Hungarian affairs of the US-Office of Strategic Services in the

Mediterranean Theater of Operations from June 1944 until

September 1945

Masterarbeit/Master Thesis

Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Master of Arts

an der Karl-Franzens Universität Graz

vorgelegt von Duncan BARE B.A.

am Institut für Geschichte

Begutachter: Ao.Univ.-Prof.i.R. Mag. Dr. phil. Siegfried Beer

Graz 2015
Before beginning, the author would like to thank the following for their help and support,
without which this work would not exist. My mentor, Siegfried Beer, who I can 'thank' for
opening the Pandora's box that is Intelligence Studies for me, his maverick approach to
traditional academia, as well as his prodding to always achieve more, go the extra mile and to
work beyond the best of one's own ability, regardless of reception or outcome. From academia
(in alphabetical order) Margit Balogh, András Forgó, Gabriele Haug-Moritz, Harald Heppner,
Gellért Kovács, Imre Okváth, Ludolf Pelizaeus, Zoltán őerecz and Nóra Szekér. Special thanks
to Michael G. Aradi, Dr. [Thomas] Domokos Hadnagy, Prof. Wendy L. Brown and the
Takács/Pendergast family for invaluable insights into the personal lives of major figures in the
work who were to them known as fathers, grandfathers and relatives, as opposed to agents and
case officers. From the National Archives in College Park, Paul Brown, Robin Cookson,
William Cunliffe and Amy Schmidt. My parents, Dorothy and Alex, and brothers Malcolm and
Alex and sister Camille for their love and support. My father Scott, for instilling in me a love
of academia.
Contents
1.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 State of Research ....................................................................................................................... 1
1.3 Comment on Sources................................................................................................................. 2
1.4 Chapter Structure ....................................................................................................................... 3
1.5 Style ........................................................................................................................................... 3
2.1 Hungary 1944-1947 ........................................................................................................................... 4
2.2 Occupation................................................................................................................................. 4
2.3 The German Question................................................................................................................ 5
2.4 Post-Occupation ........................................................................................................................ 8
2.5 Exit ............................................................................................................................................ 9
2.6 October 16th and Aftermath ..................................................................................................... 10
2.7 The Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom (MFM) ....................................................................... 11
2.8 The Provisional National Assembly, Government and Allied Control Commission .............. 18
2.9 November Elections ................................................................................................................ 20
2.10 Hungarian Security and Intelligence Services ....................................................................... 22
2.11 The Catholic Church.............................................................................................................. 26
2.12 Conclusion Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................ 33
3.1 American Intelligence Services: Overview of the OSS................................................................... 33
3.2 X-2 & SI .................................................................................................................................. 36
3.3 OSS MedTO ............................................................................................................................ 39
3.4 SICE & the Hungarian Desk ................................................................................................... 41
3.5 X-2 MedTO/SCI Unit Z .......................................................................................................... 46
3.6 OSS Austria ............................................................................................................................. 51
3.7 SSU.......................................................................................................................................... 53
3.8 SSU Austria/Italy .................................................................................................................... 54
3.9 X-2 Balkans/SCI/Z Venice ...................................................................................................... 56
3.10 Conclusion Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................ 58
4.1 Case Studies .................................................................................................................................... 59
4.2 The Roman Colony Hungarians .............................................................................................. 59
4.3 Bowery/Dallam and Luttor ...................................................................................................... 70
4.4 Delegations from Hungary - General Náday ........................................................................... 81
4.5 The Soós-Hadnagy Mission .................................................................................................... 85
4.6 The Háry Mission .................................................................................................................... 88
4.7 The Budapest City Unit ........................................................................................................... 89
4.8 Return to Rome on to Austria/Conclusion Chapter 4 .............................................................. 94
5.1 Conclusion: The End of the Beginning ........................................................................................... 99
6.1 Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 103
I. Primary Sources ........................................................................................................................... 103
Archival Materials ....................................................................................................................... 103
Interviews .................................................................................................................................... 104
Collections ................................................................................................................................... 104
Official Histories ......................................................................................................................... 104
II. Secondary Sources ...................................................................................................................... 104
Monographs................................................................................................................................. 104
Collections/Multiple Authors....................................................................................................... 106
Journal Articles, Book Reviews and Working Papers ................................................................. 108
Digital Sources, Varia ................................................................................................................. 109
1.1 Introduction
The activities of Hungarians in the service of American intelligence organizations during and
after the Second World War can by and large be traced to one major event, the liberation of
Rome. Rome was the first major European and formerly Axis capital to be liberated by the
western Allies and as the center of Mussolini's government an important political and
diplomatic center while owing to the Vatican, a religious hub of Europe. The activities of the
Hungarians encountered, recruited and directed from Rome (and liberated Italy) represent a
significant proportion of the American activities against and into Hungary during the final year
of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War. The distinct shift seen in those
attempts launched before June of 1944 and those after is connected primarily with the groups
within Hungary involved and the locations where contact and planning were effected for the
attempts. Prior to June of 1944, these arose in neutral capitals where Axis intelligence was as
free to operate as their Allied opponents.

1.2 State of Research

Topically, this thesis combines several aspects of Hungarian history with an overview of
American intelligence history. Regarding Hungarian historiography in general, the period from
1944 until 1947 is one marked by research of several key components all of which have an
influence on, but do not devote their energies fully to the content of the study to be put forward
in this work. The preferences and tendencies among researchers towards the period from 1944
until 1947 (both Hungarian and international) can be organized into three categories: a.) The
German occupation of Hungary (October 16th 1944) coupled with the installation of the
Nyilaskeresztes Párt (Arrow-Cross Party) and the ensuing siege of Budapest. b.) The Soviet
occupation of the country as well as the activities of the Soviet dominated Allied Control
Commission (ACC) for Hungary and c.) the coalition government of the Small-Holders,
Socialists, and Communists (among others) from 1945 until 1947 headed from 1945-1946 by
Zoltán Tildy. Despite this thesis' adherence to as strict a timeframe as possible, developments
and trends are presented in their organic context, irrespective of this work's own self-imposed
limitations. Along similar lines, American intelligence history, particularly that of the OSS, is
traditionally presented within its wartime context only, with most research coming to an abrupt
stop in May of 1945, with minimal attention paid to the events between May of 1945 and the
establishment of the CIA in September of 1947. While there exist an over-abundance of studies
on the wartime OSS, there is not a single (published and comprehensive) work concerned with
the OSS' successor organizations, the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) or Central Intelligence

1
Group (CIG).1 To this author's knowledge, a definitive study of American intelligence activities
in Hungary and concerning Hungarians in the service of the OSS likewise remains un-
researched, both in Hungarian historiography, and perhaps even more interestingly, in
American intelligence history. Assorted references to individual missions, particularly those
undertaken during the final year of the war are available and will be used, however, following
the cessation of hostilities in May 1945, the amount of secondary source material drops
dramatically, despite very obvious and telling connections with previous events and
personalities. Thus, this work seeks to break new ground in presenting a continuous and con-
joined history of those operations and missions under consideration, not as single and isolated
events, but rather as a continuous narrative.

1.3 Comment on Sources

The source materials for this work are primarily those of the National Archives (II) in College
Park, Maryland. These have been gathered during 5 separate trips to the archives, and reflect
thousands of hours of not only photographing and scanning, but cataloging, indexing and
summarizing reports and documentation. Presently, these documents total more than 12,000
pages, with their accompanying index compromising more than 600 pages. Another important
element of this work is reflections and memoirs composed by personalities directly involved in
the matters under consideration. The trio of István Szent-Miklósy, Domokos Szent-Iványi and
Géza Soós provide a key glimpse into the workings of the Hungarian Independence Movement,
which was the most consistent (Hungarian) partner of the OSS in the Mediterranean following
the 19th of March 1944. Efforts have been made to split secondary source material evenly
between English and Hungarian language publications, however this attempt is not perfect, and
owing to geographic necessity, could not be. As a rule, where (archival) source material can
substitute for second-hand accounts, it is used as frequently as possible, to better provide an
estimation of the sensitivities of the time, and further, to correct minor and sometimes major
inaccuracies in secondary material.
Finally, as a general aside, it must be stated that it is foolhardy to view the activities of
intelligence services within a vacuum. The events depicted within this work reflect the efforts
of the intelligence procurers, analysts and processors and their 'product' as it was presented to

1
Kevin C. Ruffner, of the CIA's History Staff prepared a series of working papers concerned with the postwar
activities of the American intelligence services in Europe. To the author's knowledge, this is the sole work which
comes nearest to detailing the histories of the SSU and CIG (as they pertained to Europe). See Kevin [Ruffner],
Eagle and [Swastika]: CIA and Nazi War Criminals and Collaborators (Draft Working Paper) (Washington DC,
2003). Available at www.foia.cia.gov in numerous pdfs.

2
various 'customers' or agencies interested within the US government. These include(d) apart
from the Executive Office, the War Department (today Department of Defense) the State
Department and the Justice and Treasury Departments, amongst others. These organizations,
not the OSS or its successors determined foreign policy and were responsible for decision-
making. Thus, failures or deficiencies in the actions and efforts of the US Government to act
on such intelligence, or ignorance of the warnings given should not be viewed as failure on the
part of the OSS or its successors.

1.4 Chapter Structure

This work is structured in the following manner. First, an introduction to the topic is provided,
coupled with a short explanation of the chapters to follow. The second chapter will be devoted
entirely to 'setting the stage' politically for the period concerned in Hungary, covering aspects
in a detailed yet understandable manner so as to ease later, more intricate case studies. This
chapter devotes sub-chapters to the Hungarian Independence Movement and its forbearers,
Hungarian Military Intelligence and the Catholic Church in Hungary. The third chapter will do
much the same regarding the intelligence history of the American organizations to be discussed
(OSS and SSU) as well as those branches and commands which are of most importance to this
work. In this chapter, several key American personalities, primarily officers are also introduced,
who are subsequently referred to, thus making this section a sort of personnel register for the
work as a whole. The fourth chapter presents various case studies, arranged more or less
chronologically. These sub-chapters concern the liberation of Rome and the first contacts made
with Hungarians there by the OSS, the Bowery/Dallam mission in October of 1944, the
Hungarian delegations which arrived in Rome in 1944/1945, the Budapest City Unit and finally
a conclusion which functions as a foreword to the formation of two major hotspots for
Hungarian activity in the postwar period, namely Austria and Italy. Finally, the fifth chapter
will provide a general conclusion for the work, while the sixth chapter offers a select
bibliography.

1.5 Style
This work will present so often as possible Hungarian names in their original Hungarian form
(i.e. Ferenc not Franz or Frank, Tamás not Thomas). For American-Hungarians (or Hungarian-
Americans) the form which they used when referring to themselves is provided. The only
exception to these rules is regarding quotations and primary source material (i.e. a report refers
to a third person as ‘Thomas’ as opposed to Tamás). The European dating convention is used
(day/month/year) as is American English (i.e defense not defence). City and place names are

3
referred by their zeitgeistlich or contemporary names (i.e. in Spring 1944, Kassa (Hungarian)
instead of Košice (Slovak)). Place names for small and lesser-known settlements (i.e. not
capitals) are accompanied at first occurrence by a geographic approximation relative to better-
known settlements, and if necessary, the imparting of the name by which they are currently
known (i.e. Újvidék (present day Novi Sad in Serbia, located equidistant from Belgrade and the
Hungarian/Serbian frontier). In certain instances, groups of settlements will be described in a
geographic context via an encompassing footnote.

