I

In a buy-bust operation, 30 kilos of shabu were seized from Dave and Daryll. They were arrested
and
placed on inquest before Prosecutor Danilo Doon who ordered their continued detention.
Thereafter, the information for the sale and distribution of shabu was filed in court. When
arraigned,
Dave and Daryll pleaded not guilty to the charge. During pre-trial, counsel for both of the
accused
raised, for the first time, the illegality of the arrest. The case proceeded to trial. After trial, the
court
scheduled the promulgation of judgment with notice to both the accused and their counsel, Atty.
Dimayuga. During the promulgation, only Dave and Atty. Dimayuga were present. Both the
accused
were convicted of the crime charged.
(a) Was the challenge to the validity of the arrest timely raised?
No, the challenge to the validity of the arrest was not timely raised.

According to Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
objections to the legality of the arrest must be made before arraignment. If not raised
before arraignment, the objection is deemed waived.

In this case, Dave and Daryll were arraigned and pleaded not guilty without raising the
issue of the legality of their arrest. Therefore, raising the issue during pre-trial was too
late, and the right to challenge the validity of the arrest was deemed waived.

(b) What is the remedy available to Daryll, if any, to be able to file an appeal?

Daryll can still file an appeal despite his absence during the promulgation of judgment. The legal
framework governing this situation includes the following steps:

 Rule 120, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: If the accused fails to
appear at the promulgation of judgment despite notice, the judgment can be promulgated
in absentia. However, if the judgment is of conviction and the accused is absent without
justifiable cause, he loses the remedies available in these rules against the judgment,
except that he can appeal within 15 days from the notice to him of the judgment in
absentia.
 Notice of Judgment: Daryll needs to be notified of the judgment of conviction. The
period for filing an appeal will start from the time he receives the notice of the judgment.
 Filing an Appeal: Daryll has 15 days from the receipt of the notice of the judgment to
file his appeal.

Summary

Timeliness of Challenge:
  The challenge to the validity of the arrest was not timely raised because it was not raised
before arraignment and is therefore deemed waived.

Remedy for Appeal:

 Daryll can file an appeal within 15 days from the receipt of the notice of the judgment of
conviction that was promulgated in his absence.

II
Jaime was convicted for murder by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in a decision
promulgated on September 30, 2015. On October 5, 2015, Jaime filed a Motion for New Trial on
the ground that errors of law and irregularities prejudicial to his rights were committed during his
trial. On October 7, 2015, the private prosecutor, with the conformity of the public prosecutor,
filed
an Opposition to Jaime's motion. On October 9, 2015, the court granted Jaime's motion. On
October 12, 2015, the public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration. The court issued an
Order dated October 16, 2015 denying the public prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. The
public prosecutor received his copy of the order of denial on October 20, 2015 while the private
prosecutor received his copy on October 26, 2015.
a.) What is the remedy available to the prosecution from the court's order granting
Jaime's motion for new trial?
a) The remedy available to the prosecution from the court's order granting Jaime's motion for new trial is
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. Under Section 1(b) of Rule 41, no appeal may be taken
from an interlocutory order and the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action as
provided in Rule 65. Here the order granting the motion for new trial is an interlocutory order since it
does not completely dispose of the case but still leaves something to be done, that is, conducting the new
trial. Hence the available remedy is the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Law

According to the Rules of Court, an order granting a motion for a new trial is not a final order
but an interlocutory order. The remedy available against an interlocutory order is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which must be filed if there is a showing of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Application

In this case, the order of the court granting Jaime's motion for a new trial is an interlocutory
order. The proper remedy for the prosecution is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court if it can show that the court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
the motion.

Conclusion
The remedy available to the prosecution from the court's order granting Jaime's motion for a new
trial is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

b.) In what court and within what period should a remedy be availed of?
In what court and within what period should a remedy be availed of?

b) The special civil action for certiorari should be filed with the Court of Appeals. It should be filed
within 60 days from receipt by the public prosecutor of the order denying the motion for reconsideration
pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 65. The 60-day period should be reckoned from the receipt by the public
prosecutor who has the direction and control of the prosecution pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 110.

