[ “| THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD L al Emre ERSEN * More than a hundred years have passed sinee Sir Halford Mackinder made his famous speech, The Geographical Pivot of History, to his audience In the British Royal Geographical Society. Since that time, Mackinder has been cited among the most prominent figures in “geopolitics” — which, in its simplest meaning, is the study of the relationship between geouraphical space and politics.! In 1919 and 1945, Mackinder revised his theory and renamed the Pivor dre (the vast area of Euro-Asia inaccessible to ships that provided Russia with the chance to replace the Mongol Empire and eccupy “the central strategic position in the world?) to Heartland: in Mackinder’s famous dictum, “who rules East Europe controls the “Ene FQEN, isa Research Asustast aml PhD. Candidate at the Deparimem ot Political Scienor ara International Relations, Marmara Unlvernty, Pstunbt 1 a wane: eunupwehemive definition of peopelities is given by Geonge Demko and Witlism Woed as “the ert asd science of understanding and predicting eatial aspects of the shifts in political poser ansong groups, particular ly states.” Cioorgs 4. Demkoamd "William Wood (eds,), Reondering the Meld: Grupetirieat Perspectives an the Doenty Fire Con). Houde, Sam Francisea, Oxford: Westview Dress, 1994, p. 3 2 Halford 1 Muckinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History” in Gearéid O Tusthail, Simon Duby: and Paul Rowiledge (edt), 7ike Gaopodites Reamer, New York: Routledge, 198, n. 30, Fonda for Middle East ued Balkan Stuilies [27THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the Word-Island [Europe, Asia and Africa); who rules the World-Istand commands the World.” Although in his theory Mackinder invested a great deal in Russia’s potential for becoming a geopolitical centre of power, his name was not very well known im that country, to which he had given special importance. As Milan Hauner notes, not even a Whisper Was heard in Russia ubout Mackinder’s speech in 1904.4 About two decades later, when Bolshevik power was established in Moscow, both Mackinder, and geopolitics im general, went even more undercover in Russia, More importantly, as Hitler's armies started to march into the Soviet Union under the influence of their geopolitical ideologue, Karl Haushofer (though whether he really had any part in this); the term geapolitit-as coined by Haushofer even became much “dirtier” in the official Soviet terminology, For about 70 years under Soviet rule, Russian scholars and politicians rarely made reference tw the is dubious term, geopolitics. Although Soviet foreign policy was frequently guided by geopolitics (ie, the Brezhney doctrine of the 1970s), such actions were never called “geopolitical” by their executors, Geopolitics continued to be viewed asa “bourgenis” science by the Soviets and it remained untouched until the late 1980s, when Gorbachev's gfasnosy opened the way for views and ideologies other than Marxism-Leninism. Right after the collapse of the Soviet Union and ance the offi- cial Marxist-Leninist ideology had lost its former credibility in terms of its expla~ nation of werld polities, a search started in Russia to find another “universally true” ideology to explain world events, Mackinder's geopolitics became one of the most significant candidates for such # position, It was interesting that a theory which has remained in the dark for mearly a hun- dred years in Russia attracted so much attention in such extraordinary rapidity. Figures and concepts previously unknown to Russia, like Mackinder, Meartland, > hMockender ox cited in Colts S. Gray and Gearhhey Sloan (eis h Geupolitics: Geography and Strategy, London, Porand: Frank Cass, 1994, 9. 27 A ydilan Haunet, Whee fi Aisa no be", Lowcion, New York: Routledge, 1992p. 47 Turkish Revicw of Burasian StudiesEmre ERS! pan-regions and Atlanticism immediately became the centre of attention for many Russian scholars and politicians throughout 1990s. As early as 1990, even before the Soviet Union had officially collapsed, Igor Malashenko, an official in the ‘Communist Party's International Department was claiming: “The confrontation of the continental power which con- trols the heart of Europe, and the coalition opposing it, is by no means confined, geopolitically to a contest between East and West [or] socialism and capitalism [...] The vety terms “East” and ‘West’ alsa reflect [...] the fact that it is mot only ideological rivalry [,..] but also a ‘de-ideologised" geopolitical confrontation.”* Since then, a lot of books including “geopolitics” in their titles started to be published in Russia. Some academicians and political philosophers tried to intro- duce the Russian public with the basic tenets and the founding fathers of geopo- litical theory. Politicians did not remain indifferent to these publications either, The Russian Foreign and Defence Ministries, the military and Russian Dima increasingly embraced geopolitical theories, mostly in their traditional forms. Geopolitics attracted significant attention from the opposition parties in the Duma, and for some time it was almost “monopolized by the so-called national-patriots and left-wing activists."6 It has almost become an indispensable vision for Russian politicians from different parts of the political spectrum as observed im several popular political ideas of the time: Gennady Zyuganov's communist “Derzhava”, Viadimir Zhirinewsky’s nationalist “Last Re-partition”, Yevgeny Primakov's real- ist “Multipolarity” and Alexander Dugin’s cxpansionist “Russian/Eurasian Empire”. 5 Dawid Kerr, “The Mew Eurstlaniser, "The Rise off Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy", Raurcipe-dséa Studies, ‘WoL. 47, Teeue 6, September 1995, p, 48, © Vindimir Kulowsoy and Rostislav Turewkay, “Russian Geopolitics atthe Fin-de-seicle”, Geupotiricy, Vol. 6 No. 1.2001, p. 143, Fondation for Middle Eusi wad Ralkan Studies | 29THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERLOD Redefining Russia’s National Identity and Geopolitics in its Traditional Form Gertjan Dijkink calls geopolitical visions “idea[s} concerning the relation between one’s own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or idis)advantage (and/or) invoking ideas about a collective mission or forcign poli- cy strategy."? This means that there is an inviolable link between national identi- ‘ty and geopolitical visions, Indeed, Dijkink calls geopolitical visions “translations of national-identity concepts im geographical terms and symbols."* Every person: is born into a spatial/territorial context, be it a city, nation-state or empire, Everyone is brought up by some specific national ideas which indispensably includes geopolitical codes,” be it a formal education or education through fami- ly or community, Therefore, everyone regardless of his or her nationality has some unique idea about the territory he or she lives in and the relationship of that terri- tory with other paris of the world, neighbouring or far away. A country’s geapo- litical vision, in this sense, might be seen as the extension of that country’s nation- al identity to other parts of the world. Geopolitical visions are important in shap- ing # state's national identity as they give an answer to the question, “to what ‘civ- lization’ or community of states do inhabitants of the state believe it belongs?”!0 It is nearly customary that especially in times of crisis or radical change, national ideas together with their geopolitical elements “represent the most vant recourse for those who wish to restore order.”!! Stalin’s move towards e- 7 Gertjan Dijkink, Murional Jdentisy and Genpafiaieal Viste: Mfepe off Pride and Pate, Landon, New York: Rourtedge, 106, p. * id. ps 14 5 Thee are “foreign orientations, usually sicady or only very yraduslly changing within the limits of lang bis- terbeal period.” Vladimir Kelossoy, High’ and "Low Geopolitics: Images af Foreign Countries in the Eyes of Russian Citizens", Geupatsics, Vol. 8, No, 1, spring 2003, p, 122 10 Jolie CrLomghlin, Geantid Cb Tuathail and Vladimir Koloeow, “Risesian Goupotitical Cultare and Pubic Opinion: the Masks of Proteus Revisited”, Tausacnises of the Penile of Britick Geographers, Vol. 30, No. J, ‘Sepeember 2005, p. 4 1 pj akink, p. 30| Turkish Review of Eurasinn StudiesEire ERSEN “socialism in one country” after the Second Cold War and Hitler’s “Lebensraum” are only two well-known ¢xamples of how political leaders, in times of trouble, can manipulate their people by making reference to their country’s national and geopolitical missions. In the case of Russia, the anticipation of a national idea has been quite old and influential. The so-called “Russian Idea” (the belief that Russia represented a unique civilization apart from both Europe and Asia and which saw “Moscow as the Third Rome”, a successor of the Roman and Byzantium empires) has always: been a major drive in the evelution of political ideas in Russia, The 19!" century's Slavophils believed in this Russian uniqueness as did the Soviets in the 20" cen- tury, though under a different model called socialism. ‘The dissolution of the Soviet Empire and the initial years of the young Russian Federation, in this regard, have created a psychological catastrophe for the Russian people, both the elite and the public, Accustomed to u vision of their country asa great empire and, later, a superpower, itwas difficult for