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Statecraft and
the Political Economy
of Capitalism
Scott G. Nelson · Joel T. Shelton
International Political Economy Series
Series Editor
Timothy M. Shaw , University of Massachusetts Boston, Boston, MA,
USA;
Emeritus Professor, University of London, London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises
impacts its organization and governance. The IPE series has tracked its
development in both analysis and structure over the last three decades.
It has always had a concentration on the global South. Now the South
increasingly challenges the North as the centre of development, also
reflected in a growing number of submissions and publications on
indebted Eurozone economies in Southern Europe. An indispensable
resource for scholars and researchers, the series examines a variety of capi-
talisms and connections by focusing on emerging economies, companies
and sectors, debates and policies. It informs diverse policy communities
as the established trans-Atlantic North declines and ‘the rest’, especially
the BRICS, rise.
NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!
Scott G. Nelson · Joel T. Shelton
Statecraft
and the Political
Economy
of Capitalism
Scott G. Nelson Joel T. Shelton
Virginia Tech Elon University
Blacksburg, VA, USA Elon, NC, USA
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
This book is dedicated to Edward Weisband,
The chapters comprising this book were written over a period of several
years, and first drafts were prepared as working papers for academic audi-
ences in North America, Europe, and Asia. The main analytical thread
linking all of the chapters was conceived in the early years of Barack
Obama’s presidency when we observed some of the key dynamics that
would culminate in Donald Trump’s election in 2016, dynamics that
would only intensify in the years after. Suffice to say that the experi-
ence of the Trump presidency sharpened our thinking about the perilous
social and political conditions that now prevail in the United States as
well as in many of the world’s “advanced” democracies. The ascendance
of far-right politics is unique to each country, of course, but there is
little question that parallel experiences obtain across them. One common
experience is that state power has been wielded at home and abroad
to further private interests rather than to secure the welfare of ordinary
people. In the American context, long prior to the coronavirus pandemic
there was a sense that a deadly combination of government neglect over
many years, coupled with abject incompetence and the onslaught of disin-
formation and propaganda, could well imperil populations and create
ever-stiffer headwinds for democracy, not to mention a politics grounded
in a commitment to equity and respect for difference. While the United
States may be a special case, a number of dangers also threaten democracy
in many countries that were once counted on as stalwarts of the liberal
democratic order.
vii
viii PREFACE
The coronavirus pandemic has laid bare the dire consequences of relin-
quishing the role of the state in securing the public interest—a task that
we associate in this volume with the art and practice of statecraft. When
Dr. Deborah Birx, the former White House Coronavirus Response Coor-
dinator, remarked in a March 2021 interview with CNN that most of the
coronavirus deaths in the U.S. could have been prevented if the Trump
administration had acted earlier and more decisively to curb the spread of
the disease (Wang, 2021), Americans were presented with a reality that
was sadly squaring all too well with their experiences with the govern-
ment in a time of crisis. A year later, in the early spring of 2022, the
country passed the one million mark of deaths attributed to COVID-19,
what remains a truly staggering number. In early summer of that year Dr.
Birx told a congressional committee investigating the federal pandemic
response that the Trump White House had urged her to dilute guidance
sent to state and local health officials in the second half of 2020 (Weiland,
2022). Certainly in the past five years Americans have been reminded
again and again that the government can choose to advance the public’s
welfare or it can aid and abet the darkest of society’s impulses. Under
Trump and a vast coterie of Republican supporters, it chose the second
path, and the country has paid dearly.
