The Politics of Vulnerable Groups:

Implications for Philosophy, Law, and

Political Theory Fabio Macioce
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-politics-of-vulnerable-groups-implications-for-philo
sophy-law-and-political-theory-fabio-macioce/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Legal Monism: Law, Philosophy, and Politics Paul Gragl

https://ebookmass.com/product/legal-monism-law-philosophy-and-
politics-paul-gragl/

Mutual Aid Groups, Vulnerable and Resilient

Populations, and the Life Cycle 3rd Edition, (Ebook
PDF)

https://ebookmass.com/product/mutual-aid-groups-vulnerable-and-
resilient-populations-and-the-life-cycle-3rd-edition-ebook-pdf/

The Coronavirus: Human, Social and Political

Implications James Miller

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-coronavirus-human-social-and-
political-implications-james-miller/

Sustainability Beyond Technology: Philosophy, Critique,

and Implications for Human Organization Pasi
Heikkurinen

https://ebookmass.com/product/sustainability-beyond-technology-
philosophy-critique-and-implications-for-human-organization-pasi-
heikkurinen/
Cicero: Political Philosophy (Founders of Modern
Political and Social Thought) Malcolm Schofield

https://ebookmass.com/product/cicero-political-philosophy-
founders-of-modern-political-and-social-thought-malcolm-
schofield/

Injustice: Political Theory for the Real World Michael

Goodhart

https://ebookmass.com/product/injustice-political-theory-for-the-
real-world-michael-goodhart/

The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Political Science

Harold Kincaid

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-oxford-handbook-of-philosophy-
of-political-science-harold-kincaid/

Indigenous Law and the Politics of Kincentricity and

Orality Amanda Kearney

https://ebookmass.com/product/indigenous-law-and-the-politics-of-
kincentricity-and-orality-amanda-kearney/

Postsecular History: Political Theology and the

Politics of Time Maxwell Kennel

https://ebookmass.com/product/postsecular-history-political-
theology-and-the-politics-of-time-maxwell-kennel/
 Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice

Series Editor
Stephen Eric Bronner, Department of Political Science, Rutgers
University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA
The series introduces new authors, unorthodox themes, critical interpre-
tations of the classics and salient works by older and more established
thinkers. A new generation of academics is becoming engaged with
immanent critique, interdisciplinary work, actual political problems, and
more broadly the link between theory and practice. Each in this series
will, after his or her fashion, explore the ways in which political theory
can enrich our understanding of the arts and social sciences. Criminal
justice, psychology, sociology, theater and a host of other disciplines
come into play for a critical political theory. The series also opens new
avenues by engaging alternative traditions, animal rights, Islamic politics,
mass movements, sovereignty, and the institutional problems of power.
Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice thus fills an important
niche. Innovatively blending tradition and experimentation, this intellec-
tual enterprise with a political intent hopes to help reinvigorate what is
fast becoming a petrified field of study and to perhaps provide a bit of
inspiration for future scholars and activists.
 Fabio Macioce

The Politics
of Vulnerable Groups
Implications for Philosophy, Law, and Political
Theory
Fabio Macioce
Department of Law, Economics,
Politics and Modern Languages
LUMSA University
Rome, Italy

ISSN 2731-6580 ISSN 2731-6599 (electronic)

Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice
ISBN 978-3-031-07546-9 ISBN 978-3-031-07547-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07547-6

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: © Ekely/E+/Getty

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgments

I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to all those who have

contributed to the development of my research on this topic with their
comments, pre-readings, and criticisms. They include, in no particular
order, Laura Palazzani, Thomas Casadei, Alberto Andronico, Tommaso
Greco, Stefano Biancu, and Francesco D’Agostino. It goes without saying
that I alone am responsible for what is written in the text and the
reflections it contains.
Of course, special thanks to Madison Allums, Naveen Dass, and all the
editorial staff at Palgrave, for taking me through this experience.
My wife Caterina deserves a special thanks: although she is not at all
interested in the content of this research, she contributes through her
daily dialogue, even on issues of legal and philosophical relevance, to a
better fine-tuning of it. But above all, she makes me understand with
words, gestures, concrete actions, and a daily ability to listen, what the
really important things in life are.
I would also like to thank, last but not least, Anna, Pietro, Francesco,
and Marco, for their ability to give my life meaning, to make confusion
and bring joy, to amaze.

