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Victory
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Victory
The Triumph and Tragedy of Just War
C IA N O’ D R I S C O L L
1
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1
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Preface
This book has its origins in a workshop I attended at Saint Andrews University
several years ago. The workshop, which was a very enjoyable occasion, involved
several just war theorists working onjus post bellum issues. When the conversa-
tion got bogged down in definitional disputes over how to define the ‘end’ or ‘end-
ings’ of war, I suggested that we, as just war scholars, should perhaps think about
using the more direct language of victory/defeat in its stead. While I will be the
first to admit that my proposal, naïve as it was, was not especially interesting in its
own right, the response it elicited surprised me. As I recall it, all the just war
scholars in the room were convinced—emphatically so—that it was a verybad
idea. I am accustomed to people disagreeing with me, but the unusual occurrence
of so many academics agreeing with one another tweaked my curiosity. Why did
they think it would be such a bad idea to connect just war theorizing to the dis-
course of victory, which is, after all, integral to how people think about warfare?
What reasons might just war theorists have for their scepticism via-à-vis victory,
and do they withstand scrutiny? Finally, what, if anything, might an analysis of
these reasons tell us about victory, but also about the idea of just war itself? This
book evolved as an attempt to address these questions.
I have gone back and forth over the past few years with respect to how to
position myself in the resulting text. Specifically, I have agonized over whether I
should write in the first person or adopt a more detached tone. While I saw no
reason to interject myself into the discussion too strongly, I also believed it would
be disingenuous to adopt a pretence of scientific objectivity. In the end, I settled
on what I hope is a happy middle-ground. Following Michael Walzer’s lead, I
decided to use the terms ‘we’ and ‘our’ throughout the text in a bid to suggest that
I am writing as a scholar interested in the ethics of war, an interest that I presume
the reader shares with me.
My use of ‘we’ and ‘our’ also indicates the extent to which I was reliant on the
help and support of others in the writing of this book. The book has taken nearly
ten years to write, and I have leaned heavily on friends and colleagues during this
time. As is customary, I will take this opportunity to express my gratitude. I must
begin with Nick Rengger, who sadly passed away this year. It was Nick’s invitation
that brought me to St Andrews for the workshop mentioned above, and he has
been a kind and supportive friend and colleague ever since I first met him all
those years ago, when I was still a doctoral student. Nick’s work on the just war
tradition has been a source of inspiration for me, and, like many others, I take
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vi Preface
some comfort in the fact that I can still hear his voice whenever I read his books
and essays.
Toni Erskine and Ian Clark supervised my PhD and have continued supervising
me ever since. I could not have asked for better mentors than Toni and Ian, and
I am happy to think that the ties of friendship bind us now. I admire them both,
not just as scholars, but as people. I have known Chris Brown and Tony Lang
almost as long as I have known Toni and Ian. Both have been extraordinarily gen-
erous with their time and advice over the past few years. I wish I could write with
as much humour as Chris, and I wish Tony hadn’t voted for Ralph Nader in 2000.
I have also been boosted by the support of my fellow just war scholars. James
Turner Johnson has also been exceptionally kind to me down the years, and I am
so grateful for his interest in my work. I especially enjoyed the praise he bestowed
on an earlier draft of this book: ‘You know, Cian, I initially thought this victory
stuff wasbull, but you might just be onto something.’ This meant a lot. John Kelsay,
‘Flash’ to his friends, is a kind and thoughtful man to whom I’ve often turned for
advice. It helps that we share a passion for sports teams that have seen better days.
Daniel Brunstetter is a dear friend, a great travel-companion, and a scholar I look
up to. Amy Eckert and Valerie Morkevius make ISA panels more fun than they
really ought to be. Their recent books on (respectively) private military compan
ies and realist ethics set a high bar for the rest of us. Daniel Schwartz was a source
of advice on all things Neo-Scholastic. Larry May took the time to read a very
early draft of this work, and Stephen Neff offered me encouragement just when I
needed it most.
Several people went the extra mile in terms of helping me prepare this book.
Luke Glanville, Gregory Reichberg, Rory Cox, Chris Finlay, and James Pattison
commented on full drafts of the text. Greg, James, and Chris have all recently
published excellent monographs of their own, and I am excited for the forthcom-
ing books that Luke and Rory are currently completing. Brent Steele has been a
great source of support, good humour, hugs, and beer since my graduate days.
Ken Booth has been a great source of grudge and critique—this book is in many
ways a response to his ideas on just war. Eric Heinze, Seb Kaempf, Neil Renic, and
David Karp have joined me on numerous panels devoted to contemporary just
war theory and I have learned a great deal from them. I am grateful to Elke
Schwartz, Janina Dill, and Rhiannon Neilsen for their advice on the tone and
structure of the book, and to Harry Gould for detailed (and prudent!) commen-
tary on early drafts of several chapters. Dan Bulley deserves a special mention for
helping me pull together the proposal for this book at a time when I had my
doubts. His encouragement meant a lot to me—it’s just a shame that it was too
rude to repeat here. Jim Brassett assisted with comedy, Mathias Thaler with vio-
lence. Nick Vaughan-Williams was encouraging of this project from the start, and
Liane Hartnett helped me finish it. She generously read multiple drafts of every
chapter. I look forward to doing the same for her own forthcoming book.
