Kant, Shelley and the Visionary Critique

of Metaphysics O. Bradley Bassler

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/kant-shelley-and-the-visionary-critique-of-metaphysic
s-o-bradley-bassler/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

For the Love of Metaphysics: Nihilism and the Conflict

of Reason from Kant to Rosenzweig Karin Nisenbaum

https://ebookmass.com/product/for-the-love-of-metaphysics-
nihilism-and-the-conflict-of-reason-from-kant-to-rosenzweig-
karin-nisenbaum/

Kant and the Law of War Arthur Ripstein

https://ebookmass.com/product/kant-and-the-law-of-war-arthur-
ripstein/

Kant and the Transformation of Natural History Andrew

Cooper

https://ebookmass.com/product/kant-and-the-transformation-of-
natural-history-andrew-cooper/

KANT and the Transformation of Natural History Andrew

Cooper

https://ebookmass.com/product/kant-and-the-transformation-of-
natural-history-andrew-cooper-2/
The Primacy of Metaphysics Christopher Peacocke

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-primacy-of-metaphysics-
christopher-peacocke/

Keats and Shelley: Winds of Light Kelvin Everest

https://ebookmass.com/product/keats-and-shelley-winds-of-light-
kelvin-everest/

Causation, Explanation, and the Metaphysics of Aspect

Bradford Skow

https://ebookmass.com/product/causation-explanation-and-the-
metaphysics-of-aspect-bradford-skow/

The Man from the Future: The Visionary Life of John von
Neumann Ananyo Bhattacharya

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-man-from-the-future-the-
visionary-life-of-john-von-neumann-ananyo-bhattacharya/

What Is Critique? and "The Culture of the Self" Michel

Foucault

https://ebookmass.com/product/what-is-critique-and-the-culture-
of-the-self-michel-foucault/
KANT, SHELLEY
AND THE VISIONARY
CRITIQUE OF
METAPHYSICS

O. BRADLEY BASSLER
Kant, Shelley and the Visionary Critique
of Metaphysics
 O. Bradley Bassler

Kant, Shelley and the

Visionary Critique of
Metaphysics
O. Bradley Bassler
University of Georgia
Athens, GA, USA

ISBN 978-3-319-77290-5    ISBN 978-3-319-77291-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77291-2

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018936911

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar
or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication
does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book
are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or
the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any
errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover credit: “after olympia” by O. Bradley Bassler, detail (photo Jason Thrasher)

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer International
Publishing AG part of Springer Nature.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
for Elizabeth, again and again
 Preface and Acknowledgments

In a current philosophical climate of scientific scholasticism, divided

between commentaries (mostly on the “great” philosophers) and minute
investigations of “contemporary issues,” the two sides of the division have
much more in common than they differ. In this volume, I seek a way to
exit from both sides of this purported dichotomy.
On the one hand, we need to step out from behind “commentary,” and
I will instead attempt to enlist Shelley and Kant as “guides.” But the cen-
tripetal tendency toward “interpretation,” and so commentary, is difficult
to resist.
On the other hand, many attempts to “do philosophical work on con-
temporary issues” strike me as failing to recognize the ineliminably meta-
phorical dimensions of this work, which is always perceived as somehow
ultimately “literal.” To draw upon two examples almost at random, what
are we to understand literally by the idea that “mind reaches all the way
out to the world”? Even more focally, what is conceptual content, exactly?
On reflection, even the idea of semantic content seems difficult to grasp
literally.
Perhaps, as in the story of the bull of Phalaris, these “ideas” are only as
good as the pain that has gone into them. Nietzsche has said that the
greatest ideas are the greatest events, but also that what we remember is
what impresses us with the most pain. Where would this pain come from,
if not from the “content” of “work”?
vii
viii Preface and Acknowledgments