v
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 Vulnerability: What Are We Talking About? 7
Introduction 7
Vulnerability and the Liberal Paradigm 11
Autonomy and Vulnerability: The Relational Perspective 14
Vulnerability as a Universal and Particular Condition 16
Vulnerability and the Political Dimension: Meaning
and Role of Vulnerable Groups 20
References 26
3 The Vulnerable Groups and Their Legal Value 31
Introduction 31
The Development of the Notion of Group Vulnerability
in International Law 33
Group Vulnerability in the Jurisprudence of the European
Court of Human Rights 40
Group Vulnerability in EU Law 46
Group Vulnerability and Bioethics 50
References 57
4 Towards a Theory of Group Vulnerability 61
Introduction 61
The Challenges of the Concept of the Vulnerable Group 63
Developing the Notion of Group Vulnerability 67

vii
viii CONTENTS

Identity-Based Group Vulnerability 68

Positional Group Vulnerability 72
The Consequences of Group Vulnerability, Between the Rights
of Individuals and the Rights of Groups 76
Conclusions 85
References 87
5 Group Vulnerability and Parallel Dimensions 93
Introduction 93
Vulnerable Groups and Collective Victimhood 94
Vulnerable Groups and Minorities 100
Vulnerable Groups and Discrimination 107
References 116
6 Group Vulnerability and Power 121
Introduction 121
Vulnerability, Power, and Oppression 123
Group Vulnerability and Resistance 132
Group Vulnerability and Resource Distribution 139
References 145
7 Vulnerability in a Positional Sense: The Case of Clinical
Trials 151
Introduction 151
Positional Vulnerability and Consensus 153
Group Vulnerability and Pandemic 157
Treatments, Trials and Informed Consent: The Case
of Vulnerable Groups 161
Conclusions 169
References 170
8 Identity-Based Group Vulnerability: The Case
of “Irregular” Migrants 175
Introduction 175
Irregularity Conditions and Vulnerability Factors 177
Group Vulnerability, Agency, and Resistance Practices 183
Conclusions 188
References 189

Index 195
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In recent years, I have been involved in several research projects in the

field of bioethics. One, in particular, funded by the European Commis-
sion, concerned the study of informed consent in clinical trials, with a
specific focus on vaccines. Among the objectives of the research, which
involved scholars from several European countries and different disci-
plines, was to assess all stakeholders’ needs in relation to Informed
Consent. More in detail, we should identify gaps and barriers in the
process of informed consent, and develop tailored strategies for informed
consent processes, thereby creating and validating guidelines to improve
citizens’ participation in research.
What struck me at the beginning of this research was the fact that one
of the explicit objectives of the European Commission was to overcome
the factors that hinder the participation of women, children, and other
‘vulnerable groups’ such as ethnic minorities in clinical trials. I knew, of
course, that the category of vulnerable groups had long been used in
numerous legal instruments in the field of bioethics, but it had never
occurred to me to deal with it specifically. In what sense were women,
or minors, to be considered a vulnerable group? If the research aimed to
develop strategies to facilitate information processes that take into account
age or gender factors, in what sense were we to do so?

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
F. Macioce, The Politics of Vulnerable Groups,
Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07547-6_1
2 F. MACIOCE

That research, in a way, was an opportunity to focus on a problem that,

as far as I knew, had not been adequately analysed. A problem that could
be expressed by paraphrasing the famous Metastasio words (taken up,
but modified, by Da Ponte in Così fan Tutte): “È la fede degli amanti /
Come l’araba fenice: / Che vi sia, ciascun lo dice / Dove sia, nessun lo
sa” (The faith of lovers / is like the Arabian phoenix / That it exists,
everyone says / But where, no one knows). Similarly, everyone mentions
vulnerable groups, but no one precisely knows what they are, and where
to find them.
On the one hand, the issue of vulnerability has increasingly become
an essential part of the philosophical, legal, and political debate. There
is a large number of texts devoted to this topic, and they are drawn up
from very different research perspectives: there are texts in which vulner-
ability is discussed in reference to the climate and to earthquakes, as well
as texts that analyse vulnerability in the context of clinical trials. There
are researches that analyses vulnerability from a legal, economic, soci-
ological, political, anthropological, geographical point of view (without
considering, as mentioned, the perspectives internal to physical sciences).
In short, when one speaks of a vulnerability turn in the social sciences,
one can do so with good reason.
On the other, the topic of vulnerable groups is, if I may say so,
somewhat ambiguous. In some cases, and from specific perspectives, the
category of vulnerable groups is uncritically accepted, as if it were an
obvious and unproblematic assumption: in the literature relating to the
analysis of climate phenomena, or in the medical and epidemiological
literature, for example, the category of vulnerable groups is not only
widely used (to indicate entire populations, human groups, or specific
clusters of subjects), but not problematized. It is considered somewhat
self-evident that there are groups of populations that are particularly
vulnerable to certain factors, and this notion is assumed as not needing
further explanation. The same thing happens in other areas, more or less,
with the important difference that the unclear definition of the concept,
and its unpredictable application, are perceived more clearly as a critical
feature: for example, in the legal literature, and in the area of international
law, the works devoted to the analysis of the notion of group vulnerability,
and the discussion of its origins and areas of application, also highlight the
vagueness (or excessive breadth) of this concept and the different inter-
pretations that arise from Courts’ case law. Such analyses, however, do
not offer a real alternative, nor do they provide or attempt to provide
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