2.1 Hungary 1944-1947

In this first chapter, the history of Hungary for the period under examination is to be discussed.
Alongside the intricacies of Hungarian politics, resistance and military intelligence during the
era in question, the confessional make-up of the country and the structure of the most populous
Church (Roman Catholic) must be examined in depth owing to the unique political, economic,
and social position that institution occupied within Hungary. This information comes primarily
from secondary sources, and is well researched and readily available in many English language
works.2 This study begins essentially where the author's previous work ended, namely on the
20th of March, 1944, when Hungary was occupied by forces of the Wehrmacht.3

2.2 Occupation
On the 19th of March 1944, German troops advanced into Hungary as Regent Miklós Horthy's
train sat on a rail-siding between Klessheim (in Salzburg) and Vienna.4 The Hungarian leader
would return home to German troops occupying his capital. In the absence of the Regent and
his top ministers, no action had been taken. One Member of Parliament, Endre Bajcsy-
Zsilinszky, of the Smallholders Party, was wounded in a shoot-out with German plain-clothes

2
The following works provide (English language) overviews of the situation in Hungary for the period
concerned; C.A. [MacArtney]'s, [October] Fifteenth: A History of Modern Hungary (1929-1945) Vol. II
(Edinburgh 1957) remains the gold standard as far as political history is concerned (for 1944-1945); Mária
[Palasik], [Chess] game for democracy. Hungary between East and West 1944-1947 (London 2011) and
Hungary in the Age of [Total War] (1938-1948), Nándor [Dreisziger] (Ed.) (New York 1998). Additionally,
despite several errors, both Peter [Kenez], [Hungary] from the Nazis to the Soviets. The establishment of the
Communist regime in Hungary 1944-1948 (New York 2006) and László [Borhi], Hungary in the [Cold War],
1945-1956 (Budapest 2004) are worth consulting.
3
See: Duncan [Bare], 'A Hungarian Show with American assistance': The OSS "[Sparrow]" Mission to detach
Hungary from the Axis in March 1944, Bachelor Thesis (Graz 2013).
4
5. October 1945, State Department Special interrogation Mission, Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer, former German
Minister to Hungary in [N]ational [A]rchives [R]ecord [A]dministration II, [R]ecord [G]roup 59, M[icrofilm]
679, [R]oll 73. For the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht [OKW] report see April 1944, Der Fall "Margarethe"
(Besetzung Ungarns) [Operation Margarethe, Occupation of Hungary] in NARA II, RG 242, [E]ntry T-77, R
1423.

4
inspectors who had come to his home to arrest him; this had been the extent of (armed)
Hungarian resistance to the German occupation. 5 Horthy was pressed to release his Prime
Minister, Miklós Kállay, who was accused of conspiring with the western Allies for a separate
peace for Hungary, according to the Germans.6 The new Prime Minister, chosen nearly a day
before the German ultimatum expired, was a General whose command of the Hungarian
language and general intelligence were considered by several contemporaries to be
questionable.7

2.3 The German Question8

With the (first) German occupation of March 19, 1944, the powers and abilities of the Regent
to administer Hungary became severely restricted and subject to approval from the German
Foreign Office (through Reich-plenipotentiary Edmund Veesenmayer).9 Previously, at least in
theory, Horthy and his Prime Minister were able to exercise autonomy in matters of internal
concern and exert a modicum of influence on those of external concern. The 'theoretical' is a
caveat owing to the permeation of all levels of Hungarian decision-making with pro-German
Hungarians and/or Hungarians of German stock/ethnicity well before any actual Wehrmacht
soldiers stepped foot on Hungarian soil. The single place where this was most obvious (and
visible) was the Hungarian armed forces. From September 1940 until April 1941, the three
highest ranking officers in the Hungarian General Staff were of German ancestry, and it was
rumored, had only a basic knowledge of the Hungarian language. 10 This should come as no
surprise as the majority of officers were of German (sváb) heritage and a large proportion of
senior commanders (and those far enough advanced in age) had served in the Austro-Hungarian

5
Cf. MacArtney, October, 254f.
6
'April 1944, Der Fall "Margarethe" (Besetzung Ungarns) in NARA II, RG 242, E T-77, R 1423.
7
Cf. Translated, but unpublished manuscript of Domokos [Szent-Iványi], The Hungarian [Independence]
Movement (1936–1946) (Published in altered book form, Budapest 2013.), 78. Generously supplied to the author
by Dr. Nóra Szekér.
8
This aspect of 20th Century Hungarian History is one of the most un-reflected upon in English scholarship
concerning Hungary. A recent example of this is an overview of OSS operations into Hungary written by an
undergraduate at West Point Military Academy. The author postulates that the failure of American undertakings
can be attributed to the country's [Hungary's] ‘uniqueness’ (described earlier as attributable to the Hungarian
language and its place in the Finno-Ugric language family). The truth, as we shall see over the course of this
work, is that there is no single cause which can be pointed to as indicative of failure, but rather, that the
complexity of both Hungary and Hungarians is multi-faceted and mercurial. Nevertheless, ties to German culture
and its influence upon Hungary are sorely neglected in English language historiography concerning the country.
See Diane Lembach, Failure to free an enemy: How the dynamics of WWII prevented the success of OSS
operations in Hungary. In: West Point Undergraduate Historical Review 2/1 (2011) 33-48. Available at:
http://www.usma.edu/history/siteassets/sitepages/report%20history%20journal/report%20volume%202.pdf
9
See: Pál [Pritz], Miklós Horthy and Edmund Veesenmayer: [Hungarian-German] Relations after March 1944,
253-266 in: Total War, Dreisziger (Ed.).
10
Cf. Iványi, Independence, 163-166.

5
Army, gaining great admiration for the German armed forces in the process.11 The Hungarian
General Staff is described by one contemporary as a “state within a state.”12 Even Horthy's
'choice' for Prime Minister following the German occupation, General Döme Sztójay (one of
the aforementioned trio of General Staff officers) backfired, when instead of following the
Regent's directives, lent more consideration to Veesenmayer and his cohorts.13 The head of
Hungarian Army Intelligence (VKF-2 or Hungarian General Staff, Section II, Intelligence and
Counter-Intelligence) from August 1943 until March 1944, Colonel Gyula Kádár, remarked in
late 1945 to American Intelligence officers that upon taking the helm of the VKF-2 he "became
acquainted with my staff and found that the majority of them were extremely pro-German and
received me with more than reserve...I also suspected that some of them were rendering services
and information to the Germans and therefore, within the first four or five weeks, I dismissed a
number of high-ranking officers...I also found irregularities in the finance[s] which resulted in
the court-martial [sic] of three officers."14
Such rabid and unfettered Germanophillia galvanized what were non-aligned and often
otherwise antithetic cliques; pro-British, pro-American or even nationalist Hungarians came
ever more to find themselves standing shoulder to shoulder with one another when faced with
what they collectively could view as treason, first and foremost to Hungary, thereafter as
disloyalty to the Regent or even collusion with evil. Thus, Hungarian middle and upper-class
society in March of 1944 was visibly polarized, a process which had been ongoing, arguably,
since the First World War came to a conclusion. Domokos Szent-Iványi, who will be introduced
below writes "anti-German activity was conducted almost as openly as the pro-German one,

11
German-speakers native to Hungary are referred to this day as Swabian (sváb) similarly to the referrence of all
German speakers in Transylvania as Saxons. According to Thomas Spira, about half a million Hungarian citizens
claimed German nationality, making them the largest minority in the otherwise ethnically homogenous
Hungarian 'rump' state. See Thomas [Spira], The [Radicalization] of Hungary's Swabian Minority on the eve of
World War II, 49-60 in: Total War, Dreisziger, (Ed.).
12
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 45.
13
There seems to be confusion concerning General Sztójay and his elevation to the Prime Ministry. According to
Veesenmayer's interrogation report, the day after Horthy's arrival in Budapest on the 21st of March, Sztójay came
to the German legation "sent by Horthy, to ask if the German government would agree to his appointment to
Prime Minister. Veesenmayer telegraphed an inquiry to the Foreign Office, which answered it agreed but would
want to see the list of [illegilble]. Sztojay met with the opposition leaders, made a list and showed it to
Veesenmayer who also proposed [illegible] and suggested [Béla] Jurc[s]ek [an Arrow-Cross politician, who
would serve as Sztójay's Minister of Agriculture]. Horthy concurred." Thus, the notion held that Sztójay was the
German 'pick' appears to be incorrect. The German choice, Béla Imrédy fell through ('hat versagt') according to
the official OKW report on Operation Margarethe, military codename for the occupation of Hungary. For the
Vessenmayer interrogation summary see 5. October 1945, State Department Special interrogation Mission, Dr.
Edmund Veesenmayer, former German Minister to Hungary in NARA II, RG 59, M 679, R 73. For the OKW
report see 'April 1944, Der Fall "Margarethe" (Besetzung Ungarns) in NARA II, RG 242, Entry T-77, R 1423.
14
Cf. 23. April 1946, DH-140 [Peter Klassen] and JJ-1 [James R. Murphy] to AE-2 [Captain Robinson Bellin]
AH-5 [Joseph Curtiss, the head of X-2 Istanbul from June 1944 until the Summer of 1946] and BB-8 [James
Angleton Jr.] Written Statement by Colonel Gyula Kadar, LSX-112 in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, [B]ox 274.

6
and it was not surprising at all that the Germans were, as early as 1941/42, quite well informed
about the underground activities of the government."15
The affinity of Hungarian military men for Germany, while one pitfall of many, provides a great
deal of explanation for the failure of any Hungarian attempt to break away from the Third Reich
conducted within an official or government context. This was not only owing to Nazi Germany's
battlefield prowess; Hitler's commitment to territorial revision struck a deep chord within
Hungary outside of the military as well. Hungary was a 'victim' of the decisions of the Paris
Peace Conference, specifically those presented at the Palais Trianon and in terms of percentage
was punished the most severely of the Central Powers in the aftermath of the First World War.
Even streteching into the 1950’s, affiliation with 'Germanness' even passive, could be used to
prop up any slew of claims or charges against political opponents.16
Intertwining with admiration for the Germans both in military and political frameworks, was
also a deep sense of duty to them, as 'brothers-in-arms' and co-combatants. Whether this was
merely an excuse Horthy (himself a former Vice-Admiral and last Commander-in-Chief of the
Austro-Hungarian Navy) invoked to explain his inaction in the summer of 1944 or truly a
sentiment he held remains to be seen, however, he is documented on more than one occasion
as having had "moral difficulty" tarnishing "Hungary's honor" the way that a premature exit
from the war would.17 Finally, one should not overestimate the strategic reality; even the most
patriotic of Hungarian officers knew well enough the capabilities of the German armed forces
vis-à-vis the inadequacies of their own army. This inferiority complex characteristic of a junior
partner in an alliance also translated across diplomatic and intelligence lines as well. All of
these factors together combined to create the disastrous events of 1944, the unfortunate result
being that almost all American attempts at securing peace with Horthy's government were
betrayed by Hungarians seeking either to curry favor with the Germans or who felt, for one
reason or another, that trespassing against them was inadvisable.18

15
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 85.
16
An example of this is the case of László Rájk (Reich) who despite being one of Mátyás Rákosi's closest allies
and most ruthless lieutenants was arrested, stricken from the Communist party and executed in 1948 in a show
trial. The latest research shows that his German heritage, while not being grounds for his arrest, was at the very
least touched upon during his interrogation and the ensuing media coverage. An additional example is provided
in the case of Cardinal József Mindszenty, the Prince-Primate of Hungary from 1945 until 1973. Mindszenty,
although he identified as being Hungarian had the misfortune of being of sváb stock (family name Phem)
something which enemies in the Nemzeti Paraszt Párt (National Peasant Party or NPP) and Communist Party
made ample usage of. For reference to Rájk see Tony [Sharp], Stalin's [American Spy]. Noel Field, Allen Dulles
& the East European Show Trials (London 2014). For the reference to Mindszenty see Kenez, Hungary, 169.
17
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 316.
18
This is particularly true in the case of the Sparrow Mission, in which either Hungarian Colonels Otto Hátz or
Antal Merkly (or both) denounced the mission to the Germans. See Bare, Sparrow.

