University of Chicago; “A Run on Oil: Climate Policy, Stranded Assets, and Asset Prices”; June
27th, 2019; https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/events/2019/november/economics-of-
climate-change/files/Paper-7-2019-11-8-Barnett-240PM-1st-paper.pdf]/ceng/msdi21
I study the impacts of uncertain climate policy on financial and economic outcomes using a general equilibrium, production-based
asset pricing model.
Introducing uncertain climate policy causes a model with oil extraction that
otherwise closely follows standard Hotelling model-type outcomes to generate a run on oil, meaning firms
increase oil extraction and exploration more and more as oil reserves go down and the atmospheric temperature increases.
Uncertain climate policy alters the subjective discount rate to be dependent on climate change.
Thus, concerns about future climate policy lead to a run on oil production as future profits from oil
are increasingly discounted as the likelihood that oil reserve assets become stranded increases.
The run on oil induced by uncertain climate policy dynamically pushes down oil firm values and
oil spot prices as agents incorporate the concern of stranded assets into their discounting , while
also generating a significant shift down in the level of oil firm values. Not accounting for uncertain climate policy in
oil firm values would lead to a “carbon bubble,” where oil firm values are overpriced because
the price does not incorporate the risk of oil reserves becoming stranded and the run on oil
production that stranded assets risk causes. In addition, I find empirical evidence in support of the theoretical
predictions of the model. First, I estimate an event-study analysis around the 2016 US presidential election and find that
sectors with large positive exposure to climate policy risk, measured by the model-suggested proxy of exposure
to oil price innovations, saw increased cumulative abnormal returns one day after the election. This effect
increased up to four weeks after the election, following the predicted dynamic implications of the model. In reduced-form
regressions and structural VAR estimates, climate policy
related shocks lead to dynamic and persistent
increases in oil production and decreases in oil firm values and oil spot prices. The reduced form
estimates show the increase in oil production from a climate policy shock is statistically significant for the US and other non-OPEC
regions, whereas it is not statistically significant for OPEC. The
impacts for both sets of estimates are greater in
magnitude when estimated using only the more recent, policy-focused time period sample than
the estimates using the entire available time period. This increase in policy impacts with increasing temperature
and climate policy concern supports the novel mechanism of my model.

Climate policies perceptually bad.

