Affect and Cognition

Author(s): Joseph P. Forgas

Source: Perspectives on Psychological Science , Mar., 2008, Vol. 3, No. 2, From
Philosophical Thinking to Psychological Empiricism, Part II (Mar., 2008), pp. 94-101
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. on behalf of Association for Psychological Science

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/40212235

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.com/stable/40212235?seq=1&cid=pdf-
reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

Association for Psychological Science and Sage Publications, Inc. are collaborating with JSTOR
to digitize, preserve and extend access to Perspectives on Psychological Science

This content downloaded from

183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE

Affect and Cognition

Joseph P. Forgas

University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia

quences ofnature
ABSTRACT - One of the greatest puzzles of human affect. This article reviews what we now know about
concerns the poorly understood interplay the
between affect
links between affect and cognition and discusses the history
and prospects
and cognition - the rational and emotional ways for research on the cognitive antecedents and
of dealing
with the social world around us. Affect is a consequences
ubiquitous of affective states.
and
powerful phenomenon in our lives, yet research on human
affectivity has been neglected until quite recently.
HISTORICAL This
AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
article reviews traditional and contemporary approaches
to this issue, and recent theoretical and empirical
In the 18th work
century, philosophers divided psychology's subject
exploring the links between affect and cognition
matter intoisthree
con- distinct faculties: cognition, affect, and cona-
sidered. The major achievements and shortcomings of this
tion. Of these, affect arguably remains the last explored and least
now-thriving research area are discussed, understood
and the future
(Hilgard, 1980). Yet in early introspectionist ex-
prospects of psychological research on human affectivity
periments by Wundt, Titchener, and others, affective, cognitive,
are considered.
and conative responses were still considered as inseparable,
complementary aspects of human experience. Unfortunately, in
subsequent psychological research, these three faculties came
Since the dawn of civilization, understanding the delicate re-
to be seen as sovereign, unrelated domains that have been
lationship between affect and cognition has been a recurrent
studied in isolation and without reference to each other, leading
puzzle that has occupied artists, writers, and philosophers.
to a neglect of affective processes (Hilgard, 1980).
Classic thinkers such as Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, Epicurus,
Descartes, Pascal, and Kant devoted considerable attention to
exploring the relationship between feeling and thinking in hu-
Affect: Destructive or Adaptive?
man affairs. In contemporary societies, attempts to promote
Another reason for the neglect of affect in psychology may be a
positive affect and well-being and reduce negative affectivity
long-dominant view in Western thought, held since Plato's time,
and depression are emerging as important policy objectives
that affect is a dangerous, invasive force that subverts rational
(Ciarrochi, Forgas, & Mayer, 2006; Diener, 2000). In a sense,
thinking, an idea that has recurred in many theories throughout
exploring the links between affect and cognition lies at the heart
the ages, including those from Freud, Tarde, and LeBon. The
of the age-old quest to understand the fundamental relationship
psychodynamic model in particular suggested that controlling
between the rational and the emotional aspects of human nature
affect requires countervailing psychological resources, which
(Hilgard, 1980).
may often fail or lead to dysfunctional consequences. Indeed,
Within psychology, the modern area of affect-cognition re-
some writers even argued that human beings' inability to un-
search began some 30 years ago, after long periods of neglect.
derstand and control affect reflects an evolutionary "fatal flaw"
Yet progress has been fragile and has been achieved against
in the brain that may ultimately threaten the very survival of our
considerable odds. Even the definition of what is meant by affect
species (Koestler, 1978). Fortunately, advances in social cog-
and emotion remains problematic, and the relationship between
nition, neuroanatomy, and psychophysiology during the last
affect and cognition continues to generate intense debate (For-
several decades led to the recognition that affect is often a useful
gas, 2006). Whereas some psychologists focus on the cognitive
and even essential component of cognition and behavior
antecedents of affect, exploring the cognitive appraisal strate-
(Damasio, 1994). Pascal's prescient claim from over 350 years
gies preceding emotional responses (e.g., Smith & Kirby,ago
2000),
that "the heart has its reasons which reason does not un-
a complementary paradigm explores the cognitive derstand"
conse- (Pascal, 1643/1966, p. 113) is now receiving empir-
ical support showing that affect is an adaptive and essential
adjunct to cognition (Damasio, 1994; Isen, 1987; Zajonc, 1980).
Address correspondence to Joseph P. Forgas, School of Psychology,
University of New South Wales, Sydney 2052, Australia;Such a view is also supported by recent evolutionary
e-mail:
jp.forgas@unsw.edu.au. approaches suggesting that, as a result of natural and sexual

