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 Contents   vii

Population 192
Historical Inequality Based on Sexuality 193
Inequality Based on Sexuality Today 197
Public Opinion 201
LGB People as Status Groups 204
The Law and Sexual Orientation 205
Globalization and Sexuality 209
Summary 210 • Critical Thinking 211 •
Web Connections 211 • Film Suggestions 211

Chapter 10 Racial and Ethnic Inequality 212

The Meaning and Creation of Race 212
U.S. Racial and Ethnic Relations: An Historical Sketch 215
Racial and Ethnic Inequality Today 220
Mobility 228
Class, Color, and Race 229
Theories of Racial and Ethnic Inequality 230
Summary 235 • Critical Thinking 235 •
Web Connections 235 • Film Suggestions 236

Chapter 11 Immigration, Place, and Religion 237

Immigration and Inequality 238
Religion and Inequality 247
Place and Inequality 252
Summary 257 • Critical Thinking 257 •
Web Connections 257 • Film Suggestions 258

PART 4 Consequences of Social Inequality

Chapter 12 Inequality, Health, and the Environment 261
Physical Health 261
Psychological Health 266
Social Inequality and Environmental Equity 273
Summary 279 • Critical Thinking 280 •
Web Connections 280 • Film Suggestions 280

Chapter 13 Inequality, Crime, and Criminal Justice 281

Perspectives on Crime and the Law 281
The Measurement of Crime 282
Criminality 283
The Criminal Justice System 289
Mass Incarceration 296
Summary 299 • Critical Thinking 300 •
Web Connections 300 • Film Suggestions 300
viii   Contents

PART 5 Social Change

Chapter 14 Social Inequality and Social Movements 303

When Do Social Movements Arise? 303
The Labor Movement 305
The Civil Rights Movement 312
The Women’s Movement 321
Summary 328 • Critical Thinking 328 •
Web Connections 329 • Film Suggestions 329

Chapter 15 Policy Alternatives 330

Redistributive Policies 331
Developing the Capacity for Self-­Sufficiency 334
Addressing Spatial Inequalities 336
Expanding and Guaranteeing Political Representation 337
Summary 338 • Critical Thinking 338 •
Web Connections 338 • Film Suggestions 338

Glossary of Basic Terms 339

References 345
Index 407
 PREFACE

Like past editions, this tenth edition of Social Inequality: Forms, Causes, and Consequences is
a user-­friendly introduction to the study of social inequality. This book conveys the pervasive-
ness and extensiveness of social inequality in the United States with an intersectional per-
spective, to show how inequality occurs, how it affects all of us, and what is being done
about it.
This edition benefits from a variety of changes that have significantly strengthened the
text. We pay increased attention to disability, intersectionality, immigration, religion, and place.
We also spotlight crime and the criminal justice system as well as health and the environment.
The tenth edition includes a new chapter on policy alternatives and venues for social change.
In sum:

1. We have added a new chapter called “Policy Alternatives” (Chapter 15) at the end of the
text. This chapter is designed to provide students with an awareness of potential altern-
atives to our current systems, and to imagine ways that we might bring about change.
2. Intersectionality was introduced in the last edition, but we have augmented the discussion
and infused it throughout the text.
3. We have reworked the theory chapters and moved them earlier in the book, providing a
better framing for students’ analyses in later chapters. We also added an elaboration of
intersectionality in Chapter 7, “Contemporary Explanations of Inequality.” Chapter 6,
“Classical Explanations of Inequality” now features a section on W.E.B. Du Bois in place
of Herbert Spencer.
4. While the last edition contained some information about immigration and religion, recent
political events have made both of these topics crucially important to an understanding of
inequality in the United States. We have created a new chapter called “Immigration, Place,
and Religion” (Chapter 11) that looks at how exclusion and discrimination by citizenship,
religion, and region contribute to inequality.
5. Chapters 12 and 13 provide students with an in-­depth look at how health, the environment,
and crime/criminal justice both are produced by and cause inequality. These chapters are
written from an intersectional perspective.

The tenth edition is divided into five major parts. Part 1 examines the scope of inequality, with
a focus on issues such as income, wealth, status, and power. Part 2 outlines general explana-
tions of inequality. The classical arguments included are those of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and
Du Bois, while the contemporary theories discuss how inequalities become durable and persist-
ent. Specifically, we look at functionalist and labor market theories, and then outline how
material and symbolic resources are hoarded. Finally, we address the importance of micro-­level
processes, such as identities and interactions. The chapters in Part 3 asks who benefits and who
loses by inequality: Chapters 8–11 discuss gender, sexuality, race, and include a chapter com-
bining immigration, religion, and place. Part 4 includes two chapters of intersectional case
studies on inequality: the first focuses on health and the environment, and the second on crime
and the criminal justice system. Finally, Part 5 addresses processes of change and stability in
the structure of social inequality through discussions of social movements and potential policy
alternatives. The book concludes with a glossary of many of the basic terms used in the text.

ix
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Although any shortcomings in the book are our own responsibility, any improvements in this
edition are due in large part to others. These include our friend and colleague Thomas Tierney
at the College of Wooster, plus our three outstanding research assistants, Olivia Proe, Taylor
Thomas, and Andrew White. We would like to give special thanks to Kimberly Lauffer for her
extremely helpful guidance on Chapter 4. Thanks also to Samantha Barbaro at Taylor and
Francis for guiding us kindly and wisely through the publication process.
We would like readers to know that this book was originally written by Charles Hurst,
and he was the sole author for the first eight editions. Two new authors were added in the last
edition, but they can only be credited with building off the incredibly strong foundation Chuck
created. We value not only Chuck’s sociological wisdom, but also his friendship and sense of
social justice.
We are all indebted to our families for their support during this project. Chuck’s wife,
Mary Ellen Hurst, has been there for all eight editions of the book. From the Fitz Gibbon
family, we thank Stewart, Andrew, and Thomas, and from the Nurse/Thompson family, we are
grateful to John, Alexander, Jacob, and Gabriel.

x
 CHAPTER 1

An Introduction
to the Study of
Social Inequality
Fernando was brought into the U.S. illegally by his mother when he was 5 years old. He is now
29 and works as a lab technician in the San Francisco Bay Area. A recipient of DACA (Delayed
Action for Childhood Arrivals, a program that allows people like Fernando to stay in the
country and work legally), he is currently consumed with anxiety because of attempts by the
federal government to end the DACA program. If he loses his DACA status, he would have to
return to Mexico, a country he barely remembers. He told a reporter:

I have no clue what they would do … Would they come knocking on my door, putting me in
detainment facilities, put me on a plane and have someone else take care of my stuff?
Would they round everyone up? I would be afraid of losing everything, losing my friends,
having to start over again in a place I barely know. I can still speak Spanish, but as far as
living a life there, it wouldn’t be mine.
(Sanchez, 2018)

Heather is a small business owner in the Midwest. She was interviewed about why she voted for
President Trump. She said:

Trump understands and supports the American dream; no matter what you have now, if
you work hard you can better yourself and positively shape your wealth and future. Clinton
made it known that she would continue Obama’s agenda of redistribution. What dream is
there in working to see your future gains chopped up by taxation and welfare? Under
Clinton I would have just held out my hand and stopped dreaming. Under Trump the Amer-
ican Dream is revived!
(Fishwick, 2016)

Sarah is the founder of a sports media company. She is concerned about barriers women and
people of color face in starting businesses. Citing data from a large-­scale study of venture
capital, she comments,
1
2 Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality
“The average black female founder with a
company raises $36,000.” In comparison,
the average amount raised by white men
who later had their businesses fail was $1.3
million. She said that, as a Black female
entrepreneur, “You’re constantly walking
this tightrope. Just acknowledging that and
then figuring out how to optimize that is
important.”
(O’Connor, 2017)
The stories above are all real stories drawn from
recent news reports. Fernando, Heather, and Sarah
are all worried about the impact of inequality in
their own lives and in society more generally, but
the particular focus of their concerns differs,
depending on their individual identities, experi-
ences, and backgrounds. What issues of inequality
worry you? You might be thinking about the
student loans you have taken out to pay for your
education. Or perhaps you are concerned that
American society has gone too far in granting
rights to particular minority groups. The aim of
this book is to give you tools to be able to think
about these kinds of issues in a larger context.
What is inequality? Why does it exist? Is it good
or bad? This chapter begins with an introduction
to the topic of inequality and is followed by the
terms and concepts you will need throughout the
text. We then turn to some key questions involv-
ing how we perceive inequality, the level of
inequality in the U.S. compared to other countries,
and whether inequality is inevitable.
THINKING ABOUT SOCIAL
INEQUALITY
You need not look far to find articles in the
popular press decrying the rise of inequality in
the United States and around the world. Many
have likened this era to the famous gilded age of
the late nineteenth century. Justin Fox in Bloomb-
erg described the gilded age as an era of
“exploding economic inequality, stagnant living
standards, growing concern about monopolies,
devastating financial crises … brazen political
corruption, frequent pronouncements that the
American republic was doomed, and seemingly
unending turmoil over race and national identity”
(Fox, 2018). For many of us, including Fernando,
Heather, and Sarah profiled above, this characteri-
zation sounds disturbingly familiar. The share of
the income that that 1 percent controls is now as
high as it was in the gilded age (see Figure 1.1),
and inequality is present and affects us at all stages
of our lives. Think of your own experiences. Even
when young, we hear of people as being from a
“bad neighborhood,” as not being “our kind,” as
being “above” or “below” us. We hear epithets
aimed at persons because of their race, ethnicity,
gender, or sexual orientation. As youths, we notice
that because of the way they dress, where they
live, and who their parents are, some children are
treated differently and have more or fewer oppor-
tunities than others. We are also smart enough to
see that there are class differences associated with
different schools and even churches. These eco-
nomic differences show no sign of disappearing,
and in fact they are at a record high.
Economically, the gap between the top and
the bottom has increased and class mobility has
stagnated in the last few decades. The middle
class has been particularly hard-­hit, with the per-
centage of adults in the U.S. living in middle-­
income households just over 50 percent in 2016,
dropping from a high of 61 percent in 1971
(Kochhar, 2018). This apparent decline of the
middle class has significant ramifications for a
democracy. Scholars as far back as Aristotle have
stressed the importance of a large and prosperous
middle class for the stability, cohesiveness, and
productivity of a society (Pressman, 2007). Yet
throughout the United States, the number of
middle-­class neighborhoods has declined, while
both poor and rich neighborhoods have grown.
Additionally, the middle class has declined most
precipitously in cities with high levels of income
inequality (Bischoff and Reardon, 2013). “With
a median income nationally of $78,056 in 2000
and only $78,442 in 2016, the middle class has
gained no ground over the past several years”
(Kochhar, 2018). Leicht and Fitzgerald put the
matter bluntly: “Middle-­class prosperity in the
late twentieth and early twenty-­first centuries is
an illusion” (2006, p. 4, italics in original).
As we see in Figure 1.1, the share of
income controlled by the richest members of our
society dropped from the early part of the century

