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REDUCING
INEQUALITIES
A Challenge for the
European Union?

Edited by
Renato Miguel Carmo,
Cédric Rio and
Márton Medgyesi
Reducing Inequalities
 Edited by
Renato Miguel Carmo • Cédric Rio
Márton Medgyesi

Reducing Inequalities
A Challenge for the European Union?
Editors
Renato Miguel Carmo Cédric Rio
University of Lisbon Centre Maurice Halbwachs
Portugal Paris, France

Márton Medgyesi
TÁRKI, Social Research Institute and
Institute for Sociology
CSS Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Budapest, Hungary

ISBN 978-3-319-65005-0    ISBN 978-3-319-65006-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65006-7

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017962339

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
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does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant
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 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Renato Miguel Carmo, Cédric Rio, and Márton Medgyesi

Part I Inequality and Poverty in European Union 11

2 Disposable Income Inequality, Cohesion

and Crisis in Europe 13
Michael Dauderstädt

3 Drivers of Growing Income Inequalities in OECD

and European Countries 31
Guillaume Cohen and Maxime Ladaique

4 Unemployment, Precariousness and Poverty

as Drivers of Social Inequality: The Case of the
Southern European Countries 45
Renato Miguel Carmo and Ana Rita Matias

v
vi Contents

5 Distributional and Categorical Inequalities in Europe:

Structural Configurations 63
António Firmino da Costa, Rosário Mauritti, Susana da
Cruz Martins, Nuno Nunes, and Ana Lúcia Romão

6 Income Poverty in the EU: What Do We

Actually Measure? Empirical Evidence on Choices,
Underlying Assumptions and Implications
(Based on EU-SILC 2005–2014) 75
Orsolya Lelkes and Katrin Gasior

7 Poverty and Social Exclusion Indicators

in the European Union: The Role of Non-Monetary
Deprivation Indicators 97
Brian Nolan and Christopher T. Whelan

8 Inequality of Outcomes and Opportunities

Among the Young 115
Márton Medgyesi

Part II European Union against Inequality 135

9 The European Union Social Tools in Question 137

Cédric Rio

10 European Union Policy on Gender Equality:

The Scope and Limits of Equality in the Single Market 149
Gwenaëlle Perrier

11 European Union and Human Rights: Reducing

Inequalities and Asymmetries in the Context of the
Economic Crisis 161
Beatriz Tomás Mallén
 Contents
   vii

12 Normative Arguments for a European Social Union 187

Antoon Vandevelde

13 Hayek’s Trap and the European Utopia We Need 213

Philippe Van Parijs

14 Wealth, Taxation and Inequality 225

Thomas Piketty and Frederico Cantante

15 Conclusion: Back to the Future – Towards a European

Social Agenda 241
Renato Miguel Carmo, Cédric Rio, and Márton Medgyesi

Index 249
 List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Development of inequality in the EU (2005–2015).

Source: Eurostat, authors’ calculations 19
Fig. 3.1 Level of income inequality, 2013 or latest year.
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database
(http://oe.cd/idd). Note: non-OECD EU countries
are shown in light blue. *The statistical data for Israel
are supplied by and under the responsibility of the relevant
Israeli authorities. The use of such data by the OECD
is without prejudice to the status of the Golan Heights,
East Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the
West Bank under the terms of international law 33
Fig. 3.2 Trends in income inequality, Gini coefficient.
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database
(http://oe.cd/idd)34
Fig. 3.3 Employment growth 1995–2013, by type of employment.
Source: OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality
Benefits All. Note: Working-age (15–64) workers, excluding
employers as well as students working part-time.
Non-standard workers include workers
with a temporary contract, part-timers
and own-account self-employed 37

ix
x List of Figures

Fig. 3.4 Trends in redistribution. Source: OECD Income

Distribution Database (http://oe.cd/idd).
Note: Redistribution is measured as the percentage
difference between inequality (Gini coefficient)
of gross market income (before taxes and transfers)
and inequality of disposable income (after taxes and transfers) 40
Fig. 4.1 Spatial clustering of income inequality among European
Union countries, measured by S80/S20 and the
Gini coefficient (2014). Legend: BE (Belgium);
BG (Bulgaria); CZ (Czech Republic); DK (Denmark);
DE (Germany); EE (Estonia); EL (Greece); ES (Spain);
FR (France); HR (Croatia); IT (Italy); CY (Cyprus);
LV (Latvia); LT (Lithuania); LU (Luxembourg);
HU (Hungary); MT (Malta); NL (Netherlands);
AT (Austria); PL (Poland); PT (Portugal); RO (Romania);
SI (Slovenia); SK (Slovakia); FI (Finland); SE (Sweden);
UK (United Kingdom). Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2016.
Note: Data for Ireland not available 48
Fig. 4.2 People at risk of poverty or social exclusion and S80/S20
ratios, EU-28 (2014). Legend: BE (Belgium); BG (Bulgaria);
CZ (Czech Republic); DK (Denmark); DE (Germany);
EE (Estonia); EL (Greece); ES (Spain); FR (France);
HR (Croatia); IT (Italy); CY (Cyprus); LV (Latvia);
LT (Lithuania); LU (Luxembourg); HU (Hungary);
MT (Malta); NL (Netherlands); AT (Austria);
PL (Poland); PT (Portugal); RO (Romania);
SI (Slovenia); SK (Slovakia); FI (Finland);
SE (Sweden); UK (United Kingdom).
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2016.
Note: Data for Ireland not available 50
Fig. 4.3 Risk of poverty or social exclusion (%), in Greece,
Spain, Portugal and EU27, between 2005 and 2015.
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2016 50
Fig. 4.4 Households’ ability to make ends meet (from great
difficulty to very easily) (%), in some European
countries (2015). Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2016.
Note: The values presented concerning ‘Inability to make
ends meet’ are the sum of percentage of the categories:
 List of Figures
   xi

‘Households making ends meet with great difficulty’

and ‘Households making ends meet with difficulty’ 51
Fig. 4.5 Average rating of financial satisfaction (0—Very low
satisfaction; 10—Very high satisfaction) by first and
fifth income quintiles, in EU-28 countries (2013).
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC, 2013, ad hoc module well-being 52
Fig. 4.6 Evolution of the employment and unemployment rate
(15–64 years), 2000, 2008, 2015. Source: EU Labour
Force Survey (Eurostat) 53
Fig. 4.7 Evolution of the youth unemployment rate and
long-term unemployment (2000–2015).
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat) 55
Fig. 4.8 Evolution of the percentage of employees with temporary
and involuntary temporary contracts (2000–2015).
Source: EU Labour Force Survey (Eurostat).
Note: Involuntary temporary contracts correspond
to the percentage of respondents that could not
find permanent job 56
Fig. 4.9 Involuntary part-time work (15–64 years)
and income inequality (S80/S20), EU-28.
Source: Eurostat. Note: Involuntary part-time
employment as percentage of the total part-time
employment, from ages 15 to 64 57
Fig. 4.10 Trends in involuntary part-time work, by age group,
in the southern countries and EU-28, in 2000, 2008
and 2015. Source: Eurostat. Note: Involuntary
part-time employment as percentage of the total
part-time employment 58
Fig. 6.1 Estimating poverty rates with margins of error.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross
sectional EU-SILC 2014 UDB August 2016.
Note: Proportion of population at risk of poverty
across the EU, 2013 income year and confidence
intervals. 95% confidence interval for each country
(meaning that there is a 95% probability of the true
figure being within the calculated range) 79
Fig. 6.2 Poverty threshold differs substantially across the EU.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross sectional
xii List of Figures

EU-SILC 2014 UDB August 2016.