"4 Copyright © 2008 Association for Psychological Science Volume 3 - Number 2

This content downloaded from

183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Joseph P. Forgas
selection since ancestral times, affective reactions (such as
jealousy) constitute specific mental modules that evolved to deal
with particular adaptive problems (Buss, 2005). One broad
evolutionary model views emotions as superordinate cognitive
programs (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000) that help us to activate and
select the subset of cognitive strategies best suited to deal with a
particular adaptive problem. For example, positive and negative
affective states may selectively recruit assimilative and ac-
commodative cognitive strategies respectively, recently shown
as most likely to yield adaptive outcomes in social cognitive
tasks (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Forgas, 2007). Another cognitive
function of emotions (such as love and guilt) may be that they
operate as commitment devices, helping us to sustain long-term
adaptive strategies against superficially attractive short-term
rewards (Frank, 1988).
The Neuroscience Approach
Recent research in neuroscience also confirms that social cog-
nitive and affective processes share overlapping neural struc-
tures, which have probably coevolved to deal with stimuli of high
significance (Damasio, 1994). Neural structures associated in
emotion processing, such as the amygdala and medial prefrontal
cortex, also participate in social information processing. Con-
versely, neural structures involved in social cognition, such as
the orbitofrontal and medial prefrontal cortex, fusiform gyrus,
and inferior frontal gyrus, are also involved in emotional pro-
cessing. These findings are consistent with evolutionary prin-
ciples suggesting that the pressures for dealing with significant
stimuli led to the comingling of structure and function in the
social and emotional brain areas. Thus, emotion regions tend to
be involved in the processing of social stimuli, and the social-
cognitive regions are also involved in the processing of emo-
tional stimuli. The adaptive advantage of responding flexibly to
social stimuli may have been enhanced by co-opting affective
neural systems that originally evolved to deal with hedonic
events. The hierarchical and modular organization of the brain
also allows for the possibility of unconscious affect: affective
influences on behavior without any conscious feelings. This,
however, presents problems for inferential models that assign a
critical role to conscious feelings (such as the affect-as-infor-
mation model).
Much is now known about the functions of areas such as the
amygdala, which is the key structure of the "emotional brain,"
involved in preconscious affective responses to sensory stimuli,
the affective modulation of attention and memory, and affect
regulation. The amygdala is also involved in social cognition, as
patients with amygdala damage are also less able to form social
inferences and evaluate the internal states, beliefs, and desires
of others. Within the cortex, two areas - the somatosensory co-
rtices (responsible for body sensations and proprioception) and
the prefrontal cortex - are most directly implicated in affectivity
(Damasio, 1994). The prefrontal cortex is important in affect
Volume 3- Number 2
This content downloaded from
183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
regulation and conscious affective experience. The ventral
prefrontal cortex plays a role in linking cognitive representations
with their hedonistic value and with the appraisals involved in
generating self-conscious emotions, such as embarrassment and
shame. The ventral section of the medial prefrontal cortex ap-
pears to be important for the incorporation of somatic feedback
into judgments and decisions (Damasio, 1994). Patients with
lesions in this area perform poorly on measures of emotional
intelligence and social functioning. In summary, neural struc-
tures implicated in emotion processing also participate in social
information processing, and structures involved in social cog-
nition are also involved in emotional processing. It may well be
adaptive evolutionary pressures to deal flexibly with significant
social stimuli that resulted in the linking of structure and
function in the social and emotional brain areas.
AFFECT AND COGNITION IN PSYCHOLOGY:
TRADITIONAL APPROACHES
Within psychology, early approaches to affect and cognition
were shaped by theories such as psychoanalysis and behavior-
ism. Psychoanalytic accounts saw affect as located within the id,
exerting pressure against the countervailing forces of rational
ego mechanisms. These ideas hugely influenced popular
thinking but had only limited influence on psychological re-
search. In one exception, Feshbach and Singer (1957) found that
attempts to suppress fear paradoxically increased the pressure
to "perceive another person as fearful and anxious" (p. 286),
suggesting that "suppression of fear facilitates the tendency to
project fear onto another social object" (p. 286). However, due to
lack of empirical support and the devastating epistemological
criticisms by philosophers like Karl Popper, psychoanalytic
theories declined in importance.
Radical behaviorism suggested that affect influences thoughts
and judgments through conditioned blind associations between
affect and other stimuli. The full repertoire of human emotions
can thus be explained in terms of cumulative conditioning ex-
periences superimposed on just a few fundamental wired-
in emotions (Watson & Rayner, 1920). Although behaviorist
orthodoxy is now widely rejected, Watson's idea that affect may
influence thoughts and judgments through incidental associa-
tions survived in subsequent research. Clore and Byrne (1974)
showed that aversive or pleasant environments (the uncondi-
tioned stimuli) can produce an affective reaction (the uncondi-
tioned response) to a person encountered in that environment.
These studies explained affect congruence in thinking in terms
of conditioning principles based on temporal and spatial
contiguity.
The emerging cognitive information processing paradigm in
the 1960s initially also focused on cold, affect-less thinking,
and it saw affect mostly as a source of disruption and noise. It
is interesting that even phenomenological theorists such as
Heider (1958) largely ignored affect and focused on cold logical
95
 Affect and Cognition