FIGURE 1.1   Share of Income in the U.S. for the Top 1% and Top .1%, 1913–2017
Source: Amended from data from Saez (2018). Data accessed from https://eml.berkeley.edu/~saez/
TabFig2017prel.xls.
to the 1950s, then stayed relatively flat until the
1970s. Since that time, the overall trend has been
one of rapid growth. This phenomenon of increas-
ing income inequality is not unique to the United
States. Nicholas Bloom, a professor at Stanford,
who was quoted in the New York Times, said,
“This is a truly global phenomenon, and I don’t
know any serious economist who would deny
inequality has gone up. The debate is over the
magnitude, not the direction” (Schwartz, 2016).
Despite a record low level of unemploy-
ment, poverty levels still persist at over 12
percent. While this is the third year that poverty
has declined, the percentage of families and chil-
dren in poverty remains higher than it was in
2000 (Edwards, 2018). And while in 2017 the
median household income in the United States
was $61,372, once we control for inflation, this
increase only brings incomes up to 1999 levels
(Fontenot, Semega, and Kollar, 2018). Further,
the 2016 compensation of chief executive offi-
cers (CEOs) in the top 500 U.S. corporations was
271 times that of the average worker (Mishel and
Schieder, 2017). As we will see in Chapter 2,
wealth is even more highly polarized than income
in the United States, with a small percentage con-
Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality 3
trolling most of the resources. Economic
inequality thrives in the United States.
Among those especially affected by
inequality are blue-­collar workers whose manu-
facturing plants have moved or shut down. In
2018, for example, General Motors announced
that several North American plants will be idled,
with 3,300 immediate layoffs and the threat of as
many as 14,000 in the long run. This happened, at
least in part, because of imports of cheap Chinese
steel. GM employee Nanette Senters stated:
To just say, “You’re done,” is wrong. Yes, a
company is supposed to make money. But
they did get all kinds of money from those
tax cuts, and they are still doing this. I am so
disappointed. They always take things out
on workers.
(Campbell, 2018)
Despite the layoffs in the auto industry, the
national unemployment rate has been decreasing
since 2010. This is good news for many workers
who suffered spells of unemployment during the
financial downturn. At the same time, many of
the available jobs today are part-­time or have
4 Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality
erratic schedules. This is problematic for people
who need or want consistent full-­time work. For
example, Melody Pabon is having trouble sup-
porting her child on her part-­time salary:
I’ve been working at Zara, a women’s cloth-
ing store in Manhattan, as a cashier and on
the sales floor for about four years. I also
just started school to become a medical
assistant. I used to be scheduled to close the
store a lot. On those nights I got home to
Brooklyn after Mason, my four-­year-old,
was already asleep. I wanted to be able to
spend time with him in the evening, so I
asked for an earlier shift. But at my job,
anyone who is not available 24/7 always
seems to get their hours cut. And that is what
happened to me. I went from working 35
hours to 25 over the course of a few weeks.
That’s almost a third of my paycheck.
(National Women’s Law Center, 2015)
The injurious impact of inequality is not confined
to the working class and the poor. In recent years,
as companies downsize to meet competition and
maintain profits, the effects of social and
­economic forces pushing people into different
economic circumstances have been increasingly
felt by those in the white-­collar ranks. Many of
the jobs lost at General Motors will be white-­
collar jobs (Boudette, 2018).
At the same time that many people are
experiencing downward mobility, advances in
computer and information technologies have
created opportunities for others to become phe-
nomenally rich. Five years ago, nobody had
heard of Evan Speigel. Yet in 2015, the 25-year-­
old creator of the application Snapchat was
among the richest Americans, with wealth well
in excess of a billion dollars (Wang, 2015).
Inequalities extend beyond economic
issues, however. For the third consecutive year,
hate crimes have increased, up 16 percent since
2016 (Eligon, 2018). While some of this increase
is likely due to increased reporting and aware-
ness, it is also clear that we are currently experi-
encing an era of increased racial tension and
rhetoric. Similarly, though the #MeToo move-
ment, focused on sexual harassment, represents a
promising development in gender relations in
that more women have been willing to come
forward to report abuse and harassment, it has
also made it clear that the problem of gender-­based
inequalities continues to persist in our society.
The statistics and stories above demon-
strate the persistence of inequalities, but they also
show their complexity. Let’s look back at the
three stories presented at the beginning of this
chapter. All three of these individuals express
insecurity and fear in our current environment of
rampant inequality. But their fears are different,
depending on their identities and backgrounds.
For Fernando, his ethnic background and citizen-
ship status are central to his concerns. Heather
expresses the concerns of the working class, and
Sarah worries about possibilities for women of
color. These stories tell us that inequalities are
located in a complex matrix of identities—race,
class, gender, nationality, sexuality (among
others) are all statuses that individually and in
combination intersect to bring about different
experiences of inequality. This idea, called inter-
sectionality (defined briefly below and more
extensively in Chapter 7) is a central and guiding
concept for this text.
KEY TERMS AND CONCEPTS
Social Inequality and
Stratification
As we use it in this text, “inequality” refers to
situations where people have different amounts
of something valuable. That could be a material
thing such as food or income, or it could be invis-
ible like prestige or education. Inequality is not
necessarily problematic if most people agree that
it is fair. For example, in surveys conducted all
over the world (including the U.S.), about three-­
quarters of respondents say performance and
effort are legitimate determinants of pay differ-
ences (Evans, Kelley, and Peoples, 2010). In
other situations, however, we do not think
inequality is fair—for example, if we started dis-
tributing income based on people’s height, we
might hear some protest.
Social stratification is related to inequality,
but it refers to a “rare form of disparity that

c­ lusters social units by layers, or strata, which
are homogenous with respect to a wide range of
goods (both autonomous and relative) and which
occupy a single, well-­defined rank order” (Tilly,
1998, p. 27). In simpler terms, social stratifica-
tion refers to a situation where people have
unequal access to various resources based on the
group they belong to, including material goods,
power, symbolic goods, and social status. If the
inequality is due to a person’s membership in a
particular group rather than individual character-
istics, this is stratification, not simply inequality
(McLeod and Nonnemaker, 1999, p. 321). In this
text, we are using “social inequality” and “strati-
fication” interchangeably.
Quintiles
In order to describe the level of inequality in our
society, we have to have a way to divide up the
population. Like many other social scientists, we
have chosen to use quintiles. A quintile is simply
a fifth (20 percent) of the population. The top
quintile of income earners, for example, are the
20 percent of people who earn the most (80
percent of the population earns less than they
do). The “middle quintile” would be the people
who earn more than 40 percent of people in the
population, but less than the top 40 percent of
income earners.
Income and Wealth
In many parts of this text we discuss how income
and wealth are distributed in society. Thus, it is
important that we have a good understanding of
what the terms mean. Money income, as defined
by the Census Bureau, includes money from vir-
tually all sources, including wages or salaries,
Social Security, welfare, pensions, and others.
There are some advantages to using total money
income when assessing the extent of economic
inequality. In the first place, it is certainly more
immediately quantifiable than many other meas-
ures, such as real estate. Second, income is
highly valued in U.S. society and serves as a
basis on which people are evaluated by others.
Third, income inequalities saturate and are
reflected in a number of other economically
Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality 5
related areas. Unemployment, inflation, farm and
food prices, rent control, feminism, racism, and
welfare are all areas that involve income-­
differential issues. In your own case, think about
the number of ways that income is implicated in
different areas of your life. Income, then, at least
at first glance, would appear to be a more than
adequate measure of economic inequality.
However, when interpreting income statis-
tics, several limitations should be kept in mind.
First, income is only a partial measure of a fami-
ly’s or individual’s economic well-­being. It does
not include the value of stocks, real estate, or
other noncash economic assets, and, second, if it
is current income, it does not take into account
the income trajectory an individual may be on if,
for example, they are just beginning in a lucra-
tive career. Third, some of the estimates of
income are based on pooled findings from several
government studies that are not always identical
in methodology or measures of income. Finally,
and most significantly, the Internal Revenue
Service contends that income is underreported
and not all persons who are required to file
income tax returns do so. The majority of under-
reported income is from businesses or self-­
employment because these are sources that are
hard for the IRS to track (I.R.S., 2016). Related
to this, high-­income earners are more likely to
underreport income than low-­income earners
(Johns and Slemrod, 2010).
While income provides important informa-
tion about people’s life circumstances, wealth
gives us a more complete measure of a family’s
economic power, since it consists of the value of
all the family’s assets minus its debts. Thus,
wealth includes the value of homes, automobiles,
businesses, savings, and investments. Even this
measure, however, does not fully reflect the
access of the wealthy to a greater number of
financial tools that serve to enhance their eco-
nomic opportunities and market situation. For
example, ownership of a great deal of stock in a
corporation that is interlocked or directly con-
nected with other corporations may give an indi-
vidual indirect influence over the economic
behavior of the latter organizations. Like poverty,
wealth has economic implications beyond the
actual size of the holdings. Economic opportunities
6 Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality
are at least in part a function of the economic
tools a person has at their disposal.
There is not a lot of consensus on how to
measure the distribution of wealth, for several
reasons. First, information about wealth is diffi-
cult to obtain. Virtually all data about it come
from various field surveys and administrative
records (such as tax records). Often, individuals
are hesitant to be interviewed, and this is espe-
cially true of the wealthy who, for several
reasons, may be sensitive about their wealth.
Sherman (2017) conducted in-­depth interviews
with New Yorkers in their thirties and forties
who had a household income of over $250,000.
She commented:
In the interviews, most people described
themselves as reluctant to talk about money
in any detail with anyone except their part-
ners and sometimes other close family
members. They described money as deeply
private—‘more private than sex,’ in the
words of one psychotherapist I interviewed.
(p. 18)
Sherman found that her interviewees were very
concerned about anonymity and they felt deeply
ambivalent about their wealth, making them
unwilling to be honest about the true extent of
their holdings or spending. As a result, it is likely
that what wealthy people report on surveys may
not be accurate.
Gini Index
The Gini Index (often called the “Gini Coeffi-
cient’) is a popular way to assess the level of
inequality in a society. It measures the extent
of difference between the actual distribution of
income and a hypothetical situation in which
everyone receives the same percentage of
income. The ratio has a possible value range of
0 to 1; 0 indicates complete equality, and 1 indi-
cates complete inequality. Some researchers crit-
icize the Gini Index because it is very sensitive
to the economic situation of people in the middle
of the distribution and it takes less account of the
extremes. This is important because research
suggests that, across countries and time, the share
of the middle of the distribution generally stays
stable. In other words, increases or decreases in
inequality are driven by the top and bottom of the
distribution. The Gini Index is also criticized
because it is unable to specify where changes in
the distribution occur. For example, if the Gini
Index goes down, it is impossible to know who
the winners and losers are. Finally, when you see
a Gini Coefficient, it is important to ask if it was
calculated before or after taxes and transfers
(transfers include non-­earned income like welfare
payments or financial aid). Inequality in societies
is usually less after taxes and transfers.
Palma Ratio
Concerns about the Gini Index led to the devel-
opment of the Palma ratio. This is a ratio of
the income of the top 10 percent divided by that
of the bottom 40 percent. The interpretation of
the Palma ratio is more intuitive than the Gini
Index. For example, if a country has a Palma
ratio of 5, the top 10 percent receive five times
the income of the bottom 40 percent (Pizzigati,
2014). Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-­winning
economist, and Michael Doyle, former Assist-
ant Secretary-­General of the United Nations,
argue that all nations should set as a goal a
Palma ratio of less than 1 (Doyle and Stiglitz,
2014).
Globalization
Another term that is central to understanding
inequality is globalization. Globalization has
been defined in two basic ways, one which is nar-
rowly economic and another which incorporates
a variety of dimensions and is sometimes referred
to as the “grand” theory of globalization. In this
latter view,
Globalization refers to a multidimensional
set of social processes that create, multiply,
stretch, and intensify worldwide social inter-
dependencies and exchanges while at the
same time fostering in people a growing
awareness of deepening connections between
the local and the distant.
(Myers Jr, 2014, p. 45)
 Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality 7