Note: Monetary value of the at-risk-of-poverty threshold
for households of two adults with two children under
14, in EUR and PPS, 2013 income year 80
Fig. 6.3 Risk of poverty based on different thresholds.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross
sectional EU-SILC 2014 UDB August 2016.
Note: At-risk-of-poverty rate gap and relationship
with the at-risk-of-poverty rate, 2013 income year 82
Fig. 6.4 The relationship of poverty risk and poverty gap.
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, cross sectional
EU-SILC 2014 UDB August 2016. Note: At-risk-of-poverty
gap and relationship with the at-risk-of-poverty rate,
2013 income year 83
Fig. 6.5 Comparing trends of the anchored and the standard poverty
risk. Countries with a relatively low ‘standard’ poverty risk
in 2013 (9%–15%). Source: European Commission,
Eurostat, cross sectional EU-SILC 2005–2014.
Note: Change in the at-risk-of-poverty
rate anchored in income year 2004 and the
at-risk-of-poverty rate, 2004–2013 income year.
The indicator ‘anchored in the income year 2004’
is defined as the percentage of the population
whose ­equivalised disposable income is below the
‘at-risk-of-poverty threshold’ calculated in ­relation
to the base year 2004 and then adjusted for inflation.
Data for anchored at-risk-of-poverty rates for Bulgaria,
France 2007–2009, Romania and Croatia is not available.
Break in series: Austria 2007, Spain 2008,
United Kingdom 2012 86
Fig. 6.6 At-risk-of-poverty rate among migrants, by region of origin,
2013 income year. Source: European Commission,
Eurostat, cross sectional EU-SILC 2014 UDB August
2016. Note: Grey bars show at-risk-of-poverty rates for
the total population. Estimates are based on a low number
of observations (20–49) in Bulgaria for non-EU migrants.
Estimates for Romania (EU and non-EU), Bulgaria (for EU)
and Slovakia (for non-EU) are omitted due to a very low
number of observations (<20) 91
 List of Figures
   xiii

Fig. 7.1 Elements of the EU poverty and social exclusion target

by country for EU-SILC 2014. Source: Eurostat,
2014 SILC data, ilc_pees01 extracted on 15/10/2016 105
Fig. 8.1 Young people neither in employment nor in education
and training (NEET rates), 15–29 years old (%).
Source: Eurostat database, edat_lfse_20 table,
extracted on 02/05/2016 117
Fig. 8.2 Evolution of the unemployment rate in different
age groups (percentage point change, 2008–2014).
Source: Eurostat database, lfsa_urgaed table, extracted
on 07/03/2016 118
Fig. 8.3 Change in prevalence of temporary work among those
in employment (percentage point change, 2008–2014).
Source: Eurostat database, lfsa_etpga table, extracted on
08/03/2016119
Fig. 8.4 Change in involuntary part-time work among those
working part-time (percentage point change, 2008–2014).
Source: Eurostat database, lfsa_eppgai table, extracted
on 12/09/2016 120
Fig. 8.5 Relative income poverty among the 15–29 age group.
Source: Own calculation based on EU-SILC UDB 2009,
2011, 2013. Note: poverty threshold is 60% of median
equivalised household income 122
Fig. 8.6 The association index (odds ratio) of being low educated
when having low-educated parents compared
to high-educated parents, 25–59 age group, 2011.
Source: Grundiza and Lopez Vilaplana (2013) 125
 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Level and change in per capita income at purchasing

power parities 17
Table 2.2a The poorest (dark grey) and richest (light grey)
quintiles in the EU (euros) (2015) 21
Table 2.2b The poorest (dark grey) and richest (light grey)
quintiles in the EU (PPP) (2015) 22
Table 2.3 Different measures of European-wide inequality
(quintile ratios) 23
Table 5.1 Income by European country in PPS and euros,
age group 25–64, 2012 (national averages) 66
Table 5.2 European income deciles in PPS, age group 25–64,
2012 (brackets and averages) 67
Table 5.3 European income deciles by social class and country,
age group 25–64, 2012 69
Table 5.4 Educational inequalities in Europe by social class
and country, age group 25–64, 2012
(average years of schooling completed) 70

xv
 1
Introduction
Renato Miguel Carmo, Cédric Rio,
and Márton Medgyesi

Inequality is a major issue today in public debates, especially since 2008

and the beginning of the financial, economic and social crises. In the
European Union (EU), the crisis exacerbates a tendency observed since
the 2000s: income inequality is growing in most countries, including in
Northern European states, which are recognised as the most egalitarian
societies in the world (OECD 2011, 2015).
Public and academic debates on inequality in the EU, like elsewhere in
the world, are mostly focused on national territories. This can simply be
explained by the fact that social issues have traditionally been linked to
the nation state: the development and acceptance of social solidarity

R.M. Carmo (*)

Centre for Research and Studies in Sociology (CIES), University Institute of
Lisbon (ISCTE-IUL), Lisbon, Portugal
C. Rio
Centre Maurice Halbwachs (CMH), Paris, France
M. Medgyesi
TÁRKI, Social Research Institute and Institute for Sociology,
CSS Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

© The Author(s) 2018 1

R.M. Carmo et al. (eds.), Reducing Inequalities,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-65006-7_1
2 R.M. Carmo et al.

