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Today’s Moral Issues, Seventh Edition, combines theoretical and practical Seventh Seventh Edition
readings on four general themes: first principles, liberty, rights and responsibilities, Edition
and justice and equality. The theoretical readings from classical philosophy, which
appear at the beginning of each of the four parts of the book, are closely related
to the contemporary readings that follow, which cover “hot button” issues of

Classic & Contemporary Perspectives

interest to today’s students.

TODAy’S
New in the Seventh Edition:
• A new section on gay marriage, one of the most contentious issues of
current politics, has been added.
• The Questions for Reflection that follow each reading have been expanded
and reworked.
• New selections are included from R. G. Frey, the World Commission on

Moral Issues
Environment and Development, Thomas Nagel, Francis Beckwith, Rosalind
Hursthouse, Stanley Kurtz, Andrew Koppelman, Maggie Gallagher, Toon
Quaghebeur, Bernadette Dierckx de Casterlé, Chris Gastmans, Carol Steiker,
Amartya Sen, Elizabeth Anderson, Robert Rector, Rachel Sheffield, and
Michael Huemer. T ODAy’S
What Instructors are Saying about Today’s Moral Issues:
“Overall, I think that the Bonevac text is an excellent choice for my course. . . .
Moral Issues

MD DALIM #1174741 12/17/11 CYAN MAG YELO BLK

The book strikes a good balance between the theory and the applied issues.”
—Tracie Mahaffey, Florida State University

“ I would say that you really can’t go wrong with this text. It’s an extremely
Classic & Contemporary Perspectives
versatile text for a wide range of ethics-oriented courses.”
—Stephen Carey, Virginia Commonwealth University

“The topics are framed by ‘first principles’ sections, which introduce students
to classical sources in the field. These, together with the broad range of topics
covered, make it the best on the market.”

Bonevac
—Nicholas Power, University of West Florida

Daniel Bonevac
 g
PREFACE
This book is a text for courses on contemporary
moral issues. Such courses assume that philosophy
has something important to contribute to contempo-
rary moral problems. They try to bring philosophi-
cal theories to bear on practical questions. From one
point of view, this seems difficult. Philosophy is in
many ways the most abstract of all disciplines. The
questions it addresses are very general: What is real?
How do we know? What should we do? But philoso-
phy is also the most practical of all disciplines. It aims
at wisdom. Living wisely, displaying good judgment,
understanding yourself and your surroundings—
these offer immense benefits to all, no matter who
they are, how they earn a living, or what kind of
society they inhabit. Living wisely is a key to living
well. For just that reason, Aristotle thought that phi-
losophy was the highest human activity and that the
contemplative life was the highest and happiest form
of life possible for a human being.
Nevertheless, it is not always easy to bring theory
and practice together in the classroom. Philosophical
texts can be hard to read. Philosophers often write
primarily for each other. And arguments about con-
temporary issues are rarely reflective; the underlying
principles can be hard to discern.
Contemporary moral problems textbooks often
amplify these difficulties. They contain mostly papers
by professional philosophers written for a profes-
sional audience. They tend to omit underlying theo-
retical approaches altogether or segregate them in a
separate section of the book. The first strategy leaves
students with no moral compass. Students have trou-
ble abstracting ethical principles and methods from
treatments of particular issues; even the best students
flounder when faced with issues that have not been
treated explicitly in class. The result is that students
emerge with only the vaguest idea of what ethical
thinking is. The second strategy divides courses into
two parts that are hard to unify. The theory usually
vii
bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd vii
strikes students as dry and irrelevant, while the prac-
tical part remains confusing or, at best, an exercise in
applying theory.
This book tries to resolve the dilemma by tying
theoretical and practical considerations together.
Today’s Moral Issues combines theoretical and practi-
cal readings on four general themes: first principles,
liberty, rights and responsibilities, and justice and
equality. The theoretical readings are closely related
to the contemporary readings that follow. I have
found that using philosophical texts helps students
connect theory and practice, for writers such as
Locke and Mill tend to be more concrete and practi-
cal in outlook than most secondary discussions of
their thought. Their motivations are not difficult for
most students to understand. And I have edited the
theoretical texts closely to bring students into direct
contact with their chief motivations and arguments.
The classic and contemporary theoretical
approaches constitute a foundation for thinking
about contemporary issues. Combining these texts
with discussions of contemporary problems lets stu-
dents see the dialectic between theory and practice
in ethics. Faced with practical dilemmas and dis-
agreements, it is easy to see why ethical thinkers
have sought to construct theories. And contempo-
rary issues provide opportunities not only to apply
theories but also to test and evaluate them. Good
students, I have found, attain not only a rich under-
standing of the theories, the issues, and how they are
related, but also a real sense of what ethical thinking
is all about.
Today’s Moral Issues is unique in treating contem-
porary moral issues in the context of both politi-
cal philosophy and ethics. Issues such as abortion,
euthanasia, and the environment have political as
well as personal dimensions. Others, such as free-
dom of speech, capital punishment, and economic,
racial, sexual, and global equality, are almost entirely
12/28/11 4:28 PM
 viii Preface
political. To treat them adequately, one must consider
the proper ends of government and the bounds of
state action.
New Features
This edition retains the virtues of earlier editions.
It combines theoretical and practical treatments of
ethical and political issues from a wide variety of per-
spectives and sources, including court cases, journal-
ists, public figures, public policy researchers, and
scientists as well as philosophers.
This edition also has some new virtues. It differs
from earlier editions in some important ways:
1. Among the most contentious issues of current
politics is gay marriage. I have expanded the book
to include it.
2. More than 20 percent of the readings are new to
this edition.
3. In the Theoretical Approaches sections, I have
added readings from Confucius. In the sec-
tions dealing with issues, I have added pieces
by R. G. Frey, the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development, Thomas Nagel,
Francis Beckwith, Rosalind Hursthouse, Stan-
ley Kurtz, Andrew Koppelman, Maggie Galla-
gher, Toon Quaghebeur, Bernadete Dierckx de
Casterlé, and Chris Gastmans, Carol Steiker,
Amartya Sen, Elizabeth Anderson, Robert Rec-
tor and Rachel Sheffield, and Michael Huemer.
4. I have reworked and greatly expanded the Ques-
tions for Reflection, especially in the theoretical
sections.
5. The Web page (http://bonevac.info/tmi) that accom-
panies the book has been expanded. It includes
many features to help both students and instruc-
tors, including
a. sample course syllabi
b. extensive class notes for all sections of the book,
with links to relevant parts of philosophical
texts (where they are public domain and avail-
able online)
c. a study guide summarizing key points
d. a comprehensive glossary of terms
e. practice exams
bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd viii
f. suggested readings
g. relevant court cases
h. Web links to other sources of information on
contemporary issues
i. a guide to writing philosophical essays
j. tips on multimedia presentations
k. PowerPoint slides for each section of the text
Acknowledgments
This book and the ideas behind it have evolved con-
siderably during the thirty years I have been teaching
contemporary moral issues courses at the University
of Pittsburgh and the University of Texas at Austin.
I am grateful to the many instructors, teaching assis-
tants, and students who have used earlier versions
and helped me refine them. I am particularly grateful
to the more than 10,000 students who have taken
my contemporary moral problems course at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin. They have taught me much
about what a course on moral issues ought to be.
I especially want to thank Nicholas Asher and
Stephen Phillips, who have team-taught courses
on contemporary moral problems with me. Their
ideas have found expression here in more ways than
I can distinguish. I am also grateful for the helpful
criticism and advice I have received throughout the
years from Randy Mayes, California State University,
Sacramento; Bill Myers, Birmingham Southern
College; David Bradshaw, University of Kentucky;
and Jonathan Davis, University of Texas at Austin.
I would like to thank the reviewers whose com-
ments have helped me clarify my own thinking and
decide what issues and readings to include: for the
first edition, L. E. Andrade, Illinois State Univer-
sity; Linda Bomstad, California State University,
Sacramento; Karen Hanson, Indiana University; and
Anita Silvers, San Francisco State University; for
the second edition, Stephanie Beardman, Rutgers
University; Ray Cebik, University of Tennessee,
Knoxville; Deirdre Golash, American University;
Patrick Lee, Franciscan University of Steubenville;
Aaron Meskin, Rutgers University; Sharon Sytsma,
Northern Illinois University; and Nathan Tierney,
California Lutheran University; for the third edition,
Naomi Azck, University of Albany, State University
12/28/11 4:28 PM