Barnett 19 [Michael Barnett, Ph.D. candidate in the Joint Program in Financial Economics, the
University of Chicago; “A Run on Oil: Climate Policy, Stranded Assets, and Asset Prices”; June
27th, 2019; https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/events/2019/november/economics-of-
climate-change/files/Paper-7-2019-11-8-Barnett-240PM-1st-paper.pdf]/ceng/msdi21
As uncertain climate policy is central to this paper, I elaborate on the interpretation and motivation for the policy structure assumed.
Apart from the example of the Paris Climate Accord previously highlighted, numerous
examples of climate policies in
the US can be used to motivate the type of policy set-up that should be used. The Energy Policy
Conservation Act (EPCA) was one of the first fuel economy goals passed in the US. The policy led to the development of catalytic
converters and unleaded gas in order to reach the required vehicle emissions levels specified by the policy. The Clean Air Act (CAA),
another early policy act that has been amended and updated in more recent times, gives air pollution and vehicle emissions
standards while providing technical and financial assistance to state and local governments in order to enforce and achieve these
standards. The Diesel Emissions Reduction Act (DERA) set increased diesel engine emissions standards with regards to greenhouse
gases, leading to innovations in diesel engine technology spearheaded by Cummins. The Energy Independence and Security Act
(EISA) and Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards have helped lead to the development of hybrid and electric vehicles
such as the Toyota Prius, Nissan Leaf, and Tesla vehicles. Such policy
examples are particularly relevant because
they typically set target goals for future deadlines, which leads to some uncertainty about such
policies being achieved, and focus on emissions from crude oil use in motor vehicles, which
makes up over 70% of crude oil consumption in the US (“Use of Oil,” EIA Independent Statistics and Analysis,
September 19, 2017). Beyond vehicle emissions, Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are another example of the type of
policy being used with regards to climate change. RPS policies, such as the Clean Power Plan (CPP) established by President Obama
in conjunction with the Paris Climate Accord, which I pre- viously mentioned, requires that a certain fraction of electricity be
produced from renewable sources to increase green production/productivity by a proposed future deadline. Though RPS polices are
meant to be mostly market-based, they also include
multipliers to help direct revenue, investments, and
jobs towards renewable sectors to help drive the necessary innovations in the green sector to make the
target goals feasible. Further evidence can be found in the annual 10-K filings for US oil producers . Each
year US firms are required to include Section 1.A - “Risk Factors” in their 10-K’s filed with the SEC , where
they are requested to list the “most significant factors” that affect the future profitability of the firm. Further details on the “Risk
Factors” section of firms’ 10-K filings can be found in Koijen et al. (2016). Examining these filings for the 10 largest oil firms
in terms of reserves held (Anadarko, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, EOG Energy, ExxonMobil, Halliburton, Marathon, Occidental, Phillips
66, and Valero) makes clear that climate policy risks are becoming increasingly more relevant for oil
producers. Between 2004 and 20010, each of these firms began including sections about climate
change policy and regulation. These sections include key words and phrases such as climate change,
climate change policy, climate regulation, carbon-constrained economy, mandate, greenhouse
gases, carbon emissions, increasing competition, reduced demand, alternative energy/fuels,
renewable energy/fuels, and Paris Agreement. The key risks associated with climate policy that firms list include
uncertainty about its impact, timing, and form, as well as potential mandates and shifts in
demand away from oil and towards alternative clean energy sources. Consider the following excerpts from
the 2018 10-K filings of ExxonMobil and Chevron, respectively: “...the ultimate impact of GHG emissions-related
agreements, legislation and measures on the companys financial performance is highly uncertain ...
because the company is unable to predict with certainty... the outcome of political decision-making processes...” ...even with respect
to existing regulatory compliance obligations... it
[is] difficult to predict with certainty the ultimate impact ...” –
ExxonMobil “These requirements could... reduce demand for hydrocarbons , as well as shift hydrocar- bon
demand toward relatively lower-carbon sources... ...governments are providing tax advantages and other subsidies
to support alternative energy sources or are mandating the use of specific fuels or technologies...” – Chevron Finally, the
assumption that the likelihood of climate policy is related to increasing climate change is another important assumption I make.
Figures 4 and 5 provide empirical support for this rela- tionship. Figure 4 shows a map of carbon prices for various countries, as well
as the global average trend in price. The
increasing likelihood of significant climate policy as climate
change increases in my model is in line with the increasing positive trend in the the average
global carbon price shown, which positively relates to observed temperature increases. We also see from this map that
carbon prices exist in relatively few places in the world. Figure 5 shows the time series of US Government Research, Development,
and Deployment for different green sectors and technologies. The time series for RDD has a correlation of 0.40 with US temperature
anomaly (the red line) and 0.72 with global temperature anomaly (not show), consistent with the assumption that there is an
increasing likelihood of significant climate policy and shift to greener production as climate change increases. [Figure
5
omitted] These policy examples and their relation to the major uses of oil, the connection of
policy to increases in temperature, and the types of policy concerns firms are listing as major
risk factors demonstrate that concerns about climate policies that include a restriction on the
use of oil as a production input, a shift in the energy demand share of green energy in the final
output production function, and a positive correlation with temperature are consistent with historical
and current policy actions and are particularly relevant to consider. Furthermore, by exploring the extension of an oil-
sector only policy scenario, I can extend the analysis to explore the case where policy is in line
with simply shutting off the oil sector input without the accompanying technological change in the green sector. This
provides further insight about the policies mentioned above in that there are likely to be cases where governments seek to impose
oil production mandates even if there is no significant green innovation. I will be able to show that this alternative setting the same
mechanisms and dynamic impacts as in the baseline policy setting still exist, though the levels of the outcomes may differ.
Furthermore, I’ll address the differences each policy outcome has in terms of welfare implications.

And, it changes competitiveness with other industries---magnifies off-shoring

and kills industry-wide productivity.
Carbone and Rivers 17 [Jared Carbone, Professor of Economics and Business, Colorado
School of Mines; Nicholas Rivers, M.A. Candidate of Public and International Affairs, University
of Ottawa; “The Impacts of Unilateral Climate Policy on Competitiveness: Evidence From
Computable General Equilibrium Models”; Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, vol.
11, no. 1; Winter 2017; UChicago Press, DOI: 10.1093/reep/rew025, Emory
Libraries]/ceng/msdi21