inferences. In the early 1980s, research on naturalistic cogni- eliciting situation, its causal antecedents, and the person's
tion established that affect plays a critical role in how people ability to cope. Different combinations of these features reliably
deal with social information (Neisser, 1982). Within social produce different emotions. Acceptance or rejection by others
psychology, Isen (1987) and Zajonc (1980) argued for the im- appears to be a particularly potent cause of affective reactions
portance of affective influences on social thinking and behavior. (Leary, 2000), which is consistent with the probable evolution-
Ultimately, Gordon Bower's associative network model gave a ary origins of many affective reactions.
major impetus to experimental affect-cognition research, A special case of emotional appraisals is when people assess
demonstrating a strong mood-congruent influence on social their expected future affective reactions to anticipated out-
memory (Bower, 1981). comes. Such future forecasting motivates many human en-
Affect was also found to play a major role in the way mental deavors in everyday life, yet there is now good evidence that
representations about social experiences are constructed (For- people make many systematic mistakes when they forecast their
gas, 1982). As Pervin (1976) noted, "what is striking is the ex- future affective reactions (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). Exploration
tent to which situations are described in terms of affects . . . and of the cognitive processes that underlie such affective fore-
organized in terms of similarity of affects aroused by them" casting errors is an exciting new research domain that is not yet
(p. 471). More recently, Niedenthal and Halberstadt (2000) adequately linked to research on contemporaneous emotion
found that "stimuli can cohere as a category even when they appraisals.
have nothing in common other than the emotional responses they More recent process models of emotion appraisal explore how
elicit" (p. 381). Thus, affect plays a key role in determining how situational information and memory-based information are
mental representations about the social world are created and combined to produce an emotional reaction through fast auto-
maintained in memory. Conversely, cognitive processes are matic and subconscious mechanisms such as priming and
also involved in the generation of affective responses, as we shall spreading activation (Smith & Kirby, 2000). However, such
see in the next section. spontaneous appraisals may subsequently be modified by rea-
soning that provides a more finely tuned emotional response,
THE COGNITIVE ANTECEDANTS OF AFFECT: THE allowing the emotion system to "learn" new interpretations.
APPRAISAL APPROACH Appraisal theory represents a promising framework for under-
standing the cognitive antecedents of affective experiences.
How do people know the right emotional reaction to A complementary approach focuses on the cognitive conse-
a situation?
What are the cognitive mechanisms implicated inquences
emotionof affective states; we shall now turn to this issue.
production? Appraisal theories seek to explain the cognitive
THEthe
genesis of emotions such as anger, sadness, and fear and COGNITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF AFFECT
functions they serve (Lazarus, 1991). The pioneering two-factor
theory of emotions by Schachter and Singer (1962)The idea
was that affect influences cognition has been around for a
highly
long time.the
influential in suggesting that cognitive labels influence How and why does this "affect infusion" occur, and
what
quality of affective experiences. Emotional appraisal are the psychological mechanisms that produce it? Unlike
combines
situational and personal information to predict what the conditioning
earlier stim- and psychoanalytic explanations, contem-
ulus means to the individual. Different individuals react to
porary cognitive theories postulate precise mechanisms re-
similar situations with different emotions, and different situa-
sponsible for the infusion of affect into thinking and judgments.
tions can elicit the same emotions in individuals Affect congruence posits that affect can influence the content of
appraising
cognition through two complementary mechanisms: inferential
them (e.g., Forgas, 1982; Pervin, 1976). Emotion appraisals
processes
have deep adaptive significance, as different emotions and memory processes. In addition, affect can also
represent
influence
different "modes of action readiness" (Frijda, 1986) how the information is processed. We shall briefly
in a given
situation. consider these approaches in the following section.
Past affective states are also interpreted through appraisal-
like processes, and pioneering research by Redelmeier and
Theories of Affect Congruence
Kahneman (1996) suggests that features such as the peak in-
tensity and the last 3min of pain during a painful
Themedical
Inferential Account
procedure have a disproportionate influence on the way this
According to this model, affect congruence in judgments is
affective experience is appraised and remembered later
caused on.
by an inferential error. Individuals may ask themselves,
The structure of emotion appraisals or "emotion rules"
"How often
do I feel about it?", and in so doing, they may mistake
takes the logical form of if-then statements and can be sys-
preexisting feelings as a reaction to the target (Schwarz, 1990).
tematized to produce entire dictionaries of emotionalThis
responses
kind of misattribution implies superficial or heuristic
to situations (Lazarus, 1991). Structural appraisal models typi-
processing and is most common when people have little interest
cally emphasize the importance and personal relevance of the
or time for more elaborate processing. For example, off-the-cuff

