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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
A Treatise on Northern
Ireland
Volume 3: Consociation and Confederation
B R E N D A N O ’ LEARY
1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
3
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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
Preface
The passage of ten months since the typescript of this treatise was sent to the
publishers has obliged no revisions of its concluding arguments. Peace continues
in Northern Ireland according to any international or political science definition.
Though there are still shootings, bombings, paramilitary assaults, and arrests of
loyalists and republicans, all such indicators are in dramatically lower registers
than before the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. The Police Service of Northern
Ireland released its annual statistics in October 2018 covering the period until
September 2018. Two people died in 2017–18 in killings attributed “to the security
situation,” the customary administrative euphemism; the number is just below the
annual average death rate since 2008–9 of 2.5 persons per annum. Peace therefore
continues, though it is not guaranteed.
Slow demographic change continues to extrude into local political geography,
shaping school openings and closures, residential housing markets and disputes
over access to public housing, and controversies over electoral districting. In these
extrusions may be traced the faded hegemony of Ulster unionists. Official ratifi-
cation that Ulster Protestants, however defined, have ceased to be a majority in
Northern Ireland awaits the 2021 census, though for now the region has three
political minorities, nationalists, unionists, and others. It seems less probable than
it once was that this configuration of inter-group sizes will stabilize into a new
equilibrium. Instead it seems increasingly probable that a reversal of status looms:
Ulster unionists will soon be less numerous than Northern nationalists, and,
strikingly, the recent policy positions of unionist parties may accelerate that
trend, because of the impact they will have on cultural Catholics who have so
far identified as “others.”
Since 2017 the DUP has overtly supported a minority Conservative government
in London, intent on exit from the EU. Theresa May’s cabinet’s negotiations with
the EU 27, thus far, have had spectacularly humiliating consequences. They have
resembled charges of very light brigades against the entrenched cannons of the
EU, and some have started to reason why. The Conservative–DUP parliamentary
alliance has magnified the disarray among the UK’s negotiators. The DUP’s
posture has not reflected the popular will in Northern Ireland, where a majority
voted to remain in the EU in 2016, a majority increasingly reinforced in size as
knowledge of the possible consequences of UKEXIT spreads. Ulster unionist
parties and their voters divided over the key question. Most backed leaving the
EU, but a very high proportion have had second thoughts about its repercussions,
a shift that has not been reflected in the postures of the current DUP leadership. If
there must be a UKEXIT, most unionists have signaled that they prefer a soft one;
that is, they want the entirety of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to stay within
the European customs union and the single market, and thereby avoid the
creation of fresh border infrastructure, either along the UK border in Ireland or
in the Irish Sea. This judgment is supported by a social scientific survey of the
Northern Ireland public and a deliberative forum co-organized by the author.
Principal investigator John Garry, Kevin McNicholl, James Pow, and I reported
the results in spring 2018, and presented them to British, Irish, and EU officials.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
viii Preface
The results are consistent with the arguments elaborated in the concluding
chapter of this volume. Two were headlined in the press. Those preferring North-
ern Ireland to remain within the EU had risen to nearly 70 percent, compared to
the 56 percent who voted that way in the June 2016 referendum. And, a hard exit
from the EU, defined as leaving the European customs union and the single
market, would almost double the probability that Northern Catholics will favor
Irish reunification. The data and analysis, sponsored by the UK’s Economic and
Social Research Council, were published in Northern Ireland and the UK’s Exit
from the EU: What Do People Think? Evidence from Two Investigations: A Survey
and a Deliberative Forum (Belfast: Queens University Belfast & The UK in a
Changing Europe, 2018). A parallel judgment flows from a YouGov online poll,
conducted for the BBC, and reported in June 2018. It showed Irish (58.6 percent),
Northern Irish (57.9 percent), and European (56.7 percent) identifiers outnum-
bering British identifiers (46.7 percent) in Northern Ireland, with over a quarter of
respondents affirming that the UK’s decision to leave has made them more likely to
vote for a united Ireland. Less than 50 percent identified as British, a result
unimaginable in 1968, and not the most probable of projections in 1998.