In summary, the models in our sample are generally in agreement that in response to unilateral climate policy, EITE
output, exports, and employment will decrease, gross welfare levels will decrease, and there
will be some leakage of carbon emissions to other countries. The main outliers deviate from the typical
assumptions regarding market and international trade structure. In particular, if there are increasing returns to scale
in EITE industries, and if EITE commodities manufactured in different countries are
homogeneous, there will be a larger relocation of these industries abroad in response to
unilateral climate policy. This, in turn, leads to much more dramatic reductions in output and
exports (and higher leakage rates). Here we discuss the extent to which the use of these alternative market and
international trade structures is supported by the literature. With regard to market structure, the scope for market power and
increasing returns to scale in many energy-intensive industries is well established in the literature (Babiker 2005). It is surprising that
so few models have explored the importance of these assumptions, but the added computational complexity associated with
modeling this type of behavior may explain the decision in most studies to use competitive, constant-returns-to-scale markets.17
With regard to international trade structure, the assumption of homogeneous traded goods is less well established (Balistreri,
Böhringer, and Rutherford 2015). The models of international trade (from which the trade elasticities used to calibrate the
Armington-based models in our sample are derived) are quite successful in describing observed patterns of bilateral trade. Thus any
argument for using larger elasticities (which would be a consequence of assuming more homogeneous trade) would have to justify
this departure from the standard practice. One such argument for using larger elasticities raised by Babiker (2005) is based on the
time horizon being considered. The elasticity estimates measured by international trade models are best thought of as reflecting
short- or medium-term time horizons. Thus, for analyses of competitiveness effects that focus on long-term impacts, it may be more
appropriate to use larger elasticity values. In a related study, Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) use a model in which trade and market
structures for EITE goods are based on the Melitz (2003) framework, which features imperfect (monopolistic) competition and firms
of varying levels of productivity. The resultingmodel produces outcomes in which large, productive firms
serve export markets while smaller, less productive firms serve domestic markets. Moreover,
changes in output prices (due to trade liberalization, for example) or costs (due to environmental regulation, for
example) result in changes in industry-wide productivity. Balistreri and Rutherford (2012) use this framework to
study unilateral climate policy and produce results that are similar to those generated by Babiker (2005) when
economies of scale were introduced. Both studies find that the introduction of climate policy causes a
strongly elastic response in bilateral trade, more relocation of EITE production to unregulated
regions of the world economy, and higher carbon leakage rates . However, unlike Babiker (2005), Balistreri
and Rutherford (2012) take the trade elasticity values implied by empirical trade models as given, and thus do not find the
dramatically larger effects associated with relaxing both market and trade structure found by Babiker (2005). Thus our survey
suggests that there is a need for further research on alternative specifications of industry and trade structures. Concluding Remarks
It is sometimes asserted that “real economists don’t talk about competitiveness,”18 and indeed the term rarely enters the dialogue
of professional economists. To some degree, this makes good sense: the welfare of a country is generally not tied to the imports,
exports, output, or employment in any particular sector of the economy and, normally, it should not be considered a role of
policymakers to ensure a particular level of sectoral output. Indeed, choosing to maintain the output of a sector through a public
policy such as preferential tax treatment can actually lead to social welfare losses. However, we have argued here that there are
a number of important reasons for economists to engage the policy debate about
competitiveness. In particular, from a pragmatic perspective, in discussions about unilateral climate
policy, competitiveness is high on the list of concerns of public policymakers and the public. In
response to these concerns, a large literature has emerged to assess potential changes in competitiveness indicators following
implementation of carbon policies. Much of this literature uses CGE models. We surveyed this literature and have found that there
is substantial agreement for several key indicators. First, these models estimate that output from energy-
intensive and trade-exposed sectors in the regulating country is likely to be reduced as a result
of unilateral climate policies. Second, the models show some consistency concerning the estimated
welfare impacts of unilateral climate policies, with most models predicting only very small
changes in social welfare, even for quite large mitigation targets. We also find, however, that the consistency
in results across studies may be driven at least partly by the studies’ common assumptions. Our survey revealed that the few models
in our sample that departed from the standard assumptions regarding industry and trade structure yielded significantly different
results. Thus additional research is needed to explore alternatives to the common assumptions of CGE models and to validate the
mainstream CGE assumptions. Other potential directions for future research include:
 I/L
Demand shocks cause instability
Van de Graaf 18 [Thijs Van de Graaf, Professor of Political Science, Ghent University, Belgium;
“Chapter 4: Battling for a Shrinking Market: Oil Producers, the Renewables Revolution, and the
Risk of Stranded Assets”; The Geopolitics of Renewables; January 11th, 2018; ISBN: 978-3-319-
67855-9, Emory Libraries]/ceng/msdi21

