1. S.P. Gupta v.

Union of India, AIR 1982, SC 149

Facts:

1. In 1981, multiple writ petitions filed in various High Courts challenged the government's
non-appointment and transfer of judges.

2. The petitions also questioned the constitutionality of the judge appointment process in higher
courts.

3. Petitioner S.P. Gupta filed a specific petition regarding the appointment of additional judges.

4. The Ministry of Law and Justice countered, arguing that no legal harm had resulted from the
government's actions or the temporary judge appointments.

Held:

1. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of disclosing correspondence in the public
interest and promoting transparency in government affairs.

2. Exceptions were noted for matters concerning national security.

3. Correspondence seeking advice under Article 74(2) was not entitled to protection if it
contained opinions rather than formal advice.

4. The Court affirmed its authority to determine disclosure of unpublished documents based on
public interest, referencing precedent.

5. Lack of consultation and relevant grounds for judges' appointments and transfers
necessitated disclosure of the correspondence in this case.

2. Mohammad rafi vs state of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2011 SC 308

Facts:

1. The petitioner was married to the third respondent on 18.08.2013, and they had a male child
on 21.10.2015.
2. The third respondent left the matrimonial home on 03.09.2016 and sought to dissolve the
marriage through "Khula" under Muslim Personal Law.

3. The third respondent approached the second respondent Shariat Council, registered under
the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, for a Khula Certificate.

4. The Shariat Council granted a Khula Certificate dated 21.06.2017 to the third respondent.

5. The petitioner had filed O.S.No.145 of 2017 for "Restitution of Conjugal Rights" and
O.P.No.23 of 2018 under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

6. The petitioner challenged the Khula Certificate issued by the Shariat Council through this
Writ Petition.

Judgment:

1. The court determined that the Writ Petition against the Shariat Council (second respondent)
is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, despite it being a private body.

2. The court recognized that a Muslim woman has an inalienable right to dissolve her marriage
through Khula, as per the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937.

3. However, the court held that private bodies like the Shariat Council cannot pronounce or
certify the dissolution of marriage by Khula.

4. The court emphasized that only Family Courts are empowered to pass a decree to dissolve a
marriage under the relevant laws.

5. The Khula Certificate dated 21.06.2017 issued by the second respondent Shariat Council
was quashed by the court.

6. The petitioner and the third respondent were directed to approach the Tamil Nadu Legal
Services Authority or a Family Court to resolve their disputes.

3. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha

Swamiyar of Shri Shirur Mutt, 1954 AIR 282

Facts:

1. Madhvacharya established eight mathas, including Shirur Math, with swamis holding an
ex-officio position managing Shri Krishna Math.

2. New president elections were celebrated with "pranayam" events, which led to significant
debt accumulation in 1931 and 1946.
3. In 1952, a Madras commissioner of Hindu religious endowment was appointed, who began
managing accounts due to the debt issue.

4. Conflict arose between the swami and the commissioner over authority, leading to legal
action.

5. A petition was filed in the Madras High Court, and after the government's favorable judgment
there, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Does the Mathadhipati have property rights within the religious institution that are protected
under Article 19(1)(f)?

2. Can Article 25, which guarantees individual religious freedom, be applied to protect religious
institutions?

3. Is the math entitled to protection under Article 26(d), which allows religious denominations to
manage their property?

4. Does the annual contribution imposed on religious institutions violate Article 27 of the
Constitution?

Held:

1. Several sections of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 were
found unconstitutional.

2. Section 76(1) was declared void as it imposed a tax, not a fee, exceeding the state
legislature's authority.

3. The annual contribution, though a tax, didn't violate Article 27 as it wasn't for promoting
religion.

4. "Property" in Article 19(1)(f) was broadly interpreted to include various proprietary-like

interests.

5. Mahants were recognized as having combined rights of office, property, duties, and personal
interests.

6. The court distinguished between taxes (compulsory exactions for public purposes) and fees
(charges for specific government services).
4. Ratilal Pannachand Gandhi vs. State of Bombay, 1954 AIR 388

Held:

1. Section 44 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950, regarding the appointment of the Charity
Commissioner as a trustee of any public trust without reservations for religious institutions, was
declared unconstitutional and void.

2. Clauses (3) to (6) of Section 47 of the Act, relating to the appointment of the Charity
Commissioner as a trustee of a religious trust, were deemed unconstitutional and void.

3. The court affirmed that religious sects or denominations have a constitutional right to manage
their own religious affairs, including spending trust property or income for religious purposes as
intended by the founder or established by usage.

4. Clause (3) of Section 55 and the corresponding provision in the latter part of Section 56(1),
which allowed diversion of trust property or funds for purposes deemed expedient by the Charity
Commissioner or court, were declared void as they encroached on religious institutions'
freedom.

5. Section 58 of the Act was found to be within the state legislature's authority, as the
contribution imposed was deemed a fee, not a tax, falling under entry 47 of List III in Schedule
VII of the Constitution.

5. Shayara Bano v union of india, AIR 2017 SC 460

Facts:

1. Shayara Bano was divorced by her husband Rizwan Ahmed through triple talaq after 15
years of marriage in 2016.

2. She filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of: a)
Talaq-e-biddat (triple talaq) b) Polygamy c) Nikah halala

3. Her petition argued these practices infringed upon fundamental rights of women under
Articles 14, 15, 21, and 25 of the Indian Constitution.