of New York; Stephen Carey, Virginia Common-
wealth University; Scott Lehman, University of
Connecticut; A. P. Roark, University of Washington;
and Stewart Shapiro, Ohio State University at New-
ark; for the fourth edition, Abrol O. Fairweather,
CSU, Hayward; A. R. Molina, University of Miami;
Barbara Montero, NYU; Lawrence Pasternack,
Oklahoma State University; Janice Staab, Southern
Illinois University; Lawrence Stark, State University
of New York at Albany; for the fifth edition, Jean
Axelrod Cahan, University of Nebraska, Lincoln;
Barbara Lowe, St. John Fisher College; Joseph Pap-
pin III, University of South Carolina; and Wendy A.
Ritch, Raritan Valley Community College; for the
sixth edition, Hannah Phelps, Pacific Lutheran Uni-
versity; Diane Bowser, The Art Institute of Pittsburg;
Lawrence Stratton, Villanova University; Jack Bayne,
University of Massachusetts, Boston; Robert Pielke,
El Camino College; and Peter Marton, Salem State
College; and, for the seventh edition,
bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd ix
Preface ix
• Nicholas Power, University of West Florida
• Stephen Carey, Virginia Commonwealth University
• Tracie Mahaffey, Florida State University
• John Messerly, Shoreline Community College
• Sean Stidd, Wayne State University
• Corine Sutherland, Golden West College
• Dan Lioy, Marylhurst University
I am grateful to all of those at McGraw-Hill who
have supported this book and worked to present my
ideas. I want especially to thank my editors. Jim Bull
was vital to the first two editions, and Ken King sim-
ilarly vital to the next two. I am also deeply grateful
to Jessica Cannavo, sponsoring editor; develop-
ment editor, Craig Leonard; marketing coordinator:
Angela R. FitzPatrick; copyeditor, Kay Mikel; project
manager, Melissa M. Leick; design coordinator,
Margarite Reynolds; and Louis Swaim, Buyer, for
their support throughout my work on this project.
12/28/11 4:28 PM
bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd x 12/28/11 4:28 PM
 g
CONTENTS

Preface vii

INTRODUCTION MORAL ARGUMENTS 1

Arguments 1
Making Moral Arguments 2
Exceptions to Moral Principles 4

PART I FIRST PRINCIPLES 7

THEORETICAL APPROACHES 13
Confucius, from The Analects 13
Aristotle, from Nicomachean Ethics 17
St. Thomas Aquinas, from Summa Theologica 23
David Hume, from A Treatise of Human Nature 27
Immanuel Kant, from Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of
Morals 31
Jeremy Bentham, from An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation 43
John Stuart Mill, from Utilitarianism 50
Nel Noddings, from Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral
Education 55

S E X U A L B E H AV I O R 6 0
Bertrand Russell, Our Sexual Ethics 61
Thomas A. Mappes, Sexual Morality and the
Concept of Using Another Person 66
Roger Scruton, from Sexual Desire 73

xi

bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd xi 12/28/11 4:28 PM

 xii Contents

S E X U A L O R I E N T AT I O N A N D G AY M A R R I A G E 7 7
Justice Byron White, Majority Opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick 79
Justice Anthony Kennedy, Majority Opinion in Lawrence et al.
v. Texas 82
Massachusetts Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall
and Justice Robert J. Cordy, Majority and Dissenting Opinions in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 87
Stanley Kurtz, The Libertarian Question 102
Andrew Koppelman, from The Decline and Fall of the Case against
Same-Sex Marriage 106
Maggie Gallagher, from (How) Will Gay
Marriage Weaken Marriage as a Social Institution:
A Reply to Andrew Koppelman 112

ANIMALS 119
International League of the Rights of Animals, Universal Declaration
of the Rights of Animals 121
Peter Singer, from Animal Liberation 123
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights 130
R. G. Frey, Moral Community and Animal Research in Medicine 134

THE ENVIRONMENT 143

Garrett Hardin, from The Tragedy of the Commons 146
World Commission on Environment and Development, from Our
Common Future: Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development 149
Daniel Bonevac, Is Sustainability Sustainable? 154

PART II LIBERT Y 163

THEORETICAL APPROACHES 165

Aristotle, from Nicomachean Ethics 165
John Stuart Mill, from On Liberty 168

D R U G L E G A L I Z AT I O N 1 7 7
Milton Friedman, An Open Letter to Bill Bennett 178

bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd xii 12/28/11 4:28 PM

 Contents xiii

William J. Bennett, A Response to Milton Friedman 181

Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization 184
James Q. Wilson, Against the Legalization of Drugs 190

PORNOGRAPHY 197
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William O. Douglas,
Majority and Dissenting Opinions in Miller v. California 199
Catharine MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech 205
The Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography, The Question
of Harm 209
Wendy MCElroy, from Sexual Correctness 216