For most of the past century, the geopolitics of oil have been guided by perceptions of scarcity
(e.g. Stern 2016). The concept of “peak oil” is central to this dominant understanding of energy geopolitics. It was coined in the
1950s by M. King Hubbert, an American geophysicist working for Shell. Hubbert posited that, for any given geographical area, the
rate of production over time would resemble a bell-shaped curve. The production of petroleum was thus projected to climb until it
reaches a plateau, after which it would enter a terminal decline. When oil prices reached their all-time high in July 2008, there was a
widespread belief that “peak oil” had finally arrived. The projections of ever-rising energy demand added to the belief that oil prices
would keep on rising (Hamilton 2014), coupled with the rapid depletion of existing oil fields, were believed to only intensify the
scramble for oil and gas reserves. The general expectation was that these developments would only inflate the power of OPEC and
other big producers such as Russia (Klare 2009). Recent events such as the build-up of tensions over a group
of oil-rich, disputed islands in the South China Sea are often interpreted as part of this global
“race for what’s left” (Klare 2012). This prevailing view of scarcity-induced conflict over oil and gas resources is flawed.
Rather than facing an imminent shortage of hydrocarbons, the world still hosts plenty of oil and gas resources.
Moreover, key shifts on the demand side are eating into oil’s global market share. Oil abundance is
not a new condition. In fact, the perennial problem for the oil industry has always been to
socially organize scarcity (Bridge and Wood 2010, 565). From the 1861 Oil Creek Association, over the monopoly of
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil, the quotas of the Texas Railroad Commission, the Seven Sisters oligopoly, and the would-be cartel of
OPEC, the history of oil is littered with examples of producer attempts to curtail the supply of oil (Yergin 1991; McNally 2017). To
the extent that oil prices would remain “lower for longer” as oil is increas- ingly displaced by
other fuels and renewables, we can expect to see more socio-political instability in countries
that are heavily reliant on hydrocarbon rents. It is important to note that the oil price fall in the 1980s
played a key role in bringing the Soviet Union to its knees, and a decade later low prices
continued to cripple [hinder] efforts by Russian President Yeltsin to liberalize and reform the economy
(Helm 2017, 26). The level of vulnerability is the highest in the Middle East and North Africa , where
there is a large share of relatively young people that all need to find suitable jobs, and where the
state’s dependence on oil rents is the highest (see Table 4.1; de Jong et al. 2017). As Smith Stegen argues in this
volume, the losers in a renewable energy world will be those countries with strong hydrocarbon
lobbies that have offered few incentives for renewable energies. Of the major oil producers, Saudi
Arabia arguably has the most to lose. Its population has grown from 4 million in 1960 to 30 million in 2015. The median
age is around 18. Keeping this young population content was already a big chal- lenge for the Al-Saud dynasty and it is set to
become only more difficult when oil prices start sliding (Helm 2017, 119–120). Iran, by contrast, has a lot of advantages. It has a
much broader economic base, a longer tradition of trading, and lower fertility rates. Like Iraq, the country oil production is much
under its potential due to years of sanctions (Helm 2017, 123–124). This might in the long run turn out to be an advantage, as these
economies prepare themselves for a post-oil age. Russia is also a major loser from the shift away
from oil. Even though it is less dependent on oil revenues than Saudi Arabia and some smaller Gulf states, its endemic corrup-
tion, autocracy and lack of an industrial base will leave the Russian economy in a precarious state when oil revenues dry up. When
the Russian economy sinks in a post-oil future, “there
will be a tension between the need for external
enemies to play out the Russian nationalism theme and the lack of money to pay for further
adventures” (Helm 2017, 142). The US comes out as a clear winner. Thanks to surging shale production and declining domestic
demand, it is the only major power that is moving steadily towards energy self-sufficiency by the 2020s. While this is neither
tantamount to autarky, nor will it insulate the US from the vagaries of the international market, it brings both economic and
strategic benefits. Low energy prices have directly benefitted the US economy and the domestic energy revolution has also helped
drive a decline in the US trade deficit, because of the reduced need for hydrocarbon imports (Dale 2015). Strategically, the US
may want to revisit its old “Carter
doctrine,” according to which it spreads a security umbrella over the Persian Gulf
(O’Hanlon 2010; Klare 2016). This might be a good thing for the US since
the Middle East has cost the US a lot of
time, money and blood. A possible US military retreat from the Persian Gulf might further create anx-
ieties in China and other big Asian consumers over their energy security. In a future world of low oil
prices and decarbonization, however, China might thrive in other ways. Thanks to the authoritarian power of the state, it has
assumed top positions in the production of clean energy sources, and the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement seems to
have only strengthened its resolve in that regard. Like Europe and Japan, China
is heavily dependent on oil imports
and if these are displaced by homegrown renewables, this might lower these countries’ energy
import bills and reduce their strategic vulnerability to security of supply disruptions. Clearly, oil
abundance does not strip hydrocarbons from their geopolitical content. Quite the contrary, the
existence of too much oil and gas could equally trigger geopolitical strife, conflict, and war. In a
context of abundance, oil producers stand to benefit from situations in which their direct competitors cannot produce at full
capacity, for some reason or another. The
continued unrest in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, for instance, plays into
the hands of all other oil exporters since it helps to keep oil prices high while also preventing
large additional oil supplies from reaching the international markets. In a ‘benign’ interpretation, such
outages are the result of purely internal political dynamics. In Libya, for example, oil production briefly restored after the 2011
toppling of the Gaddafi regime, yet strife among different clans and factions has since curbed the country’s oil output.
 Impact (Post-COVID)
Post-COVID provides the brink---demand has one cycle before change, which
determines if the post-oil transition is peaceful or not.
Williams 21 [Len Williams; “Is oil dead? ‘Black gold’ loses its sparkle”; Engineering and
Technology; January 20th, 2021; https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2021/01/is-oil-dead-
black-gold-loses-its-sparkle/]/ceng/msdi21

