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WHY RIVALS INTERVENE
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Why Rivals Intervene
International Security and Civil Conflict
JOHN MITTON
Title: Why rivals intervene : international security and civil conflict / John
Mitton.
Names: Mitton, John, author.
Description: Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: Canadiana (print) 20220427674 | Canadiana (ebook)
20220427712 | ISBN 9781487508272 (cloth) | ISBN 9781487537906 (PDF) |
ISBN 9781487537913 (EPUB)
Subjects: LCSH: Intervention (International law) – Case studies. |
LCSH: Civil war – Case studies. | LCSH: Security, International –
Case studies. | LCGFT: Case studies.
Classification: LCC JZ6368 .M58 2023 | DDC 341.5/84 – dc23
1 Introduction 3
2 A Theory of Rivalry (Intervention) 19
3 The Indian-Pakistani Rivalry 53
4 Indian Intervention in Afghanistan 73
5 Pakistani Intervention in Afghanistan 107
6 The Syrian-Israeli Rivalry and Intervention in Lebanon 159
7 The US-Soviet Rivalry and Intervention in Angola 197
8 Conclusion 229
References 243
Index 271
Tables, Figures, and Maps
Tables
Figures
Maps
1 Afghanistan 71
2 Lebanon 173
3 Angola 207
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the many people who have helped and supported
me along the way. First on this list is Frank Harvey, mentor and friend.
Also, the staff, students, and faculty over the years in the Depart-
ment of Political Science and at the Centre for the Study of Security
and Development at Dalhousie University, particularly Tracy Powell,
David Beitelman, Brian Bow, and Ruben Zaiotti. Thanks as well to the
staff, students, and faculty at the Centre for Military, Security and Stra-
tegic Studies at the University of Calgary, particularly Rob Huebert for
his interest and his kindness. Thank you to the faculty and staff of the
School of International Relations at the University of Southern Califor-
nia, particularly Patrick James, a role model in work ethic and generos-
ity. Thanks to the entire Department of Political Science at Memorial
University of Newfoundland. Thank you to Daniel Quinlan at the Uni-
versity of Toronto Press for finding a way. Most importantly, thank you
to my family: the immediate – Heather, Susan, Ron, Julia, Harold, and
Charlotte; and the extended – Ruth, Rob, Neil, Mary Ann, Laura, Brian,
The Girls, and the entire Moffatt clan. There are others too numerable
to name. I am incredibly grateful.
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WHY RIVALS INTERVENE
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Chapter One
Introduction
Civil wars are international events. Of the 150 civil conflicts that
occurred between 1949 and 1999, 101 (or 67 per cent) experienced out-
side intervention of some kind (Regan 2000, 2002). As Balch-Lindsay
and Enterline (2000, 618) have suggested, “external intervention in civil
wars is nearly ubiquitous.” Even those conflicts that do not experience
intervention have consequences for other states by, inter alia, altering
the international structure, destabilizing the region, and threatening to
spill across borders (making them pertinent to the decisionmakers of
proximate nations; see Kathman 2011).
The study of the nexus between international relations and civil war
is not new and has progressed through several more or less definable
stages, while nonetheless remaining generally marginal in the discipline.
Not surprisingly, the early literature was significantly influenced by the
dynamics of the Cold War, particularly American and Soviet involve-
ment in the Third World. Given the implications of this involvement –
and the apparent centrality of Third World proxy wars1 to broader
superpower relations – a subset of scholars became interested in the
linkage between internal and external conflict, even as the majority of
the academy continued to treat inter- and intrastate war independently
(early exceptions included Rosenau 1964, 1969; and Mitchell 1970); a
1 I have opted to focus on “intervention,” rather than simply “proxy war,” as the
former encapsulates a wider range of behaviour (up to and including direct military
involvement) that is of interest to the theory I present. Put simply, all proxy wars are
interventions but not all interventions are proxy wars.
6 Why Rivals Intervene
practice that largely continues to this day (see the summary in Levy
and Thompson 2010).
Although several quantitative analyses did appear during the last
two decades of the Cold War (see, for example, Dunér 1983; Gurr and
Duvall 1973; Pearson 1974a, 1974b; Rasler 1983; Tilemma 1989), a rela-
tive dearth of appropriate datasets and the persistent historical cen-
trality of US-Soviet rivalry meant that historical and comparative case
studies emphasizing the foreign policy dynamics, geostrategic incen-
tives, and political preferences of superpower interveners continued to
dominate the literature. With the end of the Cold War and the devel-
opment and distribution of more comprehensive data on intervention,
however, quantitative analysis (as elsewhere in political science) gradu-
ally rose in prominence, eventually becoming the standard approach in
the analysis of external-internal linkages.
