Vol. 19, No.

1, March 2007
Al-Masaq,

Between Baybars and Qalaw
un:

Under-age Rulers

Sultanate
and Succession in the Early Mamluk

ANGUS STEWART

ABSTRACT While royal minorities are often portrayed as times of instability and to be
avoided at all costs by those in power, a look at the experience of the early Mamluk

Sultanate shows another aspect to the role of child rulers. In a period where rules of
succession were subject to competing forces – heredity versus ability – the nominal, and
temporary, rule of a minor could be used to provide an element of stability until a new
strongman could emerge from among the ruling Mamluk
élite to take the title, as well as
the actuality, of power.
Keywords: Mamluk
sultanate; Rulership – underage rulers; Baraka Kh
an,

sultan; Qal
awun,
Mamluk
Mamluk
sultan; Egypt – politics

Underneath the broad parasol of the International Medieval Congress in Leeds in

July 2005 was a self-contained strand concerned with aspects of ‘under-age rule’
in the Middle Ages.1 This was a comparative strand, with papers ranging in time
from Late Antiquity to the fifteenth century, and in place from Scotland to
Baghdad, considering matters of minority rule, succession, teenage rebellion,
education, and the role of courtly milieus. In his erudite analysis of the iconography
of the Late Roman Empire, Ralph Mathisen suggested in his paper that, ‘‘child
emperors existed for only one purpose: to continue the imperial dynasty’’.2 While it
may be tempting to look for parallels between the Empire of Rome and its late-
medieval Cairene successor, with the Mamluks
as some sort of Praetorian Guard,3

Correspondence: Angus Stewart, School of History, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Fife KY16
9AL, Scotland. E-mail: ads@st-andrews.ac.uk

1
‘‘Aspects of Medieval Political Culture in the Latin West, the Byzantine Commonwealth and the
Islamic World: Under-Age Rule’’. I would like to thank the organisers of this strand, Jo Van Steenbergen
(University of St Andrews) and Björn Weiler (University of Wales, Aberystwyth), for inviting me to
contribute, and also Simon MacLean (University of St Andrews), for our fruitful conversations.
2
Ralph W. Mathisen (University of Illinois), ‘‘Child Emperors in the Late Roman Empire: The
Iconography of Youth’’.
3
Robert Irwin, writing about early mamluk
regimes across the Islamic world, drew such a comparison,
while making it clear that ‘‘the analogies are only occasional and partial’’: The Middle East in the Middle
Ages (Beckenham, 1986), p. 7. Peter Thorau, in his study of Baybars, casually refers to the ‘‘praetorian
guard of the Bahri Mamluks [which] gloriously distinguished itself by its victory at Mansur

a over the
_ _
Crusaders and at 6Ayn J
alut
over the Mongols’’: The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in
the Thirteenth Century, tr. P.M. Holt (London, 1992), p. 113.

ISSN 0950–3110 print/ISSN 1473–348X online/07/010047-8 ß 2007 Society for the Medieval Mediterranean
DOI: 10.1080/09503110601068547
48 Angus Stewart

in this paper I intend to argue that in the early Mamluk
Sultanate, child sultans had
a precisely opposite purpose.
This paper is not so much concerned with the nature or theory of ‘under-age
rule’, or even of ‘under-age rulers’, but with the nature of succession in the early
Mamluk
Sultanate, and the role of under-age sultans in this, concentrating on the
period between the two greatest early Sultans, Baybars and Qal
awun,
but also
looking at events from the wider period. This topic relates closely to the nature of
Mamluk
political culture, especially to the key problem of legitimacy.
From its foundation, the nascent Mamluk
Sultanate saw a tension regarding
succession, between competing ‘hereditary’ and ‘mamluk’
principles. It seems clear
that there was a consistent desire for the political ‘legitimacy’ conferred by
hereditary succession. We see repeated attempts to secure the succession of sons of
sultans, for example, after the deaths of Aybak, Baybars and Qal
awun.
There was
also a conscious harking back to the Ayyubid
past. The earliest Mamluk
rulers
looked to rule in the name of Ayyubid
boys, alive or dead: Shajarat al-Durr’s
rulership was proclaimed as resulting from her motherhood of (the long-deceased)
Khalil, son of al-Sa
lih Ayyub;
4 an Ayyubid
princeling, al-Ashraf Mus

a, was
_ _
installed as sultan as a compromise candidate between rival Mamluk
factions from
1250–52. The coins produced for Aybak implied he was still merely al-S
alih
_


