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SHAPING AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
Landscapes and Urban Design
SCOTT M. ROULIER
Praise for Shaping American Democracy
“Bringing diverse voices like Thomas Jefferson, Henry David Thoreau, Frederick
Law Olmsted, Frank Lloyd Wright, Robert Moses, and Jane Jacobs into conversa-
tion with contemporary political theory, Roulier offers not only a rich intellectual
history but important insights into how land-use issues raise critical challenges for
the future of our democracy. This is an invaluable book that will appeal to scholars
and students of political theory, environmental studies, intellectual history, public
policy, and urban planning.”
—Peter Cannavò, Associate Professor of Government and Director
of Environmental Studies, Hamilton College, USA
Scott M. Roulier
Shaping American
Democracy
Landscapes and Urban Design
Scott M. Roulier
Political Science
Lyon College
Batesville, Arkansas, USA
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
ix
x Contents
9 Conclusion 221
Index 233
CHAPTER 1
This book will view American democracy through the lenses of various
landscapes (wilderness and agrarian) and built environments, both urban
and suburban. There are many reasons for taking this approach. For one,
studying landscapes and cityscapes reveals aspects of democratic theory
that are often marginalized. A traditional rationale for democracy is that it
helps people come to terms with political authority—providing mecha-
nisms both to legitimize (via elections) and to limit (via constitutionally
enumerated rights) the exercise of power. This is what David Held refers
to as the “protective” justification for democracy. There are also, Held
maintains, “developmental” dimensions to democracy; the idea here is
that citizen participation in decision-making, in shaping community out-
comes, is an important avenue for self-realization (Held 2006, 35). No
doubt the protective and developmental aspects of democracy are critical;
however, most inhabitants of democracies spend only a fraction of their
time voting or expressing concerns at a city council meeting, bringing a
lawsuit against the government for a civil rights violation or campaigning
for some political office. Instead, they are socializing with friends, raising
families, and earning a living. Theorizing democracy by leaning on urban
design, it is argued, shifts the focus from what are commonly regarded as
political activities to the social dimension of democracy; that is, it seeks to
understand how a substantive commitment to democracy can or should
influence the “lived reality” of citizens—explores important concepts like
civic formation, social equality, and integration.
good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of
individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will” (Schumpeter
1976, 250). Schumpeter calls in to question both the concept of the com-
mon good and the ideal capacities of citizens attached to it. Following
Max Weber, he argues that politics often involves disputes about values
(say, political isolation versus international engagement) that are incom-
mensurable, leading to “rifts on questions of principle, which cannot be
reconciled by rational argument because ultimate values—our conception
of what life and what society should be—are beyond the range of mere
logic” (251).1
Not only is the classical view’s idea of a common good vacuous, sug-
gests Schumpeter, its assumptions about people—that they have the req-
uisite knowledge and interest to make political decisions—are naïve. While
people can make reasonably good decisions about their daily lives, about
those things that “lie within the little field which the individual citizen’s
mind encompasses with a full sense of its reality,” the same individual has
almost no experience with anticipating the probable outcomes of various
political and economic policy prescriptions (Schumpeter 1976, 258–259).
Thus, far from expressing the true intentions and reasoned conclusions of
citizens, public opinion in democracies tends to be manufactured by elites
who vie to “create the will of the people” (263).
Having disposed of the classical view, Schumpeter offers a new theory
of democracy that he believes is more consistent with empirical reality.
Whereas the classical view made the selection of representatives “second-
ary to the primary purpose” of vesting the “power of deciding political
issues in the electorate,” Schumpeter’s theory reverses the equation and
makes the “deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election
of men who are to do the deciding” (Schumpeter 1976, 269). In other
words, with the purported fiction of the common good and politically
knowledgeable and engaged citizens exposed, Schumpeter proposes what
he considers to be a more realistic model in which people choose between
competing teams of elites, upon whose shoulders the responsibility to
make decisions more appropriately rests.