Law
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a petition for certiorari should be filed before the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Supreme Court depending on the jurisdiction over the case.
The petition must be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the order.

Application
The prosecution received notice of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on October
20, 2015. Therefore, the petition for certiorari should be filed within 60 days from this date,
making the deadline December 19, 2015. The appropriate court to file the petition would
generally be the Court of Appeals, as it has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari from
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.

Conclusion
The prosecution should file the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals within 60 days
from October 20, 2015, the date they received notice of the denial of their motion for
reconsideration.

c.) Who should pursue the remedy?

Law
Under the Rules of Court, it is generally the public prosecutor who represents the People
of the Philippines in criminal cases and who should pursue legal remedies in connection
with the prosecution of such cases.

Application
In this case, it was the public prosecutor who filed the motion for reconsideration, and
thus it should be the public prosecutor who pursues the petition for certiorari to challenge
the court's order granting the motion for a new trial.

Conclusion
The public prosecutor should pursue the remedy of filing a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals.
c) The remedy should be pursued by the Office of the Solicitor General. Under Section 35(1), Chapter 12,
Title III of Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code, the authority to represent the government in
criminal cases before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court is vested solely in the Office of the
Solicitor General. (Cario v. De Castro, 30 April 2008).

III
AA, a twelve-year-old girl, while walking alone met BB, a teenage boy who befriended her.
Later, BB
brought AA to a nearby shanty where he raped her. The Information for rape filed against BB
states:
"On or about October 30, 2015, in the City of S.P. and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, a minor, fifteen (15) years old with lewd design and by means
of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
had sexual intercourse with AA, a minor, twelve (12) years old against the latter's will and
consent."
At the trial, the prosecutor called to the witness stand AA as his first witness and manifested
that he be allowed to ask leading questions in conducting his direct examination pursuant to
the Rule on the Examination of a Child Witness. BB's counsel objected on the ground that
the prosecutor has not conducted a competency examination on the witness, a requirement
before the rule cited can be applied in the case.
a.) Is BB's counsel correct?
After the prosecution had rested its case, BB' s counsel filed with leave a demurrer to
evidence, seeking the dismissal of the case on the ground that the prosecutor failed
to present any evidence on BB' s minority as alleged in the Information.

(A) No. BB’s counsel is not correct. Every child is presumed qualified to be a witness (Sec. 6,
Rule on Examination of Child Witness [RECW]). To rebut the presumption of competence
enjoyed by a child, the burden of proof lies on the party challenging his competence (Sec. 6 of
A.M. No. 005-07-SC or the Rules on Examination of Child Witness). Here, AA, a 12-year old
child witness who is presumed to be competent, may be asked leading questions by the
prosecutor in conducting his direct examination pursuant to the RECW and the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure (People v. Santos, G.R. No. 171452, October 17, 2008).

b.) Should the court grant the demurrer?

No, the court should not grant the demurrer. While it was alleged in the information that BB was
a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, the failure of the prosecutor to present
evidence to prove his minority is not a basis for the granting of the demurrer, because minority of
the accused is not an element of the crime of rape. Be that as it may, the Court should not
consider minority in rendering the decision. After all, the failure of the prosecutor to prove the
minority of AA may only affect the imposable penalty but may not absolve him from criminal
liability.
IV
Police officers Miggy and Laida were involved in an alleged buy-bust operation against Mr.
Magtalas,
a suspected drug dealer. Mr. Magtalas maintained his innocence, asserting that the drugs were
merely
planted. He further claimed that he was unjustifiably beaten up by the police officers. Mr.
Magtalas
filed before 5 of 5 the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military and Other Law
Enforcement
Officers (OMB-MOLEO) a criminal complaint for planting evidence which is punishable under
Section 29 of the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No. 9165). Mr. Magtalas also filed an
administrative
complaint for grave misconduct against Miggy and Laida in light of the unwarranted physical
assault
against him.
The Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) rendered a decision holding Miggy and Laida
administratively liable for grave misconduct and accordingly imposed the penalty of dismissal
from
service. A few weeks later, the OMB issued a separate resolution finding probable cause against
them for violation of Section 29 of R.A. No. 9165.
Aggrieved, Miggy and Laida filed before the Supreme Court the following: (i) a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari assailing the OMB’s decision finding them administratively liable for grave
misconduct;
and (ii) a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari assailing the OMB’s resolution finding
probable
cause against them.
Were the remedies availed of by Miggy and Laida proper? Explain briefly.