Ayyub’s deputy;5 as late as the reign of Qal
awun,
mamluks
being promoted to the
rank of amir swore their oath of loyalty to the sultan over al-Sa
lih Ayyub’s
tomb.
_ _
Baybars, the murderer, it must be remembered, of al-Mu6azzam Tur

ansh
ah son of
__

was presented by his official biographer Ibn 6Abd al-Za
hir as the
al-Sa
lih Ayyub,
_ _ _
latter’s natural heir since by being educated in his household he better absorbed and
represented his qualities than the sultan’s son and immediate successor.6 The
ongoing appeal of the Mamluks’


Ayyubid heritage had always, however, to be
balanced against the permanent need for effective – and that is, mamluk
– rule.
Many of the structural problems concerning succession in Mamluk
society were
to do with the nature of the Mamluk
institution itself.7 Mamluks
were slaves by
origin: they did not represent a distinct tribe, clan or dynasty, but a class, a military
4
The formula used on her coins was malikat al-muslimin, wa
lidat al-malik al-mansur
amir (‘Queen of the
_
Muslims, Mother of al-Malik al-Mansur
Amir’): see Paul Balog, The Coinage of the Mamluk Sultans of
_
Egypt and Syria (New York, 1964), p. 71. She also signed decrees as umm khalil (‘the Mother of Khalil’):
see P.M. Holt, The Age of the Crusades: the Near East from the Seventh Century to 1517 (London, 1986),
p. 83. For a general background and amplification of the political history of the Mamluk Sultanate in the
period considered in this paper, see Irwin, The Middle East, pp. 18–104, to which this paper owes a

see also Linda Northrup,
general debt, as will become clear. For details of the life and career of Qal
awun,
From Slave To Sultan: the Career of al-Mansur
Qala
wun

and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and
_
Syria (678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D.) (Stuttgart, 1998).
5
Balog, Coinage, 12: ‘‘Aybak went so far as to revive al-Sa
lih Ayyub’s

protocol on the dinar and inscribed
_ _
only his name, without any title, underneath, as if he were still his long deceased master’s lieutenant
only.’’ Balog notes that the Sa
lihi relationship was used by successive sultans (Baybars I, Qal
awun,

_ _
L
ajin), replacing the normal genealogical formula, on their coins (Coinage, 15).
6
Irwin, The Middle East, 44; Thorau, Lion of Egypt, 98–99; P.M. Holt, ‘Succession in the Early Mamluk
Sultanate’ in E. von Schuler (ed.), XXIII. Deutscher Orientalistentag: Ausgewählte Vorträge (Stuttgart,
1989), 144–148; here 147. Holt also points out that in his biography of Qal
awun,
Sh
afi6 b. 6Ali also
attempts to present that Sultan as the heir to al-Sa
lih Ayyub.

7 _ _
On the mamluk
institution, see the classic work of David Ayalon: for example, ‘L’Esclavage du
mamelouk’, Oriental Notes and Studies 1 (Jerusalem, 1951); or the studies collected together in
The Mamluk
Military Society (London, 1979). For a recent summary of the topic, see Amalia Levanoni,
A Turning Point in Mamluk History (Leiden, 1995), pp. 14–27.

Sultanate
Under-age Rulers and Succession in the Early Mamluk 49

cadre. The individual mamluks
were recruited (that is, enslaved) as pagan boys and
brought up in the household of their master, perhaps an ex-mamluk
slave himself.
After a period of training and some religious instruction, they were converted to
Islam and manumitted. This meant that the sons of mamluks
were free-born
Muslims: they could never be mamluks
themselves. Instead they formed their own
class in society, referred to as the awlad
al-nas,

literally, ‘the sons of the [i.e.,
important] people’. While in theory there was no obstacle for the son of a mamluk

to inherit his father’s property, he would not be in a position to follow his father into
the Mamluk
ruling élite. This was an especial problem with regard to sultans:
should the successor be the son of the previous sultan – and therefore not a mamluk

– or the most able mamluk
amir? This practical question obviously led to serious
theoretical questions about the nature of Mamluk
political culture: should the
sultan be a figurehead, or a holder of effective power?8 This was all the more
important to the Mamluk
Sultans as their very raison d’être was their military role as
defenders of the d
ar al-isla
m against the Frankish crusaders and, above all, against
the Mongols.9 The sultan was expected to provide able and vigorous generalship.
For instance, in 1281, an experienced and respected sultan (although admittedly
only recently enthroned, and not with universal acclamation) was threatened by his
amirs with effective deposition if he continued with his cautious tactics and failed to
march to confront the huge Il-Kh
anid invasion force.10 One could not reasonably
expect such a role of a child sultan.