This shift in the literature was about more than just methodology,
however. Also important was the proliferation of civil conflicts and
the concomitant decline of interest in traditional state-to-state conflict
(the focus of much of IR study during the Cold War). The result was a
greater emphasis on civil conflict itself, as a subject to be studied for its
own sake (see the discussion in Florea 2012). Scholars became particu-
larly interested in, for example, the onset and/or causes of civil war
(see Regan 2010), a focus embodied by the well-known “greed versus
grievance” debate: whether civil conflict initiation was best explained
by incentives for material gain or by identity concerns related to ideo-
logical/religious/ethnic characteristics.
The study of intervention, in this context, became largely about
understanding the consequences, or outcomes, of foreign involvement.
Scholars examined the effects of international intervention on the dura-
tion, severity, intractability, and/or outcome of civil war (see, for exam-
ple, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom 2004; Cunningham 2010; Elbadawi
and Sambanis 2002; Heger and Salehyan 2007; Mason and Fett 1996;
Regan 1996, 2002), as well as the conflict-resolution approaches inter-
veners might employ to end them (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce
2008; Cunningham 2006; Lemke and Regan 2004). This literature estab-
lished, in broad terms, that third-party interventions can prolong and
exacerbate civil wars (for an exception, see Collier, Hoeffler, and Söder-
bom 2004), particularly if interveners do not have as their primary
goal immediate conflict resolution (see, for example, Akcinaroglu and
Radziszewski 2005; Cunningham 2010; Walter 2002). Hironaka’s study
of “never-ending” civil wars suggests that balancing, or as she calls
them, “dual-sided” interventions are a major factor “extend[ing] the
length and intensity of a civil war by pouring resources into opposing
Introduction 7
sides, adding more and more fuel to the fire” (2005, 131–2). The fre-
quency of these competing interventions approaches that of interven-
tions more generally; if, as suggested above, over two-thirds of civil
wars since 1949 have experienced intervention of some kind, Hironaka
notes that “almost half of all civil wars fought since 1945 saw external
support given to both sides of the conflict,” which is to say that balancing
interventions and the deleterious effects they bring are endemic fea-
tures of civil conflict.
In light of these established consequences, scholars began to focus on
the potential causes of intervention (see, for example, Balch-Lindsay and
Enterline 2000; Carment, James, and Zeynep 2006; Carment and James
1996). Much of this work, however, focused on the structure and/or
characteristics of the conflict itself that might trigger intervention (for
example, the presence or involvement of an ethnic kin-group). More
recent work has examined the strategic environment facing potential
interveners, and the possibility that the dynamic interaction between
multiple interveners influences decision-making (see, for example,
Aydin 2010; Aydin and Regan 2012; Findley and Teo 2006; Fordham 2008;
Gent 2007, 2010; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Salehyan, Gleditsch,
and Cunningham 2011). For her part, Hironaka (2005, 137) suggests that
third-party intervention can be – to appropriate Clausewitz – interstate
conflict by other means: “The proliferation of weak states and corre-
sponding changes in the international community have led to the use
of intervention as a means of pursuing interstate rivalry or aggression.”
This, essentially, is the phenomenon I explore in this book.
The claim that intervention can serve as a proxy for interstate conflict
is made elsewhere. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000, 620), for instance,
note that interventions may be undertaken for reasons “wholly unre-
lated to the civil war itself,” often having more to do with the choices
of other third-party actors and geopolitical considerations related to
the international environment. Such considerations figure prominently,
of course, in studies of superpower intervention during the Cold War.
Fordham (2008), for instance, found that American intervention was
more likely in the event of Soviet intervention in the same conflict (see
also Gent 2010; Lagon 1992; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Scott 1996;
Yoon 1997). In her review of the literature on American interventions,
Amber Aubone (2013) identifies systemic and dyadic variables as one
set of explanations (along with internal determinants, domestic politics,
and individual and organizational beliefs) that have received support
through empirical analysis. As she explains: “The common assumption
is that US intervention in civil conflicts during the Cold War was driven
largely by the security concerns of containment and the motivation to
8 Why Rivals Intervene
be more powerful than its rival, the USSR” (Aubone 2013, 287). The
influence of the “geographic and strategic environment,” as Balch-
Lindsay and Enterline (2000) identify it, is of course not unique to the
superpowers during the Cold War; the salience of particular conflicts to
particular dyadic relationships in the international system will likewise
generate opportunities and challenges – and strategic sequences – that
make balancing interventions possible and even likely.
In their overview of the literature on third-party intervention in civil
conflicts, Linebarger and Enterline (2016, 99) note that, “while it is
widely accepted that third parties are strategic actors within the context
of a conflict, their strategic interactions with the broader international
environment is a neglected area of study.” They go on to identify “The
World Politics of Intervention” as an important area of future research.
Specifically, they suggest greater efforts be made to “connect civil wars
to insights in the broader world politics literature” (106). This includes
tying the decision to intervene to assessments of the international envi-
ronment, ending the hitherto exclusive focus in the civil war literature
on “the traits of the conflict or conflict-state” (108). By focusing on
international rivalry, this book is among the first full-length, detailed
examinations of the “World Politics of Intervention,” and thus consti-
tutes a needed step in the development of the literature on civil conflict
intervention.