O F F E N S I V E S P E E C H A N D B E H AV I O R 2 2 3
Plato, from The Republic 226
John Stuart Mill, from On Liberty 232
Stanley Fish, from There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech, and It’s a Good
Thing, Too 237
Thomas Nagel, Personal Rights and Public Space 243
Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Paul Stevens, Majority and
Dissenting Opinions in Morse v. Frederick 248

PART III RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 259

THEORETICAL APPROACHES 261

Thomas Hobbes, from Leviathan 261
John Locke, from Second Treatise of Government 266
Edmund Burke, from Reflections on the Revolution in
France 273
John Stuart Mill, from Utilitarianism 282
United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights 286

A B O RT I O N 2 9 0
Justice Harry Blackmun, Majority Opinion in Roe v. Wade 292
Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion 297
Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion 307

bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd xiii 12/28/11 4:28 PM

 xiv Contents

Don Marquis, Why Abortion Is Immoral 318

Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Theory and Abortion 327
Francis J. Beckwith, Personal Bodily Rights, Abortion,
and Unplugging the Violinist 333
Alexander R. Pruss, I Was Once a Fetus: That Is Why Abortion Is
Wrong 342

EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED

SUICIDE 350
Supreme Court of New Jersey, Matter of Quinlan 352
J. Gay-Williams, The Wrongfulness of Euthanasia 357
Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls,
Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Brief of the
Amici Curiae 360
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Majority Opinion in Washington
et al. v. Glucksberg et al. 366
Toon Quaghebeur, Bernadette Dierckx de Casterlé,
and Chris Gastmans, Nursing and Euthanasia: A Review of Argument-
Based Ethics Literature 372

C A P I TA L P U N I S H M E N T 3 7 9
Cesare Beccaria, from On Crimes and Punishments 381
Justice William Brennan, Concurring Opinion in Furman v.
Georgia 386
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, Majority Opinion in Gregg v.
Georgia 388
Ernest van den Haag, from The Death Penalty: A Debate 392
Hugo Adam Bedau, The Case against the Death Penalty 396
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally
Required? The Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs 403
Carol S. Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required:
Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty 415

WA R 4 2 5
St. Thomas Aquinas, Whether It Is Always Sinful to Wage War? 427
Francisco de Vitoria, from The Law of War on Indians 429
Hugo Grotius, from On the Law of War and Peace 432

bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd xiv 12/28/11 4:28 PM

 Contents xv

Carl von Clausewitz, On the Nature of War 438

Mahatma Gandhi, Non-Violence in Various Aspects 442
Richard A. Posner and Gary S. Becker, Preventive War 446

PART IV JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 449

THEORETICAL APPROACHES 451

Aristotle, from Nicomachean Ethics 451
Aristotle, from Politics 453
John Locke, from Second Treatise of Government 455
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 466
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, from On the Social Contract 474
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, from Manifesto of the Communist
Party 478
Karl Marx, from Estranged Labour, Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844 484
Karl Marx, from Critique of the Gotha Program 489
John Rawls, Justice as Fairness 492
Robert Nozick, from Anarchy, State, and Utopia 497

ECONOMIC EQUALITY 505

John Stuart Mill, from Principles of Political Economy 507
John Hospers, What Libertarianism Is 510
Amartya Sen, Equality of What? 516
Charles Murray, from Losing Ground: American Social Policy,
1950–1980 520
Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality? 529
Robert Rector and Rachel Sheffield, Air Conditioning, Cable TV, and an
Xbox: What Is Poverty in the United States Today? 540

A F F I R M AT I V E A C T I O N 5 5 4
Chief Justice Earl Warren, Majority Opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education 556
Justice Lewis Powell, Majority Opinion in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke 559

bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd xv 12/28/11 4:28 PM

 xvi Contents

Antonin Scalia, The Disease as a Cure 567

Bernard R. Boxill, from Blacks and Social Justice 573
Thomas Sowell, “Affirmative Action”: A Worldwide Disaster 579
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Majority Opinion in Gratz et al. v.
Bollinger et al. 595
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Majority Opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger
et al. 600

I M M I G R AT I O N 6 0 9
Immanuel Kant, from Perpetual Peace 611
Garrett Hardin, Living on a Lifeboat 616
Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the
Twenty-First Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture 621
Michael Huemer, Is There a Right to Immigrate? 631

bon38219_fm_i-xvi.indd xvi 12/28/11 4:28 PM

 INTRODUCTION
g
MORAL ARGUMENTS

This is a book about moral issues. What are moral Components of Arguments
issues? To answer this question, we need to consider
The initial assertions of an argument are its premises;
the definition of philosophy. If the word itself is any
the thesis that the argument tries to justify is its con-
guide, philosophy is the love of wisdom. A simple
clusion. Arguments consist of statements, sentences
definition of wisdom, in turn, is good judgment. Phi-
that can be true or false. Almost every sentence in this
losophy, then, is the love or pursuit of good judg-
book falls into this category. Statements are declara-
ment. Moral philosophy, or ethics, is the pursuit of
tive, in the indicative mood; they say something about
good judgment about character and action—about
the way the world is, correctly or incorrectly.
what kind of person to be and about what to do. Eth-
Here, for example, is a simple argument:
ics addresses questions about virtue and vice, good
and bad, right and wrong. (1) Stealing is wrong.
Such questions, clearly, have varied answers; they ∴ Stealing this book is wrong.
are often the subject of controversy and debate. The
(This format lists the premises in the order in which
moral issues considered in this book—abortion,
they are given and then gives the conclusion. The
euthanasia, pornography, capital punishment, affir-
symbol ∴ means “therefore.”)
mative action, and many others—are among the
How can we recognize arguments? The premises
most controversial our society faces. Most of this
of an argument are meant to support the conclusion.
book consists of moral arguments, in which a moral
We can recognize arguments, then, by recognizing
issue is considered and a particular position is sup-
when some statements are offered in support of oth-
ported or a particular conclusion is reached through
ers. We can do this most easily, in turn, if we can dis-
reasoning.
tinguish premises from conclusions. But how can we
How can we think through moral issues carefully
pick out the conclusion of an argument? In English,
and systematically? How do we develop arguments
various words and phrases can signal the premises or
for ethical conclusions? These are questions that I
the conclusion of an argument.
attempt to answer in this introduction.
• Conclusion Indicators: therefore, thus, hence,
consequently, it follows that, in conclusion, as a
Arguments result, then, must, accordingly, this implies that,
this entails that, we may infer that
Arguments are bits of reasoning in language. Fre-
• Premise Indicators: because, as, for, since, given
quently, we think of arguments as conflicts. In that
that, for the reason that
sense, this book presents a series of arguments about
issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and affirmative Beware: These words and phrases have other uses as
action. But philosophers and logicians primarily use well.
“argument” in the sense that one argues for a conclu- Extended or complex arguments contain other argu-
sion. An argument starts with some assertions and ments. Simple arguments do not. Because extended
tries to justify a thesis. arguments are good only if the simple arguments

