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RIGHTS AS SECURITY
ii
 Rights as Security
The Theoretical Basis of Security of Person

R H O N D A P OW E L L

1
Rights as Security: The Theoretical Basis of Security of Person. First Edition. Rhonda Powell.
© The several contributors 2019. Published 2019 by Oxford University Press.
iv

1
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© Rhonda Powell 2019
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2019
Impression: 1
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
 Acknowledgements

This book started as an Oxford DPhil project. It therefore represents a period

of growth from an enthusiastic student to a senior lecturer, with all the ups
and downs that this entails. During my doctoral studies I was privileged to
be surrounded by highly engaged and sometimes eccentric students from all
over the world, some of whom are now my closest friends. I was fortunate to
work in a beautiful environment with excellent access to resources. I learned
to take the idiosyncrasies of the ancient institution in my stride. This life-​
changing experience was made possible by generous funding from the Oxford
Clarendon Fund, St Hilda’s College, the New Zealand Law Foundation, and
the members of the University of Otago Law Faculty, who wrote reference
after reference to help me pursue my goals.
I am grateful for the continued wisdom and guidance of my primary
supervisor, Professor Denis Galligan and for the collegiality of the students
and Fellows of the Centre for Socio-​Legal Studies. I am also grateful for the
supervision provided by Professor John Gardner and Associate Professor Liora
Lazarus, each of whose astute challenges to my ideas led to many improve-
ments. I am grateful to my doctoral examiners Professor Sandra Fredman
and Professor Susan Marks, whose encouragement led me to investigate
publishing my thesis. I spent the final year of my doctoral study at Hughes
Hall, Cambridge, where I enjoyed another beautiful environment, and more
idiosyncrasies. Sarah Squire, President of Hughes Hall, provided invaluable
support and encouragement during that year and beyond.
I would never have guessed that it would take me ten years to complete
what were supposed to be minor revisions. Two international moves, two
changes in career, and two children intervened. Over the past four years, sev-
eral University of Canterbury law students have provided invaluable research
support, generously funded by the School of Law Research Committee.
Professor Neil Boister provided helpful comments on a chapter, at a time
when we barely knew each other. My colleagues Associate Professor Natalie
Baird and Professor Annick Masselot have been my academic backbone—​it is
unlikely I would have completed this book without their encouragement and
friendship. Four anonymous referees engaged by Oxford University Press pro-
vided thoughtful and insightful comments. The Academic Law editorial team at
Oxford University Press have exhibited remarkable patience with my tardiness
and have offered professional and constructive guidance throughout.

Rights as Security: The Theoretical Basis of Security of Person. First Edition. Rhonda Powell.
© The several contributors 2019. Published 2019 by Oxford University Press.
vi

vi Acknowledgements
My children, Matilda and George, tolerate my never-​ending work habits
admirably. I hope that my example helps them to set their horizons widely.
My husband, Michael, has provided the stability needed to sustain my bur-
geoning academic and professional commitments. My mother, Gaylia, has
diligently proofread this piece of work in its entirety more than once and has
offered unquestioning support in all my endeavours.
Thank you all.
Christchurch, New Zealand
4 September 2018
 Introduction: The Right to Security of Person

The illusive right to security

The right to security of person can be found in a plethora of international
and domestic human rights instruments and, yet, we know little about it.
Attention has turned to this right due to an increased focus upon ‘security’
more generally as a response to an increase in terrorism. A raft of security le-
gislation was passed throughout the world in the early twenty-​first century.
These measures have been criticized for their impact upon human rights,
instigating discussions about the appropriate ‘balance’ to be struck between
security and human rights. Within these debates, some have suggested that we
must forgo some of our liberties in the name of security—​Michael Ignatieff
famously questioned ‘whether the era of human rights has come and gone’
and put forward proposals that we accept the ‘lesser evil’ that is limitation of
rights.1 Others have suggested that security and human rights, which protect
our liberties, must be reconciled2 or balanced.3 Yet, others have criticized the
idea of ‘balancing’ security and liberty altogether,4 or put forward alterna-
tive conceptualizations of the relationship between security, citizenship, and
human rights.5

1
M Ignatieff, ‘Is the Human Rights Era Ending?’ New York Times (New York, 5 February 2002).
See also M Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror (Edinburgh UP 2004).
2
See R Ashby Wilson, ‘Human Rights in the “War on Terror” ’ in Human Rights in the ‘War on
Terror’ (CUP 2005) 2; L Lazarus and B Goold, ‘Introduction: Security and Human Rights: The
Search for a Language of Reconciliation’ in Security and Human Rights (Hart 2007) 2and the works
cited there.
3
M Atkin, Balancing Liberty and Security: An Ethical Study of US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
(Rowman & Littlefield 2013); G Treverton, Balancing Security and Liberty in the War on Terror
(Maxwell School of Syracuse University 2004).
4
D Luban, ‘Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security’ in R Ashby Wilson, Human Rights in the
‘War on Terror’ (n 2); J Waldron, ‘Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance’ in Torture, Terror and
Trade-​Offs: Philosophy for the White House (OUP 2010); R Dworkin, ‘Terror and the Attack on Civil
Liberties’ (6 November 2003) New York Rev of Books 37; R Dworkin, ‘The Threat to Patriotism’
(28 February 2002) New York Rev of Books 44.
5
D McGee, Security, Citizenship and Human Rights: Shared Values in Uncertain Times (Palgrave
MacMillan 2010).