7
2.4 Post-Occupation
With the arrival of regular German troops in March, also came large numbers of personnel of
the RSHA (Reichssicherheits Hauptamt or Reich Central Security Authority) an umbrella
organization encompassing all branches of the German police and security forces subordinate
to Heinrich Himmler, its most notable two appendages being the SS (Schutzstaffel) and SD
(Sicherheitsdienst; the intelligence arm of the RSHA). The influx of RSHA officers and
administrators was primarily to facilitate the deportation (and ultimately, murder) of the last
remaining (largely intact) Jewish community in Europe, a great portion of which was
centralized in Budapest.19 Preparations for the deportation were completed within an incredible
six weeks time.20 The deportations were spearheaded by Adolf Eichmann (Commissioner for
Jewish matters, RSHA 4th Directorate, Gestapo), although with a staff of little over 60 at his
disposal, the massive organizational undertaking, which saw more than 400,000 Jews deported
from Hungary within a matter of weeks, was despite any anecdotes concerning German
efficiency or efficacy impossible without readily available help from members of the Hungarian
government, military, police forces and civil service (i.e. railways).21 Hitherto, Jewish life, at
the very least in Budapest, had remained relatively peaceful, compared to that in occupied
Europe. 22 Several influential Jewish families (foremost amongst them, the Weiss family,
owners of the largest Hungarian arms manufacturer) were able to save themselves and shield
the Jewish community in Budapest, however those living in the agrarian north and east of the
country had less protection, as did those non-Hungarian Jews from neighboring countries who
had taken refuge in Hungary.23 Deportations proceeded throughout the summer but in July

19
There were however intelligence and counter-intelligence officers within this group; SD Balkan head,
Wilhelm Hoettl, (RSHA 6th Directorate, SD Ausland) came to Budapest in July 1944. A Gestapo (RSHA 4th
Directorate) office was organized in Budapest in March, under Stürmbahnführer Hugo Goppelt (previously
Vienna) while German military intelligence (Abwehr) had been long represented in Budapest via a liaison officer
(stretching back at least to 1940) but also through the so-called 'Klatt Bureau' (officially Luftmeldekopf Süd). At
least in the case of the SD and Abwehr, this relationship was often strained, not least owing to Klatt's Jewish
background. See 26. January 1946, Saint London to Saint Washington, Richard Klauder (Klatt) in NARA II, RG
226, E 190B, B 30.
20
See: Shlomo [Aronson], Hitler, the Allies and the [Jews] (New York 2004), 153-156.
21
Krisztián Ungváry sets the number of Hungarians who assisted Eichmann either consciously or unconsciously
in deporting Budapest's Jews at "300,000 civil servants, police officers and gendarmes supported by the
Hungarian administration." This number seems to be somewhat inflated, considering that these same 300,000
'only' organized the deportation of 437,000. Whatever the number, it is clear that far more Hungarians organized
or assisted in the organization of the sending of their Jewish compatriots to German death camps than Eichmann
or his personnel did; See Krisztián [Ungváry], Battle for [Budapest]. 100 days in World War Two (London
2011).
22
Cf. Ungváry, Budapest, xxi.
23
See: Mario D. [Fenyo]. Did Hungarian [Intellectuals] resist or betray? 123-132 In: Total War, Dreisziger (Ed.).

8
were stopped abruptly by Horthy, who again found his backbone, unfortunately not before
nearly half of the Budapest ghetto had been liquidated.24

2.5 Exit
The summer of 1944 brought Anglo-American landings in Normandy in June of 1944, followed
by the collapse of the Eastern Front during the devastating Operation Bagration and the von
Stauffenberg assassination attempt made on Hitler. August saw the conclusion of Bagration,
which ended shy of Warsaw in the north and within sight of the Carpathians in the south and
thereby, the Hungarian frontier. Likewise in August 1944, Hungary's neighbor and one of
several regional nemeses, Rumania, defected from the Axis to the Allied camp, following
more or less from the same script it had three decades earlier.
Hungarian exit plans, already under consideration in various government circles were suddenly
given a jolt as the Rumanians had beaten the Hungarians to the punch and the defensive
situation in Central Europe and the Balkans temporarily collapsed. The problem was not that
the Rumanians had better or more contacts with the Allies, but that the location of Bucharest
vis-à-vis that of Budapest did not put the Rumanian capital in as untenable a position as that of
the Hungarian capital. For almost the entirety of the Second World War, the German Army had
sought and from 1941 onwards been given access to Hungarian transportation and
communication networks which were essential in moving forces from east to west; these
transited via Budapest. Second, the Rumanians accepted all Soviet terms and more importantly,
the inevitability of Soviet occupation. Whereas the Rumanian exit came about via a coup
executed by the King and his followers, there was no such figure in Hungary who could usurp
Horthy and at the same time command the allegiance of the Army or General Staff. Finally,
while as we will see below, concrete, meticulously detailed plans did exist for exiting the war,
these were only partially followed, with illogical elements being tacked on ad hoc. In other
instances, the importance of Hungary was over-estimated. One such example of this is
evidenced in the belief in the late summer of 1944, with the Soviets already on Hungarian
territory that the British and Americans would drop airborne divisions into Budapest to
strengthen Hungarian forces against the Germans. Aside from their illusions regarding who
would be occupying the country, Horthy and his new government headed by Géza Lakatos
(chosen in August 1944 after the Regent presented Sztójay with a letter of resignation for his
signature) operated on different wavelengths and at counter-purposes. The embarrassing
ultimatum made by Lakatos to the Germans on the 6th of September that "they should send five

24
Palasik. Chess, 5f.

9
armored divisions to Hungary within 24 hours or contend with Hungary leaving the alliance"
is just one of many jaw-dropping blunders of this period.25 It was only in late September/early
October that a delegation sanctioned and accredited by the Regent was finally sent to the Soviets,
signing a preliminary armistice agreement on the 11th of that month.26 Diplomatic wrangling
was preferred at a time when decisive action would not only have yielded better results for
Hungary, but was absolutely necessary. Even at this advanced stage, the negotiators for the
armistice requested "a delay of three days to declare war on Germany, while Hungarian army
units would be deployed to Budapest."27

2.6 October 16th and Aftermath

On the evening of October 15, 1944 Horthy announced over national radio that Hungary was
leaving her alliance with Germany, and had signed an armistice agreement with the Allies in
Moscow.28 Earlier that day, Otto Skorzeny, acting on intelligence that the announcement of
Hungarian withdrawal from the war was imminent, led a team of commandos to capture the
Regent's only (remaining) son, Miklós Horthy Jr.29 The Hungarian broadcasting station making
Horthy's announcement was seized, and in the early morning of the 16th of October, German
troops converged on the city, laying temporary siege to the vár, or Royal Hill in the center of
Buda. Hungary's military, unsure and unwarned of the coming announcement acted indecisively;
several units and commanders in the East used the opportunity to surrender to the Soviets,
leaving holes to be exploited along the front, others put up sporadic but ill-fated resistance to
overwhelming German forces (primarily those of the palace guard, who briefly exchanged fire
with the German convoy approaching the palace in the early morning of the 16th) a handful
were arrested preemptively by the Germans and their collaborators, but the majority remained
in their barracks not taking any action at all. Shortly after Horthy surrendered on the 16th, in
exchange for a guarantee on his and his son's life, the leader of the Arrow Cross Party, Ferenc
Szálasi, was 'named' head of the Hungarian government following Horthy's official
resignation.30 The deportation of the remaining Jews of the Budapest ghetto was begun almost
immediately, despite the deteriorating war situation and the shortness of resources. Even as the
city of Budapest came under siege, gangs of Arrow-Cross party members arrested and

25
See. Deborah [Cornelius], Hungary in World War II. Caught in the [Cauldron] (New York 2011), 316.
26
Kenez, Hungary, 15.
27
Borhi, Cold War, 35.
28
It should be noted that during the time between the 11th and the 15th few if any substantial formations were
moved to Budapest to defend the city in the event of German action.
29
See: Nándor [Dreisziger], Edmund [Veesenmayer] on Horthy and Hungary 323-344 in: Total War, Dreisziger
(Ed.).
30
Ibid, 342f.

10
summarily executed Jews on the streets of the capital.31 Politically, Szálasi replaced ministers,
military commanders and officials with those loyal either to himself, or beholden to the
Germans; Hungarian industry, supplies and labor was moved en masse to the Reich and wide
mobilization was called for.32
By the 15th of November, the Red Army had advanced to the outskirts of Budapest completing
an encirclement of the city near the end of December. The major airfields at Budaörs, Ferihegy
and Mátyásföld were taken in quick succession from the 25th to the 28th of December.33 The
encirclement of Budapest began between the 27th and 28th of December and would stretch into
February of 1945.34 Some of the most ferocious fighting of the war would take place in the
Hungarian capital, owing primarily to the dispatch of a multitude of crack Waffen-SS
formations to the city (several of which had participated in the Ardennes offensive weeks
before), and within the city, but also to fanatical groups of Arrow-Cross militia, mobilized over
the previous two months.35 By February, when the siege ended, the city had been reduced to
rubble and deflated in population size.36 The fighting continued in Hungary until April 1945
with some of the most bitter battles of that year occurring on Hungarian soil, particularly during
the last German offensive of the war, Frühlingserwachen (Spring Awakening), launched in the
beginning of March. Indeed, even before Szálasi came to power in October, Hungary was
Germany's only remaining ally, excluding Mussolini's Salo state and the NDH in Croatia.
Rumania, Finland and Bulgaria had deserted the Axis in quick succession between the 23rd of
August and the 3rd of September.

2.7 The Magyar Függetlenségi Mozgalom (MFM)37

The beginnings of the Hungarian Independence Movement (hereafter MFM) are problematic
to trace, owing not only to the lack of documentation concerning its functions and organization

31
Even before Horthy had signed the declaration naming Szálasi as Premier on the afternoon of the 16th, a
curfew on Jews had been put into effect, and the wearing of yellow stars of David was made mandatory for all
Jews. Cf. MacArtney, October, 442f. and Ungváry, Budapest, 236-252.
32
See the chapter 'Szálasi Tyrannnus' in MacArtney, October, 444-470.
33
Cf. Ungváry, Budapest, 62.
34
Cf. Ibid, 49f.
35
See Ibid.
36
Kenez states that the city lost nearly 1/3 of its population (from 1.4 Million to 900,000) during the winter of
1945. After the war ended, the city rebounded slightly (to 1 Million) but still did not reach pre-Siege levels.
Kenez, Hungary, 35.
37
This section of the work is admittedly brief and covers several organizations; the purpose here is not to explain
the intricacies of the organization(s) involved and their members (which in the author's opinion would over-
complicate an already complicated topic), but rather offer only an overview necessary for augmenting the case
studies present in the second half of this thesis. Therefore, only key personalities and those with direct
connections to the US intelligence organizations are stressed; by nature of the importance of connections to the
western Allies, by the MFM as a whole, these personalities are those who were critical to and held leadership
positions in the organization.