This definition includes not only increasing eco- theorists who argued that inequality functions to
nomic ties between countries but also closer cul- ensure that there are incentives for the best
tural and social ties. A narrower conceptualization people to take the most important jobs in society.
of globalization views it as a strictly economic When people are well matched to jobs, society
phenomenon, involving the increase in direct functions effectively and everyone benefits.
investment, flow of workers, and free trade
between countries. It is primarily this latter defi-
Inequality in the U.S. in Global
nition that we will use in our assessment of glo-
Context
balization’s impact on inequality among nations
and within the United States. As we will explore further in Chapter 2, the
United States has notably high levels of
inequality. In Table 1.1 you can see how we rank
Intersectionality
against other large industrial countries.
First coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989), the Remember that the Gini Index would be “0” in a
term intersectionality refers to the idea that situation of complete equality. Our number is
people experience inequality differently, depend- .39. The Palma Ratio shows that the top 10
ing on their particular status. Thus, while gender percent of earners has 1.8 times the income of
inequalities are certainly consequential, Black the entire bottom 40 percent. Looking more
women face very different discrimination than do
White women. Inequalities represent a “matrix of TABLE 1.1 Income and Inequality among
domination” (Collins and Bilge, 2016), whereby Households within Selected Rich
intersecting statuses and identities combine to Industrial Countries: 2017
create a system of exploitation and domination. Country Gini Palma Ratio
To fully understand the lived experiences of Coefficient
inequality, we need to understand how the com-
bination and intersection of statuses affect our Australia .34 1.3
lives. Austria .28 1.0
Belgium .27 0.9
Canada .31 1.2
Marxist vs. Functionalist Perspective
Denmark .26 0.9
on Inequality
Finland .26 0.9
Starting in Chapter 2, we introduce two of France .29 1.1
several important perspectives on inequality. The Germany .29 1.1
“Marxist” perspective is based on the work of Greece .34 1.3
Karl Marx, a German classical theorist, who Ireland .30 1.1
wrote in the middle of the nineteenth century. Italy .30 1.3
You will read about his life and theories in detail Netherlands .28 1.0
in Chapter 6. In brief, however, a “Marxist” New Zealand .35 1.4
framework traces our current level of inequality Norway .27 1.0
to capitalism. Because capitalism is a zero-­sum Sweden .28 1.0
game, there will always be winners and losers. Switzerland .30 1.1
The winners work hard to maintain and increase United States .39 1.8
their advantage. One way that large business
Source: https://data.oecd.org/inequality/income-
owners seek to increase their profits, for example,
inequality.htm.
is by reducing the wages of workers. A function-
alist perspective on inequality is quite different Note: In Chapter 4, you will notice that we give a
different Gini Coefficient for the U.S. This is because
from a “Marxist” view. It sees inequality as the OECD calculates Gini using post-tax and transfer
having many benefits for society. In Chapter 7, income whereas many other organizations use
we introduce the ideas of Davis and Moore, two pre-tax and transfer.
8 Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality
broadly around the world, generally countries
lower in living standards by United Nations
measures have inequality levels that exceed those
in industrial nations. In terms of regions of the
world, Europe is the least unequal and the Middle
East the most unequal (Alvaredo, Chancel,
Piketty, Saez, and Zucman, 2018).
American Perceptions of Inequality
Now we have a little bit of information about the
level of inequality in the U.S. Were you sur-
prised? It turns out that most Americans have
significant misperceptions about inequality,
income, and wealth. In fact, in a recent survey,
respondents from 40 countries were asked about
the distribution of wealth and income in their
society. They were given five diagrams from
which to choose. One diagram, for example, was
shaped like a diamond (with a large middle class
and small upper and lower classes). Another
diagram was a pyramid, with a wide base (indi-
cating lots of poor people) and few people at the
top. Only 29 percent of Americans were able to
accurately identify the model that represents the
United States. Looking at the scores from the
other countries, the U.S. ranked about the middle
in terms of our knowledge of inequality (Gimpel-
son and Treisman, 2018).
Conventional wisdom, and some research,
suggest that Americans tend to understate
inequality. For example, a study by Norton and
Ariely (2011) found that Americans estimate that
the top 20 percent hold just about 60 percent of
the wealth. This is compared to the close to 85
percent they actually held. One recent study,
however, looked at income instead of wealth and
found that Americans may actually overestimate
income inequality as well as the incomes of the
richest 1 percent (Chambers, Swan, and Hee-
sacker, 2014). More research will need to be
done on this topic to understand the differences
between the studies and the differences in per-
ceptions of wealth and income. What is important
to note at this point, however, is that mispercep-
tions about inequality are widespread.
Is Inequality Desirable or
Undesirable?
Some scholars think of inequality as a source of
integration in society. The functionalist view, for
example, argues that inequality in rewards is a
way of making sure that critical occupations are
filled with the most qualified persons. That is,
since rewards provide motivation to do certain
tasks, the structure of inequality is really an
incentive system that helps the whole society
survive. Other analysts contend that economic
and other kinds of inequality create divisiveness
between the haves and the have-­nots, men and
women, minorities and majorities. This is in large
part because these groups are not equally likely
to believe that the system of inequality is fair.
Nor do they agree that inequality works to the
benefit of the entire society rather than only a
few select groups. Because of this, inequality is
more likely to instigate conflict than it is to
strengthen cohesion between groups and in
society in general.
In some ways, Americans are attracted to
equality; in other ways, they view inequality as
justified. Part of the problem here is that people
think about different things when they think
about inequality, and people feel differently
about the various kinds of equality/inequality;
thus, the meaning of equality/inequality is not
self-­evident. For example, Bryan Turner (1986)
identified four basic kinds of equality: (1) equal-
ity of human beings—that is, the notion that basi-
cally we are all the same and equally worthy as
persons; (2) equality of opportunity—the idea
that access to valued ends is open to all; (3)
equality of condition—that is, that people all start
from the same position; and (4) equality of
results or outcome, or equality of income. The
latter is the most radical of the four and the one
most likely to incite controversy.
Americans feel quite differently about
equality of opportunity than they do about equal-
ity of income, and groups feel differently about
the fairness of the system. A national poll con-
ducted by the Pew Research Center (2012a)
found that 70 percent of Americans feel that the
government should adopt policies to enhance
equality of opportunity but less than half support

