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The Chronic Crisis
of American
Democracy
The Way Is Shut
Benjamin Studebaker
The Chronic Crisis of American Democracy
Benjamin Studebaker
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
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For my parents, and for all who labor so that others may write
Contents
vii
viii CONTENTS
Index 201
List of Tables
ix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The American political establishment takes the crisis of American democ-
racy too seriously, but also not seriously enough. Many writers sound
the alarm, warning about American democracy’s impending fall [1–5].
They argue for different kinds of political reforms, all aimed at preventing
populist demagogues from polarizing Americans along ethnic and cultural
lines and manipulating the legal system to authoritarian ends. For Steven
Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, the “bulk” of the Republican Party is
“behaving in an antidemocratic manner” [6]. They think the problem
is a lack of gatekeeping. Today’s politicians can use the internet and cable
television to reach voters directly, without going through establishment
mediators. The primary system makes the political parties vulnerable to
infiltration.
But why do Americans gravitate toward the messages they hear on
the internet and on TV? Why has public trust in so many elite institu-
tions fallen to historic lows [7, 8]? The American elite is uncomfortable
confronting the role it has played in alienating people. It chalks the crisis
up to the spread of hate, to the spread of fake news, to the algorithms
used by search engines and social media companies. But is this explana-
tion really true? And even insofar as it is true, there’s still the question of
why. Why are Americans attracted to hateful messaging in the first place?
Why do they believe fake news?
Only a few years ago, it was possible in the United States to talk about
the effects of the economy on democracy and culture. Mainstream liberal
economists used to talk about this. In 2013, Joseph Stiglitz—who served
as chairman of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisers in the
1990s—argued that democracy is in trouble because:
…as our economic system is seen to fail for most citizens, and as our
political system seems to be captured by moneyed interests, confidence
in our democracy and in our market economy will erode along with our
global influence. As the reality sinks in that we are no longer a country
of opportunity and that even our long-vaunted rule of law and system of
justice have been compromised, even our sense of national identity may be
put into jeopardy. [9]
Stiglitz argued not only that the American economy was failing the
American people, but that this failure would have political and cultural
consequences. The problem, for Stiglitz, was globalization. He didn’t
think globalization was intrinsically bad—it was just that “governments
are managing it so poorly.” A handful of Americans made similar argu-
ments [10, 11]. But things shifted after the 2016 election. Both party
establishments were challenged by Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders.
Each advanced a critique of the American economy. In response, much
of the American elite closed ranks. Acknowledging the seriousness of
economic problems and the role they played in fueling resentment gave
aid and comfort to the populists. It was necessary for elites to find a
way to explain populism without engaging with the economic context in
which it arose.
This was accomplished by setting up a dichotomy between economic
and cultural explanations for President Trump’s victory. It was either due
to “economic insecurity” or “cultural backlash” [12]. American political
scientists looked at the income level of Trump voters [5, 13, 14]. They
argued that because many Trump voters were not personally economi-
cally insecure, economic factors could not be responsible for his victory.
It had to be culture rather than class. But the economy and the culture
do not exist in separate universes. The economy affects the culture. Voters
don’t have to personally experience economic precarity to feel that the
economic system is unfair, that the political class is corrupt. They may
think the economy has been rigged by greedy, decadent, hateful elites.
1 THE UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM 3
They may think those elites are the product of a debased culture. They
may look for cultural solutions to economic problems.
If you talk about the economic problems, you get accused of legit-
imizing the grievances of the populists, of aiding and abetting the bad
people. To avoid this, American elites have increasingly become trapped
in an insular cultural discussion. They are too busy denouncing the
deplorables to make any effort to properly understand the problem or
respond to it. This denial of economic reality makes elites look out
of touch. Ironically, it fuels the very resentments that drive populism
forward.
It’s different in Britain and in Europe. Discussion of the structural
problems with the global economic system still flourishes in the old world
[15–19]. There are still deep, complex narratives that bring economic and
political analysis together. French economist Thomas Piketty argues that
economic change has undermined democracy by damaging the sense that
the economy operates in a meritocratic way:
Open international capital flows and new trade agreements made it easier
for North American and European manufacturing corporations to offshore
jobs to countries where labor costs were lower, and highly internation-
alized financial sectors concentrated wealth more intensely. Everywhere,
democracies became from the 1990s increasingly unresponsive to demo-
cratic demands for economic reforms that would increase the return to
labour. Under these conditions, democracies became particularly suscep-
tible to their plutocratic tendencies and more difficult to reform. In the
case of the American republic, this turn fueled wider conflicts around
democratic citizenship. [19]
4 B. STUDEBAKER
to imports was nearly 5 times higher than it was in 2017 [20]. Between
1970 and 2021, trade increased, as a percentage of US GDP, from 11 to
25% [21].