In another way, the problem is quintessentially one of knowing what

to do with the heritage of Kant, for every attempt to “return” to “straight-
forward” philosophical work is bound to look “metaphysical” in a pejora-
tive sense to the Kantian. Can the program I have called paraphysics
(Bassler 2017), which I will develop in more detail in this volume, supply
an alternative form of “philosophical work”? To do so, it would need to
respect the historical sedimentation of metaphorical content, broadly
construed in Blumenberg’s sense, but offer an alternative to the philo-
sophical numbing of Kantian prophylaxis, the definite separation of
“critical” from “metaphysical” intent, which ultimately becomes as dog-
matic as the dogmatism it would seek to supplant. Husserl’s phenome-
nology provides a first model. Paraphysics would seek, with the help of
Blumenberg and others, to go farther.
There is an indefiniteness at the center of our existence which this
manual for paraphysics seeks to explore. Sartre famously asserted that
“nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being–like a worm” (Sartre 1956,
56). This is one attempt to articulate a sense of such indefiniteness, and
one that exercised its spell over me from my earliest encounter with phi-
losophy as a teenager. Sartre’s formulation is more traditionally ontologi-
cal than the one I will attempt, his “dialectic” of being and nothingness
too reliant on a Hegelian legacy in which the mysteries of “determinate
negation” themselves displace (rather than negating) the indefiniteness
for which an all-too-definite sense of “the Nothing” serves as replace-
ment. If nothingness lies coiled in the heart of being like a worm, then
indefiniteness would rather be spread over the skin of our existence like a
film. But the literal falsehood of the antecedent implies the only figura-
tive value of the consequent.
In this venture, I have chosen two primary companions. On the prin-
ciple of Heidegger’s reversion to Hölderlin as the earliest expression of an
insight he would cultivate, I move back over more recent candidate com-
panions to Shelley and Kant. My choice is less principled than Heidegger’s,
more pragmatic: I do not intend, for example, that the historical locus
limned by Shelley and Kant in their different ways makes them either
earliest or most powerful, though there is something about their proxim-
ity to the French Revolution that is historically specific. Also, Shelley and
Kant are both committed to the centrality of the human: Shelley in his
 Preface and Acknowledgments
   ix

version of “agnostic humanism” and Kant in the ultimate role which he

assigns to the question, “what is the human?”
Shelley’s poetry exemplifies his humanism in a tragic mode which I
find essential to it. In contrast, Kant’s humanism is less aggressive and
more durable. But both ultimately bode extremely ill for traditional con-
ceptions of the human and open the way to an identification of features
associated with the indefinite. I am much less interested in their respec-
tive humanist visions than in the problems of indefiniteness which they
uncover, and in this sense it would be misleading at best to say that para-
physics is (as Sartre said of existentialism) a humanism. As I see it – with
Kant and Shelley’s help (both positive and negative) – the human opens
out onto the indefinite. It is for this reason that I have invited them – as
they have invited me – along for the ride.
The stakes are sufficiently high. Shelley’s effective suicide (poetically if
not literally) is neither a romantic prank nor an extricable biographical
circumstance. Kant’s critical unraveling of philosophy, like Husserl’s later
phenomenological unwinding, occurs at a less apparently visceral, more
overtly intellectual, level, but the philosophical consequences are as great
as the poetic ones in Shelley’s case. It will take time and work to articulate
my sense of what these are. In any case, these will serve as two main
stocks of illustration as my enterprise unfolds. There is more here, too: I
want to use Kant to unwind Shelley, Shelley to unravel Kant. What I
propose may at first look like a Shelleyan reading of Kant, since the
emphasis will be on vision, and Shelley insisted that any poem was the
already inert track of an antecedent visionary design. Kant’s critical pro-
gram, particularly as exemplified in the first of his three Critiques, is mod-
eled on a logical architectonic which also reflects a visionary basis of sorts,
and Shelley helps to probe further into this vision. What Kant has to offer
Shelley beyond durability is a more difficult problem, but it has to do
with the radical revaluation of the notion of a philosophical category, a
vision beyond the traditionally metaphysical one. Both perspectives –
Shelley’s on Kant and Kant’s on Shelley – encourage a vision of paraphys-
ics, and melding the notions of vision and critique I refer to this casting
of paraphysics as visionary critique.
Paraphysics is intended broadly as a philosophical, not a poetic, enter-
prise, but it is more inclusive of philosophical enthusiasm than Kant’s
x Preface and Acknowledgments

strictures against an “elevated tone” would itself permit. In this regard

(though not in all others), Emerson or Blake (both originally clothed in
Swedenborg) would yield more immediate positive antecedence than
either of my companions. Positive affiliation is not the issue, but rather
the aggravation of a still largely unrecognized, though felt condition. In
this regard, Emerson is of little help, profound as my growing sense of
indebtedness to him remains, and the confrontation with Blake is per-
haps best staged in poetry itself. For now, the hope of this introduction to
paraphysics, indicated only in bare outline, is to provide an approach to
those indefinitenesses Shelley experienced as radically as any, but with the
greater robustness a philosophical fortification such as Kant’s may pro-
vide. I remind myself, along with the reader, of my skepticism: hopes are
something different, and less, than promises or even plans. There is noth-
ing to guarantee that paraphysics as an enterprise will prove any more
shielded than Shelleyan poetry, and with unshielded roots in Blake and
Emerson there is perhaps much to prove it less. It would, indeed could,
matter little to me either way. There are mysterious fortitudes to which
we may point in the later tradition of English and American lyric – one
thinks of the disparate examples of Yeats and Stevens – and the respective
bulwarkings of poetry and philosophy may prove comparable or even
ultimately in favor of the longstandingness of the poetic, as opposed to
any philosophical, tradition. In a “middle modern” context, as repre-
sented by the figures of Kant and Shelley, it is the philosopher (always of
frail health) who manifests surprising longevity and the also frail poet
who exemplifies the self-immolation of a furious fuse. Harold Bloom has
trenchantly observed that reading poetry sustains while living poetry kills
all but a very few. In contrast, Bloom contends that reading philosophy is
stultifying (i.e. burn this book), but the philosophical life is a life well
lived. Keeping Bloom’s anti-philosophical wisdom in mind, I militantly
oppose the inertial pull in the direction of merely “reading” Kant and
Shelley. I view this project, in proper American fashion, as a sort of opera-
tor’s manual and/as report from the (mine)field of paraphysics, an enter-
prise of visionary engagement (and more!). Despite the potential
perils – incrementally induced – I do recommend: try this at home.