The succession to Baybars

Al-Za
hir Baybars certainly excelled at this military aspect of the sultan’s office.
_
Perhaps the zenith of his career as general was his great invasion of Anatolia in
1277, where he wiped out a Mongol army, and had himself crowned as sultan

of Rum),
(this time as heir to the S
aljuks
before returning to Syria.11 This was to be
his last expedition as he died in Damascus on 20 June 1277, perhaps after drinking
bad qummis.12
The succession to Baybars had long been prepared, and in a manner familiar to
any student of medieval Western dynasties. In 1264, his four-year-old son, Baraka
8
In the interdisciplinary spirit of this paper’s origins, it must be observed that this potestas/nomen debate
is by no means confined to Cairo in the later thirteenth century. An obvious comparison is provided by
the question sent by the Frankish Mayor of the Palace, Pippin (III), to Pope Zacharias in 750, asking
whether the rightful king should be the man who actually exercised power, rather than the impotent
scion of a long-standing dynasty. Threatened by the Lombards in Italy, the pope replied that ‘‘it was
better to call king the one who had the royal power’’. The last of the Merovingians was removed, and
Pippin made king in 751. On this episode, see, for example, Matthias Becher und Jörg Jarnut (eds),
Der Dynastiewechsel von 751: Vorgeschichte, Legitimationsstrategien und Erinnerung (Münster, 2004); for a
summary account, see, for example, Roger Collins, Early Medieval Europe (London, 1991), p. 258.
9
This role of the early Mamluk
Sultans is stressed in their biographies – see Holt, ‘Succession’, 147–48.
10
On these events, preceding the battle of Hims in October 1281, see: Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols
_ _
and Mamluks: the Mamluk-;lkha
nid War, 1260–81 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 188; and Northrup, From Slave
to Sultan, 108–9. Sources for this incident include Ibn al-Daw
ad
ari (Kanz al-durar wa-ja
mi6 al-ghurar,
VIII, ed. Ulrich Haarmann (Quellen zur Geschichte des Islamischen Ägyptens vol. Ih; Freiburg, 1971),


241–42) and al-Yunini (Dhayl mir8a
t al-zama
n fi ta8rikh al-a6y
an (partial ed. in 4 vols, Hyderabad,
1954–61), IV, 91).
11
On this invasion, see Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 157–79; Thorau, Lion of Egypt, 235–40.
12
For an analysis of the sources relating to Baybars’ death, see Thorau, Lion of Egypt, 240–43.
50 Angus Stewart

Kh
an, before the ceremonies attendant on his circumcision, was proclaimed sultan,
and the army took an oath of loyalty. In 1267 this oath of loyalty was renewed.
The young apprentice-sultan was brought into the centre of the administration:
Baraka Kh
an was made the nominal ruler of Egypt during his father’s absences,
with Baybars’ favourite mamluk,
Bilik al-Kh
azind
ar, as his tutor or governor. When
Baybars returned to Egypt, his son would ride out to greet him, and, before the
army, they would embrace – as if equals. In order to strengthen his position vis-à-vis
the Mamluk
élite, Baraka Kh
an was not only associated with Bilik, the foremost

but also with one of the senior Sa
lihi amirs (that is, former confreres
Za
hiri mamluk,
_ _ _
of Baybars in al-Sa
lih Ayyub’s

household), Qal
awun
al-Alfi, to whose daughter
_ _
he was betrothed in 1276. Al-Sa6id Baraka Kh
an was seventeen at his father’s
death, and had been carefully groomed to succeed as sultan. To secure a smooth
succession, the faithful Bilik ensured that Baybars’ death was kept secret until the
body was brought to Egypt, and his heir could succeed unopposed. Baybars’ great
care in selecting and promoting his heir proved to be successful.13