policies that directly redistribute income. This
shows that they feel any fair distribution of goods
should be based more on equality of opportunity
rather than equality of result.
Perceptions of economic inequality are
generally viewed differently and separately from
views of racial and gender inequality. With racial
and gender inequality, inequalities of outcome
are seen as evidence of inequalities of oppor-
tunity. That is, if we find that there are differ-
ences in outcome by race, it is a fair assumption
that there are unfair obstacles in the way of some,
and thus the inequality is seen as unjust. With
economic inequality, however, inequality of
outcome coexists with inequality of opportu-
nity—and inequality of outcome may be due to
differences in efforts or skills rather than oppor-
tunity. Thus, as McCall suggests, an intersec-
tional model of income inequality should ask:
How are perceptions of rising class
inequality affected: by perceptions of trends
in racial and gender inequality? by racial and
gender differences in education, wealth,
poverty, employment, and residential
segregation? by racial and gender identities?
and by intersections of these with social
class identities and social movements?
(2014, p. 30)
Regardless of whether Americans support the
general idea of inequality, most agree that we
have too much of it today. About two-­thirds think
that the current amount of income inequality is
too large, and 63 percent believe wealth and
income should be more equally distributed
(Newport, 2015). Most Americans—as well as
residents of other countries—believe there should
be a limit on the amount of inequality. An inter-
national survey of forty countries, including the
United States, showed that citizens feel that those
in the highest-­ranking occupations should be
paid, on average, 4.6 times the salary of those in
the lowest-­ranking positions. This ratio varies
across countries with a low of 2:1 in Denmark to
a high of 20:1 in Taiwan. Respondents in the U.S.
said that the ideal gap is 7:1. Actual income gaps
are much higher (on average there was a 10:1
ratio across all the countries in the study) but the
Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality 9
U.S. has a particularly large gap. For example,
CEOs earn 357 times the salary of the lowest
wage worker (Kiatpongsan and Norton, 2014).
In sum, a majority of Americans appear to
support the principle of income inequality as being
fair, but they do not see the present system as
necessarily equitable. They also underestimate the
extent of economic inequality in the country, and
they are decidedly split on whether the government
should do something about income inequality. It is
clear that Americans’ attitudes about inequality are
complex and often contradictory.
Is Inequality Inevitable?
Perhaps the most basic issue relates to the inevi-
tability of inequality. It is important to clarify
that reference is being made here to institutional-
ized rather than individual inequality (i.e., struc-
tured inequality between categories of individuals
that are systematically created, reproduced, legit-
imated by sets of ideas, and relatively stable). We
would not be studying this phenomenon if it were
not a prominent feature of contemporary society
with significant consequences. To ask whether it
is inevitable is to address the origins of inequality
(i.e., whether it is caused by natural or artificial
factors). If social inequality is directly linked to
conditions inherent in the nature of groups of
individuals or society, then little might be
expected to eliminate it. On the other hand, if
such inequality arises because of the conscious,
intentional, and freely-­willed actions of indi-
viduals or the structures they create in society,
then perhaps it can be altered.
One side argues that inequality is always
going to be present because of personal differ-
ences among individuals either in the form of
basic differences in their own makeups or differ-
ences in the amount of effort they expend. A
large majority of Americans would appear to
agree. A recent poll, for example, found that 43
percent of Americans think that the rich got that
way because they worked harder than other
people (42 percent said it was due to advantages
they had been given) (Dunn, 2018). If there is an
open society and if people vary in their talents
and motivations, then this would suggest that
inequality is inevitable, a simple fact of society.
10 Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality
“Some inequalities come about as a result of
unavoidable biological inequalities of physical
skill, mental capacity, and traits of personality,”
argued Cauthen (1987, p. 8) in his treatise on
equality. Some early philosophers also argued
that there are “natural” differences between indi-
viduals; in fact, some people still maintain that
differences of this type separate the sexes, result-
ing in the inevitability of inequality. Aristotle
took the position that “the male is by nature
superior, the female, inferior; and the one rules,
and the other is ruled” (in Kriesberg, 1979,
p. 12). These and other explanations of inequality
will be discussed in detail later.
Other theorists have argued that inequality
is inevitable because as long as certain kinds of
tasks are more necessary for the survival of the
society than others, and as long as those who are
able to perform those tasks are rare, social
inequality of rewards among individuals is
needed to motivate the best people to perform the
most difficult tasks. Under these conditions, the
argument goes, inequality cannot be eradicated
without endangering the society.
On the other side of the fence are those who
argue that economic inequality is not inevitable
and is largely the by-­product of a system’s struc-
ture and not the result of major differences in indi-
vidual or group talents, characteristics, and
motivations. Rousseau, for example, linked the
origins of inequality to the creation of private
property (Dahrendorf, 1970, p. 10). It is the char-
acteristics of the political economy and the firms
and labor markets within it that are primary deter-
minants of differences in income and wealth.
Where a person works and in what industry have
major effects on income. Certainly, the job
changes resulting from downsizing would suggest
this. Essentially, then, this argument states that it
is not human nature and individual differences but
rather structural conditions that determine where
an individual winds up on the ladder of economic
inequality. Discrimination is another of those con-
ditions. If the conditions that generate social
inequality are artificial creations of human actions,
then they can be changed, and economic inequality
is not inevitable, nor is it necessarily beneficial for
the society and all its members. We will examine
this controversy more thoroughly in later chapters.
Levels of Analysis
The study of social inequality is concerned with
both individuals and groups, personal positions as
well as structural arrangements. Thus, analysis pro-
ceeds on several levels. For example, we are inter-
ested in how an individual’s class-­related
characteristics affect the probability of that person
being arrested, but we are also interested in how
the structure of inequality itself affects the crime
rate for the society as a whole. We are interested in
the process by which individuals attain higher or
lower status positions, but we are also interested in
how class structures shift in society and how
changes in occupational structures affect rates of
social mobility. We will look not only at how an
individual’s race or sex affects their income but
also at how institutionalized discrimination affects
the overall structure of inequality between the races
and sexes. Many of the chapters to follow take into
account these important methodological issues.
ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOK
The text is divided into four major parts. Part 1
addresses the extent of inequality in its various
forms. Chapters 2–5 focus on specific forms of
inequality that concern resource outcomes (i.e.,
income/wealth, poverty, social status, and power)
which are distributed unequally among indi-
viduals and groups in the United States. Part 2
presents the major general explanations for social
inequality, with Chapter 6 including information
about how the classical theorists, Marx, Weber,
Durkheim, and Du Bois, understand inequality.
Chapter 7 analyzes more contemporary explana-
tions, ranging from functionalist theories, to
social reproduction and constructionist theories,
to intersectional theories of inequality. In Part 3,
we look at significant categories according to
which we distribute resources. These include
gender, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, immi-
gration status, place, and religion. All of these
categories (discussed in Chapters 8–11), affect
the distribution of wealth, status, and power in
our society.
Having discussed the extent and explana-
tions of inequality in the first three parts of the
book, we then turn to the pervasive consequences

of inequality for individuals and society. Chapter
12 looks at how health and the environment have
a profound impact on the outcomes of individual
people and communities. In Chapter 13, we
examine crime and the criminal justice system.
We ask how categories including socioeconomic
position, race, and gender affect the steps in the
criminal justice process from the chances of
being arrested to the likelihood of being given a
long sentence. Street crimes, white-­collar crimes,
and hate crimes are each discussed. We also
show how inequality plays a role in determining
who commits a crime in the first place.
Part 5 of the book explores the possibility
for change. In Chapter 14, we examine how
social movements—both current and historical—
have changed inequality. These movements
include the labor, civil rights, and women’s
movements as well as #metoo and #blacklives-
matter. All of these movements can be viewed as
reactions to inequalities that were perceived as
unjust. Chapter 15 is a chance to think about
alternatives to our current system and ways that
you might be able to become involved in chang-
ing how goods are distributed in society.
Summary
So far, we have learned that inequality is a
central topic in society that affects many areas of
our lives. As in the United States, there are signi-
ficant differences in economic inequality among
nations. Generally, economic inequality is greater
in poorer countries, although there are major
variations among industrial nations. When com-
Critical Thinking
1. Try to think of a personal relationship you have
with someone who is unequal to you in some way,
and yet the inequality appears to have few negative
effects on you or your relationship. What character-
istics lessen the impact of the inequality in this rela-
tionship? Discuss some lessons from this
relationship that might be used to diminish the neg-
ative effects of inequality in society as a whole.
2. Is social inequality a problem that demands the
full attention of society, or is it merely a personal
Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality 11
Each chapter ends with a short set of ques-
tions and film suggestions, addressing some critical
issues raised by the chapter. They are aimed at
forcing you to come to grips with central problems
in inequality, often by looking at inequality in your
own life. The Web Connections sections suggest
various websites where you can get more informa-
tion and which you can use as bases for course
exercises. These should broaden and deepen your
understanding of inequality. Many chapters also
contain a brief Nutshell covering a topical issue
from the popular press or a Mini-­Case addressing a
specific issue to be analyzed. Each issue is intro-
duced to serve as a point of departure for class-
room discussion. Finally, a Glossary of Basic
Terms used in the text follows the last chapter.
The lines separating the social sciences are
often vague, the result being that discussions in
the book often will draw on the work of econo-
mists, anthropologists, as well as sociologists,
and others. In addition, there is material from
other countries. These inclusions, hopefully,
result in a more thorough and well-­rounded per-
spective on the structure and process of social
inequality in the United States.
pared to its industrial counterparts, the United
States ranks at the top in terms of its income and
wealth inequality. Research tells us that Ameri-
cans hold significant misperceptions about the
level of inequality in society but that, in general,
they would prefer to see a more equitable distri-
bution of wealth and income.
problem of those living below the middle class?
Explain your answer.
3. Is it possible for equality in political power to exist
alongside economic inequality?
4. Gazing into your crystal ball, do you think the
long-­run impact of increasing relationships among
peoples around the world will lead to a leveling of
inequalities among them, or will it solidify or
increase existing inequalities?
12 Chapter 1 • Introduction: Social Inequality
Web Connections
Several of the following chapters use information
obtained from national polls, many of which are
published on the Internet. The National Council on
Public Polls suggests that among the questions you
should consider before accepting poll results are
the following: (1) Who sponsored and who con-
ducted the poll? (2) Is the sample large enough
and representative of the whole population? (3)
Were any important groups excluded from the
poll? (4) Was the technique used in the interview
likely to affect the answers received? (5) Was the
wording of the questions neutral or biased in some
way? (6) Are the survey results still valid or are
they out-­of-date? (Carr, 2005).
 PART 1

Extent and Forms of

Social Inequality
 CHAPTER 2

Class, Income, and

Wealth
In the next several chapters, we will be considering different forms of inequality: economic,
status, gender, sexuality, racial, and political inequalities. We start here with economic
inequality in the form of social class and income/wealth differences. It makes sense to begin
here because other aspects of inequality are often strongly related to economic or class
inequality in a society. As we will see in later chapters, economic position has a significant
impact on the prestige, power, and life chances that individuals possess. Consequently, a dis-
cussion of social class and economic inequality is critical for a full understanding of other forms
of inequality.