No, the remedies availed of by Miggy and Laida were improper.

Case law dictates that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
investigatory powers, shall be reviewable, by way of petition for certiorari under Rule 65, to the
Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
administrative and disciplinary powers, shall be reviewable, by way of petition for review under
Rule 43, to the Court of Appeals.

Here, the remedies availed of by Miggy and Laida were improper, because they should have
filed a petition for review under Rule 43 to the Court of Appeals, based on the decision of the
OMB holding them administratively liable for grave misconduct and accordingly imposed the
penalty of dismissal from service. Meanwhile, they should have filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 to the Supreme Court, based on the resolution of the OMB finding probable cause
against them for violation of Section 29 of R.A. No. 9165.

V
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a complaint with the Sandiganbayan in
connection
with the sequestered assets and properties of Demo Companies Inc. (Demo) and impleaded its
officers and directors. Since the complaint did not include Demo as defendant, the
Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution where it ordered Demo to be impleaded. Thereafter, the Republic filed an
amended complaint naming Demo as additional defendant, which amendment was later
admitted.
Demo filed a motion for bill of particulars for the Republic to clarify certain matters in its
amended
complaint. The Sandiganbayan immediately granted the motion. Upon submission of the bill of
particulars by the Republic, Demo filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the answers in the bill
of
particulars were indefinite and deficient responses to the question of what the alleged illegally
acquired funds or properties of Demo were. The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case.
(a) Was the Sandiganbayan correct in dismissing the case?

No, the Sandiganbayan was not correct in dismissing the case based on the alleged insufficiency
of the bill of particulars provided by the Republic.

Legal Basis and Analysis (ALAC Method):

1. Assertion: The Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the case based on the alleged deficiencies
in the bill of particulars was incorrect.
2. Legal Basis: Under the Philippine Rules of Court, specifically Rule 12, Section 3, a
motion for a bill of particulars can be filed by a party if the pleading is so vague or
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.
However, the purpose of the bill of particulars is merely to provide clarification and not
to serve as a ground for dismissal of the case.
3. Analysis:
o The motion for a bill of particulars is intended to ensure that the defendant
understands the nature of the allegations against them and can prepare an
adequate response.
o If the Republic complied by submitting a bill of particulars, even if Demo found
the answers unsatisfactory, the appropriate remedy for Demo would not be to
move for dismissal but rather to seek further clarification through subsequent
motions or pre-trial discovery.
o Dismissal of the case for insufficient responses in the bill of particulars is not
generally sanctioned by the Rules of Court unless the failure to provide sufficient
particulars amounts to a failure to state a cause of action. In this instance, there is
no indication that the Republic failed to state a cause of action in its amended
complaint.
4. Conclusion: The Sandiganbayan should not have dismissed the case on the grounds of
the alleged insufficiency of the bill of particulars. Instead, it should have allowed the case
to proceed, providing further opportunities for clarification if necessary.

(b) What can the defendant, in a civil case, do in the event that his motion for bill of
particulars is denied?

Answer: If a defendant's motion for a bill of particulars is denied, the defendant has several
options to address the perceived deficiencies in the pleadings.

Legal Basis and Analysis (ALAC Method):

1. Assertion: The defendant can take specific steps if their motion for a bill of particulars is
denied.
2. Legal Basis: Under the Philippine Rules of Court, the defendant has several procedural
remedies available, even if a motion for a bill of particulars is denied:
o Appeal the Denial: Under Rule 41, a party can appeal a denial of a motion if it
affects the merits of the case or the rights of the party.
o Discovery Process: Rule 25 to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court allow the defendant
to use discovery procedures, including interrogatories, requests for admissions,
and depositions, to obtain the necessary details.
o Motion to Strike or Dismiss: Under Rule 16, if the pleadings are so vague or
ambiguous that a meaningful response is impossible, the defendant can move to
strike or dismiss the pleading for failure to comply with the rules.
3. Analysis:
o Appeal: The defendant can seek appellate review of the denial if it constitutes a
grave abuse of discretion or if the ambiguity affects substantial rights.
o Discovery Process: The defendant can use discovery tools to compel the plaintiff
to provide the necessary details. These tools are effective in clarifying any
ambiguities and ensuring that the defendant can adequately prepare for trial.
o Motion to Strike/Dismiss: If the pleadings remain insufficiently detailed, the
defendant can file a motion to strike portions of the pleading or to dismiss the
case for failure to state a cause of action.
4. Conclusion: The defendant has several options, including appealing the denial, utilizing
the discovery process, or filing a motion to strike or dismiss the pleading. These remedies
ensure that the defendant can obtain the necessary information to prepare a defense
adequately.