bon38219_intro_01-06.indd 1 12/22/11 11:04 AM

 2 Introduction
within them are good, it is best to break extended
arguments down into their simple components and
analyze them separately.
Validity and Soundness
To evaluate arguments, we need to ask, What dis-
tinguishes good from bad arguments? What makes a
good argument good?
A good argument links its premises to its conclusion
in the right way. In a (deductively) valid argument, the
truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the con-
clusion. If the premises are all true, then the conclusion
has to be true. Or, equivalently, if the conclusion of a
valid argument is false, at least one premise must also
be false. Consider, for example, the argument
(2) All promises ought to be kept.
Your promise to Joe is a promise.
∴ You ought to keep your promise to Joe.
In any circumstance in which the premises of this
argument are true, the conclusion must be true as
well. It is impossible to conceive of a state of affairs in
which, while all promises ought to be kept, and your
promise to Joe is a promise, you nevertheless should
not keep your promise to Joe. If it is false that you
should keep your promise to Joe, then either there
are promises that shouldn’t be kept, or your “prom-
ise” wasn’t a real promise.
Valid arguments are only one species of good
argument. Others are inductively strong (or reliable).
The truth of the premises of such an argument does
not guarantee the truth of its conclusion, but it does
make the truth of the conclusion probable. Consider,
for example, this argument:
(3) Every generous person I’ve ever known has also
been kind.
∴ All generous people are kind.
It is possible for the premise to be true while the
conclusion is false. There may be generous but nasty
people I’ve never met. So the argument is invalid.
Nevertheless, the premise lends some support to the
conclusion. The argument is inductively strong; how
strong depends on how many generous people I’ve
known, among other things.
In general, good arguments not only are valid
or inductively strong but also have true premises.
bon38219_intro_01-06.indd 2
A sound argument is a valid argument with true
premises. In any valid argument, the truth of the
premises guarantees the truth of the conclusion, so a
sound argument also has a true conclusion. A cogent
argument is an inductively strong argument with
true premises. In a cogent argument, the truth of the
conclusion is likely but not guaranteed.
Logic develops precise ways of determining
whether arguments are valid (although the most
powerful ways of evaluating arguments are intui-
tive). An argument is valid if the truth of the prem-
ises guarantees the truth of the conclusion. To show
that an argument is invalid, therefore, one needs to
show that the premises could all be true while the
conclusion is false.
There are two ways of showing that an argument
is invalid. The first, the direct method, is simply to
describe such a situation; that is, we can show an
argument to be invalid by depicting a possible cir-
cumstance in which the premises were all true but
the conclusion was false.
The second way to show that an argument is
invalid, devised by Aristotle, is based on the idea of
form and is known as the method of counterexam-
ples. To show that an argument is invalid using this
method, we must produce another argument of the
same form with true premises and a false conclusion.
This introduction is too short to present a detailed
discussion of form. But Aristotle’s insight was that
validity is formal in the sense that arguments can be
classified into certain general patterns, or forms, of
which individual arguments are instances. An argu-
ment form is valid if and only if every instance of
it is valid. More to the point, an argument form is
invalid if and only if some instance of it is invalid.
To show that an argument form is invalid, then, find
an instance with true premises and a false conclu-
sion. To show that an individual argument is invalid,
find an argument with true premises and a false con-
clusion that shares the specific form of the original
argument: the most explicit form we can devise, dis-
playing the most structure.
Making Moral Arguments
As we have seen, it is possible to attack an argument
by showing that one of its premises is false. Even
12/22/11 11:04 AM