Rights as Security: The Theoretical Basis of Security of Person. First Edition. Rhonda Powell.
© The several contributors 2019. Published 2019 by Oxford University Press.
2

2 Introduction: The Right to Security of Person

Another dimension to the debate about security and rights is the idea of
a right to security. If there is a right to security, then instead of balancing a
fundamental human right against a policy concern, the balance is between
two human rights. This may make it easier to justify security measures which
infringe human rights. The idea of a right to security has therefore caused
concern amongst human rights advocates, who fear that by requisitioning
the language of rights in order to further security, other human rights may
become ‘securitized’ or their foundations degraded.6
Talk of the right to security often refers to the collective right to security.7
There is no collective right to security in law. Rather, collective security finds
its expression as a reason to limit other rights,8 or to derogate from human
rights instruments.9 Human rights law does recognize an individual legal
right to security of person, which can at times be in conflict with the needs
of collective security.10 By a ‘legal right’, I mean a right that is recognized and
enforceable through human rights law, either in the national or international
context.
The individual legal right to security of person is well established. It can
be traced to the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen,
which affirmed four ‘natural and imprescriptible’ rights: liberty, property,
security, and resistance to oppression.11 The individual right to security
is found in three international human rights instruments, the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights (‘UDHR’),12 the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’),13 and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’).14 It is

6
L Lazarus, ‘Mapping the Right to Security’ in L Lazarus and B Goold (eds), Security and
Human Rights (Hart 2007) 327–​8.
7
I Turner, ‘A Positive, Communitarian Right to Security in the Age of Super-​Terrorism’ (2017)
13 Democracy and Security 46.
8
See, eg, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, en-
tered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR), arts 12–​13, 18–​19, 21–​22; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force
3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 3 (ICESCR), art 8; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR),
arts 8–​11.
9
See, eg, ICCPR, art 4; ECHR, art 15.
10
See Al-​Jedda v The United Kingdom (2011) 53 EHRR 23, in which a claim for breach of the
right to liberty and security of person in art 5 of the ECHR was successful. The applicant had been
in long-​term preventative detention due to his terrorist activities.
11
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (26 August 1789), art 2.
12
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948, UNGA Res 217 A(III))
(UDHR), art 9.
13
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted
7 March 1966, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195, art 5.
14
ICCPR, art 9.
 The illusive right to security 3
also found in five regional human rights instruments.15 At the national level,
the right to security of person is recognized in a number of bills of rights,
including those of Jamaica,16 Canada,17 Hungary,18 South Africa,19 and the
United States.20
Interestingly, the right to security of person is rarely found on its own.
More often it forms part of the right to ‘life, liberty and security of person’,21
or the right to ‘liberty and security of person’.22 There are two exceptions to
this: CERD and the South African Bill of Rights each specify the right to
security of person independently from the right to liberty of person.23 The
South African Bill of Rights is also unusual in defining the right to security of
person in the text. In most instances it is simply asserted, with interpretation
and definition left to the courts.
The right to security of person is also widely recognized in rights theory.
For example, Henry Shue suggests that it is one of three ‘basic rights’.24 The
right to security of person is mentioned as an example by Joseph Raz when
discussing rights and duties more generally.25 Even John Rawls’ ‘thin theory
of rights’ includes the right to security.26 The reason theorists often use the
right to security of person as an example is likely to be that its existence is un-
controversial. Notably, like legislators, rights theorists tend not to define the
right to security of person. This may suggest that they too assume its meaning
to be uncontroversial.
In fact, despite the prevalence of the right to security of person, over the
past decade or so questions have arisen as to what it means in law, what

15
ECHR, art 5; African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, en-
tered into force 21 October 1986) 1520 UNTS 217 (African Charter), art 6; American Convention
on Human Rights (signed 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 1978) 1144 UNTS 123
(American Convention), art 7; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000/​C
364/​1 (EU Charter), art 6; League of Arab States, Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights (adopted
22 May 2004, entered into force 15 March 2008), art 14.
16
The Jamaica (Constitution) Order in Council 1962, s 13(a).
17
The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c11, Part 1 (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) (Canadian Charter), s 7.
18
Constitution of India (as amended) 1949, art 55(1).
19
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ch 2 (SA Bill of Rights), s 12.
20
Constitution of the United States (as amended), Amendment IV.
21
UDHR, art 3; ICCPR, art 9.
22
ECHR, art 5; EU Charter, art 6; Canadian Charter, s 7; African Charter, art 6; American
Convention, art 7; Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights, art 14.
23
SA Bill of Rights, s 12; ICESCR, art 5(b).
24
H Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign Policy (2nd edn, Princeton
UP 1996).
25
J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Clarendon 1986) 170–​1.
26
J Rawls, ‘The Law of Peoples’ in S Shute and S Hurley (eds), On Human Rights: The Oxford
Amnesty Lectures 1993 (Basic Books 1993) 68.
4

4 Introduction: The Right to Security of Person

distinguishes it from other rights, and how it should be understood.27
Curiously, despite the right’s long history, these questions have not been ad-
equately addressed, with scholars proposing different understandings of what
the right to security of person means. For example, Sandra Fredman enunci-
ates the ‘positive right to security’ which acts as a ‘platform for the exercise of
real freedom and agency’,28 and extends to ‘the duty to provide for basic needs
of individuals’.29 By contrast, Liora Lazarus argues for ‘the narrowest possible
conception of the notion of security’ and warns against a right which be-
comes ‘the overarching legitimating principle and rhetorical tool upon which
we ground arguments for all other desirable human goods’.30 Meanwhile, Ian
Turner advocates for the recognition of a communitarian right to security.31
The difference between these perspectives reveals the need for an inquiry
about the true meaning of the right to security of person. That is the issue
addressed by this book.

Inquiring into the right to security

The obvious starting point for the inquiry is the international jurisprudence
on the right to security of person. However, the right to security of person
turns out to mean something quite different in different jurisdictions. For ex-
ample, the approach taken under the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’) effectively amounts
to procedural protections against arbitrary detention.32 By contrast, the ap-
proach taken under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (‘Canadian
Charter’) focuses upon the idea of ‘physical and psychological integrity’.33
While some of the differences may be accounted for by varying jurisdictional
attitudes to the role of courts in protecting rights in general, the inconsist-
ency may also stem from a combination of the undefined nature of this right
and its lack of theoretical underpinning. This book’s analysis of the meaning
of the right to security of person therefore extends beyond the law to theory.
In order to construct a coherent meaning for the right to security of person,
the book probes deeper into the terms which establish the right: ‘security’ and
‘the person’. It is argued that security is by its nature both a negative and a