Northern nationalists, notably Sinn Féin and its supporters, may become the
key players in deciding whether the Northern Ireland Assembly is restored, and,
in due course, whether and when there will be a referendum on Irish reunification.
The later such a referendum is held, in the author’s view, the greater the prob-
ability that there will be a decisive vote for Irish reunification. Sinn Féin’s
enthusiasts will seek an early referendum, but they would be unwise to do so.
Waiting for the Referendum will, however, become the new canopy under which
Northern Ireland politics unfolds. A second Scottish independence referendum,
and a second referendum on the UK’s EU membership, may yet precede one on
Irish reunification. In the interim, the fate of the institutions of the Good Friday
Agreement will remain undecided. That the assembly will not be restored before
the UK’s scheduled exit from the EU in March 2019 looks certain. Key DUP
leaders re-advertise that they never supported the Good Friday Agreement—
though they accepted the St Andrews Agreement that amended it within the
rules of amendment of the Good Friday Agreement. So far Peter Robinson’s plain
post-retirement warnings to his party have been studiously ignored.
Confidence in the robustness of the Good Friday Agreement has therefore
fallen; it had already been dented by the evidence presented in the latter part of
this volume. This judgment is obliged by current evidence, even though, quite
remarkably, the entirety of the EU, as well as the governments of the UK and
Ireland, are now pledged to the preservation of the Good Friday Agreement “in all
its parts.” This pledge, however, is impossible to maintain, if understood literally.
If and when the UK leaves the EU, there will have to be modifications to the Good
Friday Agreement and its UK and Irish legislative enactments, as is explained in
Chapter 3.7. It is true that the British–Irish Intergovernmental Conference
(B–IIGC) has been revived, at Irish insistence, and, as foretold and prescribed in
this volume. But it has met just once, in July 2018, with overt reluctance and poor
grace displayed by UK Prime Minister May. The meeting was without major
output. Further pressure from Ireland to make the B–IIGC a more meaningful
policy forum can be expected if the assembly and executive are not restored.
We can also expect pushback from Conservatives on that front, especially as long
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
Preface ix
as they need DUP votes. Conversely, we can expect any future Labour government
in London to co-champion the revival of the B–IIGC.
That the passage of ten months has not obliged an author to revise or modify
arguments developed and refined over thirty-five years should be much less
surprising than the fact that no significant updating has been required by the
events of 2018. It is as if in this interval Northern Ireland has been hit by an ice
storm. When such a storm emerges, roads may become impassable, especially if
strong winds accompany the freezing rain. When the freezing rain accumulates on
surfaces and the ground, it creates a glaze of ice, and when a quarter inch or more
of such ice accumulates on tree branches, power lines, and power poles, they may
be unable to withstand the new burden that they are forced to carry. The entire
landscape freezes, while wise humans stay indoors. They await the sun, or the
eventual melt from higher temperatures, not yet knowing the scale of damage with
which they will have to cope. What they can see from safety, however, is entirely
familiar, and in sharper relief. But only a full thaw will reveal the cost of the storm,
possibly triggering sharp and abrupt changes, and collapses in familiar landmarks.
Northern Ireland was not prepared for the political ice storm that hit in the
summer of 2016. By early 2018, however, an effort to restore the assembly and the
executive emerged, only to fail as it surfaced. Specifically, the DUP got cold feet on
making concessions to Sinn Féin related to the Irish language. Arlene Foster
evidently had been seeking to return to the first minister’s position, but the
DUP withdrew from the heavily annotated textual agreement because its terms
did not survive reception by its Westminster parliamentary leadership, let alone
its grassroots. Foster looked isolated. The DUP’s Westminster MPs, led by Nigel
Dodds, were happier in a supply-and-confidence arrangement with the Conser-
vatives than in sanctioning re-entry into coalition government with Sinn Féin.