within a community are strongly linked to the development and the

acceptance of a national state. Today, we see significant data regarding
inequality in the richest countries, including most of Europe. Some con-
tributions provide insight as to why nation states must limit socioeco-
nomic inequalities (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Stiglitz 2012), propose
explanations of the phenomenon (Milanovic 2011; Piketty 2014) or
develop economic and political propositions to limit it (Atkinson 2015).
The aim of this book is to develop a multiscalar approach with a focus on
inequality in the EU within and between countries, and in some contribu-
tions, comparisons with other European and Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. The book is concerned
with both vertical inequality, that is, inequality between those with high
incomes and low incomes, and horizontal inequality, that is to say inequality
between groups by nationality, age, ethnicity or gender. Our objective is
twofold. Firstly, the book describes the social situation in the EU with a
focus on inequality in a multidimensional approach, which permits com-
parisons between national populations. Inequalities are discussed through
different perspectives and indicators such as income and economic inequali-
ties, poverty and social exclusion, categorical inequalities and social classes
and educational inequalities.1 Secondly, it proposes political and prospective
analyses about the role of the EU institutions in the social domain, and with
regard to social and gender inequality. In the first part of this introduction,
we explain why we decided to edit a collective book focused on inequality at
the EU level. We present the different contributions in a second part.
Since the beginning of the European project, the institutions of the
European Economic Community and then of the EU have had access to
an ever-increasing number of tools in the field of social issues. According
to Falkner (2010), European institutions play a social role through three
general dimensions. There is firstly a regulatory role through social direc-
tives concerning working conditions, especially regarding health and
safety, and equal treatment (wage equality between men and women, for
example). The Treaty of Amsterdam (1996) gave the Commission the
ability to expand this regulatory role to all European citizens, and not
only to workers. Secondly, the regional policy, with its structural
funds—European Social Fund, Cohesion Fund and European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF)—provides a distributive role to the
 Introduction 3

European Commission. Finally, this last institution has incentive tools

with the open method of coordination, and more recently the European
Semester, which, among other effects, leads Member States to pursue
common social objectives. It seemed possible at least, particularly during
Jacques Delors’ term as the president of European Commission, to apply
the idea of Social Europe in the real world, with EU institutions playing
a major role in the social field, including limiting social inequalities
among European populations, and then to observe the development of
solidarity in the EU territory.
The situation has changed at least since the beginning of the crisis.
While the EU’s prerogatives in the social domain are the same, the trend
appears negative now, to the extent that many specialists claim that the
idea, the cosmopolitan dream of Social Europe, is dead (Crespy and
Menz 2015; Lechevalier and Wielgohs 2015). This claim is based on
many signs. Firstly, after a period of socioeconomic convergence between
European countries, in part thanks to the cohesion policy, since the crisis
we can observe a stagnation of socioeconomic disparities. Secondly, and
maybe more fundamentally, the period seems quite unfavourable to the
development of strong solidarity among European people. Before the cri-
sis, Maurizio Ferrera claimed that there is ‘a tension, an uneasiness in
linking or reconciling “solidarity” with “Europe”’ (2005). The situation
may be growing worse: both the EU and a certain idea of solidarity are
currently being called into questioned like never before. With the grow-
ing importance of the European Council, we observe a return to national
interests conflicting with European interests once states are inside the EU
project: this can be illustrated not only by ‘Brexit’, but also by the persis-
tent political divergence between Member States regarding the situation
in Greece or the reception of refugees and other migrants. In parallel,
national social systems are slowly being dismantled in all European coun-
tries, especially in the name of reduction of public debts.
Why then a book focused on European inequality now? Despite the
current situation, discussing social issues at the EU level makes sense for
at least two reasons. On the one hand, the different contributions to the
book demonstrate that the EU has still a real role in the social field and
against inequality, even if this role is currently declining. On the other
hand, we strongly believe that the EU should play a more pronounced
4 R.M. Carmo et al.

role in social issues in the future. In addition to the heterogeneity of the

social situations in the different EU countries, all the national societies
face complementary difficulties, especially with the crisis: the rise of pub-
lic debt and difficulties financing and preserving social security schemes,
a rise in unemployment and precarious jobs, and then the risk of social
exclusion and poverty. The EU can help its members find an answer to
those shared social difficulties.
It is our role as social scientists to discuss these problems. We began
this work with the creation of a European network named Inequality
Watch a few years ago, by bringing together European research centres
and civil associations focused on inequality at the national level. By gath-
ering the contributions of recognised specialists of socioeconomic
inequality and European processes from distinct scientific disciplines and
several European countries, our desire with this book is to reconcile the
analysis of social processes with an accurate assessment of public policies
affecting vulnerable populations and regional discrepancies in the
EU. While the first part of the book highlights the social situation in the
EU in line with the consequences of the financial crisis, the second part
addresses the role of the EU and its institutions to cope with this chal-
lenge. Despite the social and cultural heterogeneity of EU Member States,
the first part shows that most populations and their institutions witness a
similar phenomenon of growing inequality. It could reinforce the idea of
an ambitious Social Europe able to limit inequality, or at least help its
Member States do so. The goal of the second part is specifically to discuss
the social tools already in use at the EU level and their limits, but also to
reflect on the legitimacy of such an idea. Our aim is not to describe or
explain the recent developments of Social Europe but to think theoreti-
cally and ethically about the current and future role of the EU in the
social field and more specifically in the fight against inequality. How does
the EU deal with inequality today? What should be the role of EU insti-
tutions regarding the challenge of reducing inequality?
The theoretical advances regarding inequality have been both signifi-
cant and varied and have opened up renewed forms of understanding and
explanation. The most important theories and analyses of contemporary
social inequalities adopt a multidimensional perspective (Therborn
2006). The different dimensions of inequality—income, poverty, social
 Introduction 5

exclusion, education and social mobility—are linked and interconnected.

Likewise, it is useful to compare poverty and social exclusion levels
between countries to underline the standards of living of different
national populations. This is why we propose in the first part of the book
an analysis of the different dimensions of inequality in the EU, both
among individuals and groups within countries and between European
populations.
Analyses of the change in income inequality are developed in the first
two chapters. Despite some methodological limitations, income indica-
tors are useful to measure inequality at the EU level, as Michael
Dauderstädt shows in his analysis (Chap. 2). He proves that income
inequality between countries and their populations has been stagnant
since the beginning of the economic and social crisis in 2008, after a
period of relative convergence, but still remains high, especially when
comparing the old and new Member States of the EU. Maxime Ladaique
and Guillaume Cohen (Chap. 3) highlight and explain the growth of
income inequalities observed in a large majority of European countries
since the mid-1980s: the development of non-standard work and a com-
mon policy agenda that favours diminishing income redistribution and
progressive taxation are the main drivers of the present situation.
The following two chapters take a multidimensional perspective on
inequality at the European level. Renato Miguel Carmo and Ana Rita
Matias (Chap. 4) focus their work on social vulnerability in the southern
European countries. According to them, the link between resource
inequality and social vulnerability is stronger in the Southern and Eastern
European countries, where the gap with regard to Northern countries is
increasing. António Firmino da Costa and his team (Chap. 5) analyse the
intersections between the distributional inequalities of economic and
educational resources in the EU, as well as the categorical inequalities
between nation states and between social classes. They demonstrate that
social disparities are high between different parts of Europe in terms of
income, but also educational inequalities.
Chapters 6 and 7 develop an overview of social disparities between
national populations of the EU with a focus on poverty and social
­exclusion, including social living conditions. Reading the available data
bears out similar trends analysed previously: Southern and Eastern
6 R.M. Carmo et al.

c­ ountries are more affected by income poverty and material difficulties.