more stringent definitions, or to delimit the applicability of this notion:

in other words, the pars destruens —in which the lack of precision of the
international documents referring to group vulnerability is criticised—is
not followed by an equally precise pars construens, i.e. by an attempt
to clarify what vulnerable groups are, and in what sense and to what
extent this notion can be used. Finally, if we look at the philosophical
literature, the possibility of accurately and sensibly using the category of
group vulnerability seems to be completely discredited. Vulnerability, in
philosophical scholarship, is mostly understood as individual vulnerability,
and the attempts to identify vulnerable groups, and to describe common
or collective conditions of vulnerability, are discredited as essentialist and
stereotypical: on the one hand, the very possibility of identifying groups
is seen as fallacious, because it is based on unacceptable essentialist claims;
on the other hand, any description of a group of people as vulnerable is
criticised as having the effect of labelling the subjects who are part of it,
and as making them even more vulnerable and exposed to discrimination.
The research conducted in these pages, therefore, moves within this
horizon, to analyse this conceptual ambiguity, and try to reduce it. The
aim of the research, therefore, is to describe—with specific regard to the
legal and political context—the recurrent and, above all, undertheorized
use of the notion of vulnerable groups, without, however, criticising its
plausibility. On the contrary, the aim is to show in what terms, and
to what extent, the category of vulnerable groups is both theoretically
possible, and politically and legally necessary. In this sense, the critique of
the extensive and indiscriminate use of the notion of vulnerable groups
will not lead to a rejection of it, or a reduction of group vulnerability into
individual vulnerability: rather, it will lead to a more precise definition of
the boundaries of group vulnerability, and an analysis of the consequences
of the proposed definition(s).
In this attempt, however, I will not propose even a provisional list of
vulnerable groups. It is not my intention in these pages to make a more
or less comprehensive list of vulnerable groups, nor do I think there is
any point in doing so—as a consequence of the proposed definitions that
will be discussed in the text. What this volume can offer the reader is,
in a more modest way, a proposal for a definition of vulnerable groups,
thereby clarifying in what sense, and with what limits, such a category
can be used, and what consequences such a definition may have—in
terms of agency, of the possibility of action, of capacity to lay claims and
needs. This is the reason why I will not offer a list of vulnerable groups:
4 F. MACIOCE

what is more, there are far too many lists in international documents,
and I did not feel the need to add another one, which would also be
without any force or cogency. This is also the reason why, except for a few
cases, I do not even enter into the analysis of specific situations of group
vulnerability: except for the two final chapters, in which I will analyse
two cases (one for each of the two types of vulnerable groups I identify,
according to the definitions that will be provided in the research), I do
not discuss whether this or that group is really vulnerable, in what sense
it is vulnerable, and with what consequences.
The book discusses the issue of group vulnerability as follows: the first
chapter provides a brief overview of the studies on the concept of vulner-
ability, and on the theories that—in legal and political philosophy—have
used this concept as a point of observation on reality. The second chapter
is dedicated to the legal concept of group vulnerability, but still in a purely
descriptive way: in this chapter I describe the main uses of the category
of group vulnerability in international law, and in the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, and I analyse the extensive and
often incongruous use of this category. The third chapter is instead dedi-
cated to the definition of group vulnerability, which is considered not
only theoretically plausible, at least when interpreted in a non-essentialist
way, but also politically useful, even if susceptible to being misunderstood
and applied in a victimising way: in this chapter, therefore, two defini-
tions of group vulnerability will be offered, i.e. two different ways of
understanding group vulnerability, depending on the circumstances and
characteristics of the group itself. In the fourth chapter, the concept of
group vulnerability is put in relation with the categories and concepts
of minority and discrimination, and with the processes of victimisation
that can affect groups as well as individuals; this is both to highlight the
differences and highlight the distance between the category of vulnerable
groups, and the three dimensions indicated, and to highlight the concep-
tual autonomy of each dimension and the different protection needs.
The fifth chapter analyses the complex and often ambiguous relationship
between group vulnerability and power: in particular, it discusses both the
theme of oppression, and the forms through which power is exercised
towards vulnerable groups, and the positive aspect of the relationship
between group vulnerability and power, that is, the forms through which
group vulnerability manifests itself as a place of resistance to oppression,
and as a context in which claims and positive actions emerge. Finally, in
the two concluding chapters, two cases are presented, each related to one
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