When people think about the expansion of trade, they often think
about outsourcing—companies moving jobs abroad. Outsourcing has
eliminated some jobs. An estimated 3.7 million American jobs were lost
due to the trade deficit with China between 2001 and 2018 [22]. But
this is only one small part of the picture. Because companies can credibly
threaten to relocate, government economic policy caters to them. The
government worries about job losses, and it makes a point to limit them.
Because of this, the problem is not so much the jobs we lose, it’s the
things the government does to keep the ones we have.
To attract jobs and investment, our government stifles wage growth. It
keeps the minimum wage down and it weakens the bargaining power of
unions. The real, inflation-adjusted federal minimum wage was over $12
in 1970 [23]. Today it’s stuck at $7.25. In 1960, over 30% of American
workers were in unions [24]. Today that figure is 10%. Between 1979 and
2019, inflation-adjusted wages grew just 8%, while overall GDP rose by
760% [25, 26].
Technological changes reinforce these trends. The internet makes it
easier for more work to be done remotely, making it simpler for compa-
nies to move their operations around. Automation allows companies to
expand production without creating jobs or raising wages. Over the past
50 years, productivity increases have become completely detached from
wage growth [27].
Capital mobility doesn’t just affect wage policy. It also affects the tax
system. It’s estimated that wealthy people have stashed between $24 tril-
lion and $36 trillion in offshore tax havens [28]. But that’s just the tip
of the iceberg. Again, it’s not about the revenue we lose, it’s about the
things we do to avoid losing revenue. Over the past 50 years, the govern-
ment has filled the tax code with loopholes, undermining the statutory
corporate tax rate. Taxes on corporate income fell from almost 32% of
corporate profits in 1970 to just 10% in 2019 [29]. US states have cut
their income tax rates to compete with their neighbors, and they some-
times even use tax revenue to pay companies to come to town. Nine states
are currently without a state income tax altogether, and on top of this,
states and municipalities give away an estimated annual $45 billion to $70
billion in subsidies [30, 31].
6 B. STUDEBAKER
be attracted. But by starting with economic class, we can more clearly see
how the competitive global economy directly affects people’s lives. Subse-
quent chapters will more directly address the cultural consequences of the
crisis.
The Workers
For our purposes, the workers are the employed people who don’t go to
college and who answer to a boss. These are the people who, once upon a
time, would have worked predominately in factories and on farms. Many
of these jobs have been automated or moved abroad. This has pushed
more and more of these workers into the services sector [38]. Many of
them work in retail, food service, or hospitality. They are increasingly
working in logistics, driving trucks, staffing warehouses, and delivering
things.
When more workers were in manufacturing, they were able to organize
themselves politically with some efficacy. It is very costly to shut down a
factory, even for a brief period, and this gave labor unions in the manufac-
turing sector a lot of leverage. Capital mobility took most of this leverage
away. It became too easy for companies to move their facilities off-shore,
and this made labor unions more cautious. As manufacturing continues
to employ a diminishing percentage of workers, more of them find them-
selves in service jobs where the strike is less effective. Brief disruptions to
operations are not as devastating for many companies, and increasingly
self-checkout systems make it easy for shops to stay open with skeleton
staffs.
Even when the will to organize is there, the government has made
it steadily harder for old unions to survive and for new unions to form.
Right-to-work laws frustrate unions, making it easy for workers to enjoy
the benefits of working in unionized workplaces without having to pay
8 B. STUDEBAKER
dues [39]. This makes it hard for unions to build up the resources
they need to support their members during strikes, and that makes
workers more skittish about using what leverage they do have. As unions’
resources and leverage decline, they have fewer successes, and as their
successes fade, they struggle to persuade workers to join and contribute.
The unionization rate in the United States fell by more than half between
1980 and 2020 [24].