In recent years, efforts have been made at the EU level to build harmon-
ised data and social indicators for the European population as a whole,
especially regarding poverty and social exclusion. According to Eurostat,
an individual is considered as poor and in a situation of social exclusion
when he or she is concerned by one of the three following situations: living
in a household with very low work intensity, earning a disposable income
below 60% of the national median income or being in a situation of severe
material deprivation. These and other indicators are discussed concerning
the methodological option of establishing a defined threshold of the risk
of income poverty (Orsolya Lelkes and Katrin Gasior, Chap. 6) or the
relevance of using the indicator of material deprivation (Brian Nolan and
Christopher T. Whelan, Chap. 7). The last authors additionally present
information regarding the social categories that are suffering from differ-
ent types of social vulnerability.
In the last chapter of this part, Márton Medgyesi examines social
reproduction mechanisms and compares the social situation of young
people in different countries of the EU in relation to their participation
in education and training and the occupations of their parents. At the
European level, social class is still a pertinent category to explain and
describe the discrepancies between social positions and their distinct pos-
sibilities and opportunities. But the possibilities offered to European
people differ strongly regarding their geographic context within the
EU. Following this multidimensional perspective, the author demon-
strates in his chapter that young people are being considerably affected.
He identifies a persistence of inequalities among the young due to social
reproduction mechanisms: family background and more precisely par-
ents’ social situation and educational level have a strong influence on the
life chances of young people.
The goal of the second part of the book is to analyse the current role
and limits of the EU and its institutions in the social domain and to ques-
tion its role in the future. In the original context of the EU, social
­prerogatives are national: social policies intended to limit socioeconomic
inequalities and guarantee sufficient accessibility for all to public goods—
education, social security schemes, healthcare and so on—are decided
by the Member States, which have the ability to propose political
 Introduction 7

responses to the social consequences of the crisis. But the institutions of

the EU, and especially the European Commission, are also engaged in
the social domain.
The first three chapters of the second part propose analyses of the
nature and limits of EU engagement in the social realm. In Chap. 9,
Cédric Rio discusses existing European social tools and elaborates a
reflection about the way an ambitious Social Europe could adapt to the
social heterogeneity of Member States. He claims that the acknowledge-
ment of common social rights for all Europeans, together with ambitious
redistribution mechanisms between European countries in order to
finance these rights, could advance European social policies without
threatening the diversity of national social systems. Chapters 10 and 11
focus on specific policies associated with inequality. Gwenaëlle Perrier
(Chap. 10) proposes a discussion about the gender equality policy led by
the EU. She recalls that gender equality policy was and still is justified
mainly by economic concerns and the specific need to develop a European
free market. According to her, such a justification has limited the scope
and impact of this policy. Beatriz Tomás Mallén (Chap. 11) focuses on
the recognition of fundamental rights at the EU level through the Charter
in the Lisbon Treaty. She mentions the need to institutionalise common
and guaranteed rights for all by harmonising the two existing normative
systems developed in parallel by the Council of Europe and the EU
institutions.
The last three chapters are more prospective. In Chap. 12, Antoon
Vandevelde contrasts different theoretical visions regarding implementa-
tion of social policies at a European level. Many normative reasons that
can be considered to legitimate ambitious social policies at the EU level,
including the cosmopolitan argument that recognises fundamental rights
to all, are based on the idea of necessary solidarity between European peo-
ple to pursue the common good. But, as Philippe Van Parijs (Chap. 13)
criticises, the facts are completely different: the current situation of the EU
is characterised by limited public transnational interventions, high
inequality levels and a general lack of solidarity among national govern-
ments. This situation is very close to the project dreamed by the neoliberal
author Friedrich Hayek: before the Second World War, he defended a
potential project of multinational federalism as a way to facilitate l­ iberation
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
exclusive of drummers and fifers, with summary of the French force at
different periods, extracted from the imperial muster-rolls
 L I S T O F P L AT E S .

to face
No. 1. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Tortoza 41
page
to face
2. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Taragona 75
page
3. Explanatory Sketch of the Operations and Combat of to face
240
Elbodon page
to face
4. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege and Battle of Saguntum 283
page
to face
5. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege and Battle of Valencia 297
page
to face
6. Explanatory Sketch of general Hill’s Operations 324
page
to face
7. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Tarifa 331
page
to face
8. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Ciudad Rodrigo 386
page
to face
9. Explanatory Sketch of the Siege of Badajos, 1812 419
page

E R R ATA .

Page 3, line 23, for “armies” read “parties.”

35, 9, for “prisoners” read “provisions.”
 NOTICE.

In addition to the manuscript authorities used for the former

volumes, several memoirs, journals, and notes of officers employed
in the different operations have been consulted for this volume.
Amongst others, the Journal of general Harvey of the Portuguese
service, and some original papers supplied by sir Howard Douglas.
 In a recent controversy, I have expressed my belief that the
French army at Albuera, instead of being more, was less numerous,
than I had represented it in my account, of that battle. The following
letter, since procured, decides the question:—

Extrait d’une lettre écrite de Seville le 4 Mai, 1811, par M. le

mal duc de Dalmatie, général-en-chef de l’armée du midi, à
S. A. S. le prince de Wagram et de Neufchatel, major-
général.