Political life in “the wee six” therefore remained suspenseful and stalemated. The
political chill was intermittently broken by prophesies of disaster while the parties
awaited the collateral damage from the UK’s projected secession from the
European Union. The Alliance, the Greens, the SDLP, and Sinn Féin remained
ardent Remainers and looked confident about European futures, while exasper-
ated at their inability to be met or taken seriously by the London government. By
contrast, the DUP’s pledge never to forsake the blue skies of Ulster for the grey
mists of an Irish Republic sounded like a battle cry from long ago, as well as being
poorly informed by meteorological science. The DUP now professed to see blue
skies ahead from UKEXIT, while it looked simultaneously petrified of another
prospective British betrayal. Legislation is being prepared at Westminster, as
I write, that will enable civil servants in Northern Ireland to make some quotidian
decisions in the absence of the Northern executive. This rule by local bureaucrats
will be based on a careful legislative effort to avoid breaking the UK’s treaty
obligations with Ireland, and to avoid violating the Good Friday Agreement—a
formal legislated suspension of the assembly and executive would certainly be
that, and cannot be contemplated as the UK seeks to leave the EU.
For over two years the repercussions of UKEXIT, real and imagined, have filled
the airwaves across the Isles, Europe, and the world. Meanwhile, within the
narrower confines of the North, the slow but steady public inquiry into the
Renewable Heating Initiative, widely known as “the cash for ash” scandal, has
cast an unflattering searchlight on Foster and other key DUP figures, both
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
x Preface
ministers and their special advisors. The scandal has been described by the
Guardian’s Ireland correspondent, Rory Carroll, as just like the “Game of
Thrones: the big budget TV drama filmed in Northern Ireland with a sprawling
plot involving power, pillage, and fire. There is a vacant throne, a beleaguered
female leader surrounded by backstabbers, a kingdom with a deep treasure chest
across the sea and the risk that everything will be reduced to ash.”¹ Efforts by the
DUP to shift the blame to civil servants for the imbroglio have not been persua-
sive, though the civil service has not emerged unscathed from the probe. Key
officials admit, for example, not to have taken minutes of key meetings, allegedly
at the behest of DUP and Sinn Féin ministers. The inquiry’s report is yet to be
delivered, but the public evidence-taking has closed. Those who have watched and
listened to the proceedings will be very surprised if the report’s authors do not
expose at least some members of the DUP as poor and corrupt governors of the
public purse. Whether Sinn Féin will emerge fully vindicated remains to be seen.
Pro-unionist media will probably focus on the fact that the inquiry’s chair has
already portrayed rival departments, headed by DUP and Sinn Féin ministers, as
opportunistic alley cats, engaged in fighting their opposite numbers rather than
prioritizing good government. But it seems probable that a strong whiff of petty
kleptocracy among the DUP’s ranks is scheduled for judicial and judicious
indictment. As the inquiry proceeded, the DUP’s difficulties were magnified
when Ian Paisley Jr was exposed in yet another expenses scandal, which led on
this occasion to his suspension from the House of Commons. He narrowly
avoided, under newly established procedures, becoming the first Westminster
MP to be recalled by his constituency and obliged to restand in a special election.
He was spared that embarrassment solely because of an indefensible administra-
tive decision that made it far more difficult for many of his constituents to sign the
relevant petition than it need have been.