of the two forms of group vulnerability identified and described in the

text: the case of clinical trials, concerning group vulnerability in a posi-
tional sense, and the case of migrants in conditions of irregularity, with
reference to the identity-based group vulnerability.
Small parts of the third section have been previously published in
Macioce, Fabio. “Group Vulnerability, Asymmetrical Balance, and Multi-
cultural Recognition”. Ratio Juris 31.4 (2018): 469–484. Parts of
the seventh section have been previously published in Macioce, Fabio.
“Informed Consent and Group Vulnerability in the Context of the
Pandemic”. BioLaw Journal-Rivista di BioDiritto 2S (2021): 17–33.
Parts of the eighth section have been previously published in Macioce,
Fabio. “Undocumented Migrants, Vulnerability and Strategies of Inclu-
sion: A Philosophical Perspective”. Constellations 25.1 (2018): 87–100.
 CHAPTER 2

Vulnerability: What Are We Talking About?

Introduction
Over the last decades, the notion of vulnerability1 has become progres-
sively more relevant in philosophical debate, in the language of the social
sciences, as well as in legal texts, guidelines, and documents concerning
national and international policies. Vulnerability is invoked to justify
preventive measures, additional justification burdens, enhanced forms of
protection for specific assets (e.g. territories, artistic heritage…), or rights.
The concept of vulnerability is used to designate categories of persons or
single individuals on the basis of both their assumed physical fragility and
their equally lacking autonomy or presumed incapacity to express free
consent. At the same time, the concept of vulnerability is used to identify
situations of particular exposure to risk due to economic, environmental,
social, and legal factors, in a process of accumulation of social handi-
caps (Ferrarese 2016, 151). The reasons for such a theoretical success

1 Throughout the text I will use the notion of vulnerability—unless a different meaning
or use is expressly indicated—to indicate a state of high exposure to certain risks and
uncertainties, in combination with a reduced ability to protect or defend oneself against
those risks and uncertainties and cope with their negative consequences. Such a definition
is consistent with that provided by the United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs, United Nations Report on the World Social Situation: Social Vulnerability:
Sources and Challenges (UN, New York, 2003).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 7

Switzerland AG 2022
F. Macioce, The Politics of Vulnerable Groups,
Critical Political Theory and Radical Practice,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07547-6_2
8 F. MACIOCE

are manifold: among the many, some point out both the growing insecu-
rity and political instability of the last two decades, and the changes—the
increasing precariousness—in the labour market, as well as the financial
instability of the markets, and the emergence of an “affective turn” in
social theories (Cole 2016).
Unfortunately, the concept of vulnerability is as much discussed and
used, as it is scarcely systematised. While there are many moral, political,
and social theories that use this concept, and that interpret it in different
ways and from different perspectives, very few works provide a defini-
tion of the concept and a framework of its uses in different fields and
sectors (Mackenzie et al. 2014). However, it is possible to point out that
this concept has been developed over the last few decades in three main
perspectives (Mackenzie et al. 2014, 2): within analyses of dependency
and theories of the ethics of care; in bioethical debates; in an ontological
perspective, within reflections on the human condition and corporeality.
Additionally, we may mention analyses that take vulnerability as a stand-
point for problems of distributive justice, although this approach seems
to be transversal to the three previous ones, at least in most cases.
In the first perspective, for example, we may consider the anal-
yses of Eva Kittay (1995, 2019), MacIntyre (1999), and Nussbaum
(2001, 2009), in which the dimension of vulnerability as dependence
is interpreted as a fundamental paradigm for the elaboration of an
ethical–political perspective, as well as the theory of Robert Goodin
(1986), in which the category of vulnerability as dependence on others
(in a Lévinas-like perspective) is taken as the basis for the moral imper-
ative, and the justification for social interventions. In this vein, some
scholars underlined the importance of specific instances of vulnerability
as a primary reference for public policies and interventions oriented to
social justice (Tronto 2013). If the human vulnerability is understood
as arising in large part from social factors and the environment, care
interventions necessarily entail making claims on social institutions and
“all capable others”, because the intervention of narrow caregivers is not
enough (Engster 2019, 112). For instance, a public duty in terms of
“caring with” is necessary to mitigate workers’ vulnerabilities (to harms,
joblessness, underpay, exposure to dangerous work conditions, among
other things), being narrow care networks unable to do so (Engster
2019; Engster and Hamington 2015; Tronto 2013, 23).
The concept of vulnerability is also present in several international
documents and legal instruments (the second chapter is devoted to this
 2 VULNERABILITY: WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? 9