The reign of al-Sa6id Baraka Khan

Baraka Kh
an was no child sultan: at seventeen he certainly did not see himself as an
‘under-age ruler’. In fact, he chafed under the tutelage of Bilik, who had been his
guardian for a decade. Immediately following the new sultan’s accession, Bilik died,
probably poisoned. He was replaced as na
8ib (literally, ‘‘deputy’’ but in effect chief
minister) by a series of amirs; many of the senior Sa
lihi amirs were
_ _
imprisoned. Finally, in 1278, Baraka Kh
an appointed as his n
a8ib Kunduk
al-Za
hiri, one of the young mamluks
of his father’s household that had been
_
educated alongside the young sultan. This can be read as a clear sign that Baraka
Kh
an was favouring his (young) associates over the old guard of the Sa
lihis and
_ _
the more senior Za
hiris.14
_
Later in 1278 Baraka Kh
an decided to remove the two most powerful Sa
lihi
_ _
amirs – Qal
awun
and Baysari al-Shamsi – from Cairo. They were sent with an army
to attack the Armenian kingdom, a favourite target for the Mamluks
following the
enthusiastic Armenian participation in Hülegü’s invasion of Syria.15 The campaigns
led by Qal
awun
and Baysari, both against Cilicia and the Armenian catholicos’


outpost on the Euphrates to the east, H_romgla or Qal6at al-Rum, seem to have been
rather desultorily executed: the most notable event was the digging up of H_romgla’s
baths and their removal to the main Mamluk
fortress on the Euphrates
downstream, al-Bira. While it may seem dangerous for the sultan to have put
such potential threats as these two in charge of his armies, Baraka Kh
an’s aim seems
to have been to take advantage of their absence to strip their wealth and redistribute
their incomes. This plan, however, was not helped by squabbling among the young
mamluks
now controlling affairs in Cairo. Kunduk, removed as na
8ib, entered
into correspondence with the two absent Sa
lihi amirs, warning them of Baraka
_ _
13
For the death of Baybars, the accession of Baraka Kh
an, and its immediate aftermath, see, for
example, the account of Baybars al-Mansuri,
Zubdat al-fikra fi ta8rikh al-hijra, ed. D.S. Richards (Beirut,
_
1998), pp. 160–65; Ibn al-Daw
ad
ari, Kanz al-durar, VIII, 208–12, 219.
14
This agrees with the analysis of Holt, ‘Succession’, 146.
15
On these matters, see A.D. Stewart, The Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks (Leiden, 2001),
especially, p. 53.

Sultanate
Under-age Rulers and Succession in the Early Mamluk 51

and Baysari waited until their return to Cairo to openly

Kh
an’s plans. Qal
awun
revolt; in August 1279, his position untenable, Baraka Kh
an abdicated, and went
into exile.16
The swift collapse of his position indicates that Baraka Kh
an has simply failed to
establish secure rule. He had alienated too many interested and powerful parties,
while lacking himself a strong personal powerbase, such as would be provided by a
large household of dedicated mamluks.
Instead he relied on his unruly and
inexperienced kh
assakiyya, or bodyguard, of Za
hiri mamluks.

When more establ-
__ _
ished factions came together against him, these were to prove utterly insufficient.

The reign of al-6Adil Salamish

Qal
awun
was central to the negotiations that established the revolt against Baraka
Kh
an, and also – especially – in the negotiations for the young sultan’s abdication.
Given his wealth and personal authority, Qal
awun
was the prime candidate for the


throne. Characteristically, however, Qal
awun was careful to make sure his position
was strong enough before making a decisive play for the throne. The result was the
elevation of another son of Baybars, the eleven-year-old Sal
amish, while Qal
awun

himself took the tile of at
abak, or guardian of the young sultan, in addition to his
roles as commander of the army and head of the government. Clearly the effective
wielder of power, Qal
awun
was able to maintain and build up his own support base:
always the key factor in establishing secure political authority. The – mostly very


pro-Qal
awunid
as being punctiliously loyal to
– sources generally present Qal
awun
Baybars’ line, and certainly not seeking rule. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he
used the puppet rule of Sal
amish as an opportunity to build up his own power and
support. Qal
awun,
not the sultan, was the source of patronage, the oil that
lubricated the Mamluk
machine. Senior amirs were bound to Qal
awun’s
regime –
and/or removed from Cairo: Baybars’ great friend Sunqur al-Ashqar was made
na
8ib of Damascus, in an attempt (not wholly successful, as it turned out) to