11
(covert organizations as a matter of principle are not inclined to maintain membership rolls,
minutes of meetings, etc.) but also to the wisdom of establishing a direct connection between
those groups which preceded or were contemporary with it, and the MFM itself.38 Most would
not dispute that the MFM's spiritual father was Count Pál Teleki, the Hungarian Prime Minister
from 1939-1941. In the Summer of 1939, Teleki organized a special department within his
office known as ME-IV (Miniszterelnök IV or Prime Minister - Section IV) ostensibly
responsible for "the Prime Minister’s personal and press matters as well as connections with
Hungarian minorities abroad" but was in reality "an alternative secret cabinet on foreign policy
and an intelligence centre designed to organise an anti-German foreign policy that would have
been unrealistic in the Third Reich's shadow if pursued openly.” 39 The organization held
"Intelligence conferences, involving liaison officers of the General Staff, Gendarmerie and
ministerial officials...semi-weekly."40
This new section was headed by Domokos Szent-Iványi (b. 1898, Budapest) who came from a
"well-off Transylvanian gentry family...attend[ing] the renowned Lónyay Street Calvinist
gerammar school, later earning a degrees in Law, Economics and Political Geography at the
Pázmány Péter University." 41 Thereafter, he spent time abroad, and attended the Sorbonne,
École des Sciences Politiques and the University of Vienna. At the end of the 1920's, he began
working for the Hungarian Foriegn Ministry and found himself posted to consulates in
Cleveland, Chicago and Winnipeg, before returning to Budapest in 1935. In 1936, he became
the personal secretary of the Prime Minister (Kálmán Darányi) where he crossed paths with Pál
Teleki, who upon his rise to the Premiership in 1939, made Szent-Iványi head of ME-IV.42

38
The memoirs of István Szent-Miklósy and Domokos Szent-Iványi, combined with the detailed accounts which
Géza Soós and Domokos Hadnagy provided upon their arrival in Italy allow us a fairly detailed look into the life
of the MFM. Owing to their various movements and responsibilities, each was able to report on different areas of
the organization; Szent-Miklósy was imprisoned after October 16th and thus was able to communicate what
transpired to those who had been apprehended or remained in Hungary; Szent-Iványi was in Moscow from
October 1944 onwards and later joined with the Debrecen government while Soós and Hadnagy were in Italy
with the Americans from December of 1944.
39
The intelligence capailities of ME-IV are described by Szent-Iványi as entailing the "carrying out [of]
intelligence work with the help of the Premier’s Office, the General Staff of the Army, the Gendarmerie, the
Ministry of the Interior, the special decoding department conjointly controlled and directed by the Foreign
Ministry and the General Staff and by means of any other activity considered as useful and practical." Cf. Nóra
[Szekér], Domokos Szent-Iványi and his Book - Part I In: [Hungarian Review], 4/6 (2013). Quote regarding
intelligence functions Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 121.
40
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 119.
41
While Szent-Iványi attended, the institution was known as the Péter Pázmány University (not to be confused
with the present day Péter Pázmány Catholic University). Today, this university is known as the Eötvös Loránd
University (or ELTE). The three designations (University of Budapest, Péter Pázmány University and Eötvös
Loránd University) all refer to the same institution at varying points in the 20 th century.
42
This section paraphrased and cited from Szekér in Hungarian Review.

12
ME-IV's contacts included several who would later become quite influential in the MFM, one
of whom is particularly relevant and related to this work namely Baron Gábor Apor (both he
and his brother Vilmos were good friends of Teleki and part of ME-IV).43 Teleki committed
suicide in April of 1941 in protest of the Hungarian declaration of war on Yugoslavia (and
transit of German troops through Hungary to invade Yugoslavia) harkening the dissection of
ME-IV, with its resources divided between three ministries. This was not achieved overnight,
but rather spanned a period of several months, concluding in February of 1942. The recipients
of ME-IV funding, personnel and records were the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Education
and Religion and finally the Ministry of Information (created in 1942). Szent-Iványi returned
to the Foreign Ministry, coming under the authority of the Press Secretary, Antal Ullein-
Reviczky.44 Szent-Iványi and his constituents continued meeting, however, even after ME-IV
had ceased to function. As such, a core of like-minded individuals in positions of varying
importance was preserved and the two years which Szent-Iványi had spent making contacts at
the highest echelons of Hungarian government were not in vain. Out of this group would grow
the organization which would become the MFM. The founding members, in 1942 along with
Szent-Iványi were General Gábor Faraghó, the former Hungarian military attaché in Moscow
(he would become Inspector of all Gendarmerie and Police Forces) and Justice Elek Boér
45
(Chairman of the Administrative Court). This group, following the induction of more
members, designated itself in June 1943 the MFM.46
The MFM differed from ME-IV in several key ways. First, it had "no charter whatsoever, no
rules, and in general we never put into writing any decisions or directives...no statues, no oath
was ever taken, no fees and no office, not even a regular meeting or secret place. For meeting
places we used our private homes. Most of the time we met in my apartment or in that of General
Faraghó."47 Next, as MFM was not a formal institution or arm of the government, it did not

43
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 125f.
44
Antal Ullein-Reviczky is an interesting figure owing to his rather mercurial allegiance. In 1939, he was
described as "one of the chief pioneers of Hungary's gemanophil policy, advocating her adhesion to the Tripartite
Pact, participation in the war against Russia, etc...Being an opportunist, he did not take long to understand the
immense importance of Stalingrad and Tunis for the outcome of the war. From then on, he tried to make friends,
but with not much success, with anti-German circles at home. The result of these intrigues however was that he
found himself on the floor between two chairs. The Germans having asked for his removal [as Press Secretary]
he was appointed late in 1943 Minister to Stockholm. Anti-German circles in Hungary follow with the greatest
distrust his activities in the neutral capital." Citation in text Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 200-203 and 221f.
Information concerning Ullein-Reviczky's person Cf. March 1944, Bakach-Bessenyey File in NARA II, RG 226,
E 190C, B 6.
45
István [Csicery-Rónay], A magyar [függetlenségi] mozgalom története (The history of the Hungarian
Independence Movement). In: Magyar [Szemle] (Hungarian Survey) 8/11-12 (1999).
46
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 273f.
47
Cf. Ibid, 274.

13
possess an official budget as ME-IV. It is absolutely critical to stress that the MFM was a semi-
covert organization committed to Hungarian independence, and was not until the end of 1944
a resistance network. 'Independence' at least according to Szent-Iványi entailed “The freedom
of Hungary from the influence, control or determination of another state or other states.”48 This
can be understood as a form of resistance, directed definitely against the Germans, but also
applicable to the Soviets or any other power which became too involved in Hungarian or
Danubian basin affairs. Operating 'above' the MFM (and indeed ME-IV) was a far more
secretive (and nationalist) organization known as the Hungarian Fraternal Collective (Magyar
Testvéri Közösség or MTK, sometimes referred to as Hungarian Brotherhood49); membership
in both ME-IV and MFM often overlapped with that in MTK, however, it must be noted that
the three organizations were not mutually interchangeable with one another (i.e. membership
in one was not guarantor of membership in one of the other two). For the purposes of this work,
we can confine ourselves to ME-IV and MFM.50 Nonetheless, it should be noted that one of the
most senior figures of the MFM, Géza Soós, was a member of all three organizations.
Géza Soós (b. 1912, Budapest) a Calvinist, attended the University of Budapest from 1931-
1935, graduating with a doctorate in Law.51 Thereafter, in 1936, he became Secretary-General
of the Solo dei Gloria movement, a Calvinist youth society, rising to that organization's
presidency in 1940. 52 Professionally, he worked as a judge in Budapest, before joining the
Hungarian Ministry of Justice becoming secretary to the minister. 53 In 1939 he was made
Secretary Gerneral of ME-IV.54 After Teleki's suicide, Soós would go on to work in the Foreign
Ministry as assistant for cultural affairs, however, he maintained contact with Szent-Iványi and

48
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 44.
49
For an excellent study of the MTK see Nóra [Szekér], A magyar [közösség] története [The History of the
Hungarian Fraternal Collective/Brotherhood] PhD Thesis, Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem, (Budapest, 2009)
available (in Hungarian) at http://mek.oszk.hu/08400/08480/08480.pdf.
50
The impetus for founding the MTK was the notion that Hungary's dismemebrment had come about owing to
the influence of 'non-Hungarians' (chiefly as Germans and Jews) in determining Hungarian foreign and domestic
policy. Membership in the MTK was restricted to ethnic Hungarians and primarily those of the upper-class and
Gentry with strong representation from Transylvania. Szent-Iványi claims that the racial and anti-Semitic facets
of the MTK dissipated so that by the Second World War, the organization was analog to ME-IV and MFM; this
view is not shared entirely by the author. Szent-Iványi himself only learned of the MTK in 1946, after years of
work in ME-IV and MFM which makes it even more difficult to evaluate his statement concerning its
tendencies. Cf. Domokos Szent-Iványi, Independence, 275f.
51
See n. 41. Cf. 18. September 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-003-1809 in NARA II, RG 226, E
212, B 3, [W]ithdrawal [N]otice 20777.
52
Cf. 1. November 1945, MFM Hungarian Resistance Organization in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 345 WN
13726.
53
Cf. Csicery-Rónay, függetlenségi and 18. September 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-003-1809
in NARA II, RG 226, E 212, B 3, WN 20777.
54
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 119.

14
was one of the first to nudge him in the direction of forming a successor organization in 1942,
ultimately joining MFM in its 'second-wave' in the first half of 1943.55
By 1944, MFM had built itself into a formidable organization, having established various cells,
and possessing representatives within Horthy Jr.'s 'Special Bureau'56, the Foreign Ministry, the
Gendarmerie and several military commands in the East of the country, however action was not
forth-coming until after the German occupation of March, from which the organization came
away relatively intact. Only after the realization of a German viceroy (Veesenmayer)
controlling the country via what amounted to a puppet Prime Minister (Sztójay) did the MFM
assume a more proactive and offensive role. The connections of the MFM to the Regent were
effected through several channels, notably his confidant, István Bárczy, the permanent
undersecretary to the Premier and chef de protocol, and via the Regent’s son, Nicky Horthy Jr.
who was close friends with with and influenced by Géza Soós. 57 Despite these ties, the
consensus appears to be that the Regent himself was not intimately involved with or even
wholly aware of the MFM. The strategy which the leadership of the MFM elected for in the
wake of German occupation was to allow the German forces in the country to be lulled into
thinking that their hold on Hungary could be relaxed, permitting them to redirect their troops
elsewhere (which occurred within weeks of Margarethe) and thereafter to resume, or rather
restart negotiations with the Allies for Hungary's exit from the war.58 Within Hungary, the first
step in this process was to convince Horthy to exert himself, specifically since with a Cabinet
not of his choosing, he was legally not bound to rule with its consent, opening the door for
unilateral action.59 Next, the MFM formulated contingency plans in the event of an armstice or
peace with the Allies; the Regent and his family would need to announce any such agreement
from safety, meaning away from Budapest. Horthy would therefore relocate shortly before any
large undertaking to Transylvania where he would be protected by the Hungarian 1st and 2nd

55
Soós will play a prominent role in later chapters. See 16. December 1944, Caserta to Washington, No. 19999
in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 359, WN 14119.
56
Nicknamed the "Breakaway Office" (kiugrási iroda) this was a special bureau located in the Royal Palace
headed by the Regent's son Nicky which focused on "handling the various problems arising in connection with
the state of war between Hungary and the Allies, and in particular with the issues concerning Hungarians living
abroad." In reality, this office functioned as a sort of clearinghouse for information and communications between
the Allies and Horthy, granting the Regent plausible deniability from taking an active part in any negotiations
going on between the two warring parties. Szent-Iványi and Soós both worked in this Office. Cf. Szent-Iványi,
Independence, 284.
57
An assassination attempt was made at the end of June 1944 on Bárczy by Hungarian Nazis. The attempt failed,
but this event, coupled with his receipt of the so-called Auschwitz Protocols, smuggled out of Poland and
translated, and later distributed on a limited basis by the MFM at the beginning of June would shake Horthy out
of his post-Margarethe coma. Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 311-315 and Csicery-Rónay, függetlenségi.
58
Csicery-Rónay, függetlenségi.
59
Cf. Ibid.