The coronavirus may have appeared at the worst possible moment in
the United States’ recent history; to be sure, its timing was equally tragic
for all other countries, no matter the size or stage of development. Yet,
so devastating in the United States was a political culture that proved so
ill-equipped to grapple with the gravity of the situation from the very
start of the pandemic. Decades of government failings, and not least the
transformation of the world economy over the preceding half century, had
badly warped the country’s entire political-economic landscape. Counter-
globalization movements of the early 2000s and the far-right politics that
took root during the Great Recession (e.g., the Tea Party) resembled
in some ways the populist politics of the early twentieth century, but
in 2020 the social and cultural drivers were very different—the world
economy was far larger, involved many more players, and did not display
anywhere near the level of coordination needed to allow nations to fight
the rapid spread of the virus. The financial crisis that began in 2008
risked a disaster as potentially damaging as the Great Depression of the
1930s. Fortunately, the economic turmoil of 2008–2010 was contained
by swift and competent (if insufficient) action by the Obama administra-
tion, preventing a fullscale collapse of the country’s financial system, an
PREFACE ix
event that would have exacted considerably more damage on the economy
than the country experienced.
Still, trust in government was further corroded by the presence of
many lasting scars—the Great Recession inflicted deep wounds upon
millions in the United States and in many other countries. In the wake
of the crisis more imaginative and politically difficult roads to recovery
were tragically not traveled. While the stock market eventually regained
its losses, employment recovered much too slowly and labor force partic-
ipation declined overall. The perception—not unfounded—that banks
had been bailed out while homeowners were left high and dry further
damaged public trust and left citizens susceptible to the appeals of well-
funded and all too narrow interest groups bent on further dismantling
government and, what may be worse, sowing the seeds of hatred of
minorities, immigrants and the so-called “elite.” Many social illnesses
became even more grave, proving that the links between the events of
2008–2010 and Trump’s election several years later are many and run
deep.
Of course, the financial crises of 2008–2010 impacted many coun-
tries. With memories of crisis still relatively fresh, governments and central
banks in affluent countries responded aggressively to the economic crisis
that followed the pandemic shutdown in 2020; developing economies, on
the other hand, spent only what they could, which many now acknowl-
edge was not nearly enough. As Adam Tooze (2021) described in his early
history of the pandemic response, governments of “advanced” democ-
racies shut down in part because they could afford to do so, and they
injected unprecedented levels of fiscal stimulus that provided almost
immediate relief for many businesses and households. Central bankers
in financial capitals came to the rescue of markets for corporate bonds
and sovereign debt. In the United States, the Federal Reserve inter-
vened swiftly and creatively on several fronts: The Fed shored up the
market for treasuries, engaged in large-scale purchases of financial assets,
and monetized public debt at near-historic levels. In Europe the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB) also pledged aggressive monetary support, and
under Christine Lagarde’s leadership the ECB’s programs were paired
with a once-unthinkable decision by European governments to finance
a COVID-19 relief package with the issuance of common debt. The very
worst of the economic pain was again avoided by decisive administrative
action, yet citizens felt acutely the uneven nature of a “crisis economics”
that was beginning to seem like the new normal.
x PREFACE
References
Galbraith, J. K. (1998). The affluent society (40th anniversary ed.). Mariner
Books.
Rodrik, D. (2011). The globalization paradox: Democracy and the future of the
world economy. W.W. Norton.
Tooze, A. (2021). Shutdown: How Covid shook the world’s economy. Viking.
Wang, A. (2021, March 27). Birx tells CNN most U.S. covid deaths ‘could have
been mitigated’ after first 100,000. Washington Post.
Weiland, N. (2022, June 23). Deborah Birx says Trump White House asked her
to weaken covid guidance. New York Times.
Acknowledgments
This book, like many such collaborations, had its beginnings in a series of
conversations between the authors that took place in fits and starts over
many years. It is the product of shared scholarly interests and norma-
tive commitments marked by what is now a friendship of more than two
decades. As with any project completed over an extended period, our
debts are many and it is a pleasure to record them here.