Petty corruption within the ranks of one of its two premier parties of govern-
ment is unfortunately a regrettably normal phenomenon in contemporary
democracies. It does not explain why Northern Ireland has been restored to global
media attention. Its constitutional and political status has become globally visible
again because it is now the key obstacle to the ambitions of those who ardently
want the UK to leave the EU. To the so-called Brexiteers, the Good Friday
Agreement either does not, or should not, constrain the UK’s departure from
the EU. Some of them affect outrage at the idea that one part of the UK may end
up being treated differently from another, even though the Good Friday Agree-
ment is the standing example of differential constitutional treatment of one
component of the UK. With brutal frankness, some polling has demonstrated
that a large portion of the English and Conservative public who favor the UK’s
departure from the EU simply do not care if that process is at the expense of the
Good Friday Agreement. Others, however, think very differently. The govern-
ments of the EU 27, and those in Great Britain who favor remaining in the EU, are
firmly agreed that Northern Ireland is the subject of an international treaty, which
the UK government should be obliged to uphold—even if it is determined to leave
the EU. In this judgment, May’s feet, and that of her cabinet colleagues, must be
Preface xi
held to the fire: Britannia may not waive the rules to which it has signed up, nor
should it be allowed to resile from the negotiating concessions that it made in
December 2017.
Before that last moment is briefly elaborated, one minor update is required. The
past tense is now required to describe Boris Johnson as the UK Foreign Secretary.
Having resigned in protest against Prime Minister Theresa May’s compromise
proposals for leaving the EU—the so-called Chequers Plan was unveiled in July
2018—Johnson has struggled to avoid consignment to what Trotsky once called
the dust heap of history. That Johnson’s ambition exceeds his abilities, or his
willingness to do his homework, is not world-historical news, nor a partisan
judgment. Indeed, these traits may prove no impediments to his ultimate ascent
to his party’s leadership and the UK premiership. What matters, for our purposes,
is what he exhibits, both in his impatience and in his expressions of impatience.
For now, the “Irish backstop” is the target of his wrath, the object through which
he presses his claim to become the best guardian of the UK’s exit. The backstop is
the proposal, to which May’s government, with Johnson in her cabinet, agreed in
December 2017, in solemn undertakings with the EU’s negotiators, in order to
allow the withdrawal negotiations to proceed to the next stage. As explained in the
concluding chapter of this volume, the backstop, if given credible legal framing,
would prevent, forever, the erection of fresh physical infrastructure on the border
created by the partition of 1920. Short of a technological miracle, it would apply in
all circumstances—even if Great Britain were fully to leave the EU’s customs
union and the single market. Johnson is not alone in complaining that the
backstop prevents the UK from exiting the EU on his preferred terms, though
his terms are invariably vague, romantic, and articulated in the future perfect
tense. He persistently gestures toward technological solutions to customs inspec-
tions, collection regimes, and regulatory monitors that are not yet known to public
officials or journalists, but he is scarcely singular in this respect.
Critics cannot decide whether Johnson advocates “Canada Dry” or “Canada ++,”
shorthand expressions for different ways of taking the UK out of the European
single market and customs union, as well as all of its other institutions. With no
formal withdrawal agreement on the terms of its secession from the EU, the UK
would head toward “Canada Dry”—namely, a hard and cliff-edge exit, as the saying
goes. By contrast, with a formal withdrawal agreement and a promised future
“special relationship” with the single market, the UK may accomplish “Canada
++”—namely, a hard exit with a transition period before a trade agreement is
completed with the EU. As I write, efforts are being made by May to lengthen
and soften that transition, and to avoid the backstop being made permanent. The
latter will be stoutly resisted by Ireland, especially by its Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar,
and its Tánaiste, Simon Coveney, and, Ireland assumes, by the EU 26.
Nearly one hundred years ago, as surveyed in Volume 2 of this treatise, Canada
was an ambiguous role model for the future Irish Free State in the negotiations
concluded under the auspices of Prime Minister David Lloyd George for Great
Britain, and of the Vice-President of Sinn Féin, Arthur Griffith. Today Canada is a
much more ambiguous role model. It is seen as a beacon for those would-be
British policymakers who disbelieve that it is usually more efficient to trade with
one’s immediate neighbors than with those who live and produce further afield.