96 Volume 3- Number 2

This content downloaded from

183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Joseph P. Forgas
responses to an unexpected telephone survey may show such
misattribution effects (Schwarz, 1990). It is not clear whether the
"How do I feel about it?" heuristic operates as a conscious,
inferential process or as an implicit, automatic mechanism. The
model also does not specify how cues other than misattributed
affect, such as the actual stimulus information, can enter into
producing a response. When the real source of affect is irrele-
vant to the task, as is the case in most experiments based on this
model, this seems more like a theory of misjudgment or aborted
judgment rather than a comprehensive theory of how affect in-
fluences cognition and judgments. When affect is integral to the
task, the inferential model suggests a direct, automatic process
of affect congruence that is reminiscent of earlier classical
conditioning accounts (Clore & Byrne, 1974). More recent re-
formulations of the theory suggest that affect can also function
as a heuristic cue influencing information processing strategies
(Clore & Storbeck, 2006).
The Memory Mechanism: The Affect Priming Principle
The alternative affect priming model (Bower, 1981) posits that
affect is an integral part of peoples' cognitive representations
about the world. Affect may thus automatically prime associated
ideas and memories, facilitating their use in constructive cog-
nitive tasks that use memory-based information. Numerous ex-
periments found that affect priming is most likely when people
face complex and demanding cognitive tasks that call for con-
structive thinking and the extensive use of affectively primed
information in memory (Eich & Macauley, 2006). Integrative
theories such as the affect infusion model (AIM; Forgas, 1995,
2002) seek to link the inferential and memory-based accounts as
complementary rather than competing mechanisms and specify
the processing conditions likely to promote their use. The theory
predicts that the extent of affective influences on social thinking
should critically depend on the kind of information processing
strategies recruited by a given task and context.
Affective Influences on Information Processing
Affect itself may also directly influence the process of cogni-
tion - that is, how people think (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler,
2001; Isen, 1987). It was originally thought that positive affect
reduces processing effort and that negative affect increases it, as
people in a good mood try to maintain it, and those in a negative
mood try to improve how they feel (Clark & Isen, 1982). How-
ever, recent evidence showed that the processing consequences
of affect can best be understood in terms of a fundamental di-
chotomy between accommodation and assimilation (Bless &
Fiedler, 2006), a distinction also used by Piaget.
Accommodation involves focusing on the demands of the
external world, paying careful attention to external stimulus
information and using more inductive, bottom-up thinking.
Assimilation is a complementary process in which existing
knowledge structures guide processing, thus producing more
Volume 3- Number 2
This content downloaded from
183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
top-down, deductive thinking. Most cognitive tasks involve a
combination of both these processing strategies in different
proportions. This model is consistent with evolutionary theories
that highlight the adaptive significance of positive and negative
affect triggering different processing styles (Frijda, 1986).
Current evidence supports the view that positive affect promotes
a more assimilative, schema-based processing style, whereas
negative affect calls for a more accommodative, externally fo-
cused thinking strategy (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Fiedler, 2001;
Forgas, 2006). In addition, beyond such general valence effects,
specific emotions can also trigger particular cognitive and
judgmental strategies, a recent and highly promising area of
research (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).
Integrative Theories: The AIM
Affect may thus influence both the content, and the process of
how people think. However, these effects are subject to impor-
tant boundary conditions. The AIM predicts that affective in-
fluences on cognition depend on the processing styles recruited
in different situations, which differ in terms of two features: the
degree of effort and the degree of openness of the information
search strategy. By combining processing quantity (effort), and
quality (openness, constructiveness), the model identifies four
distinct processing styles: direct access processing (low effort,
closed, not constructive), motivated processing (high effort, closed,
not constructive), heuristic processing (low effort, open, construc-
tive), and substantive processing (high effort, open, construc-
tive). Affect infusion is most likely when constructive
processing, such as substantive or heuristic processing, is used.
In contrast, affect should not infuse thinking when motivated or
direct access processing is used. The AIM also specifies a range
of contextual variables related to the task, the person, and the
situation that influences processing choices and thus affective
influences. The AIM is most relevant to explaining the cir-
cumstances when affect congruence is likely or unlikely to occur
and the kind of mechanisms (inferential vs. memory processes)
likely to produce affect congruence. Thus, the AIM seeks to
integrate the inferential and memory-based accounts of affect
congruence and suggests empirical means (such as the mea-
surement of processing latencies) allowing the determination of
which mechanisms is likely to be used. The AIM further predicts
that affective states also have a direct influence on information-
processing strategies. The nature of these mechanisms has been
most clearly elucidated in the work of Bless and Fiedler (2006).
The implications of this model have now been tested in a number
of experiments, as we shall in the following section.
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
There are several theoretical accounts that link affect to
how people represent the social world and the memories and
97
 Affect and Cognition