No, the Sandiganbayan was not correct in dismissing the case based solely on the alleged deficiencies in
the Republic's bill of particulars.

Legal Basis:

1. Rules of Court, Rule 12: Rule 12 of the Rules of Court governs the bill of particulars. It states
that if the pleading is vague or ambiguous, a party may move for a bill of particulars to clarify the
issues. However, the failure to file a sufficient bill of particulars is not in itself a ground for the
dismissal of the complaint.
2. Judicial Precedents: Philippine case law has established that the primary purpose of a bill of
particulars is to enable the movant to prepare for trial, not to defeat the complaint. A case should
 not be dismissed if there is still a way to clarify the ambiguities or deficiencies through further
proceedings.

Application:

In this case, the Republic filed an amended complaint against Demo, which then filed a motion for a bill
of particulars seeking clarification on certain matters. The Sandiganbayan granted this motion, and the
Republic complied by submitting the requested bill of particulars. Demo subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that the Republic's responses were indefinite and deficient.

The Sandiganbayan should have considered whether the deficiencies in the bill of particulars were so
significant that they prevented Demo from preparing its defense. If the responses were indeed insufficient,
the proper remedy would be to order the Republic to provide further details or to clarify specific points,
not to dismiss the case outright. Dismissal is a drastic measure and should only be resorted to when it is
clear that the plaintiff has no cause of action.

Conclusion:

The Sandiganbayan's dismissal of the case was premature and not in line with procedural rules. The
appropriate course of action would have been to allow further clarification or additional proceedings to
address any ambiguities or deficiencies in the Republic's bill of particulars. Therefore, the dismissal of the
case was incorrect.

VI
Under Section 5, Rule 113 a warrantless arrest is allowed when an offense has just been
committed
and the peace officer has probable cause to believe, based on his personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it. A policeman approaches you for
advice and asks you how he will execute a warrantless arrest against a murderer who escaped
after
killing a person. The policeman arrived two (2) hours after the killing and a certain Max was
allegedly the killer per information given by a witness. He asks you to clarify the following:

[a] How long after the commission of the crime can he still execute the warrantless arrest?

In executing a warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113, the Supreme

Court held that the requirement that an offense has just been committed
means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time
the offense was committed and the time of the arrest. (Joey M. Pestilos v.
Moreno Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014) If there was an
appreciable lapse of time between the arrest and the commission of the
crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured. In any case, personal knowledge
by the arresting officer is an indispensable requirement to the validity of a
warrantless arrest.
The exact period varies on a case to case basis. In People v. Gerente, G.R.
No. 95847-48, March 10, 1993), the Supreme Court ruled that a warrantless
arrest was validly executed upon the accused three (3) hours after the
commission of the crime. In People v. Tonog, Jr., G.R. No. 94533, February
4, 1992, the Supreme Court likewise upheld the valid warrantless arrest
which was executed on the same day as the commission of the crime.
However, in People v. Del Rosario, 365 Phil. 292 (1999), the Supreme Court
held that the warrantless arrest effected a day after the commission of the
crime is invalid. In Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, February 11,
1992, the Supreme Court also declared invalid a warrantless arrest effected
six (6) days after the commission of the crime.