reconcile him to Qal
awun’s administration, or at least to remove him from Cairo,
the hub of Mamluk
politics. Qal
awun
infiltrated his own men into the upper
echelons of government: his mamluk
Furun3
ay was made na
8ib al-sal3ana in Egypt,

even sought, with success, to win over the
effectively the sultan’s deputy. Qal
awun
surviving Za
hiri amirs. Eventually, after all these preparations, Qal
awun
allowed
_
himself to be persuaded to take personal rule: the Mamluk
sultan had to be both
an effective leader of the armies and an effective head of the government. A child
sultan obviously failed on both counts, so Qal
awun
overcame his fidelity to the
memory of his old colleague Baybars, and acceded as Sultan al-Mansur.
17
_
16
On these events – the campaign against H_romgla up to the abdication of Baraka Kh
an – see, for
example, the account of Baybars al-Mansuri,
Zubdat al-fikra, 166–72. Happenings at al-Bira (modern
_
Birecik) are threatening H_romgla (Rumkale) once more: the waters behind the Birecik dam have already
flooded the lower work at the fortress, and consequent erosion threatens the site as a whole. On H_romgla
and its eventual Mamluk conquest in 1292, see A. Stewart, ‘Qal6at al-Rum/H_
romgla/Rumkale and the
Mamluk Siege of 691AH/1292CE’, in Hugh Kennedy (ed.), Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria
(Leiden, 2006), pp. 269–80; and H. Hanisch, Hromklay: Die armenisch Klosterfestung am Euphrat
(Bregenz, 2002).
17

see, for example, the account of Baybars
On the short reign of Sal
amish and the accession of Qal
awun,

Zubdat al-fikra, 173–74; Ibn al-Daw
ad
ari, Kanz al-durar, VIII: 227–31; for a Damascene
al-Mansuri,
_


perspective, see al-Yunini, Dhayl mir8a
t al-zam
an (Hyderabad ed.), IV: 7–9.
52 Angus Stewart

The usefulness of child sultans

An adult non-mamluk
ruler was a potential threat to an existing Mamluk
élite.

It was always possible that he might have his own ideas about important matters
such as the exercise of patronage. Keen to build up his own support base, he might
divert patronage away from those hitherto accustomed to its receipt. A child sultan,
on the other hand, would be much more malleable – the élite could continue to
control affairs. In this way, Sal
amish was far preferable to his elder brother Baraka
Kh
an. His reign was always intended to be temporary, only a stop-gap measure,
until a more permanent succession could be arranged.
It is commonplace to view periods of minority rule as periods of instability: a
time for rivals to put forward their claims, and for unruly nobles to rise up
against the oppressive yoke of centralising government. These were periods to be
avoided by those with a stake in government. Given the lack of clear rules
governing succession in the early Mamluk
Sultanate, one would expect this
recipe for instability to have been avoided. It seems, however, that child sultans
were seen as a useful tool allowing the élite – the senior Mamluk
amirs – to
shape the political destiny. Behind the scenes, power struggles raged, but the
child sultan – himself uninvolved and no threat – was there to ensure these
power struggles remained politic rather than exploding into violent civil war.
The child sultan was a helpful expedient until the new strongman could emerge,
having built up a sufficient power base, sufficient support among the senior
Mamluk
élite, and sufficient reputation as a leader. The child ex-sultan could
then be sent into exile: in the case of Sal
amish, as with Baraka Kh
an, to the
fortress of Kerak in Jordan.18
This interpretation does not merely rest on the example of Sal
amish. After the
murder of al-Mu6izz Aybak in 1257, his fifteen-year-old son 6Ali was made sultan
(as al-Mansur).
His two-year reign allowed Aybak’s most favoured mamluk,