* * *
 Preface and Acknowledgments
   xi

Too many people have contributed directly and indirectly to this work to
list them all, but several former students from whom I have learned
deserve special mention and must stand in acknowledgment for all the
many others. Isadora Mosch labored mightily on earlier versions of this
project as a research assistant during her time at the University of Georgia,
and John Paetsch has helped with editorial suggestions and much else.
Conversations with David Hart are at the center of this work, particularly
in the consideration of Northrop Frye and Harold Bloom, and conversa-
tions with Angus Fletcher were a privilege I hope never to forget. As
always Ricardo Abend Van Dalen has been a constant source of support.
I am grateful to April James at Palgrave Macmillan for her work, and to
an anonymous reader for the press. Last, not least but quite the opposite,
I acknowledge the continuing supportive environment my family pro-
vides. In a line of three generations spanning from my mother, Shirley
Anne Gipson Bassler, to my daughter, Zoe Lalene Brient, my wife,
Elizabeth Brient, is the center to whom this work is dedicated.

Athens, GA, USA O. Bradley Bassler

December 2017

Bibliography
Bassler, O. Bradley. Diagnosing Contemporary Philosophy with the Matrix Movies
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).
Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology,
trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square, 1956).
 Contents

1 From Imagination to the Parafinite   1

1.1 From Imagination to the Parafinite (A First Pass)   1
1.2 Vision and Vision: A Framework for Conversation?   9
1.3 Philosophical Vision, and the Anomalous Vision of Kant  14
1.4 Pure Synthesis as Egological Self-Positioning  18
1.5 Kantian Prophylaxis and Husserlian “Platonism”: A First
Comparison of Two Transcendentalisms  34
Bibliography  44

2 The Parafinite and Self-Positioning  47

2.1 Versions and Aversions of the Parafinite: Galileo, Leibniz
and Kant (and More on Self-Positioning)  47
2.2 Second-Order Self-Positioning as Intimated
in the Second Critique 59
2.3 Theoretical and Practical Self-Positioning in the Opus
Postumum 63
2.4 Symbolism as Higher-Order Schematization
and Blumenberg’s Metaphorology  68
Bibliography  84

xiii
xiv Contents

3 Principles and Categories from Leibniz to Peirce in Five

Easy Steps  87
3.1 Leibniz on the Principle of Sufficient Reason  87
3.2 Kant’s New Elucidation 91
3.3 False Subtleties (Kant) and Four Incapacities (Peirce) 100
3.4 A New List of Categories (Peirce) 106
3.5 The Pragmatic Maxim and Higher-Order
Empiriocriticism: Exponentiation of Self-Positioning 117
Bibliography 134

4 Spotlight on Mathematics: Dislocations of Kant

and Husserl 137
4.1 Brouwer: Dislocation of Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic 138
4.2 Hilbert: Relocation of Kant’s Regulative Rationality 141
4.3 Tarskian Semantics: Dislocation of Kant’s Truth
Criterion145
4.4 Analytic Philosophy (and a Comment on Hermeneutics) 148
4.5 Frege as Partial Husserl (Lothar Eley) 149
4.6 Marion’s “Brouwerian” Reading of Wittgenstein 154
4.7 Van Atten’s “Husserlian” Reading of Brouwer 158
Bibliography 160

5 Adjunction and Relocation 163

5.1 Adjunction as Global Dislocation: Introducing a Second
Level of Paraphysics by Kantian Example 163
5.2 Distribution as Relocation: A Third Level, and Kant’s
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories 170
5.3 Blumenberg’s Modernity: A Relocative Appreciation 176
Bibliography 181

6 Shelley’s Vision 183
6.1 Spirit Vision: Shelley’s Poetic Modernism 183
6.2 Beginning and Beyond: Notes to Queen Mab193
6.3 Triumphal Cars 202
6.4 Hesperus and Prosperus: An Exemplary Excursion 210
 Contents
   xv

6.5 Proof Text for Locative Poetics: Shelley’s Triumph

(Part One) 214
6.6 Reading, Response; Criticism, Vision: A Goethean
Digression218
6.7 Proof Text for Locative Poetics: Shelley’s Triumph
(Part Two) 220
6.8 At Eton and Mont Blanc 227
Bibliography 236

7 Conclusion 239
7.1 The Parafinite and the Imagination 239
7.2 Intimations of the Parafinite 245
Bibliography 251

Index 253
 1
From Imagination to the Parafinite

1.1 F rom Imagination to the Parafinite

(A First Pass)
At the beginning of this enterprise I acknowledge a singular precedent to
the agon I stage between Kant and Shelley. In an essay of manifold sug-
gestiveness, Northrop Frye has proposed that we see literature as a “cri-
tique of pure reason.” My overall indebtedness to Frye’s work extends well
beyond the bounds of this pregnant essay, and in particular to his seminal
volume on Blake. In his brief essay, although I find Frye’s paraphrase of
Kant’s critical project less than inspiring, the project he outlines so envel-
ops my own that I feel under some obligation to declare that I only stum-
bled upon his essay after this book was well underway. Yet with little
violence Frye’s overall project may be characterized as monadological
(Frye 1957, 121; see also Frye 1982, 209, 224), each part enveloping all,
and so the fact that this piece entered my horizon late in the game means
little, nor should the inadequacy of Frye’s rather journalistic portrait of
Kant encourage us to belittle his all-too-ambitious proposal. To a first
approximation, we might understand it as a revisioning of Cassirer’s “phi-
losophy of symbolic forms,” with an eye not to literature as a repository of
symbols, but rather as a source of that archetypal design which ­underpins

© The Author(s) 2018 1

O. B. Bassler, Kant, Shelley and the Visionary Critique of Metaphysics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77291-2_1
2 O. B. Bassler

all, and so even the most purely rational, of categorical structures. As such,
it would engulf that tradition which since the Renaissance has come to be
known as “philosophia perennis,” reintegrating philosophy within the
larger literary fold of which it was originally an aberrant generic eclosion.
Although I do not intend this project as one in which I use literature
to provide a critique of pure reason, Frye’s proposal sets a first model for
the encounter between Kant and Shelley. It is too one-sided in its sugges-
tion that literature reveals the imaginative nude retreating beneath philo-
sophical clothing – what Frye declares the elusive object of his ongoing
quest (Frye 1990a, 169). Frye’s terms are the romantic ones of imagina-
tion bounding reason, securing and circumscribing a limited domain of
rationality in a sea of imaginative tradition, buffering reason from its own
tendency to extend itself irrationally. Representative of his orientation is
his concluding remark that “[i]n Canada today, for example [1982], with
its demoralized government and chaotic economy, it seems to me only its
lively and articulate culture that holds the country together” (Frye
1990a, 182). (1982 is the year of appearance of David Cronenberg’s
Videodrome, set in Northrop Frye’s own Toronto.)
Much as I agree with Frye about the power of culture and ideas, his
vision of culture’s role risks, as most romanticisms do, the psychological
function of self-congratulation. More saliently, it massively simplifies the
very rift between literature and philosophy (not to mention the much
larger rift between culture and society) it would seek to repair. In this
regard it shares many features with the otherwise admirable ambitions of
Kenneth Burke, whose A Grammar of Motives serves as another precedent
for this enterprise limited only by its appreciation of the philosophical
tradition, which is not as powerful as its attuned sense of literary effect. In
this volume I seek, instead, a fully deployed agon between Kant and Shelley,
involuting and undoing them to expose their encounter at its utmost.
It goes almost without saying that I exclusively invoke the literary prece-
dents of Burke and Frye and their limitations not at all to demean them, but
because there are no equally forward-looking antecedents to mention on the
philosophical side of the equation. Philosophically, our age has largely
devolved into a fetishistic preoccupation for the precision of the well-tooled
cog in the machine, with insufficient appreciation for the monolithic status
of the apparatus “underway.” I have not turned to literature for literary so
 From Imagination to the Parafinite 3

much as for philosophical reasons: the massive default of the contemporary

philosophical enterprise to deliver any extended, coherent reflection on its
larger purport. The best we could hope for in recent times has been the
honesty of Richard Rorty, making a virtue out of necessity by declaring in
another 1982 essay that “[a] nation can count itself lucky to have several
thousand relatively leisured and relatively unspecialized intellectuals who are
exceptionally good at putting together arguments and pulling them apart.
Such a group is a precious cultural resource. As we keep saying on our grant
applications, the nation would do well to have analytic philosophers advise
on public projects. We shall kibbitz at least as well as any other professional
group, and perhaps rather better than most” (Rorty 1982, 220–221). (The
pedigree of Rorty’s essay is indicated by its first presentation in 1981 at a
meeting of the American Philosophical Association and its first appearance
in print in The American Scholar). It is true that such argument parsers gen-
erally make good intellectual bureaucrats and more especially good profes-
sional advisors, but one wonders how much – then, and even more so
now – they are accurately characterized as “relatively unspecialized,” and
what, if anything, their skills have to do with philosophy. Such is the unlucky
situation in which we philosophers find ourselves. Fortunately, there are
exceptions: I speak above all of contemporary conditions of philosophical
culture and not of the agendas (publicly disclosed or privately withheld) of
individual philosophers.
Philosophical romanticisms, from the German varieties through post-­
Comtean versions of positivism, are as much the root of this problem as
any resource for solution, and I mean to explode them here, along with
their literary counterparts. These philosophical romanticisms – of which
contemporary Hegelianism and analytic philosophy would both count as
vestiges – would have us believe that something can be philosophically
got from nothing, as if concepts would by themselves engender positive
or negative elucidations of reality. Kant’s recognition is that concepts are
in themselves philosophically inert, and this points to an entirely differ-
ent conception of philosophical work which still remains largely unrecog-
nized in the philosophical community at large. Nothing is got from
nothing, and the work I promote in this book requires thinking about the
programs of Kant and Shelley, not just the concepts they (purportedly)
“invoke.” This is only one path to paraphysics, not a singular, royal road.
4 O. B. Bassler

There is a story told of both philosophical and literary “romanticism”

which inspires Frye’s vision. As the story goes, it is the power of the pro-
ductive imagination, the palpitating heart of the retreating nude, which
comes to redeem our world from the cold heart of modern rationality.
Versions of this story are well-known in the case of Kant, even better
known in the case of Shelley. I want to begin to show how the imagina-
tion, whose operation has been highlighted legitimately enough, serves,
however, as a shadow for a more basic actor, the parafinite.
In Kant, we meet the parafinite first in the twofold form of the indefi-
nite manifold, space and time.1 In Shelley, the identification is all the
more powerful, coming in the form of Power itself, which “dwells apart
in its tranquillity/Remote, serene and inaccessible” (Shelley 1977, 92). In
Kant’s case, the relative status of the manifold, which is indicated in its
need to be conditioned by unity, indicates that we are dealing with a form
of what I call the relative parafinite. In contrast, Shelley’s invocation of
Power in Mont Blanc appeals to what I call the absolute parafinite, at least
as a poetic figure, and perhaps as more. One of the questions running
throughout this enterprise is whether there is a philosophically defensible
conception of the absolute parafinite. In some sense the answer is yes,
with antecedence in such a notion as Blake’s “total form” and, as we will
see in more detail, the Kantian sublime. However, it will eventually turn
out that the terms of the question are also in need of revision. We are
making our way, step by step, into a new landscape. One of the things we
should see along the way is that our “new way” is not as new, nor “old
things” as old, as we might at first suspect.
In previous work, I have approached the parafinite through the math-
ematical domain (Bassler 2015). Here my approach will be largely
through the more immediate channels of poetry and philosophy, hence
leaving the discussion of the mathematical parafinite mostly to one side.
Yet we may still see the enterprise of paraphysics as an attempt to develop
a philosophical vision which is independent of the commitments philoso-
phy has traditionally (if often implicitly) had to a determinate distinction
between the finite and the infinite. The concept of the parafinite, by
implication, calls this determinate distinction between the finite and the
infinite into question. Even at its best, philosophically “shored up” against
the ruins of a largely undefended and conceptually opaque foundation
 From Imagination to the Parafinite 5

for mathematics, the distinction between the finite and the infinite is not
what it has traditionally been taken to be. Rather than viewing philoso-
phy as grounded in an appeal to the mathematical, I take as focus the
more basic relation between philosophy and poetry. Because the Western
philosophical tradition emerges out of and in vocal opposition to the
tradition of Greek literature and especially Homeric epic, I begin with
poetry in our modern age as a cultural context for the reconsideration of
philosophy.2
I turn first to Mont Blanc – to which I will return again and again, and
particularly to the lines in which Shelley describes Power.

Power dwells apart in its tranquillity

Remote, serene, and inaccessible:
And this, the naked countenance of earth,
On which I gaze, even these primæval mountains
Teach the adverting mind. (Shelley 1977, 92)

Is it Power itself, or the “tranquillity” of power that Shelley characterizes

as “remote, serene, and inaccessible?” This question will be held open; for
now the fine tuning need not detain us. Let us assume, since it collapses
fewer distinctions, that it is the tranquillity of power which is so
characterized.
Shelley was well versed in the Greek and Latin classics, and his notion
of Power is indebted, in particular, to the atomist tradition. In Greek, the
term apeiron is usually translated “infinite.” It is generally taken to be
formed from the privative prefix a- and the root peras, which means
bound, limit or end. Consequently, the term means more literally,
unbounded, unlimited, or unending. In each case, what is negated by the
privative prefix is something definite, and so the unbounded is indefinite.
Peras is associated with the verbal root peraino, which means to end, fin-
ish or accomplish. So we might add to our list of proposed translations
above that apeiron means unaccomplished. Here the indefinite is mani-
fest as something unfinished, hence ongoing – perhaps broken off.
Charles Kahn, however, has proposed an alternative derivation for the
term apeiron. Instead of the root peras, he associates apeiron with the root
peran, which used as an adverb means “on the other side, across, or
beyond,” and is associated with the verbal root perao, which means “to
6 O. B. Bassler

pass across or through a space, to penetrate, pierce or extend” (Kahn

1985, 232).3 On Kahn’s reading, the root meaning of apeiron would
hence be: the untraversable. Kahn’s proposal is interesting because the
notion of the untraversable is not indefinite in the same sense that the
unbounded, the unlimited or the unending are. And if there is something
on the “far side” of the untraversable, it would properly be called “the
inaccessible.”
Whether Kahn’s proposed derivation of the meaning of the term
apeiron is right or not, it indicates a more concrete notion. If you do not
have access to a rocket ship, the moon is inaccessible; and if you do not
have access to a boat or an airplane, another continent is inaccessible.
This makes neither the moon nor the other continent, nor the space that
separates us from them, indefinite. In either case we are dealing with a defi-
nite extent, simply one that is untraversable. The untraversability we
speak of here is, of course, a relative untraversability: relative, in particu-
lar, to our means of transport. Correlatively, the moon or another conti-
nent is only relatively inaccessible. Is there a sense in which something
could be absolutely inaccessible? Shelley’s characterization of the tran-
quillity of Power may suggest that we are dealing with something rela-
tively inaccessible. Indeed, what would it mean for the tranquillity of
Power to be absolutely inaccessible? And even more importantly: would
this absolutely inaccessible be definite, like the moon or the European
continent, or in some way indefinite? We have as yet no means for answer-
ing these questions.
Shelley continues: “And this, the naked countenance of earth, /On
which I gaze, even these primæval mountains/Teach the adverting mind”
(Shelley 1977, 92). What ‘this’ refers to includes, but is not limited to, the
wisdom teaching concerning Power, given in the previous two lines. A
rapid reading of these next lines in the context of the poem at large would
seem to recommend a reading of ‘these primæval mountains’ in terms of
something like the Kantian doctrine of the sublime. But if we attenuate our
pace, peculiar questions emerge from these lines. (We start slowly and
build.) Why does Shelley list first the “naked countenance of the earth” and
only then “these primæval mountains”? And why does he speak of “even
these primæval mountains”? The ‘even’ registers a qualification, but why?
All is not here what it would sublimely seem.
 From Imagination to the Parafinite 7

Perhaps it is most natural to suggest the following: “even” the primæval

mountains teach the poet that power, or its tranquillity, is inaccessible
because in this of all cases a sublime power has been revealed, and so
made accessible. In contrast, the inaccessibility is revealed (accessible?!) in
the naked countenance of earth. So far as it goes, this seems plausible.
But how, exactly, does the naked earth reveal this inaccessibility, and if it
reveals it so directly why isn’t that the focus of the poem? And further: if
the effect of the primæval mountains is concessive, why is it the focus?
The dynamics of accession and concession are intricate, and this leads us
into the difficult heart of a major poem.4
As a point of comparison, let us turn equally briefly to Kant’s charac-
terization of the sublime. In the Critique of Judgment Kant tells us: “That
is sublime in comparison with which everything else is small” (Kant
1987, 105). Kant’s characterization of the sublime comes at the end of a
section called “Explication of the Term Sublime,” which is the first sec-
tion in the larger division on the mathematically – as opposed to dynami-
cally – sublime. Since Kant discusses the mathematical sublime before
the dynamical sublime (the difference between the two need not concern
us just yet), here he first lays out that use of the term ‘sublime’ in the
Critique of Judgment. What Kant describes is seemingly a characterization
of the absolutely, rather than the relatively, parafinite: the sublime is large
not relative to some thing, but in comparison with all things. Yet there is
still some comparison at issue here. In this passage, Kant does not say,
“the sublime is the large as such.” How can some thing be large in com-
parison with every other thing? The answer, it seems, must be that the
sublime is not a thing in the same way as all the other things; but how
then can they be compared? A mountain is not, in the most straightfor-
ward sense, larger than everything else. Nor, for that matter, is a galaxy or
a nebula. But perhaps the Power which a mountain discloses is even larger
than the mountain which discloses it, or even a galaxy or nebula.
Terminologically, at least, the concern about comparison is settled by the
way that Kant begins this section. Pluhar translates this beginning: “We call
sublime what is absolutely [schlechthin] large” (Kant 1987, 103). This trans-
lation is warranted by passages which follow, but a more literal translation
than ‘absolutely large’ would in fact be ‘large as such’. The matter is some-
what delicate, for Kant immediately goes on to distinguish that which is
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
464 Diosma ovata Oval-leaved G. Shrub. May.
Diosma H.
Straddling-leaved G.
465 Protea divaricata Shrub. July.
Protea H.
G.
466 Goodenia tenella Slender Goodenia Shrub. June.
H.
Lythrum G. All
467 Shrubby Lythrum Shrub.
fruticosum H. Summer.
H.
468 Aloe arborescens Tree Aloe Shrub. June.
H.
Crown-flowered G.
469 Protea coronata Shrub. July.
Protea H.
G.
470 Ophrys arachnoides Spider-like Ophrys Shrub. July.
H.
G.
471 Ophrys myodes Fly-like Ophrys Shrub. July.
H.
Scolloped-leaved G.
472 Hibbertia crenata Shrub. July.
Hibbertia H.
473 Yucca gloriosa Superb Yucca Har. Shrub. July.
Winged-leaved G.
474 Psoralea pinnata Shrub. July.
Psoralea H.
Heart-bearing H.
475 Serapias cordigera Shrub. June.
Serapias H.
Melaleuca Diosma-leaved G.
476 Shrub. July.
diosmæfolia Melaleuca H.
477 Linum venustum Graceful Linum Har. Shrub. July.
Broad-leaved H.
478 Crinum latifolium Bulb. August.
Crinum H.
479 Fragaria indica Indian Strawberry Har. Herb. July.
Shining-leaved
480 Vaccinium nitidum Har. Shrub. June.
Whortle-berry
West India Bark- H.
481 Cinchona caribæa Shrub. August.
tree H.
482 Dianthus alpinus Alpine Pink G. Shrub. July.
 H.
Dwarf winged- G.
483 Dahlia pinnata nana Herb. September.
leaved Dahlia H.
G.
484 Nicotiana glutinosa Clammy Tobacco Herb. August.
H.
Melaleuca Willow-leaved G.
485 Shrub. July.
salicifolia Melaleuca H.
486 Pæonia Daurica Dauric Pæony Har. Herb. June.
Xeranthemum Herbaceous Eternal G. All
487 Herb.
herbaceum Flower H. Summer.
Broussonetia
488 Paper Mulberry Har. Shrub. June.
papyrifera
Gnaphalium Large-flowered G.
489 Shrub. August.
grandiflorum Gnaphalium H.
H.
490 Pontederia dilatata Dilated Pontederia Aquatic. September.
H.
H.
491 Gardenia radicans Rooting Gardenia Shrub. August.
H.
Oxylobium Heart-leaved G.
492 Shrub. July.
cordifolium Oxylobium H.
 ERRATA.
Plate 438 read 433.
467 instead of Lythrum of Linnæus, read Lythrum fruticosum of Linnæus.
468 line 4 from the bottom, instead of height read size.
 *** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE
BOTANIST'S REPOSITORY FOR NEW AND RARE PLANTS; VOL.
07 [OF 10] ***

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
be renamed.

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright in
these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it
in the United States without permission and without paying copyright
royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part of
this license, apply to copying and distributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept
and trademark. Project Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and
may not be used if you charge for an eBook, except by following the
terms of the trademark license, including paying royalties for use of
the Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is very
easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such as
creation of derivative works, reports, performances and research.
Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and printed and given
away—you may do practically ANYTHING in the United States with
eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright law. Redistribution is subject
to the trademark license, especially commercial redistribution.

START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE
 PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the free

distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work (or
any other work associated in any way with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full
Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or online at
www.gutenberg.org/license.

Section 1. General Terms of Use and

Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree
to and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property
(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all
the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or
destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works in your
possession. If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a
Project Gutenberg™ electronic work and you do not agree to be
bound by the terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from
the person or entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in
paragraph 1.E.8.