Then there is the policy response to the recession. Many countries have signalled their commitment to
‘building back greener’. Governments, especially in Europe, have made significant commitments to using the crisis as an
opportunity to boost ‘green’ industries. This too could put oil out of favour. While the pandemic is the biggest
immediate challenge to oil, it has not been the only crisis facing producers. In March 2020, a price war
between Saudi Arabia and Russia led to a significant drop in prices per barrel. Professor Michael Bradshaw, an oil expert at the UK
Energy Research Centre (UKERC), explains the reason behind the spat. Since 2014, American shale oil production has taken a
growing share of the global market and lowered prices. This led the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and
other nations including Russia to try to stabilise prices by reducing supply. However, communication between Russia and OPEC
broke down in 2020, as Russia continued to oversupply the market. Saudi Arabia responded by increasing production, leading to a
price war. Another factor weighing on the future of oil is the renewables revolution and the concomitant electrification of
transport. Energy from renewable sources currently only makes up about 11 per cent of global energy supply, yet this proportion is
increasing fast. A combination of improving technology, economies of scale and government incentives mean these alternative
energy sources may soon compete directly with oil. And, crucially, electric vehicle sales are rising fast and will take a bigger share of
the market over time. That, in turn, will reduce demand for petrol and diesel. Oil firms are seeing another
fundamental challenge: staffing. Thanks to a tarnished reputation and climate change concerns, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to attract new talent in some countries. According to one 2019 study, the number of graduates applying to work
at UK oil and gas firms dropped by 61 per cent between 2012 and 2017. “We think we will see oil consumption down by 8 per cent in
2020 compared to 2019,” says Cailin Birch, analyst at research firm the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). “We don’t expect full oil
demand to return before 2023.” She adds that prices per barrel will stabilise around the $45 mark (in 2010, by contrast, a
barrel traded at $79). Although the EIU sees demand for crude creeping up after 2023, Birch says they expect
global oil consumption to peak in the late 2020s – which correlates with Capital Economics’ view that ‘ peak demand’ will
arrive around 2030. Does this mean that oil will be consigned to the history books within a decade? Not necessarily. “If you
look at the OECD [a club of wealthy countries], we actually had peak oil demand in 2005,” explains UKERC’s Bradshaw.
However, “in the global South and non-OECD countries, we are not yet past peak demand”. Birch of the EIU
points to the fact that China has increased oil consumption in the second half of 2020 as the government pushes to
kickstart an industry-led recovery. For Bradshaw, it is likely there will at least be one more cycle of oil
demand. “The next question is what happens after we reach peak global demand.” Depending on who you ask,
oil usage will plateau at a high level for many years, decline gradually or drop off very steeply. The way that demand
changes around the world will depend on a wide variety of factors too. Today, the well-known ‘oil majors’ – firms
such as BP, Shell or Total – actually only hold around 12 per cent of oil reserves. The vast majority is in the hands of National Oil
Companies (NOCs) such as Saudi Arabia’s Aramco, Russia’s Gazprom or Mexico’s Pemex. This means that even if firms like BP
commit to becoming cleaner ‘energy’ companies, their influence is smaller than in the past. NOCs will have a far bigger role in
influencing future demand, and their actions may be unpredictable. For states that rely heavily on oil revenues, there is little
incentive to cut production. Bradshaw points out that NOCs are aware that oil may be a resource with a limited future, so they will
potentially try to produce more of it; it will be better to sell the resource at a lower price now than leave it in the ground. There is
also the question of need. Even if the whole world managed to electrify car and train transport,
it’s going to be an awful lot harder to power ships and planes with anything other than oil
products. Similarly, many industries, including plastics, chemicals, fertilisers and textiles depend on products derived from oil.
Until alternatives are found, we’re likely to see continued demand for many decades. Oil remains the world’s primary
source of energy. The commodity has brought enormous wealth, huge advances in social and economic development, and
countless inventions and conveniences. Yet it has many well-documented downsides. Burning oil-derived fuels is, of course, a major
source of greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution. It has also fuelled corruption and been a significant factor in many an armed
conflict. So, what might declining oil consumption mean for global society? Bradshaw points out that many
countries’ economies depend on oil, and that “increased competition for what demand is left is also a
potential cause for volatility”. He adds that “new tensions will also emerge around low-carbon
technology, so a world with less oil consumption won’t suddenly become more peaceful”.
Struggles over supply of materials needed for EV batteries or solar PV cells could generate
conflict in future, for example. That said, Kingsmill Bond of think tank the Carbon Tracker says: “A world using more
renewables will be a more local world, a more just world.” We might well see fewer fights over access to resources if
countries can power themselves with cheap electricity generated on their territory. However, Bond notes this
transition will be challenging. “Unless correctly managed, the switch will create instability
because of the fragility of the petrostates.”