Le général Latour Maubourg a été obligé de se replier sur

Constantina et Alamis, Cordove est menacée par un corps Anglais,
Portugais, et Espagnol, beaucoup de troupes se concentrent en
Estramadure; Badajoz est investie. Le général Blake a réuni sur
l’Odiel une armée de quinze à seize mille hommes, et paroit se
préparer à marcher sur Seville. Le restant du quatrième corps est en
opérations contre les troupes qui out débauché de Murcie. Si
j’enumere bien, je suis en cet instant attaqué sur divers points par
plus de soixante mille hommes indépendamment de troupes qui sont
restées à Cadiz et à l’isle de Léon, et de celles qu’il y a à Tarrifa, à
Algesiras, et à Gibraltar, que je dois contenir, le danger est pressant,
je dois faire face de tous côtés assurer de nouveaux triomphes aux
armées de S. M. l’empereur, et éviter les facheux événemens, que
l’on prépare contre l’armée du midi. J’espère réussir, mais le succès
sera complet si les secours que j’attends arrivent apropos; voici mes
dispositions. Je pars dans quatre jours avec vingt mille hommes,
trois mille chevaux, et trente pièces de canon, pour rejetter au delà
de la Guadiana les corps ennemis qui se sont répandus en
Estremadure, dégager Badajos et faciliter l’arrivée du général comte
d’Erlon. Si les troupes que ce général amène peuvent se réunir avec
celles que je conduirai et si les troupes qui sont parties des armées
du nord et du centre, dont j’ai en partie disposé, arrivent à tems,
j’aurai en Estremadure trente-cinq mille hommes, cinq mille chevaux,
et quarante pièces de canon de campagne; alors je livre bataille aux
ennemis quand bien même toute l’armée Angloise qui est sur le
continent y seroit réunie, et ils seront vaincus.
Si une partie des renforts que j’attends manquent je ferai avec ce
que j’aurai, tout ce que pourrai vers le but proposé.
Le général-en-chef de l’armée impériale du midi,
(Signée) Mal Duc de Dalmatie.
Pour extraits conformes.
 To her grace the duchess of Abrantes.
September 11, 1833.
Madam,
In the eighth volume of your “Mémoires,” which I have only just seen, I find the
following passages:—
“Toutefois, pourquoi donc m’étonner de la conduite des Portugais? N’ai je pas
vu ici, en France, un des frères d’armes de Junot souffrir qu’on imprimât, dans un
ouvrage traduit de l’Anglais, des choses revoltantes de fausseté sur lui et sur le
maréchal Ney?...... Cet ouvrage, fait par un colonel Napier, et qui a trouvé grâce
devant le ministère de la guerre parce qu’il dit du bien du ministre, m’a été donné à
moi, à moi la veuve de Junot, comme renfermant des documents authentiques.
J’ai du y lire une indécente attaque contre la vie privée d’un homme dont on ne
pouvait dire aucun mal comme militaire dans cette admirable affaire de la
Convention de Cintra, puisque les Anglais ont fait passer à une commission
militaire ceux qui l’avaient signée pour l’Angleterre; et les beaux vers de Childe
Harold suffisent seuls à la gloire de Junot, quand l’original de cette convention ne
serait pas là pour la prouver. Heureusement que je le possède, moi, cet original, et
même dans les deux langues. Il n’est pas dans M. Napier;”————
It is not permitted to a man to discover ill-humour at the expressions of a lady;
yet when those expressions are dishonouring to him, and that reputation and
talents are joined to beauty to give them a wide circulation, it would indicate
insensibility to leave them unnoticed.
To judge of the talents of a general by his conduct in the field has always been
the undisputed right of every military writer. I will not therefore enter upon that
subject, because I am persuaded that your grace could not mean to apply the
words “revolting falsehoods” to a simple judgement of the military genius of the
duke of Abrantes. Indeed you intimate that the offensive passages are those
directed against his private life, and touching the Convention of Cintra. I think,
however, your grace has not perused my work with much attention, or you would
scarcely have failed to perceive that I have given the Convention of Cintra at
length in the Appendix.
But, in truth, I have only alluded to general Junot’s private qualities when they
bore directly upon his government of Portugal, and, by a fresh reference to my
work, you will find that I have affirmed nothing of my own knowledge. The
character of the late duke of Abrantes, as drawn by me, is that ascribed to him by
the emperor Napoleon, (see Las Cases,) and the authority of that great man is
expressly quoted. It is against Napoleon therefore, and not against me, who am
but a repeater of his uncontradicted observations, that your resentment should be
directed.
 If your grace should deign to dispose of any further thought upon me or my
work, I would venture to suggest a perusal of the Portuguese, and English, and
Spanish, and German histories of the invasion of Portugal; or even a slight
examination of only a small part of the innumerable, and some of them very
celebrated periodicals which treat of that event. You will be then convinced that, so
far from having wantonly assailed the character of general Junot, I have made no
slight effort to stem the torrent of abuse with which he has been unjustly
overwhelmed; and believe me, madam, that the estimation in which an eminent
man will be held by the world is more surely to be found in the literature of different
countries than in the fond recollection of his own family. I admired general Junot’s
daring character, and having enough of the soldier in me to like a brave enemy, I
have, wherever the truth of history would permit, expressed that feeling towards
him and towards other French generals whose characters and whose acts have
been alike maligned by party writers in this country: such indeed has been my
regard for justice on this point, that I have thereby incurred the charge of writing
with a French rather than a national bias, as your grace will discover by referring to
my lord Mahon’s History of the War of the Succession, in which his lordship has
done me the honour to observe that I have written “by far the best French
account yet published of the Peninsular War.”
For my own part I still think that to refrain from vulgar abuse of a gallant enemy
will not be deemed un-English, although lord Mahon considers it wholly French;
but his lordship’s observation incontestibly proves that I have discovered no undue
eagerness to malign any of the French generals; and with respect to the duke of
Abrantes, I could shew that all the offensive passages in my work rest upon the
published authority of his own countrymen, and especially of his great master the
emperor Napoleon, and that they are of a milder expression than those authorities
would have warranted. It is, however, so natural and so amiable in a lady to defend
the reputation of her deceased husband, that rather than appear to detract in any
manner from the grace of such a proceeding, I choose to be silent under the
unmitigated severity of your grace’s observations.
Not so, however, with respect to that part of your remarks which relate to
marshal Ney. After carefully re-examining every sentence I have written, I am quite
unable to discover the slightest grounds for your grace’s accusations. In all parts of
my work the name of Ney is mentioned with praise. I have not, indeed, made
myself a partizan of marshal Ney in relating his disputes with marshals Soult and
Massena, because I honestly believed that he was mistaken; neither have I
attributed to him unbounded talents for the higher parts of war, but this is only
matter of opinion which the world is quite capable of appreciating at its true value;
and upon all other points I have expressed admiration of marshal Ney’s
extraordinary qualities, his matchless valour, his heroic energy!
 In the hope that your grace will now think it reasonable to soften the asperity of
your feelings towards my work, I take my leave, with more of admiration for your
generous warmth in defence of a person so dear to you, than of any sentiment of
resentment for the harsh terms which you have employed towards myself. And I
remain, madam,
Your very obedient servant,
William Napier, Colonel.
 HISTORY

OF THE

PENINSULAR WAR.
 BOOK XIII.