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Preface vii
I owe my colleagues at Glasgow an apology for gloating about how much I was
enjoying my study-leave while they were busy teaching. As well as being great
friends, Kelly Kollman and Andy Judge made that period of study-leave possible
for me by arranging my cover. I am very grateful for this. Ty Solomon, Sophia
Dingli, and Beatrice Heuser commented on full drafts of this book. Going above
and beyond what I would expect of departmental colleagues, their friendship has
been a real boon for me. Other colleagues at Glasgow have offered feedback on
specific chapters. Some have even endured me reading tricky paragraphs at them.
Karen Wright, Georgios Karyotis, Chris Claassen, Mo Hume, Naomi Head, Alvise
Favotto, Chris Berry, Craig Smith, Carl Knight, Ana Langer, Philip Habel, and
Myrto Tsakatika all deserve special mention. Brian Girvin has taken time out of
‘retirement’ to help me fix the wonkier parts of my argument. I also benefited
from the expert mentoring of Lauren McLaren and Jane Duckett and the sup-
portive management of Chris Carman. Additionally, I have benefited greatly
down the years from the vibrant (and collegial) research culture fostered by our
IR and Political Theory research groups and also by the Glasgow Global Security
Network. I feel lucky to have landed in such a great department. It would be
remiss of me not to mention Alasdair Young. Alasdair left Glasgow for Georgia
Tech some years back, but his influence is still discernible in Glasgow, most not
ably in the high standards he set for professionalism and integrity.
Andy Hom, another former colleague, has also contributed greatly to this
book. He was a post-doctoral fellow at Glasgow when I was just starting out on
this project. His critical questioning, willingness to talk an idea out, eagerness to
tell me how wrong I am, and enduring interest in all things ‘theory’ have been a
source of both pain and pleasure for me. He wouldn’t have it any other way. He
has read several drafts of this book and it is better for his input. Phil O’Brien,
whose contribution to War Studies at Glasgow was immense, is a great friend,
and the first person I call when I need advice on how to approach a chapter and
what brand of lounge-pants to buy. Working closely with Andy, Phil, and Kurt
Mills, I was fortunate to receive an ESRC grant (ES/L013363/1) which provided
me the time to eke out the hard yards on this book. This grant afforded me the
opportunity to chat about long-bows with Matthew Strickland, Peter Jackson, and
Stuart Airlie, and to work with the hugely talented Andee Wallace, Louis Bujnoch,
and Gavin Stewart. Later in the life of the project, I received generous support
from the Independent Social Research Foundation. The ISRF mid-career fellow-
ship programme granted me the break from teaching and e-mail that I needed to
finish this book.
I also benefited from the opportunity to present elements of this book at different
universities. I received helpful feedback from colleagues at: Warwick University,
Edinburgh University, the University of Limerick, the University of Southern
Denmark, CalTech, Florida State University, Johns Hopkins SAIS at Bologna,
Georgetown University, the University of Dundee, the University of Bath, the
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viii Preface
Preface ix
Tom and Felix are always on hand to remind me that I look silly, have an outsized
head, and smell bad. They are growing up so fast that the day is swiftly approach-
ing when I will no longer fancy wrestling them. It is, however, my parents, Peter
and Jacinta, to whom I owe the most. They have worked hard to ensure that,
alongside Aoife and Cormac, I have always had the opportunity to do whatever
makes me happy. They have supported me in everything I’ve done, encouraged
me every step of the way, and always been on hand to keep me updated with the
latest scores in Munster matches. The pride they take in what I do is humbling.
They light the way for me. This book is dedicated to them.
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Contents
Bibliography 153
Index 171
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Introduction
The Very Object of (Just) War?
Introduction
1 General Douglas MacArthur, ‘Farewell Address to Congress, 19 April 1951’. Available at: www.
americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm. Accessed: 18 January 2019.