4. Women's rights organizations like BEBAK collective and Bhartiya Muslim Mahila
Andolan supported her petition.
 5. The All India Muslim Personal Law Board opposed the petition, arguing: a) Muslim law is
not codified and thus not subject to judicial review b) Divorce is a religious practice
protected under Article 25 of the Constitution
6. The Supreme Court accepted the petition and formed a five-judge constitutional bench in
2017.

Issues involved

● Whether the practice of talaq-e-biddat (instantaneous triple talaq) an essential practice in

Muslim personal law and protected under Article 25 of the Indian Constitution?

● Whether the triple talaq infringes on the fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution and is unconstitutional?

Held:

1. In August 2017, the Supreme Court declared Triple Talaq unconstitutional in a 3:2 majority
decision. The bench comprised justices from different faiths: Sikh, Christian, Parsi, Hindu, and
Muslim.

2. Justices Nariman and Lalit ruled that Triple Talaq (talaq-e-bidat) under Muslim Personal Law
is arbitrary and lacks constitutional validity.

3. Justice Kurian Joseph emphasized that Triple Talaq contradicts Quranic teachings and
theological principles, hence cannot be upheld in law.

4. Chief Justice Khehar and Justice Abdul Nazeer dissented, arguing Triple Talaq is an
essential religious practice protected under Article 25 of the Constitution.

5. The core legal issue was whether Triple Talaq qualifies as an essential religious practice
exempted under Article 25, which protects religious freedoms from state interference.

6. Durgah Committee Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali and Ors ,1961 AIR 1402

Facts:

1. Dispute arose over the appointment of Sajadanashin after the migration of the last office
holder in 1947, with the appellant's father appointed in 1948.

2. Initial suit dismissed by trial court citing Ajmer Land Revenue Regulations; subsequent
appeals affirmed its maintainability.
 3. Durgah Khawaja Saheb Act, 1955 established Durgah Committee, which resisted the suit,
asserting authority under sections 13 and 21 to appoint Sajadanashin beyond traditional
succession rules.

4. High Court ruled plaintiff as nearest male heir and Governor approved his appointment,
upheld on appeal.

5. Supreme Court dismissed appeals and upheld High Court's decision, confirming customary
succession rules for appointing Sajadanashin.

Held:

1. **Hereditary Nature of Sajadanashin Office**: The office of Sajadanashin, traditionally held by

a hereditary descendant of the Saint, was recognized by the Government of India without
disturbance.

2. **Transitional Arrangement**: Section 21 of the Durgah Khawaja Saheb Act, 1955 allowed
the existing Sajadanashin to continue in office, subject to provisions of the Act and pending
litigation related to the office.

3. **Limitations on Durgah Committee**: Section 13 of the Act confines the Durgah

Committee's role to recognizing the legitimate heir according to established succession rules,
not to appointing someone new through public applications.

4. **Legitimacy of the Plaintiff**: The plaintiff was recognized as the legitimate successor to the
Sajadanashin office, as other potential successors were either not considered closest or were
deceased during the suit.

5. **Legal Precedents**: Asrar Ahmed v. Durgah Committee, Ajmer, AIR 1947 P.C. 1 and The
Durgah Committee, Ajmer & Anr. v. Syed Hussain Ali informed the interpretation and application
of these principles.

7. -Mohd Ahmad Khan v/s Shah Bano Begum, 1985 2 SCC 556

Facts:

1. Shah Bano, married to Mohd. Ahmad Khan in 1932, faced abandonment in 1975 after her
husband married a younger woman.

2. In 1978, Shah Bano filed for maintenance under Sec. 125 of CrPC after being disowned,
seeking Rs. 200 per month promised by her husband.

3. In November 1978, Mohd. Ahmad Khan pronounced irrevocable Triple Talaq, claiming it
terminated his legal obligation to provide maintenance.
4. Initially granted Rs. 25 per month, Shah Bano appealed to Madhya Pradesh High Court for
Rs. 179 monthly maintenance.

5. The case reached the Supreme Court as Shah Bano contested the High Court's decision,
challenging interpretations of Islamic law and rights to maintenance post-divorce.

Held:

1. **Verdict and Chief Justice**: Chief Justice Chandrachud delivered the Shah Bano case
verdict.

2. **Intervening Bodies**: The All India Muslim Personal Law Board and Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind
intervened in the case.

3. **Court's Conclusion**: On February 3, 1981, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's
decision and dismissed Mohd. Ahmad Khan's appeal.

4. **Application of Section 125**: The Court affirmed that Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure applies to Muslims without discrimination.

5. **Limitation of Husband's Responsibility**: The Supreme Court ruled that a Muslim husband's
obligation towards his divorced wife extends only until the Iddat period, but rejected this as
adequate under Section 125, asserting it was against humane principles as the divorced wife
may be unable to support herself afterwards.

8. sarla mudgal vs union of india , 1995 AIR 1531

Facts:
1. **Case Background**: Sarla Mudgal, president of NGO Kalyani, filed a petition in the
Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution.

2. **Marital Issues**: Meena Mathur discovered that her husband, Jitender Mathur, married
another woman, Sunita Narula (Fathima), after converting to Islam to circumvent legal
provisions.

3. **Legal Challenge**: Sunita Narula accused Jitender Mathur of neglecting her after
reconverting to Hinduism, leaving her without legal protection under personal laws.

4. **Assault Allegations**: Geeta Rani, another petitioner, accused her husband Pradeep
Kumar of assault and subsequently marrying another woman, Deepa, after converting to Islam.