The first British dominion, partly built by English and Scots settlers, has recently
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
xii Preface
completed a trade agreement with the EU, known as CETA, the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement—it was signed in October 2016. Its parties are
the EU, its member states, and Canada. Over two decades in the making, the
CETA was concluded after seven years of negotiations. This negotiating history,
especially its length, is cheerfully ignored by advocates of following “the Canada
option” for UKEXIT. They point out that the UK conforms for now to EU laws
and regulations, and therefore, they reason, making a UKCETA should be much
easier and faster than the making of the CETA. But the self-styled Bexiteers
frequently though conveniently fail to observe that the reason they prefer the
Canada option is precisely because they want to diverge from EU laws and
regulations. This openly expressed ambition alone makes a fast UKCETA much
less probable. The EU has diplomatically pointed to the CETA as one logical model
for future relations between the EU 27 and the UK, especially if the EU is expected
to take the London government at its word—namely, that it wants to be able to
make its own free trade agreements with other countries. But, no EU official whom
I have met or interviewed in 2017–18 expects or promises that a UKCETA will be
quickly or easily negotiated. Given the time spent in negotiating the so-far uncon-
cluded withdrawal agreement, experience suggests that it is EU officials who are
making the sounder judgment about the speed of future negotiations.
In 1921 the Welshman Lloyd George and his English Liberal and Conservative
partners insisted that Ireland had to remain within the British Empire. If it
seceded from the UK to become a dominion with the same status as Canada,
then it would have to grant Northern Ireland the right of secession from the Irish
Free State (subject to a boundary commission). In 2018, the EU’s chief negotiator,
Michel Barnier, insists that, if there is to be a withdrawal agreement with the UK,
and an agreed political declaration over future relations between the UK and the
EU, then there has to be watertight and permanent legal provisions that prevent
fresh infrastructure across the UK land border in Ireland, in effect keeping
Northern Ireland within the EU’s single market and the customs union. In
2016–18, as was true in 1919–21, talk of Canada was in the air partly because of
the recognition, insistence, or denial that Northern Ireland should be treated
differently. For Barnier’s negotiating team, with the full authority of the EU 27,
short of technological transformations, the Irish backstop has to apply, especially
if Great Britain later insists on having a relationship with the EU modeled on its
former North American colony—that is, outside the said customs union and
single market. Lloyd George kept the Irish Free State in the British Empire on a
Canadian model and Northern Ireland within the UK; by contrast, Michel Barnier
may keep Northern Ireland within the single market and customs union of the EU
while freeing Great Britain to pursue its Canadian dream. If the DUP succeeds in
blocking this possible compromise, it may have to do so at the expense of
precipitating a hard and cliff-edge exit, from which Great Britain, Ireland, and
Northern Ireland will suffer, probably in that order of magnitude of pain. We shall
see whose bluff is called.
Johnson’s successor as UK Foreign Secretary, for now, is Jeremy Hunt. At the
Conservative Party Conference of October 2018 he compared the EU to the
USSR. The suggestion met with frank astonishment by ambassadors from East
European member states who had grown up behind the iron curtain. They were
not tempted to smile. Few of them, however, could have had higher diplomatic
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
Preface xiii
expectations of Hunt than his immediate predecessor. Hunt, after all, had recently
managed to describe his Chinese wife, Lucia Guo, as Japanese in the course of
exchanging pleasantries with his Chinese hosts. In short order, a UK foreign
secretary who displays bigoted impatience with the Irish, and who denigrates
other Europeans, has been replaced by one who nervously gets spectacularly
wrong both the ethnicity of his own wife and the ethnic histories of his principal
interlocutors. These presentational problems are not just the standard problem of
arrogant males who refuse to listen or learn, or who assume that others are not
competent to assess their own histories and interests. Rather, they are symptom-
atic of a crisis of professional gravitas among the current Conservative leadership.
The syndrome is equally evident among female politicians, and not just May
and Foster. The newest occupant of the role of Her Majesty’s Principal Private
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is Karen Bradley MP. No evidence had
emerged to evaluate her ministerial worth when this volume was drafted, so the
text that follows avoided premature judgment. We now know a little more,
however, about this latest incumbent of a little-sought-after role. Bradley has a
BA in Mathematics from Imperial College London and was a professional tax
accountant in a previous life. She is therefore highly numerate. Yet she plainly
took no opportunity to learn imperial history at her alma mater. In September
2018 she told House magazine, the weekly circular of the mother of parliaments, of
her ignorance of Northern Ireland before May had assigned her to her new role.