2 Ken Booth, ‘Ten Flaws of Just Wars’, International Journal of Human Rights 4:3–4 (2000), pp. 316–17.
Victory: The Triumph and Tragedy of Just War. Cian O’Driscoll, Oxford University Press (2020). © Cian O’Driscoll.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198832911.001.0001
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2 Victory
Just War
The idea of just war rests on the dual claim that war may sometimes be justified
and that it is possible to discern between just and unjust uses of force. This way of
thinking about war has a long history. Scholars usually trace its origins to early
Christian political theology, though there is evidence to suggest that its roots
extend deeper, into antiquity.3 Over time it coalesced around three discrete but
interlocking sets of principles bearing on the conditions that justify the recourse
to war (jus ad bellum), the limits that constrain the conduct of war (jus in bello),
and the desiderata that should guide its conclusion (jus post bellum). Scholars
sometimes quibble over the relative weighting assigned to different principles, but
this should not obscure the fact that there is considerable consensus regarding the
identity of these principles. Most scholars agree that jus ad bellum inquiries
necessarily revolve around the principles of just cause, proper authority, right
intention, aim of peace, last resort, and reasonable chance of success; that jus in
bello concerns pivot on the principles of discrimination (i.e., non-combatant
immunity) and proportionality; and that the task of jus post bellum analysis is to
parse the responsibilities of both the victors and the vanquished in the aftermath
of armed conflict. There is, I trust, no need to gloss these principles here, save to
note that they are best understood, not as criteria for a checklist, but as open-
ended questions that may be usefully employed to structure and guide our ethical
evaluation of warfare.4
The central proposition of just war theory is, therefore, that war can and should
be subjected to moral scrutiny. The aim of this scrutiny is not to identify which
wars are just and which are unjust. As Oliver O’Donovan has argued, ‘Major his-
torical events cannot be justified or criticised in one mouthful; they are concaten
ations and agglomerations of many separate actions and many varied results.’5
3 The key texts on the history of the tradition are: James Turner Johnson, Ideology, Reason, and the
Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200–1740 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1975); James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1981); Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2006); and
Frederick H. Russell, Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975). On
the move to look beyond the tradition’s putative roots in Christian thought: Rory Cox, ‘Expanding the
History of Just War: The Ethics of War in Ancient Egypt’, International Studies Quarterly 61:2 (2017):
371–84; Gregory A. Raymond, ‘The Greco-Roman Roots of the Just War Tradition’, in Howard M.
Hensel (ed.), The Prism of Just War: Asian and Western Perspectives on the Legitimate Use of Military
Force (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010): 7–29; Cian O’Driscoll, ‘Rewriting the Just War Tradition: Just War in
Classical Greek Political Thought and Practice’, International Studies Quarterly 29:1 (2015): 1–10; and
Cian O’Driscoll, ‘Keeping Tradition Alive: Just War and Historical Imagination’, Journal of Global
Security Studies 3:2 (2018): 234–47.
4 Chris Brown calls them ‘aids to judgement’. Chris Brown, ‘Just War and Political Judgement’, in
Anthony F. Lang, Jr., Cian O’Driscoll, and John Williams (eds.), Just War: Authority, Tradition, and
Practice (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013), p. 46. For a primer on the principles of
the just war tradition: Charles Guthrie and Michael Quinlan, Just War: Ethics in Modern Warfare
(London: Bloomsbury, 2007).
5 Oliver O’Donovan, The Just War Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 13.
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Rather, the purpose of just war theory is to guide our efforts to examine how the
actions and results that wars entail might be interrogated in ethical terms. Within
this, an issue that requires further attention is the question of how one should
understand the relationship between the jus ad bellum and jus in bello judgements.
Should a belligerent party’s jus ad bellum basis for resorting to war in the first
instance be taken into account when considering what counts as permissible con-
duct in the course of that war? Michael Walzer, whose 1977 text Just and Unjust
Wars has swiftly become a modern classic, has argued that, all things being equal,
jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations should be treated independently of
one another.6 This opens up the possibility of judging an otherwise justified war to
have been waged unjustly, and vice versa. Recent years have seen this proposition
become the focus of a fierce debate between Walzer and his critics.7 Scholars such
as Jeff McMahan have claimed that it reflects faulty reasoning.8 Their argument is
that the strict separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations leads to
wrongheaded thinking, such as, for instance, the belief that so long as he or she
adheres to jus in bello norms, a soldier does no wrong by fighting for an unjust cause.
I will have more to say about this debate, and its implications for the argument
I seek to develop in this book, in Chapter 7.
In the meantime, it is important to say something about why the idea of just
war matters. Although the discussion has focused thus far on Latinate categories
of analysis and abstract scholarly debates, one should not underestimate the prac-
tical edge of just war thinking and its significance for international politics. While
it was possible in the past to discount the idea of just war as an obscure, recondite
hobby pursued by Catholic theologians cloistered in ivy towers, its recent promin
ence in the discourse of political and military leaders suggests a very different
story.9 As numerous scholars have shown, just war has become the predominant
frame through which western military and policy elites discuss matters of war and
peace.10 Walzer has famously dubbed this development the ‘triumph of just war
6 ‘War is always judged twice, first with reference to the reasons states have for fighting, secondly
with reference to the means they adopt.’ Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument
with Historical Illustrations—Fifth Edition (New York: Basic Books, 2015), p. 21.
7 There is a wealth of material available on this debate, which is often (misleadingly) cast as a clash
between ‘revisionist’ and ‘traditionalist’ approaches to just war theory. For an overview: Seth Lazar,
‘Evaluating the Revisionist Critique of Just War Theory’, Daedalus 146:1 (2017): 113–24; and James
Pattison, ‘The Case for the Non-Ideal Morality of War: Beyond Revisionism Versus Traditionalism in
Just War Theory’, Political Theory 46:2 (2018): 242–68.