5. **Legal Strategy**: The conversions to Islam were alleged to exploit loopholes in the Indian
Penal Code, particularly Section 494, which deals with bigamy.
Held:

1. **Legal Challenge**: The Supreme Court of India addresses the practice where Hindu men
convert to Islam to marry multiple women while evading legal responsibilities under Hindu law,
particularly Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code.

2. **Marriage Obligations**: Marriage imposes significant obligations and liabilities on parties,

regardless of subsequent religious conversions or attempts to circumvent legal frameworks.

3. **Legal Inconsistencies**: The Supreme Court highlights inconsistencies between Hindu and
Muslim personal laws regarding marriage, particularly the allowance of multiple wives under
Muslim law.

4. **Call for Uniformity**: Emphasizing the need for a Uniform Civil Code, the Court advocates
for a single set of laws governing marriage, divorce, and related matters across all religious
communities in India.

5. **Protecting Constitutional Integrity**: As the guardian of the Indian Constitution, the

Supreme Court underscores its role in upholding the integrity and sovereignty of the constitution
through consistent legal interpretation and enforcement.

9. Minerva Mills vs union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1789

facts:

1. **Background**: Minerva Mills, a textile mill near Bengaluru, faced production declines
prompting the Central Government to appoint a committee under Section 15 of the Industries
Development Act, 1951 in 1970.

2. **Nationalization**: Following the committee's report in October 1971, the Central

Government authorized the National Textile Corporation Limited to take over Minerva Mills
under the Industries Development Act, 1951.

3. **Constitutional Amendments**: The 39th Amendment placed nationalization under the Ninth
Schedule, immune from judicial review after the precedent set by Indira Gandhi vs Raj Narain.

4. **42nd Amendment**: Passed in 1976, it amended Article 31C, ensuring laws implementing
Directive Principles couldn't be invalidated for violating Articles 14 or 19, and amended Article
368 to remove limitations on Parliament's power to amend the Constitution.

5. **Legal Impact**: The amendments aimed to nullify judicial restrictions on Parliament's

amending power, particularly in response to challenges like the Kesavananda Bharati case,
reinforcing parliamentary supremacy over constitutional amendments.
held:

1. After nearly 7 years, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered its verdict with a 4:1
majority.

2. Supported by Justices A.C. Gupta, N.L. Untwalia, and P.S. Kailasam, it emphasized that
while Parliament has the power to amend the Constitution under Article 368, this power must
not violate the basic structure doctrine. Clause (5) of Article 368 was deemed unconstitutional
as it undermined democracy and judicial review.

3. The majority held that if Directive Principles under Part IV undermine fundamental rights in
Part III, it would damage the basic structure of the Constitution. They emphasized the
importance of preserving fundamental freedoms under Articles 19 and 14.

4. Dissented on several grounds, supporting the validity of Article 31C and arguing that
non-compliance with Directive Principles would be unconstitutional. Justice Bhagwati opposed
the majority's stance on clauses (4) and (5) of Article 368, advocating for a broader scope for
legislative action in line with Directive Principles.

5. On July 31, 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that Sections 4 and 55 of the 42nd Amendment
Act, 1976 were unconstitutional. However, the writ petition challenging other provisions related
to nationalization under the 2nd Schedule of the Nationalization Act, 1974 was dismissed.

10. Prakash v phulavathi, AIR 2016 SC 769

Facts:

1. **Background and Claim**: The respondent filed a claim in the Belgaum Trial Court for a
share in ancestral and self-acquired properties of her father, who passed away in 1988.

2. **Trial Court Proceedings**: The trial court considered the respondent's claim regarding
ancestral property, leading to a partial allowance of her suit. The exact date of the trial court's
ruling is unknown but the case was documented in 1992.

3. **Amendment Act and Legal Assertion**: The respondent invoked Section 6(1) of the
Amendment Act after its passage on September 9, 2005, to legally claim a significant portion of
the property.

4. **Appeal to High Court**: Dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, the respondent appealed
to the High Court of Belgaum in 2007, shortly after the initial trial court ruling.
5. **Supreme Court Decision**: The Supreme Court eventually overturned the High Court's
decision, thereby concluding the legal dispute over the inheritance and property rights involved
in the case.

Held:

1. The Supreme Court clarified that the Amendment Act granting daughters equal rights in
ancestral property became effective from September 9, 2005, and applies only if the coparcener
(father) passed away after this date.

2. For a daughter to claim a share in the joint Hindu family property, she must have been alive
on September 9, 2005, when the Amendment Act came into force.

3. If a daughter dies before the enactment of the Amendment Act, her legal heirs cannot claim
a share in the joint family property as coparceners.

4. The father of the daughter must also be alive on the date of the Amendment Act's enactment
for her to assert her rights as a coparcener in the joint family property.

5. Any alienation, disposal, or partition of joint family property that occurred before the
Amendment Act's enactment date remains unaffected by the daughter's subsequent claim as a
coparcener.

11. Danamma vs. Amar Singh, AIR 2018 3 SCC 343

Facts:
1. The case revolved around the appellants, Danamma and Suman, who challenged the lower
courts' rulings that denied them coparcenary rights in their family's joint property under Hindu
law.

2. The respondents, Arun Kumar and Vijay, filed a partition suit claiming a share in the family
property, arguing they were coparceners along with their father and the widow of Gurulingappa
Savadi.

3. The trial court and subsequently the High Court held that Danamma and Suman, born before
the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, were not eligible as coparceners under the traditional
interpretation of Hindu law prevailing at that time.

4. Dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, Danamma and Suman filed a Special Leave
Petition in the Supreme Court of India seeking to challenge the lower courts' rulings and assert
their rights as coparceners.
 5. The Supreme Court's decision in this case clarified the rights of daughters as coparceners in
joint family property, setting a precedent for equal inheritance rights irrespective of birth before
or after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Held:

1. The Supreme Court's decision in Danamma vs Amar Singh marked a significant milestone in
interpreting the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, regarding gender equality in
coparcenary rights within Hindu Undivided Families (HUFs).

2. The case primarily focused on Section 6 of the 2005 Amendment Act, which established that
daughters are coparceners by birth, granting them equal rights and liabilities in ancestral
property as sons.

3. Danamma and Suman, daughters of Gurulingappa Savadi, were recognized by the Supreme
Court as coparceners entitled to an equal share in their father’s ancestral property alongside
their brothers and mother.

4. The ruling clarified that daughters' entitlement to coparcenary rights is not contingent on their
birth date relative to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, ensuring equal
inheritance rights regardless of when they were born.

5. The court ordered the division of Gurulingappa Savadi’s property into five equal shares,
allocating one share each to his two sons, two daughters (Danamma and Suman), and his
widow. The respondent, representing the son of one of Gurulingappa Savadi’s sons, received a
1/25th share reflecting his portion of the inheritance.

12. Mangamal @ Thulasi And Anr. vs T.B.Raju And Ors. 19 April, 2018

Facts

1. **Parties Involved**: The appellants are daughters of Late Shri T.G. Basuvan and Late Smt.
Sundari. Respondent No. 1 is their brother. Late T.G. Basuvan left behind three properties:
agricultural lands (Item Nos. 1 & 2) and a dwelling house (Item No. 3).

2. **Lease and Dispute**: Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 leased agricultural lands (Item Nos. 1 and 2)
during the lifetime of the appellants' mother. After her death, when the lease expired, appellants
sought possession but were informed that the lands had been sold to Respondent No. 1.

3. **Legal Proceedings**: Appellants filed a suit (O.S. No. 202 of 2003) for partition and
separate possession of the three properties. The trial court dismissed the suit, questioning the
appellants' independence from the influence of Respondent No. 1.
4. **Appeals**: The District Judge and subsequently the High Court dismissed the appeals filed
by the appellants, upholding the trial court's decision.

5. **Supreme Court Appeal**: Dissatisfied with the High Court's decision, the appellants
approached the Supreme Court via Special Leave Petition.

Held:

1. **Ancestral Property and Amendment**: The court discussed the concept of ancestral
property and the impact of the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989. This
amendment conferred coparcenary rights to daughters, but only if unmarried at the time of the
amendment's commencement.

2. **Entitlement to Partition**: The court concluded that since both appellants were married
before the 1989 amendment, they did not qualify as coparceners and thus could not claim
partition rights directly under Section 29-A of the Act.

3. **Property Division**: Despite the above finding, the court recognized the appellants' right to
succession shares in their father's separate property, which was divided according to the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, upon his death.

4. **Outcome**: The appeal was partially allowed, affirming that the appellants were not entitled
to a share in coparcenary property. However, they were awarded their respective shares in their
father's separate property upon his demise, following the rules of succession.

5. **Final Decision**: The appellants were granted 1/6th share each in their father's separate
property, while Respondent No. 1 was allocated 2/3rd share. The sales of properties to
Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were upheld, with compensation awarded to the appellants based on
their legitimate shares.

13. Kamla Neti (dead) L.Rs v. Special Land Acquisition Officers and Ors, . (2023) 3 SCC
528

Facts:

1. **Background**: The dispute revolves around the apportionment of compensation for land
acquired by the government. The land originally belonged to Satyananda Negi, with subsequent
inheritance involving his sons and their descendants.

2. **Legal Issue**: The appellant, Kamla, claimed a 1/5th share in the compensation as the
daughter of Chakradhar, one of Satyananda Negi's sons. However, her claim was rejected by
the Reference Court and upheld by the High Court on the grounds that as a member of a
Scheduled Tribe, she is not entitled to succession rights under the Hindu Succession Act,
specifically citing Section 2(2).

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, emphasizing that Section 2(2) of
the Hindu Succession Act excludes its application to members of Scheduled Tribes unless
specifically notified. Therefore, Kamla's claim for a share based on survivorship under the Act
was denied.

4. While acknowledging the potential equity issues, the Court highlighted that legislative action
is necessary to amend the Hindu Succession Act to include Scheduled Tribes if equality under
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution is to be fully realized.

5. The appeal was dismissed, with the Court urging the Central Government to consider
amending the Hindu Succession Act to remove exemptions for Scheduled Tribes, thereby
ensuring equal rights in property succession.

14. Indian Young Lawyers' Association v. State of Kerala, a AIRONLINE 2018 SC 243

Facts:

1. **Origin of Challenge**: In 2006, the Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a PIL in the
Supreme Court challenging the Sabarimala Temple's prohibition of women's entry, citing
violations of Article 14 (Right to Equality) and Article 25 (Freedom of Religion).

2. **Initial Notices and Referral**: On August 18, 2006, the Supreme Court issued notices to
concerned parties. The matter was referred to a 3-Judge Bench on March 7, 2008.

3. **Progression to Constitution Bench**: After several hearings and delays, on February 20,
2017, the Supreme Court indicated its intent to refer the case to a 5-Judge Constitution Bench.