Oil sector collapse causes instability through price shift.

Smith 21 [Elliot Smith; “Oil nations tipped for political instability if the world moves away from
fossil fuels”; CNBC; March 26th, 2021; https://www.cnbc.com/2021/03/26/oil-nations-tipped-
for-political-instability-if-fossil-fuels-abandoned.html]/ceng/msdi21

Analysts suggested the worst-hit countries could enter “doom loops of shrinking hydrocarbon
revenues, political turmoil, and failed attempts to revive flatlining non-oil sectors.” Since the oil
price crash of 2014, most exporters have either stagnated or reversed efforts to diversify their
economies, Maplecroft data highlighted, with many doubling down on production in the ensuing years in a
bid to plug revenue holes. “Despite this, the majority took a hit on their foreign exchange reserves anyway, including Saudi Arabia,
which has burnt through almost half of its 2014 dollar stockpile,” the report added. Break-even costs, the capacity
to
diversify and political resilience were identified as the three key factors determining the severity
of the impact on stability when the expected energy transition begins to bite. “Currently, if countries’ external break-
evens – the oil prices they need to pay for their imports – remain above what markets can offer,
they have limited choices: draw down foreign exchange reserves like Saudi Arabia since 2014, or devalue their currency like
Nigeria or Iraq in 2020, effectively rebalancing their imports and exports at the expense of living standards,” the report explained.
Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, relies on crude sales for around 90% of its foreign exchange earnings and
has devalued its naira currency twice since March last year. The IMF last month urged the country’s central bank to
devalue once again, but met with resistance. Verisk Maplecroft researchers suggested that recent currency devaluations
were a “harbinger of the bleak options” ahead for oil-producing countries, who will have to either diversify or face
forced economic adjustments. “Many, if not a majority, of net oil producers are going to struggle with
diversification largely because they lack the economic and legal institutions, infrastructure and
human capital needed,” said Head of Market Risk James Lockhart Smith. “Even when such institutions are in
place, the political environment, corruption or governance challenges and entrenched
interests mean some may not reform their way out of trouble , even where it is the rational course.” The
most vulnerable countries are higher-cost producers that are heavily dependent on oil for
revenues, have lower capacity to diversify and are less politically stable, the report said, identifying Nigeria, Algeria, Chad and
Iraq as the first to be hit “if the storm breaks” due to their fixed or crawling exchange rates.
 AT: COVID Thumper
No thumpers---the demand shock is temporary and restores confidence.
Smith et. al 21 [Grant Smith; Alex Longley; Andy Hoffman; “After a catastrophic year, oil is
posting a remarkable recovery”; World Oil; February 7th, 2021;
https://www.worldoil.com/news/2021/2/5/after-a-catastrophic-year-oil-is-posting-a-
remarkable-recovery]/ceng/msdi21

