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Why Do Religious Forms Matter?: Reflections on Materialism, Toleration, and Public Reason 1st Edition Pooyan Tamimi Arab full chapter instant download
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Why Do Religious Forms
Matter?
Reflections on Materialism,
Toleration, and
Public Reason
Why Do Religious
Forms Matter?
Reflections on Materialism, Toleration,
and Public Reason
Pooyan Tamimi Arab
Amsterdam, Noord-Holland,
The Netherlands
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For Roshan
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Philip Getz and his colleagues at Palgrave and Springer for
their patience as I wrote this book during the Coronavirus pandemic.
For Chap. 2 I would like to thank Jennifer Hughes and S. Brent Plate
for comments and support. Our coedited Routledge Handbook of Material
Religion will contain a version of this chapter, which is based on a lecture
I gave in 2018 for the Amsterdam Spinoza Circle at Paradiso. I am
indebted to Henri Krop and fellow Spinozists and to the city of Amsterdam
where I first encountered the philosopher at the multicultural Spinoza
Lyceum High School.
Chapter 3’s theoretical basis was developed for a 2017 Studium
Generale lecture delivered at Wageningen University, the Netherlands. A
short version that doesn’t focus on Locke also appeared in Religion,
Secularism, and Political Belonging, edited by Leerom Medovoi and
Elizabeth Bentley and published by Duke University Press in 2021. Apart
from the inspiration I’ve found in Martha Nussbaum’s works, the reflec-
tions on neutrality found here were inspired by reading and conversing
with Rajeev Bhargava at a 2012 summer school at the University Centre
Saint-Ignatius Antwerp—as well as more recently by a public conversation
with Tariq Modood and Ernst van den Hemel at Utrecht University,
which was published as “A Conversation on Tariq Modood’s Essays on
Secularism and Multiculturalism” in Patterns of Prejudice in 2021.
For Chap. 4 I am indebted to Christoph Baumgartner, who first rec-
ommended Habermas’s essay “Religion in the Public Sphere” and whose
critical comments sharpened my argumentation. A section of this chapter
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Index131
About the Author
xi
List of Figures
Fig. 1.1 Hunt Slonem. 1983. Saint Martin de Porres. Oil on canvas.
Private Collection. (Photograph by Ben Visser) 3
Fig. 2.1 Francis Bacon. 1965. From Muybridge “The Human Figure
in Motion: Woman Emptying a Bowl of Water/Paralytic Child
Walking on All Fours.” Oil on canvas. Stedelijk Museum
Amsterdam21
Fig. 2.2 Pieter Brueghel the Elder. 1562. The Fall of the Rebel Angels.
Oil on panel. Royal Museum of Fine Arts, Brussels 24
Fig. 2.3 Pieter Jansz. Saenredam. 1649. Interior of the Sint-Odulphuskerk
in Assendelft. Oil on panel. Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam 27
Fig. 3.1 Orthodox church frequented by Ethiopians and Eritreans in the
“Jungle Refugee Camp,” Calais, France. (Photograph by
Friedrich Stark, February 2016) 51
Fig. 3.2 Breitman-Breitman Architecture. 2016. The Western Mosque
in Amsterdam (Dutch: Westermoskee, Turkish: Ayasofya Camii).
(Photograph by the author, Spring 2016) 59
Fig. 3.3 Ritual slaughterhouse in Oudeschoot, the Netherlands, in
preparation for the Islamic Feast of Sacrifice. (Photograph by
Robert Vos, November 2011, published in 2015 in the national
newspaper NRC Handelsblad in an article on competing
interpretations of ritual slaughter) 74
Fig. 4.1 Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, the Qur’an, the Bible,
and other books on the table of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, The Hague. (Photograph by Bart Maat,
September 2014) 88
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Abstract This book explores the Early Modern roots and contemporary
relevance of a materialist perspective on the politics of religious diversity.