4. **Constitution Bench Order**: On October 13, 2017, a 3-Judge Bench comprising Chief
Justice Dipak Misra, Justices R. Banumathi, and Ashok Bhushan formally referred the case to a
5-Judge Constitution Bench for adjudication.

5. **Final Judgement**: The case culminated in a landmark judgement on September 28, 2018,
where the Supreme Court lifted the ban on the entry of women of menstruating age (10-50
years) into the Sabarimala Temple, declaring the practice unconstitutional and affirming
women's right to equality and freedom of religion.
Held:

1. **Verdict**: In a 4:1 majority verdict, the Supreme Court held that the restrictions on women
aged 10-50 entering the Sabarimala shrine were unconstitutional. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu
Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 was struck down.

2. **Religious Denomination**: The majority determined that devotees of Lord Ayyappa at

Sabarimala did not constitute a separate religious denomination within Hinduism. Exclusion of
women was not supported by essential religious practices and violated constitutional principles.

3. **Constitutional Violation**: Rule 3(b) was deemed ultra vires the Kerala Hindu Places of
Public Worship Act, aimed at reforming and opening public Hindu places to all. It was found to
violate Part III of the Constitution, which guarantees fundamental rights.

4. **Justice Chandrachud's Opinion**: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud likened the exclusion based
on menstrual status to a form of untouchability, invoking Article 17 (abolition of untouchability).
He emphasized that such practices violate dignity and privacy rights under the Constitution.

5. **Dissenting Opinion**: Justice Indu Malhotra dissented, arguing that Ayyappans constituted
a religious denomination under Article 26, and their practices were protected. She believed the
limited restriction on women's entry did not violate constitutional rights.

15. The Commissioner of Police vs Acharya Jagdishwarananda Avadhuta, AIR 2004 SC

2984

Facts:

**Petitioners**: Members of the Ananda Marga sect, known for their tandava dance which
includes carrying blades and skulls.

- **Police Directive**: The police department issued directives under Section 144 of the
Criminal Procedure Code (CRPC), declaring the tandava dance against public morals and
prohibiting it.

- **High Court Petition**: Initially, the petitioners approached the High Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution, seeking orders to stop the police from interfering with their tandava dance
performances.

- **High Court Decision**: The High Court denied the petition, upholding the police
department's directive and reasoning it was necessary to maintain public order and morality.
 - **Supreme Court Complaint**: The Ananda Marga group filed a complaint in the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, alleging that the police department's actions infringed
their rights guaranteed under Articles 25 (Freedom of Religion) and 26 (Freedom to Manage
Religious Affairs).

Held:

- **Identification as Part of Hindu Religion**: The Court determined that the Ananda Marga
group is part of the Hindu religion and does not qualify as a separate religious denomination
under Article 26 of the Constitution. This decision was based on the writings of the group's
founder, which reflect the essence of Hindu beliefs, particularly within the Shaivaite sect of
Hinduism.

- **Scope of Tandava Dance**: The Court clarified that while the performance of the tandava
dance by the Ananda Marga group is a religious practice, conducting it in public spaces, such
as streets, is not mandatory. They are allowed to perform the dance in private spaces.

- **Restrictions under Section 144 of CrPC**: The Court acknowledged that the police
department's directives under Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) were aimed
specifically at prohibiting the carrying of weapons during the tandava dance performed by the
Ananda Marga group in public places.

16. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755

FACTS

Indra Sarma was an unmarried woman quit her job and started a live-in relationship with a
married man named V.K.V Sarma. They continued to be in a live-in relationship for 18 years
despite knowing that Mr. Sarma was married and had children.

He established a company in her name, and they were making money from it. Later, he moved
the business to his home and continued it there with the assistance of his son, denying her the
opportunity to work and earn money.

It was claimed that V.K.V Sarma left the company of the appellant without supporting her
financially because his family consistently opposed their live-in relationship and ultimately forced
him to do so.

Failure to support a woman who is involved in a “domestic relationship” is considered “domestic

violence” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005.

Held:
1. **Essential Conditions for a Domestic Relationship**: The Court emphasized that for a
relationship to be considered akin to marriage under the Domestic Violence Act, certain
essential conditions must be met. These include mutual agreement to be in a domestic
partnership, living together as husband and wife, and publicly declaring their union.

2. **Exclusion of Same-Sex Partners**: The Court clarified that relationships involving

same-sex partners do not fall within the scope of Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act. It
highlighted the need to expand and redefine this section to include a broader range of domestic
relationships.

3. **Duration of Relationship**: The Court interpreted "at any point of time" under Section 2(f) to
imply a significant duration required to establish and sustain a domestic relationship, varying
case by case.

4. **Shared Household Definition**: According to Section 2(s) of the Act, a "shared household"
is defined specifically, addressing the physical space where partners reside together or have
previously lived together.

5. **Factors Establishing Domestic Relationship**: The Court identified several factors crucial in
determining a domestic relationship, such as financial interdependence, domestic arrangements
indicating shared responsibilities, sexual intimacy beyond casual encounters, presence of
children, public representation as a married couple, and mutual understanding of the
relationship's nature and responsibilities.

17. Madan mohan singh vs. Rajnikanth, (2010) 9 SCC 209

**Facts:**

1. **Background**: The dispute arose over the inheritance rights to certain khata numbers in
villages Bhojapur and Kanshari. Chandra Deo Singh was recorded as the khatedar of these
khata numbers.

2. **Claimants**: Respondents Rajni Kant and Anjani Kumar claimed to be the sons of Chandra
Deo Singh from his relationship with Smt. Shakuntala. They filed objections under Section
9-A(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, seeking inclusion of their names as heirs.

3. **Counterclaim**: Appellants, who were also claimants to the property, argued that Rajni Kant
and Anjani Kumar were not legitimate heirs of Chandra Deo Singh, alleging that Smt.
Shakuntala was not legally married to Chandra Deo Singh but rather was in a live-in relationship
with him.

**Judgment:**
1. **Concurrent Findings**: The Supreme Court noted that three statutory authorities under the
Consolidation Act had already made concurrent findings of fact:

- Chandra Deo Singh and Smt. Shakuntala had a long-standing relationship akin to husband
and wife.

- They lived together openly as husband and wife after the death of Chandra Deo Singh's first
wife.

- This relationship was accepted by society and family members.

- The respondents (Rajni Kant and Anjani Kumar) were born during this relationship.

2. **Evaluation of Evidence**: The Court examined various documents presented by the

appellants, including school registers and electoral rolls, which purportedly showed
inconsistencies regarding the birth dates of Smt. Shakuntala and the respondents. The Court
found these documents unreliable and contradictory.

3. **Legal Principles**: The Court reaffirmed that entries in official records such as school
registers should be corroborated with other evidence to determine their probative value. The
standard of proof required in such cases remained high, similar to other civil and criminal cases.

4. **Presumption of Marriage**: Given the long-term cohabitation and societal acceptance, the
Court invoked the presumption of marriage between Chandra Deo Singh and Smt. Shakuntala.
This presumption was not rebutted by the appellants with credible evidence.

5. **Conclusion**: The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts and
dismissed the appeal. It held that the evidence presented by the appellants did not sufficiently
challenge the established facts of the case, and therefore, no interference was warranted in the
findings of the statutory authorities and the High Court.

18. S.P.S.Balasubramanyam v. Suruthaya, AIR 1992 SC 756

Facts

1. **Parties Involved**: The case involves a dispute over ancestral property between the Plaintiff
(Appellant) and descendants of other branches related to Manthi, who had three sons including
Chinathambi.

2. **Marital Status Dispute**: Chinathambi, one of Manthi's sons, lived with two women named
Pavayee. He had issues with both, including Ramaswamy from the second Pavayee. The legal
dispute centered on whether Chinathambi's relationship with Pavayee No. 2 constituted a valid
marriage or if she was merely a concubine.
3. **Property Dispute**: The Plaintiff claimed a one-third share of the property sold to him by
Ramaswamy, asserting rights based on a deed of settlement executed by Chinathambi in 1968.
However, this claim was contested by other descendants who argued against Ramaswamy's
legitimacy and the validity of the settlement deed.

4. **Trial Court and Appellate Proceedings**: The trial court ruled against Ramaswamy's
legitimacy and invalidated the settlement deed. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed these
findings, recognizing Chinathambi and Pavayee No. 2 as married based on prolonged
cohabitation and validating the settlement deed.

5. **High Court Intervention**: The High Court reversed the Appellate Court's decision, rebutting
the presumption of marriage due to various factors, including absence of Pavayee No. 2's
mention in Manthi's will and the compromise decree among Manthi's sons, which excluded
reference to Pavayee or her offspring.

**Judgment:**

1. **Presumption of Marriage**: The Supreme Court affirmed that a presumption of marriage

arises when a man and woman live together for a prolonged period as husband and wife,
despite lack of formal marriage proof. This presumption was central to the Appellate Court's
decision.

2. **Rebuttal of Presumption**: The High Court rebutted this presumption based on various
factors, including the absence of Pavayee No. 2 and her children in legal documents like the will
and compromise decree among family members.

3. **Legal Validity of Settlement Deed**: The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the
settlement deed executed by Chinathambi in 1968, recognizing his exclusive ownership rights
over the ancestral property following a partition decree among family members.

4. **Lack of Adulterous Relationship**: Arguments regarding Pavayee No. 2's alleged

adulterous relationship were not considered as they were not raised earlier in the case and no
findings were made by the lower courts.

5. **Decision**: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment and restoring
that of the First Appellate Court, thereby validating Ramaswamy's claim derived from the
settlement deed. Each party was directed to bear their own costs.

19. Velusamy v. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469

Facts:
1. **Petition Filed**: D. Patchaiammal filed a petition under Section 125 of the CrPC in 2001,
claiming marriage to D. Velusamy on 14th September 1986. She stated they lived together for
about two to three years at her father’s home before he moved away intermittently.

2. **Maintenance Claim**: Patchaiammal, citing lack of income, sought maintenance from

Velusamy, a Secondary Grade Teacher earning Rs. 10,000/- per month, requesting Rs. 550 per
month.

3. **Velusamy's Defense**: Velusamy claimed he was married to Lakshmi on 25th June 1980,
providing evidence such as ration card, voter ID, son's transfer certificate, hospital discharge
certificate, wedding photos, and other documents.

4. **Family Court Judgment**: On 5th March 2004, the Family Court determined that Velusamy
was married to Patchaiammal and not to Lakshmi.

5. **High Court Confirmation**: The Madras High Court upheld the Family Court's decision,
leading Velusamy to appeal both rulings in the Supreme Court of India.

Held:

1. **Error in Ruling**: The Supreme Court found that the High Court and the Family Court Judge
erred by ruling that the appellant was not married to Lakshmi without giving her proper notice,
which violated principles of natural justice.

2. **Remand to Family Court**: The Court ordered that the findings must be overturned, and
the case should be sent back to the Family Court. The Family Court was directed to notify
Lakshmi, hear her arguments, and make a new determination under the law.

3. **Validity of Marriage**: The Court emphasized that determining whether the appellant was
married to Lakshmi is crucial. If they were legally married, the subsequent marriage to the
respondent would not be valid without the dissolution of the first marriage.

4. **Nature of Relationship**: It was noted that the Family Court Judge did not adequately
assess whether the appellant and respondent lived together in a relationship resembling
marriage for a substantial period, which is essential for the case.

5. **Outcome**: As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the High Court and
the Family Court, Coimbatore. The case was remanded to the Family Court for a fresh
determination based on proper legal procedures and considerations. The appeals were allowed
to proceed accordingly.

20. Vidyadhari v. Sukhrana Bai (2010) 10 SCC 469

Facts:

1. **Background**: Sheetaldeen, employed as a CCM Helper, passed away on May 9, 1993. He

had two wives during his lifetime: Sukharana Bai and Vidyadhari. Vidyadhari lived with him for
20-25 years and bore him four children.

2. **Nomination and Claims**: Sheetaldeen nominated Vidyadhari under Form A for receiving
benefits from Provident Funds, Coal Mines Deposit Life Scheme, and Family Pension Scheme.
He described Vidyadhari as his wife and their children as his legal heirs.

3. **Legal Dispute**: After Sheetaldeen's death, both Vidyadhari and Sukharana Bai claimed to
be his widow and filed separate claims for a succession certificate regarding his movable
properties.

4. **Trial Court Decision**: The trial court consolidated both claims and ruled in favor of
Vidyadhari, granting her the succession certificate. Sukharana Bai's claim was dismissed.

5. **High Court and Supreme Court Appeal**: Sukharana Bai appealed to the Madhya Pradesh
High Court, which reversed the trial court's decision and granted her the succession certificate.
Vidyadhari then appealed to the Supreme Court, which allowed her appeal, affirming her as the
nominee of Sheetaldeen. Sukharana Bai was granted a one-fifth share in Sheetaldeen's
properties.

Held:

1. **Widow Status**: The Supreme Court ruled Sukharana Bai as the legal widow of
Sheetaldeen, rejecting Vidyadhari's claim based on customary divorce laws.

2. **Children's Legitimacy**: Vidyadhari's children were recognized as legitimate heirs of

Sheetaldeen, following established legal precedent.

3. **Decision**: Sukharana Bai was affirmed as the legal widow, and Vidyadhari's children were
upheld as Sheetaldeen's rightful heirs, settling the succession dispute.

21. Dhannulal & Ors vs Ganeshram, (2015) 12 SCC 301

Facts:
1. **Background**: Ganeshram, the plaintiff, filed a suit seeking declaration, possession, and
damages related to two houses (Schedule A & B) against multiple defendants. He contested the
validity of a 1987 sale deed and a 1977 will executed by Phoolbasa Bai, who was claimed to be
his grandfather's (Chhatrapati's) second wife.
2. **Dispute**: The plaintiff argued that Phoolbasa Bai was not legally married to Chhatrapati
and that the sale deed and will were invalid.
3. **Trial Court Decision**: The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, upholding the validity
of the will and the sale deed. It dismissed the plaintiff's claim of adverse possession and
concubinage between Chhatrapati and Phoolbasa Bai.
4. **High Court Appeal**: The High Court partially allowed the appeal, setting aside the trial
court's decision on the will's validity but confirming the sale deed's legality.
5. **Supreme Court Decision**: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings. It
concluded that Phoolbasa Bai was legally married to Chhatrapati based on the evidence of long
cohabitation and societal recognition. The Court found the will to be suspicious and not proven
according to legal requirements, thus affirming the High Court's decision.
6. **Conclusion**: The appeals filed by both parties were dismissed by the Supreme Court,
thereby confirming the High Court's judgment regarding the legality of the sale deed and the
invalidity of the will due to lack of proper proof.

23. Lata Singh vs State Of U.P. & Another 2006 AIR SCW 3499 75
Facts of the Case:

1. **Petitioner's Background**: Lata, a graduate pursuing her Masters in Hindi, lived with her
brother Ajay Pratap Singh in Lucknow after their parents' death. She married Bramha Nand
Gupta at Arya Samaj Mandir, Delhi, on 2nd November 2000.

2. **Allegations by Petitioner**: Lata's brothers opposed her inter-caste marriage and

subsequently harassed her and her husband's family. They filed false police reports, assaulted
family members, seized property, and threatened violence.

3. **Legal Proceedings**:

- **Police Actions**: The police arrested relatives of Lata's husband based on false
accusations. Lata sought protection from the Rajasthan Women Commission due to safety
concerns.

- **Court Proceedings**: Despite Lata's statement that her marriage was voluntary, legal
proceedings continued against her husband and his family. The Chief Judicial Magistrate issued
a committal order against them.

- **High Court Intervention**: The accused filed a petition in the Allahabad High Court
(Lucknow Bench) under Section 482 CrPC, challenging the non-bailable warrants issued by the
Fast Track Court.

Judgment:
1. **Findings**:

- The Court recognized Lata as a major with the right to marry freely under Indian law.

- It condemned the harassment and violence perpetrated against Lata, her husband, and his
family due to their inter-caste marriage.

- Emphasized the illegality of such acts under Indian law and directed authorities to protect
couples undergoing inter-caste marriages.

2. **Directive**:

- **Quashing of Proceedings**: The Court quashed the pending criminal proceedings against
Lata's husband and his relatives.

- **Protection Order**: Ordered police authorities to ensure no harassment or violence against

Lata, her husband, or their relatives. Strict actions were mandated against offenders.

- **Legal Action**: Directed immediate criminal proceedings against Lata's brothers and others
involved in harassing the couple and their families.

3. **General Comments on Inter-caste Marriages**:

- Condemned the caste system as divisive and called for its eradication.

- Stressed the importance of protecting the rights of individuals to marry freely without fear of
violence or intimidation.

24. Khushboo v. Kanniammal & Anr, , (2010) 5 SCC 600

Facts:

**Appellant and Remarks**: S. Khushboo made remarks supporting pre-marital sex in the
context of live-in relationships during an interview with India Today in September 2005.

**Publication and Reaction**: Her remarks were published in Dhina Thanti but in a distorted
manner, leading to public outcry and legal actions.

**Legal Cases**: Kanniammal and others filed multiple criminal cases in Tamil Nadu courts
under IPC sections 499 (defamation), 500 (punishment for defamation), 504 (intentional insult),
505 (statements conducing to public mischief), 509 (word, gesture or act intended to insult the
modesty of a woman), and sections 4 and 6 of the Indecent Representation of Women
(Prohibition) Act, 1986.
**High Court Petition**: Khushboo approached the Madras High Court seeking to quash these
proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC.

**High Court Decision**: On 30th April 2008, the Madras High Court declined to quash the
cases, citing that factual issues needed to be resolved by a trial court.

**Appeal to Supreme Court**: The case was appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the
High Court's decision.

Held:

- **Defamation Case**: The Supreme Court found no prima facie case of defamation against S.
Khushboo for her remarks on pre-marital sex in live-in relationships.

- **Malicious Intent**: It concluded that the criminal complaints filed against Khushboo were
motivated by malice.

- **Relief Granted**: The Court granted relief by quashing all complaints, aiming to prevent
misuse of criminal law.

- **Role of Magistrates**: Magistrates should use their statutory powers to investigate

allegations rather than punishing individuals for expressing unpopular views.

- **Legal Interpretation**: The offense under Section 509 IPC requires insult to the modesty of a
specific woman or identifiable group, not applicable in cases of written statements.

- **Section 153(A)**: This section does not apply as Khushboo's statement was not targeted at
or on behalf of any specific group.

25. Chanmuniya vs Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, 2011 1 SCC 141

Facts:

1. Chanmuniya was married to Ram Saran and had two daughters.

2. After Ram Saran’s death in 1992, Chanmuniya married Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha
according to local custom.

3. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha denied the marriage and refused to recognize it.
4. Chanmuniya filed a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure
Code.

5. The High Court ruled that the marriage did not meet the Hindu Marriage Act's requirements
and dismissed the petition.

6. Chanmuniya appealed to the Supreme Court, which examined "relationship in the nature of
marriage."

7. The Supreme Court held that long-term cohabitation could presume a valid marriage,
rebuttable by evidence.

8. The Court stated that women in relationships akin to marriage could claim maintenance under
Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Held:

1. **Relationship in the Nature of Marriage**: The Supreme Court held that long-term
cohabitation as husband and wife creates a presumption of a valid marriage, which can be
rebutted by contrary evidence.

2. **Validity of Customary Marriages**: The Court recognized that customary marriages can be
valid if partners live together as husband and wife for a long time, creating a presumption of
marriage.

3. **Right to Maintenance**: The Court ruled that women in relationships akin to marriage are
entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, even if the
relationship does not meet formal marriage requirements.

4. **Protection of Women’s Rights**: Emphasizing the protection of women's rights, the Court
provided rights and protections to women in relationships similar to marriage, recognizing the
concept of "relationship in the nature of marriage."

5. **Formal Requirements of Marriage**: The Court maintained that the formal requirements of
marriage under Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act must be met for a marriage to be legally
valid but also acknowledged the need to protect women's rights in non-formal marital
relationships.
25. Mr.Abhijit Bhikaseth Auti vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr
Facts:

1. **Marriage and Legal Proceedings**: The petitioner and the 2nd respondent married on April
22, 2004. The 2nd respondent filed an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, seeking interim relief for a flat.

2. **Interim Relief and Appeals**: The petitioner argued that appeals under Section 29 of the
Domestic Violence Act do not apply to interlocutory orders, including interim orders issued under
Section 23.

3. **Definition and Procedure**: Domestic violence is defined in Section 3 of the Act, with
procedural guidelines framed in 2006. Applications under Section 12 of the Act follow the
procedure outlined in Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and orders are
enforceable under Section 128 of the Code.

4. **Magistrate's Powers**: Under Section 23, a Magistrate can direct the respondent to vacate
a shared household and grant ex parte interim relief. However, interim relief can only support
final relief under Sections 18 to 22 of the Act.

5. **Appeal Restrictions**: The Supreme Court ruled that appeals do not lie against procedural
orders under Section 202 of the Act of 1913. Appeals are permitted against final orders under
Section 29, not against interlocutory orders like those under Section 23.

Held:

• The order by the Additional Sessions Judge, being interim, will remain until the final disposal of
the application under Section 12 of the Act.

• As the flat is jointly owned by the petitioner and the 2nd respondent, no interference is
warranted.

• The Appellate Court generally will not interfere with the Magistrate's discretion in orders under
Section 23.

• An appeal under Section 29 is not maintainable for purely procedural orders that do not
determine parties' rights and liabilities.