topic) concerning biomedical interventions, as well as in a large number of

studies in the field of bioethics. Within this field, both scholars and legis-
lators highlighted specific areas or contexts of vulnerability in bioethics,
thereby developing specific burdens of protection towards certain groups
in clinical trials: for instance, vulnerability has been interpreted—with
regard to informed consent procedures—as a condition of increased expo-
sure to risks deriving from clinical, cognitive, relational, social, economic,
or structural reasons (Kipnis 2001). At the same time, in bioethics, a
certain excessive use of the notion of vulnerability has begun to be crit-
icised, especially when it is used to label—at least in documents and
guidelines—whole populations or groups of individuals. The dangers of
such a “labelling approach” have thus begun to be emphasised, since it is
liable to obscure the needs of single individuals in a given context (Hurst
2008; Luna 2009), and since it is so extensive as to be meaningless, as well
as stereotyping and discriminating (Rogers et al. 2012; Rogers 2014, 76).
Finally, in the third perspective, many scholars focused on the bodily
dimension, thus contributing to shifting the discussion into an ontological
perspective. Starting from Butler’s analyses, the investigation into vulner-
ability became the interpretation of the human condition as such, and
led to distinguishing universal human vulnerability as a form of expo-
sure to hurt and suffering (precariousness), from conditions of pathogenic
vulnerability, i.e. socially induced vulnerability (precarity) (Butler 2016,
25). Similarly, vulnerability has been discussed within the horizon of the
ethics of care, underlining the importance of specific instances of vulnera-
bility as a primary reference for public policies and interventions oriented
to social justice. It is also with reference to these analyses, that Fineman
(2008, 1; 2010, 251) and Turner (2006) discussed the concept of vulner-
ability in political and social theory, to both explore anti-discriminatory
policies, in response to conditions of inequality or disadvantage, and focus
on forms of structural injustice hidden behind the liberal model and its
myth of a perfectly autonomous and rational individual. Since vulnera-
bility is an anthropological feature, it cannot be ignored and marginalised
in the private sphere: rather, it is the basic reason human beings create
political institutions and claim state intervention (Fineman 2013).
It is worth noting that despite the diversity of approaches and the
plurality of meanings of the term, some topics seem recurrent within the
theories of vulnerability. To be more precise, three main axes of research
can be identified within vulnerability theories. These are not themes that
are developed by every theory of vulnerability; rather, they are research
10 F. MACIOCE

issues that are particularly significant in these theories, even from different
perspectives.
A first topic which is extensively discussed by theories of vulnerability is
the dialectic with liberal thought: not necessarily in the sense of rejecting
such a tradition, but at least in the sense of highlighting that some of its
salient characteristics are inadequate to fully grasp the human condition.
Theories of vulnerability, also with arguments developed within feminist
approaches, focus on typical liberal assumptions, such as the emphasis
on the individual and on his (the masculine pronoun is not accidental)
autonomy, as well as the crushing of this autonomy on the rational dimen-
sion, that is, on the ability to exercise a kind of sovereignty over one’s own
life and choices. Theories of vulnerability challenge this horizon, empha-
sising in contrast the value of human relationality and the constitutive
dependence of the human being. The second topic that is developed by
many theories of vulnerability is the alternative between an interpreta-
tion of vulnerability as an ontological characteristic, and therefore as a
universal trait, and the emphasis on situated vulnerability, or more gener-
ally on the specific circumstances that produce conditions of vulnerability
for individuals or groups. On the one hand, therefore, the idea of a
universal vulnerability contradicts the liberal myth of autonomy and inde-
pendence as the marks of the human condition; on the other hand, the
focus on circumstances of vulnerability makes it possible to highlight the
dynamics of power, oppression, and exclusion that determine conditions
of vulnerability, and ground claims in terms of recognition, redistribu-
tion, or balancing of power. As a consequence, the third thematic area
is the investigation of the social, political, and institutional structures
that shape, and respond to, subjective vulnerability. Central to this, is
the analysis of the political dimension of vulnerability, in opposition to
a rigid separation between public and private which is typical of many
liberal accounts, as well as discussion on the factors that can determine
the specific vulnerability of each individual. The theme of vulnerability
is intertwined here with that of resilience, but both are understood in
their public or social dimension, i.e. with reference to the question of
the resources (be they personal, material, institutional) that society makes
available to each person.
These axes of the research on vulnerability will be discussed in the
following paragraphs. However, it should be pointed out that, transversal
to them, a fourth perspective can be identified, which is represented by
 2 VULNERABILITY: WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? 11