Plunging Stockpiles The strongest sign of the recovery is one of the most esoteric -- a price structure known as
backwardation. Near-term futures contracts have built up a sizable premium relative to later months, indicating
immediate supplies are tightening fast. One gauge watched closely by crude traders -- the difference between
contracts based on North Sea Brent crude settling in December versus those a year later -- has surged to a two-year high
of $2.84 a barrel. That’s a signal for refiners to dig into the huge stockpiles that built up during the
worst of last year’s demand slump. These inventories are plunging everywhere, from major
depots in the U.S., China and the United Arab Emirates to the tanker fleet once commandeered
to house spare barrels at sea. Global inventories have declined by about 300 million barrels
since the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and its partners made deep production
cuts in May, the International Energy Agency estimates. The cartel projects that it will deplete another
82 million barrels this quarter, pushing stockpiles in industrialized nations down to their five-
year average by August. Bloated inventories weigh on oil prices, so eliminating the overhang
could pave the way for a further recovery. “We are drawing stocks,” said Ben Luckock, co-head of oil
trading at Trafigura Group in Geneva. Prices have recovered well and “can seriously perform come
summer both in crude and in products,” he said. The crisis triggered by the deadly coronavirus was the worst the
petroleum industry has ever seen. Fuel demand crashed by a fifth, prices slumped below zero, producers fought viciously over
customers, and more than a billion surplus barrels poured into storage tanks around the world. Yet oil’s emergence from
the calamity has been stark. Futures rallied to a one-year high near $60 a barrel in London last week
as Chinese consumption surpasses pre-virus levels, the vaccine rollout restores confidence, and
the OPEC cartel and its allies keep a tight leash on supply. With western economies still pounded by a high death toll
and lockdowns, demand for transport fuels -- particularly in aviation -- remains depressed. But it’s roaring for the
petroleum products that cater to a society working and consuming at home -- ones that power
ships, make plastics, and fire up space heaters. “The recovery is proceeding at a faster rate than
people perceived,” said Ed Morse, head of commodities research at Citigroup Inc. “The demand recovery is going
to look stellar. The inventory draw is significantly greater than what many people thought.” The
sudden reversal is a salve for an array of producers. It’s offering supermajors like Exxon Mobil Corp. and
BP Plc a glimmer of hope after a grueling year. For countries like Iraq and Angola, which have sought aid from
the International Monetary Fund to quell economic crises, it’s a lifeline. Even wealthier exporters like Saudi Arabia consider the
extra revenue crucial. Asian Recovery One of the forces driving this rapid turnaround is the rebound in oil
consumption, particularly in Asia “Not only did China have a V-shaped recovery but they’re actually back into significant
growth mode,” Royal Dutch Shell Plc chief executive Ben van Beurden said in a Bloomberg television interview last week. “ We are
quite optimistic about what it is that we are seeing in China.” The world’s biggest crude importer’s success at
containing the coronavirus has allowed a rapid resumption of economic activity. Government data showed a record stockpile
decline in December as processing volumes increased. In India, fuel consumption has inched back toward normal
levels as the spread of the coronavirus prompted the use of more cooking fuel and gasoline. Overall, the nation’s oil-product
demand in December was 1.4% lower than year-ago levels, provisional data from its oil ministry showed. Big Boxes Asia’s
resilience is only part of oil’s comeback. It’s being amplified by less obvious sources of strength
that can be summed up as freight, chemicals, and cold. Consumers are diverting spending from holidays and restaurant meals
toward deliveries of physical goods. That entails shipping box-loads of stuff across the planet, which is
spurring demand for diesel to power ships, trucks and freight trains. United Parcel Service Inc., the courier
whose biggest customer is Amazon.com Inc., said it observed a seasonal peak almost without parallel. Profits from
making diesel in the U.S. are at a nine-month high of about $15 a barrel. “Diesel has been the standout,” said Morse. “In a lot of
parts of the world, trucking demand went up -- and that’s part and parcel of the pandemic, where people stop shopping at retail
stores and start shopping at home.” The e-commerce boom is lifting other hydrocarbons as well. The packaging needed for all those
deliveries is boosting demand for naphtha, used in plastics. Typically trading at a discount to Brent crude, the oil product is at a rare
premium of 30 cents a barrel -- the strongest in seasonal terms in at least five years, according to DV Trading. Chemicals giants like
Dow Inc. and BASF SE have reported bumper earnings amid the plastic bonanza, while refiners such as Austria’s OMV AG also
observed robust demand. Big Freeze Then there’s exceptionally cold weather this winter, which inflicted freezing
temperatures on Asia and one of the worst snow storms to ever hit New York City. The chill boosted global oil demand by
1 million barrels a day, as soaring prices of natural gas prompted the switch to diesel generators for power, according to
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. It also stirred purchases of propane, used in the heaters that became ubiquitous outside
bars and restaurants in parts of the U.S. where indoor dining was discouraged.

COVID doesn’t thump---subsidy and storage for temporary means.

Hughes 20 [Mark Hughes, Founding Faculty Director, Kleinman Center for Energy Policy,
University of Pennsylvania; “Bailout or Subsidy: Oil in the Age of Pandemic”; March 31 st, 2020;
https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/news-insights/bailout-or-subsidy-oil-in-the-age-of-
pandemic-2/]/ceng/msdi21

But production hasn’t stopped completely. Are extraction and refining companies simply selling
for reduced profits or perhaps even at a loss? That is likely happening in many transactions. But there is
something else going on as well—something that has big implications for both the government stimulus
efforts and the shape of our future economic recovery. That something else is storage. Energy
companies employ a variety of ways to store crude and refined products. There are vast storage tank
facilities or underground caverns at points along the oil supply chain. There are also large capacities for
storage in facilities normally devoted to transporting oil and its derivatives: tanker ships, tanker rail cars, tanker
trucks, as well as long distance pipelines. Fossil energy companies have strong incentives to continue extracting
and refining as long as there is a place to store products until demand and price recover. IHS
Markit estimates that the gap between world oil (liquids) supply and demand will be 7.4million barrels/d for
Q1 2020 and 12.4 million barrels/d in Q2 2020. Storage facilities are filling fast around the globe and soon will
be full. According to commodity data from KPLER, there are currently over 3.5 billion barrels of global crude oil inventories. This
enormous global supply has large and complex implications for the eventual recovery of the global economy. But the concern here
focuses on the urgent question of how to design government assistance to fossil energy companies. This assistance
is rightly
characterized as a bailout, an extraordinary government effort to soften the blow of crashing demand
and ensure that the damage done does not persist after demand returns. In the United States, the
recently approved Coronavirus Relief Package excluded $3 billion to “bail out” the oil industry. But that exclusion was at the last
minute and at the behest of the Democratic caucus; next time, a stimulus package may well include a bailout for oil. In Canada,
plans to rescue the industry are in the making. As prices continue to plummet, oil state producers in the U.S.
and around the world will likely be exploring ways to provide relief to oil companies. Any of that assistance
made available for oil must be designed to prevent an appropriate bailout from becoming a hidden subsidy. Any compensation for
the costs of storing oil that sells for $25 a barrel now but might sell for $100 a barrel in a future recovery is not a bailout. Instead, it
is subsidy that provides a future windfall for oil companies.
It proves future demand is key.
Dickson 21 [Duane Dickson, Principal of Deloitte Consulting’s Energy, Resources & Industials
group; “Facing the challenge of transformation in the next decade”; Deloitte; 2021;
https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/energy-and-resources/articles/oil-and-gas-industry-
outlook.html]/ceng/msdi21