constructs they use to interpret complex information. In keeping Affect and Stereotyping
with the affect priming model, results from numerous studies Affect also plays an important role in stereotyping and inter-
determined that memory is enhanced when retrieval mood group judgments. Psychodynamic ideas and the frustration-
matches the original encoding mood (Eich & Macauley, 2006). aggression hypothesis suggest that negative affect might contribute
Thus, people in a positive mood recall more happy events from to intergroup discrimination and prejudice. Conditioning mod-
their childhood, and those in a bad mood remember more neg- els also suggest that regularly associating certain groups with
ative episodes. People also recall more mood-consistent rather aversive situations can elicit anger and resentment, just as
than mood-inconsistent events they recorded in their diary the evaluative reactions to individuals can be influenced by affec-
previous week (Bower, 1981). Due to the activation of mood- tive conditioning (Clore & Byrne, 1974). In turn, contact with
primed associations, affect congruent information also receives outgroup members while feeling good may reduce negative at-
greater attention and deeper processing (Bower, 1981). titudes and improve intergroup relations, according to the con-
tact hypothesis (Allport, 1954). Positive affect may also promote
more inclusive cognitive categorizations, thus reducing inter-
group distinctions (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996). Different negative
More Extensive Processing Magnifies Affect Infusion
affective states have different effects on intergroup judgments.
One key counterintuitive prediction derived from the AIM is
For example, sadness reduces reliance on stereotypes, but anger
that, paradoxically, affect congruence should be greater when
and anxiety may increase it (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998).
longer and more constructive processing is required to deal with
The process of stereotyping itself involves a variety of distinct
more complex cognitive tasks. This prediction was confirmed in
cognitive operations such as the identification of the relevant
a number of experiments where the complexity of the task was
category, activation of its contents, applying stereotyped fea-
manipulated to create more or less demand for constructive
tures to the target, and correcting for inappropriate stereotyping.
thinking (Forgas, 2002). For example, happy or sad judges were
Affect may influence stereotyping differently at each of the four
asked to form impressions of (a) well-matched or poorly matched
stages of the stereotyping process. Ultimately, a motivated ten-
couples, (b) typical or atypical people, and (c) serious or minor
dency to correct judgments also influences stereotyping. Thus,
relationship conflicts. Judgments in all cases showed significant
negative affect sometimes functions as a warning, indicating the
mood congruence as happy participants formed more positive
need for a motivated reassessment of potentially undesirable
impressions. However, mood had a significantly greater effect
responses.
when the task was more demanding (judging badly matched or
atypical targets). Processing latency and memory data confirmed
The Cognitive Benefits of Negative Affect: When Is Sad Better
that, paradoxically, longer and more elaborate thinking indeed
Than Happy?
magnified affect infusion, providing clear evidence for the
Affect can also influence the kind of information processing
process sensitivity of affect infusion into cognition.
strategies people adopt. Negative affect can reduce or eliminate
such common judgmental mistakes as the fundamental attri-
bution error (Forgas, 1998) by triggering more accommodative
Affect and Front-End Cognition: The Interpretation of and externally oriented thinking (Bless & Fiedler, 2006).
Observed Behaviors Affective influences on processing strategies also influence
Affect may also influence the way observed behaviors are
eyewitness accuracy (Forgas, Vargas, & Laham, 2005). Partic-
spontaneously perceived and encoded. This hypothesis was
ipants in a negative mood had better eyewitness memory for
tested (Forgas, Bower, & Krantz, 1984) by asking happy orcomplex
sad events that they had observed because they were less
participants to rate both their own and their partner's observed
likely to incorporate misleading information into their eyewit-
interactive behaviors as seen on a videotape. As predicted,
ness accounts (Forgas et al., 2005). These results - together
with the evidence for mood effects on inferential mistakes such
happy people saw significantly more positive, skilled behaviors
and fewer negative, unskilled behaviors both in themselves
as the fundamental attribution error - confirm that negative af-
and in their partners than did the sad subjects. These effects
fect can produce adaptive cognitive benefits in information
confirm that affect priming can subtly influence the kinds of
processing, reducing judgmental errors, and improving eyewit-
associations and interpretations people use when encoding
ness memory.
complex observed behaviors. Thus, a smile or gesture that may
Negative affect may also benefit certain interpersonal be-
seem friendly when one is in a good mood may be perceived
haviors according to several recent studies. As negative affect
as awkward when in a negative mood. Similar affective biases
produces more accommodative thinking (Bless & Fiedler,
also influence the way people think about themselves, and
2006), it may also improve the quality of interpersonal persua-
these effects are particularly strong when individuals deal
sive messages. This was confirmed in a series of experiments
with peripheral, poorly rehearsed aspects of themselves
(Forgas, in press) in which participants in a negative mood
(Sedikides, 1995). produced significantly more concrete, and ultimately more