“I didn’t understand things like when elections are fought, for example, in Northern
Ireland, people who are nationalists don’t vote for unionist parties and vice versa. So
the parties fight for the election within their own communities . . . That is a very
different world from the world I came from.” Indeed, Secretary of State. What,
however, was the more reprehensible in Bradley’s admission? Not knowing these
elementary political facts about Northern Ireland before her appointment, or being
entirely unembarrassed about subsequently revealing her ignorance on this matter
in a public interview that would be read by her peers?
Johnson, Hunt, May, and Bradley are among the latest in a line of English
politicians largely oblivious of Britain’s history in Ireland, and insensitive to the
potential pitfalls that their ignorance may trigger. At this moment in British–Irish
relations it may seem apt that figures from a Punch and Judy show are flitting
across the frozen stage. After all, negotiating UKEXIT, so far, resembles farce. But
tiresome and repetitive farce is not laugh inducing, and this farce cannot last
forever. The last rites may soon be performed on English imperial delusions, at the
hands of a Frenchman from central casting. The May government may surrender
to the EU, to be followed in turn by the Conservative party at Westminster, and
they may have enough Labour MPs to join them in steamrolling the DUP’s
resistance to the UK’s surrender to Brussels and the EU 27. If May does not
surrender, however, then the UK is programmed for a hard and cliff-edge exit that
she does not want, and for which her government and country are ill-prepared.
Unable to move in either direction, May could prove to be what George Osborne
has infamously described her as, “a dead woman walking.” She may yet be downed
in an internal Conservative heave. But there may also be no parliamentary
majority for any of the options facing the UK—a hard and cliff-edge exit with
no backstop (the Boris bluff); a soft exit that locks the UK permanently into the
customs union and the single market, making the backstop redundant (the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
xiv Preface
Preface xv
xvi Preface
comparisons, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity. In 2017, however, the World
Bank’s staff estimated Ireland’s GNI PPP at $61,910, just higher than that of the
USA, and significantly ahead of the UK’s $42,560.
There are at least two reasons why these updated economic data matter for the
future of the subjects considered in this volume. They suggest, first, that the Irish
economy can withstand the negative repercussions that may flow from a hard and
cliff-edge UKEXIT, and that it has sufficient resources and robustness to make the
structural, logistical, and transportation adjustments that any UKEXIT may make
necessary. Ireland can expect some solidarity from its EU partners if this scenario
comes to pass, but it need not rely upon it. Secondly, it suggests that, whether the
future brings forth a cliff-edge UKEXIT, or one with a feather-bed landing, or
indeed a reversal of UKEXIT, sovereign Ireland will be able to afford Irish
reunification, and that both the North and South will stand to gain materially
from doing so. Whether Ireland’s voters will support reunification in any refer-
endum subsequent to one held in the North is another matter. The author would
expect the Dublin region to have the highest number of voters who would tick
‘No’ to reunification, but also expects the rest of Ireland to vote strongly to
overturn the repercussions of centuries of conquest. Yet, if Irish reunification is
to happen, ’twere best if it were done with preparation.
A new ministry for Irish national reunification and reconciliation would not be
premature. Its first planning agenda should include a long constitutional conven-
tion to address the new institutional configurations, territorial order, and protec-
tions of minority rights that would be required to make a success of reunification,
and how Northerners could participate in the remaking of the island. This vista, of
course, will revive language from down the centuries, and tracked throughout
these volumes. Warnings of a loyalist backlash or forelash will rent the air. Yet, if
and when a referendum is won by advocates of Irish reunification, it is most
unlikely that British regiments will be deployed in de facto alliance with loyalist
militias—as occurred in 1920, and again after 1970. An Ireland, moreover, that
has prepared its constitution and its institutions with proper, prudent, and
consultative foresight may be able to reunify with its lost counties with minimal
threat to any human life. Though other malign vistas cannot be excluded—including
those that start with premises based on Albion’s record of treaty-breaking—the one
just briefly sketched seems far likelier than at any previous time in this author’s life.