the Russians to reconcile themselves with the ides that Russia was now a “normal great power” in world polities. Viadimir Shlapentokh names this psychological situation ax the “greutness syndrome™.!2 Whatever the reasons of this “syndrome” were, the syn- drome itself has been an important determinant behind the re-emergence of a new type of Russian/Eurasian national idea with its special emphasis on a Mackinder- type geopolitical vision towards the world, At first glance, it is interesting to note that the rise of geopolitical discourses and studies in Russia evolved contrary to the gencrul trend in the West, Russian geopolitical thinking in the post-Cold Wer period has remarkably tilted towards traditional geopolitical views whereas, in the West (with the impact of post-mod- emism and critical theory on imtemational relations theories) contemporary © vasa nie hlapemtokh, "Es the "Gireainers Syndrome’ Eroding?”, The Washington Quartet, Winter 2002. pp Fonderion tor Middle Bast and Balkan Stodivs | 31THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD geopolitical thought moved towards critical understanding of the relationship: between geography and politics,!" This new version of geopolitics, as highlighted by several Western scholars’ such as John Agnew and Geardid O Tuathail, views Reography us a construction of the human mind and maintains that geopolitical fixutions and the perception of “boundaries” might change if people alter their current imagination of geography, It also refuses to view geopolitics exclusively in the light of military power and tries to embrace cultural, economic and social dynamics behind the globalization of world politics, Getting back to the “greatness syndrome” and the national identity crisix in Russia after the collapse of the Sovict Union, it is understandable why Russians have found traditional geopolitics much more interesting than its critical version, Traditional geopolitics (evident in the ideas of Mackinder and Haushofer) takes the geopolitical “laws” as universal in time as well as space. Whereas critical geopolitics deals with the so-called “low politics” in an increasingly “transnation- al” and globalizing world, traditional geopolitics devotes much interest and ener- By in “high politics" ~ i.c. strategic/military aspects of “interstate” affairs, This is also why traditional geopolitics is sometimes viewed merely as a branch of polit- jeal realism. But-as Eduard Solovyev states, “traditional geopolitics [...] is often even more reductionist in its emphasis on state size and geography in explaining state behaviour and in searching [for] selutien{s] to world problems. The reductionism and simplicity of traditional geopolitical thinking affected the rise of geopolitics in Russia in three ways, First, as Saul Cohen also argues, traditional geopolitics simplifies the world map for statesmen by taking geogra- phy as static and making exclusive reference to size, distance and other physical "3 Foran overview of critical geagenphical thinking see Ceandid {) Tuathail and Semon Dulby (este), Rewhinbing: Geapotiticr, New York: Riuitleder, (776 amd Gearind (2 Tua, “Uedersianding Crisieal Geopatities: Geopolitics und Risk Security” in Colin S Geny and Geoffrey Sloan (eds, opulicine: Geography: amd Sarategy, London, Portland: Fra Cass, 199%, pp: 107124 "4 Eduard G. Solovyer, “Geupolitice in Russia ~ Science or Vocmica!", Cammunier aunt Post-Commnnist Saati, Vol. 37, 2004, p88 32) Tarkish Review of Burusian StudiesFire ERSEN attributes: of territories, which might be subdued by traditional factors of power like a state's military strength:!5 Second, this simplicity results in the frequent association of traditional geopol- ities with political realism (or ree/poalicik). By reducing geography to something that might be conquered or distributed in the name of keeping a balance of power, geopolitics becomes almost identical with the realist theory of international rela- tions, Henry Kissinger underlined the close connection between truditional geopolitics and realism by claiming that geopolitics was synonymous with “glob- al equilibrium and permanent national interests in the world balance of power."!6 This compatibility between realism and traditional geopolitics is also due to the fact that they both take “conflict”, either between nation-states or between land power and sea power, as a central concern in their view of world politics. The connection between realism and geopolitics can be observed in Soviet stratesy during the Cold War: Although they disliked the term, the Soviets frequently acted on geopolitical concerms embedded in ther reefpolitik thinking. From Stalin's “spheres of influences” to Brezhnew's doetrine that called for military intervention in Eastern Europe in case the USSR’s interests were threatened, Soviet foreign policy might be called a “realist foreign policy”, Marina Lebedeva also underlines the evolution of a predominuntly realist understanding of international relations in the USSR, both as an academic discipline and practice. She argues that such think- ing still has a great influence in contemporary Russia with its “link with geopoli- tics, in that the idea of a strong state in a favourable geographical location, togeth- er with an element of mystique, provides a heady political cocktail,"!7 15. gaut B. Coben: “Geopolitics in the Mew World Mra” in Genepe J. Demukin and William B. Wood fect, Reondering the Horid: Gowpalitical Meryreciiver nn the Twenttlrs’ Century, older, Sen Francisco, OxSacd Westview Press, 1994, pp. FT. 1 Kissinger defined genpotitics an fullows: “hy gevpolitical | mean an approach that pays aiteution ia the fequireanesis of equilibrium.” Genitrey Sloan and Calin $, Gray, “Why Geopotitice?” in Cokin S. Gray and Greatiey Slaaa (a), Geapolinen Ciengraphy snd Stearegy, Landon, Poriand: Prank Cass, 1998, pL 7 paris M, Lebedeva., “International Relathans Sadiey it che USSR/Rusia: by There » Russian National School of 1 Smadies?”, Glahal Sewiery, Vil 1B, Mo. 3, daly 2008, 9. 270, Fondation for Middle Bast and Balkan Studies|33THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD ‘Third, traditional geopolitics helped politicians make use of its. simplicity while presenting their ideas to the Russian public, which in general was disinter- ested in geopolitics or forcign affairs. John O'Loughlin believes that the develop- ment of a popular manifestation. of geopolitical codes could be observed in the Russian public from the end of 1990s.1" 75’ of the Russian respondents ina 2000 survey admitted their nostalgia for the USSR as a superpower and about 71% of respondents in a 2001 survey agreed that Russia belonged to a “Eurasian” civiliza~ tion as distinet from the Western one.!" In this, one can see the appeal that tradi- tional geopolitics can have for ordinary Russians, who demonstrate a desire to see their country as a great and unique one, even ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, The rise of geopolitics in post-Cold War Russia was also closely related to the so-called “end of ideologies”. As Soviet Marxism was discredited as an explana- tion of contemporary world politics, Russians were confronted with the need to find a substitute to continue their “great power" status in the world, Despite the fact that Russia in the first half of the 1990s increasingly lost its power in the tra- ditional sense (e.g. military capabilities, global political influence and economic welfare), the Russian decision-makers long refused to reconcile with this reality. It was not until Vladimir Putin's presidency that the Russian elite were finally able to anticipate that Russia was faced with the threat of becoming a third-rank coun- iy. Stephen Sestanovich believes that the recourse of Russian politicians to the geopolitical uniqueness of Russia was something like “peotherapy” — a kind of “psychological therapy for Russians, faced with a disastrous economy and uncer- tain political future."20 1 John. CF Leughtin, “Geopolitiral Funtasies. National Strategies and Cirdinury Russie ins the Post: ‘Communit Em", Geepalises, ol, 6, No, 3. Winter 2001, p. 18 19 The first survey was conducted by Tomar Research Croup; tht second ane hy VTMIOM (AIL Russign. Centre for Research oo Pubic Opinion). See Jot (Loughlin, Gearéad € Tuatha aid Viadisnir obossay, “A ‘Ricky Woscward Tart"? Putin's 9-11 Serpe and Crslimary Rurssinns”, furape-dado Sudier, Wok 5é, No, 1, Jaruary 2004, pS and Viadimir Shlapentokh, p. 131 20 Cy Loughlim, OTeaiball and Kuloaay, “A ‘Risky Westward Tum!.."\ p21 M| Turkish Review of Eurasian StudiesEmre ERSEN Throughout the 1990s, Russi had to deal with serious troubles inside and out- side her borders, Yeltsin presidency’s faith in constructing closer tics with the Westen world and his moves towards the liberalization of the Russian economy through “shock therapy” methods did not prove fruitful in advancing Russia's sta- tus as a great power in world politics. On the contrary, the country repeatedly entered domestic political and economic crises throughout the 1990s. The Russians became much more miserable economically, the social security systems collapsed and a high degree of corruption became normal in the daily lives of ordi- nary Russians. Abroad, Russia had to give approval 10 NATO's enlargement towards former Warsaw Pact countries and accept Western terms in the solution of the Yugoslay conflict. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which was created to replace the Soviet Union, could not even be tumed inte an effec- tive mechanism for multilateral cooperation. And most importantly, Russia could ‘not even keep the US and other Westem powers away from its “Near Abroad” (the former Soviet republics) on which she claimed she had special interests. As all this took place, Yeltsin’s domestic and foreign policies started to come under sharp criticism from Russian opposition parties. Yeltsin and his team were accused of being pro-Atlanticist and of betraying Russia's greatness. A new lype of nationalist-patriotic opposition has marked a victory in the Russian parkiamen- tary elections in 1993. The victors of the election, namely the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LIDPR) and the Communist Pary of the Russian Federation (CPRE), were headed by two men, Vladimir Zhirinoveky and Gennady Zyuganov, respectively, who made strong use of traditional geopolitical thinking in their political campaigns. Linking the “Russian Idea” with Russia's necessity to re- assert its geopolitical greatness in world affairs, these two figures, together with other notable figures in the Russian opposition have turned the Russian Duma into a stronghold for the so-called “red-to-brown” coalition (a loose political alliance between the nationalists. and communists). If there was one thing which held these formerly irreconcilable ideologies together in opposition to “pro-Atlanticist” Fondation for Middie East and Batkan Studies [35THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD ‘Yeltsin, geopolitics was undoubtedly the leading candidate for such a position, As Viadimir Kolossov also points owt, “using the heartland theory has enabled Russians to predict # return to great power status simply because of their geo- graphical location, without a need for any major effort on their part."2! The “red- to-hrown” patriots’ solution to Russia's present national identity crisis, therefore, was recourse to the easiest way of asserting Russian national salvation; Russia’s unique geographical position between Europe and Asia as a distinct “world” unto itself ~ “Russia as Eurasia”. Schools of Russian Geopolitical Thinking in the Post-Cold War Period In 1990s, the introduction of geopolitics as a viable discourse that both explains the current position of Russia in the world politics and offers a way to re- establish Russia asa great power in world affairs gave rise to several different schools of thought that debated the most appropriate geopolitical direction for Russia. Some claimed that Russia should integrate with Europe; others found the solution in creating Russian dominance in Eurasia, While some concentrated on Russia’s “balancing role between Europe and Asia” as a great Eurasian bridge, others opted for tuming Russia into a geopolitical centre against the US in world polities. Although it is not easy to classify Russian geopolitical thinking in clear- cut branches (simply because any categorization would exclude some important trends in Russian geopolitics), it is possible to spot at least three major schools of geopolitical thinking in post-Cold War Russia, Westernizers, ‘Russia as part of Europe and the Wesi* The first school of Russian geopolitical thinking was the Westernist (or Atlanticist, as it is often called in Russia) and it heavily influenced the practice of Russian foreign policy in the first few years immediately following the Cold War. 71 Kolessov and Turawsky, p. 144. 36| Turkish Review of Eurasian StudiesEine ERSEN A Westemist version of geopolitical thought can be traced back to: Mikhail Gorbachev's “New Political Thinking" and was further advanced by the ideas of Russia’s first Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, Although the Westernizers themselves disliked the term ‘geopolitics’, beliey- ing that it was a thing of the past,2? the discourse they used, nevertheless, had its own geopolitical vision as well as its own understanding of Russia's great-power status. Back in 1992, Andrei Kozyrey was putting the Westemizers’ geopolitical idea im the following way; “No doubt Russia will not cease to be a grent power. But it will be 2 normal great power, Its national interests will be a priority, But these will be interests understandable to democratic countries, and Russia will be defending them through interaction with partners, not through confronta- tion... These [political and economic] reforms offer, in view of the government, the only path to prosperity in Russia asa great (but normal!) Eurasian power in all its aspects — European, Asian, Siberian and Far Eastern — a power that in its domestic lite and foreign policy refutes the pessimistic prophecy of Rudyard Kipling that East and West will never meet.“ Kozyrev's geopolitical thinking was actually influenced by Gorbachev's “New Thinking” which according to Kolossow and Turovsky aimed “a transition from the bipolar to a *polarless' world, based on harmony and international entente, and without any hegemonic status within the system.” Within the framework of his 22 For example, the former Forcign Minister of the LISSR, Exduand Shevarnadee cloiesed that “genpelilical otions se jet useless classical mechanism in quantiem theory.” Cilenm Chafete, “The Strupgle for w National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia, Priitical Solewew Quarearty, Wl, 111, No, 4, winter 16- FORT, p, 46 25 Andiet Kocyney, “Rossia: a Chance for Survival”, Foreign Affitir,, Vol, TH, No, 2. gop. HOlane 15, 4 Kalussay and Turaweky. p. 147 Fondation for Middle Bust and Barkan Studies [37THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD famous slogan, “from Vladivostok to Vancouver", Gorbachev indeed tried to relieve Ruséia of the burden of traditional geopolitical thinking with its emphasis on balance of power and a zero-sum mentality. Instead, he discredited the geopo- litical notion of “clashing interests” between states and introduced “common val- ues” for all humanity like peace, prosperity and development, Security, according to him, was inseparable; therefore it should be tackled within the framework of joint action with other states, by placing the United Nations (UN) in the centre of these efforts asa forum for multilateral cooperation. Interdependence, both eco- nomic and political, was a key term in Gorbachev's New Thinking. He believed in “interdependence, the integrity of the world, the imperative need for pooling the efforts of humanity for the sake of its self-preservation, for its benefit today, tomorrow and for all time.”25 Although Gorbachev's New Thinking included the diversification of Soviet relations with countries like India and China, his specif- ic emphasis was in a “pan-European policy”: “Some: in the West are trying to ‘exclude’ the Soviet Union from Europe [...] We are Europeans. The history of Russia is an organic part of the Great European histo- ry [.--] Europe is indeed a common home where geogra- phy and history have closely interwoven the destinies of dozens of countries and nations.” 2 For Gorbachev's Westernist successors, foreign policy was viewed ag a tool to “ensure favourable foreign conditions for success of political and economic reforms.”2? Through establishing a free-market economy, privatization and liber- alization of the Russian economy, the Westernizers thought that Russia would take its place “as a reliable partner in the community of civilized states." They were 25 Mikhall Gorhachey, Pencriiiha: New Thinking for Our Country ama dhe Horie, Landon; Gellins, 17, p. 147 26 thid pp B91 and 19S, 77 pwis-Veltain melted in Chafee p, 675 28 Kezyrer, “Russia: a Chance for Survival 38| Turkish Review of Eurasian StudiesEmre ERSEN highly critical of ideas concentrating on the te-assertion of “Russian greamess” and believed that excessive concern over Russia's great power status was simply an inferiority complex. In their view, Russia should stop worrying about extemal threats and direct its focus on democratization and liberalization in domestic affairs. In this sense, they paid special tribute to “democratic peace” — i.e. the notion that democratic states are much more inclined to resort to negotiation, rather than military confrontation to solve their conflicts, Thus, in case Russia became a democratic and liberal country and joined the true civilization (which was certainly the Western one}, then external threats would be also reduced to a preater extent. The formula to give Russia her greatness back laid not in the re- emergence of some type of Russian Idea, but in Russia's integration into the Western political and economic system through greater partnership with Western powers and intemational organizations.2? Regarding the CIS, Westemizers agreed with the opposition that it was aregion. of top foreign policy priority, but they opted for refraining from military und polit- ical hegemony there, They underlined that the CIS was a “forum” and not some type of tool to advance Russia's sphere of influence over the former Soviet republics, Even if Russia had a special role in Eurasia, for Westernizers, this was “the role of setting standards of liberal democracy, rather than stabilizing or uni- fying the essentially anti-liberal region."3° Throughout the 1990s, another prominent Russian politician, Gregori Yavlinsky, the leader of the liberalist Yabloko party, has also used Westernist geopolitical discourse. Yavlinsky found it ridiculous te devote excessive time to discussing “the Russian Idea”, He said, “it is an eternal and meaningless question and impossible to resolve. Russia is Russia.”>! He also underlined several times. 29 Chafing, p. 679. 30 andrei Taygankov, “Miteting Space in Burasix: Russia's Goopolitical Thinking uflor the Soviet Break-Up", ‘Communit ancl Paxs-Commnist Studies, Vol 36, 2008, p. 107, 3) Yuviinsky ax cited in Sirke Milkinen, "On the Geopolitical Miscouruet of the Russian Yabloke Association”, Genpwrunes, Vol. 8. No_ |. spring 2000, p. 159. Fondation for Middle Gast and Balkan Studies [39THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD that Russia was a European country historically, culturally and geographically. Although Yavlinsky welcomed closer integration with the CIS, he opposed renewed Russian military dominance there. As Sirke Mikinen notes, “Yabloke maintains that Russia can be a great power within her current territory."32 The Westernist vision towards Russia's geopolitical future is summarized in Dmitri Trenin’s book, The End of Eurasia. Resembling Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, the Russian scholar believes that the cra of Russian hegemony in Eurasia is completely over and that Russia has:to make a choice between tradi- tional geopolitics and globalization. His choice for Russia is clear: “Russia- Eurasia is over. To the west of its borders, there lies an increasingly unified Europe, a natural place for Russia's own integration as a European country in an appropriate form.'5 Trenin acknowledges that the US has already acquired a deep. presence in Eurasia and that Russia does not have much lefi to do t stand against this reality, He believes that CIS cannot be the proper instrument for advancing Russia's global geopolitical interests in the post-Cold War and he is very c al ofa unton between Russia and Belarus in the same manner, According to Andrei Taygankov, “[in] Trenin’s thinking, Russia has little choice but continue tw retreat from the region [Eurasia] in the face of Western dominance." Tsygankov, at the same time, highlights a group in Russian acade- mia of emerging political geographers who try to emphasize the role globalization and transnationalism play in contemporary geopolitics. In line with critical geopo- litical thinking and liberal institutionalism, several Russian academicians such as Viadimir Kolossov and Nikolai Mironenke tried to highlight a “geopolitics of cooperation” in Eurasia.** They claimed that Russia should act as a major centre in Eurasia, not a5 a military superpower or political hegemon, but simply as a 32 phic, p> 165. 33 Dmitri Trenim, tie Hind of Eurasia, Washington: Camegic ndoweess far imornational Peace, 3W)2, p, 324. 4 Teypankow, p. 114, 3S tid, polis. 40) Turkish Review of Buraspan StadiesEmre ERSEN mediator conducting economic activities such as the construction of energy pipelines in Eurasia, The geopolitics of cooperation “emphasizes communication between spatial systems, not just conflicts between them, studies new forms of political activism in the world arena (transnational business, non-governmental organizations, separatist movements. and so on); and studies aspects of global geopolitical interdependence and their expressions, such as socio-economic: and ecological crises.“ Kolossev, who has becume a respected scholar in the field of political peogra- phy through his several Russian and international publications on geopolitics, tight be viewed as one of thé few representatives of Russian geopolitics who stresses the importance of new forms of geopolitical thinking that should guide Russian foreign policy. He believes that geopolitics should be fashioned accord- ing to the dynamics of globalization such as international trade as well as finan- cial and transportation flows.27 But at the same time, he also underlines the impor- tance of several other factors such as ethnicity, religion, literature, music and arts on the construction of geopolitical visions in a country, In this way, he distances himself from the excessive emphasis on the strategic/military factors of tradition- al geopolitics. In sume'of his works, conducted together with several adherents of critical geopolitical thought, such as John O° Loughlin and Gearoid © Tuathail, Kolossov also showed his dedication to include the views of the Russian public in the emergence of a Russian geopolitical vision and conducted some surveys to understand how ordinary Russians perceived major developments in world poli- tics throughout the 1990s, In terms of his geopolitical choices, Kolossov's views are situated somewhere in between Westernizers and Eurasianists.3* He disagrees with the Westernizers’ 36 Solowyer, p93. 77 Viedimir Kaloesev, “A Quantitative Analysis of the Geapotiticn! Sivetion im Rumiia”, fikinties, Wal 70, iain 4221623, Seqeember-December 2003, p. 316, J Ip civilicational terms, be ts claer to Wenterizers in seeing Russia x9 part of the European, and nod the uresian cultare. Kolossor, “A Qsaantitative Analysis." p 320 Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies [a1THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSS! THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD view that the West should be Russia's mast important focus for geopolitical diree- tion, but at the same time, accuses Eurasianism of being too simplistic in a world where global economic processes are by no means negligible. The Westernist vision dominated the Russian executive in the first two years of Yeltsin's presidency. But, as told earlier, cooperative relations with the West, espe- cially with the US, neither resulted in generous Western economic loans (indeed, aid coming from the West was mostly in credits that Russia had to pay back in the future) nor recognition of Russia's objections in several key foreign policy areas such as NATO enlargement or the conflict in former Yugoslaviz “losses” in terms of traditional forms of power were not tolerated by the opposi- tion parties that deminated the Duma starting from 1993. The “geopolitics of cooperation” with the West gradually gave way to “geopolitics of confrontation” ‘These Russian in which Russia was viewed as a Eurasian giant searching for ways to regain its great power status in world affairs. The new dominant ideology for the Russian foreign policy elite, so-called Eurasianism, “has framed itself in relation to both ‘Wester liberalism and Ailanticism” under these circumstances.?? Neo-Eurasianists: “Russia as Eurasia” One of the most interesting developments regarding post-Cold War Russia was the re-emergence of Eurasianism ~ a Russian émigré movement which, back in the 1920s, underlined the incompatibility of the collectivist and spiritualist Orthodox- Tatar culture of the Eurasian peoples with the individualist and materialist culture of the Romano-Germanic peoples of Europe, Classical Eurasianists, following the Russian Slavophils’ ideas, were much more interested in the religigus and philo- sophical questions that caused this incompatibility between Russia and Europe. Geopolitics, wgether with culture, religion, and economic and social ways af liv- 39 .Geaham Smith, “The Masks of Proveus: Russia, Geopolisical Shift and the New Ewrasianéem’', Transacnioer taf the Hesraute of British Gevsrraphert, Val. 24, No, 4, 1999, 9.482 42| Turkish Review of Eurasian StudiesEmre ERSEN ing was only one of the elements differentiating Russia from Europe in Classical Eurasiamist thought,“ Neo-Eurasianists, by comparison, placed much heavier emphasis on the geopolitical factors separating Russia from the West, and chose traditional geo-politicians like Mackinder and Haushofer as their chief mentors rather than Classical Burasianists like Petr Savitsky and Nicholas Trubetzkoy, This is probably why Charlés Clover calls the new version of Eurasianism “a geopolit- ical theory"4t ‘New-Eurasianism as a distinct political and ideological movement has been marginal in terms of its direct influence on Russian polities and people, Fer cxam- ple, the votes of the Eurasia Party founded by Alexander Dugin — the chief neo- Eurasianist ideologue — remained less than | in the latest Russian parliamentary elections. But the influence of this school of thought on Russian foreign policy thinkers has been much stronger. Indeed, neo-Eurasianism has become a centre of interest mostly because of its ability 10 tum itself into an “umbrella: discourse” under which opposing ideologies (communism, religious orthodoxy and national- ism) in Russia could unite against Yeltsin's “pro-Atlanticist” policies, Thus, although neo-Eurasianisin did not possess the political/intellectual base which might become a centre of attraction on its own, the special context Russia has been going through and the sharp political confrontation between the Russian executive headed by the so-called Atunticists and the legislature dominated by “red-to- ideas has turned this movement into a melting pot for variable political/ideological ideas supporting anti-Westernism. Alexander Dugin also underlines this aspect of Eurasianism by saying that “the Eurast the contradictions hetween white and red on the basis af a broad civilizational project."4? brown” ists transformed 40 por an averview of Classica! Euruslanicm see Petr Sxvitsky ef wl,, Bootes in the Bast: Foreboditigs ant Bvonss, translated onl edited by Llya Vinkovetsky. Publisher: Charles Schlacks Jr, USA, 1996 and Denitry ‘Shiapentokh, “Eurasianitan: Past sal Present”, Commumist and! Fost-Cramunist Studies, Mol. 41, No, 2, 1997 4) Chartes Clover, “Threams of the Eurasian Heartland”, Farcign Aifetes, Vul. 78, Na. 2, March/April 1999, 9, 9. 42 thrid, p10, Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies [43THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD ‘Neo-Eurasianism is a very diverse political discourse. Mosi of its adherents believe in Russia's great power status and in the necessity of some type of expan- sion of Russia's territories in Eurasia, either through conquest or by voluntary reincorporition, but they do net agree with each ether on the direction of such an expansion. Some favour limiting the expansion with the former Soviet territories, whereas some focus on Russia’s South, Most of them believe in the necessity of keeping and enhancing Russia’s conventional and nuclear capabilities to advance its great power status and for domination in Eurasia. Compared with the Classical Eurasianists, they are much more sympathetic towards Europe (especially Germany) and emphasize that their chief global rival is the US, against which all the peoples of the Eurasian continent should unite, This Eurasian bloc is also a point of disagreement as some neo-Eurasianists concentrate on warking with all the possible Eurasian powers (Gecmany, fran, Japan, China, Turkey, India) while some might be quite antagonistic to.some of these (e.g. Dugin is against China and Turkey while favouring Japan and fran). Roughly, one can ilk about two versions of neo-Eurasianism. The Burasianist New Right which represents the hard-line version of Eurasianism and includes such figures as Alexander Prokhanov, editor-in-chief of one of Russia's most Prominent nationalist publications, Dem (later re-named as Zavtra): Shamil Sultanov, Prokhanov's first deputy editor in Den-Zavira and Alexander Dugin, leader of the Eurasia Party and the editor of his own journal Elementy. As stated carlier, the geopolitics of hard-line Eurasianism is heavily influenced by tadition- al geopolitics (especially Mackinder's version) and by French and Belgian right- ist thinkers such as Jean Thiriart and Alan de Benoist, who proposed 2 Russo- European alliance against the US. Tf one was to choose 4 major slogan for the geopo continents”, This “great war” mentality is often underlined in Dugin's popular book, Gsnvvy Geopolitiki (Foundations of Geopolitics), published in 1997. According to Dugin: ics of hard-line Eurasianism, it would be something like “the great war of 44| Turkish Review of Eurusian StudiesEmre E “Russia is neither East, nor West; it is an independent and special Third way |...) Russia is identical with Eurasia [..,] Russia is “The Pivot of History’“4 For Dugin and other hard-line Eurasianists, the eternal war of continents in the post-Cold War period has been represented by the conflicts between the Atlantic empire led by the US and the Eurasian empire led by Russia, Arlanticism (the Anglo-American world view, heavily shaped by the liberal values of the sea peo- ple) has its specific culture: mondialism —a mixture of “globalization, cosmopoli- tanism and both liberal and socialist internationalism.” Dugin beliewes that there is only one global strategic confrontation: mondialism/unipolarism versus eonti- nentalism, Therefore, the world continues to be bipolar just as was the case in the Cold War. In this sense, mondialism is still the greatest threat for peoples of Eurasia. Against Anglo-American attempts to create a unipolar world order, the neo-Eurasianisis believe that Russia should establish a Eurasianist bloc, compris- ing of the countries of Europe and Asia united under the leadership of a new form of Russian-Eurasian empire which will roughly encompass the lands of the former Soviet Union. tn this, Dugin favours extensive cooperation specifically with Germany in the West, Japan in the East and Iran in the South43 Ching und Turkey, on the other hand, are strongly accused by Dugin with being “the agents of Atlanticism”. Dugin’s “land versus séa” dichotomy is also used by another major neo- Eurnsianist thinker, Alexander Panarin, Panarin presents a much more philosoph- ical version of Eurasianism and rather focuses on the harms that the current Western type of modemity and globalization inflicts on the world. For Panarin, “Europeocentrism is dangerous for people's moral health, since it suggests a com- #7 Aleksande Dupin, Raw Jeepuleifi Avraaves Yaiapin, Translated by Viyar baie, Eslaeali Kine, 2005, p. 3. +4 Senin, py: a. 4 For the continental Ressian'Euresian empire and ihe geopolitical axes to be drawn front Ressin’Euresia, sce Dugin, pp. $1.40 Fondation for Middle Bast and Batkan Studies |45THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS 1N RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD plex of non-completion and minimizes theiz own values."4* Nevertheless, Panarin still has some interest in geopolitics as well. He believes it is necessary to “restore the wholeness of the post-Soviet space”, but at the same lime “to revive the spirit of Russia."*? This restoration for Panarin is net only geopolitical, but also moral, spiritual, economic and technological. If Russia can- not achieve this restoration, it will become a part of the Third World. Therefore, Russia's only chance is to re-establish the real bipolarity between East and West. Other bipolarities such as North versus South or globalization versus ethnicity are all artificially created by the West.** Panarin does not wish to achieve this restora= tion through conquering the ex-Soviet lands or ather parts of Eurasia, He is much more interested in achieving a new world order and getting rid of the contempo= rary American dominance in world affairs. For him, the American unipolarity should be replaced by some type of multipolar or bipolar system where Russia/Eurasia will also have its place, Although Panarin believes that “sea” rep- ‘global pirates”, he is still distant from Dugin's mystical Eurasianism. Instead, he views Eurasianism as a means for Russia to stand against Western-direcied “unipolarist globalization” and create a multipolar world through links with India, China and the Islamic world. Like Dugin, he is also against Turkey's Eurasian project, which according to him resis on the ideas of pan-Turkism. For Panarin, “a non-Russian Eurasia would mean the death of Russia itself“? resents fluidness and calls sea civilization Among the hard-line neo-Eutasianists, Dugin is definitely much more interest- ed in expanding Russia to the East while Prokhanov's interest has been more towards the South. Prokhanov was a well-known advocate of the Soviet Union's 6 Panarin as cited in Marlene Laruclle, “The Two Faces of Contemporary Eusastaniam; an Imperial ¥ersice of Russian Nationalisen”, Nariamolities Papers, Nol 32, Na. |, Maeeh 2004, p. 120 © Panarin ws cited in Solovyey, 48 tid, Laruelle, p. 121 7 Lavelle, e123; 46] Turkish Review of Eurasian StudiesEmre ERSEN military intervention in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and he was called “the nightin- gale of the general staff” for his interest in that country.“ But Prokhanov wits not alone in this interest. One of the most colourful figures of Russian politica in the 1990s, Wladimir Zhirinowsky, also advocated Russian expansion southwards and has written a book called The Last Bid for the Sourh for this purpose. According to Zhirinovsky's project: “The Russian army will asscmble for the last time for its southern campaign and will stop forever on the shores of the Indian Ocesa [...] The world gains the order it has Jong needed." Zhirinovsky seems to be greatly influenced not only by Mackinder, but also by Karl Haushofer as he tries to divide the world into new pan-regions.*? In Zhirinovsky’s “last repartition”, the world will be divided imto four spheres of influences im the north-south direction. Japan and China will dominate in Southeast Asia including the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia and Australia; Russia will have Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey; Western Europe will have Africa asa whole and Canada and the US will have all of Latin America“? Although Zhirinovsky's views represent somewhat a utopie version of geopolitics, still, his LDPR has achieved some degree of influence in the Russian Duma, with its strong initiative in the creation and subsequent domination of a geopolitics committee, 9 Hauer, p. 222. S) Zhirinowsky es cited in Wayne Allensworth, Nationafism, Modernization anf For’-Communiy Russia, ‘Maryland: Rowman 2 Litlefield Publishers Ine., 1998, 9. 197, 52 Haushofer’s pan-regices included the partition of the warlil ints four basit region: “Pan-Amenca ened around the United States, Pan=A.sin with Jepari at master |...) Barafiica’ wnilet events! German tutclage. A pot aible fourth ‘panregion’ the Russia-lndia combination [Pux-Russie] mwaited future resolution.” See Motger H. ‘Herwig, “Ceopolitik: Hausbofer, Hitler and Lebesraum” in Colin 8. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (eds). Geopotiten: Gengrapky and Strategy, London, Portland: Frank Case, 1999, pp. 226-227 53 Viadimir Dhirinowsicy, Mi Seruggie’ she Explastve Mews of Rucata s Mast Conteowersia! Political Figure, Now ‘Work: Barricade Hcciks, 19, p. 70. Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies |47THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD the only committee of such a kind in the world, The geopolitics commiti¢e was chaired throughout the 1990s by another lead- ing figure of the LDPR, Alexei Mitrofanov, Mitrofanov is no less utepic than Zhirinovsky himself regarding his views about the partition of Eurasia among Russia, Germany, China and Iran and his plans to bomb the “Lithuanian parlia- ment while it is in session” or provoking the African-Americans to establish “Black Republic” within US territory. Mitrofanov believes that Russia is cur- rently facing a “geopolitical Stalingrad” and in order to stand against the power- ful Adantic alliance between the US, UK and Turkey, he invokes a formula very similar to that of Dugin: the formation of # core Germany-Russia-Japan axis with collaboration from China and India. But Mitrofanov, contrary to Dugin and Zhirinovsky, interestingly does not propose a major expansion of Russian territo- ries in Eurasia except for Northem Kaz#khstan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Instead, he wishes to take Russia out of the CIS and concentrate on unification with her Slavic brothers — namely Belarus and Ukraine. In this regard, his views resemble those put forward by the famous nationalist and Soviet dissident, Alexunder Solzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn, like Matrofanov, proposed that Russia should tum to its Slavic roots and leave the burden of taking care of the Muslim republics of the Soviet Union, Back as carly as 1990, he was siying, “We do not have powers to devote to an empire, And we no more have necessity for an empire: let this burden fall from our shoulders!""55 Though not a very popular dis- course within the Russian right, eventually Solzhenitsyn's vision represented some type of “Russian isolationism”. According to Kolossov and Turovsky: “The geopolitical choices of the isolationist included the creation of @ Russian nation-state with the dominance S stesei Mimedanoy, Rusia Mow Croplicict Trunelated smd edited by Richard Weits Strengthening: Democratic tnermutions Project, John F. Kennedy. Schoo! of Gayerment, Harvant University, July 198 —henp var: claonet wrg/wpsiiniad|> (Octuber 21, 2605) 55 nteksandir Saljenitedn, Mtinya Nazi! Kurtufur? Letsaiol: Kemzi Kieabewi, 1940, p. La 48| Turkish Review of Eurasian StudicsEmre ERSEN of the Orthodox Church; the reunification of Russia with the Ukraine and Belarus, that is, the restoration of the east Slavonic geopolitical space from the Kievan Rus period; the withdrawal of Russia from the Caucasus and from Central Asia; and the promotion of the national revival of the Russian people and the struggle against Eurasianists and communisis, both of whom are associ= ated with anti-national forces responsible for the destruc- tion of Russian identity."5 Asecond category within neo-Eurasianism might be called “Eurasian commu- nism”. This version of Eurasianigm has been represented by the leader of the CPRF, Gennady Zyuganov. Zyuganov himself has written two becks on “the pew geopolitics”, as he coms the term,‘? It is an irony that what Zyuganov called “new geopolitics” closely resembled the views of Mackinder, the father of traditional (i.e. old) geopolitical thought, Zyuganov believed that “we [Russians] live in an era where geopolitics is literally knocking the door, and ignoring it would be not just a mistake, but a crime’ and that “it is only by returning to communism and fulfilling its geopolitical destiny as a Eurasian power that Russia will be strong enough to stand up to the West."*? While invoking Eurasianism, be paid tribute to the Classical Burastanists as well as the well-known Russian ethnogeographer, Lev Gumilev, Zyuganoy belicved that Russia continued to be “the guarantor of geopolitical equilibrium” in the world. In his words: $8 Keolosioy mind Turok. pp 146-147, 57 His most fienans werk in this regard was the ane entitied Geogruflve Madedi: Gnmov Hosrestor Ceuprtiriky (The Geesrapiy of Fietury: Fownudrtioas ef Mecstae Cenpotiiens, 58 Chaves, pM 59 Zyuganiow s-cited in Siiith, (486. Fondation for Middle Bust and Balkan Stadies [49THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD “Russia's unique geographical position, coupled with its considerable military-economic, demographic, and polit- ical capabilities, dictates a special type of development for our foreign policy. We should strive to return Russia its traditional centuries-long role as keeper and guarantor of the world's geopolitical balance [...] We would seek to restore our state's unique tole as the pivot and fulerum of a Eurasian continental blow — and its consequent role a5 a Necessary balance between East and West." If geopolitics and Eurasianism were the two key terms im Zyuganov's dis- course, patriotism was the third. In one of his articles, he “called on leaders of the ‘patriotic movement’ to develop an ‘ideology of national rebirth" as part of a ‘nutional liberation’ strategy for Russia.”*! Zyuganov frequently referred to his goal to re-establish Russia’s position as Derzhava (meaning “great power” in Russian) in world affuirs.©2 In his writings, he generally made reference to the “great old days" of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union where people of Eurasia lived happily under a communal spirit (sobornast), Zyuganov beheved that this communal spirit (which later found its expression im Soviet communism) was an inherent aspect of Eurasian civilization, marking its difference from the individualistic West. “By resisting capitalist globalization and asserting its natural hegemonic position as Eurasian continental power,” said Zyuganov, “Russia can build on its communist past and Burasian heritage te promote its interests." The thing that separated Zyuganoy from the Eurasianist New Right was that he opted for a voluntary reincorporation of the territories of the former Soviet Anmoni, NY: MLE, Sharpe, 997, pp. 19 and £29, $0 (sennaly Zyagancw, My Russia, Euited by Vailim Medi 61 \tlesaworth, po 16S, 62 dyugenos'e Devshive “means ihe re-creation af the Soviet inlegeatid sine sireiching from the Hulkie! ‘Chinese bord.” Hid. p. 108 €3,0'Loughlie, p, 26 50) Turkish Review of Eurushan StudiesEmre ERSEN Union. He was one of the major supporters of the Duma’s 1996 denouncement of the 1991 Belozevh Agreements, which formally brought an end to the Soviet Union, But according to Zyuganov, the CIS also might be tured into. some type of mechanism for the voluntary incorporation of the former Soviet republics. He underlined that no state would be forced to join with another one, but because of the inherent communitarian spirit of the Eurasian peoples, the former Soviet republics would automatically find it beneficial to unite with Russia once again, Democratic Statism: ‘Russia aya pole in a multipolar world’ After the initial clash between the geopolitical views of both the Westernizers: and the neo-Eurasianists, a new form of geopolitical thought started to emerge and dominate the foreign policy preferences of Russian statesmen, This new vision was called "Democratic Statism” and it was a blend of some Westernism with a great deal of political realism and Eurastanism. In fact, Graham Smith calls Democratic Statism the third major branch within neo-Eurasianism — some type of “official Eurasianism™. The Democratic Statists (often called gosudastvenniki or derzhavniti in Russian), who have had an increasing influence on Russian foreign policy since around 1992, are Westernizers in the sense that they favour advanc- ing liberalization and democratization in the domestic sphere (though under the guidance of a strong central state), while they are much closer (o the ideas of neo- Eurasianists in terms of guarding Russia's national and geopolitical interests abroad. ‘The Democratic Statist view towards Russia's current position in world affairs started to mature around mid-1992. Previous supporters of the Yeltsin regime, one by one, had already started to express their dislike for Yeltsin’s excessively pro- ‘Western policies, This dislike grew 1o such an extent that Yeltsin's vice-president Alexander Rutskoi and the Speaker of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov, 4 See “A New Saviet Union?” in Zyuganoy, pp, 15-14 Fondation fur Middle Eust and Balkan Studies [51‘THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD. became leaders of an anti-Veltsin campaign that resulted in Yeltsin's order for the Russian army t@ bomb the Supreme Soviet building in 1993, Rutskoi and Khasbulatoy were temporarily removed from the Russian political scene. But the views they represented, especially those regarding Russian foreign policy, were kept alive both by the opposition parties im the Duma and by an increasing num- ber of officials within the Russian government, Sergei Stankevich, the state councillor for political affairs, was one of them, In March 1992, Stankevich wrote an article stating the necessity for a more assertive Russian foreign policy. He claimed that “Russia's forcign policy must provide for woals and tasks elevated above opportunistic pragmatism.” Stankevich believed that Russia would mot become more than “a junior partner” for developed Wester states and called on Russian leaders to concentrate on advancing the country’s relations with “Eurasian” countries like China, India and Turkey, as well as other “second echelon” states like Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, South Africa, and ‘Southeast Asian states, He was in favour of a Burasianist forcign policy, but he did not understand Eurasianism in the same light a5 the neo-Furasianists, For Stankevich, Evrasianism was a rejection of excessive Westerniam, but it was, af the same time, a balanced poliey. Through this balanced policy, instead of a “jun- ior partner”, Russia could become “the conciliator, the unifier and the harmonizer [...] 