if the argument is valid or strong, such an attack
shows that it is not sound or cogent and undercuts
its conclusion.
Moral arguments typically have both moral and
factual premises. Some statements are factual or
descriptive. They say how the world is. Other state-
ments are evaluative, prescriptive, or normative. They
say how the world ought to be; more generally, they
evaluate how the world is, characterizing it as right
or wrong, acceptable or unacceptable, delightful or
dismal. They include specifically evaluative terms.
A moral argument is an argument with an evaluative
conclusion. People who reach opposite conclusions
may differ in moral principles, but they may also dif-
fer in factual assumptions. One of the chief purposes
of a contemporary moral problems course is to teach
people how to disentangle moral from factual issues.
The distinction matters, because factual and moral
conclusions require different kinds of support.
Consider a simple example:
(4) You promised to sublet the apartment.
You should keep your promises.
∴ You should sublet the apartment.
The first premise is factual. Whether you promised
to sublet the apartment is a matter of fact. If it is
disputed, we may ask about the facts: What exactly
did you say? Is there any agreement in writing? Did
you sign anything? Was it really this apartment?
The second premise, in contrast, is evaluative. It
speaks of how things ought to be, not how they
are. Consequently, no amount of inquiry into the
facts can help us determine its truth or falsehood.
To justify it, we must appeal to more general moral
principles.
The general pattern of moral arguments for par-
ticular conclusions is thus:
(5) Factual premise(s)
Moral premise(s)
∴ Moral conclusion
This is utterly familiar. You ought to return those
books to the library. Why? You borrowed them (fac-
tual premise), they are due (factual premise), and
you ought to return what you borrow when it is due
(moral premise). Or, you may take vacation the last
week of April. Why? It won’t cause your coworkers
any inconvenience (factual premise), and you may
bon38219_intro_01-06.indd 3
Introduction 3
take vacation whenever it won’t cause your cowork-
ers any inconvenience (moral premise).
Arguing for a Moral Principle
(5) is a pattern for arguing to a particular moral con-
clusion. But how can one argue for general moral
conclusions, such as the moral principles on which
such arguments rely? How, in other words, does one
support moral premises such as You ought to keep
your promises, You ought to return what you borrow
when it’s due, or You may take vacation whenever it
won’t cause your coworkers any inconvenience?
In essence, there are two ways to argue for a moral
generalization: from above and from below. To argue
from above, appeal to a more general moral prin-
ciple. John Stuart Mill, for example, would argue
as follows for the generalization, You ought to keep
your promises:
(6) You ought to follow the rules that will maximize
human happiness.
Following the rule You ought to keep your
promises will maximize human happiness.
∴ You ought to keep your promises.
Immanuel Kant would justify it differently:
(7) You ought to treat others as ends, not merely as
means.
Keeping a promise to someone treats that per-
son as an end, but breaking one treats him or
her as a means to your ends.
∴ You ought to keep your promises.
Philosophers who prefer justifications from above
tend, like Mill and Kant, to search for a single, very
general moral principle that can justify other prin-
ciples.
Moral principles may also be justified from
below, by appeal to their instances. One could
try to argue that it is wrong to break promises,
for example, by generalizing from examples of
particular situations:
(8) Say someone promises to marry you but
doesn’t show up at the altar; that would be wrong.
Say Frank borrows money from you, promis-
ing insincerely to repay it, and then absconds; that
would be wrong.
12/22/11 11:04 AM
 4 Introduction
Say the doctor makes an appointment to see you and
then goes to play golf instead; that would be wrong.
Say Joan agrees to pay you $1,000 for landscaping
her yard, you do the work, and she refuses to pay;
that would be wrong.
∴ Breaking promises is wrong.
or more specific kinds of situations:
(9) Someone who agrees to marry someone on a par-
ticular day should show up for the wedding.
Someone who borrows money ought to repay it.
Someone who makes an appointment ought to
keep it.
Someone who signs a contract ought to fulfill it.
∴ Breaking promises is wrong.
These arguments are not valid, but they are induc-
tively strong if the examples are numerous and
diverse enough.
The readings in this book contain many arguments
for moral principles, some from above, some from
below. Arguments from above are important, for they
say something about why the moral principle holds.
Kant’s argument for promise keeping, for example, not
only concludes that promises should be kept but also
indicates that they should be kept because breaking
them treats others as means to your own ends. Mill’s
argument, similarly, indicates that promise keeping is
obligatory because it maximizes human happiness.
Arguments from below are also important, for they
link principles to particular cases about which we
have strong moral intuitions. The more abstract and
general a moral principle is, the fewer intuitions we
have about whether it is correct. Moral theories there-
fore rely on both kinds of arguments.
Arguing against a Moral Principle
How does one argue against a moral principle? One
tries to find a counterexample: an instance in which
the principle seems to give the wrong result. Is it
always right to keep promises, for instance? One
can try to find examples of promises that should not
be kept. Recall that, in a valid argument, the truth
of the premises guarantees the truth of the conclu-
sion, or, equivalently, the falsehood of the conclusion
guarantees the falsehood of at least one premise. One
can construct a valid argument from the principle to
a false conclusion:
bon38219_intro_01-06.indd 4
(10) One should always keep one’s promises.
∴ If Herman promised to murder the entire
city council, he should do it.
The absurdity of the conclusion shows that there is
something wrong with the premise.
Many philosophers have objected to Kant’s opin-
ion that lying is always wrong by constructing a simi-
lar argument. Suppose that a distraught child runs to
you begging for help. A homicidal maniac is chasing
her. You hide her in a closet. The maniac bangs on
your door and asks whether you know where she is.
Surely you should not tell the truth.
Exceptions to Moral Principles
This example illustrates that most moral principles
have exceptions. Most moral principles are true other
things being equal (in Latin, ceteris paribus), but not
universally. Plato recognized this about promise
keeping and telling the truth:
. . . are we to say that justice or right is simply to speak
the truth and to pay back any debt one may have con-
tracted? Or are these same actions sometimes right
and sometimes wrong? I mean this sort of thing, for
example: everyone would surely agree that if a friend
has deposited weapons with you when he was sane,
and he asks for them when he is out of his mind, you
should not return them. The man who returns them
is not doing right, nor is one who is willing to tell the
whole truth to a man in such a state. (Republic, 331c)*
Although Keep your promises and Tell the truth are
good moral rules in general, they can be overridden
or defeated by other moral considerations. For that
reason, they are called defeasible. Normally, you
ought to keep your promises. Normally, you ought
to tell the truth. But sometimes there are good rea-
sons to break a promise or to lie, and then you have
a moral conflict.
Philosophers often analyze such situations of moral
conflict in terms of prima facie duties. W. D. Ross
defined “prima facie duty” as a “characteristic (quite
distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an
*Plato,The Republic, translated by Paul Shorey (Cambridge, Mass.:
Loeb Classical Library, 1930).
12/22/11 11:04 AM