8 Jeff McMahan, ‘Innocence, Self-Defence and Killing in War’, Journal of Political Philosophy 2:3
(1994): 193–221.
9 President Barack Obama famously framed his Nobel Peace Prize address in the language of just
war. Barack Obama, ‘Nobel Lecture’, 10 December 2009. Available at: www.nobelprize.org/prizes/
peace/2009/obama/26183-nobel-lecture-2009/. Accessed: 18 January 2019. Obama was not alone in
invoking just war, however. Other leaders have also made extensive reference to it. See: Cian
O’Driscoll, ‘Talking about Just War: Obama in Oslo, Bush at War’, Politics 31:2 (2011): 82–90.
10 For example: Mark Totten, First Strike: America, Terrorism, and Moral Tradition (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 2010), pp. 80–3; and Daniel Brunstetter and Scott Brunstetter, ‘Shades of
Green: Engaged Pacifism, the Just War Tradition, and the German Greens’, International Relations 25:1
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4 Victory
theory’.11 He argues that since the Vietnam War just war discourse has emerged as
the lingua franca of those in power. This, he notes, is a significant development. It
indicates how deeply just war norms and concepts have become embedded in con-
temporary international relations. It is not merely that generals and presidents exploit
the just war idiom for rhetorical purposes, it is that it has also been internalized
by them and incorporated into military planning and operations at all levels. It is
not going too far to suggest that the just war tradition has become the pre-eminent
framework for examining the rights and wrongs of the use of force in inter
national society.12
Victory
Victory is integral to how we understand war. Aristotle and Cicero called it the
‘telos’ of military science, Sun Tzu hailed it as ‘the main object in war’, while
General Douglas Macarthur proclaimed that it knows ‘no substitute’.13 But what is
it? Victory is one of those concepts that, like time, appears simple to grasp until
you actually start to examine it.14 The issue is that victory is simultaneously a
rhetorically powerful concept but also a hopelessly vague one.15 On the one hand,
it is a very resonant term. It conjures up images of soldiers driving enemies from
the battlefield, planting a flag on a captured hill, seizing the enemy’s capital, and
vanquishing their foes.16 In each case, victory is represented as something that is
emphatic, decisive, conclusive. It stands for the termination of hostilities, the
(2011): 65–84. It is also important to note the work being done by the adjective ‘western’. In terms of its
provenance, just war theory is usually regarded as a western tradition. It does, however, have ana-
logues in other cultures. My focus will be on western just war theory. On the comparative ethics of
war: Gregory M. Reichberg, Henrick Syse, and Nicole M. Hartwell (eds.), Religion, War, and Ethics:
A Sourcebook of Textual Traditions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Vesselin Popovski,
Gregory M. Reichberg, and Nicholas Turner (eds.), World Religions and Norms of War (New York:
United Nations University Press, 2009); and Richard Sorabji and David Rodin (eds.), The Ethics of
War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006).
11 Michael Walzer, Arguing About War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), pp. 3–22.
12 For a different take which emphasizes legalistic discourse: Fernando G. Nunez-Mietz,
‘Legalization and the Legitimation of the Use of Force: Revisiting Kosovo’, International Organization
72:3 (2018): 725–57.
13 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by Harry Rackham (London: Wordsworth, 1996), p. 3
[1.i.3]. Marcus Tullius Cicero, ‘The Republic’, in The Republic and the Laws, trans. by Niall Rudd
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 83 [V.8]. Mark R. McNeilly, Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern
Warfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 16. General Douglas MacArthur, ‘Farewell Address
to Congress’. Available at: www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/douglasmacarthurfarewelladdress.htm.
Accessed: 18 January 2019.
14 ‘What then is time? Provided that no one asks me, I know.’ Augustine, Confessions, trans. by
Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 230 [XI.xiv.17].
15 Robert Mandel describes victory as a ‘fuzzy, contentious, and emotionally charged’ idea. Robert
Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006), p. 13.
16 Dominic P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat
in International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 5–6. Also: Paul
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Kekcskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1958).
17 Andrew R. Hom, ‘Conclusion’, in Andrew R. Hom, Cian O’Driscoll, and Kurt Mills (eds.), Moral
Victories: The Ethics of Winning Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 235.
18 Richard Hobbs, The Myth of Victory: What is Victory in War? (Boulder: Westview, 1979), pp. xvi–2;
Tommy Franks, ‘What is Victory? A Conversation with General Tommy Franks’, The National Interest
86 (2006), p. 8.