27
Lazarus (n 6) 326.
28
S Fredman, ‘The Positive Right to Security’ in Lazarus and Goold, Security and Human Rights
(n 2) 307.
29
ibid, 308. 30
Lazarus (n 6) 326. 31
Turner (n 7).
32
East African Asians (British Protected Persons) v United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 76
(Commission Decision).
33
Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG) [1993] 3 SCR 519 (CanLII).
 Inquiring into the right to security 5
positive concept and that therefore the right to security of person should
ground both negative and positive duties. It is argued further that security
is a ‘relational’ and not a ‘substantive’ concept. This means that security pro-
vides a structure for understanding the relation between other things but that
it does not itself tell us which interests are protected by the right to security
of person. The ‘substance’ of the right comes from an analysis of person-
hood. The book draws upon the notion of personhood put forward as part of
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities approach’, which is used
for measuring human well-​being.34 The capabilities approach suggests that
the correct focus for policy-​making is upon what each individual is able to do
and to be in relation to certain universally valuable ‘functionings’. Nussbaum
provides a list of core capabilities, a minimum of which should be guaranteed
to all on the basis of human dignity.35 The capabilities approach can be ap-
plied to construct a substantive right to security of person by treating the core
capabilities as the interests to be protected by the right.36
This new and original theoretical development of security of person is then
applied to the legal context in order to illustrate the variety of interests the
right to security of person covers and the types of duties it imposes. For in-
stance, it extends to things like food, minimum welfare, and education, as
well as protection against violence and the opportunity to exercise practical
reason. The right to security of person imposes negative and positive duties
on states to protect, promote, and fulfil a wide range of important personal
interests.
The analysis demonstrates that the right to security of person is very broad.
This helps explain why, when it forms the basis of a legal right, different jur-
isdictions are able to legitimately give such different meanings to the right.
Each jurisdiction is protecting some aspects of personhood, but not all: se-
lection and prioritization has taken place in order to create a legal right that
has clear boundaries. It is argued that those boundaries are pragmatic and
not principled. Existing legal rights to security of person do not protect the
full scope of the right. However, it is not argued that existing legal rights to
security of person should be given meanings in line with the true breadth of
the right on a theoretical level.
Instead, an alternative and preferable way of understanding the relation-
ship between security of person and human rights is put forward, drawing
once again upon the capabilities approach which this time plays a different

34
M Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Belknap Press
2006); A Sen, Development as Freedom (OUP 1999).
35
Nussbaum (n 34) 76–​8.
36
This is a variation on the approach taken by Fredman (n 28).
6

6 Introduction: The Right to Security of Person

role—​to determine what it takes to secure a right. It is suggested that ra-
ther than attempting to confine a broad concept into a narrow form, human
rights law as a whole should be seen as a mechanism to secure the person. This
new approach is called ‘rights as security’.
Throughout this book, examples are drawn from three jurisdictions: the
ECHR, the Canadian Charter, and the South African Bill of Rights. Whilst
it is recognized that there may be very good historical and contextual reasons
why legal rights are defined in particular ways, the book is not concerned
with why each particular jurisdiction took the approach it did. That question
would require a more historical and contextual inquiry, sensitive to the role
of the courts and the attitude towards rights in the particular jurisdiction.
Neither is the book concerned with the differences in legal context between
the three jurisdictions or whether one jurisdiction can learn from another
in its interpretation of the right. The book analyses the problem from the
other direction—​focusing on the nature of the universal right, which should
ground its legal expressions. It is assumed that legal rights should share the
core features of the universal human rights on which they are based.
The three jurisdictions were chosen for two reasons. First, these juris-
dictions have created sufficient jurisprudence to provide a detailed under-
standing of their approach to the right to security of person. By contrast, in
many other jurisdictions, little is said on the right to security of person, albeit
that it appears in the text of the relevant instrument.37 Secondly, these juris-
dictions exhibit the need for theoretical analysis particularly well because they
take very different approaches to the right. Case law is used in three ways: to
describe the approaches taken in each jurisdiction; to show why theoretical
analysis may help untangle the meaning of the right to security of person; and
to exemplify the theoretical points developed.

Outline of chapters
Chapter 1 investigates the approach taken to the right to security of person in
law. It focuses on the ECHR, the Canadian Charter, and the South African
Bill of Rights. It is revealed that the right to security of person is portrayed

37
For instance, to my knowledge the United Nations Human Rights Committee has only con-
sidered the right to security of person (as opposed to the right to liberty of person) on one occa-
sion: William Eduardo Delgado Páez v Colombia CCPR/​C/​39/​D/​195/​1985 23 August 1990 (HRC).
The Office of the United Nations High Commission on Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/​AIDS (UNAIDS) have interpreted art 9 to extend to com-
pulsory AIDS testing: OHCHR and UNAIDS, International Guidelines on HIV/​AIDS and Human
Rights: 2006 Consolidated Version (Geneva 2006) 95–​6.
 Outline of chapters 7
inconsistently between the jurisdictions. The legal analysis shows a lack of
agreement about the meaning of the right to security of person. While it gives
plenty of food for thought, descriptive legal analysis is not able to provide a
common understanding of the right. It is therefore necessary to take a more
theoretical approach.
The book then turns to conceptual analysis. This is a technique of analyt-
ical philosophy in which a concept or its constituent parts are broken down,
in order to gain a better understanding of the philosophical issues which
apply to the concept. As Thomas Nagel describes, conceptual analysis is con-
cerned ‘with the concepts and methods that enable us to describe and think
about what we can observe’.38 The conceptual method has been employed by
analytical legal philosophers, most famously by HLA Hart in analysing the
concept of law.39
Chapter 2 considers whether the meaning of the right to security of person
can be understood through a conceptual analysis of security. It discusses lit-
erature, drawn primarily from the discipline of international relations,40 but
also from criminology,41 which attempts to define the concept of security. It
is argued that no previous attempt to define security is sufficiently context-​
neutral that it can be applied to the right to security of person.
Chapter 3 puts forward a new analysis of the concept of security, relying
on the strengths and improving on the weaknesses of the existing accounts.
It is argued that security describes a fourfold relation between other concepts
and that in order to understand its meaning in any particular context, one
must identify four factors: security for whom (an agent or patient), security of
what (an interest or value), security from what (a risk or threat), and security
by whom (a protector). As a relational concept, security relies upon both pol-
itical philosophy and political discourse to determine each of these variables
in any particular context. Importantly, this means that security need not be
restricted to preserving that which we have but that it can extend to putting
people in a ‘secure’ position for the future.
Chapter 3 also argues that security is both intrinsically negative and in-
trinsically positive: one cannot be secure in the absence of protection even if
one faces no threat. It follows that the legal right to security of person should
incorporate both negative and positive duties. It is concluded that whilst the
relational analysis of security establishes the type of duties required by the