_
Qutuz, to out-manoeuvre his rivals, such as the at
abak Sanjar al-Halabi, who was
_
imprisoned. Eventually, the threat posed by the Mongol invasion of Syria – and,
therefore, the need for the sultan to provide effective military leadership – was
enough to excuse 6Ali’s deposition and al-Muzaffar Qutuz’s accession, in November
_
1259.19 As Irwin points out, the reign of the young sultan ‘‘served only to provide a
20
façade of stable legitimacy’’. It is clear that this technique was used repeatedly
during the formative decades of the Mamluk
Sultanate.
The system was by no means, however, infallible. The succession to Qal
awun

himself was far from straightforward. The groomed successor, al-Sa
lih 6Ali,
_ _
18
Kerak certainly became the customary place to send an exiled child-sultan, but was close enough to
the centres of power for the possibility of the emergence of restoration plots (see, for example, Northrup,
From Slave to Sultan, 88–90). Qal
awun
had the surviving sons of Baybars moved from Kerak to closer
supervision in Cairo; his son and successor, al-Ashr
af Khalil (on whom, see below), felt it expedient to
send them to a new home, in Constantinople (see Baybars al-Mansuri,
Zubdat al-fikra, 254–55 – which
_
includes the writer’s involvement, escorting them to Cairo, and his own appointment as governor of
Kerak – and 286–87).
19
Holt (‘Succession’, 145) quotes al-Maqrizi’s account of Qutuz’s speech suggesting, implicitly, an
emphasis of mamlu
k practicality over dynastic legitimacy: ‘‘My only aim is to unite us to fight the
Mongols, and this cannot be achieved without a king. If we go out and defeat this enemy, the affair is in
your hands – install as sultan whom you will.’’ For a slightly earlier account of Qutuz’s accession, see, for
example, Ibn al-Daw
ad
ari, Kanz al-durar, VIII, 38–39.
20
Irwin, The Middle East, 29.

Sultanate
Under-age Rulers and Succession in the Early Mamluk 53

predeceased his father, so that Qal
awun’s
less popular son, al-Ashraf Khalil,
eventually succeeded in 1290, aged twenty-seven.21 He proved to be a dynamic
ruler and it was under his leadership that the Mamluks
threw the last remnants of
the Crusader States into the sea. He was never popular, however, nor was he ever
able to build up his own power base.22 In December 1293 he was murdered by a
group of mamluks
led by the powerful Mansuri
amir Baydar
a, who had been too
_
powerful for Khalil to depose – yet – but who felt threatened. Baydar
a, however,
did not represent a consensus of Mamluk
opinion, and he and most of his
co-conspirators were viciously executed. Once again, with no obvious candidate for


the throne among the élite, a child sultan was installed, this time Qal
awun’s young
son al-N
asir Muhammad.23 Again, as Irwin points out, ‘‘the convention of rule by a
_ _
child sultan was employed to mask the manoeuvrings’’ of the amirs, this time from
24


among Qal
awun’s former household, the Mansuriyya.
After the killing of one of
_
the main candidates, Sanjar al-Shuj
a6i, the other, Kitbugh
a al-Mansuri
emerged as
_
the new sultan in 1294, with the title al-6Adil. Kitbugh
a, however, seems to have
moved too soon: he was not unchallenged, and was not strong enough to establish
his rule on a firm footing. After a coup in 1296, Kitbugh
a abdicated, allowing
another strongman to chance his arm.25 Al-Mansur
L
ajin ruthlessly sought to
_
exploit his position to build up his faction – again, amirs were sent on a campaign
against the Armenian kingdom, in order that the sultan could redistribute their
incomes in their absence – but in doing so he antagonised too many powerful
parties, and he was murdered in 1298. After the failure of first Baydar
a, and then
Kitbugh
a and L
ajin to establish secure rule, there were no obvious candidates left,
and so the child-sultan expedient was used again to end the increasingly violent
contention for power. Al-N
asir Muhammad was recalled to rule in name for a
_ _
second period, again as cover for a power struggle, this time between Baybars
al-Jashnakir and Sal
ar, two more Mansuri
amirs.26 No longer a child, and fed up
_
with the emptiness of his title, al-N
asir Muhammad abdicated unexpectedly in
_ _
1308, forcing the issue of who actually was to wield effective power: (al-Muzaffar)
_
Baybars (II) took the title, but his authority was insufficiently strong to ensure
widespread support. While the new sultan and his overmighty subject Sal
ar
squabbled, the exiled al-N
asir was able to build up his own support. In 1310,
_
the latter was able to resume power, and this time on his own terms, which included