19 Philip Caputo’s remarks are indicative: ‘Victory was a high body-count, defeat a low kill-
ratio, war a matter of arithmetic.’ Philip Caputo, A Rumour of War (New York: Henry Holt &
Company, 1996), p. xix. On the metrics of winning: Leo J. Blanken, Hy Rothstein, and Jason J. Lepore
(eds.), Assessing War: The Challenge of Success and Failure (Washington DC: Georgetown University
Press, 2015); Gregory A. Daddis, ‘The Problem of Metrics: Assessing Progress and Effectiveness in the
Vietnam War’, War in History 19:1 (2012): 73–98.
20 Dominic Tierney, The Right Way to Lose a War: America in an Age of Unwinnable Conflicts (New
York: Little, Brown & Company, 2015), p. 145.
21 Andrew J. Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War (New York: Henry Holt
& Company, 2010), p. 10.
22 Mark Tran, ‘General David Petraeus Wars of Long Struggle Ahead for U.S. in Iraq’, Guardian,
11 September 2008. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/sep/11/iraq.usa. Accessed:
18 January 2019. Donald Rumsfeld went further, complaining that there was no ‘metrics to know if we
are winning or losing the Global War on Terror’. Quoted in: Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory,
p. 135. For more on this: Jeffrey Record, Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, 2003), pp. 5–6.
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6 Victory
‘it invokes the notion of Emperor Hirohito coming down and signing a surrender
to MacArthur’.23 Obama’s efforts to excise victory from the lexicon have since
been reversed by President Donald Trump, in whose rhetoric ‘winning’ occupies
pride of place.24
The wars of the post-9/11 era also illuminate the degree to which victory
remains essential to how people think and talk about war. This underlines the
need for a clear definition of victory. This is easier said than done. Victory defies
parsimonious formulae. This is a reflection of its multivalence and historical
mutability. Victory can denote a wide variety of outcomes and has been under-
stood in very different ways at different times. As William C. Martel has observed,
‘victory describes in general terms a wide range of favourable or successful polit
ical, economic, and military outcomes that routinely occur in war’.25 It is, in this
sense, a very baggy or ‘imprecise’ term which only loosely captures a vast range of
phenomena.26 Strategists and military historians have tended to respond to this
problem (if that is indeed what it is) by elaborating complex typologies that are
intended to reflect the different categories of victory that can be achieved through
the use of force. Thus, for example, Colin Gray parses victory along operational,
strategic, and political dimensions while the aforementioned Martel refers to the
tactical, strategic, and grand-strategic levels of victory.27
The famous Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz furnishes us with another
way of approaching the task of defining victory. Instead of accounting for its
vicissitudes, he attempted to reduce it to its core essence. According to Clausewitz,
victory is best understood in terms of the imposition of one’s will upon the
enemy.28 As such, and unlike other similar terms such as ‘success’, it denotes a
fundamentally zero-sum outcome. For one side to win, the other must lose, and
for every victor there must be a vanquished.29 Victory, on this account, is a matter
23 Quoted in: Gabriella Blum, ‘The Fog of Victory’, European Journal of International Law 24:1
(2013), p. 421. On Obama’s efforts to excise victory from US discourse: William C. Martel, Victory in
War: Foundations of Modern Strategy—Revised and Expanded Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2011), pp. 17–18.
24 It would be a missed opportunity not to include at least one quote evoking victory from
President Trump: ‘You’re going to be so proud of your country. [. . .] We’re going to turn it around.
We’re going to start winning again: we’re going to win at every level, we’re going to win economically
[. . .] we’re going to win militarily, we’re going to win with healthcare for our veterans, we’re going to
win with every single facet, we’re going to win so much, you may even get tired of winning, and you’ll
say “Please, please, it’s too much winning, we can’t take it anymore”, and I’ll say “No it isn’t”, we have to
keep winning, we have to win more, we’re going to win more!’ Quoted in: Cian O’Driscoll and
Andrew R. Hom, ‘Introduction’, in Andrew R. Hom, Cian O’Driscoll, and Kurt Mills (eds.), Moral
Victories: The Ethics of Winning Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 3.
25 Martel, Victory in War, p. 19. 26 Ibid.
27 Colin S. Gray, Defining and Achieving Victory (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002),
p. 11. Martel, Victory in War, pp. 34–9.
28 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1989), pp. 77 [I.I]; 142–3 [II.II]. Clausewitz is discussed further in Chapter 6.