38
T Nagel, ‘The Central Questions (Review of “A Life of HLA Hart: The Nightmare and the
Noble Dream” by Nicola Lacey)’ in London Rev of Books (London, 3 February 2005) 12, 13.
39
H Hart, The Concept of Law (Clarendon 1979).
40
K Booth, Theory of World Security (CUP 2007); B Buzan, O Waever, and J de Wilde, Security: A
New Framework for Analysis (Lynne Rienner 1998).
41
I Loader and N Walker, Civilizing Security (CUP 2007).
8

8 Introduction: The Right to Security of Person

right, a theory of personhood is needed in order to identify the interests on
which the right to security of person is based.
Chapter 4 focuses on ‘the person’. Unlike security, there is a wide analyt-
ical literature on persons and personhood. Thus, rather than conduct a new
conceptual analysis, an existing theory, the capabilities approach,42 is applied.
It is argued that the capabilities approach, which is based on an Aristotelian
view of personhood, could be used to identify the most important interests of
the person. In this way, the capabilities approach can substantiate the idea of
‘security of person’: in the context of a right to security of person, Nussbaum’s
list of ‘capabilities’ can be used to identify the interests to be protected.43
Chapters 5 and 6 apply the theoretical analysis to the legal context.
Chapter 5 provides examples of the variety of interests which should be pro-
tected by the right to security of person. Illustrations are drawn primarily
from rights discourse in Europe, Canada, and South Africa. The right to se-
curity of person should protect a wide range of interests, cutting across the
distinction between civil and political rights and socio-​economic rights. For
example, it should cover both the right to political participation and the right
to food. However, it is also noted that, on this interpretation, the right to se-
curity of person overlaps with, and subsumes, a number of other legal rights.
Chapter 6 discusses the types of duties which are imposed by the right to
security of person. Drawing on the conceptual analysis of security as well as
human rights theory,44 it is argued that the right to security of person correl-
ates to duties of restraint, protection, and fulfilment. The chapter then returns
to the three jurisdictions which are analysed for their ability to reflect both
the negative and positive nature of security of person. In particular, Canada
is criticized for its failure to recognize positive duties. Both the ECHR and
South Africa recognize positive duties, which stem both from their general
approaches to rights and from their interpretation of the right to security of
person.
Chapter 7 examines the key implications of recognizing the full breadth
of the right to security of person. This breadth is not solely a feature of the
capabilities approach—​ any theory of personhood would be equally all-​
encompassing. However, once it is recognized that the right to security of
person is necessarily so broad, it is clear that any legal recognition of the right
cannot take on its full meaning. It would be inappropriate and counterpro-
ductive to protect such a wide range of interests within one legal right, par-
ticularly given that many of the interests are already protected in other ways

Nussbaum (n 34); Sen (n 34).

42 43
Nussbaum (n 34) 76–​8.
S Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (OUP 2008); Shue
44

(n 24).
 Outline of chapters 9
through human rights law. Rather than expanding the meaning of existing
legal rights to security of person, it may be preferable to focus on creating
further specific rights to protect any important personal interests that are
not already protected by human rights law. In relation to important personal
interests that are already included but that are not afforded the full positive
protection that they deserve, human rights law should be strengthened. This
is particularly necessary in the area of socio-​economic rights.
Finally, Chapter 7 proposes a new framework with which to view the rela-
tionship between security of person and human rights: ‘rights as security’. It
is proposed that human rights law as a whole can be seen as a way to secure
the person, with individual rights protecting individual personal interests.
The ‘rights-​as-​security’ approach enables security of person to take on its full
meaning in the context of human rights law. The capabilities approach could
still serve as a tool to identify what it takes to fulfil a right, thus defining what
it means to secure the person.
10

1
The Legal Right to Security of Person

Introduction
There is no agreed meaning ascribed to the legal right to security of person,
even though it is an internationally recognized human right and a term
found in legislation and political dialogue around the world. Most jurisdic-
tions have left the courts to interpret the meaning of the right to security of
person. Security takes on different meanings according to context and ac-
cordingly, courts in different jurisdictions have taken different approaches to
determining which interests should be protected by the right to security of
person. This can be demonstrated by analysing the meaning that courts have
given to the right as it appears in the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),1 the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Canadian Charter),2 and the South African
Bill of Rights.3 As noted in the introduction, these jurisdictions are explored
because they have a developed body of jurisprudence about the right to se-
curity of person.
Under the ECHR, the right to security of person amounts to proced-
ural safeguards against arbitrary detention. In developing the case law, the
European Court of Human Rights (the ‘Strasbourg Court’) has considered
whether the right has any broader relevance but has decided on a limited
definition that restricts ‘security of person’ to situations in which somebody’s
liberty is restricted (eg when somebody is arrested, detained, or at risk of im-
prisonment). In comparison, the approach taken by the Canadian Supreme
Court in its interpretation of the Canadian Charter is broader. In that con-
text, the right to security extends to bodily and psychological integrity and in
some instances, autonomy. Finally, in South Africa, the only jurisdiction of

1
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European
Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR).
2
The Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c11, Part 1 (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms) (Canadian Charter).
3
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, ch 2 (SA Bill of Rights).

Rights as Security: The Theoretical Basis of Security of Person. First Edition. Rhonda Powell.
© The several contributors 2019. Published 2019 by Oxford University Press.
 The right to security in the European Convention 11
the three to provide a legislative definition of the right to security of person,
the cases focus primarily upon violence to the person. Rather than providing
a structured understanding of the right to security, the analysis in Chapter 1
demonstrates a lack of cohesiveness internationally, particularly in relation to
the relationship between liberty of person and security of person. As Lazarus
has noted, there is ‘a curious schizophrenia between a view of security as in-
distinct from and submerged within liberty, and a clearly autonomous notion
of security as inclusive of liberty and many other rights’.4
It is not normally seen as problematic that courts in different jurisdictions
take different approaches to resolving similar legal problems. International,
regional, and domestic rights instruments use different wording and have dif-
ferent internal structures. Varying local legal, social, and political norms result
in great diversity in legal systems and legal solutions worldwide. International
and regional courts work within a constrained political context. Differences
between jurisdictions can be therefore explained on the basis of textual and
contextual differences. However, arguably human rights protection in dif-
ferent jurisdictions should be based on an element of commonality because
legal rights are built on a common understanding of the human rights on
which they are based. By their very nature, human rights are universally ap-
plicable5 and we should therefore expect that in interpreting human rights
law in domestic contexts, relevant international norms will be considered.
Indeed, in some instances, judges are explicitly directed to do so by the legis-
lature.6 That does not mean that human rights law is necessarily a coherent
system as a whole, but that in the various contexts in which any one human
right is protected any local variation should be based on the common uni-
versal core. In terms of the right to security of person, this is not the case.