the increasing relevance of a relational understanding of the human condi-

tion: here both the concept of autonomy and that of vulnerability are
understood in a relational perspective, in order to highlight the extent
to which both are “shaped” by the system of social, political, and insti-
tutional relations. Lessening the anti-liberal reading of vulnerability, this
approach shows how the promotion of autonomy (even though under-
stood in a relational sense) is necessary for the fulfilment of political and
legal obligations resulting from the vulnerability of individuals or groups,
and that it should not be interpreted as an alternative to the condi-
tion of vulnerability itself (Nedelsky 1989; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000;
Anderson 2003; Christman 2004; Anderson and Honneth 2005).
Finally, it should be emphasised that even if this impressive flourishing
of studies and analyses is probably the source (or one source) of the ambi-
guity of the concept of vulnerability, it retains a strong critical value from
both a political and a theoretical point of view, being a crucial standpoint
for challenging discriminatory policies and practices. On the one hand,
depending on the perspective one follows, vulnerability may be linked
(in different ways and for different purposes) to the bodily, emotional,
psychological, and affective spheres, it may be understood as a condi-
tion that is either universal or particular and it may be considered as an
element that is both intrinsic to the human condition as well as contingent
and dependent on specific circumstances. On the other hand, as Fineman
correctly argues, the ambiguity of the concept of vulnerability enables
to explore the complex relationships inherent but sometimes hidden in
the term, using this concept as a heuristic device (Fineman 2008, 9).
Therefore, vulnerability remains a conceptual basis for political agency,
that is, for opposing systems that produce marginalisation and oppres-
sion. In other words, the ambiguity and broad applicability of the concept
allow it to be used to construct critical perspectives in the legal or political
sphere, so as to raise new questions and elaborate new solutions to social
and political challenges.

Vulnerability and the Liberal Paradigm

The reflection on vulnerability has been developed along with criti-
cisms—arising from different perspectives—of the liberal paradigm of
the autonomous, independent, rational, and productive subject (Kittay
1997; Fineman 2004; Fineman and Grear 2013). Such criticisms have
been developed by perspectives that can be traced back to feminist or
12 F. MACIOCE

communitarian thought, highlighting how the liberal conception is not

able to take the condition of constitutive dependence of the human
being into account, nor the relational and progressive character of the
construction of the self. Even if there are significant differences between
these approaches, they all underline the inadequacy of the liberal account
of justice, precisely because it is unable to take the bodily dimension,
the relational dimension, and the social and political aspects of human
experience fully into account.
Liberalism itself, of course, is far from being homogeneous. Therefore,
criticisms which are relevant here should not be understood as referred
to liberalism per se, as a theoretical model, rather as concerning specific
traits of liberalism, linked in particular to its underlying anthropology and
to liberal accounts of justice which are consequent to such anthropology
(Nussbaum 1997, 5).2 At the same time, it is true that, within liberal
theories, the intuition of the fundamental equality (in terms of dignity)
of every human being, regardless of their status and role in society, arises
directly from the capacity of human beings to elaborate life plans and
choices in accordance with one’s own subjective values and goals (Nuss-
baum 1997, 4). If justice in political contexts can only be realised in
a reciprocal limitation of individual freedom and collective interest, at
the core of the liberal tradition there is the guarantee of the interests
and choices of independent and autonomous citizens, whose voices give
legitimacy to the structures of power that implement justice in a given
context.
Criticism of the liberal model, in other words, has centred on this
conception of the person as fully autonomous, self-determining, and
independent. From communitarian and identity politics perspectives, for
instance, the excessive individualism of such a vision has been stressed,
i.e. the idea that the subject and his/her identity can be defined before,
and independently of, collective aims, values, memberships, and identities
(Sandel 1981; Kymlicka 1989). From feminist perspectives (MacKinnon
1987; Abbey 2014), it has been pointed out that the premise of this