As I close the composition of this Preface, it has been officially announced that
Ireland’s Constitution has been amended once more. Its blasphemy laws, under
which no one was ever convicted, have been removed with popular assent, and
President Michael D. Higgins, a democratic socialist and a political scientist, has been
elected to a second term in office. Ireland’s politics currently continue to move to a
different and warmer rhythm than in many other democracies, where bleak intim-
ations of fascism are palpable. For Northern Ireland, voluntarily, to join in Ireland’s
positive transformations, with significant support from among its Protestant popu-
lation, would certainly entitle others to complain of the luck of the Irish.
Brendan O’Leary
Philadelphia
October 2018
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 22/3/2019, SPi
Contents: Volume 3
Notes 365
Acknowledgments 391
Bibliography 397
Index of Names 429
General Index 439
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hand daily; but right hands and right eyes must be parted with for
Him, who ordereth all things well.
O help my unbelief!
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCVII.
To Mr. and Mrs. D――.
My dear Friends,
I HOPE this will find you not only at, but fixed at Bethesda. Your
brother James yesterday told me, “He thought it best.” It is not a
time to think of leaving a happy wilderness now. There’s more noise
in great cities. I am every day, every hour, almost every moment,
thinking of and preparing for America. A pilgrim life to me is the
sweetest on this side eternity. I am daily expecting Bethesda
accompts. I am daily waiting for the kingdom of God. God bless my
poor negroes. I am always, my dear friends,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCVIII.
To Mr. A――s.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCIX.
To the Reverend Mr. S――y.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCX.
To Mr. R―― K――n.
My dear Friend,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXI.
To Mr. W――hy.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXII.
To Mr. R―― K――n,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXIII.
To the Same.
My dear Friend,
G. W.
♦ “Chentlenam” replaced with “Cheltenham”
LETTER MCCCCXIV.
To Mr. J――s.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXV.
To Mr. T―― A――ms.
I suppose you will sing that hymn soon; and if we should die in
singing it? What then? Why then, welcome, welcome eternity! God
bless you all! Yesterday I saw your sister J――s comforted under her
trial. I see, whether married or single, thorns in the flesh we must
have. But Christ’s grace will be sufficient for us. Hallelujah!
Hallelujah! Brethren, pray for us. Cordial respects to Mrs. A――s; I
think her name is Phebe. I hope to send a few lines to Mrs. R――s
and Mrs. H――r very soon; in the mean while entreat them, and all
like-minded, to accept most grateful acknowledgments, and most
cordial respects, and be assured of being always remembered in the
poor prayers of, my very dear Tommy,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXVI.
To Mr. S―― S――.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXVII.
To the Same.
H OW glad was I to find, that you could write so long a letter! Who
knows but the withered hand may be yet stretched out? “Abba,
Father!” all things are possible with thee! Grant it, if it be thy blessed
will, for Jesus Christ’s sake! This leaves me a little recovering from
my late indisposition, consequently it leaves me singing, “He will not
always be chiding, neither will he keep his anger for ever.” How truly,
how incomparably great, will these loving corrections make us in a
future state? Then shall we sing without sorrowing,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXVIII.
To Mr. R―― K――n.