The work of writing Statecraft and the Political Economy of Capitalism
commenced nearly seven years ago with the preparation of a co-authored
paper for the annual meeting of the International Studies Association
(ISA) in Atlanta (2016). Since that time, we presented early versions of
chapters at meetings of the ISA in Baltimore (2017), Hong Kong (2017),
St. Louis (2019), and at the ISA’s virtual conference during the coron-
avirus pandemic (2021). An early chapter draft was also presented at the
British International Studies Association (BISA) Annual Conference in
Bath, UK (2018). Drafts of two chapters were presented to the Political
Economy Working Group, and the ASPECT Working Paper Series, both
at Virginia Tech. We thank our many colleagues near and far who took
the time to read our work and to help us refine our thinking on these
occasions.
Two chapters of the book were adapted from previously published
journal articles. Chapter 3 is adapted from “The Public Purpose of Polit-
ical Economy,” which was published in New Political Science, 41(3),
400–422. Chapter 5 is adapted from “The Delicate Order of Liberalism:
xv
xvi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Resentment Politics and the Public Trust,” which was published in Polity,
53(4), 589–615. We thank several anonymous reviewers and members of
these journals’ editorial teams for their input.
We are grateful to those who provided especially valuable support as
scholars and colleagues, and no one more than Edward Weisband of
Virginia Tech. Edward is at once our teacher, valued mentor, and dear
friend, and this book would not have been possible without the guidance
he provided in many forms over the years. We happily dedicate the book
to him. We are also indebted to Timothy W. Luke of Virginia Tech for
advice at many stages of the project. Paul Bowles at the University of
Northern British Columbia gave us feedback on two chapters, and gener-
ously shared with us his thoughts on what would become the book in the
early stages of the manuscript’s development.
At Palgrave Macmillan we thank Timothy Shaw, Anca Pusca,
Hemapriya Eswanth, and Paulin Evangelin for their efforts on behalf of
this project and for their patience with our many requests for deadline
extensions as we worked to complete the manuscript during a difficult
two years.
Scott Nelson would like to recognize the support of various kinds
that came from Judson Abraham, Binio Binev, Thomas Balch, Mauro
Caraccioli, Cara Daggett, Francois Debrix, Bikrum Gill, Bradley S. Klein,
Andy Scerri, and Yannis Stivachtis. Besnik Pula was especially helpful at
several turns, offering us particularly incisive readings of several chapters.
Once again, Scott’s colleagues in Virginia Tech’s Global Education Office
gave support when he was assigned to Virginia Tech’s Steger Center for
International Scholarship in Canton Ticino, Switzerland. These colleagues
include Sara Steinert Borella, Rachel Fitzgerald, Guru Ghosh, Don
Hempson, Theresa Johansson, and Caroline Skelley. He would also like
to recognize his students (far too many to name) in the European Affairs
in a Global Context program at Virginia Tech.
Joel Shelton would like to recognize the support of his colleagues in
the Department of Political Science & Policy Studies at Elon Univer-
sity. A special word of thanks is due to Barış Kesgin and to Kaye Usry.
Joel also thanks the many students with whom he discussed the ideas and
arguments presented in this volume, particularly those students who were
part of the inaugural cohort of Elon’s Philosophy, Politics, and Economics
(PPE) program. Additionally, Joel acknowledges the family and friends
who have sustained him over the past several years. He thanks his
parents, Tim and Karen Shelton, his brother, Derek Shelton, his grand-
mother, Phyllis Trent, and many dear friends, including David Avery,
Ben Berkow, Brent Blevins, Aliesje Chapman, Thomas Dickerson, Rachel
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xvii
xix
Contents
1 Reintroducing Statecraft 1
2 The Ambitions of Government: Statecraft in Historical
Perspective 13
3 The Public Purpose of Political Economy 39
4 National Economic Policy: History, Culture,
and Development 71
5 The Delicate Order of Liberalism 93
6 The Transgressive Economy 125
7 Democracy as Statecraft 153
8 Conclusion: An Agenda for Citizenship 171
Index 181
xxi
CHAPTER 1
Reintroducing Statecraft
DU JOURNALISME
TYPES DE JOURNALISTES
POLÉMIQUES LITTÉRAIRES
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ESPOIRS ET REGRETS