The right to security in the European Convention—​

arbitrary interference with liberty
The Strasbourg Court and the earlier European Commission of Human
Rights (‘the Commission’) have limited the context in which the right to

4
L Lazarus, ‘Mapping the Right to Security’ in L Lazarus and B Goold (eds), Security and
Human Rights (Hart 2007) 333.
5
See the reference to the ‘equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family’ in the
Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res
217 A(III) (UDHR). See further Chapter 7, 154.
6
See, eg, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 32(2); SA Bill of
Rights s 39(1); Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) s 2.
12

12 The Legal Right to Security of Person

security applies to deprivations of physical liberty. This is despite the fact that
the parallel right in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR),7
which was drafted during a similar period and which adopts similar phrasing,
was clearly intended to include matters such as personal integrity,8 and that
section 7 of the Canadian Charter has also been given a broader meaning.9
Article 5(1) of the ECHR reads:
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accord-
ance with a procedure prescribed by law . . .
Article 5(2)–​5(5) provides procedural protections for persons arrested or
detained.
Under the ECHR, the right has no relevance outside detention scenarios
(including imprisonment and compulsory detention for mental health treat-
ment), no application that is separate from the right to liberty and no in-
dependent content of its own. However, states are required to take positive
measures to protect a person’s liberty under Article 5(2)–​5(5). It is argued
here that these positive measures amount to ‘security’ under the ECHR.
Unsurprisingly, given that security has not been given an independent sub-
stantive meaning in ECHR jurisprudence, there is very little academic com-
mentary on the right to security under the ECHR.10
It is interesting to see how the Commission first justified its limitation
of the meaning of the right to security, which in other jurisdictions is seen
as an independent right.11 The Commission stated explicitly that this inter-
pretation by no means makes the right to security meaningless.12 Rather, the
right to security is important to secure freedom from arbitrary detention by
requiring procedural safeguards such as being informed of the cause of deten-
tion,13 being brought promptly before a judge,14 a right to challenge the de-
tention,15 and a right to compensation if the right is breached.16 The doctrine

7
UDHR, art 3.
8
J Morsink, ‘World War II as a Catalyst’ in The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins,
Drafting, and Intent (U of Philadelphia Press 1999) 40.
9
Rodriguez v British Columbia (AG) [1993] 3 SCR 519 (CanLII).
10
See Lazarus (n 4) and R Powell, ‘The Right to Security of Person in European Court of Human
Rights Jurisprudence’ (2007) 6 EHRLR 649.
11
See the discussions of Canada and South Africa below.
12
East African Asians (British Protected Persons) v United Kingdom (1981) 3 EHRR 76
(Commission Decision) [222].
13
ECHR, art 5(2). 14
ECHR, art 5(3).
15
ECHR, art 5(4); see MH v United Kingdom (2014) 58 EHRR 35.
16
ECHR, art 5(5).
 The right to security in the European Convention 13
of positive obligations was in its early stages at that point in time.17 However,
with the benefit of hindsight it can be seen that the same procedural safe-
guards could stem from the right to liberty. It is difficult to see what ‘security’
adds to Article 5.
The cases about the right to security in ECHR jurisprudence can be div-
ided into four sets. Each new set reflects a subtle change in interpretation of
the right over time. The first set, in the 1970s, made it clear that the right
to security of person had no meaning outside the context of deprivations of
liberty. In the second set, in the late 1990s, the language changed slightly to
recognize the potential for security to have an independent meaning from
liberty. The third set, in the early twenty-​first century, signalled movement
towards recognizing security as a separate right from liberty, although it did
not actually take this step. The fourth set, during a similar time period, took
a different approach by examining the issues under other ECHR provisions,
despite the claims for breach of right to security of person under Article
5. This same period saw an increase in usage of the rhetoric of security by
the Strasbourg Court. The overall picture is of increasing claims related to
security of person and increasing use of security language by the court, but a
failure to move from the position outlined in the first right to security chal-
lenge. That is, security of person, within the meaning of Article 5, is restricted
to the context of liberty deprivation.
It is important not to overestimate these variations, as the Strasbourg Court
steadfastly limits security to procedural protections against arbitrary deten-
tion. Nevertheless, the subtle changes are illuminating because Strasbourg
judgments tend to follow standard forms such that the reasoning in one judg-
ment may be repeated verbatim in another.18 It is therefore likely that changes
in the standard wording are deliberate. If these subtle changes are not delib-
erate, then the rhetoric of security may be influencing the Strasbourg Court
to find new ways to protect a broader sense of security of person within the
framework of the ECHR.
The first set of cases firmly establishes that the right to security in Article 5
is only relevant in the context of deprivations of liberty. In East African Asians
v United Kingdom,19 United Kingdom passport holders of Asian origin who
17
The doctrine was first recognized in the Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use
of Languages in Education in Belgium” (No 2) (1968) 1 EHRR 252. See further M Mowbray, The
Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European
Court of Human Rights (Hart 2004); D Xenos, The Positive Obligations of the State under the European
Convention of Human Rights (Routledge 2012).
18
This is one way the Strasbourg Court achieves consistency. It may also be the result of the pro-
cedures of the Court or be due to the time spent negotiating wording between judges of different
jurisdictions.
19
East African Asians (n 12).
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 Soak the gelatine in the milk for two hours. Beat up the eggs till
very light. Add the sugar and beat again. Bring the milk and gelatine
to the boil. Pour over the eggs and sugar. Strain. Put on the fire in a
double boiler and stir till thick; but do not allow it to boil. Add the
vanilla and pour into a wet mould.