act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g., the
keeping of a promise), of being an act which would
be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of
another kind which is morally significant.”* A prima
facie obligation, that is, holds under normal circum-
stances; it holds all other things being equal, becom-
ing actual—an obligation all things considered, or,
in Ross’s terms, “a duty proper”—unless some other
moral consideration intervenes.
Prima facie obligations offer a way to explain the
force of rules while allowing for exceptions. The idea,
in essence, is that a prima facie rule applies unless
some other rule conflicts with it. John Stuart Mill’s
secondary principles are paradigms of prima facie
principles: They dictate obligations unless they come
into conflict. In that case, Mill stipulates, the prin-
ciple of utility, the sole rule in his system that has an
absolute rather than prima facie character, resolves
the conflict. This indicates a key difference between
actual and prima facie obligation: Prima facie obliga-
tions can conflict, whereas actual obligations cannot.
If a homicidal maniac asks whether you know where
an innocent child is hiding, there is a moral conflict:
You have a prima facie obligation to tell the truth and
another to tell a lie. Only one can be actual—what
you ought actually to do in that situation, all things
considered. Saving a life is more important than
never telling a lie, so your obligation to lie is actual,
overriding your obligation to tell the truth.
Let’s revisit Plato’s puzzle about returning weapons
to a friend who is out of his mind. Because uncondi-
tional statements of actual obligation cannot conflict,
this pair is inconsistent:
(11) You have an actual obligation to return the
weapons.
*W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1930), 19.
bon38219_intro_01-06.indd 5
Introduction 5
You have an actual obligation not to return the
weapons.
You cannot be obliged, actually, all things con-
sidered, both to return the weapons and not
to return them.
Because conditional prima facie obligations can
conflict, this pair of statements is consistent:
(12) You have a prima facie obligation to return the
weapons.
You have a prima facie obligation not to return
the weapons.
In general, you have a prima facie obligation to
do something whenever the circumstances trigger a
defeasible moral rule. In Plato’s case, there are defea-
sible rules that you ought to keep your promises and
that you ought to prevent harm. Your promise gives
rise to the prima facie obligation to return the weap-
ons; your friend’s madness gives rise to the prima
facie obligation not to return them.
Moral conflicts such as those Plato describes have
spurred philosophers to devise moral theories to
help us compare different kinds of moral consider-
ations and resolve conflicts generated by them.
Seeing that moral considerations can come into
conflict helps to dissolve some of the motivation for
relativism. In morality, it is often true that one per-
son or culture sees things one way and another sees
them quite differently. But even within the view of a
single person and culture, there are many different
perspectives, which it is the task of morality to relate,
evaluate, and, in particular situations, reconcile. Rea-
sonable people can differ on how to reconcile them.
That is what makes a book like this both possible
and important.
12/22/11 11:04 AM
bon38219_intro_01-06.indd 6 12/22/11 11:04 AM
 PART I
g
FIRST PRINCIPLES
Most of our moral judgments concern particular things.
We judge certain actions and certain people good or
bad. There are many gradations: Acts or people may
be heroic, splendid, admirable, acceptable, indifferent,
unsatisfactory, despicable, or horrible, to mention just
a few moral adjectives. There are also many dimen-
sions of moral consideration: Acts or people may be
honest, kind, loyal, trustworthy, noble, brave, gener-
ous, self-controlled, gentle, friendly, witty, pleasant,
helpful, effective, efficient, or considerate, to mention
just a few positive attributes. Usually, we apply these
to particular actions or to particular people.
When people disagree about a moral judgment,
they try to justify their views. They do this by con-
structing an argument that appeals to moral prin-
ciples. Suppose, for example, that Jennifer killed
Michael by breaking a baseball bat over his head.
And say that you and I disagree about the morality of
the act. I think it was wrong; you think it was justifi-
able. I might try to justify my judgment by construct-
ing a simple argument:
1. Jennifer’s killing Michael was murder. (Fact)
2. Murder is always wrong. (Moral principle)
3. Therefore, Jennifer’s killing Michael was wrong.
(Moral conclusion)
An argument for a particular moral conclusion gen-
erally contains both factual and moral premises, just
as this one does. The first premise is factual; it pur-
ports to describe the way the world is. The second
premise, in contrast, is moral. It does not describe
the world as it is but evaluates a general category
of action. Assertions like the first premise are often
called factual or descriptive. Those like the second
premise or the conclusion are often called evaluative,
prescriptive, or normative.
bon38219_pt1_007-162.indd 7
The distinction between these kinds of assertions
matters, for we resolve disagreements about them in
very different ways. Suppose, for example, that you
challenge my first premise. You deny, in other words,
that Jennifer committed a murder. We might resolve
our disagreement by clarifying our use of words and
investigating the facts. If I defend my premise with
further premises:
4. Murder is killing a human being with malice
aforethought.
5. Jennifer killed Michael.
6. Michael was human.
7. Jennifer intended to do Michael harm.
you might challenge my definition of murder (4) or
my description of the facts (5, 6, and 7). We might
proceed to investigate whether Jennifer was really the
killer and Michael really the victim; whether Jennifer
intended to harm Michael or killed him accidentally;
whether Michael was human or a robot; and whether
my definition of murder is correct. All these issues
concern definitions or matters of fact.
If you challenge my second premise, however,
investigating matters of fact cannot resolve our dis-
agreement. We differ not on how the world is but
on how it ought to be. And, as David Hume stresses,
there is no way to derive ought from is; no amount
of factual information can determine how the world
ought to be. To justify my premise, I must appeal
to some broader moral principle—and ultimately,
many philosophers have thought, to a first, most
fundamental moral principle from which all others
follow. The thinkers of the Enlightenment, espe-
cially, saw that if we could establish and agree upon
a first principle of morality, all our disagreements
would concern definitions and matters of fact and
12/28/11 8:14 PM
 8 First Principles
thus would be resolvable by investigation. Morality
would lend itself to scientific inquiry as much as
anything else.
The search for a first principle of morality has
other sources. One stems from the great variety of
things we call good. We say that certain actions, peo-
ple, and even qualities (such as honesty) are good.
What makes them all good? What do they have
in common? Similarly, we call things as diverse as
September 11, Hitler, deception, and cruelty wrong.
What makes them all wrong? What do they have
in common? To answer would be to give the first
principle of morality. Why couldn’t there be several
such principles? Because we could raise the question,
What makes them fundamental principles of moral-
ity? What do they all have in common?
To try to justify moral principles as well as partic-
ular moral judgments is to construct a moral theory.
Moral theories are systematic attempts to provide
and justify answers to questions such as What
should I do? and What kind of person should I be?
Confucius distinguishes these questions and devel-
ops two independent answers to them. The person
who does the right thing follows the Way, observing
the rules of propriety. The person of superior char-
acter is sincere, generous, kind, diligent, and serious,
doing the right thing for the right reason. Most mod-
ern moral theories take the former question as basic.
They focus on action and try to distinguish right
from wrong in principled ways. But some theories
focus instead on the latter question and try to distin-
guish good character traits from bad. Good traits are
virtues; bad traits, vices.
Aristotle develops the classic theory of virtue.
He distinguishes intrinsic goods, which are desired
for their own sake, from instrumental goods, which
are desired as means to other things. To justify any
answers to the above questions, we must appeal to
intrinsic goods. Suppose that someone asks why
you are reading this book. “Because it’s required for
my ethics course,” you answer. “But why do what’s
required?” “I want to get a good grade.” “Why do
you want a good grade?” “I want to have a good
GPA.” “Why?” “It will help me get a job.” “Why do
you want a job?” “I want money.” “Why?” “I want
things money can buy!” “Why do you want them?”
To stop the chain of questions, you must appeal to
something that is intrinsically good. Every time you
bon38219_pt1_007-162.indd 8
appeal to an instrumental good, the questioner can
ask in turn why you want it.
Aristotle contends that people desire only one
thing for its own sake and never for the sake of some-
thing else: happiness. Any series of requests for jus-
tification leads eventually to the response, “Because
I want to be happy!” If someone persists in asking
why, there is nothing more to say; happiness is desir-
able for its own sake.
What is happiness? What is it to live well?
Aristotle’s answer relies on the idea that human
beings have a function. Just as a good knife cuts well
and a good teacher teaches well, a good person fulfills
the function of a human being well. But what is the
function of a person? It is what is most distinctive of
human beings: to act rationally. A good person acts in
accordance with virtue, and to act virtuously is to act
rationally. A good person does the right thing at the
right time, and in the right way, for the right reason.
Virtue is thus a mean between extremes. The ability
to find that mean Aristotle calls practical wisdom. To
fear too much is cowardly, but to fear too little is rash.
Courage is fearing what ought to be feared, when it
ought to be feared, to the extent that it ought to be
feared, and for the appropriate reason.
How does a person become virtuous? How, in other
words, can someone become practically wise? Not by
abstract thought, Aristotle says, but by doing virtu-
ous things. Shakespeare’s Polonius advised, “Assume
a virtue if you have it not”; Aristotle agrees. If you
do brave things, for example—initially, by forcing
yourself to do them, by pretending to be brave—you
gradually develop the habit of doing brave things.
When the habit is ingrained and automatic, to the
point of being “second nature,” you are brave. In
general, people become good by doing good things.
There is no rule for becoming good or for distinguish-
ing good from bad, right from wrong; a person of
practical wisdom has a highly refined ability to draw
the right distinctions and tell right from wrong.
St. Thomas Aquinas bases his views on ethics and
political philosophy on those of Aristotle. But he adds
many innovations, blending Aristotelian insights into
a Christian worldview. He develops a comprehensive
theory of natural law that remains influential today.
Aquinas begins with Aristotle’s idea that human good
depends on human nature. To live well—to excel or
flourish—is to fulfill one’s function well. Just as an
12/28/11 8:14 PM