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only be

used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people
who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a
few things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg™ electronic
works even without complying with the full terms of this agreement.
See paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with
Project Gutenberg™ electronic works if you follow the terms of this
agreement and help preserve free future access to Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the
collection of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the
individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the
United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright law in
the United States and you are located in the United States, we do
not claim a right to prevent you from copying, distributing,
performing, displaying or creating derivative works based on the
work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg are removed. Of
course, we hope that you will support the Project Gutenberg™
mission of promoting free access to electronic works by freely
sharing Project Gutenberg™ works in compliance with the terms of
this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg™ name
associated with the work. You can easily comply with the terms of
this agreement by keeping this work in the same format with its
attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when you share it without
charge with others.

1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also
govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most
countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside the
United States, check the laws of your country in addition to the terms
of this agreement before downloading, copying, displaying,
performing, distributing or creating derivative works based on this
work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The Foundation makes
no representations concerning the copyright status of any work in
any country other than the United States.

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg:

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other

immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must
appear prominently whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg™
work (any work on which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” appears, or
with which the phrase “Project Gutenberg” is associated) is
accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, copied or distributed:
 This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United
States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away
or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License
included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you
are not located in the United States, you will have to check the
laws of the country where you are located before using this
eBook.

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is derived

from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not contain a
notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the copyright
holder), the work can be copied and distributed to anyone in the
United States without paying any fees or charges. If you are
redistributing or providing access to a work with the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the work, you must
comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 through
1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the Project
Gutenberg™ trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is posted

with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution
must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any
additional terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms
will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™ License for all works posted
with the permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of
this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project

Gutenberg™ License terms from this work, or any files containing a
part of this work or any other work associated with Project
Gutenberg™.

1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this

electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with
active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project
Gutenberg™ License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if you
provide access to or distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg™ work
in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other format used in
the official version posted on the official Project Gutenberg™ website
(www.gutenberg.org), you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense
to the user, provide a copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means
of obtaining a copy upon request, of the work in its original “Plain
Vanilla ASCII” or other form. Any alternate format must include the
full Project Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™ works
unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing

access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works
provided that:

• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation.”

• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who

notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that
s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
 copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and
discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project
Gutenberg™ works.

• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of

any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in
the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90
days of receipt of the work.

• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg™

electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set
forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the manager of
the Project Gutenberg™ trademark. Contact the Foundation as set
forth in Section 3 below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend

considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe
and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright law in creating
the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite these efforts, Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the medium on which they may
be stored, may contain “Defects,” such as, but not limited to,
incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt data, transcription errors, a
copyright or other intellectual property infringement, a defective or
damaged disk or other medium, a computer virus, or computer
codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except

for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in paragraph
1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner
of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark, and any other party
distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic work under this
agreement, disclaim all liability to you for damages, costs and
expenses, including legal fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO
REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF
WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE
PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE
FOUNDATION, THE TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY
DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE
TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL,
PUNITIVE OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE
NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you

discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it,
you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by
sending a written explanation to the person you received the work
from. If you received the work on a physical medium, you must
return the medium with your written explanation. The person or entity
that provided you with the defective work may elect to provide a
replacement copy in lieu of a refund. If you received the work
electronically, the person or entity providing it to you may choose to
give you a second opportunity to receive the work electronically in
lieu of a refund. If the second copy is also defective, you may
demand a refund in writing without further opportunities to fix the
problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth in
paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’, WITH NO
OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied

warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages.
If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the
law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be
interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted
by the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any
provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the
Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and distribution
of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless from all liability,
costs and expenses, including legal fees, that arise directly or
indirectly from any of the following which you do or cause to occur:
(a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg™ work, (b)
alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any Project
Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any Defect you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of

Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers.
It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and
donations from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the

assistance they need are critical to reaching Project Gutenberg™’s
goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™ collection will
remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project
Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a
secure and permanent future for Project Gutenberg™ and future
generations. To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation and how your efforts and donations can help,
see Sections 3 and 4 and the Foundation information page at
www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-profit
501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the
state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal
Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal tax identification
number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent
permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500 West,

Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact links and up
to date contact information can be found at the Foundation’s website
and official page at www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to

the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission of
increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can
be freely distributed in machine-readable form accessible by the
widest array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small
donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax
exempt status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating

charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United
States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a
considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and
keep up with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in
locations where we have not received written confirmation of
compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of
compliance for any particular state visit www.gutenberg.org/donate.

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where

we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no
prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in
such states who approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make

any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from
outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current donation
methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of
other ways including checks, online payments and credit card
donations. To donate, please visit: www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project

Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could be
freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose network of
volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several printed

editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by copyright in
the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not
necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper
edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,

including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how
to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks.
back
back
back
back
back