*Strawberry Sponge
1 quart strawberries
Powdered sugar
4 whites of eggs
¹⁄₂ pint boiling water
1 oz. isinglass
Mash the strawberries with sufficient sugar to sweeten and set
them aside for about an hour. Boil the water and two ounces of sugar
for twenty minutes. Add the gelatine which has been soaked for an
hour in a little cold water. Remove from the fire and strain. Put the
strawberries through a fine sieve. Add the syrup gradually, beating
hard for five minutes. Beat the whites to a stiff froth. Add them to the
strawberries and beat till the mixture begins to set. Put into a wet
mould. Serve with whipped cream.

*King’s Soufflé

¹⁄₂ lb. powdered sugar

3 small lemons
3 eggs
¹⁄₂ pint whipped cream
³⁄₄ oz. gelatine
¹⁄₂ gill water
Beat the yolks of the eggs. Add to them the sugar, the juice of
three lemons, and grated rind of two. Pour into a double-boiler, and
whisk continually until the mixture thickens. Do not let it boil. Strain
and set aside to cool. Melt the gelatine in the water, and add it to the
cold egg mixture. Add the cream and the whites whipped to a stiff
froth. Whip lightly together, and when beginning to set, pour into a
mould. Garnish with crystallised violets or rose-leaves.
 Pastry
PAGE
Plain Pastry—I. 125
” ” II. 125
” ” (Short) 125
Puff Pastry 126
Rich Crust 126
Short Crust for Tartlets 127
Biscuit Paste for Tartlets 127

General Directions
In making pastry, the colder the hands of the maker, the water and
the room, the better. A marble slab is the best thing on which to
make it: otherwise a hard board which is kept for pastry only should
be used.
Use iced water for mixing, when possible. Pastry will be flakier if
set on ice before it is finally rolled out for use. The flour used should
be very dry and should be sifted with a little salt. Use the best flour
only and fresh butter, or half butter, half lard.
Use as little water as possible.
Never knead pastry.
Use the hands as little as possible. Mix with a knife unless
otherwise specified.
Bake in a moderate or quick oven.
 Baking powder, in the proportion of one tea-spoon to each quart of
flour, may be added when eggs are not used. The baking powder
should be sifted twice with the flour before mixing.
It is better to bake pastry separately from the fruit when possible. It
will thus be much crisper. To do this fill the dish which is to be used
with stiff crumpled paper, over which a smooth and well-buttered
piece should be laid. Cover with the pastry and bake. Remove the
pastry and fill the dish with well-sweetened stewed fruit. Moisten the
edges of the dish with white of egg and replace the crust.
In making open tarts and tartlets, when the tin is lined with pastry it
can be filled with rice and baked. This is in order to keep the crust
crisp. The rice must be taken out and the fruit or jam put in its place
just before serving.

Plain Pastry—I
12 ozs. flour
3 ozs. butter
3 ozs. lard
Salt
Cut up the lard and butter, very finely, in the flour. With a knife, mix
with a little water. Roll and fold up three or four times.

Plain Pastry—II
1 lb. flour
¹⁄₂ lb. butter
Cold water
Rub the butter into the flour. Add cold water gradually to make a
stiff paste, mixing with a knife. Roll out quickly.

*Plain Pastry Crust—III

 (For Tarts)
4 ozs. butter
2 ozs. lard
10 ozs. flour
Beat the butter to a cream. Rub butter and lard very carefully into
the flour, adding a little salt. Mix with as little water as possible.

*Puff Pastry
1 lb. fresh butter
1 lb. dry sifted flour
Salt
Work the flour well with a little water into a still dough. Flour the
pastry board slightly. Roll out the dough until one inch thick. Flatten
the butter and put in the centre of the dough. Fold the edges up over
the butter and roll out very lightly five times, always rolling outwards,
and using as little flour as possible on the board. The butter must on
no account be allowed to work through the paste. Set aside in a cold
place, or on ice, for at least an hour. When making tarts, &c., cut off
a piece at a time, instead of using the whole quantity, and roll out
very lightly. Bake in a rather hot oven. This is a simple and excellent
receipt.

*Rich Crust—IV
10 ozs. flour
8 ozs. butter
Juice of a lemon
Rub two ounces of the butter into the flour. Mix with the lemon
juice and a little water. Divide the rest of the butter into three parts.
Roll out the paste half an inch thick. Cut one lot of butter into small
pieces and dab them on the paste. Fold it over three times
lengthwise, and then three times the other way. Roll out again.
Repeat the process twice, when the butter will be used up.
 This receipt may be made with baking powder (see General
Directions).

*Short Crust—V
(For Tartlets)
1 lb. flour
³⁄₄ lb. butter
2 table-spoons powdered sugar
Yolks of 3 eggs
Water
Salt
Rub the butter into the flour and sugar. Beat the yolks with a little
water. Stir into the flour with a knife until smooth.

Biscuit Paste—VI
(For Open Tarts and Tartlets)
1 lb. flour
¹⁄₄ lb. sugar
6 yolks
Milk
Sift the flour and sugar together. Stir in the eggs with a knife. Make
into a stiff paste with some milk (about 1 gill).
 Open Tarts and Tartlets
PAGE
Almond Tartlets—I. 129
” ” II. 129
Chocolate Cream Tartlets 130
Cream Tartlets 130
Cream and Fruit Tartlets 131
Fruit Tartlets 132
Lemon Cheesecakes 132
Mincemeat 133
Orange Tartlets 133
Strawberry Tartlets 134

Almond Tartlets—I

¹⁄₄ lb. sweet almonds

5 ozs. powdered sugar
10 drops vanilla
6 whites of eggs
A few drops of lemon juice
Blanch and pound the almonds with the lemon juice. Add the
sugar. Whip the whites to a stiff froth. Stir in the almonds, sugar and
vanilla. Bake in a moderate oven in patty pans lined with puff pastry.

Almond Tartlets—II
 5 ozs. potato flour
8 yolks
3 whites
2¹⁄₂ ozs. butter
2 lemons
2¹⁄₂ ozs. sweet almonds
¹⁄₄ oz. bitter almonds
Blanch and pound the almonds. Melt the butter. Grate the rind of
the lemons. Beat the yolks. Mix all thoroughly together except the
whites. Beat them to a froth, and stir them in last.
Line two round tins with short crust (see p. 127). Spread it with
apricot jam, and pour the almond mixture over it. Bake in a slow
oven.