The unions played a pivotal role in politically organizing workers. As
they have declined, the quality and quantity of worker political partici-
pation has also fallen. Political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson
argue the biggest political problem for workers is the lack of groups that
can “provide a continuing, organized capacity” to both monitor govern-
ment policy and mobilize workers to respond to it [40]. The unions were
the core type of organization that did this work, and no clear replacements
have emerged. Without them, it’s harder to mobilize workers to vote, it’s
harder to fund candidates who prioritize workers, and it’s harder to get
workers accurate information about which candidates prioritize them.
This situation understandably makes some workers feel politically
futile, but many continue to do their best to understand what’s going
on. Unfortunately, as the unions decline, the information available to
workers increasingly comes from media controlled by other economic
classes. Wealthy oligarchs own the television networks and newspapers,
and they use them to disseminate perspectives that are friendly to their
own interests. While independent media offers an alternative to corpo-
rate media, independent media is largely produced by the professional
class. The professionals—who have college degrees—do not always share
workers’ interests and cannot be relied upon to put them first.
This leads some workers to reject both corporate and independent
media, preferring instead to indulge in conspiracy theories. Statistically,
lower levels of education heavily predict a person’s propensity to believe
in conspiracies [41]. While conspiracy theories are often mocked by
oligarchs and professionals, they are a way of trying to understand
what much of the corporate and independent media refuse to explain—
why the country is becoming increasingly cruel and unfair to working
people. Workers who engage in conspiracy theories do not understand the
changes, but at least they are trying to understand. At least they are able
to recognize that corporate and independent media are not principally
interested in helping them.
1 THE UNSOLVABLE PROBLEM 9
The Professionals
For our purposes, the professionals have college degrees, but they still
answer to bosses or clients. They still rely on a wage—be it a salary or
an hourly rate—for the bulk of their income. As conditions grew more
difficult for workers over the past few decades, education was increasingly
pitched as a reliable way out. More and more people went to college.
In 1970, less than 17% of Americans between the ages of 25 and 29
had a college degree. By 2021, that figure increased to 39% [42]. But
as we’ve discussed, inflation-adjusted wages haven’t been rising much.
Even as the workforce becomes more educated, its wages stagnate. This
means that while today’s professionals do earn more money than today’s
workers, they aren’t earning dramatically more money than the workers of
yesterday. Social mobility in the United States declined substantially after
1980, both intergenerationally and within one lifespan [43, 44]. More
people aren’t earning more money than their parents or their younger
selves, even though they are often more educated than their parents and
their younger selves.
10 B. STUDEBAKER
for the right to earn a wage comparable to that of a 1970s factory worker,
without the quality pension or the job security that a 1970s factory
worker would have enjoyed. The size of the debt limits their options and
fills them with a desperation that makes them easy to exploit. Their prin-
cipal fear is that all of this hard work will have been for nothing. They’ll
toil for years, accumulate large debts, and end up in jobs that are little
different from the jobs ordinary workers do. This, sadly, is the fate of
many.
We can make a distinction within the professional class. On the one
hand, there are “rump professionals,” who manage to get secure jobs in
their majors and have the kind of life they envisioned for themselves when
they made the decision to go to college. On the other hand, there are
“fallen professionals,” who are forced into jobs that are precarious, low-
paying, or not in their preferred field. The fallen professionals are deprived
of most of the benefits they were promised when they made the decision
to go to college. All they have left from their university experience is their
cultural capital, their familiarity with the symbols, norms, and language
that educated people use. The more the fallen professionals are made to
live like workers, the more they hold onto this cultural distinctiveness
as a way of resisting proletarianization [54, 55]. This means the fallen
professionals are constantly drawn into pretentious discourses that exclude
ordinary workers. The more a discourse excludes workers, the more that
discourse flatters the fallen professional’s self-concept as a highly educated
person of taste whose merit and virtue have gone unfairly unrewarded.
The rump professionals did not experience the same letdown. They
are doing the jobs they hoped they would do, and therefore they are
much less resentful. Most of the prestigious, influential jobs in politics,
the civil service, the media, and the arts are performed by rump profes-
sionals. Rump professionals make most of the content that other classes
consume. They often work for oligarchs and corporations, but most of
the people who consume the content they produce are workers and fallen
professionals. To attract an audience, the rump professionals need to
cater to the resentment that workers and fallen professionals feel. But if
rump professionals direct resentment toward wealthy oligarchs, the rump
professionals will be directing resentment toward their own employers.
This might get them fired. The rump professionals did not get to where
they are by taking these kinds of risks. They were the honors students who
followed the rules, the college students with the best networking skills.