I THANK you for your intended benefaction. Our Lord will write
himself your debtor for it. His interest is pretty good, “a hundred
fold.” A hundred fold! what can the most avaricious trader desire
more? It comes very opportunely; for in looking over my Georgia
letters this morning, I find Mr. Dixon desires me to purchase negro
cloth, and osnabrigs for the negroes, in London; it will be a great
saving, and render double service to my dear orphan family. In about
a month or five weeks I hope to set sail. I long for your return, wish
you could shorten your Scarborough expedition. I want to consult you
in many things; and in particular, to have proper writings drawn up,
empowering you, as my attorney, to act in all things as if I was
present. O that you may have the presence of our great Advocate, to
guide, guard, and protect you in journeying! May he be a wall of fire
round about you, and be your wisdom, righteousness, sanctification,
and all in all! My hearty love to Mr. E――ds, Mr. G――th, Mr.
A――ge, &c. &c. That the Lord may richly reward you for all your
disinterested labours of love, and bless you and yours in time and
eternity, is the constant prayer of, my dear dear friend,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXIX.
To Mr. B――s.
My dear Sir,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXX.
To Mr. J――s.
My dear Captain,
M Y last to ――, will make you guess that my hands and heart are
full. Last night I went on board the Friendship; the Captain is
to dine with me to-morrow. I expect to sail the first week in
September at furthest. You must be then in town. Mr. Brooksbanks (if
Mr. K――n does not come) will supply your place. I hope all things
will be settled on a right plan. You may be assured of my having,
under God, the greatest confidence in you. I only wish some means
may be found out to save the late great expence of coach hire. It
hath mounted very high. But more of this when we meet. Blessed be
God for smiling on your labours. This is the way; you need not be
exhorted to continue to walk in it. God bless you! God bless you! Mr.
K――n is expected from his Yorkshire tour on Saturday. All is well at
home. Cordial love to all. Brethren, pray for us. With regret I am
obliged to hasten to subscribe myself, my dear man,
LETTER MCCCCXXI.
To Mr. T―― A――ms.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXXII.
To Mr. J――ss.
B LESSED, for ever blessed be the God and Father of our Lord
Jesus Christ, for causing his word so to run, and so to be
glorified in your hands. No wonder that you meet with a thorn in the
flesh. But we know who hath said, “My grace is sufficient for thee.” I
have no objection against your circuit westward. I believe it will be a
blessing to many souls. In a few days I expect to hear that either Mr.
D――cy or S――y will be in town. If so, you may proceed; if not, I
must beg you to be here at the time of my departure. Ten days, and
then. What then? You may guess. God bless you and yours. God
bless all dear, christian, never-to-be-forgotten Bristol friends. Last
Thursday evening was a parting letter-night indeed. A night much to
be remembered. Your flaming letter was read. That God may make
you flame more and more, till you are called to be a flaming seraph in
yonder heaven, earnestly prays, my very dear man,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXXIII.
To Mr. T―― A――ms.
A LTHOUGH I could not write to you whilst ashore, yet I must drop
you a few lines now I am come aboard. Just now we have
taken up the anchor: and I trust my anchor is cast within the veil,
where the ground will never give way, otherwise, how should I have
stood the shock of parting, and put to sea at this time, or rather at
this decline of life? But our God can, and our God does renew both
bodily and spiritual strength. I have not been in better spirits for some
years; and I am persuaded this voyage will be for the Redeemer’s
glory, and the welfare of precious and immortal souls. I am assured I
fare the better for the prayers of my dear very dear Gloucestershire
friends. Our parting solemnities have been exceedingly awful; and I
thank God for giving me the honour of taking my leave on Sunday
afternoon at Gravesend market-place. O for this rambling way of
preaching till I die! If Mrs. H――ker gets into harbour before me, she
will be well off. Cordial respects await her, your wife, Mrs. R――ts,
and all the friends of Zion. O England! England! God preserve thee
from and divert every threatening storm! Follow, follow with your
prayers, and assure yourselves of not being forgotten by, my very
dear friends,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXXIV.
To Mrs. H――ge.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXXV.
To Mr. and Mrs. S――n.
Dear Friends,
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXXVI.
To Mr. W――hy.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXXVII.
To Mrs. M――.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXXVIII.
To Mr. R―― K――n.
G. W.
LETTER MCCCCXXIX.
To Mr. and Mrs. F――tt.