[b] What does "personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the person to be
arrested committed it" mean?
The phrase “personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances that the
person to be arrested committed it” means that matters in relation to the
supposed commission of the crime were within the actual perception,
personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the
crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually,
fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal
evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could
determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested has committed the crime; however, the determination of probable
cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the
element of immediacy.
The arresting officer’s determination of probable cause under Section 5(b),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his
personal knowledge of the facts or circumstances that the person sought to
be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain
to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt on the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest. The probable cause to justify warrantless arrest ordinarily signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged, or an actual belief
or reasonable ground of suspicion, based on actual facts. (Joey M. Pestilos
v.
Moreno Generoso, G.R. No. 182601, November 10, 2014)

VII
Hercules was walking near a police station when a police officer signaled for him to approach.
As
soon as Hercules came near, the police officer frisked him but the latter found no contraband.
The
police officer told Hercules to get inside the police station. Inside the police station, Hercules
asked
the police officer, "Sir, may problema po ba?" Instead of replying, the police officer locked up
Hercules inside the police station jail.
a.) What is the remedy available to Hercules to secure his immediate release from detention?
The remedy available to Hercules to secure his immediate release from detention is a petition for
writ of habeas corpus. Under Rule 102, the writ of habeas corpus is available in cases of illegal
detention. Section 5 of Rule 102 provides that a court or judge authorized to grant the writ must,
when the petition therefor is presented and it appears that
the writ ought to issue, grant the same forthwith, and immediately thereupon the clerk of court
shall issue the writ or in case of emergency, the judge may issue the writ under his own hand and
may depute any officer or person to serve it. The court or judge before whom the writ is returned
must immediately proceed to hear and examine the return. (Section 12, Rule 102).

b.) If Hercules filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for warrantless search, as counsel for
the police officer, what defense will you raise for the dismissal of the complaint?

I will raise the defense that the warrantless search was authorized as a “stop and frisk.” “Stop and frisk” is
the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons and
contraband whenever he observes unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal activity
may be afoot. (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1).

VIII
Atty. Dalmacio, the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, applied for a search
warrant
before the Executive Judge of RTC Manila. He alleged in his application that a certain alias
Django
was keeping about 10 kilos of shabu in a wooden cabinet located at Dillian's Store in Paseo de
Sta.
Rosa, Laguna. The Executive Judge of Manila personally examined Atty. Dalmacio and his
witnesses
and thereafter issued the search warrant particularly describing the place to besearched and the
items
to be seized.
(a) Can the search warrant issued by the Executive Judge of Manila be enforced in Laguna?
(2.5%)

YES. Executive Judges and in their absence, Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City, shall have authority to act on applications for search warrants involving, inter alia,
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2000. The applicant in this case, Atty.
Dalmacio of the NBI, is applying for a search warrant involving the search and seizure of 10
kilos of the prohibited drug “shabu” or metamphetamine hydrochloride. Under current rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court, the search warrant that shall issue from such application
may be enforced in Laguna.

(b) Can the legal concept of "venue is jurisdictional" be validly raised in applications for search
warrants? As a general rule, YES, the question of jurisdiction or “venue” in applications for
search warrants can be validly raised, except in cases where the application is made before the
Executive Judges or in their absence, the Vice-Executive Judges, of RTCs in Manila and Quezon
City for offenses involving violations of certain enumerated laws committed in jurisdictions
outside of the territory of the aforementioned RTCs.

IX
Juancho entered a plea of guilty when he was arraigned under an information for homicide. To
determine the penalty to be imposed, the trial court allowed Juancho to present evidence proving
any mitigating circumstance in his favor. Juancho was able to establish complete self-defense.
Convinced by the evidence adduced by Juancho, the trial court rendered a verdict of acquittal.
May the Prosecution assail the acquittal without infringing the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy in favor of Juancho? Explain your answer. (5%)
Yes, the prosecution may assail Juancho's acquittal without violating his right against double jeopardy. In
the similar case of People v. Balisacan (GR. No. L-26376, August 31, 1966), the Supreme Court held that if
an accused who first entered a plea of guilty was later on allowed to prove any mitigating circumstance,
his prior plea is deemed vacated. The court should require him to plead anew on the charge, or at least
direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. Thus in this case, since Juancho was allowed to
present evidence to prove mitigating circumstances in his favor, there can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the prosecution's appeal.