4 country that takes in West and East, North and South,"*7 Stankevich's ideas vradually found support from most of Yeltsin's advisors om foreign policy as conflicts started to erupt in the former Soviet Republics. These conflicts were in the form of civil wars in Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia and 5 Senpci Stanbevick, “Russia in Search for iol", YA National Aiowst, sunimer 1992, a8 cited in Jobo B, Dunlop, The Rive of Rees and he Fail: the Soviet Eoysiee, Ewing, MJ: Prinéston University [Pres 1P9S. p. aa. 0 Ta. 7 Stanbevieh us cited in Robert Donaldace anu! Joseph ogee, The Faverige Policy of Riera: Cheimging Stems, ‘Bnaduring thierests, MY: M18. Sharpe, 2002; jo U4. S2| Turkish Review of Eurasian StudienEmre ERSEN Tajikistan and human rights violations against Russians in Latvia and Estonia, in 1992, one of Yeltsin's advisors and a member of the Presidential Council, Andranik Migranian, was underlining Russia's need to “declare to the world that the entire geopolitical space of the former USSR is a space of vital interests” while the Russian ambassador te the US, Vladimir Lukin, was labelling Russia “a stabi- lizer of the Eurasian geopolitical environment”, which should be guided by am idea of “enlightened patriotism.”6* The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, Yevgenit Ambartsumoy, on the other hand, was proposing ina lever te Kozyrev that Russia should guard its vital national interests over the entire geopolitical space of the former Soviet Union and come up with its own “Monroe Doctrine” in this repion.** Stankevich, Ambarisumow and Lukin were all members of the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy, a non-governmental organization that published “A. Strategy for Russia” in August 1992, The Steategy, which underlined Russia's necessity Io protect the rights of Russian-speaking minoritics in the “Near Abroad” (the former Soviet republics as distinct from the “Far Abroad” — coun- tries outside the boundaries of the former Soviet Union) and gave Russia the right to resort to use of force if its interests in the CIS were threatened, was quite influ- ential on the final version of the Russian Fereign Policy Concept approved by ‘Yeltsin in April 1993.7 The Concept was taken as a “Consensus” between the Westemizers and Eurasianists, But in fact, even this final version was reported ta be written by another Democratic Statist, Yuri Skokov, the Secrctary of the newly founded Security Council, which — challenging Kozyrev’s authority over foreign affairs — gradually became the major centre for decision making in Russian for- 68 Thid, p, (14 and Vladimir Lakin, “Our Security Predicament™, Foreigs Policy, lesue 88, tall 1992 (necomed tn BESO Academic Search Database in HTML. format}. Margot Light, “Foreign Policy Thinking” in Neil Malcolm et al. fmermal Factoys wr Russa Foreign Paltey, (Onfant, New Mark: Royal Institute aif international Affairs by Cxfond University Press, 1998, p. 54, 70 For majar proposals of the Strategy and is influchce an the Foccign Policy Concepd, sce thd yp. 61-07. Fondation for Middle Bast and Balkan Studies |33THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSLA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD eign policy, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept was an-end to the dominance of the Westernizers’ ideas that had provided the basis for the conduct of Russian foreign policy until that time. Greatly influenced by Eurasianist discourse, the Concept was # mani- festation of the change in the direction of Russian foreign policy. The CIS, now popularly called the “Near Abroad”, was viewed as the “top priority” for Russian foreign policy as a region under Russia's sphere of influence. The Concept declared that Russia had the right to conduct peacekeeping operations in the Near Abroad under the mandate of the UN or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Although the hope of maintaining close cooper- ation with the US was also included, the document simultaneously emphasized that Russian and Western interests might not always coincide, For this purpose, the Concept alse included Russia’s goal to normalize and enhance relations with China and Japan. Overall, the Concept “appeared to be less convinced that Russia’s external environment was benign and more assertive about Russia's future role"?! ag well as more direct in its claim that Russia was still a great power in world affairs, Around 1992, the tide of democratic statism became so high that even Kozyrev himself could not escape from adopting a tougher stance towards the Western world. In a CSCE meeting in December 1992, he declared that Russia was a Eurasian power, criticized NATO's plans in Bosnia, demanded the removal of sanctions against Serbia and claimed that the former Soviet space should be exempt from CSCE norms.” On that same day, Yelisin replaced Kozyrev's pro- Western ally, Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, who had the major respons: 71 For a summary of the Concept ser thid., pp. 67-70and Donaldson amd Noger, pp, 117-148. 72 Koayrew later claimed thai he nsade thin apesch in order to warm the Western world. about she danger of the nneo-Eunnianist vision that wes oo the rise in Russia. Donaldson and Nopee, p, 116; for the change in Koayrev’s views de also Andrei Koayony, "The: Lagging Parmership", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, Maylene 1994, pp. 071 54 Turkish Review of Burasian StudiesEmre ERSEN ity for “shock therapy" in the Russian economy, with an industrial figure, Viktor Chernomyrdyn. Koryrev, himself, kept his office for some more years, but he became an important spokesman for the ideas which he once rejected. According to Bobo Lo, the geopolitical thinking of Democratic Statists has evolved around three concepts: zero-sum mentality, the balance of power and spheres of influence.?4 In this regard, the Democratic Statists, like their Soviet predecessors, blended political realism with waditional geopolitics and tuned Mackinder’s formula into something like “who controls the Heartland possesses an efficient means to command world politics, by maintaining the geopolitical bal- ance [in Eurasia] and the balance of power in the world." The idea of Russia as a geopolitical balance and stabilizer in the Eurasian space has also been defended by several Russian scholars such as Kamaludin Gadzhiyey and Konstantin Pleshakey. For example, Gadzhiyey stated that “Russia's strategy in Eurasia must [...] seek to stabilize the region politically as well as economical- ly, using a wide range of available policy instruments."’> In this vision, Near Abroad was highlighted among Russia's vital spheres of interest both because it was strategic in terms of giving Russia its great power status in world affairs and because the instability in this region created severe security threats for the Russian Federation itself, due to the permeability of its borders. If “Russia’s mission as a stabilizer” was the basic discourse in the Democratic Statist view towards the Near Abroad, “Russia as a pole in a multipolar world” might best summarize their stance regarding Russia's relations with the Far Abroad. “Multipolarity” has become an integral part of Russia's foreign policy thinking ever since Yevgenti Primakow was appointed the new Russian Foreign 73 Hobo Lo, Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet ra; Reality, Miioe an Mythmaking, Gordonsville, WA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002, p. 9% 74 Kolomsav, “A Quantitative Analysis..." pS. 75 teygankaw, p, 118 Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies [58THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: Minister replacing Kozyrev in 1996. The so-called “Primakow Doctrine” had five key elements regarding Russia"s relations with the workd:7 a) the view of Russia as a great power in world politics despite her current political, economic and strategie weuknesses, b) the conduct of » multidimensional forcign policy including the maintenance of relations with great powers such as the US, China and the European Union, togeth- er with increasing links with regional powers like Tran and Turkey, ¢) making use of Russia’s strategic cards which kept her as a great power: her unique geopolitical position as a Eurasian bridge, her possession of nuclear weapons and her permanent membership in the UN Security Council, d) Russia's advanced cooperation with those countries: which were also uneasy about the increasing American tendency (owards unipolarism, ¢) the embracing of political realism's notion that there ure no “constant enemies”, but there are “constant national” interests, which obliged Russia to “pursue a ‘rational pragmatism’ devoid of romanticism and unaf- fordable sentimentality” and to “look much farther afield for ‘constructive partnerships’, especially to China, India, and Japan, as well as Iran, Libya, Iraq, and oth- 78 Alvin 2. Rubindein, "Rossin Adsl: Serteyie Anchors far Russ Foreign Pobiey", Harvard Insernational Weview, winteroguing 