98 Volume 3- Number 2

This content downloaded from

183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Joseph P. Forgas

effective, persuasive arguments in support of topical issues (e.g.,
student fees). This result is consistent with the finding that
negative mood promotes a processing style that is more attuned
to the requirements of a particular situation and thus improves
the quality and effectiveness of cognitive performance.
Other Behavioral Consequences
As many complex behaviors are the product of elaborate cog-
nitive processes, we may expect that affective influences on
cognition should also impact on real-life behaviors. This is in-
(Haidt, 2002), another rapidly developing area of inquiry on the
interface of affect and cognition.
There can thus be little doubt that empirical research and
theory building linking affect and cognition will continue apace
in the future. In particular, evolutionary ideas and neuroscience
research are likely to become important sources of theoretical
progress, focusing on the adaptive significance of affective
phenomena and highlighting the manifold links between cog-
nitive research and the neurosciences (Buss, 2005). It is not too
far-fetched to suggest that in early evolutionary history, wired-in

deed what research has shown. For example, consistent with the
AIM, happy people are more confident, form higher expecta-
tions, and behave in a more optimistic and cooperative manner
in a negotiation than do people in a negative mood. Other ex-
periments found that positive mood also impacts on real-life
interpersonal strategies, such as the way people interact with
others, formulate interpersonal requests, or respond to real-life
situations (Forgas, 2002). Affective influences on self-disclo-
sure were also demonstrated in several experiments, showing
emotional reactions provided distinct survival advantages
(Frijda, 1986), just as our existing emotion appraisal strategies
clearly serve adaptive ends (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Kirby,
2000). Much recent research suggests the beneficial conse-
quences of positive affect in promoting creativity, flexibility,
cooperation, integrative thinking, successful negotiation, and a
host of other desirable outcomes (Isen, 1987). However, we
have also seen that in the right circumstances, negative affec-
tive states such as sadness may also confer significant adaptive

that happy people preferred more intimate disclosure topics, advantages by promoting a more attentive, accommodating
consistent with their more confident and optimistic assessment thinking style that produces superior outcomes.

of the encounter. Finally, positive affect also functions as a It seems intriguing that despite our apparently never-ending

motivational resource, allowing people to cope with necessary quest for happiness, the human emotional repertoire remains
but aversive situations (Trope, Ferguson, & Raghunanthan, heavily skewed toward negative emotions. Four of the six deeply

2001). ingrained basic emotions with distinct physiological substrates

are negative ones - fear, anger, disgust, and sadness - sug-
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS gesting that these emotions were adaptive in the precarious
ancestral environment by preparing the organism for flight, fight,
or avoidance
This article reviewed historical and contemporary evidence for in the face of challenges. It is interesting that even
though
the close interdependence of affect and cognition. We consid- sadness is clearly unpleasant and provides no hedonic
benefit, it remains one of the most enduring and ubiquitous
ered several theories that seek to explain both the cognitive
affective states (Ciarrochi et al., 2006). The possible adaptive
antecedents and consequences of affect in a variety of social
functions and cognitive benefits of sadness are suggested in
situations. The empirical evidence reviewed shows that there
are close neural links and a complex, multifaceted, and several
bidi- recent experiments reviewed above, indicating that
negative mood can reduce judgmental errors, improve eyewit-
rectional relationship between affect and cognition. Cognitive
ness memory, and produce more effective persuasive arguments.
processes determine emotional reactions, and, in turn, affective
Such findings are broadly consistent with the notion that over
states influence how people remember, perceive, and interpret
social situations and execute interpersonal behaviors. Manyevolutionary
of time, affective states functioned as automatic
triggers
these effects are highly context sensitive and depend on the kind to elicit cognitive and behavioral responses that are
appropriate in a given situation.
of information processing strategies adopted. Integrative theo-
It is noteworthy that most investigations of the cognitive and
ries like the AIM (Forgas, 2002) offer a process-based expla-
nation of when, how, and why such affect infusion occurs.behavioral consequences of affect looked at mild, undifferen-
Given the relative neglect of affective phenomena in tiated
psy- mood states, whereas research on the antecedents of
chology until the 1980s (Hilgard, 1980), much has been covers a wide variety of specific emotional states be-
emotion
achieved in the past three decades. However, significant yond
prob- positivity and negativity. We believe that an important
direction
lems remain. We still lack a satisfactory definition of affective for future research is to better integrate research on the
elicitation of emotion with the study of the cognitive and be-
phenomena, and the various research domains linking affect and
havioral consequences of affect. For example, several intriguing
cognition remain poorly integrated. Yet, a better understanding
experiments
of the interface of affect and cognition is of vital importance in a now suggest that emotions also have reliable
cognitive consequences for social judgments and decisions
variety of applied fields, such as public policy and organiza-
(Keltner,
tional and health psychology (Diener, 2000; Forgas & George, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993).
In
2001; Salovey, Detweiler, Steward, & Bedell, 2001). Affect is conclusion, there is emerging evidence that the closely
interactive relationship between affective states and information
also heavily implicated in many moral judgments and decisions