They have spent their whole lives trying to impress their parents, teachers,
12 B. STUDEBAKER
professors, and employers. In many cases they have internalized the values
of these authority figures, making it extremely difficult for them to even
articulate a critique of those values in the first case. Even when they can
articulate such a critique, their priority tends to be on keeping their jobs
and moving up in their careers.
Therefore, most rump professionals must direct resentment away from
their bosses and onto various social and cultural groups. They encourage
workers to blame social and cultural groups for social problems, and they
encourage fallen professionals to look down on workers for targeting
those groups. In this way, rump professionals encourage a cultural antago-
nism between workers and fallen professionals, making it harder for them
to cooperate with one another against the oligarchs. Even when workers
and fallen professionals avoid swallowing these narratives, the rump
professionals’ emotionally intense content monopolizes public discourse
and crowds out alternatives. Anger and outrage are enormously viral
online, and the market rewards media outlets and political organizations
that find ways to generate it [56].
The rump professionals are, for the most part, unaware of the role they
play in perpetuating divisions and drowning out constructive attempts to
organize. Many of them genuinely believe in the values of their employers.
They are so effective at creating and disseminating content that defends
their employers’ interests in large part because they have bought into their
employers’ worldview. This brings us to our next class—the employers
themselves.
The Employers
For our purposes, the employers are the people who are their own boss,
regardless of education level. Like the professionals, they come in two
varieties—the small employers run small businesses, while the oligarchs
own large stakes in the transnational corporations that increasingly domi-
nate the landscape. The oligarchs are the primary beneficiaries of the
economic changes we’ve been describing. Between 1971 and 2021, the
top 1% of American earners saw their share of national income increase
from 11.1 to 19.1% [37]. Their share of national wealth—including their
share of physical assets, like land, as well as their share of investment
capital—increased from 26.3% in 1971 to 34.9% in 2021. The top 1%
of US households now own 15 times more wealth than the bottom
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the eye of speculation, it soon ceases to be exhilarating; it becomes
overwhelming, and I, for one, dare not dwell too long upon it. The
night is clear. Will you go with me to the observatory?”
“Certainly,” replied St. Arnaud, without showing the faintest
surprise.
Frederick rose, and as he did so he fell into a violent paroxysm of
coughing. When it was over he sank into his seat, too overcome with
weakness to stand. Annoyance was pictured on his face at this
exhibition of illness before the officers of the Empress Queen, and
also a spirit of iron determination. His soul was ever stronger than
his body, and in this case he triumphed over illness and exhaustion.
After a few moments he rose, and going toward the door, St. Arnaud
respectfully opened it, and he passed out. He held his hat in his
hand, but had omitted to take his cloak, which hung over the back of
his chair. St. Arnaud had not noticed the omission, but Gavin had,
and picking the cloak up, he ran after the King, saying, “Your Majesty
would do well to take this; the night air is sharp.”
Frederick, with the ghost of a smile, proceeded to wrap himself
up in the cloak, and then said: “You may come also.”
Nothing loath, Gavin followed. Crossing a large garden, they
ascended the stairs of a moderately tall observatory. The effort made
Frederick gasp and tremble, but his step never faltered as he
climbed up. Reaching the top, he struck his flint and steel, and with
St. Arnaud’s assistance he lighted a large lamp, saying, “That is
visible from every part of the house, and signifies I am in the
observatory, and I am not to be disturbed.”
The telescope was soon arranged, and the King and St. Arnaud
were deep in astronomical surveys and discussions. St. Arnaud was
singularly well versed in astronomy, and Frederick seemed to be
fascinated by his intelligent conversation. Gavin, a mute listener, sat
near by, and longed unspeakably for a glimpse through the
telescope.
An hour passed, and at the end of that time, while St. Arnaud
was giving his views in his clear and musical voice on certain
aspects of the planet Saturn, Frederick’s head sunk back in his chair,
his head rested against the wall, and he slept peacefully.
Neither St. Arnaud nor Gavin could restrain a feeling of pity for
him then. His face, thin and drawn, was a picture of sadness. He
looked not only ill, but frightfully worn, and his sleep was the sleep of
exhaustion.
St. Arnaud raised his hand as a sign to Gavin to keep perfectly
still. He remembered the King’s remark, that he had not slept well of
late, and thought this sudden drowsiness probably a blessed relief.