Furthermore, the Supreme Court ruled in the Balisacan case that a plea of guilty is an unconditional
admission of guilt with respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said
charge and leaves the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the
circumstances. Since Juancho was only allowed to testify to establish mitigating circumstances to fix the
penalty, his testimony, thus, could not be taken as a trial on the merits to determine his guilt or
innocence. Juancho's acquittal is therefore void considering that the prosecution was not afforded an
opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant.

X
Alex, Bobbie, and Gabbie were charged with the crime of Murder. Finding them to have acted in
conspiracy, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted them of Homicide. Only Bobbie appealed
the
conviction with the Court of Appeals (CA). Consequently, an entry of judgment was issued as
against Alex and Gabbie.
Subsequently, the CA modified Bobbie’s conviction from Homicide to Murder. In the same
judgment, the CA likewise modified Alex and Gabbie’s conviction from Homicide to Murder.
Upon learning of the CA’s decision, Alex and Gabbie confronted Bobbie, saying: “Bakit ka pa
ba nagappeal?
Tumaas tuloy ang sentensya namin. Nadamay pa kami!” Bobbie snapped back: “Bakit parang
galit
kayo? Pero bakit kasalanan ko? Parang kasalanan ko?”
Was the CA correct in modifying the judgment as to Alex and Gabbie? Explain briefly.

NO, the CA was incorrect in modifying the judgment as to Alex and Gabbie.

Case law dictates that as a rule, the co-accused who did not appeal shall not be affected by the
modified decision of the appellate court. The exception is if the modified decision was favorable
or beneficial to the co-accused, in which case it shall also be extended to those who did not
appeal.

Here, the CA was incorrect in modifying the judgment as to Alex and Gabbie, because Alex and
Gabbie did not appeal, and the decision of the CA modified the conviction of Bobbie from
Homicide to Murder. Thus, it should not be applied to them as the modified decision was
unfavorable to them.

No, the CA erred when it modified the judgment as to Alex and Gabbie.

Sec 11(a) Rule 122 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an appeal taken by one or
more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment
of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Here, only Bobbie appealed his conviction. The appeal resulted in a judgment that increased the
penalty from Homicide to Murder which would not be favorable to Alex and Gabbie who did not
appeal their convictions. The CA was therefore wrong in modifying the judgment of Alex and
Gabbie.

XI
Boy Maton, a neighborhood tough guy, was arrested by a police officer on suspicion that he was
keeping prohibited drugs in his clutch bag. When Boy Maton was searched immediately after the
arrest, the officer found and recovered 10 sachets of shabu neatly tucked in the inner linings of
the
clutch bag. At the time of his arrest, Boy Maton was watching a basketball game being played in
the
town plaza, and he was cheering for his favorite team. He was subsequently charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, and he entered a plea of not guilty when he was arraigned.

During the trial, Boy Maton moved for the dismissal of the information on the ground that the
facts
revealed that he had been illegally arrested. He further moved for the suppression of the evidence
confiscated from him as being the consequence of the illegal arrest, hence, the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
The trial court, in denying the motions of Boy Maton, explained that at the time the motions
were
filed Boy Maton had already waived the right to raise the issue of the legality of the arrest. The
trial
court observed that, pursuant to the Rules of Court, Boy Maton, as the accused, should have
assailed
the validity of the arrest before entering his plea to the information. Hence, the trial court opined
that any adverse consequence of the alleged illegal arrest had also been equally waived.
Comment on the ruling of the trial court.
The trial court is correct insofar as Boy Maton is considered to have waived his
objections to the illegality of his arrest. In Villanueva v. People (G.R. No.
199042, November 17, 2014), the Supreme Court held that objections to the
irregularity of arrest must be made before his arraignment. In this case, Boy
Maton did not object to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Hence the trial court is correct when it ruled that Boy Maton had already
waived his right to question the illegality of his arrest. Any irregularity
attending the arrest of an accused “should be timely raised in a motion to
quash the information at any time before arraignment, failing [in] which, he is
deemed to have waived” his right to question the regularity of his arrest (People
v. Cunanan, G.R. No. 198924, March 16, 2015).