99
Volume 3- Number 2

This content downloaded from

183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Affect and Cognition

processing strategies may be the key to understanding affective Eich, E., & Macauley, D. (2006). Cognitive and clinical perspectives
influences on thinking, judgments, and interpersonal behavior. on mood-dependent memory. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Affect in social

Cognitive processes are intimately involved in the generation of
affective responses (Smith & Kirby, 2000), and affect in turn has
a subtle but reliable impact on social thinking and behavior
(Forgas, 2002). A number of contextual influences mediate and
moderate these effects. Considering that most of the empirical
research on affect in psychology occurred in the last quarter of a
century, a great deal has been achieved. However, we are still far
from fully understanding the multifaceted influence that affect
has on social thinking and behavior. Hopefully, this article will
stimulate further interest in this fascinating and rapidly devel-
oping area of inquiry.
Acknowledgments - This work was supported by a Special
Investigator Award and a Professorial Fellowship from the
Australian Research Council and by the Research Prize by the
Alexander von Humboldt Foundation to Joseph P. Forgas. For
further information on this research project, see www.psy.unsw.
edu.au/~joef/jforgas.htm.
REFERENCES
Forgas, J.P, Bower, G.H., & Krantz, S. (1984). The influence of mood
Allport, G.W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison
Wesley.
Bless, H., & Fiedler, K. (2006). Mood and the regulation of information
Forgas, J.P, & Fiedler, K. (1996). Us and them: Mood effects on in-
processing. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Affect in social cognition and
behavior. New York: Psychology Press.
thinking and behavior (pp. 105-123). New York: Psychology
Press.
Feshbach, S., & Singer, R.D. (1957). The effects of fear arousal and
suppression of fear upon social perception. Journal of Abnormal
and Social Psychology, 55, 283-288.
Fiedler, K. (2001). Affective influences on social information pro-
cessing. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), The handbook of affect and social
cognition (pp. 163-185). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Forgas, J.P. (1982). Episode cognition: internal representations of in-
teraction routines. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experi-
mental social psychology (pp. 59-104). New York: Academic
Press.
Forgas, J.P. (1995). Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model
(AIM). Psychological Bulletin, 117, 39-66.
Forgas, J.P. (1998). Happy and mistaken? Mood effects on the fun-
damental attribution error. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 75, 318-331.
Forgas, J.P. (2002). Feeling and doing: affective influences on inter-
personal behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 13, 1-28.
Forgas, J.P. (Ed.). (2006). Affect in social thinking and behavior. New
York: Psychology Press.
Forgas, J.P. (2007). When sad is better than happy: Negative affect can
improve the quality and effectiveness of persuasive messages and
social influence strategies. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology, 43, 513-528.
on perceptions of social interactions. Journal of Experimental
Social Psychology* 20, 497-513.
tergroup discrimination. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-

Bodenhausen, G.V., & Macrae, C.N. (1998). Stereotype activation chology, 70, 36-52.
and inhibition. In R.S. Wyer Jr. (Ed.), Stereotype activation and Forgas, J.P, & George, J.M. (2001). Affective influences on judgments