So, indeed, it was. Gradually, as he slept more soundly, his face lost
its look of pain. Soon it was plain there was no danger of his
awaking. It grew chill in the room, and Gavin, softly taking off his own
cloak, laid it over Frederick’s knees. The warmth appeared to soothe
him still more; he sighed profoundly, settled himself more
comfortably in his chair, and slept like a child.
Hours passed. No one came to disturb them, for the light shining
through the window was a warning that no one must enter. The town
grew still as the night advanced, and in the deep silence nothing was
heard but the faint tramp of sentries and the quiet flow of the river.
But after midnight this changed. The wind rose, clouds of inky
blackness scurried across the face of the moon, and presently it
began to rain furiously. The heavy drops battered down like thunder
upon the roof of the observatory, but no sound awakened Frederick,
who slumbered peacefully on.
Not so Gavin and St. Arnaud, both of whom sat up, wide-awake.
There was so little chance of awaking the King that they conversed
together in whispers.
“What did you see through the telescope?” asked Gavin.
“That the King has no mind to help the Prince of Bevern. I saw it
as plainly as I saw the moon.”
“It is strange he did not recognize us.”
At which St. Arnaud made a gesture which indicated that
Frederick knew them quite as well as they knew him, but for reasons
known only to himself did not choose to admit it.
About two o’clock the storm increased in severity. The sound of
the rushing river was distinctly heard over the wild swirl of wind and
rain. Presently there was a roar of waters, and looking out of the
window into the garden, forty feet below, they saw it was flooded
several feet. A culvert had given way, and the swollen river poured
itself into the garden.
In the house lights were moving about. The King’s household had
determined, in spite of his rigid prohibition, to come to the
observatory after him. But it was a question how they could get
there, as the water was already four feet deep and rising rapidly.
Just at this moment Frederick stirred in his sleep and waked. Like
a true soldier, he had his memory and all his wits about him the
instant he opened his eyes. He rose at once, and hearing the noise
of the storm, said:
“I must have slept many hours—more than I have slept in a
week. I feel much better for it.”
“Look, your Majesty,” said St. Arnaud, opening the window.
Frederick looked out, and as he looked he laughed. The running
about in the house was plainly visible by the moving and flashing
lights.
“They are all in a panic over there. I suppose they will be sending
after me in a boat. It will take time to find me.”
“Pardon me, sire,” said Gavin. “If your Majesty will trust yourself
on my back, I can get you over safely. The water is not yet up to my
waist, and the distance is short.”
“Yes,” cried Frederick, laughing again. “While my staff are racing
about like frightened chickens in a barnyard I will walk in on them.”
He stooped and picked up Gavin’s cloak, which lay on the floor.
“I remember your laying this over my knees, although you
thought I was sleeping too soundly to know anything; but come, the
water rises every moment.”
He went rapidly down the stairs, followed closely by Gavin and
St. Arnaud. Gavin stepped boldly into the flood, which was up to his
waist, and cried to the King:
“Your Majesty must make yourself very small, for my honour is
engaged to get you across without wetting you. And you must also
wear my cloak over your own.”
Frederick sprang up on Gavin’s back with great agility, drawing
his heels up under Gavin’s arms. St. Arnaud covered him up well
with the two cloaks, and Gavin stepped lightly forward into the flood.
His young strength enabled him to withstand the flow of the waters
with considerable steadiness, and it was plain he could get the King
over without difficulty. About midway, however, he came to a dead
stop.
“Your Majesty,” he asked, “do you remember us, and that night at
the country house in Silesia, and Madame Ziska?”
“Certainly I do,” coolly responded Frederick, “and had you not lost
your senses, it would have been by no means impossible for you to
have made your escape by a rush, when I broke the door in.”
“So I have often thought, your Majesty, if only I had had the wit to
knock your Majesty down. We declined to accept your parole, but
you see we got away from Glatz just the same.”
“I know it. That ridiculous old Kollnitz and his ‘system.’ But I have
a better man there than Kollnitz. You could not do it so easily now.”
“Sire, the Empress Queen gave me a sword for that escape, and
both of us got promotion.”
“Very naturally. Women are always taken with those showy
things, which count, however, for little in the long run. Your Empress
Queen is like the rest of her sex.”
“Sire, I do not know if you mean that disrespectfully or not, but if
you say one disparaging word about my sovereign I will drop you
into the water if I am shot for it to-morrow morning.”
“Then I shall certainly speak of the Empress Queen with the
highest respect, and feel it, too, until I am safe on dry land. Oh, the
devil! Go on!”