THE EVERYDAY REALITY OF CLASS

In general, Americans do not like to talk about class:

Class is not discussed or debated in public because class identity has been stripped from
popular culture. The institutions that shape mass culture and define the parameters of public
debate have avoided class issues … [F]ormulating issues in terms of class is unacceptable,
perhaps even un-­American.
(Mantsios, 2004, p. 193)

But their reluctance to discuss class does not mean that Americans do not think about it. The
meaning of class for the public is rooted in their everyday experiences and relationships.
Awareness of class differences begins early; even preschool children categorize individuals as
rich or poor and make judgments about them on that basis (Horwitz, Shutts, and Olson, 2014).
By elementary school, children can reliably identify social class location, and they have definite
ideas about behavioral and social differences between groups (Mistry, Brown, White, Chow,
and Gillen-­O’Neel, 2015).
Class structure is also a subjective reality for adults. When asked about it, people in the
United States are much more likely to agree on and have clear images of the top and bottom of
the class structure than they are of the middle classes, which are seen as more amorphous and
heterogeneous. The perceived distinctiveness of the top, for example, is based not only on their
wealth, but also on the social and cultural boundaries that are seen as separating them from
15
Another random document with
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Faustus was first brought out at the theatre, Lincoln’s Inn Fields, in
’23. It had so prodigious a run, and came into such vogue, that after
much grumbling about the “legitimate” and invocations of “Ben
Jonson’s ghost” (Hogarth calls him Ben Johnson), the rival Covent
Garden managers were compelled to follow suit, and in ’25 came out
with their Doctor Faustus—a kind of saraband of infernal persons
contrived by Thurmond the dancing-master. He, too, was the deviser
of “Harleykin Sheppard” (or Shepherd), in which the dauntless thief
who escaped from the Middle Stone-room at Newgate in so
remarkable a manner received a pantomimic apotheosis. Quick-
witted Hogarth satirized this felony-mania in the caricature of Wilks,
Booth, and Cibber, conjuring up “Scaramouch Jack Hall.” To return to
Burlington Gate. In the centre, Shakspeare and Jonson’s works are
being carted away for waste paper. To the left you see a huge
projecting sign or show-cloth, containing portraits of his sacred
Majesty George the Second in the act of presenting the
management of the Italian Opera with one thousand pounds; also of
the famous Mordaunt Earl of Peterborough and sometime general of
the armies in Spain. He kneels, and in the handsomest manner, to
Signora Cuzzoni the singer, saying (in a long apothecary’s label),
“Please accept eight thousand pounds!” but the Cuzzoni spurns at
him. Beneath is the entrance to the Opera. Infernal persons with very
long tails are entering thereto with joyful countenances. The infernal
persons are unmistakeable reminiscences of Callot’s demons in the
Tentation de St. Antoine. There is likewise a placard relating to
“Faux’s Long-room,” and his “dexterity of hand.”
In 1724, Hogarth produced another allegory called the Inhabitants
of the Moon, in which there are some covert and not very
complimentary allusions to the “dummy” character of royalty, and a
whimsical fancy of inanimate objects, songs, hammers, pieces of
money, and the like, being built up into imitation of human beings, all
very ingeniously worked out. By this time, Hogarth, too, had begun to
work, not only for the ephemeral pictorial squib-vendors of
Westminster Hall—those squibs came in with him, culminated in
Gillray, and went out with H. B.; or were rather absorbed and
amalgamated into the admirable Punch cartoons of Mr. Leech—but
also for the regular booksellers. For Aubry de la Mottraye’s Travels
(a dull, pretentious book) he executed some engravings, among
which I note A woman of Smyrna in the habit of the country—the
woman’s face very graceful, and the Dance, the Pyrrhic dance of the
Greek islands, and the oddest fandango that ever was seen. One
commentator says that the term “as merry as a grig” came from the
fondness of the inhabitants of those isles of eternal summer for
dancing, and that it should be properly “as merry as a Greek.” Quien
sabe? I know that lately in the Sessions papers I stumbled over the
examination of one Levi Solomon, alias Cockleput, who stated that
he lived in Sweet Apple Court, and that he “went a-grigging for his
living.” I have no Lexicon Balatronicum at hand; but from early
researches into the vocabulary of the “High Mung” I have an
indistinct impression that “griggers” were agile vagabonds who
danced, and went through elementary feats of posture-mastery in
taverns.
In ’24, Hogarth illustrated a translation of the Golden Ass of
Apuleius. The plates are coarse and clumsy; show no humour; were
mere pot-boilers, gagne-pains, thrusts with the burin at the wolf
looking in at the Hogarthian door, I imagine. Then came five
frontispieces for a translation of Cassandra. These I have not seen.
Then fifteen head-pieces for Beaver’s Military Punishments of the
Ancients, narrow little slips full of figures in chiaroscuro, many drawn
from Callot’s curious martyrology, Les Saincts et Sainctes de
l’Année, about three hundred graphic illustrations of human torture!
There was also a frontispiece to the Happy Ascetic, and one to the
Oxford squib of Terræ Filius, in 1724, but of the joyous recluse in
question I have no cognizance.
In 1722 (you see I am wandering up and down the years as well
as the streets), London saw a show—and Hogarth doubtless was
there to see—which merits some lines of mention. The drivelling,
avaricious dotard, who, crossing a room and looking at himself in a
mirror, sighed and mumbled, “That was once a man:”—this poor
wreck of mortality died, and became in an instant, and once more,
John the great Duke of Marlborough. On the 9th of August, 1722, he
was buried with extraordinary pomp in Westminster Abbey. The
saloons of Marlborough House, where the corpse lay in state, were
hung with fine black cloth, and garnished with bays and cypress. In
the death-chamber was a chair of state surmounted by a “majesty
scutcheon.” The coffin was on a bed of state, covered with a “fine
holland sheet,” over that a complete suit of armour, gilt, but empty.
Twenty years before, there would have been a waxen image in the
dead man’s likeness within the armour, but this hideous fantasy of
Tussaud-tombstone effigies had in 1722 fallen into desuetude.[8] The
garter was buckled round the steel leg of this suit of war-harness;
one listless gauntlet held a general’s truncheon; above the vacuous
helmet with its unstirred plumes was the cap of a Prince of the
Empire. The procession, lengthy and splendid, passed from
Marlborough House through St. James’s Park to Hyde Park Corner,
then through Piccadilly, down St. James’s Street, along Pall Mall,
and by King Street, Westminster, to the Abbey. Fifteen pieces of
cannon rambled in this show. Chelsea pensioners, to the number of
the years of the age of the deceased, preceded the car. The colours
were wreathed in crape and cypress. Guidon was there, and the
great standard, and many bannerols and achievements of arms.
“The mourning horse with trophies and plumades” was gorgeous.
There was a horse of state and a mourning horse, sadly led by the
dead duke’s equerries. And pray note: the minutest details of the
procession were copied from the programme of the Duke of
Albemarle’s funeral (Monk); which, again, was a copy of Oliver
Cromwell’s—which, again, was a reproduction, on a more splendid
scale, of the obsequies of Sir Philip Sidney, killed at Zutphen. Who
among us saw not the great scarlet and black show of 1852, the
funeral of the Duke of Wellington? Don’t you remember the eighty-
four tottering old Pensioners, corresponding in number with the
years of our heroic brother departed? When gentle Philip Sidney was
borne to the tomb, thirty-one poor men followed the hearse. The
brave soldier, the gallant gentleman, the ripe scholar, the
accomplished writer was so young. Arthur and Philip! And so century
shakes hand with century, and the new is ever old, and the last
novelty is the earliest fashion, and old Egypt leers from a glass-case,
or a four thousand year old fresco, and whispers to Sir Plume, “I, too,
wore a curled periwig, and used tweezers to remove superfluous
hairs.”
 In 1726, Hogarth executed a series of plates for Blackwell’s
Military Figures, representing the drill and manœuvres of the
Honourable Artillery Company. The pike and half-pike exercise are
very carefully and curiously illustrated; the figures evidently drawn
from life; the attitudes very easy. The young man was improving in
his drawing; for in 1724, Thornhill had started an academy for
studying from the round and from life at his own house, in Covent
Garden Piazza; and Hogarth—who himself tells us that his head was
filled with the paintings at Greenwich and St. Paul’s, and to whose
utmost ambition of scratching copper, there was now probably added
the secret longing to be a historico-allegorico-scriptural painter I
have hinted at, and who hoped some day to make Angels sprawl on
coved ceilings, and Fames blast their trumpets on grand staircases
—was one of the earliest students at the academy of the king’s
sergeant painter, and member of parliament for Weymouth. Already
William had ventured an opinion, bien tranchée, on high art. In those
days there flourished—yes, flourished is the word—a now forgotten
celebrity, Kent the architect, gardener, painter, decorator,
upholsterer, friend of the great, and a hundred things besides. This
artistic jack-of-all-trades became so outrageously popular, and
gained such a reputation for taste—if a man have strong lungs, and
persists in crying out that he is a genius, the public are sure to
believe him at last—that he was consulted on almost every tasteful
topic, and was teased to furnish designs for the most incongruous
objects. He was consulted for picture-frames, drinking-glasses,
barges, dining-room tables, garden-chairs, cradles, and birth-day
gowns. One lady he dressed in a petticoat ornamented with columns
of the five orders; to another he prescribed a copper-coloured skirt,
with gold ornaments. The man was at best but a wretched sciolist;
but he for a long period directed the “taste of the town.” He had at
last the presumption to paint an altar-piece for the church of St.
Clement Danes. The worthy parishioners, men of no taste at all,
burst into a yell of derision and horror at this astounding croûte.
Forthwith, irreverent young Mr. Hogarth lunged full butt with his
graver at the daub. He produced an engraving of Kent’s
Masterpiece, which was generally considered to be an unmerciful
caricature; but which he himself declared to be an accurate
representation of the picture. ’Twas the first declaration of his guerra
al cuchillo against the connoisseurs. The caricature, or copy,
whichever it was, made a noise; the tasteless parishioners grew
more vehement, and, at last, Gibson, Bishop of London (whose
brother, by the way, had paid his first visit to London in the company
of Dominie Hogarth), interfered, and ordered the removal of the
obnoxious canvas. “Kent’s masterpiece” subsided into an ornament
for a tavern-room. For many years it was to be seen (together with
the landlord’s portrait, I presume) at the “Crown and Anchor,” in the
Strand. Then it disappeared, and faded away from the visible things
extant.
With another bookseller’s commission, I arrive at another halting-
place in the career of William Hogarth. In 1726-7 appeared his
eighteen illustrations to Butler’s Hudibras. They are of considerable
size, broadly and vigorously executed, and display a liberal
instalment of the vis comica, of which William was subsequently to
be so lavish. Ralpho is smug and sanctified to a nicety. Hudibras is a
marvellously droll-looking figure, but he is not human, is generally
execrably drawn, and has a head preternaturally small, and so
pressed down between the clavicles, that you might imagine him to
be of the family of the anthropophagi, whose heads do grow beneath
their shoulders. There is a rare constable, the perfection of
Dogberryism-cum-Bumbledom, in the tableau of Hudibras in the
stocks. The widow is graceful and beautiful to look at. Unlike Wilkie,
Hogarth could draw pretty women;[9] the rogue who chucks the
widow’s attendant under the chin is incomparable, and Trulla is a
most truculent brimstone. The “committee” is a character full study of
sour faces. The procession of the “Skimmington” is full of life and
animation; and the concluding tableau, “Burning rumps at Temple
Bar,” is a wondrous street-scene, worthy of the ripe Hogarthian
epoch of The Progresses, The Election, Beer Street and Gin Lane.
This edition of Butler’s immortal satire had a great run; and the artist
often regretted that he had parted absolutely, and at once, with his
property in the plates.
So now then, William Hogarth, we part once more, but soon to
meet again. Next shall the moderns know thee—student at
Thornhill’s Academy—as a painter as well as an engraver. A
philosopher—quoique tu n’en doutais guère—thou hast been all
along.