2000, p19, TT pid, 78 For the full text of the Aimepeint, seo Ricssian National Security Bduspereml (20 13etober 2004) 56 | Turkish Review of Eurasian StudiesEnire ERSEN ‘The main tenets of the Primakow Doctrine might alsa be visible in the Russian National Security Blueprint of 1997, Although increasingly anxious about Russia's declining economic performance, the document held that Russia’s “national interesis in the iniemational sphere require the implementation of an active foreign policy course aimed at consolidating Russia's position as a great power — one of the influential centres of the developing multi-polar world.” Moreover, the Blueprint followed the views of Eurasianists by calling Russia “an influential European-Asian power with national interests in Europe, the Near East, Central and South Asia, and the Asian and Pacific region.” In this regard, the yol- untary multidimensional integration between CIS member states and the develop- ment of “equal” parinership with the other centres of economic and military power were listed as the most important goals of Russian foreign policy. Eurasianism and multipolarity have continued to influence present-day Russian foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Dugin called Putin a Eurasianist and bad close relations with one of Putin's influential political advisors, Gleb Pavlowsky, Although it is dubious whether Putin might be taken as an ideal Eurasianist, due to his. close relations with the US President after the September |! attacks, his vision of world politics certainly carried elements of Eurasianist thinking. When he first came to office in 2000, he said that he would do anything to “restore the country to its position as a great state."7? In November 2000, he uttered the following words on Russia's Eurasianist course: “Russia always felt itself as a Furasian country. We have never forgotten that a greater part of Russian territory lies in Asia. But frankly speaking, we have not always used that advantage." 7 Shlupemtokh, p. 4. 80 putin as cited in C'Loughlim, p. 28. Fondation for Middle Bast and Balkan Studies | $7RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD In his first Foreign Policy Concept of 2000, Putin also clearly undeslined the strong influence Democratic Statism continued to enjoy over Russian foreign pol- icy in the new millennium. Putin’s Concept declared Russia's foremost goal a3 meeting “the interests of the Russian Federation as a great power and influential ‘eentre in the world” while stating her basic concern to be “the establishment of unipolar world structure that would be dominated by the United States economi- eally and through force.”§! The Concept chose “multipolarity” as the best instru- ment for the achievement of both objectives. It also drew a link between multipo- larity and Russia’s geopolitical position as a Eurasian power. In short, Putin's ‘Concept saw Russia as a “great power” in the world dedicated to a “multipolari- ty" that recognizes Russia as a pole by virtue of her special “geopolitical” position as a “Eurasian power". CONCLUDING REMARKS After decades of official condemnation, geopolitics, bath in its utopic and prag- matic forms made a “comebuck" in Russia in the 1990s, Geopolitical theory has nearly been treated as a new ideology for many rightist and patriotic figures in Russian politics, Even moderate political factions made use of geopolitical theo- nes through such visions as “Pragmatic Nationalism” or “Democratic Statism”. ‘One major reason behind the increasing appeal of traditional geopolitics for the Russian elite was their babit of conducting foreign policy in realist terms. Soviet decision-makers clearly made use of a realist vision of international relations in their foreign policy and promoted concepts such as “zero-sum game”, “spheres of influences” and “halance of power". Although it might be argued that they were consciously acting in a geopolitical way, they nevertheless took geopolitical deci- sions - military intervention im Afghanistan, for cxample, was one of these *! See Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Fedcration im the Appendix, Igor S. Ivanov, New Russian Diplomacy: Ten Years of Moscow's Foreign Policy, Washington DC: Brcokings Institution (Press, 2002 58 | Turkish Review of Eurasian StudiesEntre ERSEN Therefore, traditional geopolitical thinking assisted the conduct ofa realist foreign policy for the Soviet Union. Academically, too, intemational relations studies were mostly devoted to the study of national foreigm policy. It is not surprising to see that the Russian post-Cold War elite, most of them having been raised with such realist visions in the conduct of foreign policy, found traditional geopolitics 4 useful tool te simplify the world map, which became increasingly complicated in the post-Cold War era Ifthe Soviet legacy was one factor in the rise of geopolitics in Russia, the con- tinued interest in the historical “Russian Idea" was another onc. Especially whee the Russian Federation entered a new “Time of Troubles” in the domestic and international sphere, so-called “Russian greatness and uniqueness" was once more embraced as a safety belt for both the Russian elite and the public. This linkage between the re-assertion of Russian national identity and geopolitical visions might be most visible once it was understood that Russia now had serious short- comings of power in the traditional sense, Instead of accepting the reality that Russia was a “normal great power", quoting Kozyrev, national-patriotic forces in Russia chose to make pro-Westernism of the Yeltsin-Kozyrev-Gaidar bloc a scapegoat for betraying Russia's greatness. Actually, one of the most cited school of geopolitics in post-Soviet Russia, neo-Eurasianism, has framed itself almost exclusively against the pro-Westernism of politicians like Gorbachev and Kozyree, ‘Neo-Eurasianists probably also knew that Russia's great power status could not be achieved without improvements in its military capabilities and economic per- formance. A group of hard-line Eurasianists referred to’as “Modernizers” indeed called for Russia's avoidance of any military conflict in the post-Soviet world, claiming that it was in Wester interests to keep Russia involved in miliary con- *2 Andrei Trygankay, "Hanl-Line Eurssianism and Russia's Contending Cicapalitical Perspectives", Fast Burapean Quanerly, XXXUL Wo 3, fll 1998, p. NET. Fondation for Middle Bast and Balkan Studies | 59THE RISE OF GEOPOLITICS IN RUSSIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR FERIOD flicis in order to further weaken and exclude her from global influence? On the other hand, Russia's geopolitical position a8 2 central Eurasian power eneompass- ing nearly one-eighth of the enrth’s surface was already a given, which meant that Russians did not have to do much to get recognized as a great power, at beast im geographical terms, Coupled with the simplistic notion of traditional geopolitics, calling Russie the Heartland of the world against the sea power of the US, this “geopolitical greatness” was immediately accepted as the easiest way for Russia to regain her national salvation. At the same time, it was seen as another “univer- sal scientific” ideology to replace Marxism-Lcamism in terms of proving Russia's uniqueness in the world. ‘The increasing appeal of Eurasianism on Russia was evident. Whether as a sta- bilizer or a hegemon in the region, Russia could be respected as a great power in world politics mostly through her position vis-a-vis the CIS and Eurasia in gener- al. The extremism of the Eurasianists was curbed and became marginal in terms of influencing Russian foreign policy throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s. ‘Truc, a hard-line faction of Eurasianism continued to vew for the expansion of Russian territories in Eurasia and the maintenance of a strong anti-US attinde but, by the end of the 1990s, their views were mostly taken as a utopic version of Russian geopolitics. But geopolitical thinking continued to be among the strongest influences on Russian foreign policymakers. Blending moderate Eurasianism (though traditional geopolitics and its “balance of power” mentality still kept noticeable influence) with the idea of “multipolarity”, key Russian politicians such as Primakev and Putin continued to equip Russia with a “geopolitical mis- sion” in Eurasia, Indeed, it was Russia's geopolitical position in Eurasia that tumed her into one of the poles next to the American, European and Chinese poles. Russian foreign policy documents also underlined this belief in the post-Cold War period. Today, the previous debate between Westernism and Eurasianism does not have 60 | Turkivh Review of Emrasinn StudiesEmre FRSEN, its former influence on the conduct of Russian foreign policy. Ever since the so- called “consensus” was achieved in Russian foreign policy around 1992, Democratic Statism continued to be the dominant discourse for Russian decision- makers, Gone is the excessive identification of Russia's national interests with Western or Eurasian states, Gone are the visions for a world “from Vancouver to Viadivostok” or “a final war between the Eurasian and Atlantic axes”. But the influence of geopolitics om Russian scholars and politicians remained untouched and has made its way into the conduct of Russian foreign policy in the new mil- lennium, Fondation for Middle East and Balkan Studies | 6!