15
Armies and various other formations, commanded by officers who were members of the MFM
and whose loyalty to the Regent was assured. 60
By the summer of 1944 (and even before) the only realistic partner for any armistice involving
Hungary was the Soviet Union, something which the MFM had, to their credit realized and
accepted, but which the Regent, did not.61 This was just one of several illusions which Horthy
held on until the situation was far too advanced. Only at the beginning of September was the
dispatch of delegations to the Soviets and the Western Allies approved by Horthy; General
Faraghó, one of the founding members of the MFM was tapped for the Moscow mission and
(Air Force) General István Náday for Rome. Náday was to work with Baron Apor, the
Hungarian envoy to the Vatican (explained in greater detail in Chapter 4) arriving in Bari on
the 22nd of September.62 The Faraghó delegation, which came to include Szent-Iványi, only
arrived in Moscow on the 1st of October with a preliminary armistice being signed on the 11th.
After Horthy was notified, he refused to leave Budapest, effectively dooming the entire
undertaking.63 In reviewing the MFM plans, it appears plausible that a Hungarian breakaway,
coinciding with the MFM's contingencies, would have been successful, inasfar as Horthy would
have been safe and at the head of a large sized and well-equipped army in defensible terrain,
however, as the ultimate obstacle in the plan was the man to whom the organization pledged its
allegiance, the entire affair was for naught. The events of October 15th/16th are recanted above
and do not require repetition here. Following the installation of the Szálasi government, MFM
activities went further underground and were dealt a severe blow. Most of the leadership had
either been dispatched abroad for negotiations, arrested, or as was the case for Géza Soós, gone
into hiding. 64 Key army commanders and officers were arrested shortly after Horthy’s
announcement was made, and even alternates within the capital (who would have assumed
command of forces located there) were apprehended. Politically, the MFM merged with the
Hungarian Front (Magyar Front) led by Zoltán Tildy (explained below). Those MFM officers,
who did not escape, defect or come under arrest, likewise joined with the Magyar Front, with
most being folded into the Committee of Liberation. This core of professional soldiers
represented perhaps the MFM's greatest advantage compared to the other Hungarian resistance

60
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 313-315.
61
Szent-Iványi states that already in January 1944, the MFM had pushed and prepared for General Faraghó to be
sent to Moscow for negotiations. Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 315.
62
31. January 1945, Office of Naval Intelligence to Lt. Col Roger A. Pfaff, Acting Chief X-2 Branch, Hungarian
Mission to the Allies in NARA II, RG 226, E 171A, B 65.
63
. Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 349.
64
Soós would flee Hungary for Bari along with a small group of MFM members in a stolen plane on the 9th of
December 1944, this event is reported in detail over the course of this work. See István [Szent-Miklósy], With
the Hungarian Independence [Movement], 1943-1947 (New York 1980), 89-102.

16
groups (such as the Dissident Ministers, or the Kállay clique) as they could, at least in theory,
activate a small (trained and equipped) army, something other groups could lay no such claim
to. Ultimately, however, the final coup de grace on this last MFM bulkwark was delivered at
the end of November, when a large gathering of officers (120) was rounded up during a meeting
of the Committee of Liberation in Budapest.65
All told, the MFM numbered nearly 3,000 at its height.66 Politically, it was fervently pro-Horthy,
but owing to the influence of Szent-Iványi, held a political stance akin to that of the late Pál
Teleki. The organization was controlled by a Secretariat of 50-60 members, itself overseen by
three chiefs. The MFM was divided into several sections, of varying importance and size, the
two most influential being the Miitary and Political Sections. Alongside Szent-Iványi (and
particularly during his absence beginning in October) Soós assumed nominal leadership of the
MFM having previously headed the political section. The military section, perhaps the most
critical, was chaired first by Major István Szent-Miklósy, a General Staff deputy, but following
his arrest, by Colonel Pál Németh, chief of staff of the Hungarian Air Force. The aviation
section of the MFM was coordinated by Domokos Hadnagy, who will be introduced in a later
chapter. 67 The MFM was not completely smashed by either the Szálasi coup or by the roundup
of the Committee of Liberation on the 22nd of November, however its ranks, and perhaps most
importantly, its capabilities were handicapped. The organization would be rejuvenated within
provisional Hungary, however it is questionable to link pre-October 1944 MFM activities with
those which came about in the spring and summer of 1945. With the ending of the Second
World War, those dissident diplomats and officials who were based around Europe began
ascribing membership in or connections with the MFM to their personas. Those leaders who
had made their way out of Hungary, likewise relcaimed their previous positions, and attempted
to revitalize the old cells. Szent-Iványi who after Moscow went first to Debrecen and then

65
The activities of this group, known as the MNFFB (Magyar Nemzeti Felkelés Felszabadító Bizottsága or
Hungarian National Committee of Liberation) are brief and tragic; the group was formed at the beginning of
November by the underground Smallholder MP Éndre Bajcsy-Zsilinsky to coordinate the resistance activities of
the remaining underground groups in Hungary, which by then consisted primarily of students and religious
officials, but also those political groups which had not been well-represented within the MFM (the Small
Holders, The Social Democrats and the Communists) . The meeting of the military section of the MNFBB held
on the 22nd of November was raided, being betrayed to the Arrow-Cross and Germans. See 18. April 1946, DH-
140 [Klassen] to AE-2 [Bellin], X 4389, Hungarian Resistance Groups before 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E
108A, B 274.
66
It is worth noting here, as Soós, Szent-Miklósy, Hadnagy and Szent-Iványi all confirm, that these 3,000
included many in positions of authority/command, and as such, would most likely have been able to win over
many times their number should an opportunity for mass opposition present itself.
67
See 18. April 1946, DH-140 [Klassen] to AE-2 [Bellin], X 4389, Hungarian Resistance Groups before 1945 in
NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 274.

17
Budapest resumed the helm of the MFM, designating Soós the organization's representative in
Italy that summer.68

2.8 The Provisional National Assembly, Government and Allied Control Commission
Shortly before Budapest was encircled, the Soviets organized elections to elect a provisional
national assembly which would in turn form a government (to be the signatory/partner in
formalizing and implementing the armistice agreement of 20th January 1945 as opposed to the
Szálasi government) based in Debrecen. 69 The election results, coming from only a small
segment of the Hungarian electorate gave the Communists their highest returns for the period
of the next 3 years; an impressive 40% of the vote with their Socialist partners taking a 30%
share of the electoral spoils.70 The creation of a government was naturally influenced by the
presence of an occupying army in the country (indeed, the government had already been
determined in Moscow, the election was more or less a formality) however the end-result was
viewed positively by outside (Hungarian) observers, owing not only to its moderate character,
but also the inclusion of several known MFM members.71 The Debrecen (and later Budapest)
provisional government was headed by General Béla Miklós, one of the handful of Hungarian
commanders who had defected to the Red Army on the 16th of October and saw members of
the Small-Holder, Social Democrat, Communist, National Peasant and Civic Democrat parties.
The Communist Party, headed by Hungarians who had spent the majority of the 1940's in
Moscow was the party favored clearly by the Soviets, however would receive only moderate
popular backing (17% in elections in November of 1945 and 22% in the early 1947 elections).
The real power of the Hungarian Communist Party from 1945 until 1947 can be traced to a
number of factors, the most important of which was the presence of the Red Army in Hungary.
With the provisional National Assembly and Government established and an armistice
agreement signed, the Soviets spearheaded and subsequently dominated the Allied Control
Commission for Hungary (ACC) likewise established in Debrecen, before moving to Budapest
in the spring of 1945. This Commission was formed on the 20th of January 1945 following the

68
See 18. April 1946, DH-140 [Klassen] to AE-2 [Bellin], X 4389, Hungarian Resistance Groups before 1945 in
NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 274.
69
Kenez, Hungary, 30.
70
Ibid.
71
Several sources more or less mirror each other on this. The MFM members were Béla Miklós Dálnoki (Prime
Minister), János Vörös (Minister of Defence, referred to as 'reactionary' by the first source cited), Count Géza
Teleki (Minister of Education) and Gábor Faraghó (Minister of Supplies). Domokos Szent-Iványi was nominated
for Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, he declined the position. See Palasik, Chess, 10f. See also 5. January
1945, No. 3167 in NARA II, RG 331, E NND 80153, B 174, R 297 and 28. December 1944, Dulles to
Washington, in NARA II, RG 226, E 190C, B 6 and 23. March 1945, Caserta to G-2, No. 625 in NARA II, RG
226, E 210, B 328, WN 13501-13522.

18
signing of the Armistice agreement.72 Allied Control Commissions were the official military-
administrative entities tasked with supervising and enforcing armistice conditions until
definitive peace treaties could be drawn up and signed. They likewise had to work in
conjunction with domestic governments in the occupied countries, at least in theory. As in all
belligerent countries, this commission had tripartite representation (American, British and
Soviet) but depending on the nation in question was chaired by different occupying powers. In
Hungary, there was an American and British component, however they played little role in
decision-making as Soviet hegemony in the country was recognized despite periodic and
increasing American and British objections. In personnel terms, the British and American
missions numbered between them 150 while the Soviet mission was 800 strong.73 The chair of
the ACC would in reality function as a sort of Soviet viceroy for internal Hungarian matters.74
At the same time, this chairman (first Klement Voroshilov followed by Vladimir Sviridov in
February of 1946) blocked any British or American attempts to have even the most basic contact
with the Hungarian government(s) without Soviet interlocution. 75 Another facet of Soviet
chairmanship was that they alone determined who (of the other Commission partners) could
receive travel permits/visas to Hungary and thereby enter the country legally. 76 It is interesting
to note that already in 1944, OSS officers noted their dissatisfaction with Soviet behavior.77
Such paranoia however was, at least in the ensuing months warranted, as Soviet occupied
territories grew in importance for US Intelligence gathering efforts. 78 Whether this was in

72
Cf. Gergő [Bendegúz Cseh], Documents of the Meetings of the Allied Control [Commission] for Hungary
1945-1947 (Budapest 2000), 10f.
73
Cf. Bendegúz Cseh, Commission, 12f.
74
This is referenced in various works. Kenez mentions the role Voroshilov played in spurring the early
Hungarian election in autumn of 1945 as well as his hand in the land reform legislation. Bendegúz Cseh,
(perhap's Kenez's source) highlights that Voroshilov "failed to consult his western colleagues or even inform
them of his proposed actions [vis-a-vis the land reform legislation of 18 March 1945]." See Kenez, Hungary, 66
and Bendegúz Cseh, Commission, 15f.
75
Anglo-American representatives could establish contacts with Hungarian authorities only through the
intercession of the Soviet chairman or his deputy. Cf. Kenez, Hungary, 63f.
76
Kenez, Hungary, 66. The USMR (United States Military Representation) of the ACC for Hungary noted
sourly in August of 1944 that "Local Soviets consistently refuse permission for entry into Hungary of US
civilians including congressmen, clergymen, war correspondents, relief agency representatives and
representatives of business firms with interest in Hungary...Buck passed to Moscow and should be matter
between American representative there and People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs." Cf. ACC Hungary
USMR in NARA II, RG 331, NND 80153, B 174, R 297.
77
For example, already in October 1944, Abraham Gilmore Flues, the envisioned head of the Budapest City Unit
wrote his then superior, Howard M. Chapin that "...good contacts could be made there [Hungary] but the
Russians would swallow them up if they even let us get that far." Cf. 28. October 1944. Flues to Chapin in
NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
78
Following the cessation of hostilities in Europe, US intelligence organs, particularly in Germany and Austria,
noted a surge of Soviet activity directed against them. Such operations are beyond the scope of this work, but
one anecdote is that of the botched kidnapping of Richard Kauder, aka Klatt in January of 1946 near Salzburg.
Klatt had been cooperating with American intelligence officers and the remnants of his former intelligence
apparatus in south-eastern Europe were being primed for reactivation. Several months later, in April of 1946,

19
response to Soviet activity against the Americans or British, or in fact accelerated these efforts
is difficult to state definitively, however, it does appear as though, at least in the case of the
American intelligence authorities that the opening moves came from the Soviets. Regardless,
cooperation remained the (official) order of the day.