However, the trial court erred when it ruled that Boy Maton likewise waived his right
to assail the illegal search. In the Villanueva case, the Supreme Court ruled that “a
waiver of an illegal arrest is not a waiver of an illegal search.” It further held that
“while the accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he
is not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search.”
Therefore, Boy Maton may still move for the suppression of the evidence confiscated
from him being the consequences of the illegal arrest.

XII
Danjo, a stay-in gardener at the Dy family home in Quezon City, applied for overseas
employment
in Riyadh as a flower arranger. After he left for abroad, Dino Dy, head of the family, discovered
that
all his wristwatches were missing. Dino followed Danjo's lnstagram account and in one instance
saw
Danjo wearing his Rolex watch. He filed a complaint for qualified theft against Danjo with the
Office of the Prosecutor (OP), Quezon City. The subpoena with the affidavit-complaint was
served
on Denden, Danjo's wife, at their house. No counter-affidavit was filed by Danjo who continued
to
work in Riyadh. After conducting a preliminary investigation, the OP found probable cause
against
Danjo and subsequently filed the information for qualified theft before the RTC of Quezon City.
The court likewise found probable cause and issued in 2016 a warrant for Danjo's arrest.
Danjo was repatriated to the Philippines in 2018. While Danjo was lurking outside the Dys'
house,
which was only about 100 meters away from the police station, SPO1 Dody recognized Danjo.
Realizing that the police station had a copy of Danjo's warrant of arrest, SPO1 Dody
immediately
pursued and arrested Danjo.
(a) Was the warrant of arrest issued against Danjo who was not in the Philippines valid?
(2.5%)
YES. The issuance of the warrant was validly had after the filing of a valid complaint and the conduct of
a preliminary investigation even when Danjo was in absentia and was even abroad.
B. There is no question here as to jurisdiction, since the jurisdiction required in this case under the law
and the Rules are that the court has subject matter jurisdiction (as to the offense) and that it was
committed in a place within the limited territorial bounds of the court (venue jurisdiction). Therefore, the
warrant of arrest can be served on Danjo anytime upon his return because it does not expire or go stale
upon issuance.

XIII
The information against Roger Alindogan for the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article
336
of the Revised Penal Code avers:
"That on or about 10:30 o'clock in the evening of February 1, 2010 at Barangay Matalaba,
Imus, Cavite and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd and unchaste design, through force and intimidation, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter, Rose Domingo, a minor of
11 years old, either by raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, against her will
and consent to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW."
The accused wants to have the case dismissed because he believes that the charge is confusing
and
the information is defective. What ground or grounds can he raise in moving for the quashal of
the
information? Explain.
The grounds which the accused can raise in moving for the quashal of the information are the following:
1. THE INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE. The information charges two offenses, that
is, rape and sexual abuse. Worse, the charges are stated in the alternative, making it unclear to the
accused as to what offense exactly he is being charged with.
2. THE INFORMATION DOES NOT CONFORM SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE REQUIRED FORM. The information
merely states that the accused committed acts of lasciviousness upon the victim without specifying what
those acts of lasciviousness were

XIV
Mayor Dalupan, who was notorious for being involved in rigged public biddings, was convicted
by
the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Seeking to overturn his
conviction, Mayor Dalupan filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court on
the
59th day from notice of the assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.
Is the remedy availed of by Mayor Dalupan correct? Explain briefly.

No, Mayor Dalupan availed of the wrong remedy. Sec 7 of PD 1606 provides that decisions and
final orders of the Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review
on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Mayor Dalupad had fifteen days from notice of the assailed ruling to file the Rule 45 petition
with the Supreme Court.