FOOTNOTES
[2] To me there is something candid, naïve, and often
something noble in this personal consciousness and confidence,
this moderate self-trumpeting. “Questi sono miri!” cried Napoleon,
when, at the sack of Milan, the MS. treatises of Leonardo da Vinci
were discovered; and he bore them in triumph to his hotel,
suffering no meaner hand to touch them. He knew—the
Conquering Thinker—that he alone was worthy to possess those
priceless papers. So too, Honoré de Balzac calmly remarking that
there were only three men in France who could speak French
correctly: himself, Victor Hugo, and “Théophile” (T. Gautier). So,
too, Elliston, when the little ballet-girl complained of having been
hissed: “They have hissed me,” said the awful manager, and the
dancing girl was dumb. Who can forget the words that Milton
wrote concerning things of his “that posteritie would not willingly
let die?” and that Bacon left, commending his fame to “foreign
nations and to the next age?” And Turner, simply directing in his
will that he should be buried in St. Paul’s Cathedral? That
sepulchre, the painter knew, was his of right. And innocent
Gainsborough, dying: “We are all going to heaven, and Vandyke
is of the company.” And Fontenelle, calmly expiring at a hundred
years of age: “Je n’ai jamais dit la moindre chose centre la plus
petite vertu.” ’Tis true, that my specious little argument falls
dolefully to the ground when I remember that which the wisest
man who ever lived said concerning a child gathering shells and
pebbles on the sea-shore, when the great ocean of truth lay all
undiscovered before him.
[3] The bezant (from Byzantium) was a round knob on the
scutcheon, blazoned yellow. “Golp” was purple, the colour of an
old black eye, so defined by the heralds. “Sanguine” or “guzes”
were to be congested red, like bloodshot eyes; “torteaux” were of
another kind of red, like “Simnel cakes.” “Pomeis” were to be
green like apples. “Tawny” was orange. There were also “hurts” to
be blazoned blue, as bruises are.—New View of London, 1712.
 [4] I believe Pope’s sneer against poor Elkanah Settle (who
died very comfortably in the Charterhouse, 1724, ætat. 76: he
was alive in 1720, and succeeded Rowe as laureate), that he was
reduced in his latter days to compass a motion of St. George and
the Dragon at Bartholomew fair, and himself enacted the dragon
in a peculiar suit of green leather, his own invention, to have been
a purely malicious and mendacious bit of spite. Moreover, Settle
died years after Pope assumed him to have expired.
[5] 1720. The horrible room in Newgate Prison where in
cauldrons of boiling pitch the hangman seethed the dissevered
limbs of those executed for high treason, and whose quarters
were to be exposed, was called “Jack Ketch’s kitchen.”
[6] Compare these voluntary torments with the description of
the Dosèh, or horse-trampling ceremonial of the Sheik El Bekree,
over the bodies of the faithful, in Lane’s Modern Egyptians.
[7] Daniel Button’s well-known coffee-house was on the south
side of Russell Street, Covent Garden, nearly opposite Tom’s.
Button had been a servant of the Countess of Warwick, and so
was patronized by her spouse, the Right Hon. Joseph Addison.
Sir Robert Walpole’s creature, Giles Earl, a trading justice of the
peace (compare Fielding and “300l. a year of the dirtiest money in
the world”) used to examine criminals, for the amusement of the
company, in the public room at Button’s. Here, too, was a lion’s
head letter-box, into which communications for the Guardian were
dropped. At Button’s, Pope is reported to have said of Patrick, the
lexicographer, who made pretensions to criticism, that “a
dictionary-maker might know the meaning of one word, but not of
two put together.”
[8] Not, however, to forget that another Duchess, Marlborough’s
daughter, who loved Congreve so, had after his death a waxen
image made in his effigy, and used to weep over it, and anoint the
gouty feet.
[9] “They said he could not colour,” said old Mrs. Hogarth one
day to John Thomas Smith, showing him a sketch of a girl’s head.
“It’s a lie; look there: there’s flesh and blood for you, my man.”
 Studies in Animal Life.
“Authentic tidings of invisible things;—
Of ebb and flow, and ever-during power,
And central peace subsisting at the heart
Of endless agitation.”—The Excursion.