29 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 71. Also:
Michael Howard, ‘When Are Wars Decisive?’, Survival 41:1 (1999), p. 130.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 25/09/19, SPi
of prevailing over one’s adversaries and of forcing them to taste defeat. This way of
approaching victory emphasizes its antagonistic, conflictual character. This is
very much in line with the synonyms people habitually substitute for it: conquest,
triumph, vanquish, subdue, subjugate, and overcome.30 Each of these terms high-
lights the notion that victory is something that is achieved over others and at their
expense through means of domination and/or violence. Furthermore, while the
practice of characterizing a victory by reference to its degree of comprehensive-
ness (i.e., tactical, strategic, or grand-strategic) serves a practical purpose, it is
predicated upon the fact that victory, unqualified, ordinarily carries connotations
of decisiveness and totality.31
Having introduced the fundaments of just war and victory, the next challenge is
to consider how they go together. This issue has not received much attention in
recent just war scholarship. While books and essays have appeared on almost
every conceivable issue relating to the ethics of war—from long-standing con-
cerns regarding sovereignty and intervention to novel worries arising from the
emergence of new military technologies—since the publication of Walzer’s Just
and Unjust Wars, the relation between just war and victory has been largely
overlooked.32 To put it more accurately, just war scholars have tended to avoid
using the language of victory and winning. This is not to say that the concept of
victory has been entirely absent from the current literature on just war. It does
make an occasional appearance. The issue is that it is seldom handled with any
care or concern for its full depth of meaning. Scholars evoke it but do not
engage it. This is especially apparent in three domains of contemporary just war
scholarship.
We might expect to find a thoughtful discussion of victory and its relation to the
idea of just war in analyses of the jus ad bellum principle of reasonable chance of
success. This principle may be taken to suggest that a war that satisfies all the
30 These synonyms are listed in: Martel, Victory in War, p. 22. 31 Ibid.
32 There are several honourable exceptions. Janina Dill (ed.), ‘Symposium on Ending Wars’, Ethics
125:3 (2015): 627–80; Beatrice Heuser, ‘Victory, Peace, and Justice: The Neglected Trinity’, Joint Forces
Quarterly 69 (2013): 1–7; Blum, ‘The Fog of Victory’; James Q. Whitman, The Verdict of Battle: The Law
of Victory and the Making of Modern War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). There is
also the collection of essays that I co-edited with Andy Hom and Kurt Mills: Andrew R. Hom, Cian
O’Driscoll, and Kurt Mills (eds.), Moral Victories: The Ethics of Winning Wars (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017).
Another random document with
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‘The greater extent of the plain was in grass, studded with thorny
“sidder” bushes; but some crops of barley and beans looked
flourishing, and here and there, where irrigation had been attempted
by means of watercourses from the river “Ghemáts” vegetation was
luxuriant beneath olive and other fruit-trees.
‘At about 4 p.m. the country assumed a more pleasing aspect as
we passed the villages of the Shloh tribe of Mesfíwa. These Shloh,
like the natives of Sus and Rif, are all of Berber race. Neither
Phœnicians, Goths, Romans nor Arabs ever succeeded in bringing
them completely under subjection, for they retreated before the
conquerors to the mountains, and in these highland fastnesses
maintained their independence. With the exception of a few tribes
they owe no political allegiance to the Sultan, but acknowledge his
spiritual suzerainty as the recognised head of the Mohammedan
religion in Morocco, in virtue of his direct descent from the Prophet.
They altogether differ in appearance from the Arabs, and no affinity
can be traced between the Berber and the Arabic languages,
excepting in words connected with the Mohammedan religion which
were introduced when the Berbers adopted the creed of Islam. In
place of tents the Shloh live in houses, of one or two stories, built of
mud and stone without mortar, the earth of this district having the
peculiar quality, when well beaten down, of being impermeable.
‘Learned writers have disputed the origin of the Berbers, but they
seem to agree that they are not the aborigines of the country, but
displaced another and more ancient race of inhabitants. One of the
traditions of the Berbers is that their ancestors were driven out of
Syria by the “Khalífa” of “Sidna Musa” (“our Lord Moses”), meaning
Joshua, the lieutenant of Moses. Their country in the South of
Morocco is called generally “Sus,” and the manner of their expulsion
is related in yet another legend quoted from a commentary on the
Koran.
‘God said unto David, “Banish the Beraber out of this land, for if
they dwelt in hills of iron they would break them down.” Whereupon,
says the story, King David placed the people on camels, in sacks
called “gharaiar,” and sent them away. When they arrived at the
Atlantic coast their leader called out, in the Berber tongue, “Sus”—
which means let down, or empty out—so the exiles were canted out
of their sacks, and the country is thence called “Sus” to this day!
‘Many of the Shloh proper names appear to have an affinity to the
Hebrew, if not actually of Hebraic origin, such as Ait Usi, Ait Atta, Ait
Emor, Ait Sisac, Ait Braim. The Hebrew equivalent of the first three
being Hait Busi, in our translation the Jebusites, Ha Hitti, the Hittites.
Ha Emori, the Amorites. Ait Sisac may be translated “Those of
Isaac,” or The children of laughter. Ait Braim needs no translation.
‘On our entry into Mesfíwa we were surprised to find signs of
much more industry, and even of civilisation, than in the districts
inhabited by the Arab population. Here irrigation was carefully
attended to; the numerous plantations of olive and fruit-trees, as well
as the fields of grain, were better cultivated; and the condition of the
bridle roads and rude bridges over the streams afforded further proof
of a more intelligent and industrious people.
‘Ascending the slopes we reached the camp pitched in an olive-
grove on a small island formed by the Ghemáts, here called the “Dad
i Sirr,” evidently its Berber name. We crossed with some difficulty this
mountain torrent, which foamed and swirled up to the horses’ girths.