The extant literature has established that ‘rivalry’ is strongly cor-
related with the decision to intervene. For example, Findley and Teo
(2006) find that a state was eleven times more likely to intervene if a
rival state was supporting the government in a civil conflict, and four
times more likely if a rival was supporting the opposition.2 Yet recog-
nizing that such a correlation exists does not illuminate the underlying
cause(s) of the behaviour. What is it about rivalry that motivates states
to intervene in this way, particularly given the enormous costs and risks
associated with involvement in an outside civil conflict? Why would
violence and war that occur in another country – often one with seem-
ingly minimal immediate economic or strategic significance – trigger
potentially risky entanglement?
Such questions are familiar to diplomatic historians. The legacy
of Vietnam and other costly interventions (or “over-extensions”) in
2 There are different sets of criteria for establishing that a relationship constitutes
“rivalry” (X number of conflicts over X number of years, etc.), with obvious
implications for the coding of rivalry as a variable and the resulting statistical
analysis. Often, scholars performing quantitative analysis will check their findings
against alternative formulations (see, for example, Colaresi et al. 2008).
Introduction 9
International Rivalry
In lay parlance, the meaning of the term rivalry is relatively well under-
stood, and the designation has long been used in diplomatic history and
foreign policy analysis. One understands that the United States and the
Soviet Union were “rivals” during the Cold War; indeed, much of the
10 Why Rivals Intervene
3 While intuitive, this assumption was not always incorporated into studies of
international conflict, which traditionally treated war atomistically, separating
particular conflicts from their historical context. See, for example, Midlarsky (1989).
Another random document with
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par l’union qui lui est accordée dans la perte de tous ses biens
naturels.
Il faut encore que la mémoire soit dénuée des images qui lui forment
les connaissances douces et tranquilles des choses dont elle se
souvient, afin qu’elle les regarde comme des choses étrangères, et
que ces choses lui paraissent d’une manière différente de l’idée
qu’elle en avait auparavant. Par ce moyen, cette nuit obscure
retirera l’esprit du sentiment commun et ordinaire qu’il avait des
objets créés, et lui imprimera un sentiment tout divin, qui lui
semblera étranger; en sorte que l’âme vivra comme hors d’elle-
même, et élevée au-dessus de la vie humaine; elle doutera
quelquefois si ce qui se passe en elle n’est point un enchantement,
ou une stupidité d’esprit; elle s’étonnera de voir et d’entendre des
choses qui lui semblent fort nouvelles, quoiqu’elles soient les mêmes
que celles qu’elle avait autrefois entre les mains. La cause de ce
changement est parce que l’âme doit perdre entièrement ses
connaissances et ses sentiments humains, pour prendre des
connaissances et des sentiments divins; ce qui est plus propre de la
vie future que de la vie présente.—P. 601.
‘Pour répondre à cette objection, je dis que plus la mémoire est unie
à Dieu, plus elle perd ses connaissances distinctes et particulières,
jusqu’à ce qu’elle les oublie entièrement: ce qui arrive lorsque l’âme
est établie dans l’union parfaite. C’est pourquoi elle tombe d’abord
dans un grand oubli, puisque le souvenir des espèces et des
connaíssances s’évanouit en elle. Ensuite elle se comporte à l’égard
des choses extérieures avec une négligence si notable et un si
grand mépris d’elle-même, qu’étant toute abîmée en Dieu, elle
oublie le boire et le manger, et elle ne sait si elle a fait quelque chose
ou non, si elle a vu ou non; si on lui a parlé ou non. Mais lorsqu’elle
est affermie dans l’habitude de l’union, qui est son souverain bien,
elle ne souffre plus ces oubliances dans les choses raisonnables,
dans les choses morales, ni dans les choses naturelles: au contraire,
elle est plus parfaite dans les opérations convenables à son état,
quoiqu’elle les produise par le ministère des images et des
connaissances que Dieu excite d’une façon particulière dans la
mémoire. Car lorsque l’habitude de l’union, qui est un état
surnaturel, est formée, la mémoire et les autres puissances quittent
leurs opérations naturelles et passent jusqu’à Dieu, qui est à leur
égard un terme surnaturel. En sorte que la mémoire étant toute
transformée en Dieu, ses opérations ne lui sont plus imprimées, et
ne demeurent plus attachées à elle. La mémoire et les autres
facultés de l’âme sont occupées de Dieu avec un empire si absolu,
qu’elles semblent être toutes divines, et que c’est lui-même qui les
meut par son esprit et par sa volonté divine, et qui les fait opérer en
quelque façon divinement: “Puisque celui,” dit l’Apôtre, “qui s’unit au
Seigneur, devient un même esprit avec lui” (1 Cor. vi. 17). Il est donc
véritable que les opérations de l’âme, étant unies totalement à Dieu,
sont toutes divines.’—Montée du Carmel, liv. III. ch. i.
Madame Guyon.
QUIETISM.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.