CHAPTER I.
While marshal Beresford followed Soult towards Llerena 1810.
lord Wellington recommenced the siege of Badajos, but the
relation of that operation must be delayed until the transactions
which occurred in Spain, during Massena’s invasion of Portugal,
have been noticed, for it is not by following one stream of action that
a just idea of this war can be obtained. Many of lord Wellington’s
proceedings might be called rash, and others timid, and slow, if
taken separately; yet, when viewed as parts of a great plan for
delivering the whole Peninsula, they will be found discreet or daring,
as the circumstances warranted: nor is there any portion of his
campaigns, that requires this wide-based consideration, more than
his early sieges; which, being instituted contrary to the rules of art,
and unsuccessful, or, when successful, attended with a mournful
slaughter, have given occasion for questioning his great military
qualities, which were however, then most signally displayed.
In the northern provinces the events were of little interest. Gallicia
after the failure of Renovales’ expedition and the shipwreck that
followed, became torpid; the junta disregarded general See Vol. III p. 404.
Walker’s exhortations, and, although he furnished vast
supplies, the army, nominally twenty thousand strong, mustered only
six thousand in the field: there was no cavalry, and the infantry kept
close in the mountains about Villa Franca, while a Official abstract of
weak French division occupied the rich plains of Leon. general Walker’s
despatches
General Mahi having refused to combine his
operations with those of the Anglo-Portuguese army, was thought to
be disaffected, and at the desire of the British authorities had been
removed to make way for the duke of Albuquerque: he was however
immediately appointed to the command of Murcia, by Blake, in
defiance of the remonstrances of Mr. Wellesley, for Official abstract of
Blake disregarded the English influence. Mr. Wellesley’s
despatches MSS.
When Albuquerque died, Gallicia fell to Castaños, and while that
officer was co-operating with Beresford in Estremadura, Santocildes
assumed the command. Meanwhile Caffarelli’s reserve having joined
the army of the north, Santona was fortified, and See Vol. III pp. 312,
Bessieres, as I have before observed, assembled 407, and 475.
seven thousand men at Zamora to invade Gallicia.
In the Asturias, Bonet, although harassed, on the side of Potes, by
the Guerillas from the mountains of Liebana; and on the coast by the
English frigates, remained at Oviedo, and maintained his
communications by the left with the troops in Leon. In November
1810 he defeated a considerable body of insurgents, and in
February 1811 the Spanish general St. Pol retired before him with
the regular forces, from the Xalon to the Navia; but this retreat
caused such discontent in Gallicia that St. Pol Mr. Stuart’s Papers,
advanced again on the 19th March, and was again MSS.
driven back. Bonet then dispersed the Partidas, and was ready to aid
Bessieres’ invasion of Gallicia; and although the arrival of the allied
forces on the Coa in pursuit of Massena stopped that enterprise, he
made an incursion along the coast, seized the Spanish stores of
English arms and clothing, and then returned to Oviedo. The war
was, indeed, so little formidable to the French, that in May Santander
was evacuated, and all the cavalry in Castile and Leon joined
Massena for the battle of Fuentes Onoro, and yet the Gallician and
Asturian regular armies gained no advantage during their absence.
The Partidas, who had re-assembled after their defeat by Bonet,
were more active. Porlier, Campillo, Longa, Amor, and Merino cut off
small French parties in the Montaña, in the Rioja, in Biscay, and in
the Baston de Laredo; they were not, indeed, dangerous in action,
nor was it very difficult to destroy them by combined movements, but
these combinations were hard to effect, from the little accord
amongst the French generals, and thus they easily maintained their
posts at Espinosa de Monteres, Medina, and Villarcayo. Campillo
was the most powerful after Porlier. His principal Intercepted letter of
haunts were in the valleys of Mena and Caranza; but general Barthelemy
he was in communication with Barbara, Honejas, and to general Drouet,
1810. MSS.
Curillas, petty chiefs of Biscay, with whom he
concerted attacks upon couriers and weak detachments: and he
sometimes divided his band into small parties, with which he overran
the valleys of Gurieso, Soba, Carrado, and Jorrando, partly to raise
contributions, partly to gather recruits, whom he forced to join him.
His chief aim was, however, to intercept the despatches going from
Bilbao to Santander, and for this purpose he used to infest Liendo
between Ovira and Laredo, which he was enabled the more safely to
do, because general Barthelemy, the governor of the Montaña, was
forced to watch more earnestly towards the hilly district of Liebana,
between Leon and the Asturias. This district was Porlier’s strong-
hold, and that chief, under whom Campillo himself would at times
act, used to cross the Deba and penetrate into the valleys of
Cabuerniego, Rio Nauza, Cieza, and Buelna, and he obliged the
people to fly to the mountains with their effects whenever the French
approached: nevertheless the mass were tired of this guerilla system
and tractable enough, except in Liebana.
To beat Campillo once or twice would have been sufficient to ruin
him, but to ruin Porlier required great combinations. It was necessary
to seize Espinosa, not that of Monteres, but a village in the
mountains of Liebana, from whence the valleys all projected as from
a point, and whence the troops could consequently act towards
Potes with success. General Barthelemy proposed this plan to 1811.
Drouet, then with the 9th corps on the Upper Douro, whom he
desired to co-operate from the side of Leon, while Bonet did the
same from the side of the Asturias: but though partially adopted, the
execution was not effectually followed up, the districts of Liebana
and Santander continued to be disturbed, and the chain of Partidas
was prolonged through Biscay and the Rioja, to Navarre.
In this last province Mina had on the 22d of May defeated at 1811.
the Puerto de Arlaban, near Vittoria, twelve hundred men who May.
were escorting a convoy of prisoners and treasure to France; his
success was complete, but alloyed by the death of two hundred of
the prisoners, unfortunately killed during the tumult; and it was
stained by the murder of six Spanish ladies, who, for being attached
to French officers, were in cold blood executed after Mr. Stuart’s Papers,
the fight. Massena, whose baggage was captured, MSS.
was to have travelled with this escort, but disliking the manner of the
march, he remained in Vittoria until a better opportunity, and so
escaped.
These partizan operations, combined with the descents on the
coast, the aspect of the war in Estremadura, and the unprotected
state of Castile, which was now menaced by Santocildes, were
rendered more important by another event to be noticed hereafter:
Bessieres therefore resolved to contract his position in the north; and
first causing Reille and Caffarelli to scour Biscay and the Rioja, he
ordered Bonet to abandon the Asturias. On the 14th of June that
general, having dismantled the coast-batteries, sent his sick and
baggage by sea to Santander and marched into Leon, where
Santocildes, who had now increased the Gallician field army to
thirteen thousand men, was menacing Astorga, which place the
French evacuated after blowing up some of the works. Serras and
Bonet then united on the Esla, and being supported by three
thousand men from Rio Seco, skirmished at the Ponte de Orvigo on
the 23d, but had the worst, and general Valletaux was killed on their
side: and as lord Wellington’s operations in Estremadura soon drew
the French armies towards that quarter Santocildes held his ground
at Astorga until August. Meanwhile two thousand French were
thrown into Santona, and general Rognet coming, from the side of
Burgos, with a division of the young guard, made a fruitless incursion
against the Partidas of Liebana.
This system of warfare was necessarily harassing to the 1811.
French divisions actually engaged, but it was evident that June.
neither the Asturias nor Gallicia could be reckoned as good
auxiliaries to lord Wellington. Gallicia with its lordly junta, regular
army, fortified towns, rugged fastnesses, numerous population, and
constant supplies from England, was of less weight in the contest
than five thousand Portuguese militia conducted by Trant and
Wilson. The irregular warfare was now also beginning to produce its
usual effects; the tree though grafted in patriotism bore strange fruit.
In Biscay, which had been longest accustomed to the presence of
the invaders, the armed peasantry were often found fighting in the
ranks of the enemy, and on one occasion did of themselves attack
the boats of the Amelia frigate to save French military Appendix, No. I.
stores! Turning now to the other line of invasion, we Section 1.
shall find the contest fiercer, indeed, and more honourable to the
Spaniards, but the result still more unfavourable to their cause.

O P E R AT I O N S I N T H E E A S T E R N P R O V I N C E S .

It will be remembered that Suchet, after the fall of Mequinenza,

was ordered to besiege Tortoza while Macdonald marched against
Taragona. Massena was then concentrating his army for the invasion
of Portugal, and it was the emperor’s intention that Suchet should,
after taking Tortoza, march with half of the third corps to support the
prince of Esling. But the reduction of Tortoza proved a more tedious
task than Napoleon anticipated, and as the course of events had
now given the French armies of Catalonia and Aragon a common
object, it will be well to compare their situation and resources with
those of their adversary.
Suchet was completely master of Aragon, and not more by the
force of his arms, than by the influence of his administration; the
province was fertile, and so tranquil in the interior, that his
magazines were all filled, and his convoys travelled under the care of
Spanish commissaries and conductors. Mina was however in
Navarre on his rear, and he communicated on the right bank of the
Ebro with the Partidas in the mountains of Moncayo and Albaracin;
and these last were occasionally backed by the Empecinado, Duran,
and others whose strong-holds were in the Guadalaxara, and who
from thence infested Cuença and the vicinity of Madrid. From
Albaracin, Villa Campa continued the chain of partizan warfare and
connected it with the Valencian army, which had also a line of
operation towards Cuença. Mina, who communicated with the
English vessels in the bay of Biscay, received his supplies from
Coruña; and the others, in like manner, corresponded with Valencia,
from whence the English consul Tupper succoured them with arms,
money, and ammunition. Thus a line was drawn quite across the
Peninsula which it was in vain for the enemy to break, as the retreat
was secure at both ends, and the excitement to renewed efforts
constant.
On the other flank of Suchet’s position the high valleys of the
Pyrenees were swarming with small bands, forming a link between
Mina and a division of the Catalonian army stationed about the Seu
d’Urgel, which was a fortified castle, closing the passage leading
from the plain of that name to the Cerdaña: this division in
conjunction with Rovira, and other partizans, extended the irregular
warfare on the side of Olot and Castelfollit to the Ampurdan; and the
whole depended upon Taragona, which itself was supported by the
English fleet in the Mediterranean. Aragon may therefore be
considered as an invested fortress, which the Spaniards thought to
reduce by famine, by assault, and by exciting the population against
the garrison; but Suchet baffled them; he had made such judicious
arrangements that his convoys were secure in the interior, and all the
important points on the frontier circle were fortified, and connected,
with Zaragoza, by chains of minor ports radiating from that common
centre. Lerida, Mequinenza, and the plain of Urgel in Catalonia, the
fort of Morella in Valencia, were his; and by fortifying Teruel and
Alcanitz he had secured the chief passages leading through the
mountains to the latter kingdom: he could thus, at will, invade either
Catalonia or Valencia, and from Mequinenza he could, by water,
transport the stores necessary to besiege Tortoza. Nor were these
advantages the result of aught but his uncommon talents for war, a
consideration which rendered them doubly formidable.
The situation of the French in Catalonia was different. Macdonald,
who had assumed the command at the moment when Napoleon
wished him to co-operate with Suchet, was inexperienced in the
peculiar warfare of the province, and unprepared to execute any
extended plan of operations. His troops were about Gerona and
Hostalrich, which were in fact the bounds of the French conquest at
this period; for Barcelona was a military point beyond their field
system, and only to be maintained by expeditions; and the country
was so exhausted of provisions in the interior, that the army itself
could only be fed by land-convoys from France, or by such coasters
as, eluding the vigilance of the English cruizers, could reach Rosas,
St. Filieu, and Palamos. Barcelona like the horse-leech continually
cried for more, and as the inhabitants as well as the garrison
depended on the convoys, the latter were enormous, reference
being had to the limited means of the French general, and the
difficulty of moving; for, although the distance between Hostalrich
and Barcelona was only forty miles, the road, as far as Granollers,
was a succession of defiles, and crossed by several rivers, of which
the Congosta and the Tordera were considerable obstacles; and the
nature of the soil was clayey and heavy, especially in the defiles of
the Trenta Pasos.
These things rendered it difficult for Macdonald to operate in
regular warfare from his base of Gerona, and as the stores for the
siege of Taragona were to come from France, until they arrived he
could only make sudden incursions with light baggage, trusting to the
resources still to be found in the open country, or to be gathered in
the mountains by detachments which would have to fight for every
morsel. This then was the condition of the French armies, that
starting from separate bases, they had to operate on lines meeting at
Tortoza. It remains to shew the situation of the Catalan general.
After the battle of Margalef, Henry O’Donnel reunited his 1810.
scattered forces, and being of a stern unyielding disposition, July.
not only repressed the discontent occasioned by that defeat, but
forced the reluctant Miguelettes to swell his ranks and to submit to
discipline. Being assisted with money and arms by the British
agents, and having free communication by sea with Gibraltar, Cadiz,
and Minorca, he was soon enabled to reorganize his army, to collect
vast magazines at Taragona, and to strengthen that place by new
works. In July his force again amounted to twenty-two thousand men
exclusive of the Partidas, and of the Somatenes, who were useful to
aid in a pursuit, to break up roads, and to cut off straggling soldiers.
Of this number one division under Campo Verde, was, as I have
before said, in the higher valleys, having a detachment at Olot, and
being supported by the fortified castles of Seu D’Urgel, Cardona,
Solsona, and Berga. A second division was on the Llobregat,
watching the garrison of Barcelona, and having detachments in
Montserrat, Igualada, and Manresa to communicate with Campo
Verde. The third division, the reserve and the cavalry were on the
hills about Taragona, and that place and Tortoza had large garrisons.
By this disposition, O’Donnel occupied Falcet, the Col de
Balaguer, and the Col del Alba, which were the General Doyle’s
passages leading to Tortoza; the Col de Ribas and Correspondence,
MSS.
Momblanch, which commanded the roads to Lerida;
San Coloma de Queralt and Igualada, through which his connection
with Campo Verde was maintained; and thus the two French armies
were separated not only by the great spinal ridges Colonel Green’s do
descending from the Pyrenees, but by the position of MSS.
the Spaniards, who held all the passes, and could at will concentrate
and attack either Suchet or Macdonald. But the Catalonian system
was now also connected with Valencia, where, exclusive of
irregulars, there were about fifteen thousand men under General
Bassecour. That officer had in June occupied Cuença, yet having
many quarrels with his officers he could do nothing, and was driven
from thence by troops from Madrid: he returned to Official Abstracts of
Valencia, but the disputes continued and extended to Mr. Wellesley’s
Despatches, MSS.
the junta or congress of Valencia, three members of
which were by the general imprisoned. Nevertheless, Mr. Stuart’s Papers,
as all parties were now sensible that Valencia should MSS.
be defended at Tortoza, Bassecour prepared to march to its succour
by the coast-road where he had several fortified posts. Thus, while
Suchet and Macdonald were combining to crush O’Donnel, the latter
was combining with Bassecour, to press upon Suchet; and there was
always the English maritime force at hand to aid the attacks or to
facilitate the escape of the Spaniards.
In the above exposition I have called the native armies by the
names of their provinces, but in December 1810 the whole military
force being reorganized by the regency the armies were designated
by numbers. Thus the Catalonian forces, formerly called the army of
the right, was now called the first army. The Valencians, together
with Villa Campa’s division, and the partidas of the Empecinado and
Duran, were called the second army. The Murcian force was called
the third army. The troops at Cadiz, at Algesiras, and in the Conde
Niebla were called the fourth army. The remnants of Romana’s old
Gallician division which had escaped the slaughter on the Gebora
formed the fifth army. The new-raised troops of Gallicia and those of
the Asturias were called the sixth army. And the partidas of the
north, that is to say, Mina’s, Longa’s, Campillo’s, Porlier’s, and other
smaller bands formed the seventh army.
Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon’s order to besiege
Tortoza arrived. Suchet was ready to execute it. More than fifty
battering guns selected from those at Lerida were already equipped,
and his depôts were established at Mequinenza, Caspe, and
Alcanitz. All the fortified posts were provisioned; twelve thousand
men under general Musnier, intended for the security of Aragon,
were disposed at Huesca and other minor points on the left bank of
the Ebro, and at Daroca, Teruel, and Calatayud on the right bank;
and while these arrangements were being executed, the troops
destined for the siege had assembled at Lerida and Alcanitz, under
generals Habert and Laval, their provisions being drawn from the
newly conquered district of Urgel.
From Mequinenza, which was the principal depôt, there was
water-carriage, but as the Ebro was crossed at several points by
rocky bars, some of which were only passable in full water, the
communication was too uncertain to depend upon, and Suchet
therefore set workmen to reopen an old road thirty miles in length,
which had been made by the duke of Orleans during the war of the
succession. This road pierced the mountains on the right bank of the
Ebro, passed through Batea and other places to Mora, and from
thence by Pinel to Tortoza, running through a celebrated defile called
indifferently the Trincheras and the Passage of Arms. When these
preliminary arrangements were made general Habert assembled his
division at Belpuig near Lerida, and after making a feint as if to go
towards Barcelona, suddenly turned to his right, and penetrating
through the district of Garriga, reached Garcia on the left bank of the
Lower Ebro the 5th of July. Laval at the same time quitted Alcanitz,
made a feint towards Valencia by Morella, and then See plans, No. 1 &
turning to his left, came so unexpectedly upon Tortoza 3.
by the right bank of the Ebro, that he surprised some of the outposts
on the 2d, and then encamped before the bridge-head. The 4th he
extended his line to Amposta, seized the ferry-boat of the great road
from Barcelona to Valencia, and posted Boussard’s cuirassiers, with
a battalion of infantry and six guns, at Uldecona, on the Cenia river,
to observe Bassecour’s Valencians.
During these operations Suchet fixed his own quarters at Mora,
and as the new road was not finished, he occupied Miravet, Pinel,
and the Trincheras, on its intended line; and having placed flying
bridges, with covering works, on the Ebro, at Mora and Xerta, made
those places his depôt of siege. He likewise seized the craft on the
river, established posts at Rapita, near the mouth of the Ebro, and at
Amposta, and made a fruitless attempt to burn the boat-bridge of
Tortoza, with fire vessels. Following Napoleon’s order, Macdonald
should at this time have been before Taragona; but on the 9th,
Suchet learned, from a spy, that the seventh corps was still at
Gerona, and he thus found himself exposed alone to the combined
efforts of the Catalans and Valencians. This made him repent of
having moved from Aragon so soon, yet thinking it would be bad to
retire, he resolved to blockade Tortoza; hoping to resist both
O’Donnel and Bassecour until Macdonald could advance.
The Spaniards who knew his situation, sallied on the right bank
the 6th and 8th, and on the 10th his outposts on the left bank were
driven in at Tivisa by a division from Falcet, which, the next day, fell
on his works at Mora, but was repulsed; and the 12th, general Paris
pushed back the Spanish line, while Habert took post in force at
Tivisa, by which he covered the roads to Xerta and Mora.
O’Donoghue, who commanded Bassecour’s advanced guard, now
menaced Morella, but general Montmarie being detached to its
succour, drove him away.
The 30th, O’Donnel having brought up fresh troops to Falcet,
made a feint with ten thousand men against Tivisa, and then
suddenly entered Tortoza, from whence at mid-day, on the 3d of
August, he passed the bridge and fell with the bayonet on Laval’s
entrenchments. The French gave way at first, but soon rallied, and
the Spaniards fearing for their communications regained the town in
disorder, having lost two hundred prisoners besides killed and
wounded.
 This operation had been concerted with general Caro, who 1810.
having superseded O’Donoghue, was now marching with the August.
Valencians by the coast-road towards Uldecona: Suchet therefore,
judging that the intention of the Spaniards was to force him away
from the Lower Ebro, before Macdonald could pass the Llobregat,
resolved first to strike a sudden blow at the Valencians, and then turn
upon the Catalans. In this view he contracted his quarters on the
Ebro, and united at Uldecona, on the 13th, eleven battalions with
eight hundred horsemen. Caro was then in a strong position
covering the two great routes to Valencia, but when the French, after
driving in his advanced guard from Vinaros, came up, his Valencians
would not stand a battle, and being followed beyond Peniscola
separated and retreated in disorder by different roads. Whereupon
Suchet returned to Mora, and there found an officer of Macdonald’s
army, who brought information that the seventh corps was at last in
the plains of Reus, and its communications with the third corps open.

O P E R AT I O N S O F T H E S E V E N T H C O R P S .

When Macdonald succeeded Augereau he found the troops 1810.

in a state of insubordination, accustomed to plunder, and June.
excited to ferocity by the cruelty of the Catalans, and by the conduct
of his predecessor; they were without magazines or Vacani.
regular subsistence, and lived by exactions: hence the
people, driven to desperation, were more like wild Victoires et
beasts than men, and the war was repulsive to him in Conquêtes
François.
des

all its features. It was one of shifts and devices, and

he better understood methodical movements; it was one of plunder,
and he was a severe disciplinarian; it was full of cruelty on all sides,
and he was of a humane and just disposition. Being resolved to
introduce regular habits, Macdonald severely rebuked the troops for
their bad discipline and cruelty, and endeavoured to soothe the
Catalans, but neither could be brought to soften in their enmity; the
mutual injuries sustained, were too horrible and too recent to be
forgiven. The soldiers, drawn from different countries, and therefore
not bound by any common national feeling, were irritated against a
general, who made them pay for wanton damages, and punished