Chocolate Cream Tartlets

1 pint milk
1¹⁄₂ ozs. grated chocolate
1¹⁄₂ ozs. flour
¹⁄₄ lb. powdered sugar
1 oz. butter
4 eggs
Boil the chocolate and milk together. Stir in the flour, mixed smooth
in a little cold milk. Stir until it thickens. Strain. Pour over the well
beaten yolks. Add the sugar and butter. Stir over the fire until just
below boiling point.
Line small tins with a short crust. Fill with the cream and bake.
Make a meringue of two whites and two table-spoons of powdered
sugar (see p. 4). Put in the oven to brown slightly.

Cream Tartlets
 1 pint cream
¹⁄₂ pint milk
2 ozs. powdered sugar
Peel of one lemon
8 yolks
Put the cream and milk into a sauce-pan. When they boil, add the
sugar, the very finely-pared lemon peel and a little salt. Stir for a few
moments. Pour the cream over the well beaten yolks. Set back on
the fire. When thick, strain into a basin. Set aside in a cool place till
wanted. Line some small tins with puff paste. Fill with uncooked rice.
Bake. Take out the rice and fill with custard. Sprinkle with lemon
sugar (see p. 164).

Cream and Fruit Tartlets

For cream:—
1 tea-cup cream or milk
2 whites of eggs
1 table-spoon powdered sugar
¹⁄₂ tea-spoon cornflour
Line a dish with short crust. Fill it closely with raspberries,
strawberries, cherries or other fruit and sufficient sugar. Cover with
crust, but do not press it down round the edges. When baked, lift off
the upper crust and fill with cream.
Cream.—Scald the milk or cream. Add the whites beaten to a stiff
froth, the sugar and the cornflour mixed smooth with a little cold milk.
Boil three minutes, stirring continually. Set aside until quite cold.

Fruit Tartlets
Stew the fruit until tender, taking care to keep it whole, in plenty of
water and sugar. Take out the fruit gently with a skimmer when done.
Add a few drops of lemon juice to the syrup. Boil it until reduced to a
thick syrup. Line several small tins with a short crust (No. IV. or V.).
Fill with uncooked rice and bake. Take out the rice. Arrange the fruit
in them and pour the syrup over.

Lemon Cheesecakes

¹⁄₄ lb. butter

1 lb. loaf sugar
6 eggs
3 lemons
Melt the sugar in the lemon juice. Add the butter, eggs (taking out
the whites of two) and the grated rind of two lemons. Stir until thick
and of the consistency of honey. A few pounded almonds may be
added.
Line small tins with puff or short pastry, fill with the mixture and
bake.

Mincemeat
2 lbs. suet
3 lbs. raisins
2 lbs. sultanas
2 lbs. currants
1 lb. mixed candied peel
2 lbs. moist sugar
1 dozen sour apples
4 lemons, grated peel and juice
2 tea-spoons mixed spice
2 ” ground ginger
¹⁄₄ lb. pounded sweet almonds
2 grated nutmegs
¹⁄₂ pint brandy
¹⁄₂ pint sherry
 Mix the sugar, spices and very finely-chopped suet. Chop the fruit,
and peel as fine as possible. Mix all well together, adding the brandy
and wine last. It is best made several weeks before using.

Orange Tartlets
7 oranges
¹⁄₂ pint syrup
1 lemon
Puff or short paste
Peel six oranges. Scrape off all the white skin with a sharp knife.
Divide into sections, removing all the rest of the white and seeds.
Drop them very carefully into boiling syrup (see p. 151) and let them
simmer three minutes. Take the pieces out gently, and set them on a
sieve to drain over a basin.
To the syrup add the juice of an orange and lemon and the juice
that drains from the cooked oranges. Reduce it by boiling till very
thick.
Line some patty pans with short or puff paste. Fill them with
uncooked rice and bake quickly. Remove the rice, arrange the
oranges on the pastry and pour the syrup over them just before
serving.

Strawberry Tartlets
1 lb. loaf sugar
1 gill water
1 wine-glass brandy or sherry
Strawberries
Make a syrup of the sugar and water. Add the brandy or sherry.
Reduce until thick. Pour this syrup over a number of fine
strawberries.
 Line some small tins with short crust (No. 125). Fill them with
uncooked rice and bake in a quick oven.
Turn out the rice and fill with the strawberries and syrup. Serve
hot.
 American Pies
PAGE
Apple Pie 137
Cocoanut Pie 137
Custard Pie 138
Lemon Pie—I. 138
” ” II. 139
Mincemeat 140
Mock Mincemeat 141
Pine-Apple Pie 141

General Directions
The following American receipts are all good. Care, however, must
be taken in baking that there is a good bottom heat, or the under
crust will be sodden.
The pies should be made in shallow tins about 8 to 9 inches in
diameter. Puff paste may be used; but No. II. pastry (see p. 125) is
very satisfactory. It should be rolled very thin.
Where a covering of pastry is used, it should be slit across the
centre in three places, about two inches long, to allow the steam to
escape.

Apple Pie
1 lb. sour apples
7 ozs. brown sugar
 Roll out pie crust No. II. very thin. Line a tin with it. Pare and core
the apples and cut them in thin sections. Arrange them symmetrically
on the undercrust. Add the sugar. Cover with a thin overcrust,
moistening it with water at the edges and pressing down. Make three
slits about two inches long in the centre of the crust to allow the
steam to escape. Bake in a moderate oven.
Wellington apples should be used, if possible.

Cocoanut Pie

¹⁄₂ lb. grated cocoanut

³⁄₄ lb. powdered sugar
6 ozs. butter
5 whites of eggs
2 table-spoons rose water
1 gill white wine
Cream the butter and sugar. Beat for fifteen minutes with the
rosewater and wine. Stir in the cocoanut and then the whites, beaten
to a stiff froth, lightly and quickly. Pour into a tin lined with No. II.
pastry or puff pastry. Serve cold, sprinkled with powdered sugar.

Custard Pie
3 eggs
1 table-spoon sifted flour
3 table-spoons powdered sugar
1 tea-spoon vanilla
1 pint scalded milk
Beat the yolks till light and creamy. Sift the sugar and flour
together. Add it to the yolks. Add a little salt and the vanilla. Beat the
whites to a stiff froth. Whip them in. Add the cold scalded milk
gradually. Put into a tin lined with puff pastry. Bake thirty minutes.
 Lemon Pie—I
2 lemons
3 eggs
2 table-spoons flour
12 ozs. powdered sugar
1 pint water
1 oz. butter
Grate the rind of the lemons. Pare off with a sharp knife all the
white skin. Cut the lemons into very small pieces, removing all skin
and pips. Put them in an enamelled saucepan. Add the sugar, flour
and two-thirds of the grated rind and the water. When hot, stir in the
beaten eggs. Remove from the fire when just below boiling point. Stir
in the butter. When cold, pour into a tin lined with thin pastry. Cover
with pastry and bake.

Lemon Pie—II
2 lemons
1¹⁄₂ cups powdered sugar
1 table-spoon corn-flour
3 eggs
2 cups of water
Butter size of a walnut
Mix the sugar, flour and grated rind of the lemons thoroughly. Beat
the yolks till light and creamy. Add to the sugar and beat well. Stir in
the water. Set on the fire in a double boiler. Stir continually. When
hot, add the butter. Stir till thick but do not allow it to boil. When cool
pour it into a rather deep tin lined with No. II. pastry or puff pastry,
and bake. Whip the whites to a froth, adding gradually three table-
spoons powdered sugar. Spread on the pie when cold. Put in the
oven to brown a little. Serve cold.

Mincemeat
 ³⁄₄ lb. meat
1 lb. suet
2 lbs. raisins
1 lb. currants
4¹⁄₂ lbs. chopped apples
1 lb. golden syrup
2¹⁄₂ lbs. brown sugar
¹⁄₂ lb. mixed peel
¹⁄₂ table-spoon salt
¹⁄₂ tea-spoon white pepper
1 nutmeg, grated
¹⁄₂ tea-spoon ground cloves
1 tea-spoon ground cinnamon
1 bottle sherry
¹⁄₂ pint brandy
Use lean beef. Chop very fine and remove all gristle and fat. Mix
all well together, adding the wine and brandy last.
Bake as directed for apple pie or in small covered tarts, using No.
II. pastry.
Add a little lemon-juice to the mincemeat each time it is used.

Mock Mincemeat
6 toast biscuits
¹⁄₂ pint molasses or syrup
¹⁄₂ pint brown sugar
¹⁄₂ pint cider vinegar
³⁄₄ pint melted butter
¹⁄₂ pint chopped raisins
¹⁄₂ pint currants
 2 well beaten eggs
1 dessert-spoon allspice
¹⁄₂ tea-spoon grated nutmeg
¹⁄₂ tea-spoon cloves
1 tea-spoon salt
¹⁄₂ tea-spoon black pepper
1 gill brandy
Crush the biscuits. Mix all well together, adding the brandy last of
all.

Pine-Apple Pie

¹⁄₂ lb. grated pine-apple

¹⁄₂ lb. powdered sugar
¹⁄₄ lb. butter
1 gill thick cream
3 eggs
Beat the butter until creamy. Add the sugar and beaten yolks,
beating all till very light. Whip the cream. Add it to the grated pine-
apple. Beat the whites to a stiff froth. Stir them lightly in. Mix
altogether. Bake with an undercrust of puff pastry or a short crust.
 Ices
General Directions
If a machine is used (and the best should be obtained) it will take
about half an hour to freeze a cream or water ice. The cylinder
should be set in the pail filled with finely crushed ice and rock salt, in
the proportion of one part of salt to three or four of ice. To break the
ice, wrap carefully in a flannel and pound it with a hammer or flat iron
until it is broken into very small pieces. Pack it solidly round the
cylinder in layers of about three inches, divided by layers of salt. As it
is most important that there should be sufficient salt, it is best to
measure both ice and salt accurately with a saucer. The cylinder
should be turned slowly for the first ten minutes, then quickly. When
the mixture is frozen take out the metal beater, scrape the ice from
the sides of the cylinder, beat it well and pack it firmly down. Put on
the cover, fix the cylinder down into the pail, and cover with a piece
of old felt or carpeting which has been wetted with salt and water.
Leave until it is required.
Water should not be drawn off from the pail until there is so much
that the cylinder begins to float. When it does, draw off the water and
add more salt and ice.
If the ice is to be put into a mould, beat it well and pack firmly into
the mould. Cover closely and pack in ice.
Care must be taken in removing the cover of a cylinder or mould
that none of the salt mixture falls into the ice.
Ices can easily be made without a machine. The cylinder is
replaced by a long round biscuit or coffee tin, about four inches in
diameter. Put the tin in a pail. Pack it round with ice and salt as
above. Pour the mixture which is to be frozen into the tin and beat it
hard for ten minutes. Put on the lid firmly. Cover it with ice and then
cover the whole thing with a thick blanket or piece of carpet. Leave it
for an hour. Remove the ice on lid of the tin, wipe it and take it off.
Scrape off the frozen mixture at the sides and beat very hard again
for ten minutes. Replace the cover, ice, salt and blanket, and leave
for five or six hours, only looking occasionally to see if the water
must be drawn off and more ice and salt added. This, although a
lengthy process, is very simple and inexpensive and most
successful.
For beating, a long wooden spatula, thin at the end and about the
size of a carving knife, should be used.
It is essential that rock salt and not common salt be used. Snow
can be used instead of ice, but is not quite so good.
To take out ice, dip the cylinder quickly in hot water and shake it
gently.
Scald the tins in which ices are made directly they are emptied,
and dry in the oven.
If cream ices are to be put in moulds it will be found more
satisfactory to add to them a little dissolved gelatine in the proportion
of ¹⁄₂ oz. of gelatine to two quarts of cream.
Cream ices are excellent served with a hot chocolate, fruit, or wine
sauce. The sauce should be served separately.
 Cream Ices
PAGE
Cream Ice—I. 146
” ” II. 146
Brown Bread Cream Ice 147
Caramel Cream Ice 147
Chestnut Cream Ice 148
Coffee Cream Ice 148
Fruit Cream Ice 148
Strawberry Cream Ice 149
Tutti Frutti 149

*Cream Ice—I
1 quart cream
1 cup powdered sugar
1 table-spoon vanilla
Scald the cream. Add the sugar. When it is melted set aside to
cool. Flavour when cold. Freeze.
The whites of three eggs beaten to a foam, but not stiff, may be
added to the cream just before it is put into the freezer.

Cream Ice—II
(Frozen Custard)