The political philosophies of Spinoza, Locke, and Rawls are explored in
three chapters to understand what coexisting religious forms are and why
they matter for the idea of justice. The introduction defines religious
forms as configurations of sensuous materials, which are indispensable to
understanding religious matters in an entangled, pluralist world. However,
this book does not exclude religious ideas, beliefs, and linguistic expres-
sions: Religious forms of discourse are part of the analysis. These diverse
religious forms—from buildings, images, and food to discourses—mani-
fest in “domains,” which are private and public spaces whose existence
depends on how political conceptions of justice are applied.
This book explores the Early Modern roots and contemporary relevance of a
materialist perspective on the politics of religious diversity. I analyze the polit-
ical philosophies of Spinoza, Locke, and Rawls to understand what coexist-
ing religious forms are and why they matter for the idea of justice. Each
philosopher writes about religious forms in a distinct style. In general, in
referring to a religious “form” I mean nothing more or less than “a configu-
ration of sensuous material,” as Hegel defines “form” in his lectures on aes-
thetics—to be distinguished from “the content,” an idea or a belief.1 My
understanding of the forms that can be said to be religious derives from the
so-called material-religion approach. Starting in the 1990s, by self-examining
the notorious “Protestant bias,” scholars in history, anthropology, and reli-
gious studies have corrected the reduction of the concept of religion as com-
prising sets of beliefs. This was done in part under the influence of the
twentieth-century “affective turn” in the humanities, which recognizes the
power of pre-linguistic or extra-linguistic structures of experience along with
experiences that are shaped by discourses.2 In contrast with Hegel, these
scholars do not see forms as the secondary manifestations of a more universal
capitalized Ideal. They pay attention to the entanglement of form and con-
tent and—in some cases, as in formalist art history—to the internal logics or
independence of forms themselves. This led in 2005 to the founding of
Material Religion: The Journal of Art, Objects, and Belief, as well as to numer-
ous research projects conducted on all continents. The material-religion
approach is spearheaded by, among other researchers, my colleague Birgit
Meyer, who coined the concept of the “sensational form” as a methodologi-
cal device for focusing on specific, tangible forms as entry points to people’s
religious worlds. For Meyer, a sensational form mediates access to what
believers call “spirits,” the “divine,” the “transcendent,” or simply a “beyond”
that cannot be perceived directly. Mediation bridges the distance between
mere form and the reality of God’s and other beings’ presence, which is “felt
in the bones” (Meyer 2009: 5).
Sensational forms, as conceived by Meyer, are part of larger “aesthetic
formations” that not only produce representations through the imagination
but also materially shape ever-interacting and thus ever-changing religious
communities. As an anthropologist, she is interested in those communities’
perspectives and what is true for them. From an outsider perspective, how-
ever—which anthropologists must take if they not only participate in their
research field but also want to observe it—the idea of aesthetic formations
entails giving a distanced description of the webs of meaning that tie reli-
gious identities to cosmologies, rituals, and experiences. These religious
identities are modalities of the forms that communities themselves design.
The Tibetan flag, with two snow lions on a white mountain under a radiant
1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS A RELIGIOUS FORM? 3
sun, does not just represent a past identity; it also reinforces the very idea of
a Tibetan people and the demand for religious freedom today. A necklace
with a conspicuous gilded cross does not just represent Iranian Christian
converts’ newfound faith; it does that, but the act of wearing it also makes
them appear as what they want to be in the European country they sought
refuge in. Scholars of material religion are often interested in the empirical
complexity of the use of such specific things, and they predominantly choose
interpretive methods that make it possible to convey their unique stories—
even as these forms are embedded in recurring patterns of religiosity
throughout history and in macro-level societal developments.3
Consider a painting of Saint Martin de Porres (1579–1639) by the
American neo-expressionist artist Hunt Slonem, who was born in 1951 in
the state of Maine (see Fig. 1.1).