Flowing down a gorge of the Atlas running nearly North and South,
this river then takes a north-westerly direction till it joins the Tensift,
which again flows into the Atlantic near Saffi.
‘On the side of a hill, about four hundred yards from the site of the
camp, lay the village Akhlij, crowned by a castle built of red stone
and earth, and having five square bastions with loopholes for
musketry. In fact every house in these villages can be used as a little
fort, the walls being pierced so that each householder can defend
himself against his neighbour, or all can combine and act against an
invader of their stronghold. The population of Akhlij is said to be
about 500 souls, including some forty Jews, each Jewish family,
according to the custom of the Shloh, being under the special
protection of a Mohammedan chieftain.
‘Above the spot where we were encamped rose the mountain of
Zinat Kar, the summit dotted with patches of snow, and, towering
over all, the snowy heights of “Glaui” frowned upon the groves of
palms, oranges and olives which spread below basking in the sultry
temperature of the plains.
‘On our arrival in camp the Sheikh and elders of the village
presented themselves, by order of the Sultan, to welcome the
“Bashador.” The Sheikh, a tall man, was draped in a long, seamless
“haik;” but some of his followers wore a black burnous similar to
those in use among the Jews of Marákesh. The meeting took place
under the British flag—hoisted for the first time in these wild regions
—before Sir John’s tent. In the evening the deputation returned,
bringing an abundant supply of provisions and forage, and, in
addition, huge dishes of cooked food for the soldiers and camp-
followers. This “mona” was collected from the whole province under
the rule of Basha Grenog, comprising some fifteen “kabail,” or tribes,
spread over a district about fifty miles in diameter. The tax therefore
fell lightly on the inhabitants, not amounting to more perhaps than a
half-penny a family, which sum would be deducted from the payment
of their annual taxes.
‘This spot in the valley of Uríka, at the foot of the Atlas, is about
500 feet above Marákesh and 2,000 feet above sea-level, and the
fine air was most enjoyable. The night appeared cold, the
temperature falling below 60° Fahr. At midday it was 74° in the
shade.
‘There were contradictory statements as to the sport to be
expected. But, after much cross-questioning, the natives confessed
that there were no wild boar nearer than the snow; that the
“audad[48],” or wild sheep, was to be found, but only on the highest
hills a couple of hours’ ride distant; and that lions and leopards were
not to be seen within two days’ march, or about thirty miles further
among the snowy ranges. On inquiry whether there were any fish in
the river, we were told that, later in the season, a speckled fish about
nine or ten inches long comes up from the Tensift. This no doubt is
the trout, which is found also in the mountain streams near Tetuan.
On asking the Berber name for large river fish, Sir John was
surprised to hear that it is “selmen,” which would appear to be a
cognate word to our “salmon.”’
Two of the stories related to Sir John on the march by the Sultan’s
stirrup-holder may be inserted here as exemplifying the manners and
customs of the officials about the Moorish Court, and especially
those of the military class. The first may be called ‘A Story of a
Moorish Prince.’
Mulai Ahmed, second son of Sultan Mulai Abderahman Ben
Hisham, was appointed by his father Viceroy of the districts of Beni
Hassén, Zair, Dukála, Shedma, &c. His residence was at Rabát.
This Prince was clever, and endowed with many good qualities,
but he was extravagant and reckless in his expenditure, and thus
became deeply indebted to the merchants and shopkeepers of
Rabát; but no man ventured to press his pecuniary claims on the
wayward youth. His debtors, moreover, had only to ask some favour
by which they might be benefited in their trade, and it was
immediately granted by the Prince; the favour thus conferred amply
recouping them for their unpaid goods.
On the occasion of a visit of the Sultan to Rabát in 1848, Mulai
Ahmed was still Viceroy. Various complaints had been brought by the
inhabitants to the Uzir, Ben Dris, against His Royal Highness for not
paying his debts; but the Uzir endeavoured so to arrange matters as
to avoid reporting the misconduct of the young Prince to his father.
One day, however, when the Sultan was going to mosque, an
Arab from the country called out, from a high wall—on which he had
climbed to avoid being silenced by the troopers who formed the
escort of the Sultan—‘Oh Lord and Master, Mulai Abderahman, my
refuge is in God and in thee! I have been plundered and unjustly
treated during this your reign.’
The Sultan, restraining his horse, desired his attendants to learn
who this man was; and, after hearing their report, sent for the Uzir
and directed him to inquire into the case and report thereon.
On the man presenting himself before the Uzir, the latter
reprimanded him for brawling in the streets for justice. ‘One would
suppose,’ said Ben Dris, ‘that there were no longer governors or
kadis in Morocco! Whence are you? what have you to say?’
‘I am an Arab from Shedma,’ the man replied. ‘I had a fine horse,
for which I had been offered by the chief of my tribe three hundred
ducats, but I refused to sell; for, though a poor man, my horse was
everything to me; I would not have parted with him for all the wealth
that could be offered me. Some weeks ago I came to Rabát, and
Mulai Ahmed—may God prolong his days!—in an evil hour saw my
horse, and ordered his soldiers to seize it, sending me a purse of
three hundred ducats, which however I refused to accept. For forty
long days have I been seeking justice, but can obtain hearing neither
of Mulai Ahmed nor of any one else.’
The Uzir replied, ‘If your story be true, your horse shall be
returned to you; but, if false, you shall be made an example of for
daring to bring a complaint against the son of the Sultan.’
The Uzir then sent a messenger to inquire of Mulai Ahmed
concerning the matter, and by him the Prince sent reply that he knew
nothing about the horse. The Uzir was consequently about to order
the Arab to be bastinadoed, when the latter begged Ben Dris to send
him, accompanied by some of his—the Uzir’s—attendants, to the
stables of Mulai Ahmed, where he felt sure he would find the horse;
begging that his whole tribe might, if necessary, be called upon to
give evidence respecting the identity of the horse.
The Uzir accordingly sent the Arab, with a guard, to the Prince’s
stables to point out the horse, with directions that it should be
brought before him. He also sent to inform Mulai Ahmed that this
order of his father the Sultan must be obeyed.
The attendants took the Arab to the stable, where he immediately
recognised his horse, but had no sooner done so than he was
arrested, along with the Uzir’s men, by some soldiers sent by Mulai
Ahmed, and brought before the Prince, who had them all
bastinadoed and dismissed.
On the return of the Uzir’s men, they reported to their master what
had taken place. The Uzir had them again bastinadoed for not
having carried out his orders, viz. to bring back the Arab and his
horse in safety. Then, mounting his mule, he rode direct to the
palace, where he recounted to the Sultan what had occurred.
His Majesty was highly incensed; his eyes flashed lightning, and
his voice was as thunder. ‘Dare any son of mine disobey the orders
of his father? Are my people to be robbed and ill-used at his caprice?
Summon the chief kaid of our guard.’
The officer appeared. ‘Take,’ said the Sultan, ‘a saddled mule to
the palace of Mulai Ahmed. Bind the Prince hand and foot. Conduct
him this day to Meknes, where he is to be imprisoned until further
orders. Let the Arab have his horse and an indemnity for the rough
treatment he has received. Let a proclamation be issued that all
persons who have been unjustly used by Mulai Ahmed are to
present themselves to me; for there is no doubt,’ added the Sultan,
‘that is not the only case of injustice of which my son has been
guilty.’
The orders of Sultan Mulai Abderahman were obeyed. The chief
of the guard appeared before Mulai Ahmed with a mule saddled and
bridled, and informed the Prince he was deposed from his position
as Viceroy, and that he was to proceed at once with him to Meknes.
At first Mulai Ahmed refused to obey his father’s commands, but,
on being threatened by the officers with fetters and manacles if he
showed any resistance, consented to mount the mule and start at
once on his journey. The third day they arrived at Meknes, where
Mulai Ahmed was confined in prison, whence he was not liberated
for five years.
I suppose the young Sultan intends to tread in the footsteps of his ancestors
and remain stagnant.
My belief is that these people, or rather this Government, will never move
ahead until the lever acts at headquarters continuously, by the presence and
pressure of the Foreign Representatives. So long as we preach and pray at a
distance, nothing will be done. On the other hand, if the Foreign Representatives
were removed to the Court, there would no doubt be a rupture of relations, or
some tragedy, before twelve months elapsed.
Again, shortly after the accession of Mulai Hassan, Sir John writes
to the same correspondent:—
I shall make a fresh effort to induce the young Sultan to introduce some
reforms and improvements, but I have but faint hope of success, as the Ministers
and satellites of the Court are either rogues or fools.
From my experience of Turkey and the Turks I confess I have little confidence
in the beneficial effect of any attempt to introduce European grafts on the old
Mohammedan stock. The tree which showed signs of vigour has been cut down,
and the fruit of the European graft contains rather the evils than the virtues of both
the West and the East.
When this letter was written, Sir John was already on his way to
Fas. On March 3, 1875 he left Tangier, accompanied by several
members of his family, some personal friends[51], and the officers
appointed by the British Government to attend the Mission.
The reception at Fas was magnificent, some six thousand troops
having been sent to do honour to the Representative of Great
Britain; but what was more pleasing to him and greatly enhanced the
effect of the entry, was the presence of the citizens of Fas, who had
come to meet him in their thousands, bringing with them their wives
and children; to show, they said, their appreciation of his friendship
and love of justice. The shrill ‘zagharit’ continually raised by the
women as Sir John passed through the crowd, attended by his staff
and escort, completely drowned at times the sound of the brass
band which the Sultan had sent to play before the procession. Soon
after the instalment of the Mission at Fas, the incident occurred
which Sir John relates as follows:—