CHAPTER IV.
An extinct animal recognized by its tooth: how came this to be possible?—The task of classification.—
Artificial and natural methods.—Linnæus, and his baptism of the animal kingdom: his scheme of
classification.—What is there underlying all true classification?—The chief groups.—What is a
species?—Re-statement of the question respecting the fixity or variability of species.—The two
hypotheses.—Illustration drawn from the Romance languages.—Caution to disputants.
I was one day talking with Professor Owen in the Hunterian Museum, when a
gentleman approached with a request to be informed respecting the nature of a
curious fossil, which had been dug up by one of his workmen. As he drew the fossil
from a small bag, and was about to hand it for examination, Owen quietly remarked:
—“That is the third molar of the under-jaw of an extinct species of rhinoceros.” The
astonishment of the gentleman at this precise and confident description of the fossil,
before even it had quitted his hands, was doubtless very great. I know that mine was;
until the reflection occurred that if some one, little acquainted with editions, had drawn
a volume from his pocket, declaring he had found it in an old chest, any bibliophile
would have been able to say at a glance: “That is an Elzevir;” or, “That is one of the
Tauchnitz classics, stereotyped at Leipzig.” Owen is as familiar with the aspect of the
teeth of animals, living and extinct, as a student is with the aspect of editions. Yet
before that knowledge could have been acquired, before he could say thus confidently
that the tooth belonged to an extinct species of rhinoceros, the united labours of
thousands of diligent inquirers must have been directed to the classification of
animals. How could he know that the rhinoceros was of that particular species rather
than another? and what is meant by species? To trace the history of this confidence
would be to tell the long story of zoological investigation: a story too long for narration
here, though we may pause awhile to consider its difficulties.
To make a classified catalogue of the books in the British Museum would be a
gigantic task; but imagine what that task would be if all the title-pages and other
external indications were destroyed! The first attempts would necessarily be of a rough
approximative kind, merely endeavouring to make a sort of provisional order amid the
chaos, after which succeeding labours might introduce better and better
arrangements. The books might first be grouped according to size; but having got
them together, it would soon be discovered that size was no indication of their
contents: quarto poems and duodecimo histories, octavo grammars and folio
dictionaries, would immediately give warning that some other arrangement was
needed. Nor would it be better to separate the books according to the languages in
which they were written. The presence or absence of “illustrations” would furnish no
better guide; while the bindings would soon be found to follow no rule. Indeed, one by
one all the external characters would prove unsatisfactory, and the labourers would
finally have to decide upon some internal characters. Having read enough of each
book to ascertain whether it was poetry or prose: and if poetry, whether dramatic, epic,
lyric, or satiric; and if prose, whether history, philosophy, theology, philology, science,
fiction, or essay: a rough classification could be made; but even then there would be
many difficulties, such as where to place a work on the philosophy of history—or the
history of science,—or theology under the guise of science—or essays on very
different subjects; while some works would defy classification.
Gigantic as this labour would be, it would be trifling compared with the labour of
classifying all the animals now living (not to mention extinct species), so that the place
of any one might be securely and rapidly determined; yet the persistent zeal and
sagacity of zoologists have done for the animal kingdom what has not yet been done
for the library of the Museum, although the titles of the books are not absent. It has
been done by patient reading of the contents—by anatomical investigation of the
internal structure of animals. Except on a basis of comparative anatomy, there could
have been no better a classification of animals than a classification of books according
to size, language, binding, &c. An unscientific Pliny might group animals according to
their habitat; but when it was known that whales, though living in the water and
swimming like fishes, were in reality constructed like air-breathing quadrupeds—when
it was known that animals differing so widely as bees, birds, bats, and flying squirrels,
or as otters, seals, and cuttle-fish, lived together in the same element, it became
obvious that such a principle of arrangement could lead to no practical result. Nor
would it suffice to class animals according to their modes of feeding; since in all
classes there are samples of each mode. Equally unsatisfactory would be external
form—the seal and the whale resembling fishes, the worm resembling the eel, and the
eel the serpent.
Two things were necessary: first, that the structure of various animals should be
minutely studied, and described—which is equivalent to reading the books to be
classified;—and secondly, that some artificial method should be devised of so
arranging the immense mass of details as to enable them to be remembered, and also
to enable fresh discoveries readily to find a place in the system. We may be perfectly
familiar with the contents of a book, yet wholly at a loss where to place it. If we have to
catalogue Hegel’s Philosophy of History, for example, it becomes a difficult question
whether to place it under the rubric of philosophy, or under that of history. To decide
this point, we must have some system of classification.
In the attempts to construct a system, naturalists are commonly said to have
followed two methods: the artificial and the natural. The artificial method seizes some
one prominent characteristic, and groups all the individuals together which agree in
this one respect. In Botany the artificial method classes plants according to the organs
of reproduction; but this has been found so very imperfect that it has been abandoned,
and the natural method has been substituted, according to which the whole structure
of the plant determines its place. If flying were taken as the artificial basis for the
grouping of some animals, we should find insects and birds, bats and flying squirrels,
grouped together; but the natural method, taking into consideration not one character,
but all the essential characters, finds that insects, birds, and bats differ profoundly in
their organization: the insect has wings, but its wings are not formed like those of the
bird, nor are those of the bird formed like those of the bat. The insect does not breathe
by lungs, like the bird and the bat; it has no internal skeleton, like the bird and the bat;
and the bird, although it has many points in common with the bat, does not, like it,
suckle its young; and thus we may run over the characters of each organization, and
find that the three animals belong to widely different groups.
It is to Linnæus that we are indebted for the most ingenious and comprehensive of
the many schemes invented for the cataloguing of animal forms; and modern attempts
at classification are only improvements on the plan he laid down. First we may notice
his admirable invention of the double names. It had been the custom to designate
plants and animals according to some name common to a large group, to which was
added a description more or less characteristic. An idea may be formed of the
necessity of a reform, by conceiving what a laborious and uncertain process it would
be if our friends spoke to us of having seen a dog in the garden, and on our asking
what kind of dog, instead of their saying “a terrier, a bull-terrier, or a skye-terrier,” they
were to attempt a description of the dog. Something of this kind was the labour of
understanding the nature of an animal from the vague description of it given by
naturalists. Linnæus rebaptized the whole animal kingdom upon one intelligible
principle. He continued to employ the name common to each group, such as that of
Felis for the cats, which became the generic name; and in lieu of the description which
was given of each different kind, to indicate that it was a lion, a tiger, a leopard, or a
domestic cat, he affixed a specific name: thus the animal bearing the description of a
lion became Felis leo; the tiger, Felis tigris; the leopard, Felis leopardus; and our
domestic friend, Felis catus. These double names, as Vogt remarks, are like the
Christian- and sur-names by which we distinguish the various members of one family;
and instead of speaking of Tomkinson with the flabby face, and Tomkinson with the
square forehead, we simply say John and William Tomkinson.
Linnæus did more than this. He not only fixed definite conceptions of Species and
Genera, but introduced those of Orders and Classes. Cuvier added Families to
Genera, and Sub-kingdoms (embranchements) to Classes. Thus a scheme was
elaborated by which the whole animal kingdom was arranged in subordinate groups:
the sub-kingdoms were divided into classes, the classes into orders, the orders into
families, the families into genera, the genera into species, and the species into
varieties. The guiding principle of anatomical resemblance determined each of these
divisions. Those largest groups, which resemble each other only in having what is
called the typical character in common, are brought together under the first head. Thus
all the groups which agree in possessing a backbone and internal skeleton, although
they differ widely in form, structure, and habitat, do nevertheless resemble each other
more than they resemble the groups which have no backbone. This great division
having been formed, it is seen to arrange itself in very obvious minor divisions, or
Classes—the mammalia, birds, reptiles, and fishes. All mammals resemble each other
more than they resemble birds; all reptiles resemble each other more than they
resemble fishes (in spite of the superficial resemblance between serpents and eels or
lampreys). Each Class again falls into the minor groups of Orders; and on the same
principles: the monkeys being obviously distinguished from rodents, and the carnivora
from the ruminating animals; and so of the rest. In each Order there are generally
Families, and the Families fall into Genera, which differ from each other only in fewer
and less important characters. The Genera include groups which have still fewer
differences, and are called Species; and these again include groups which have only
minute and unimportant differences of colour, size, and the like, and are called Sub-
species, or Varieties.
Whoever looks at the immensity of the animal kingdom, and observes how
intelligibly and systematically it is arranged in these various divisions, will admit that,
however imperfect, the scheme is a magnificent product of human ingenuity and
labour. It is not an arbitrary arrangement, like the grouping of the stars in
constellations; it expresses, though obscurely, the real order of Nature. All true
Classification should be to forms what laws are to phenomena: the one reducing
varieties to systematic order, as the other reduces phenomena to their relation of
sequence. Now if it be true that the classification expresses the real order of nature,
and not simply the order which we may find convenient, there will be something more
than mere resemblance indicated in the various groups; or, rather let me say, this
resemblance itself is the consequence of some community in the things compared,
and will therefore be the mark of some deeper cause. What is this cause? Mr. Darwin
holds that “propinquity of descent—the only known cause of the similarity of organic
beings—is the bond, hidden as it is by various degrees of modification, which is
partially revealed to us by our classifications”[10]—“that the characters which
naturalists consider as showing true affinity between any two or more species are
those which have been inherited from a common parent, and in so far all true
classification is genealogical; that community of descent is the hidden bond which
naturalists have been unconsciously seeking, and not some unknown plan of creation,
or the enunciation of general propositions, and the mere putting together and
separating objects more or less alike.”[11]
Before proceeding to open the philosophical discussion which inevitably arises on
the mention of Mr. Darwin’s book, I will here set down the chief groups, according to
Cuvier’s classification, for the benefit of the tyro in natural history, who will easily
remember them, and will find the knowledge constantly invoked.
There are four Sub-kingdoms, or Branches:—1. Vertebrata. 2. Mollusca. 3.
Articulata. 4. Radiata.
The Vertebrata consist of four classes:—Mammalia, Birds, Reptiles, and Fishes.
The Mollusca consist of six classes:—Cephalopoda (cuttlefish), Pteropoda,
Gasteropoda (snails, &c.), Acephala (oysters, &c.), Brachiopoda, and Cirrhopoda
(barnacles).—N.B. This last class is now removed from the Molluscs and placed
among the Crustaceans.
The Articulata are composed of four classes:—Annelids (worms), Crustacea
(lobsters, crabs, &c.), Arachnida (spiders), and Insecta.
 The Radiata embrace all the remaining forms; but this group has been so altered
since Cuvier’s time, that I will not burden your memory just now with an enumeration
of the details.
The reader is now in a condition to appreciate the general line of argument adopted
in the discussion of Mr. Darwin’s book, which is at present exciting very great attention,
and which will, at any rate, aid in general culture by opening to many minds new tracts
of thought. The benefit in this direction is, however, considerably lessened by the
extreme vagueness which is commonly attached to the word “species,” as well as by
the great want of philosophic culture which impoverishes the majority of our
naturalists. I have heard, or read, few arguments on this subject which have not
impressed me with the sense that the disputants really attached no distinct ideas to
many of the phrases they were uttering. Yet it is obvious that we must first settle what
are the facts grouped together and indicated by the word “species,” before we can
carry on any discussion as to the origin of species. To be battling about the fixity or
variability of species, without having rigorously settled what species is, can lead to no
edifying result.
It is notorious that if you ask even a zoologist, What is a species? you will almost
always find that he has only a very vague answer to give; and if his answer be precise,
it will be the precision of error, and will vanish into contradictions directly it is
examined. The consequence of this is, that even the ablest zoologists are constantly
at variance as to specific characters, and often cannot agree whether an animal shall
be considered of a new species, or only a variety. There could be no such
disagreements if specific characters were definite: if we knew what species meant,
once and for all. Ask a chemist, What is a salt? What an acid? and his reply will be
definite, and uniformly the same: what he says, all chemists will repeat. Not so the
zoologist. Sometimes he will class two animals as of different species, when they only
differ in colour, in size, or in the numbers of tentacles, &c.; at other times he will class
animals as belonging to the same species, although they differ in size, colour, shape,
instincts, habits, &c. The dog, for example, is said to be one species with many
varieties, or races. But contrast the pug-dog with the greyhound, the spaniel with the
mastiff, the bulldog with the Newfoundland, the setter with the terrier, the sheepdog
with the pointer: note the striking differences in their structure and their instincts: and
you will find that they differ as widely as some genera, and as most species. If these
varieties inhabited different countries—if the pug were peculiar to Australia, and the
mastiff to Spain—there is not a naturalist but would class them as of different species.
The same remark applies to pigeons and ducks, oxen and sheep.
The reason of this uncertainty is that the thing Species does not exist: the term
expresses an abstraction, like Virtue, or Whiteness; not a definite concrete reality,
which can be separated from other things, and always be found the same. Nature
produces individuals; these individuals resemble each other in varying degrees;
according to their resemblances we group them together as classes, orders, genera,
and species; but these terms only express the relations of resemblance, they do not
indicate the existence of such things as classes, orders, genera, or species.[12] There
is a reality indicated by each term—that is to say, a real relation; but there is no
objective existence of which we could say, This is variable, This is immutable.
Precisely as there is a real relation indicated by the term Goodness, but there is no
Goodness apart from the virtuous actions and feelings which we group together under
this term. It is true that metaphysicians in past ages angrily debated respecting the
Immutability of Virtue, and had no more suspicion of their absurdity, than moderns
have who debate respecting the Fixity of Species. Yet no sooner do we understand
that Species means a relation of resemblance between animals, than the question of
the Fixity, or Variability, of Species resolves itself into this: Can there be any variation
in the resemblances of closely allied animals? A question which would never be
asked.
No one has thought of raising the question of the fixity of varieties, yet it is as
legitimate as that of the fixity of species; and we might also argue for the fixity of
genera, orders, classes; the fixity of all these being implied in the very terms; since no
sooner does any departure from the type present itself, than by that it is excluded from
the category; no sooner does a white object become gray, or yellow, than it is
excluded from the class of white objects. Here, therefore, is a sense in which the
phrase “fixity of species” is indisputable; but in this sense the phrase has never been
disputed. When zoologists have maintained that species are variable, they have
meant that animal forms are variable; and these variations, gradually accumulating,
result at last in such differences as are called specific. Although some zoologists, and
speculators who were not zoologists, have believed that the possibility of variation is
so great that one species may actually be transmuted into another, i.e., that an ass
may be developed into a horse,—yet most thinkers are now agreed that such violent
changes are impossible; and that every new form becomes established only through
the long and gradual accumulation of minute differences in divergent directions.
It is clear, from what has just been said, that the many angry discussions respecting
the fixity of species, which, since the days of Lamarck, have disturbed the amity of
zoologists and speculative philosophers, would have been considerably abbreviated,
had men distinctly appreciated the equivoque which rendered their arguments hazy. I
am far from implying that the battle was purely a verbal one. I believe there was a real
and important distinction in the doctrines of the two camps; but it seems to me that
had a clear understanding of the fact that Species was an abstract term, been
uniformly present to their minds, they would have sooner come to an agreement.
Instead of the confusing disputes as to whether one Species could ever become
another Species, the question would have been, Are animal forms changeable? Can
the descendants of animals become so unlike their ancestors, in certain peculiarities
of structure or instinct, as to be classed by naturalists as a different species?
No sooner is the question thus disengaged from equivoque, than its discussion
becomes narrowed within well-marked limits. That animal forms are variable, is
disputed by no zoologist. The only question which remains is this: To what extent are
animal forms variable? The answers given have been two: one school declaring that
the extent of variability is limited to those trifling characteristics which mark the
different Varieties of each Species; the other school declaring that the variability is
indefinite, and that all animal forms may have arisen from successive modifications of
a very few types, or even of one type.
 Now, I would call your attention to one point in this discussion, which ought to be
remembered when antagonists are growing angry and bitter over the subject: it is, that
both these opinions are necessarily hypothetical—there can be nothing like positive
proof adduced on either side. The utmost that either hypothesis can claim is, that it is
more consistent with general analogies, and better serves to bring our knowledge of
various points into harmony. Neither of them can claim to be a truth which warrants
dogmatic decision.
Of these two hypotheses, the first has the weight and majority of authoritative
adherents. It declares that all the different kinds of Cats, for example, were distinct and
independent creations, each species being originally what we see it to be now, and
what it will continue to be as long as it exists: lions, panthers, pumas, leopards, tigers,
jaguars, ocelots, and domestic cats, being so many original stocks, and not so many
divergent forms of one original stock. The second hypothesis declares that all these
kinds of cats represent divergencies of the original stock, precisely as the Varieties of
each kind represent the divergencies of each Species. It is true that each species,
when once formed, only admits of limited variations; any cause which should push the
variation beyond certain limits would destroy the species,—because by species is
meant the group of animals contained within those limits. Let us suppose the original
stock from which all these kinds of cats have sprung, to have become modified into
lions, leopards, and tigers—in other words, that the gradual accumulation of
divergencies has resulted in the whole family of cats existing under these three forms.
The lions will form a distinct species; this species varies, and in the course of long
variation a new species, the puma, rises by the side of it. The leopards also vary, and
let us suppose their variation at length assumes so marked a form,—in the ocelot,—
that we class it as a new species. There is nothing in this hypothesis but what is
strictly consonant with analogies; it is only extending to Species what we know to be
the fact with respect to Varieties; and these Varieties which we know to have been
produced from one and the same Species are often more widely separated from each
other than the lion is from the puma, or the leopard from the ocelot. Mr. Darwin
remarks that “at least a score of pigeons might be chosen, which, if shown to an
ornithologist, and he were told that they were wild birds, would certainly, I think, be
ranked by him as well-defined species. Moreover, I do not believe that any
ornithologist would place the English carrier, the short-faced tumbler, the runt, the
barb, the pouter and fantail in the same genus! more especially as in each of these
breeds several truly-inherited sub-breeds or species, as he might have called them,
could be shown him.”
The development of numerous specific forms, widely distinguished from each other,
out of one common stock, is not a whit more improbable than the development of
numerous distinct languages out of a common parent language, which modern
philologists have proved to be indubitably the case. Indeed, there is a very remarkable
analogy between philology and zoology in this respect: just as the comparative
anatomist traces the existence of similar organs, and similar connections of these
organs, throughout the various animals classed under one type, so does the
comparative philologist detect the family likeness in the various languages scattered
from China to the Basque provinces, and from Cape Comorin across the Caucasus to
Lapland—a likeness which assures him that the Teutonic, Celtic, Windic, Italic,
Hellenic, Iranic, and Indic languages are of common origin, and separated from the
Arabian, Aramean, and Hebrew languages, which have another origin. Let us bring
together a Frenchman, a Spaniard, an Italian, a Portuguese, a Wallachian, and a
Rhætian, and we shall hear six very different languages spoken, the speakers
severally unintelligible to each other, their languages differing so widely that one
cannot be regarded as the modification of the other; yet we know most positively that
all these languages are offshoots from the Latin, which was once a living language,
but which is now, so to speak, a fossil. The various species of cats do not differ more
than these six languages differ: and yet the resemblances point in each case to a
common origin. Max Müller, in his brilliant essay on Comparative Mythology,[13] has
said:—
“If we knew nothing of the existence of Latin—if all historical documents previous to
the fifteenth century had been lost—if tradition, even, was silent as to the former
existence of a Roman empire, a mere comparison of the six Roman dialects would
enable us to say, that at some time there must have been a language from which all
these modern dialects derived their origin in common; for without this supposition it
would be impossible to account for the facts exhibited by these dialects. Let us look at
the auxiliary verb. We find:—