21
On the death of Qal
awun
and the accession of al-Ashraf Khalil, see, for example, Baybars al-Mansuri,

_
Zubdat al-fikra, 270–273; Ibn al-Daw
ad
ari, Kanz al-durar, VIII: 301–5.
22
It is even possible that he was rather too bellicose even for the Mamluks: on his campaigns, and for this
suggestion, see A.D. Stewart, ‘The Logic of Conquest: Tripoli, 1289; Acre, 1291; Why not Sis, 1293?’,
Al-Masa
q, 14 (2002): 7–16.
23
On these events, see, for example, Baybars al-Mansuri,
Zubdat al-fikra, 295–300; Abu
l-Fid
a8,
_
al-Mukhtasar fi akhba
r al-bashar, in P.M. Holt (extracts tr.), The Memoirs of a Syrian Prince: Abu’l-Fid
a8,
_
Sultan of H ama
h (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 22–23; Ibn al-Daw
ad
ari, Kanz al-durar, VIII: 345–53.
24 _
Irwin, The Middle East, 85.
25
On the takeovers of Kitbugh
a and L
ajin, see, for example, Baybars al-Mansuri,
Zubdat al-fikra, 305–6,
_
310–13; Abu
l-Fid
a8, Mukhtasar, 23–24, 26–27; Ibn al-Daw
ad
ari, Kanz al-durar, VIII, 357–58, 365–66.
_
While Kitbugh
a kept al-N
asir Muhammad in the citadel of Cairo, L
ajin sent him to Kerak.
26 _ _
On the killing of L
ajin and the restoration of al-N
asir Muhammad, see, for example, Baybars
_ _
al-Mansuri,
Zubdat al-fikra, 323–26; Abu
l-Fid
a8, Mukhtasar, 32–33; Ibn al-Daw
ad
ari, Kanz al-durar,
_ _


VIII, 376–84; al-Yunini, Dhayl mir8a
t al-zam
an, in Li Guo (ed. and tr.), Early Mamluk Syrian
Historiography (volumes I–II; Leiden, 1998), I (tr.): 113–17, II (ed.): 56–60.
54 Angus Stewart

the deaths of both Baybars and Sal
ar. Thus began the long, secure and autocratic
third reign of al-N
asir Muhammad.27
_ _
The question remains as to why the two early reigns of al-N
asir Muhammad did
_ _
not see the emergence of a successful ‘strongman’. This may have been a
consequence of the increasing complexity of Mamluk
society. The withering away
of the old Sa
lihi élite – the amirs of al-Sa
lih Ayyub’s

household, who had been
_ _ _ _
responsible for the establishment of the Mamluk
Sultanate in the first place –
perhaps led to a break-up of an early sense of corporate identity, limited as that may
have been. Ideas of dynastic legitimacy certainly survived, even as they were
unobserved – as seen in Qal
awun’s
stated support for the line of Baybars – and,
in default of any new candidate strong enough to impose himself, these transferred
from the Ayyubid


line to the Qal
awunid: which survived, latterly under a
lengthy series of mostly child nominal sultans, until the usurpation of al-Za
hir
_
Barquq
in 1382.28
As suggested above, periods of under-age rule are often viewed as periods of
potential trouble, when a dynasty had to be maintained at the possible – and,
hopefully, temporary – cost of unstable administration. Nevertheless, if well
managed, the early Mamluk
experience suggests that having a child ruler could aid
stability. The child sultan, his rule intended as a stopgap, could provide a fig-leaf of
legitimacy allowing a political strongman to strengthen, secure and impose his
regime. When the system failed, there was instability, and a possible sequence of
weak sultans – but this was not necessarily during the minority rule itself, but after a
precipitate seizure of the sultan’s office by an insufficiently supported amir. When
the system worked, a successful strongman could out-manoeuvre his rivals
relatively peacefully, obviating the need for open and violent confrontation, and
minimising the harmful effect of a usurpation on overall Mamluk
power. In the
early Mamluk
Sultanate, child sultans were there to facilitate transmission from one
effective mamluk
sultan to another, while maintaining the unity and power of the
Mamluk
Sultanate itself. Dynastic considerations, while present, were secondary.

27
On these events, see the analysis of Levanoni, A Turning Point, especially 28–30.
28


On these later Qal
awunid child sultans, and the nature of their rule, see the contribution by Jo Van

under-age rule and the later Qal
awunids’,
Steenbergen’s article ‘‘‘Is anyone my guardian. . . ?’’ Mamluk

in Al-Masa
q, 19, i (2007) 55–65.