2 Nussbaum rightly points out that the focus on vulnerability does not imply, per se,
the rejection of the liberal approach: she argues that (p. 5) “liberalism needs to change
to respond adequately to those insights: but it will be changed in ways that make it
more deeply consistent with its own most foundational ideas”. In this sense, according to
Nussbaum, some basic liberal assumptions are essential to guarantee substantial justice for
women: among these, in particular, the centrality of the idea of equal citizenship.
 2 VULNERABILITY: WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? 13

independence is the (unpaid) care labour performed by women, and that

therefore such a perfectly independent (or falsely independent) subject is
essentially a male one, whose independence is gained at the expense of
that of women (Okin 1989, 138)3 ; that the liberal account of justice
is excessively formal, and therefore inadequate to manage and modify
systemic injustices that depend on mechanism of power and culture
(Young 1990, 114); and that it is generally hyper-rationalistic, and there-
fore tends to devalue the significance of emotions and caring in public life,
thus contributing to placing the question of vulnerability in the private
sphere (Jaggar 1989; Lloyd 1993). The idea—especially in the so-called
feminism of difference and in critical theories—is that the liberal model
has taken a disembodied subject as its reference: therefore, it is unable
to appreciate relationships of care, as well as the constitutive condition
of dependence of the human being, and it is more generally blind to the
relational character of human existence, arising from patriarchal premises
that actually allow these aspects (Tronto 1993, 120) not to be seen,
and not to be considered. On the contrary, liberalism confines them to
the private sphere and delegates them (in a logic of exploitation) to the
unpaid work of women (Gilligan 1982; Pateman 1988). Finally, disability
theories have emphasised how the condition of universal dependence
should be discussed in conjunction with the specific forms of depen-
dence experienced by people with disabilities, and highlighted that the
(liberal) objective of protecting and enhancing individual independence
should be replaced with that of managing universal and specific depen-
dence (Kittay 2019), and with a new understanding of legal capacity
and autonomy (Bernardini 2018). In short, these critiques have under-
lined that a different and more complex subject should be placed at the
centre of the polis, whose specific trait (inclusive of, but not reducible to,

3 “The division of labor within marriage (except in rare cases) makes wives far more
likely than husbands to be exploited both within the marital relationship and in the world
of work outside the home. To a great extent and in numerous ways, contemporary women
in our society are made vulnerable by marriage itself. They are first set up for vulnerability
during their developing years by their personal (and socially reinforced) expectations that
they will be the primary caretakers of children, and that in fulfilling this role they will
need to try to attract and to keep the economic support of a man, to whose work life
they will be expected to give priority. They are rendered vulnerable by (…) the fact that
the world of wage work, including the professions, is still largely structured around the
assumption that “workers” have wives at home” (pp. 138–39).
14 F. MACIOCE

dependence: Fineman 2008, 11)4 is precisely that of vulnerability: such

a trait, if understood as an inherent feature of human experience, cannot
be hidden (even if it is confined to the private sphere), and deconstructs
the distinction between autonomous and non-autonomous subjects.

Autonomy and Vulnerability:

The Relational Perspective
It is precisely around the concept of autonomy that the reflection
developed by the theories of vulnerability has manifested the “rela-
tional” approach I mentioned earlier. Within this relational perspective,
autonomy ceases to be understood as a subjective predicate (a quality of
individual subjects, so that one can say that someone is either autonomous
or not), and becomes an ontological trait whose exercise can be facili-
tated or inhibited by the networks of relationships of each person. All,
or almost all, in this sense, may be autonomous, even if some need the
support of others to exercise their autonomy, and even if some need it
more extensively than others. In this sense, autonomy depends on the
guarantee of subjective freedom, as well as on the availability of resources
and supportive relational networks, given that these elements do not
determine individual choices, but they support them and make them
possible: construed in such a way, autonomy becomes a dimension that is
compatible with vulnerability and dependence, rather than an alternative
to them.
Therefore, autonomy is linked to the availability of material resources,
as well as to the institutional and regulatory framework that make its
exercise possible. Firstly, it refers to social rights, i.e. to goods and mate-
rial resources (such as education, health, adequate economic conditions,
opportunities to participate in the cultural and religious life of one’s
community, etc.) that are the social conditions of autonomy (Rawls 1971;
Raz 1986; Young 1986; Oshana 1998; Sen 1999). Secondly, autonomy
requires the subject to be placed in a relational context suitable for its
exercise, and more precisely in a context characterised by positive rela-
tions of recognition: autonomy is a capacity that flourishes within social