excellent knife cuts well and an excellent eye sees
well, an excellent human being displays excellence
in rational activity. As these examples suggest, dif-
ferent things have different functions. In general, the
function of a thing depends on its nature. So, what
something ought to do and be depends on its func-
tion, which in turn depends on its nature.
Aquinas adds God to this Aristotelian picture.
God establishes the order of nature, determining the
natures of things and their functions and their excel-
lences. God thus indirectly establishes not only the
physical laws that constitute the order of nature but
also the natural laws that free beings ought to obey.
Since human nature is distinctively rational, law itself
is essentially a matter of reason.
Aquinas distinguishes several different kinds of
law. Eternal law is the law of nature, established by
God, that governs the entire universe. Everything in
the universe obeys eternal law and does so neces-
sarily. Science investigates eternal law and tries to
describe it. Natural law is normative; it prescribes
what things should do and be. Since a thing’s nature
determines its function and thus its virtue—what it
ought to do and be—eternal law determines natural
law. Natural law is the manifestation of eternal law
in creatures capable of rational choice and activity.
Natural law manifests the eternal law by way of “the
light of natural reason.” God imprints on us the natu-
ral ability to tell right from wrong.
Aquinas also distinguishes natural law from
human law. Natural law is fully general and uni-
versal, but human law must apply to particular cir-
cumstances in specific ways. Natural law relates to
human law as principles relate to conclusions drawn
from them. One can think of natural law, then, as
comprising the axioms of the moral law in general.
Because natural law serves as an axiom of the moral
law, it must be self-evident; it cannot be a conclu-
sion from some other premise. Precepts of natural
law must be both general and obvious. That might
make it seem that natural law has little content. Pur-
sue good; avoid evil. Everyone can agree to that. But
what is good? What is evil?
Here, Aquinas appeals to human nature. As
Aristotle argued, human excellence depends on our
characteristic function, which depends in turn on
our nature. This is true in two senses. What we are
determines what we ought to do and be. And what
bon38219_pt1_007-162.indd 9
First Principles 9
we are tells us what we ought to do and be. The uni-
verse is ordered so that we naturally tend to pursue
good and avoid evil. Our own dispositions thus pro-
vide a test. We are naturally disposed to pursue good
and avoid evil. We have a natural tendency not only
to have certain inclinations (toward food, drink, and
sex, for example), but also to control them through
the exercise of reason. If lust is natural, so are ratio-
nality, shame, and self-restraint.
Aquinas classifies the precepts of natural law into
three groups: (1) laws of self-preservation, (2) laws
of biological welfare, and (3) laws of reason.
Aquinas does not develop his theory of natural
law into a comprehensive political philosophy. Nev-
ertheless, several important theses follow from it.
First, human law aims at the common good. Sec-
ond, the purpose of human law is to help people
follow natural law—that is, to make them virtuous.
Law is essentially paternalistic, restricting people’s
freedom for their own good. The law accomplishes
this by training people to recognize right and wrong.
Third, human law must be flexible. As Aristotle said,
virtue is a mean; there is no strict rule for finding it.
Human laws cannot take into account the full com-
plexity of the world; they inevitably oversimplify.
We must create law to regulate our behavior but also
must allow for exceptions in those cases in which
the law does not make sense. One might think that
we may solve this problem by making law more
specific. We might, for example, require people to
return goods held in trust unless such return poses
a risk to national security. But this only makes the
problem worse. We are better off with general laws
flexibly applied. Fourth, a law that is unjust or fails
to promote the common good, in general or in a
particular case, has no authority as law. It should not
be obeyed.
Finally, just as people have a natural inclination
to virtue, they have a natural inclination to live in
certain social structures: in families, in communities,
and in states. These social institutions are natural, not
conventional; they thus have moral force. People are
inherently social, as Aristotle observed. More specifi-
cally, they are naturally family members, members
of communities, and citizens. Law, therefore, should
serve to strengthen these natural institutions.
The Enlightenment produced a great challenge
to morality in the thought of David Hume. Aristotle
12/28/11 8:14 PM
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Julia Cary
and her kitten
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
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you are located before using this eBook.

Title: Julia Cary and her kitten

Author: M. E. Miller

Release date: September 17, 2023 [eBook #71668]

Language: English

Original publication: New York: American Tract Society, 1873

Credits: Bob Taylor, Charlene Taylor and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This file was
produced from images generously made available by The
Internet Archive/American Libraries.)

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK JULIA CARY

AND HER KITTEN ***
 JULIA CARY
AND
HER KITTEN.

BY MRS. M. E. MILLER.

AMERICAN TRACT SOCIETY,

150 NASSAU STREET, NEW YORK.
 Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by the American
Tract Society, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
JULIA CARY
AND

HER KITTEN.
 CHAPTER I.
A SAIL.

A fine large steamboat was sailing up the Hudson river one

summer morning.
Up and down its broad decks and pretty saloons skipped lively
little Julia Cary.
“Don’t ask me to keep still, Ellen; I can’t, I am so happy,” she said.
Ellen was her nurse, who had taken loving care of Julia since she
was a baby.
She kindly went to the side of the boat, whenever it was to land, so
that the little girl might see a stout man ring a big bell, and other men
throw ropes to men on shore. These ran and threw the ropes over
huge posts, and so held the boat fast till people went ashore. Then
other people came on the boat; then the ropes were drawn back,
and the boat started on again.
But Julia liked better still to wander about, holding her father’s
hand. He could answer all her questions about the lovely shores they
sailed between. He told the names of the villages they passed, and
showed her the busy machinery that sent the boat swiftly along, far
away from the hot city.
“Papa,” said Julia, “are you poor?”
“In money, child? No, no; I have more than you and I will spend.”
“And you are good, papa, and are not sick. What did that lady
mean when she said, ‘Poor Julia! poor papa!’”
Mr. Cary walked quickly on, leading Julia by the hand.
Down stairs, where trunks and boxes of all kinds were piled, on
their own poor luggage sat a family of German emigrants.
 You would quickly call them poor. Their clothes were coarse. They
were eating black bread, because they could not pay for a good
dinner such as Julia and her father had.
Two little girls and one stout boy laughed and jabbered their queer
talk with their mother and father. The mother held a baby on her
knee—an odd-looking fat baby, with a funny cap on its head.
Mr. Cary sat down on a trunk, at a little distance from them, and
lifting Julia upon his knee, he said,
“My darling will learn that she and I must be, in one way, poor as
long as we live. What has that little trot-foot got that money cannot
buy for my Julia?”
Julia looked at the shiny, apple-cheeked little Dutch girl who came
shyly towards her. She noticed the thin dress, the heavy shoes, the
ugly net over her yellow hair. Surely, Julia bought for herself lovelier
things than those.
Julia kept thinking. The strange child too was thinking, and drew
so near that she was scared at last to find herself so far from her
mother. She turned and ran back. The mother held out her arm,
hugged the little girl close to her heart, and kissed her between her
blue eyes.
That kiss told Julia what her father meant. Laying her head upon
his shoulder, she said, “I know, papa; she has her own dear mother.
But mine—O papa!”
Julia’s tears choked back the words that might have told you her
dear mother was in heaven.
Sitting there, Julia and her father felt how very poor she was in
losing mother-love and care and kisses, like that which blessed
those little strangers. The Germans had no house, no land—had
only money enough to take them West, where they must work hard
all day, early and late. But they had each other.
They might tell us that life and love are God’s best blessings.
Health and wealth are also his rich gifts, but not so dear—oh no! oh
no!
 CHAPTER II.
A RIDE.