XV
An information for murder was filed against Rapido. The RTC judge, after personally evaluating
the
prosecutor's resolution, documents and parties' affidavits submitted by the prosecutor, found
probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest. Rapido's lawyer examined the rollo of the case and
found that it only contained the copy of the information, the submissions of the prosecutor and a
copy of the warrant of arrest. Immediately, Rapido's counsel filed a motion to quash the arrest
warrant for being void, citing as grounds:
a.) The judge before issuing the warrant did not personally conduct a searching
examination of the prosecution witnesses in violation of his client's constitutionallymandated
rights;
b.) There was no prior order finding probable cause before the judge issued the
arrest warrant.
May the warrant of arrest be quashed on the grounds cited by Rapido's counsel?
State your reason for each ground.
No, the warrant of arrest may not be quashed on the grounds cited by Rapido’s counsel. a) The Supreme
Court has held in Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) that Section 2 of Art. III of the Constitution
does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The
judge may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the regarding the
existence of probable cause and on the basis thereof issue a warrant of arrest.

b) There is no requirement of a prior order by the judge finding probable cause. The SC has held that the
judge may rely upon the resolution of the investigating prosecutor provided that he personally evaluates
the same and the affidavits and supporting documents, which he did. (People v. Grey, 26 July 2010).

XVI
Paz was awakened by a commotion coming from a condo unit next to hers. Alarmed, she called
up
the nearby police station. PO 1 Remus and P02 Romulus proceeded to the condo unit identified
by
Paz. PO 1 Remus knocked at the door and when a man opened the door, POI Remus and his
companions introduced themselves as police officers. The man readily identified himself as
Oasis
Jung and gestured to them to come in. Inside, the police officers saw a young lady with her nose
bleeding and face swollen. Asked by P02 Romulus what happened, the lady responded that she
was
beaten up by Oasis Jung. The police officers arrested Oasis Jung and brought him and the young
lady back to the police station. PO1 Remus took the young lady's statement who identified
herself as
AA. She narrated that she is a sixteen-year-old high school student; that previous to the incident,
she
had sexual intercourse with Oasis Jung at least five times on different occasions and she was paid
P5,000.00 each time and it was the first time that Oasis Jung physically hurt her. P02 Romulus
detained Oasis Jung at the station's jail. After the inquest proceeding, the public prosecutor filed
an
information for Violation of R.A. No. 9262 (The VA WC Law) for physical violence and five
separate informations for violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Child Abuse Law). Oasis Jung's
lawyer
filed a motion to be admitted to bail but the court issued an order that approval of his bail bond
shall be made only after his arraignment.
a.) Did the court properly impose that bail condition?
No, the court did not properly impose the condition that the approval of the bail bond shall be
made only after the arraignment. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme Court held that in
cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise, the accused
may be hindered from filing a motion to quash since his arraignment would necessarily be
deferred pending the resolution of the motion to quash. This would amount to a substantial
dilution of his right to file a motion to quash. (Lavides v. Court of Appeals, 1 February 2000).
Before arraignment, Oasis Jung's lawyer moved to quash the other four separate
informations for violation of the child abuse law invoking the single larceny rule.
b.) Should the motion to quash be granted?
No, the motion to quash should not be granted. In a case involving similar facts, the Supreme
Court held that each act of sexual intercourse with a minor is a separate and distinct offense
under R.A. No. 7610. Hence the single larceny or single offense rule is not applicable. (Id.).

c.) After his release from detention on bail, can Oasis Jung still question the validity
of his arrest?
Yes, Oasis Jung can still question the validity of his arrest after his release from detention on bail. Under
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity
of his arrest provided that he does so before entering his plea. (Sec. 26, Rule 114).

XVII
Tomas was criminally charged with serious physical injuries allegedly committed against
Darvin.
During the pendency of the criminal case, Darvin filed a separate civil action for damages based
on
the injuries he had sustained.
Tomas filed a motion to dismiss the separate civil action on the ground of litis pendentia,
pointing out
that when the criminal action was filed against him, the civil action to recover the civil liability
from
the offense charged was also deemed instituted. He insisted that the basis of the separate civil
action
was the very same act that gave rise to the criminal action.
Rule on Tomas' motion to dismiss, with brief reasons.

The motion to dismiss should be denied. Darvin’s civil action is based on

physical injuries, and is therefore an independent civil action which may proceed
independently of the criminal case (Article 33, Civil Code). However, Darvin
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action (Rule 111, Section 2, Rules of Court).

As the Supreme Court ruled in People v. Lipata (G.R. No. 200302, April 20,
2016), “[t]he independent civil actions in Articles 32,33,34, and 2176, as well as
claims from sources of obligations other than delict, are not deemed instituted
with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even
without reservation”.