4 “Dependency is episodic and shifts in degree on an individual level for most of us,
mainstream political and social theorists can and often do conveniently ignore it. In their
hands, dependency, if acknowledged at all, is merely a stage that the liberal subject has
long ago transcended or left behind and is, therefore, of no pressing theoretical interest”.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the
collection of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the
individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the
United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright
law in the United States and you are located in the United
States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from copying,
distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works
based on the work as long as all references to Project
Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope that you will
support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting free
access to electronic works by freely sharing Project
Gutenberg™ works in compliance with the terms of this
agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg™ name
associated with the work. You can easily comply with the terms
of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format with
its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when you share it
without charge with others.

1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also
govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most
countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside
the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to
the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying,
displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works
based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The
Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright
status of any work in any country other than the United States.

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project

Gutenberg:

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other

immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must
appear prominently whenever any copy of a Project
Gutenberg™ work (any work on which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed,
viewed, copied or distributed:

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United

States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it
away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg
License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United
States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to
anyone in the United States without paying any fees or charges.
If you are redistributing or providing access to a work with the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the
work, you must comply either with the requirements of
paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use
of the work and the Project Gutenberg™ trademark as set forth
in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

posted with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and
distribution must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through
1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed by the copyright holder.
Additional terms will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™
License for all works posted with the permission of the copyright
holder found at the beginning of this work.

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project

Gutenberg™ License terms from this work, or any files
containing a part of this work or any other work associated with
Project Gutenberg™.
 1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute
this electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1
with active links or immediate access to the full terms of the
Project Gutenberg™ License.

1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if
you provide access to or distribute copies of a Project
Gutenberg™ work in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or
other format used in the official version posted on the official
Project Gutenberg™ website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at
no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a
means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other
form. Any alternate format must include the full Project
Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™
works unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or

providing access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works provided that:

• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
 about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation.”

• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who

notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that
s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and
discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project
Gutenberg™ works.

• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of

any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in
the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90
days of receipt of the work.

• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project

Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different
terms than are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain
permission in writing from the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project Gutenberg™
trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3
below.

1.F.

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend

considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on,
transcribe and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright
law in creating the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite
these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the
medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,”
such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt
data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other
medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.

1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES -

Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in
paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation, the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
and any other party distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic
work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to you for
damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU
AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE,
STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH
OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH
1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR
ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE
OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If

you discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of
receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you
paid for it by sending a written explanation to the person you
received the work from. If you received the work on a physical
medium, you must return the medium with your written
explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the
defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu
of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or
entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.
If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund
in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.

1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set

forth in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’,
WITH NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
ANY PURPOSE.

1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied

warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this
agreement violates the law of the state applicable to this
agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the
maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable
state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of
this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.

1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the

Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless
from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that
arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project
Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or
deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any Defect
you cause.

Section 2. Information about the Mission of

Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new
computers. It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of
volunteers and donations from people in all walks of life.

Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the

assistance they need are critical to reaching Project
Gutenberg™’s goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™
collection will remain freely available for generations to come. In
2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was
created to provide a secure and permanent future for Project
Gutenberg™ and future generations. To learn more about the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your
efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the
Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.

Section 3. Information about the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-
profit 501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by
the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal
tax identification number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax
deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and
your state’s laws.

The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500

West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact
links and up to date contact information can be found at the
Foundation’s website and official page at
www.gutenberg.org/contact

Section 4. Information about Donations to

the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission
of increasing the number of public domain and licensed works
that can be freely distributed in machine-readable form
accessible by the widest array of equipment including outdated
equipment. Many small donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly
important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.

The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws

regulating charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of
the United States. Compliance requirements are not uniform
and it takes a considerable effort, much paperwork and many
fees to meet and keep up with these requirements. We do not
solicit donations in locations where we have not received written
confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or
determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit
www.gutenberg.org/donate.

While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states

where we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know
of no prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from
donors in such states who approach us with offers to donate.

International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot

make any statements concerning tax treatment of donations
received from outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp
our small staff.

Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current

donation methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a
number of other ways including checks, online payments and
credit card donations. To donate, please visit:
www.gutenberg.org/donate.

Section 5. General Information About Project

Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could
be freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose
network of volunteer support.

Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several

printed editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by
copyright in the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus,
we do not necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any
particular paper edition.

Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.

This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,

including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new
eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear
about new eBooks.