At Catskill Mr. Cary and Julia left the boat; and Ellen, too, with her
hands full of baskets, bags, and wraps.
They walked aside from the crowd on the dock, towards a man
who was holding the reins of two bright bay horses.
This was uncle Benjamin. He had left his hay-field, ten miles away,
and come down to the river to welcome our travellers. Smiles and
black eyes lit up his sunburnt face cheerily.
If you had been looking off from the boat to see Julia go ashore,
you would have wished you too might have been lifted by his strong
arms into his easy carriage.
Ellen and the baskets were next put in. Mr. Cary sprang to the
front seat, and uncle Benjamin got up beside him.
The horses started as if they were in a hurry to get through the
bars of their green pasture-lot again. Away they went over the hills.
Julia thought there was no other man so good as uncle Benjamin.
She thought he owned all that country, that all the calves and colts
scampering about the farms they passed belonged to him, and many
an eager question she asked about what she saw.
“O uncle Benjamin!” she shouted at last, so quickly that he half
stopped his horses, as he turned to hear, “have you got any kittens
for me?”
“Ha! ha!” he laughed; “I thought you had dropped your hat or bag
in the road. Got any kittens? Can’t say. Charley or Johnny will know.”
A few more hills were crossed, and uncle Benjamin was at home.
Aunt Abby stood smiling at the open door; but the boys met the
carriage at the gate. They were in haste to see this dear little cousin
who came but once a year.
Before Mr. Cary had hung up his dusty linen coat, Julia whispered,
“Papa, they have got kittens, four of them. Please ask if I may
have one for my own self.”
Mr. Cary told aunt Abby how lonely Julia was at home without her
mother; how for weeks her heart had been so sad she could hardly
play at all. She was getting used to the stillness in the house, and
the heartache was wearing away. But she wanted some live thing to
play with, she said, and hoped to take home a real kitten.
“Poor little motherless girl!” sighed aunt Abby.
When called to tea, Julia came in smiling, with Charley and
Johnny, who had been showing her their out-door pets.
After tea, Julia led her father to the old woodhouse stairway, where
there was a more lowly kind of mother-love to be seen.
A large contented-looking cat lay on the door-step, winking
fearlessly at them. The cunningest of four kittens was climbing on
her back. Two prettier kittens were having a frolic at her feet, while
the other one sat soberly looking on. Sometimes the wild ones rolled
over and over each other down the steps.
“Did you ever see such lovely, pesshus kittens, papa dear?”
 “None so precious to you and this mother-cat,” her papa said,
smiling to see her so pleased.
“And I can have one! All the folks say so. Now help me find out,
papa, which is the bestest kitty.”
“I wish a mouse would come along; then I’d tell you which I think is
the best,” said Charley.
 “But I don’t care ’bout my kitty’s catching mice; I only want her to
play with me. She shall have milk to drink, and part of my dinner
every day.”
“Kittens would look prettier to me if I didn’t know they would grow
to be cats,” Johnny said.

“Bah! yes!” said Charley. “Up on that shed, by your bedroom

window—see, Julia—see that big striped cat! Johnny and I just loved
him when he was a kitten. But he kills our birds, and that we can’t
forgive.”
Up spoke kind-hearted Johnny: “I b’lieve he’s the wickedest,
badest cat that meows. So many nests he has spoiled! Then the
mother-birds cry and call so, we have to stop our ears. When I get a
gun, I b’lieve I’ll shoot you, Mr. Tom.”
 Johnny handled a willow-rod as if it were a gun, and pointed it up
at the big gray cat. But it did not fear him, it was up so high. Perhaps
it knew nothing about guns.
“Better go to bed now, Julia. Dream about the kittens, and in the
morning we will see which one we like the best.”
 CHAPTER III.
CHOOSING THE KITTEN.

In the morning two little girls, Anne and Rose, from the next
farmhouse, came to ask for a kitten.
Aunt Abby said Julia must first choose her own.
The liveliest kitty had a black-and-white coat, with black cap and
ears. Its clean white face and hands and feet pleased Julia so well,
that she tied her red ribbon around its neck.
Anne and Rose were just as content with the gray ones the boys
gave to them.
When they went away, each carried a kitten in her arms, and each
very sweetly asked Julia to come to see them.
“We will,” said aunt Abby, “to see how the kittens like their new
home.”
“Come here, Papa Cary,” this kind aunt said after breakfast, when
he sat under the cherry-tree reading his newspaper; “come to my
kitchen-door and see a pretty picture.”
Papa went with her, and saw his Julia trying to make the kitten
love her.
She had a basin of new milk, of which kitty had been drinking.
Now it was purring its thanks. Julia laid her fat cheek against its furry
side to hear the purr-purring sound.
“Dear little kitty, you will love me, wont you? My dollies just lie still,
and can’t love a bit. You nice, warm, live kitty, you wont let me be
lonesome any more.”
 CHAPTER IV.
LITTLE THIEVES.

So now there were only two kittens in aunt Abby’s house.

Julia found them in mischief that very day, up on the kitchen table.
Aunt Abby was getting ready to make a custard. She had gone to
the pantry for some eggs, and had left the milk on the table, and the
sugar-jar uncovered. When she stepped out of the kitchen, the
kittens stepped in. The flies, perhaps, had been in before.
No little boy or girl would meddle with sugar or milk left in the way;
but it is hard to teach kittens that it is wrong to touch what is not
theirs.