Like Schumpeter, Robert Dahl believes that many of our cherished
views of democracy crumble under close inspection, though, as we will
see, he does not accept Schumpeter’s rather pessimistic view that demo-
cratic control should be ceded to elites—and thus moves back toward the
center of the democratic spectrum. While expressing his admiration for
Madison, Dahl begins his classic A Preface to Democratic Theory by exposing
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND ITS SPACES: AN INTRODUCTION 7
the significant “cracks” in the Founder’s theory (Dahl 1956, 4). Madison
was committed to the republican principle of allowing the majority to
express its will through its elected representatives, but he was equally
concerned that the majority would use its power to undermine minority
rights. Dahl sympathizes with this Madisonian concern but largely rejects
Madison’s prescriptions. In Federalist 49, for instance, Madison counsels
against “the accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judi-
ciary, in the same hands”; however, as Dahl points out, if by “power” we
mean “constitutionally prescribed authority,” then Madison’s claim is
“demonstrably false, for it is pretty clearly not necessary to every non-
tyrannical republic, as an examination of parliamentary, but certainly non-
tyrannical, democratic systems like that of Great Britain readily prove”
(13). Moreover, as Dahl applies the solvent of critical inquiry to important
Madisonian concepts—such as tyranny and factions—they yield vexing
aporias. The upshot of Dahl’s critique of Madison is that the latter relies
too much on external constraints and “underestimates the importance of
the inherent social checks and balances existing in every pluralistic society”
(22).
Another theory, what Dahl calls “populistic democracy,”2 focuses less
on the specter of majority tyranny and, instead, seeks to maximize political
equality and popular sovereignty, but he does not believe the latter are
absolute goals. He observes that few people would forego privacy, or
social stability or income for some incremental increase in political equal-
ity: “It is an observable fact that almost no one regards political equality
and popular sovereignty as worth an unlimited sacrifice of these goals”
(Dahl 1956, 51).
So what alternative, if any, remains? Dahl suggests that the Madisonian
and populistic models of democracy pursue a method of “maximiza-
tion”—the first maximizing non-tyranny and the second maximizing the
goals of political equality and popular sovereignty. By contrast, a more
suitable method, one based on description, involves studying many indi-
vidual examples of self-styled democracies and, using this data set, seeks to
isolate the “distinguishing characteristics” these polities share and to dis-
cern the “necessary and sufficient conditions” for such political organiza-
tions (Dahl 1956, 63). According to Dahl, in “polyarchies,” his term for
modern, heterogeneous democracies, several conditions “exist to a rela-
tively high degree” (84). For example, during the voting period, each
person is allowed to vote, and each person’s vote is weighted equally. The
policy or candidate that receives the greatest number of these votes is
8 S.M. ROULIER
Tocqueville claims that “devoted service to any one man becomes more
rare”; though the “bond of human affection may be extended,” it is simul-
taneously “relaxed,” leaving the individual more room for her own con-
cerns and pursuits (396). Again, while “aristocracy had made a chain of all
the members of the community, from the peasant to the king, democracy
breaks that chain and severs every link of it” (397). In short, Tocqueville
argues that when the social landscape is leveled—and no one is born a
master or slave, a patrician or a peasant—citizens of a democracy incline
toward individualism, believing they “owe nothing to any man, they
expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering
themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole
destiny is in their own hands” (397). In this vision, democracy as a regime
form is touted for the liberty it affords its citizens—its ability to unchain
individuals from (often suffocating) traditions and institutions and to
unleash their energy for self-exploration, expression, and development.
This individual-oriented democracy3 manifests itself in several spatial
forms, including the wilderness tradition of Thoreau, Wright’s radically
decentralized “Broadacre City,” and Moses’s urban modernism.
If Tocqueville helps us to understand the relationship between a liberal
individualism and democracy, the opposite tendency, that democracy
would turn toward communalism, is best summed up in the word “repub-
licanism,” which Gordon Wood reminds us “added a moral dimension, a
utopian depth, to the political separation from England,” an expectation
of a radical re-ordering of both politics and society, based on the ideas of
the great thinkers and republics of antiquity (Wood 1993, 47–48). The
literal meaning of “republic” (res publica) is the notion that a government,
the thing or “res,” is not the property of a single person or small group of
persons but belongs to the people, the “publica.” Republican ideology,
then, contrasted sharply with monarchical and aristocratic thinking in
which the public good was subordinated to the interests of ruling elites
(54–55). The Founders who espoused this philosophy were acutely aware
of a republic’s fragility, for while monarchy could rely on fear and force,
republics had to rely on the “willingness of the individual to sacrifice his
private interests for the good of the community—such patriotism or love
of country—… demanded an extraordinary moral character in the people,”
the inculcation and preservation of public virtue in the citizenry (68).
The firm foundation for the public good and its attendant virtues,
believed republicans, was not merely a political restructuring, that is,
10 S.M. ROULIER