Fig. 1.1 Hunt Slonem. 1983. Saint Martin de Porres. Oil on canvas. Private
Collection. (Photograph by Ben Visser)
4 P. TAMIMI ARAB
In the Netherlands, where I live and the current location of the artwork,
few know the first Black Saint of the Americas. And so, after seeing the
painting, they ask about the haloed man’s identity. The art critic Vincent
Katz’s answer gives a glimpse of the amazing web of meaning one image
can conjure in the mind:
Saint Martin de Porres was a Peruvian lay Dominican brother, born in Lima,
the son of a Spanish soldier and a black Panamanian freedwoman. He
devoted himself to the sick, built an orphanage, and founded several nurser-
ies. He was known for bilocation, levitation, miraculous knowledge, instan-
taneous cures and an ability to communicate with animals. One of his
symbols was the grouping of a dog, a cat, and a mouse, who ate together
without fighting. St. Martin de Porres is often depicted with a broom, since
he thought all work, even sweeping a floor, to be sacred. He is the patron
saint of African-Americans, bi-racial people, hairdressers, hotel-keepers,
mulattoes, and race relations. He was canonized in 1962.4
inspired by Protestant debates about the role of religious forms in the rela-
tion between State and Church. Spinoza stands out because he developed
ideas that the material-religion approach explicitly relies on—as well as
ideas that its protagonists would strongly criticize. On the one hand,
Spinoza’s mind-body equating lays the foundation for his analysis of
human affects, which inspired the affective turn through such readers as
Deleuze and underpins material-religion scholars’ view of religious affects.
Spinoza, famously, turns against the denigration of sensed things and
against the supposed superiority of human thinking or the immaterial
soul, radically stating, “The order and connection of ideas is the same as
the order and connection of things” (Spinoza, in Curley’s translation,
[1677] 1985: 451). On the other hand, this theoretical perspective also
paves the way to the Enlightenment philosopher’s critique of religious
imaginations and associated practices. In contrast to most anthropologists
today, Spinoza’s political philosophy is concerned with criticizing the
theocratic abuse of state power. “Superstition,” he argues in the Theological-
Political Treatise, published in 1670, is what demagogues use to justify
violence in the name of misleading religious imaginations. To launch these
and other criticisms, Spinoza describes the forms of all historical religions,
prefiguring scholarship such as Durkheim’s 1912 Elementary Forms of
Religious Life (cf. Meyer 2016), which explains how a form of life, broadly
conceived, relies on being made tangible through a definite “material
form” (une forme matérielle, see in English: Durkheim 1995: 94). I use an
open concept of forms to connect and compare how Spinoza and other
philosophers thought about diverse religious forms in shared public
domains, highlighting what he wrote about visions, books, rituals, and
buildings. By re-membering our philosophical ancestor, the material-
religion approach’s genealogy and theoretical basis are understood better.
The focus on material religion, however, also reveals the Early Modern
boundaries of inclusion in Spinoza’s conception of a free society.
Notwithstanding his celebrated freedom to philosophize, Spinoza, as I
will show, does not develop a concept of toleration for religious minori-
ties’ diverse ways of materially manifesting themselves.