inhibition: Advances in social cognition (Vol. 11, pp. 1-52). and behavior in organizations: An information processing per-
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. spective. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Pro-
cesses, 86, 3-34.
Bower, G.H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36,
129-148. Forgas, J.P, Vargas, P., & Laham, S. (2005). Mood effects on eyewit-
ness memory: Affective influences on susceptibility to misinfor-
Buss, D.M. (2005). The handbook of evolutionary psychology. Hoboken,
NJ: John Wiley & Sons. mation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 41, 574-588.
Frank, R.H. (1988). Passions within reason: The strategic role of the
Ciarrochi, J.V., Forgas, J.P., & Mayer, J. (Eds.). (2006). Emotional
emotions. New York: Norton.
intelligence: A scientific approach (2nd ed.). New York: Psychol-
ogy Press. Frijda, N. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cam-
Clark, M.S., & Isen, A.M. (1982). Towards understanding the rela- bridge University Press.
tionship between feeling states and social behavior. In A.H. Haidt, J. (2002). "Dialogue between my head and my heart": Affective
Hastorf & A.M. Isen (Eds.), Cognitive social psychology (pp. 73- influences on moral judgment. Psychological Inquiry, 13, 54-56.
108). New York: Elsevier-North Holland. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York:
Clore, G.L., & Byrne, D. (1974). The reinforcement affect model of Wiley.
attraction. In T.L. Huston (Ed.), Foundations of interpersonal Hilgard, E.R. (1980). The trilogy of mind: Cognition, affection, and
attraction (pp. 143-170). New York: Academic Press. conation. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 16,
Clore, G.L., & Storbeck, J. (2006). Affect as information about liking, 107-117.

efficacy, and importance. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Affect in social
thinking and behavior (pp. 123-143). New York: Psychology
Press.
Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (2000). Evolutionary psychology and the
emotions. In M. Lewis & J.M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook
of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 91-115). New York: Guilford.
Damasio, A.R. (1994). Descartes9 error. New York: Grosset/Putnam.
Diener, E. (2000). Subjective well-being: The science of happiness,
and a proposal for a national index. American Psychologist, 55,
34-43.
Isen, A.M. (1987). Positive affect, cognitive processes, and social
behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social
psychology (Vol. 20, pp. 203-253). San Diego, CA: Academic
Press.
Keltner, D., Ellsworth, PC, & Edwards, K. (1993). Beyond simple
pessimism: Effects of sadness and anger on social judgment.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64, 740-752.
Koestler, A. (1978). Janus: A summing up. London: Hutchinson.
Lazarus, R.S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford
University Press.

100 Volume 3- Number 2

This content downloaded from

183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Joseph P. Forgas

Leary, M.R. (2000). Affect, cognition, and the social emotions.
In J.R Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in
social cognition (pp. 331-356). New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Lerner, J.S., & Keltner, D. (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of
emotion-specific influences on judgment and choice. Cognition
and Emotion, 14, 473-493.
Neisser, U. (1982). Memory: What are the important questions? In
Schachter, S., & Singer, J.E. (1962). Cognitive and social psycholog-
ical determinants of emotional state. Psychological Review, 69,
379-399.
Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and moti-
vational functions of affective states. In E.T. Higgins & R. So-
rrentino (Eds.), Handbook of motivation and cognition:
Foundations of social behaviour (Vol. 2, pp. 527-561). New York:
Guilford Press.

U. Neisser (Ed.), Memory observed (pp. 4-27). San Francisco:
Freeman.
Niedenthal, P., & Halberstadt, J. (2000). Grounding categories in
emotional response. In J.R Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking:
The role of affect in social cognition (pp. 357-386). New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Pascal, B. (1966). Pensees. Baltimore: Penguin Books. (Original work
published 1643)
Pervin, L.A. (1976). A free-response description approach to the
analysis of person-situation interaction. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology', 34, 465-474.
Redelmeier, D.A., & Kahneman, D. (1996). Patients' memories
of painful medical treatments: Real-time and retrospective
evaluations of two minimally invasive procedures. Pain, 66,
3-8.
Salovey, P., Detweiler, J.B., Steward, W.T., & Bedell, B.T. (2001).
Affect and health-relevant cognition. In J. Forgas (Ed.), Hand-
book of affect and social cognition (pp. 344-370). Mahwah, NJ: Zajonc, R.B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no in-
Erlbaum.
Sedikides, C. (1995). Central and peripheral self-conceptions are
differentially influenced by mood: Tests of the differential sen-
sitivity hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
69, 759-777.
Smith, C.A., & Kirby, L.D. (2000). Consequences require antecedents:
Toward a process model of emotion elicitation. In J. Forgas (Ed.),
Feeling and thinking: The role of affect in social cognition (pp.
83-106). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Trope, Y., Ferguson, M., & Raghunanthan, R. (2001). Mood as a re-
source in processing self-r,elevant information. In J.R Forgas
(Ed.), The handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 256-274).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Watson, J.B., & Rayner, R. (1920). Conditioned emotional reactions.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1-14.
Wilson, T.D., & Gilbert, D.T. (2003). Affective forecasting. In M.
Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 35,
pp. 345-411). New York: Academic Press.
ferences. American Psychologist, 35, 151-175.

Volume 3- Number 2

This content downloaded from

183.87.223.194 on Tue, 11 Jun 2024 06:04:40 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms