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Constructing the EU‘s
Political Identity
Edited by
Sabine Saurugger
Mark Thatcher
Constructing the EU’s Political Identity
Sabine Saurugger Mark Thatcher

Editors

Constructing the EU’s


Political Identity

Previously published in Comparative European Politics,


“Constructing the EU’s political identity”, Volume 17,
Issue 4, August 2019
Editors
Sabine Saurugger Mark Thatcher
Sciences Po Grenoble London School of Economics
Institut d’Etudes Politiques Department of Government
Grenoble, France London, UK

ISBN 978-3-031-17406-3

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature
Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar
or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard
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This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Contents

Constructing the EU’s political identity in policy making . . . . . . . . . . . 1


Sabine Saurugger and Mark Thatcher
Constructing and de-constructing the European political identity:
the contradictory logic of the EU’s institutional system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Sergio Fabbrini
Affirming Europe with trade: deal negotiations and the making
of a political identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Francesco Duina and Ezekiel Smith
Transforming identity in international society: the potential
and failure of European integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Thomas Diez
Do central bankers dream of political union? From epistemic
community to common identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Erik Jones
The EU’s legal identities and the Court of Justice of the EU . . . . . . . . . 89
Sabine Saurugger and Fabien Terpan
Common market, normative power or super-state? Conflicting
political identities in EU asylum and immigration policy . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Sandra Lavenex
Direct and market governance paths for the creation
of an EU political identity: cultural heritage policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Mark Thatcher
Understanding the identity of a policy field: the European
Commission and liberal modernization in the domain of labour
and social policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Georg Menz

v
vi Contents

Comment: the EU and European identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161


Neil Fligstein
EU Political identity, integration and top-down analyses: a reply
to Neil Fligstein . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Sabine Saurugger and Mark Thatcher
Comparative European Politics (2019) 17:461–476
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41295-019-00169-2

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Constructing the EU’s political identity in policy making

Sabine Saurugger1 · Mark Thatcher2,3

Published online: 29 March 2019


© Springer Nature Limited 2019

Abstract
Questions of identity have returned to the centre of political debates in Europe. A
key issue is that while the EU has greatly expanded its powers in key policy domains
that traditionally have been the preserve of nation states, its political identity remains
weak. The special issue examines the construction of the EU’s political identity (or
identities), variations in its strength and the nature of its content. Drawing on studies
both on European nation-state formation and on the EU’s identity, we take a top-
down approach and analyse how EU institutions in different major policy domains
have themselves sought to create political identity through policy making. We define
the construction of EU political identity and set out empirically applicable indicators
to assess political identity in policy making. We analyse the construction of iden-
tity through a process-oriented approach that explicitly includes contestation and the
existence of rival political identities. Comparing across policy domains, we suggest
that the ability of EU institutions to construct an EU political identity has been lim-
ited not only by existing national identities but also by the coexistence of rival EU
political identities within policy domains. Hence, it has been difficult for EU insti-
tutions to establish a strong identity, with identity being strongest where there are
clear external alternatives and limited rival identities within the EU.

Keywords Political identity · EU · Policy

* Sabine Saurugger
sabine.saurugger@iepg.fr
Mark Thatcher
mthatcher@luiss.it; m.thatcher@lse.ac.uk
1
Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Sciences Po Grenoble, Pacte, 38000 Grenoble, France
2
LUISS, Rome, Italy
3
LSE, London, UK

1 Reprinted from the journal


S. Saurugger, M. Thatcher

Introduction

Identity has returned to the centre stage of politics in Europe. A key question concerns
the EU’s political identity. The special issue starts with a puzzle: on the one hand, the
EU has greatly expanded its policy responsibilities and powers and indeed has acquired
many ‘state-like’ features—a common currency, system of law with a supreme court,
myths and symbols, political system, external borders and wide legal powers over other
domains traditionally the preserve of nation states, from monetary policy to welfare,
culture and immigration. On the other hand, the EU’s political identity has failed to
match its increased powers and, at the same time, has become increasingly contested,
as questions arise about its content, coherence and conflicts with national identities.
These issues are increasingly at the core of political debates and crises as the EU’s sup-
posed lack of a political identity is used to attack its lack of legitimacy or ability to cre-
ate a political project that matches its legal and economic powers.
Academically, the EU’s identity is generally analysed through the processes whereby
citizens identify with the EU and the strength of such identification. The study of citi-
zen identification is useful but faces preliminary issues of the extent to which the EU
has a coherent and well-formed political identity with which citizens can identify and
the content of that identity. Our interest lies with these latter matters. Our central ques-
tion is: to what extent, how and why have EU organisations and institutions created an
EU political identity and what is the content of that identity? In particular, we focus on
the construction of the EU’s political identity by EU organisations. Drawing on studies
on both the construction of national identities and on the EU as a ‘state’, we take a top-
down approach by looking at how EU institutions (i.e. organisations), such as the Com-
mission, European Court of Justice or European Parliament and Council, have created
(or failed to create) an EU identity in key policy domains.
We examine EU identity construction through the policy-making process. Thus,
we attempt to define political identity and find major indicators that can be studied
empirically in looking at EU policy making. We then develop claims both through pro-
cess tracing and by variations in identity construction over time and especially across
domains. We explicitly incorporate the possibility that there can be several identities in
a domain and contestation about which should become dominant.
This introduction begins by discussing the study of EU political identity, delineat-
ing our approach from those based on identification by individuals and setting out its
inspiration from studies of the construction of national state identities in Europe and
that on the EU more specifically. We then define political identity and offer indicators
and methods for studying it within the policy-making process, before summarising our
central findings and ending with wider claims for further investigation.

Analysing the EU’s political identity

The literature on political identity is vast (for a good review, see Abdelal et al.
2009). The concept is amorphous, contested and multifaceted. One approach is to
focus on the beliefs and attributes of individuals and their feelings of belonging to

Reprinted from the journal 2


Constructing the EU’s political identity in policy making

a group. For example, in terms of general definitions, James Fearon distinguishes


between personal identity and social identity, with the latter being a ‘social category,
a set of persons marked by a label and distinguished by rules deciding membership
and (alleged) characteristic features or attributes’ (Fearon 1999: p. 2), while Rog-
ers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper (2000) offer three alternative views of social
identity, namely identification/categorisation; individual self-understanding; and
commonality/connectedness/groupness. After reviewing the literature, Abdelal et al.
(2001) (cf Abdelal et al. 2009) offer three different understandings of identity: an
indirect one, namely the way actors understand the world; a theory of action, based
on the distinction between an in-group and an out-group; role theory in which the
behaviour of actors (or attempts to act) is more or less consistent with actors’ role
expectations flowing from their identities which provide socially appropriate roles
that actors perform.
The literature on identification with the EU is also extensive and long standing,
going back to the earliest debates about neo-functionalism and a transfer of identity
from the national to the European level (for a good overview, see Sassatelli 2009: ch
1). It has enjoyed considerable expansion in recent years (e.g. Checkel and Katzen-
stein 2009; Risse 2010; Bruter 2005, special issue International Organization 2005).
The most prominent studies look at individuals by examining citizen identification,
often using Eurobarometer, polling results or focus groups that measure the beliefs
and behaviour of European citizens. They suggest that a European identity, whether
it is political or social, emerges from processes of creating a shared identity at the
level of citizens (Bruter 2003, 2005; Diez Medrano 2003; Katzenstein and Checkel
2009; Risse 2010; Duchesne et al. 2013; van Ingelgom 2014; Hooghe et al. 2017).
Neil Fligstein (2008), for instance, adopts the premise that a specific form of Euro-
pean society is in the process of emerging via horizontal and vertical relationships
between citizens and elites. He argues that this will doubtless lead to a socially
divided Europe, where those who participate more in European integration will feel
more European than those who do not.
The literature on political identity is helpful for a study of the EU by underlining
that identity is constructed through action and the development of social categories.
Equally, that on citizen identification in Europe is valuable for assessing mass views
of the EU and the electoral context within which actors operate. However, given its
focus on citizens, it does not concentrate on the role of elite policy makers in con-
structing an EU political identity with which citizens can identify. The processes of
making EU policies, their content and their presentation are likely to influence the
extent and content of identity, which in turn may well influence identification by
citizens. This relates to identity being created by top-level institutions rather than
just emerging organically from citizens.
Here, we therefore take an alternative perspective, in looking at the construc-
tion of the EU’s political identity by one group of collective elite actors, namely EU
organisations in policy making. Our approach draws inspiration from work on ‘state
building’ and nations and nationalism in Europe. The literature makes a very useful
distinction between nation, based on feelings of belonging, and a state (e.g., Smith
1991; Guibernau 1999). The two can exist or develop at different times. A nation can
precede a state—for instance, Italy had strong nationalist movements well before the

3 Reprinted from the journal


S. Saurugger, M. Thatcher

modern Italian state was created in the late nineteenth century. But crucially for our
purposes, a state can precede a nation or indeed exist without it or contain several
nations or having movements that seek to create new states. Indeed, states can exist
despite many great internal diversities—a classic study by Eugene Weber on France
argued that in the late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century organisations
such as the judiciary, education system, army and church (aided by economic and
technological changes) ‘transformed peasants into Frenchmen’ (Weber 1976).
Indeed, an important literature on nation-state building underlines the role
of institutions such as the church, the army or the educational system in building
national identities (Tilly 1975; Poggi 1978; Skowronek 1982; Elias 1982; Evans
et al. 1985; Breuilly 1993; Smith 1999). Studies show how these institutions acted
not only through coercion but also by creating symbols, myths and ‘invented tra-
ditions’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) in order to create ‘imagined communities’
(Anderson 2006) that came over time to constitute the publicly stated and collec-
tively shared political identities of nations. State organisations can create identity
over time . They can increase their role at certain key periods, notably in times of
crisis such as war, as well as those of rapid economic and technological develop-
ment. But these processes were not without conflicts. Studies on national identity
building have also indicated how identity can be contested—collective sharing does
not mean that everyone accepts or shares the same identity and that its construction
can be highly political, as actors press alternative identities as part of wider political
struggles.
Studies on the EU build on this research and point to the importance of organisa-
tions that create an identity. The literature is very considerable and diverse, rang-
ing from discussions of how a ‘European’ identity fits with other identities, espe-
cially national and regional ones, to the problems of constructing an EU identity
or to detailed ethnographic studies of specific groups (for just a few examples, see
Risse 2004, 2010; Smith 1992, 1995; Foret 2008; Favell 2011). Much work has
focused on culture and EU building a ‘cultural identity’. Thus, for instance, recently,
Kathleen McNamara has underlined that historically political authorities have used
carefully crafted symbols and practices to create a cultural foundation for rule, most
notably in the modern nation state and argued that the EU has sought to create a
‘critical infrastructure’ of culture to support the expansion of its political author-
ity (McNamara 2015). Oriane Calligaro (2013) has studied how ‘entrepreneurs of
Europeanness’, both within and especially outside EU institutions, have developed
representations of the European project. Vincent della Sala has argued that the EU
has created myths that are similar to those of nation states, such as those concern-
ing its foundation and culture as well as exceptionalism (della Sala 2016). Consid-
erable research has looked at how the EU creates symbols and seeks to develop a
‘taken-for-granted’ or ‘banal’ European identity (Cram 2009; Foret 2008; McNa-
mara 2015). In the field of ‘culture’, efforts by EU institutions to create a European
‘cultural identity’ through visible symbols such as ‘cities of culture’, an EU passport
and maps, as well as narratives in the form of histories and ‘memory’, have been
studied (e.g. Sassatelli 2009; Shore 2000; Calligaro 2013; Delanty 1995).
Other work has examined discourse and norms. Vivien Schmidt has argued that
EU institutions such as the Commission and ECB are central to the definition and

Reprinted from the journal 4


Constructing the EU’s political identity in policy making

operation of the EU, but that the lack of resonance of EU decision-making which
is often dominated by economic issues with citizens and their limited participation
in its decision-making creates ‘policies without politics’ (Schmidt 2006, 2009). She
also suggests that there are at least four discourses about the EU’s identity: a prag-
matic one in which the EU is a problem-solving entity; a normative one based on
being a value-based community; a principles one in which the EU is a border-free
rights-based post-national union; a strategic one in which the EU is a global actor
that breaks out of traditional realpolitik (Schmidt 2009: p. 24). Equally, the role of
norms in the EU’s development and power is at the core of work on ‘Normative
Power Europe’, whereby the EU has been defined as an ‘ideational’ actor charac-
terised by common principles and constituted as an ‘elite-driven, treaty-based,
legal order’, so that its identity and behaviour are fundamentally based upon a set
of common values such as peace, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, human rights,
social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance,
which are reflected in the rhetoric of its leaders (Manners 2002: p. 241; Manners
2002, 2006; Smith 2013; Meunier and Nicolaidis 2006).
The studies on state creation of a political identity are highly relevant to our study.
They show that even in countries used as exemplars of nation states such as France,
political identities were constructed over time and despite features such as multiple
languages and strong conflicts between social groups and geographical areas. They
point to the roles that organisations with powers over key domains such as public
order, education and the economy can play in building such identities. The work on
the invention of traditions is particularly relevant to studies about the roles that EU
organisations play in the construction of an EU policy identity. Equally, research
showing that contestation and conflict have been a central aspect in the slow, and
often incremental, emergence of national identities aids in providing a perspective
when looking at the often acrimonious and/or slow development of the EU.
At the same time, the studies on national identity construction need to be treated
as a starting point and adapted and developed rather than simply ‘read across’ to the
EU. While drawing on existing research on the development of national identity,
which offers a valuable set of tools and claims, we are using as it a source of inspi-
ration rather than seeking an exact replication—since we recognise that suprana-
tional political identity construction in the twenty-first century based on a union of
states is likely to have important differences with national identity construction on
the nineteenth century. Hence, for instance, McNamara (2015) suggests that the EU
often ‘localises’ its symbols which thus have a national element. Moreover, ‘national
identity’ is often a mythical and unrealistically high yardstick for identity, while the
historical literature is itself the subject of intense academic debates.
With respect to studies of EU identity, they too are immensely valuable. They
underline the importance of identity being developed through action, which may be
part of deliberate strategies by the EU to gain legitimacy (Sassatelli 2009; Shore
2000). Considerable discussion concerns identification with Europe, albeit using
different methods than Eurobarometer citizen identification studies (notably quali-
tative and ethnographic) and theoretical frameworks (especially various forms of
constructivist and interpretative approaches). They offer definitions—for instance,
Sassatelli (2009: p. 5) usefully defines European cultural identity as having both

5 Reprinted from the journal


S. Saurugger, M. Thatcher

individual and collective dimensions, namely a shared public and individual under-
standing of what it means to be European and then individual self-understanding of
those meanings.
We seek to build on these studies of EU identity. In particular, we seek to develop
empirically applicable definitions of political identity (which may differ from cul-
tural identity that is based in part on individual understandings, whereas we focus on
the EU as a collective political body) and that link to the EU’s main activity which
is policy making. We also seek empirically grounded explanatory factors or even
hypotheses about when, how and why the EU does and does not develop a politi-
cal identity. Moreover, recognising that there are different EU identities opens many
questions about their coexistence and which prevail. Finally, while many of the stud-
ies on EU identity construction operate either at a detailed level, looking within spe-
cific organisations or sometimes policy domain, or else at very macro level across
the EU as a whole, this leaves space for the meso-level analysis at the level of policy
domains and ‘medium-level theorising’.
Thus, drawing inspiration from work on nation building (while remaining sen-
sitive to the differences between a nineteenth-century nation state) and on stud-
ies of EU identity construction, we examine key EU institutions in central policy
domains, to see how they seek to construct political identity in their activities of
policy making. Thus, we accept the important argument made in both general and
specifically EU studies that identity is constructed through activities and roles. We
look at whether, how and why institutions construct a political identity for the EU
in setting policy aims, choices and criteria, throughout the policy process. Hence,
the construction of a political identity includes announcing reasons rationales for
policies, the policy aims followed by the legislative process and the production of
policy documents as well as explanations for these. The activities may seem rou-
tine, but not only is policy making the central activity of the EU but also it involves
both coercive tools and symbolic or discursive ones that articulate values. Studying
policy making also allows us to look at the substantive content of an identity—as
articulated by EU institutions. Hence, we examine the strategies and capacities of
these institutions in presenting, explaining and interpreting their policy decisions.
We also seek to contribute to the literature on EU identity by focusing on particu-
lar EU institutions (taken here to mean EU-level organisations) and in highlighting
major explanatory factors and causal processes in EU policy making. We operate at
the meso-level of policy domains, seeking to compare domains to see how their fea-
tures affect EU identity creation. The following section presents the indicators used
in the special issues analysis and develops preliminary hypotheses. We are particu-
larly interested in rival identities in domains—which ones exist and why, and then
which are stronger, when and why.

Studying the EU’s political identity in policy making

Given our focus on top-down identity construction by EU institutions in policy mak-


ing, we now face three related questions. How do we define the EU’s ‘political iden-
tity’ in ways that can be applied empirically in the policy process? What processes

Reprinted from the journal 6


Constructing the EU’s political identity in policy making

and mechanisms in policy making do we envisage as possible means of its construc-


tion? How can and do we study it empirically in policy making?
Laura Cram (2009), drawing on Tönnies (1955), underlines that the EU’s politi-
cal identity involves belonging to a political community (Gemeinschaft) as distinct
from a functional society (Gesellschaft). As the literature on nation-state building
underlines, constructing such a community involves political institutions that artic-
ulate values publicly—i.e. public communication and discourse that offer narra-
tives, symbols and myths—so that they can be shared (cf. Foret 2008; Cram 2009;
Schmidt 2009). But it also requires a political content or ‘values’, so the EU’s iden-
tity refers to more than just an interstate agreement for economic benefits (Foret and
Calligaro 2018). Values can be seen as building blocks of identity. We refer to val-
ues in this special issue as an understanding that is ‘produced by a social convention
and asserted by an institution’ (Foret and Calligaro 2018: p. xx). As such, conflicts
and controversies lead to situations in which specific values are questioned, and can
then be defined and asserted. Equally, establishing a hierarchy by claiming that such
values take priority over others—e.g. that they are claimed to be ‘fundamental’,
unalterable or at least enjoy precedence over others—is essential in an identity and
separating it from other, lower ranked aims. Indeed, Calligaro distinguishes ‘Euro-
peanness’, which she defines as ‘the presentation of the European project capable of
arousing the citizens’ feelings of belong’ (a definition that itself separates represen-
tations of Europe from actual citizen identification), from European identity which
she says has more fixed characteristics (Calligaro 2013: p. 8, 7); identity does indeed
need to have claims to endure over time and to be fundamental. Moreover, ‘values’
need to be shared, as identity has an internal dimension across the EU. Finally, being
distinct involves an external dimension or differentiation from other polities, as the
studies both on nation-state formation and on the EU as a ‘normative power’ under-
line; such differentiation can be vis-à-vis EU member states or other European poli-
ties or organisations or non-European polities. (Although this does not mean that
such identity must be exclusive—it may well be possible to feel a sense of belonging
to both the EU and other polities, just as one can belong to both a nation and a sub-
national unit or social group.)
Hence, we define EU ‘political identity’ as the articulation of political values that
are claimed to be:

• Fundamental—i.e. unalterable and take precedence over others


• Shared across the EU—i.e. an internal dimension
• Distinct, differing from other polities—i.e. an external dimension (such differen-
tiation can be from EU member states or other European polities or organisations
or non-European polities).

How can such an articulation be found empirically in the EU? Given that the EU is
very much a ‘policy state’ (Richardson 2012), we focus on its policy making. More
specifically, we seek to identify the EU’s political identity by looking at the articula-
tion of values and claims made for them. This may occur in many ways, including:
stated policy aims and priorities, the paradigms/frameworks/models used in making
or justifying decisions, symbols and myths, and claims of community put forward

7 Reprinted from the journal


S. Saurugger, M. Thatcher

by EU institutions. These are located in institutions’ statements and discourse,


explanations of policy choices or in legal norms, but also the wording of legisla-
tion and decisions. Hence, we can ask questions such as: Are a coherent set of aims
and criteria for decisions put forward or many contradictory ones? Which aims are
repeated and which not? Which aims are set out as fundamental and which are pre-
sented as subordinate? Which are set out as being ‘shared’ across Europe and how is
such sharing presented?
The political identity of a policy can differ from the content of a policy, which
can be hidden or differ from public claims made for it or the values that led to its
adoption. Thus, for instance, in looking at EU foreign policy, Hebel and Lenz (2016)
suggest that the link between EU identity and policy has two steps: identity con-
struction, in which a collective EU identity is formed from the constituent norms of
its members; identity operationalisation, in which they formulate and apply regula-
tive norms. This offers a useful division (although we may debate whether a col-
lective European identity is only composed of the norms of its members). We are
most interested in identity construction. The articles of this special issue share the
same process-oriented approach, studying the values put forward by EU institu-
tions. Such a process does not take place in a vacuum, since the construction of
identity can be observed inside and through the interactions taking place inside the
EU institution and with external actors such as non-EU institutions, non-govern-
mental organisations and the media. We see political identity as being constructed
by actors, who pursue their own aims, which may range from increasing their power
to legitimating policies, shifting blame or deepening European integration. Identity
construction can be an incremental, non-strategic act or a conscious one (to con-
struct identity strategically). Multiple causal mechanisms are possible—e.g. ranging
from cost–benefit calculation to constructivist/socialisation mechanisms such as role
playing and normative suasion (cf. Checkel 2005). Indeed, our approach draws on
or is similar to strategic constructivism in looking at the strategies, resources and
constraints of actors in constructing an EU political identity. This does not mean that
we see actors as having an overall plan but does mean that we focus on their directed
actions concerning the creation of political norms that can construct an EU political
identity. (We can of course also include unintended effects of their efforts, but the
starting point is their behaviour as they seek to create a political identity.) We adopt
a specifically actor-centred perspective, insisting that although actors are embedded
in cognitive frames they are equally able to develop a strategy that will help them to
achieve their goal (McNamara 1998; Parsons 2002; Blyth 2002; Hay and Rosamond
2002; Jabko 2006; Hay 2004, 2006; Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2018; for a critical view,
see Bell 2011). From this perspective, cognitive frames do not solely constitute the
environment in which actors are embedded (a constitutive logic), but are also tools,
consciously used by these same actors to attain their goals (a causal logic) (Gofas
and Hay 2010), in an environment in which power is unequally distributed amongst
actors (Saurugger 2013, 2016).
In terms of empirical coverage, we focus on the closest EU equivalents to
those suggested by studies both of European and American state building, such
as the European Commission, Court of Justice of the EU, European Council and
European Parliament, who make policies in key domains. While accepting that

Reprinted from the journal 8


Constructing the EU’s political identity in policy making

there are contrasting views and individuals ‘entrepreneurs’ within these organisa-
tions (cf Calligaro 2013), for our purposes, we treat them as actors who set out
values in the policy-making process. In terms of time periods, although ‘identity’
has been an EU policy since the 1973 Declaration on European Identity made
at the European Summit of 14–15 December 1973 at Copenhagen, we focus on
recent years, when identity has become part of wider responses to economic,
financial and political crises which have called into question membership of
the EU, the euro or the goal of ‘ever closer union’. We compare across different
domains that are usually central to national political identities (without claiming
that the models of a Western nation state can just be read across to the EU)—i.e.

• Constitutional identities—e.g. the articulation of the right allocation of pow-


ers between different levels of government and also the overall norms of the
polity
• Judicial identity—e.g. the role and limits of the power of the judiciary, espe-
cially over politics
• Cultural identity—the ‘common heritage’ and past of the polity
• External identity—the borders of the polity and whom is included and who is
a ‘foreigner’, who is a migrant, immigrant, etc.
• Macroeconomic policy—e.g. the allocation of fiscal and monetary powers, the
aims of the central bank and the paradigm used for governing an economy.
• Social or welfare identity—the rights and protections that workers and citizens
can expect.

We explicitly include conflict, since one of the basic assumptions of this spe-
cial issue is that political identity is contested—within EU organisations, among
EU organisations and then by other non-EU actors. EU organisations can face
opposition to the creation of an EU identity in a domain. Equally, there can be,
and often are, rival political identities—about EU aims (e.g. for constitutions,
between a union des patries and an ever closer union), models (e.g. how mon-
etary policy should work and its relationship with national fiscal policy) or pri-
orities (e.g. rights of workers versus those of capital). We examine how actors
such as some national governments, or civil society actors, offer opposing identi-
ties, to those currently presented by EU institutions. Hence, contributors examine
whether, to what extent and when EU has overcome opposition to create a politi-
cal identity in a domain and if there are rival identities, which ones are pressed
and which dominate.
It may be useful to state briefly what we are not doing. As noted, we do not look
at whether citizens actually identify with the political identity that EU organisa-
tions create. Equally, we do not seek to examine the effects of the EU’s identity on
national identities (on this, see Cram 2009; Smith 1995). Nor do we study the inter-
nal identity of EU organisations, such as the views and norms of their staff in their
dealings with each other or the role of individual entrepreneurs (for such studies,
see, for example, Hooghe 2002; Kassim et al. 2013; Calligaro 2013). Equally, we do
not look at the effects of the EU on national identities. While these are all important,
space and focus put them beyond our reach.

9 Reprinted from the journal


S. Saurugger, M. Thatcher

Findings

The articles of this special issue approach these issues through three groups of stud-
ies. Contributions encompass a broad understanding of the EU’s internal and exter-
nal political identity (Fabbrini 2019; Diez 2019) and then concentrate on specific
European institutions in the construction of EU’s policy identities in various policy
domains—external trade and internal single market through case studies of GMO
foods and audiovisual services (Duina and Smith 2019), law (Saurugger and Ter-
pan 2019), monetary policy (Jones 2019), ‘social Europe’ and labour markets (Menz
2019), immigration (Lavenex 2019) and cultural policies (Thatcher 2019).
The first finding is that the EU institutions have sought actively to create politi-
cal identities in policy making. They have developed and articulated values that go
beyond the benefits of economic exchange. They have promoted values that limit
and harness economic competition, sometimes in surprising circumstances. Thus,
for instance, the ECB has tried to encourage greater political union; the Commission
has sought to introduce ‘social Europe’ or cultural exceptions to free movement of
goods, while the European Court has expanded values of social and human rights
alongside market creation (Jones 2019; Menz 2019; Thatcher 2019; and Saurugger
and Terpan 2019). Sometimes the articulation of political values has formed part of
economic strategies (e.g. in trade) and sometimes it has been an alternative (e.g. in
immigration) (Duina and Smith 2019, and Lavenex 2019).
However, the second finding is that the extent and coherence of a distinct EU
identity vary greatly. In some domains, the EU has developed a well-established and
consistent identity. The two clearest examples are external trade and external bor-
ders, where the EU has developed a clear identity (Duina and Smith 2019 and Diez
2019). In others, there are several distinct and well-formed EU identities—the clear-
est example is the constitutional nature of the EU between a supranational approach
and intergovernmental approaches, and in immigration and asylum policy among
three identities (statist, normative power and market) (Fabbrini 2019 and Lavenex
2019). But in other fields, EU identity is less developed—wavering over time in
labour policy (Menz 2019) or less differentiated from national ones in certain parts
of cultural heritage policy (Thatcher 2019).
The third finding is change and development over time, with an expansion of
identity and also modifications in its content. In almost all cases, EU institutions
have expanded their attempts to create an EU identity. Sometimes this has gone
hand in hand with the expansion of policy powers or soon after expanded powers
were granted. Examples are macroeconomic policy, where after monetary union, the
ECB began to press for a stronger EU political identity (Jones 2019) or the European
Court’s contribution to the creation of an integration through law identity of the
EU (Saurugger and Terpan 2019). But expansion of EU policy has not always led
to the growth of a supranational EU identity—on the contrary, intergovernmental
approaches have expanded in the 2000s (Fabbrini 2019). Nor is such an expansion a
necessary condition for EU institutions striving to develop an EU identity—EU poli-
cies in cultural heritage remain modest but attempts to expand its identity through
symbols and discourse began before the EU gained competencies and have grown
(Thatcher 2019).

Reprinted from the journal 10


Constructing the EU’s political identity in policy making

The cases studied, as well as cross-case comparison, can help identify explana-
tory factors and attendant causal processes that aid or constrain the expansion of
the EU’s political identity—or often identities—and the content of those identities.
The first and powerful factor seems to be whether the domain is external or internal
to the EU. In the former, EU organisations have found it much easier to craft an EU
identity in matters that involve non-EU actors. Thus, for instance, Francesco Duina
and Zeke Smith (Duina and Smith 2019) show the contrasts between the Commis-
sion’s capacity to find common values and a public discourse in international nego-
tiations concerning food and GMOs and its ability to do in the internal market on
communications. Using a constructivist approach, Thomas Diez (Diez 2019) argues
that setting borders is constitutive of identity, as apparently economic or technical
matters such as customs rules establish an identity of being ‘within the EU’ or out-
side of it. The authors point to several processes and factors that can apply strongly
in external domains. One is institutional—for instance, exclusive powers in external
trade negotiations. Another is opposition to other countries—such as the USA in
food standards or Turkey and Russia in setting borders. In contrast, the efforts by EU
organisations to build a differentiated EU identity in internal matters face stronger
several constraints that relate to four other explanatory factors.
Indeed, the second factor concerns the existence of long-standing and powerful
rival national identities. This is clearest in heritage policy where national identities
are closely associated with conceptions of the nation state or in immigration and
asylum policies where the right to exclude ‘foreigners’ is seen as a key preroga-
tive of the modern nation state (Thatcher 2019; Lavenex 2019). (Of course, whether
these national policies are really fundamental to national identities can be ques-
tioned—many ‘national traditions’ were invented in the nineteenth century and/or
belong to specific groups and not the entire nation, especially the contemporary one,
while many legal restrictions on immigration are relatively recent, but beliefs about
their relationship with nation states are powerful and can impede an EU identity.)
Hence, in certain domains, EU institutions face stronger and better formed national
identities and opponents armed with arguments that such domains should remain the
preserve of the national level as they are essential for national identity, than in other
domains.
Third, however, there are also conflicting EU identities. As Sergio Fabbrini (Fab-
brini 2019) underlines, the EU has a supranational identity which is challenged by
an intergovernmental one. Which identity predominates is linked to institutional
rules and allocation of powers. Supranational institutional arrangements create
strong incentives for organisations such as the Commission and Court to promote a
supranational identity, whereas the Council is keener on an intergovernmental one.
Hence, in policy areas that are more intergovernmental, there are stronger conflict-
ing identities. One good example is in immigration and asylum policy, where inter-
governmental arrangements predominate, and hence, a ‘statist’ identity whereby
member states have great autonomy predominates over other, more supranational
identities such as an economic one or a rights-based one (Lavenex 2019). In con-
trast, in domains which are more supranational, EU organisations have greater
capacities to build an EU identity. Thus, for example, the Court of Justice has been
able to pass judgements and set out the values of integration through law as well as

11 Reprinted from the journal


S. Saurugger, M. Thatcher

balancing economic values with other ones thanks to its position as the EU’s high-
est court (Saurugger and Terpan 2019). But supranational organisations may also
have stronger incentives to do so. The most striking example here is macroeconomic
policy, where Erik Jones (Jones 2019) argues that the unelected ECB has promoted
the development of an EU political identity in order to have greater legitimacy in
the domain and also to share if not offload responsibilities for inherently political
decisions.
The fourth factor is whether EU policies have expanded, in either a domain or
a related domain. Sometimes such expansion has seen EU organisations engage
in strong and successful attempts to build an EU identity, as in the social market
policies under Delors or external trade policies in battles with USA over GMOs
(Menz 2019 and Duina and Smith 2019). The example of macroeconomic policy
also indicates that as the EU’s policy competencies expand, so policy makers seek
an identity to legitimate their actions (Jones 2018). Sometimes this has occurred
as EU policy in one area led to pressures for more a policy identity in a related
one—for instance, as the single market developed in the 1980s, the Commission
led by Jacques Delors sought to offset liberalisation with a ‘social market’ identity,
although this was then reduced in the 2000s (Menz 2019). But there is no automatic
link between such expansion and the creation of an EU political identity—relatively
limited policy powers in cultural heritage have not prevented a series of attempts by
the Commission to build an EU identity, although these have largely been unsuc-
cessful (Thatcher 2019).
The fifth explanatory factor is the interests and preferences of member states.
They affect the scope and content of the EU’s political identity(ies). Georg Menz
shows how the content of the EU’s identity in labour market policy has evolved over
time according to not only the preferences of its leaders but also those of national
leaders—from a ‘social market’ under the Delors Commission to a more liberal
one based on values of competitiveness in the 2000s as even social democratic gov-
ernments at the national level also adopted such values (Menz 2019). Moreover,
although frequently national politicians have sought to limit the development of an
EU domain, being able to do so most strongly in intergovernmental domains, they
have also aided its growth by ascribing values to the EU that they oppose or wish
to contrast with their own. In turn, EU organisations have reacted, sometimes by
rejecting the labels attached to their actions—for instance, in macroeconomic pol-
icy—and sometimes by underlining the distinctiveness of EU identity—as in a set
of common European values that are opposed to nationalistic ones in parts of cul-
tural policy. The current populist wave that identifies the EU with values such as
economic neo-liberalism, openness to immigration and austerity may thus have the
effect of strengthening the EU’s identity.

Conclusions

Studying the EU’s political identity from a top-down perspective adds important
insights to our understanding of state building. While we do not enter debates about
whether the EU is a state or what kind of state it might be, the articles of this special

Reprinted from the journal 12


Constructing the EU’s political identity in policy making

issue show under which circumstances supranational institutions contribute to the


creation of specific policy identities. The contributions to this special issue provide
five explanatory factors that could be the basis for hypotheses on the construction
of European—or even wider regional integration-wise—policy identities. First,
it seems that external policies are more prone to have a clear identity, as they are
established against an external opponent, be it the third country or another regional
organisation. Second, the more coherent a national policy identity, the more difficult
it is for European institutions to establish a European policy identity, as we have
seen negatively in the area of the European heritage or social policy or positively
in the field of the contribution of the ECB to the political identity construction of
EMU. Third, when the preferences and interests of member states differ widely, a
window of opportunity can allow European organisations to establish a distinct pol-
icy identity, as we have seen in the field of market integration through law. Finally,
the existence of conflicting interests does not necessarily lead to an impossibility of
European policy identities. The coexistence of different policy identities is a real-
ity in the EU as it is at the national level. Instead, the key issue for us is to whether,
how and why EU institutions can construct policy identities and the content of such
identities.

Acknowledgements We wish to warmly thank the Centre d’Etudes Européennes at Sciences Po Paris,
the research centre Pacte at Sciences Po Grenoble and the School of Advanced International Studies,
Johns Hopkins University Bologna and especially the Patrick McCarthy fund for funding and host-
ing workshops in which papers were presented and discussed; we also wish to thank the discussants at
those workshops, notably for this article, Florence Haegel, Colin Hay, Matthias Matthijs and Manuela
Moschella, as well as Kathleen McNamara and Sophie Jacquot; we also express our gratitude to the edi-
tors of the journal for their support.

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Reprinted from the journal 14


Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Large shirts or tobes, ready made, of striped cottons, and
white calico.
Coarse white calico. ⎱
much esteemed.
Fine do. do. ⎰

Frankincense,

purchased of the Jews in Tripoli, or
Ottaria, ⎬
Leghorn.

Spices,
The beads most in demand, indeed the only ones that they will
purchase, are:—
H’raz-el mekka, white glass beads, with a flower.
Merjan tiddoo, mock coral.
Quamur, white sand beads.
Quamar m’zein, small black beads, with yellow stripes.
H’raz-el pimmel, ant’s head bead, with black stripes.
Contembali, red and white.
Hazam el bashaw, the bashaw’s sash.
Sbgha m’kerbub, red pebble, from Trieste.
Sbgha toweel, long bead.
H’shem battura, Arab’s nose, a large red bead.
Arms of all descriptions, of an inferior quality, will always meet
with a ready sale, as well as balls of lead, and what we call
swan-shot.
JOURNAL

OF

AN EXCURSION,
ETC. ETC.
PREFATORY NOTICE
TO THE

Narrative of Captain Clapperton’s Journey from Kouka to Sackatoo.

The Manuscript of the following Journal was placed in my hands by Captain


Clapperton, on his departure from England, with a request that I would see it
through the press, whenever the account of the recent mission to Central Africa
should be published. In complying with this request, I have carefully abstained
from altering a sentiment, or even an expression, and rarely had occasion to add,
omit, or change, a single word; so that my easy task has been confined to the
mere ordinary correction of the press.
Captain Clapperton, like Major Denham, as will appear from his Journal, makes
no pretensions to the systematic knowledge of natural history. They were both
excellent pioneers of discovery, and capable of ascertaining the latitude by
observations of the heavenly bodies; and also to compute, to a certain degree of
accuracy, the longitudes of the various places which they visited: and even this is
no trifling advantage to geography, though it has but too commonly been neglected
by travellers. By a strict attention to these points, by comparing them with the
courses and distances travelled, and by Captain Clapperton’s frequent endeavours
to verify the estimated results by lunar observations (though not much to be
depended on by one observer, on shore), we may now be pretty well assured of
the actual and relative positions of many places, which have hitherto been wholly
dislocated and scattered at random on our best maps of Africa,—all of them bad
enough,—and the situation of cities and towns have also been ascertained, whose
names even had never before reached us.
The only traveller of the party, who was supposed to possess a competent
knowledge of natural history, was Doctor Oudney; and he was unfortunately
disabled from the pursuit of it by a protracted illness, which terminated in death. As
so little appears in the present volume from the pen of Doctor Oudney, and as
Captain Clapperton has stated (page 5) a wish expressed by that gentleman, a
short time previous to his death, that “his papers should be put into the hands of
Mr. Barrow, or Professor Jameson, provided the request meets with Earl Bathurst’s
approbation,” I feel it necessary to say a few words on this subject. Nothing could
have been more gratifying to me than to have undertaken and executed, to the
best of my power, such a task: it is quite natural that I should have willingly done
so, were it for no other reason than my having been instrumental in his
appointment, from the strongest testimonials in his favour which I had received
from Professor Jameson, whose acquirements in natural history stand so
deservedly high in public estimation, as to entitle any recommendation from him to
immediate attention. Unfortunately, however, for this branch of science, Doctor
Oudney, at a very early stage of their journey, caught a severe cold, which fell on
his lungs, and which rendered him, on their arrival in Bornou, nearly incapable of
any exertion. It will be seen from Major Denham’s Narrative, how frequently and
how seriously, not to say alarmingly, ill, he became from the first moment of their
arrival in Bornou. In a letter addressed to Mr. Wilmot Horton, of the date of the 12th
September, 1823, Doctor Oudney says, “I send you a simple itinerary from Fezzan
here; that to the river Shary, and the borders of Soudan, and my remarks on
Bornou, I must leave till another time. I cannot write long; one day’s labour in that
way makes me ill for a week.”
No account of these journeys to the river Shary, and the borders of Soudan,
appear among his papers; nor any materials respecting them, beyond what are
contained in a very general account of the proceedings of the Mission, in an official
letter addressed to the Secretary of State. The papers, delivered to me by Captain
Clapperton, consisted of an account of an excursion, jointly performed by these
gentlemen, from Mourzuk to Ghraat, the first town in the Tuarick country:—some
remarks on the journey across the Great Desert, which appear not to have been
written out fair:—and the rest, of mere scraps of vocabularies, rude sketches of the
human face, detached and incomplete registers of the state of the temperature,
and a number of letters to and from the Consul at Tripoli, respecting the pecuniary
and other affairs of the mission, wholly uninteresting, and of which no use
whatever could be made.
The Journey to Ghraat above mentioned, I have caused to be printed at the
end of the Introductory Chapter, with which it appears to be partly connected,
omitting some trifling details, of no interest whatever; and I requested Major
Denham to add a few foot-notes, chiefly geological, to his own Journal across the
Great Desert. It seems to have been well known to the party that Doctor Oudney
could not possibly survive the journey into Soudan; and, indeed, he was well
aware of it himself; but his zeal to accomplish all that could be done, would not
suffer him to remain behind. It was that zeal which led him to undertake the
journey to Ghraat, which not a little increased his disorder; for, to say the truth, he
evidently was labouring, while in England, under a pectoral complaint; but when I
told him so, and strongly advised him not to think of proceeding (as I had before
done to his unfortunate predecessor Ritchie), he, like the latter, persisted that,
being a medical man, he best knew his own constitution, and that a warm climate
would best agree with it. Neither of them, however, seem to have calculated on the
degree of fatigue, and the sudden changes of temperature, to which they were
necessarily to be exposed.
With every disadvantage of collecting, preserving, and bringing home from so
great a distance, and over so dreary a desert of twelve hundred miles, specimens
of natural history, it will be seen, by reference to the Appendix, that this department
of science has not been neglected.
JOHN BARROW.
JOURNAL

OF

AN EXCURSION,
ETC. ETC.
SECTION I.
FROM KOUKA TO MURMUR, WHERE DR. OUDNEY DIED.

From our first arrival in Bornou, we intended to avail ourselves of


the earliest opportunity of exploring Soudan. Our preparations being
at length completed, and the sheikh having consented to our
departure, although with some degree of reluctance, Dr. Oudney,
notwithstanding the infirm state of his health, and myself, were ready
to set out on the 14th December, 1823. Accordingly we sent off our
camels and servants in the morning, and went in person to take
leave of the sheikh. On this occasion we found him in an inner
apartment, attended by two or three servants only. He asked us, as
he had often done before, if, in the course of our travels, we
proposed going to Nyffee. We answered, yes, if the road was open.
He replied, it was a great distance; and he feared we were not likely
to return to Kouka. We told him we hoped to return, if possible,
before the rains set in; but however that might be, we assured him
we should ever retain a grateful sense of his exceeding great
kindness towards us. He bade us farewell in the most affectionate
manner. About noon we left the town, accompanied by our comrade,
Major Denham, and most of the principal inhabitants. Even Hadje Ali
Boo Khaloom, with whom we had frequent occasion to be
dissatisfied, joined the train: they attended us to the distance of four
or five miles, and then took leave; our friend, the cadi Hadje
Mohamed Zy Abedeen, having first repeated the Fatha, or first
chapter of the Koran. We halted at the village of Fuguboo Thorio,
where our servants had pitched our tents, being distant from Kouka
about ten miles.
Our party consisted of Dr. Oudney and myself, two servants,
Jacob the Jew, a sort of major domo, and three men of Fezzan. We
had three saddle horses, and four sumpter camels; the servants,
except Jacob, were on foot. There were also in the kafila (commonly
pronounced goffle) twenty-seven Arab merchants, two of whom were
shreefs, or descendants of the Prophet, one from Tunis, the other
from Houn, near Sockna, and about fifty natives of Bornou. The
Arabs were mostly mounted on horses, which they intended for sale;
some having besides a led horse. The Bornouese were on foot; one
of them, a hadje or Mahometan pilgrim, who had visited Mecca,
would on no account stay behind at Kouka, but persisted in
accompanying us, for the express purpose of having his hand
regularly dressed by Dr. Oudney: he had been wounded by the
accidental bursting of a gun; he invariably pitched his tent close to
that of the Doctor, whom he always regarded with the utmost
respect.
Dec. 15.—We started at seven o’clock. The road was the same
we had travelled on a former visit to Old Birnee. We were no longer
annoyed with the noise and confusion in pitching the tents, or with
the clamours of obstreperous camel drivers; which we had formerly
experienced when under the guidance of Boo Khaloom. The weather
too was clear, cool, and pleasant. A little after mid-day we halted at
the wells of Budjoo; distance, north-west by north, seventeen miles.
Dec. 16.—We met several kafilas from Gubsharee and the
surrounding country, going to Kouka. Their heavy goods were
carried on bullocks; the smaller packages, weighing from twenty to
thirty pounds, were borne on men’s heads. The bearers poise their
burdens with much dexterity and ease to themselves, by cords
hanging from the sides of the packages, which are carried
lengthwise on the head; by this simple contrivance they avoid the
fatiguing posture of keeping the arm raised. We halted about three
o’clock in the afternoon.
We still pursued the Old Birnee road: we saw several of the large
red and white antelopes, called by the Arabs mohur. We encamped
on the margin of one of the lakes, formed by the overflowing of the
Yow; the river was only about a quarter of a mile distant from us, to
the north. It had now fallen fully six feet, and its current might be
about three miles an hour.
Dec. 18.—We travelled along the banks of a chain of small lakes
formed by the Yow, once, perhaps, its original channel. I observed,
by the roadside, the tracks of various wild animals,—among others
of the hippopotamus and lion. We passed one of the country fairs,
held on a small hill, near the ruins of a large town which had been
destroyed by the Felatahs. We halted at Damasak, near an
encampment of the sheikh’s cowherds; who, on hearing that we
were in the kafila, brought us an abundant supply of milk.
Dec. 19.—As the low grounds from Damasak to Mugabee, about
ten miles distant, were inundated, we were obliged to make a long
circuit by an upper road, frequently wading across hollows filled with
water. At noon we had to halt on the banks of one of those
temporary rivers which are formed during the wet season: it still
contained a considerable body of water, which was running at the
rate of about two miles an hour. We met here several kafilas of
loaded bullocks, on their way from Gubsharee and Soudan. The
people were busily floating their goods over the river on rafts, made
of bundles of reeds; but there being too few in number to transport
our baggage, it was necessary to make new rafts for ourselves. We
therefore pitched our tents; and one man was sent by each of the
Arab merchants to cut long reeds, which are readily made into rafts,
by lashing bundles of them across two long poles.
I proceeded two or three miles up the banks of the river, which
last summer did not contain a drop of water. The lower road certainly
exhibited the appearance of being overflowed during the rains; but
nobody, from merely seeing it in that state, could suppose that for
nearly one half of the year it is a broad sheet of water, or that the
upper road itself is traversed, for the same period, by several large
streams falling into the Yow. The ferry-dues, paid to the people who
swim over with the rafts, are a rotal for every camel load of goods:
the rotal is now merely nominal, and represents a pound of copper,
eight or ten of which are equivalent to a Spanish dollar. The bullocks,
horses, and camels, are made to swim over, together with the negro
slaves.
Dec. 20.—Hitherto the atmosphere had been clear and serene,
but to-day it became hazy, and was particularly cold about day-
break. Hadje Ali, the invalid alluded to, having a very large raft, we
ferried over our baggage upon it without the smallest accident, by
means of a rope fastened to each end. It was far otherwise with the
Arabs a little lower down the river; there was nothing but hubbub and
bustle among them: many, through ignorance or obstinacy, had their
goods much damaged. The greatest difficulty was with the camels
and female slaves; the women screamed and squalled with great
vehemence; several of the men seemed almost in as great a panic
as the ladies, especially those of Fezzan, none of whom could swim;
and some of them jumped off the raft into the water three or four
times, before they could muster courage to cross. The camels
occasioned a great deal of trouble, one man having to swim before
with the halter in his teeth, while another kept beating the animal
behind with a stick, which every now and then attempted to turn
back, or bobbed its head under water. Before all had crossed, it was
too late to continue our journey that day; we therefore encamped on
the west bank for the night.
Dec. 21.—We still travelled along the upper grounds, on account
of the extent of the inundation. Yet the earth itself was so dry, that we
were put in some slight danger by a kafila, near Old Birnee,
carelessly setting the grass on fire in the course of the night: the fire
advanced rapidly, like a sea of flame, and must have put us all to
flight had we not had the good fortune to obtain shelter within the
ruined walls of the city, which checked a little the progress of the
conflagration. We did not halt, however, but continued our route to a
town called Bera, on the banks of a beautiful lake, likewise formed
by the overflowing of the Yow. Immediately there was quite a fair in
our camp, the townswomen coming with gussule or Guinea corn,
bean straw, cashew nuts, and milk; which they offered in exchange
for glass beads and gubga, or native cloth. The beads in greatest
request are pretty large, of a chocolate colour, with a small spiral
white ring round the middle, and are called by the natives
conteembalee, or Muckni; the latter appellation is derived from a
sultan of Fezzan of that name, who was originally a merchant, and
first brought these beads into fashion. A single bead exchanged for a
quart of Guinea corn. The gubga is narrow cotton cloth, of native
manufacture, about a palm in width; forty fathoms of which are
usually valued at a dollar. The value of commodities in barter seems
to be maintained with a certain stability, somewhat like the money
rate of exchange in Europe, by fixing a local standard price for those
articles in greatest demand, in lieu of the fictitious par of exchange,
which, with us, powerfully influences and indirectly regulates all
money transactions.
Dec. 22.—We crossed over a neck of land formed by a bend of
the river to a town called Dugamoo, where we halted. The banks of
the river are every where studded with towns and villages.
Dec. 23.—The morning was cold. Dr. Oudney had been very
unwell during the night, and felt himself extremely weak. At eight
o’clock we left Dugamoo, and, following a winding path, nearly due
west, we reached Deltago, having passed a number of towns and
villages, one of which, called Kukabonee, was of considerable size,
and contained perhaps 5000 or 6000 inhabitants. The country to the
west of Old Birnee rises in gentle undulations of hill and dale. There
are very few trees, except on the banks of the Yow. The soil is chiefly
a red clay. The inhabitants raise great quantities of Guinea corn, and
beans something like calavances. We had a very plentiful market.
The people here preferred coral, and the beads called
conteembalee, in exchange for grain, &c. to native cloth. Gunpowder
was much sought after as a medicine. To-day we gave a sheep as a
boozafer or gift, by way of footing, which all pay who travel this way
for the first time; a practice akin to our usage on doubling capes, or
crossing the tropics and line. Cotton seed bruised is very much used
for feeding sheep, bullocks, asses, and camels. These animals soon
become extremely fond of it: it is an excellent food for fattening them.
In the evening gussule was sent for our horses and camels, as had
been done in the other towns: we passed as soon as the people
learned we were the friends of the sheikh.
Dec. 24.—Dr. Oudney felt himself much better. We halted to-day,
on account of one of the merchants’ camels falling lame; the owner
was obliged to send to Dugamor to buy another. The kafila kept a
grand boozafer day, and all merchant new-comers paid a dollar
apiece, or gave its value in goods.—Time is to these people of no
importance: whatever accidental occurrence takes place to detain
them, they bear the delay with perfect indifference.
Dec. 25.—The weather clear and cool. We left Deltago, and,
winding along the banks of the river, or occasionally cutting off a
bend by a cross path, we reached Bedeekarfee. There is more wood
here than we had yet seen, and the soil is still a strong red clay.
Villages and towns are numerous; the inhabitants principally belong
to the Alluanee tribe of Shouah Arabs. The town of Bedeekarfee is
large and populous. The governor, commonly called in this and other
African towns Sultan, although holding a subordinate command, had
seen us when we were on the expedition to Munga with the sheikh of
Bornou. On our arrival he came out to meet us, and gave us a very
cordial reception. He was an elderly man, much afflicted with a
urinary disorder, for which he consulted Dr. Oudney. His dwelling,
large, extremely clean, and constructed after the manner of the
country, consisted of a spacious quadrangular enclosure,
surrounded with mats fixed to high poles, within which were several
small round huts, also of matting, with thatched conical roofs, each
surmounted by an ostrich egg. In outward appearance, these huts
somewhat resemble our bee-hives. Their walls are frequently made
of clay. The ostrich egg is a distinctive mark of the occupant being a
man of rank. The floor inside is covered with sand; and the only
furniture is a bench to supply the place of a bedstead, and a few
mats for squatting upon, besides some carved or coloured gourds
and wide-mouthed earthen jars, piled above one another, and
intended to combine ornament with utility. There is but one opening
or door-way, which is round at the top, and closed by a wicket. The
door always faces to the west, on account of the prevailing rains
coming from the opposite quarter. The grand entrance of the
enclosure is often a hut erected at the western side of the square,
with an open thoroughfare, where a black slave officiates as porter.
Each separate hut is called a coozee.
The Arab women of this place are really beautiful; they wear their
hair differently from their countrywomen elsewhere: the fashion of it
is such, that at a distance it might be mistaken for a helmet,—a large
braid on the crown having some semblance to a crest, and the side
tresses being neatly plaited and frizzled out at the ends. There are
also many women of Bornou among them, who imitate the same
style.
Guinea fowls abound in this part of the country: I went out after
we halted, and shot five of them, besides a wild duck and a quail.
Mohamoud El Wordee, one of two Fezzanee merchants, to whom
we were particularly recommended by the sheikh of Bornou, and
who had always appeared to me to be a man of strong natural
sense, was thrown into a sad fright by losing a charm or amulet off
his horse’s neck, with a number of which almost all are equipped.
This charm is nothing more than a short sentence from the Koran.
Had he lost an only child he could scarcely have been more afflicted.
I gave him a scrap of paper to make another, which Hadje promised
to write out for him.
Dec. 26.—This morning after sunrise, Fahrenheit’s thermometer
stood at 49°. The merchants were busily employed firing off their
guns and putting them in order for the Bedites, an ancient race of
native Bornouese, who have not embraced Islamism, and who
occupy an adjoining territory, chiefly protected by its natural
fastnesses. They are held both in dread and abhorrence by all the
faithful. Every thing being ready at eleven o’clock, we broke up our
encampment. Our kafila was now of an immense size. We had been
joined at Bedeekarfee by 500 people at least, who were waiting
there for an Arab kafila to pass through the Bedee country; for all
Arabs are esteemed by the natives here extremely formidable, as
well from the possession of fire arms, as from their national
intrepidity. Their muskets, however, in comparison of those of
Europe, are of the meanest quality; and so uncertain in their fire, that
they are hardly worth more than their weight as old iron. The
courage, too, of most of these Arabs is very questionable. When
successful they are overbearing and cruel in the extreme, and in bad
fortune are in like degree servile and abject.
The natives of Haussa carry their merchandise on the head, and
go armed with bows and arrows. Those of Bornou convey their
goods chiefly on asses and bullocks, and are armed with spears.
The Haussa merchants deal in tobacco, Goora nuts, Koghelor or
crude antimony, cotton cloth in the web, or made into dresses called
tobes and turkadees, and tanned goat skins. Goora nuts are the
produce of Ashantee and other parts near the west, and are chewed
by all people of consequence, on account of their agreeable bitter
taste, not unlike that of strong coffee, and the supposed virtue of
curing impotency. They are even in great esteem as far as Fezzan
and Tripoli, where they bring the exorbitant price of two dollars a
score. Crude antimony in powder is applied by both sexes to the
eye-lashes, to render them dark and glossy. Native cloth, or gubga,
as before mentioned, is extremely narrow, seldom more than four
inches in width. The tobe is a large shirt with loose hanging sleeves
like a waggoner’s frock, generally of a dark blue colour, and is an
indispensable part of male attire throughout central Africa. The
turkadees are articles of female dress, commonly of blue cotton
cloth, about three yards and a half long and one broad. Sometimes
they are made of alternate stripes of blue and white (of the breadth
of African cloth), or are all white, according to fancy. Women of better
circumstances commonly wear two turkadees, one round the waist,
and another thrown over the shoulders. These articles are bartered
in Bornou for trona or natron, common salt and beads; which,
together with coarse tobes, are also carried by Bornouese
adventurers to Haussa. Our road lay over an elevated clayey plain,
with low trees, most of them mimosas. We passed the ruins of
several towns, and such of our travelling companions as were best
acquainted with the country informed us it was well peopled before
the Felatah invasion. At sunset we halted, being already in the
Bedee country.
Dec. 27.—The temperature this morning was remarkably low, and
the water in our shallow vessels was crusted with thin flakes of ice.
The water skins themselves were frozen as hard as a board[65].
These water skins, by the way, are goat skins, well tanned and
seasoned, stripped from the carcass over the animal’s head. They
are extremely convenient on a tedious journey over arid wastes and
deserts. The horses and camels stood shivering with cold, and
appeared to suffer much more than ourselves. The wind during the
night was, as usual, from the north, and north-north-west. Dr.
Oudney was extremely ill, having become much worse from catching
a severe cold. We now travelled south-south-west, over a country of
much the same kind of soil as that above described. As we
approached the low grounds it was better wooded, and the trees
were of greater size and variety. Of these, the most remarkable were
the kuka and the goorjee.
The kuka is of immense size, erect and majestic; sometimes
measuring from twenty to twenty-five feet in circumference. The
trunk and branches taper off to a point, and are incrusted with a soft,
glossy, copper-coloured rind, not unlike a gummy exudation. The
porous spongy trunk is straight, but the branches are twisted and
tortuous. The leaves are small, somewhat like the young ash, but
more pulpy, and growing in clusters from the extremities of the lesser
twigs. The tree is in full leaf and blossom during the rainy months of
June, July, and August. The flowers are white, large, and pendulous,
somewhat resembling the white garden lily. The fruit hangs by a long
stalk, and is of an oval shape, generally larger than a cocoa nut, with
a hard shell full of a powdery matter, intermixed with reddish strings
and tamarind-like seeds. In its unripe state it is of a beautiful velvety
dark green colour, and becomes brown as it approaches maturity.
The tree, whether bare of its leaves, in flower, or in full bearing, has
a singularly grotesque naked appearance; and, with its fruit dangling
from the boughs like silken purses, might, in the imagination of some
Eastern story-teller, well embellish an enchanted garden of the
Genius of the Lamp. The leaves are carefully gathered by the
natives, dried in the sun, and used for many culinary purposes.
Boiled in water they form a kind of clammy jelly, giving a gelatinous
consistence to the sauces and gravies in most common use. I have
also eaten them boiled with dried meat, according to the custom of
the country, but did not much relish such fare. Both leaves and fruit
are considered, to a certain degree, medicinal. The leaves, mixed
with trona and gussub, are given to horses and camels, both for the
purpose of fattening these animals, and as a cooling aperient: they
are administered to the former in balls, and to the latter as a drench.
The white mealy part of the fruit is very pleasant to the taste, and
forms, with water, an agreeable acidulous beverage; which the
natives, whose libidinous propensities incline them to such remarks,
allege to possess the virtue of relieving impotency.
The goorjee tree much resembles a stunted oak, with a beautiful
dark red flower, when in full blow rather like a tulip. The natives make
use of the flower to assist in giving a red tinge to the mouth and
teeth, as well as in seasoning their food. These two trees are
generally found on a strong clayey soil, and are peculiar to Haussa
and the western parts of Bornou.
At noon, we came in sight of a lake called Tumbum, apparently
formed by some river in the rainy season. All the country to the
southward and westward, as far as the eye could reach, was a
dismal swamp. Just as we arrived within a short distance of the lake,
—at the very spot in which of all others the Arabs said we were most
likely to encounter the Bedites,—two men made their appearance.
They were dressed in the Bornouese costume; a loose tobe and
drawers, with a tight cap, all of blue cotton cloth. Each carried on his
shoulder a bundle of light spears, headed with iron. I was a little way
in front of our party, and first met them; they saluted me very civilly,
and I passed on without further notice, when the other horsemen
meeting them, and putting some questions, which the strangers did
not answer to their satisfaction, immediately seized, stripped, and
bound them. Considering it a matter in which I had no authority to
interfere, I merely requested that their drawers might be returned to
them, remarking, it was better not to treat them ill, as they might
prove to be honest men. “Oh! d——n their fathers,” (the strongest
imprecation in Africa), replied the captors, “they are thieves; what
would they be doing here if they were honest men?” I still urged the
propriety of taking them to Bedeguna, at least, to afford them a
chance of being recognised by the townspeople, before treating
them as robbers. I now rode off to water my horse; when I returned, I
found the magnanimous El Wordee guarding the two unfortunate
wretches, one of whom was a Shouah Arab, and the other a Negro.
The latter, while I was absent, had received a dreadful cut under the
left ear from a Bornouese, who pretended that the Negro had
attempted to escape; an attempt little likely in his desperate situation.
Notwithstanding the wound, they were leading the poor fellow by a
rope fastened round his neck. He was covered with blood, and Dr.
Oudney assured me, if the wound had been a little lower down it
must have caused instant death. I could not refrain from beating the
merciless Bornouese; and I obliged him to use his own tobe in
binding up the wound, at the same time threatening to lodge the
contents of my gun in his head, if he repeated his cruelty. The
occasion prompted me to impress on the minds of the Arabs
generally how unworthy it was of brave men to behave with cruelty to
their prisoners, and to suggest, that it would be far better to sell
them, or even to put them to death, than wantonly to inflict such
barbarities. The Arabs threw the blame on the Bornouese, and
although evidently exulting in secret over their captives, they were
fairly shamed into good behaviour, and promised to liberate the men
if innocent, or, if guilty, to surrender them to justice at Bedeguna.
Our road skirted the border of the great swamp, and we arrived at
Bedeguna at sunset. The galadema, literally “gate-keeper,” or
governor, was a Felatah, and a particular friend of Mohamoud El
Wordee, by whom we were introduced to him. He was tall and
slender, with a high arched nose, broad forehead, and large eyes;
and, indeed, altogether as fine a looking black man as I had ever
seen. His behaviour, too, was at once kind and dignified. Besides his
native language, he spoke with fluency Arabic, and the tongues of
Bornou and Haussa. He asked us a great many questions about
England, of which he had heard; and said his master, the Sultan of
the Felatahs, would be glad to see us. He applied to Dr. Oudney for
medicines, on account of a urinary obstruction, a disease very
prevalent in this country. We made him a present of a small paper
snuff-box full of cloves; he sent us, in return, a plentiful supply of
milk.
The territory of Bedeguna, or little Bede, formerly belonged to
Bornou. The inhabitants are Bornouese, and speak their native
language. The territory includes many towns and villages, and
produces much gussub, Indian corn, wheat, and cotton. Herds of
cattle are also numerous. The principal implement of agriculture is a
hoe made of native iron, of their own manufacture. They reap with a
crooked knife, and merely cut off the ears of corn, which they store in
round thatched huts of clay, or matting, raised on wooden blocks
from the ground. The grain is cleaned from the husk by hand
rubbing, and ground into flour between two stones. We saw no
plough to the southward of Sockna, a town between Tripoli and
Fezzan. I inquired of the governor about the source of the swollen
river we crossed on a raft between Gateramaran and old Birnee,
which again presented itself close to our present encampment. He
told me it rose in the country of Yacoba, among rocky hills, and,
running to the eastward of old Birnee, soon afterwards entered the
Yow. On questioning him further about Yacoba, the name of the
country, he said it was the sultan’s name; for the people were
infidels, and had no name for their own country. The river, he added,
was distinguished by the appellation of the Little River, and in these
parts did not dry up throughout the whole year.
The country to the south-east and south-west appears to be an
entire swamp, overflowed of course in the rainy season. Felatahs are
in features, and in the manner of wearing the turban, very like the
inhabitants of Tetuan in Morocco. They are here much esteemed by
the people whom they rule for the impartial administration of justice,
and were uniformly kind and civil to us. Our two prisoners happened
to be well known, having only left the town that morning. They were
accordingly liberated, but their clothes were not restored.
We were not a little indebted to the Arab merchants for the good
name they gave us. They almost looked upon us as of their own
nation; and although Kafirs, we, as Englishmen, were allowed to
rank at least next to themselves. I really believe they would have
risked their lives in our defence. Travelling in a kafila was much more
pleasant than any mode we had hitherto tried; all being ready to
oblige one another, and all vying in attention to us. The lake
Zumbrum is about twelve miles south-south-west from Bedeguna.
Dec. 28.—At sunrise to-day the thermometer was at 45°. Our new
friend, the governor, accompanied us two or three miles out of town.
At parting he prayed God to bless us; and, laying his hand on his
forehead, said he hoped we should ever continue friends. The road
at first followed the borders of the marsh, by the side of the Little
River, which suddenly breaks off to the southward, at a town called
Goobeer. There we filled our goat skins with water. We continued our
course, and shortly came to a strong red clay soil, densely covered
with grass so long that it actually overtopped our heads, although on
horseback. At sunset we halted in the woods for the night. The
horses and beasts of burden were last watered, when we filled our
water skins. Dr. Oudney was attacked with ague, but luckily the
evening proved very mild. For two or three nights past he has had a
fire in his tent, which seemed to abate the violence of his cough. This
evening, addressing me with resigned composure, he said, “I feel it
is all over with me. I once hoped to conduct the mission to a
successful termination, but that hope has vanished. Whenever my
death takes place, I wish my papers to be put into the hands of Mr.
Barrow, or Professor Jameson, provided the request meets with Earl
Bathurst’s approbation.” As this was a painful subject, I did not
encourage its renewal, and, according to this solemn injunction of
my lamented friend, I have delivered all his papers to Mr. Barrow.
Dec. 29.—After toiling two hours through a thickly wooded
country, we came in view of a large plain, with numerous towns and
villages. We found the towns by no means so neat as in Bornou, the
coozees, or huts, being much smaller, and often in bad repair. The
people raise great quantities of grain, principally gussub. We saw
five ostriches, which made off from us with great speed. Dr. Oudney
was a great deal better. In the afternoon we arrived at Sansan. Our
horsemen skirmished a little in front of the caravan before entering
the town, and then galloped up in pairs to the governor’s door, firing
off their muskets. This is the common compliment paid by kafilas in
such cases. The governor was absent on an expedition, headed by
the governor of Katagum, against the Bedites, who are in the
immediate neighbourhood. As before observed, the Bedites have
never received the doctrines of Mahomet; and, although speaking
the language of Bornou, and acknowledging a kind of nominal
sovereignty of the Bornouese sultan, they are every where regarded
as a race of outlaws, whom it is incumbent on every good
Mussulman, Bornouese, or Felatah, to enslave or murder. This race
is said to have no religion; but their common practice of first holding
up to heaven the carcass of any animal, killed for food, belies their
being atheists—a reproach attributed to them solely by their
enemies. On the contrary, it harmonizes with those universal feelings
of reverence and awe for a Supreme Being, which have ever existed
among all nations, and in all ages. The favourite food of this
persecuted tribe is said to be dogs, which they fatten for the
purpose. Their country is of small extent, defended by impenetrable
morasses and forests, by which alone they preserve a precarious
and dangerous independence.
At Sansan we were waited upon by the principal native
inhabitants, and the resident Arabs. Among the Arabs there was a
cousin of the sheikh of Bornou, Hadje El Min El Hanem. The reports
of our travelling companions, the merchants, contributed very much
to exalt our character wherever we went.
Dec. 30.—At noon I found the latitude of our encampment to be
12° 20′ 48″ north by meridian alt. of lower limb of sun. Sansan in
Arabic signifies “the gathering,” where the scattered parties of an
army assemble previous to an expedition. The town had its name
from a late sultan of Bornou, making it the rendezvous of his army
when he went to conquer Haussa. The place where he pitched his
tent is still held in great veneration, and the buildings around it were
first erected by his army. The neighbouring district also abounds in
towns and villages, which, together with Bedeguna and Sansan, are
under the governor of Katagum, who is himself subordinate to the
governor of Kano. Sansan is formed of three distinct towns, called
Sansan Birnee, Sidi Boori, and Sansan Bana. The principal one, in
which the governor resides, is Sansan Birnee, or Sansan Gora,
signifying “the walled,” from a low clay wall in ruins, surrounded by a
dry ditch almost filled up. The mosque is without a roof, and the huts
and houses of the inhabitants are old and dilapidated. Sidi Boori,
another of the three towns, having a signification so indecent that I
must forbear to translate it, is about half a mile west of Sansan
Birnee, and inhabited by Shauah Arabs. The third town, called
Sansan Bana, or, “of the banners,” where the sultan’s tent stood, is
about a mile distant from Sansan Birnee, and is inhabited by
Bornouese, who are here in great numbers, and were first brought
by force from Old Birnee, and other towns of Bornou. At present they
are quite reconciled to the change, and now remain from choice.
The sister of the sultan of Bornou, having been made captive by
the Felatahs, was living here with her husband in great obscurity,
although her brother, the sultan, is surrounded by all the barbaric

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