The Brent oil price benchmark has reflected inertia at around $45/bbl since June 2020.7 Oil’s stability at this price
range is reassuring, but its inability to break the upper level ($50/bbl) despite a bull run in the broader equity and commodity
markets is disconcerting. In fact, oil was the worst-performing commodity, falling behind even coal in 2020, and its range-bound
behavior has been atypical.8 The result: O&G companies remain short of confidence and capital to invest at this price range. What
do range-bound oil prices mean for the industry’s supply-demand balance? Oil and gas is a
depleting resource with an average annual production decline rate of 6–7%.9 Add to that five years of low
capital spending and deep cuts in 2020 (global O&G capex is projected to fall by more than 23% year over year in 2020) and we have
an industry at risk of underinvestment.10 Just to replace the annual consumption and offset natural field declines, the industry
would need to invest more than $525 billion annually.11 But will this underinvestment affect 2021 supplies? Probably not,
considering OECD crude inventories are still at an all-time high of 2,962 million barrels and OPEC+ nations have 7–
8 MMbbl/d of pledged output cuts to be rolled back.12 Yet in the medium-to-long term, underinvestment could
affect supplies, especially from non-OPEC producing nations. But, unlike in the past, demand (or lack of it) will
likely have a larger influence on the future supply-demand balance. Although there is a visible uptick in
road traffic, local office commuting and international travel both remain muted : Work-related travel in the
United States still remains 35-40% below the prepandemic level.13 Even in the base-case scenario, analysts expect 2021 global jet
fuel demand to remain below 75% of prepandemic levels.14 With the risk to both supply and demand, the jury is still
out on the future supply-demand balance. In our postelection poll (see “About the study”), 44% of O&G executive
respondents expect the oil market to remain in balance, and 33% of O&G respondents expect a high risk of a
new supply crunch over the next five years (2020–2025). In light of this uncertainty, what should O&G companies do to guard
against downside risk and be ready for any potential upside in 2021? Companies should consider accelerating digital transformation
to reduce operating costs, “variablizing” their fixed costs of support functions, maintaining flexibility in their operations, and
optimizing their capital allocation for the projects of tomorrow.15

It will rebound---question is investment care---demand’s key.

Crowley 20 [Kevin Crowley; “With No Cuts Left to Make, Big Oil Sits and Waits for a Recovery”;
Bloomberg; October 31st, 2020; https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-31/with-
no-cuts-left-to-make-big-oil-sits-and-waits-for-a-recovery]/ceng/msdi21

Chevron, for example, plans to invest just $14 billion next year, even after recently buying Noble Energy Inc. That’s not far
above the $10 billion level that the company has historically said is the minimum to sustain
production. CFO Pierre Breber said the company would let oil volumes drop if it made financial sense.
“We’re not trying to sustain short-term production,” he said. The question is not will Big Oil
survive but whether it can still make investors care. BP and Shell are no longer the dividend
linchpins of European stock markets. Exxon, the profit powerhouse that dominated the top spot on the S&P 500 Index
for years, now ranks outside the top 50. Energy is now worth about 2% of the S&P 500 Index, making it a rounding error in many
generalist fund managers’ portfolios. “Making
energy relevant and investable again is the million dollar
question,” said Jennifer Rowland, a St. Louis-based analyst at Edward Jones. “They’re still trying to figure
that out.” For Rowland, having a compelling strategy in a low-carbon future is key. While that hands an advantage to the Europeans,
who are pledging net zero emissions by mid-century, unlike Exxon
and Chevron, BP and Shell still need a
recovery in their traditional businesses to fund the move, Rowland said. With less cash, a green
pivot becomes more difficult. Exxon’s Swiger is convinced that prices will recover. Things are so bad
that prices across oil, refining and chemicals are “at or significantly below bottom of the cycle
conditions,” he said. Whether Big Oil investors are willing to wait for that forecast to come true
remains to be seen.