Italian. Wallachian. Rhætian. Spanish. Portuguese. French.

I am sono sum sunt sunt soy sou suis
Thou art sei es eis eres es es
He is e é (este) ei es he est
We are siamo súntemu essen somos somos sommes
You are siete súnteti esses sois sois êtes (estes)
They are sono súnt eân (sun) son são sont.

It is clear, even from a short consideration of these forms, first, that all are but
varieties of one common type; secondly, that it is impossible to consider any one of
these six paradigms as the original from which the others had been borrowed. To this
we may add, thirdly, that in none of the languages to which these verbal forms belong,
do we find the elements of which they could have been composed. If we find such
forms as j’ai aimé, we can explain them by a mere reference to the radical means
which French has still at its command, and the same may be said even of compounds
like j’aimerai, i.e. je-aimer-ai, I have to love, I shall love. But a change from je suis to tu
es is inexplicable by the light of French grammar. These forms could not have grown,
so to speak, on French soil, but must have been handed down as relics from a former
period—must have existed in some language antecedent to any of the Roman
dialects. Now, fortunately, in this case, we are not left to a mere inference, but as we
possess the Latin verb, we can prove how, by phonetic corruption, and by mistaken
analogies, every one of the six paradigms is but a national metamorphosis of the Latin
original.
“Let us now look at another set of paradigms:—

Sanskrit. Lithuanian. Zend. Doric. Old Latin. Gothic. Armen.

 Slavonic.
I am ásmi esmi ahmi ἐμμι yesmě sum im em
Thou art ási essi ahi ἐσσὶ yesi es is es
He is ásti esti asti ἐστί yestǒ est ist ê
We (two) are ’svás esva yesva siju
You (two) are ’sthás esta stho? ἕστόν yesta sijuts
They (two) are ’stás (esti) sto? ἐστόν yesta
We are ’smás esmi hmahi ἐσμές yesmǒ sumus sijum emq
You are ’sthá este stha ἐστέ yeste estis sijup êq
They are sánti (esti) hěnti ἐντί somtě sunt sind en

“From a careful consideration of these forms, we ought to draw exactly the same
conclusions; firstly, that all are but varieties of one common type; secondly, that it is
impossible to consider any of them as the original from which the others have been
borrowed; and thirdly, that here again, none of the languages in which these verbal
forms occur possess the elements of which they are composed.”
All these languages resemble each other so closely that they point to some more
ancient language which was to them what Latin was to the six Romance languages;
and in the same way we are justified in supposing that all the classes of the vertebrate
animals point to the existence of some elder type, now extinct, from which they were
all developed.
I have thus stated what are the two hypotheses on this question. There is only one
more preliminary which it is needful to notice here, and that is, to caution the reader
against the tendency, unhappily too common, of supposing that an adversary holds
opinions which are transparently absurd. When we hear an hypothesis which is either
novel, or unacceptable to us, we are apt to draw some very ridiculous conclusion from
it, and to assume that this conclusion is seriously held by its upholders. Thus the
zoologists who maintain the variability of species are sometimes asked if they believe
a goose was developed out of an oyster, or a rhinoceros from a mouse? the
questioner apparently having no misgiving as to the candour of his ridicule. There are
three modes of combating a doctrine. The first is to point out its strongest positions,
and then show them to be erroneous or incomplete; but this plan is generally difficult,
and sometimes impossible; it is not, therefore, much in vogue. The second is to render
the doctrine ridiculous, by pretending that it includes certain extravagant propositions,
of which it is entirely innocent. The third is to render the doctrine odious, by forcing on
it certain conclusions, which it would repudiate, but which are declared to be “the
inevitable consequences” of such a doctrine. Now it is undoubtedly true that men
frequently maintain very absurd opinions; but it is neither candid, nor wise, to assume
that men who otherwise are certainly not fools, hold opinions the absurdity of which is
transparent.
Let us not, therefore, tax the followers of Lamarck, Geoffroy St. Hilaire, or Mr.
Darwin with absurdities they have not advocated; but rather endeavour to see what
solid argument they have for the basis of their hypothesis.
 FOOTNOTES
[10] Darwin: Origin of Species, p. 414.
[11] Darwin: Origin of Species, p. 420.
[12] Cuvier says, in so many words, that classes, orders, and genera, are
abstractions, et rien de pareil n’existe dans la nature; but species is not an
abstraction!—See Lettres à Pfaff, p. 179.
[13] See Oxford Essays, 1856.
 Strangers Yet!
Strangers yet!
After years of life together,
After fair and stormy weather,
After travel in far lands,
After touch of wedded hands,—
Why thus joined? why ever met?
If they must be strangers yet.

Strangers yet!
After childhood’s winning ways,
After care, and blame, and praise,
Counsel asked, and wisdom given,
After mutual prayers to Heaven,
Child and parent scarce regret
When they part—are strangers yet

Strangers yet!
After strife for common ends,
After title of old friends,
After passion fierce and tender,
After cheerful self-surrender,
Hearts may beat and eyes be wet,
And the souls be strangers yet.

Strangers yet!
Strange and bitter thought to scan
All the loneliness of man!
Nature by magnetic laws
Circle unto circle draws;
Circles only touch when met,
Never mingle—strangers yet.
 Strangers yet!
Will it evermore be thus—
Spirits still impervious?
Shall we ever fairly stand
Soul to soul, as hand to hand?
Are the bounds eternal set
To retain us strangers yet?

Strangers yet!
Tell not love it must aspire
Unto something other—higher:
God himself were loved the best,
Were man’s sympathies at rest;
Rest above the strain and fret
Of the world of strangers yet!
Strangers yet!

R. Monckton Milnes.
Framley Parsonage.
CHAPTER X.
Lucy Robarts.