Muslims, the right to religious freedom must include the right to have
access to a mosque—to build one, or to convert an existing building, if nec-
essary—the features that are essential to a mosque are those that allow col-
lective prayer and other rituals to be performed, and a minaret does not
qualify for that purpose. What a minaret does, plainly, is to signal to the
wider world that the building it is attached to is a mosque, increase its visi-
bility, and in certain cases make it easier to broadcast the call to prayer. These
may all be seen as desirable features, but they fall into the same broad cate-
gory as stained glass windows, or indeed church spires, which are equally
not essential to Christian practice. (Miller 2016: 445)
Miller poses the question in a way that fails to recognize the power inequal-
ity that manifests as aesthetic inequality between the Swiss who identify
with Islam and the Swiss who identify with Christianity—either as a reli-
gion they adhere to or as the keeper of national heritage in the form of
church architecture. Miller describes the Swiss (post-) Christians as “the
indigenous majority” in order to garner sympathy for a nation’s right to
shape and preserve the environment it lives in. But by doing so he is
unconvincingly drawing on the connotation of the word “indigenous,”
which often refers to groups who lacked the power of self-determination
under the yoke of European colonialism—as in, say, when we speak of
“Australia’s indigenous population.” Moreover, while Miller has a point—
at least from a minimalist conception of human rights: that the right to a
building may matter more than stained glass windows—from the perspec-
tive of anthropologists and scholars of religion, his reasoning betrays an
essentialist conception of religion, which in this case problematically
determines that the beginning of Islam decisively informs the meaning of
minarets in Switzerland in the twenty-first century.6
Miller’s reasoning can be called adiaphorous in the sense that it refers
to minarets as though they are not integral to Islam—or at least as though
Muslims are indifferent to minarets. Compare this underlying view of reli-
gions to Slonem’s lively depiction of Saint Martin de Porres, which speaks
to the intricate web of meaning that even seemingly simple forms can
have. Miller thus privileges a religious essence at the expense of what
becomes mere aesthetic baggage: describing what in religions is “required”
as opposed to what is only preferred or appreciated. Like Spinoza, who
defended the idea of an official religion of the majority, Miller does not
take as a starting point the experiences and desires of religious-minority
citizens themselves—in this case, Muslims, for whom the minarets express
equal citizenship.
8 P. TAMIMI ARAB
Miller’s reasoning fits into the kind that gives political philosophers the
reputation that they think too abstractly, losing sight of what is happening
on the ground. This has sometimes led to stereotypes. In the anthology
Materiality (Politics, History, and Culture), the anthropologist Daniel
Miller sharply distinguishes philosophical heights from grounded anthro-
pology, stating: “Anthropology always incorporates an engagement that
starts from the opposite position to that of philosophy” (2005: 14). In
Religion: Material Dynamics, comparative religion scholar David Chidester
writes that “religion is more like cooking than philosophy” (2018: 53)
suggesting that religion, not unlike anthropology, is involved in the varied
sensory nature of human lives more than philosophy is. There is a grain of
truth in these statements, since throughout history philosophers have
tended to privilege essence over appearance and universal principles over
particular experiences (with consequences for the less powerful—for
example, women or indigenous people—whose ideas and practices were
relegated to the realm of mere appearance, the non-essential, and the non-
enlightened). We see this tendency in Spinoza’s philosophy, too, in his
attempt to purify the meaning of the very word “religion,” identifying it
with a moral core. But, at the same time, there are so many forms, so many
configurations of sensuous material, that philosophers in the Early Modern
period were deeply concerned with and wrote about. These interactions
and experiences of philosophers revolved around texts and Biblical criti-
cism—which is itself a practical issue, connected as it was to preaching—
and around highly context-dependent questions, such as whether it is
allowed to wear a surplice in church. By discussing and reinventing the
relations between forms (of worship) and contents (beliefs) and between
State and Church, in the Early Modern period the ground was paved for
Locke’s systematizing the insights of his time into a theory of toleration.
Locke, in contrast with Spinoza, takes a relativistic stance regarding reli-
gions’ ultimate truths and a subjectivist stance toward religious forms.
Much of our understanding of toleration and equality today rests on this
assumption that these principles are not supposed to preserve religious
forms in themselves, but only as forms that matter to right-bearing sub-
jects who deem them important. That is, if the state is to institute toler-
ance as a civil right—which is a right that citizens intrinsically have, rather
than a right that is bestowed on them by the state—then it should restrain
from imposing certain forms over others, instead applying a stance of strict
neutrality as much as circumstances allow. The answer to this book’s ques-
tion—why religious forms matter—then, can be found in Locke’s early
1 INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS A RELIGIOUS FORM? 9
Family Ulmaceæ