2.9 November Elections

The Hungarian coalition government held office until elections were announced in the autumn
of 1945; the Communist leadership, which believed they would be able to secure a majority of
the votes, ended the election disappointingly and only with Soviet pressure was admitted as a
partner into the Smallholder Party coalition government of Zoltán Tildy which followed.79 They
received a disproportionate number of not only ministerial portfolios, but the lion's share of the
important positions compared to their showing in the election. These included the Ministries of
the Interior and Army.80 This was justified, at least officially, as a result of the "significance of
the working class" which the Communist Party could lay wholesale claim to. The Communists
argued successfully that the votes of the working class were more valuable than those of any
other demographic and should be weighted accordingly.81 The Smallholders, led by Tildy,
sought a compromise with the Communists, putting forth the notion that a new Ministry for
State Security should be formed out of the Ministry of the Interior and that each should have a
Minister of the Smallholders and Communist Parties and a vice minister of the party not holding
the ministry; this proposal was flatly denied by the Communists, who had been informed from
Stalin, by way of Voroshilov, that they were to demand nothing less than wholesale stewardship
of the ministry.82 To compensate for the Ministry of the Interior, the Smallholders were given
a ministry without portfolio and the Ministry of Finance.83 Altogether, the Smallholders exited
the election with 9 Ministries, the Communists with 4, the Socialists with 4 and the National
Peasant Party with 1.84 However, as stated, the Communists occupied the ministries "which
mattered."85 Nonetheless, the election in November 1945 was most certainly the first ‘free’
election Hungary had enjoyed since the early 1920’s. The elections and (more importantly)
government were immediately recognized by the Americans, who noted keenly "the distinction

Crosby Lewis, the SSU Chief for Germany bluntly stated "Soviet Intelligence is by far the greatest target". Cf.
24. April 1946. Crosby Lewis, SSU Germany Report in RG 226, E 214, B 4, WN 24600-24604. For information
on Klatt/Kauder/Saber see NARA II, RG 226, E 213, B 2.
79
See Kenez, Hungary, 106.
80
See Bendegúz Cseh, Commission, 16.
81
Cf. Kenez, Hungary, 102.
82
Ibid.
83
Palasik, Chess, 53.
84
Kenez, Ibid, 103.
85
Ibid.

20
between Hungary, where free elections had taken place, and Bulgaria and Rumania where they
had not"86
Economically, Hungary had to contend with the lingering burdens of (German) occupation,
wartime destruction, Soviet occupation and reparations. During the first phase, namely German
occupation, many factories had either been signed over to the Germans (for example the
Manfred Weiss conglomeration, in exchange for that family's safe passage to Portugal) or had
been evacuated to the territories of Nazi Germany. Per the armistice agreement of January 20th,
assets which had belonged to Nazi Germany were to be seized by the occupying power (the
Soviet Union).87 This meant that instead of factories reverting to Hungarian ownership, they
actually came under Soviet control. Even factories which had not been under German
stewardship were commandeered temporarily by the Red Army to produce for the Soviet war
effort.88 Still other industries had been impacted by western Allied bombing campaigns or the
ground war between the Germans and Soviets in late 1944 and 1945.89 Next, there came Soviet
occupation which entailed the looting, rape and destruction, characteristic typical of most
victorious armies on the territory of their enemies. 90 Kenez describes Soviet behavior in
Hungary as "worse than in Bulgaria or Rumania but not worse than in Germany." 91 For the
average Soviet soldier, the standard of living in Hungary was despite its lower rank among other
European countries, extremely high for those coming from further east. Toilets, clocks, watches
and other modern novelties attracted the awe, suspicion and fear of occupying troops.92 Finally,
after hostilities had concluded and Soviet military occupation assumed a sort of rhythm,
Hungary had to contend with reparations payments (not only to the Soviet Union but also
Yugoslavia and controversially, Czechoslovakia) as well as reconstruction.93 Here, we again

86
Kenez, Hungary, 104.
87
Susan [Glanz], Economic [Platforms] of the various political parties inn the elections of 1945, 169-184. In:
Total War, Dreisziger (Ed.), 171.
88
This ended by and large in the summer of 1945, but the factories were often returned in a poor state, with
machine tools or components missing either in part or entirely. See. András B. [Göllner]. Foundations of Soviet
Domination in [Post-War Hungary], 185-210. In: Total War, Dreisziger (Ed.).
89
The most obvious casualty of this was Hungarian infrastructure, already only partly industrialized prior to the
country's invasion by the Red Army, it was systemically destroyed by retreating German and Hungarian forces.
See: Ibid.
90
Kenez cites a different study of Pető's which provides the same numbers, however the below study is
somewhat more current. Pető estimates the number of rapes committed by the Red Army in Budapest to range
from 50,000-200,000. See Andrea [Pető]. Budapest [Ostroma] 1944-1945-ben - női szémmel. [The battle of
Budapest 1944-1945 through women's eyes]. In: Budapesti [Begyed] 8/3-4 (2000) 203-220. Accessible at:
http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00003/00023/peto.html. Last accessed 11.02.2015.
91
Kenez, Ibid, 40.
92
Ibid, 42.
93
This amount of reparations was stipulated at $300 Million USD, with 2/3 earmarked for the USSR (the
majority of which was to be paid within 2 years) and the remaining 1/3 divided between Czechoslovakia ($70
million USD and Yugoslavia. $30 million USD) Bendegúz Cseh, Commission, 11.

21
cite Kenez who notes quite correctly that the twin task of meeting the reparation requirements
as well as reconstructing the country was "impossible."94 In the interim, Soviet seizures of
Hungarian industry had exceeded those which had previously been under German stewardship
and came to include most strategic and profitable industries in the country. 95 The Hungarian
Pengö depreciated enormously throughout 1945 and by the end of that year "the revenues of
the state amounted to only one tenth of its expenditures".96 One American asset in Hungary
predicted rioting for New Year's Eve.97 Both the Communists and Smallholders agreed that a
currency reform was needed, and planned to unveil the Forint in summer, following what was
expected to be a successful harvest.98 The Forint was introduced on the 1st of August 1946 at a
rate of 1 Forint to 400,000 Quadrillion Pengoes.99

2.10 Hungarian Security and Intelligence Services

For the period under consideration in this work, there are two main Hungarian services which
performed functions similar to those American organizations to be discussed in Chapter 3.
Unlike the American organizations, which were officially subordinated to the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (and only near the end of the period of study, with strong ties to the Department of State
and Department of War) the Hungarian organizations can be separated into distinct 'civilian'
and military entities. During the war, the Vezérkári Fönökség - 2 Osztály (General Staff – 2nd
Department) was the Hungarian military's intelligence arm. The VKF-2 was divided into
positive (koffa) and counter-intelligence (kemélhárító) sections. This organization had played a
major role in the Sparrow operation of March 1944, with a former head (General István
Újszásszy) the chief (Colonel Gyula Kádár) and several other officers being directly involved
and in contact with the mission.100 Újszásszy had been a regular visitor to ME-IV meetings and
maintained a good relationship with Szent-Iványi, however, it is not believed that he was a
member of the MFM or involved with the missions described below, particularly as the

94
This was not feasible for several reasons; first, Hungarian industry was valued less than the total value of the
reparations payments. Second, Hungary was to pay 5% interest on late or unfulfilled reparations. Third,
Hungary's accomodation of the Soviet occupying army as well as the ACC was not taken into account against
the reparation totals. Fourth, what little industry Hungary did have required raw materials available only outside
of the country, leading to Hungary often importing raw materials from the USSR on credit, to fulfill reparations
to the same country, compounding debt in the process and finally (and perhaps most damaging) the reparation's
themselves were valued in 1938 USD not 1945 USD, which were valued at a rate of 1 to 1.28 (i.e. 1 1938 USD
was worth 1.28 1945 USD) See Kenez, Hungary, 70-80.
95
Göllner, Post-War Hungary, 192.
96
Palasik, Chess, 82.
97
22. November 1945. Vienna to Washington; In 30796, #5917. In NARA II, RG 226, E 88, B 661.
98
Palasik, Ibid, 83f.
99
This enormous sum 'earned' Hungary the honor of having the most inflated currency in world history. Cf. Ibid,
85.
100
See Bare, Sparrow.

22
Americans believed that he was the cause for Sparrow's failure and for most of 1944 and beyond
in and out of interrogations/prison. Following the events of the 16th of October, VKF-2
witnessed a re-shuffling with General András Zako becoming Szálasi's designate for head of
the intelligence service.101
With the establishment of the Provisional Government, there was an urgent need to apprehend
and prosecute war criminals, but also to vet the political allegiance of Hungarians as a whole,
and to ascertain (prior) membership within the Arrow-Cross. This was to be undertaken both
within the civilian population, but also within the military. The two civilian services were from
1945-1946 the Budapesti Fökápitánysága Politikai Rendészeti Osztályának or Budapest
Constabulary: Political Department (BPRO) and a complimentary organization for areas
outside of Budapest, the Vidéki Fökápitánysága Politikai Rendészeti Osztályának or Regional
Constabulary: Political Department (VPRO). In 1946, these two organizations were merged
into the Magyar Államrendőrség Államvédelmi Osztálya or Hungarian State Police State
Protection Authority, (ÁVO) which would exist until 1950, functioning as the internal political
police. A second, military organization, the Katonapolitikai Osztály or Military political
department, (hereafter Katpol) also was called into existence in March of 1945.102 For this work,
the operations of Katpol are of greater importance, as they were responsible not only for
counterintelligence within Hungary but also counter and positive intelligence outside of
Hungary, specifically within those areas occupied by the Americans and from which American
operations into Hungary would be launched. With that said, the BPRO/ÁVO should not be
discounted.103
The postwar basis for what would form Katpol can be traced to February of 1945 when a small
office in the Provisional Government's Department of War was formed.104 It was stipulated as
part of the Armistice Agreement that Hungary take an active part in determining and

101
See 10. July 1945, Hungarian Nazi personalities in Bavaria and Oberösterreich, LS-376 in NARA II, RG 226,
E 210, B 471, WN 17732-17742.
102
Cf. Imre [Okváth], [Kémek] kémek ellen. Adalékok a magyar katonai hírszerzés tevékenységéhez a
hidegháború kezdeti időszakában (1945-1950) [Spies against spies. Supplementing the [history of] the activities
of Hungarian military intelligence during the initial period of the Cold War (1945-1950)] In: A nagy testvér,
[szatócsboltja]. Tanulmányok a magyar titkosszolgálatok 1945 utáni történetéből [Big Brother's Grocery.
Studies in the history of the Hungarian secret services after 1945]. György [Gyarmati], Mária [Palasik ](Eds.)
(Budapest 2012) 67-92. Generously supplied to the author by Imre Okváth.
103
See László [Ritter], The [Secret War] between the Soviet Bloc and Yugoslavia, 1948-1955. In: The Future a
Memory: The [Cold War] and Intelligence Aspects. Heiner [Timmermann] (Ed.) (Zürich et al. 2013) 107-122.
104
Ferenc [Dávid], „[Fából] vaskarika”, avagy: a magyar katonai államvédelmi szervek 1945 utáni
újjászervezésének jogi és szervezeti alapja [„Absurdity”, or: the Legal and Organizational Basis of the
Reorganization of Hungarian Military Secret Services after 1945]. In: Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle [National
Security Survey] 1 (2014) 114-132. This citation 116f.

23
prosecuting those citizens responsible for war crimes.105 Katpol was headed by Captain (later
General) Győrgy Palffy [Oesterreicher] and tasked with reviewing cases of returnees to
Hungary with military backgrounds and their political activities during the war.106 By the end
of 1945, the organization had grown to comprise 1/3 of all Hungarian men-under-arms (mostly
owing to the absorption of the Frontier Guards) quoted at a strength of 10,000.107 Officially, the
organization was to "establish a democratic foundation for the National Army, combat
reactionary elements and secure a democratic future for Hungary."108 However, its “sphere of
action” as stated by one defector in 1946 included "Military registration. Counter-espionage.
Matters in connection with own military attaches, Investigation in cases of endeavors to
endanger the moral worth and democratic spirit of the army and common crimes in connection
with this. Bringing before the People’s Court of War Criminals and those who committed anti-
national deeds. Providing of data for the use of the justifying committee concerning those about
to be judged [sic]"109
From March until May 1945, Katpol was divided into 2 subsections (alosztály) and several
auxiliary offices or groups (csoport). Similar to OSS and SSU, the two (main) subsections were
Defensive (Elhárító) and Intelligence (Hírszérző). The Defensive subsection was further
divided into an Investigative (Nyomozó) and Examination (Vizsgálati) office (főcsoport), which
coordinated activities and an internal security office for the War Ministry (Hadosztályok
Deffenziv-tiszti szolgálat). 110 In June, an administrative re-organization and expansion was
undertaken; the Investigative office was divided into war criminals, internal security and

105
Dávid, Ibid.
106
Cf. [Vallomások] a holtak házából. Ujszászy Istváan vezérőrnagynak, a 2. vkf. Osztály és az Államvédelmi
Központ vezetőjének az ÁVH fogságában írott feljegyzései. [Confessions from the house of the dead. Major General
Ujszászy István, Chief of Department 2 of the Hungarian General Staff (VKF.) and the Civic Defense Center and
his writings and written records while captive of the Hungarian secret police (ÁVH).] György [Haraszti], Zoltán
Kovács, and Szabolcs Szita (Budapest 2007) 25.
107
The cited report, and many others came to the SSU X-2 officer in Budapest by way of British intelligence and
were sourced, interestingly, from the Second-in-Command of Katpol, Viktor Kruchina, a Social Democrat and
member of the Hungarian resistance who had offered his services to the British in 1945, following the siege of
Budapest. In 1947, Kruchina would be involved in a shootout with ÁVO agents, in the aftermath of which he
would flee to the British embassy. Cf. Undated, Introductory Notes on Hungarian Intelligence Service and
Political Police (Source Shamus, Viktor Kruchina, Second-in-Command of Katpol) in NARA II, RG 226, E 211,
B 38, WN 20228. For more information on Kruchina see, Ferenc [Dávid], A katonai [titkosszolgálatok] az 1945-
ös újjászervés időszakában [The military secret services in the reorganization of 1945]. In: [Kutatási] Füzetek
[Research Papers] 20 (2013) 37-66.
108
Author's translation/paraphrase Cf. Imre [Okváth], "[Sziget] egy reakciós tenger közepén". Adalékok a Katpol
történetéhez 1945-1949 ["An island in a sea of reactionnarism" Commentary regarding the history of the
Katpol]. In: [Államvédelem] a Rákosi-korszakban [People's defense in the Rákosi era] György [Gyarmati] (Ed.)
57-96. This citation 59f. Generously supplied to the author by Imre Okváth
109
Cf. Undated, Introductory Notes on Hungarian Intelligence Service and Political Police in NARA II, RG 226,
E 211, B 38, WN 20228.
110
Cf. Okváth, Sziget, 60f in Államvédelem, Gyarmati (Ed.).

24
interrogation units, while a special section which administered camps for returnees was also
established under the aegis of the Defensive subsection, headed by Major Lajos Földy.111 The
offensive or intelligence subsection, headed by Colonel Zoltán Gáth was tasked primarily with
penetrating the west, and at least in late 1945 and 1946, determining the extent of (western)
Allied utilization of former Nazis and/or fascists. The subsection also monitored the activities
of Hungarians abroad, and sought to garner as much information on (western) Allied decision-
making as possible. In these pursuits, until November of 1945, Gáth could rely on former VKF-
2 men, however, following (superficial) abolition of the branch on orders from the ACC, had
to rejuvenate his staff with inexperienced, but (Communist) party-loyal recruits. 112 In
November, a new directive circulated Katpol, citing organizational priorities in wake of the
'changes' which had been implemented. Three of the points represent veiled indications that the
organization would continue and in actuality, ramp up operations abroad "...to bring war
criminals and enemies of the people before people's tribunals...to supply the evaluation organs
[Igazoló csoport] with information and data....and to direct and coordinate the activities of
military attaches abroad in regards to foreign affairs."113
After the November elections, the administration of Katpol was, at least in theory, divided
between the Smallholders and the Communists, however, in reality, decision-making was
undertaken only among Communists or those who could be trusted. Similarly to the ministerial
situation, the most important sections and duties within Katpol fell to party loyalists.114
Finally, before concluding this brief section, it would be prudent to dispel a myth which
permeates most English-language research on military and intelligence capabilities of the
(soon-to-be) Soviet satellites, namely vis-a-vis their competence, efficiency and freedom of
action as it related to the Soviet intelligence services. While Hungary was occupied by the
Soviet Union, and Mátyás Rákosi, the leader of the Hungarian Communist Party was one of
Stalin's most unwavering disciples and Győrgy Pálffy, head of Katpol, a party loyalist, the

111
Cf. Ibid, 61-64 in Ibid.
112
This 'purge' of Katpol officers served two purposes; first, the organization was restrained in the eyes of the
(western) Allies and its offensive capabilities removed. Second, domestically, the organization was restructured
in such a way that non-Communist or non-reliable elements were let go. Cf. Undated, Introductory Notes on
Hungarian Intelligence Service and Political Police in NARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 38, WN 20228.
113
Cf. Okváth, Ibid, 64.
114
Pálffy was "a rabid Communist - whether by conviction or for convenience is not known." The two
subsection-heads were Communist or at the very least, party sympathizers. Gáth had been captured during the
war and trained by the Soviets; claimed by Kruchina “at heart to be a patriot but by virtue of his actions, fully in
sync with the Communists.” Földy, the head of the Intelligence subsection had purportedly organized a militia
unit for the Soviets after the siege of Budapest which was disbanded owing to "excessive looting and
disorderliness" but received a major's commission owing to party affiliation. Cf. Undated, Introductory Notes on
Hungarian Intelligence Service and Political Police in NARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 38, WN 20228.

25
Soviets did not until 1950 exert noticeable influence over Hungarian Intelligence and Counter-
Intelligence.115

2.11 The Catholic Church

In analyzing the Catholic Church within Hungary, the parallel (and wholly related) topic of
land-ownership and distribution presents itself as a contextual hurdle. Between 1945 and 1949
the percentage of landless peasants in Hungary dropped from nearly 50% to 17%, in part
achieved by the forced eviction of ethnic Germans, but also by the dismantling of large estates,
foremost amongst them being those of the Catholic Church.116 The paradox of the importance
which the Catholic Church played (and continues to play) within the lives of the rural poor in
Hungary, and its role as the largest landholder in the country, appears, from a distance
contradictory. With the end of the War, the Catholic Church held more than 1.2 million acres
or about 5% of the entire country.117
Reverting our attention to the confessional aspect, Hungary was and remains by and large a
Catholic country, with an estimated 2/3 of the population belonging to the Roman Catholic
Church. If the dominance of the Catholic Church in terms of sheer weight of numbers were not
influential enough, the Church in Hungary was headed from 1944 until well beyond the scope
of this work by a succession of adept albeit staunchly conservative leaders. The first of these
Prince-Primates was Jusztinián Serédi, who held the post from the late 1920's until his death in
March of 1945. Serédi's legacy is controversial, and as we shall see in the course of this work,
difficult to evaluate. Serédi's defiance of the German occupation and assistance to (Catholic)
refugees is noteworthy, his actions vis-à-vis the Szálasi regime as well as his refusal to sign a
joint declaration with other Hungarian Christian leaders condemning the deportations of
Hungary's Jews on the grounds that he "could not take joint action [with them]" perhaps more
telling.118 Adding to Serédi's legacy is his (purported) behavior following the Arrow-Cross coup

115
See Ritter, Secret War, 107f. in Cold War, Timmermann (Ed.).
116
Kenez, Hungary, 112.
117
Ibid, 166.
118
On the 23rd of June, 1944, an official Protestant delegation composed of Baron Radvanszky (Lutheran) and
Jenö Bálogh (Calvinist) asked for the Prince-Primate's collaboration in opposing the deportations of the
Hungary's Jews. The Primate replied that he could not take joint action with the Protestants. They should do as
they wished; he, in his turn, would do what he could. At this, the delegation went to Sztójay, declared that unless
something were done a pastoral letter on the subject would be read in all the Protestant churches in Hungary.
Sztójay sent the Minister of Propaganda to Esztergom (the seat of the Prince-Primate) on 27 June. The
Propaganda Minister asked Serédi not to participate. The Propaganda Minister later reported to Bishop Ravasz
that Serédi insisted no protest should be made as the government would themselves bring the deportations to a
halt. Cf. 27. January 1945. Some Aspects of the Hungarian Resistance Movement in NARA II, RG 226, M 1642,
R 103.

26
of October 16, 1944.119 In addition to his duties as Prince-Primate, Serédi was also a member
of the National Council of Hungary, a body which had to issue convocation on whether Horthy's
abdication had been legal or illegal. It was widely known that the Arrow-Cross' party program
had long advocated radical land reform, and despite exerting control over barely half of the
country, were still, at least domestically a force to be reckoned with for the remainder of the
war. Additionally, some segments of the Arrow-Cross were anti-clerical, embracing what is
known as 'Turanic' ideology. All of this did nothing to endear Szálasi to Serédi. Nonetheless, a
modus vivendi was reached between the Arrow Cross and the Catholic Church, namely that in
exchange for the latter's 'blessing' (in the form of a favorable -and decisive- vote in the National
Council) Catholic estates would not be targeted in the Arrow Cross' land reform program.120
While it can be argued that Serédi played the cards he had been dealt, the inconvenient fact
remains that in not refusing Szálasi or the Arrow-Cross, Serédi made their ascension to power
all the more easy, legitimate and what is perhaps worse, sent a signal to his flock that the Arrow-
Cross was not an enemy of the Catholic Church, perhaps paving the way for greater cooperation
and facilitation. 121 Serédi died before he could be made to answer for his role in interwar
Hungarian politics, the Holocaust or the rise of Ferenc Szálasi to power. Even if he had lived,
examples abound of central and eastern European clerical officials who had cooperated with
right-wing and reactionary movements during the war and found themselves, at war's end, in
the pay or service of various western governments rather than in courtrooms.122

119
The account sourced here is from information which Géza Soós and Domokos Hadnagy (two Protestants)
brought with them and provided in a series of reports; an alternative account is provided by Father Gyula
Magyary, who was also in Hungary for the events of the 16th of October and met on several occasions prior to
those events with the Prince-Primate. For his account see 26. April 1945, Sarazen [Zsolt Aradi]/Moly [Gyula
Magyary] to Chief SI/MedTO and Chief SICE in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II.
120
Cf. 3. February 1945; R&A Hungarian Report No. 14, Further Aspects of the history of the Hungarian
Resistance Movement (15 October - 9 December 1944) in NARA II, RG 226, M 1642, R 103.
121
Prior to Serédi's vote, the Council had been divided into two camps, one, which held, quite correctly that
Horthy's abdication had been anything but voluntary, led by the President of the Supreme Court, Géza Töreky
(himself a Legitimist and reactionary) and the other, headed by the President of the Lower House of Parliament,
Dr. András Tasnady-Nagy (a member of Horthy's MÉP). Serédi's reasoning is said to be based at least in part on
Horthy's Protestant background as he argued during the meeting of the National Council that the messenger
Horthy sent to him (a Father Tóth) carried a message that the abdication was voluntary (later accounts of Father
Tóth's message say the exact opposite, namely that he came to tell Serédi that the abdication was not legitimate
or legal). Cf. 3. February 1945; R&A Hungarian Report No. 14, Further Aspects of the history of the Hungarian
Resistance Movement (15 October - 9 December 1944) in NARA II, RG 226, M 1642, R 103.
122
Norman J.W. Goda makes references to several such figures from Rumania, Ukraine and Croatia. In Croatia,
he mentions specifically the case of Archbishop Stepinać of Zagreb, who while voicing concern over the ethnic
and racial policies of the Pavelic state, performed important functions within the state and would later be called
to answer for his lack of action vis-à-vis other Church leaders. The second chapter (227-264), 'Nazi
Collaborators in the US' mentions Ukrainian and Rumanian clerical leaders with collaborationist histories who
were supported by and even in some cases admitted entrance into the United States. See [US Intelligence] and
the Nazis, Richard [Breitman], Norman J.W. Goda, Timothy Naftali, Robert Wolfe (Cambridge 2005).

27
Following Serédi’s death, the question as to who would head the Hungarian Catholic Church
assumed geopolitical importance. The Soviets favored one candidate, the Archbishop of Eger,
Gyula Czapik, there are indications that a segment of the Vatican, possibly including the Holy
Father preferred another, Monsignor Ferenc Luttor while a third candidate, the Bishop of
Veszprém, József Mindszenty was eventually appointed (in secret) in August of 1945. 123 Two
additional candidates, Provost and Vicar László Bánáss (Debrecen) and Bishop Áron Márton
(Gyulafehérvar, today Alba Iulia in Rumania) were likewise under consideration.124
Mindszenty's selection is believed to be based on several factors working in his favor. First, he
was a known Legitimist and supporter of the Habsburgs; he made no attempt either prior to or
following his elevation to the Primacy to hide this and instead actually became more vocal once
in Esztergom, the seat of the Prince-Primate.125 This was a double-edged sword, particularly
for the Vatican inasmuch as while contingencies for a Habsburg restoration in Central and
Eastern Europe were flouted time and again, particularly in 1944 and early 1945, as the realities
(and permanence) of Soviet occupation became known, and more importantly, the results of the
Yalta Conference, all but the most die-hard Vatican Legitimists had banished the idea of some
sort of Danubian federation, albeit bitterly, to the annals of history; Mindszenty, and his
supporters were not among this group.126 Second, Mindszenty was a staunch conservative, but
while virulently anti-Communist his political-leanings were of the sort toxic and oppositional
even to (liberal) democracy and Republicanism.127 This was appreciated at the outset of his

123
Mindszenty had only been Bishop of Veszprém for little more than a year (since March 1944). Cf. Margit
[Balogh], Kardinal József [Mindszenty]. Ein Leben zwischen kommunitischer Diktatur und Kaltem Krieg.
[Cardinal József Mindszenty. A life between Communist dictatorship and the Cold war] (Berlin, 2014) 66-69.
124
See 4. September 1945, Salzburg, Objectives of the Catholic Church Source Sarazen Sub Source High
Church Official, LS-520 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 471, WN 17732-17742. Balogh shows several other
candidates in the running and stresses that Mindszenty was not among them but owing to the recommendation of
Töhötöm Nagy SJ, quickly became the favorite. For details of this See Balogh, Mindszenty, 95-99.
125
Mindszenty's Legitimism appears to have begun in 1911 with his entry into the Seminary in Szombathely.
There, he was greatly influenced by the diocesan bishop, Count János Mikes, who had been Archduke (later
Emperor) Karl I/IV's tutor. Cf. Balogh, Mindszenty, 21.
126
During an audience in November of 1945, the Holy Father is reported as saying "A Hapsburg restoration
would be the salvation of a middle European bloc, but who is going to do this today? Perhaps we have never
been further away from a realization of this than at this time." Even at the time of Mindszenty's convocation,
there were conflicting signals being sent from the Vatican. Whether these made or would have made any
difference to Mindszenty at all is questionable, considering his reaction to Vatican directives to cease openly
calling for a Habsburg restoration in the ensuing months. For the quote from the Pope see 22. November 1945,
Töhötöm Nagy, Jelentes a 2. romai tartozkodásom alatt elért eredményekröl [Report of my second trip to Rome
- 11 October - 19 November] in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A B 200. For the Vatican directive informing
Mindszenty to cease see 5. December 1945, Vienna to Washington, #5207 Source Sarazen in NARA II, RG 226,
E 210, B 457, WN 17008.
127
Again, the roots for this stretch back to Mindszenty's education and beginnings as a priest. During the
disintegration of Habsburg rule in the autumn and winter of 1918, Mindszenty was a proponent of the Christian-
Social People's Party [Keresztényszociális Néppárt] as opposed to the coalition of liberals and social-democrats
behind the Aster-Revolution which propelled Count Mihály Károlyi to a brief and turbulent phase as Prime
Minister/President of the Hungarian Republic. Although Mindszenty was certainly opposed to the ensuing

28
tenure as indicative of what could be expected from his relationship vis-à-vis the Soviets,
however, the Vatican was quick to recognize that such conservativism was ultimately
detrimental to its aims and perhaps even more damning, not largely popular, particularly where
his oft-vocalized support for the aristocracy and nobility was concerned.128 An example of this
sort of anathema to liberal democracy is seen in a statement Mindszenty gave in 1938 at an
emergency conference of the clergy called by then Prince-Primate Serédi in reaction to the
German annexation of Austria "[the Arrow-Cross movement insinuates] our [the Catholic
Church's] collusion with those elements against which we have been fighting for decades (Jews,
Liberals and large estate owners)."129 It is perhaps also worth noting that at the same time,
Mindszenty had proposed a "middle way" between the (his) Christian People's Party and the
'National Socialists', which was however, rejected by Serédi.130
A third advantage which Mindszenty had was how he fared from 1944 until 1945. His elevation
to Bishop in 1944 had been opposed by both Horthy and, more importantly, by Serédi, who
cited several reasons in a letter to Rome.131 Some weeks after the events of the 16th of October,
Mindszenty had been “persecuted, arrested and deported” at the hands of the Arrow-Cross.132
His conservatism had led him to oppose openly the Arrow-Cross, meaning that the Hungarian
Communists and the Soviets could not brand him as a fascist, at least not initially. Nonetheless,

Communist dictatorship of Béla Kun, and supportive of Horthy's counter-revolutionary army, Mindszenty's
mentor, Count Mikes played a crucial role in the attempt of Archduke Karl to restore Habsburg rule in Hungary
during Easter of 1921 at the behest of (then Regent) Horthy. Horthy, although better than the Communists or
Democrats, was Reformed and thus could never be fully accepted or supported by the Catholic hierarchy of
Hungary. Cf. Balogh, Mindszenty, 30-36.
128
The Vatican recognized this almost immediately after Mindszenty's appointment, as an American intelligence
report affirms. See 31. October 1945, Salzburg, LA-147 Source Sarazen in NARA II, RG 226, E 108, B 168.
129
Trannslated from the German "Es droht die Gefahr, dass sie [Pfeil-Kreuzler] uns, Pfarrer, aufgrund eines
völlig falschen Verständnisses und einer völlig falschen Erklärung der Vergangenheit der Kirche genau
denjeniger (Juden, Liberale, Großgrundbesitzer usw.) zurechnen, gegen die wir seit Jahrzehnten gekämpft
haben." Cf. Balogh, Mindszenty, 59.
130
It is not clear whether 'National Socialists' refers to the NSDAP or the Hunngarian Arrow-Cross Party. See
Balogh, Ibid.
131
Serédi held that Mindszenty's legitimism would create a conflict between the Church and Horthy, however
also cited Mindszenty's minimal education ("unzureichende Bildung") abruptness ("Schroffheit") and lack of
patience. Cf. Balogh, Mindszenty, 67.
132
This 'persecution' has been attributed to a wide variety of causes. On some occasions it is believed to have
arisen from a letter Mindszenty and several other church leaders had penned imploring the Germans not to turn
(predominantly Catholic) western Hungary into a battlefield. In another source, Mindszenty's refusal to swear
allegiance to the Szalási regime is noted, as is his rejection of the usage of (his) Bishop's palace as Szalási's
headquarters in Veszprém. As Kenez mentions, Mindszenty's letters mention nothing of the largescale
deportations of Jews transitting across western Hungary on their way to build fortifications in south-eastern
Austria. Between the first and second German occupations (March to October) Mindszenty had also written to
Serédi expressing his feelings concerning the Arrow-Cross. These writings indicate only that he was opposed to
their activities agaisnt the Church, specifically with regards to Church schools. See Kenez, Hungary, 168. For
the American report see 9. August 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-183 in NARA II, RG 226, E
211, B 44, WN 20418 and for information concerning the death marches of Hungarian Jews via western
Hungary to eastern Austria see Aronson, the Jews, 309-311. See also Balogh, Mindszenty, 69f, 74-84.

29
this should not be misconstrued as implying any moral objections to (or knowledge of) the
deportation of the Hungarian Jewish population. Mindszenty's position vis-à-vis the Hungarian
Jewry is contentious and upon close inspection, only marginally better than that of Serédi. 133
Finally, and perhaps inadvertently, Mindszenty possessed a fourth advantage, his 'simplicity'
and 'Hungarian-ness'. He did not represent the intelligentsia or bourgeois and was born to a poor
peasant family. He was not 'worldly' compared to other colleagues in the habit (he had turned
down a scholarship to the prestigious Pázmáneum in Vienna in favor of remaining in
Szombathely) and was fluent 'only' in Latin and Hungarian, remarkably limited linguistic
competence for a senior Churchman.134 In fact, he had even changed his family name in 1942
from the German Pehm to Mindszenty, not only as a sign to his would-be detractors where his
national loyalty lay, but also in protest to German propaganda efforts directed at Hungarians of
German stock.135
Mindszenty's early tenure would be marked by numerous controversies. As Prince-Primate he
would stress repeatedly that he was in fact the highest political and not just spiritual authority
in the country, pending legal dissolution of the Monarchy.136 He also lambasted politicians
who did not first travel to Esztergom before making a decision as would be showcased time and
again between 1945 and 1946.137 It must be reasoned therefore that he was either unable to
comprehend or unwilling to accept policy set by Rome. The blame for this should not be placed
solely on his shoulders however as Vatican policy was in a state of flux in the aftermath of the
war in Europe. Communism was a threat, yes, but it was not known whether more could be
gained by compromise or resistance. Indications are, at least in the case of Hungary during the
period under consideration in this study, that the Soviet Union far preferred compromise
(initially) and that such a policy might have reaped greater rewards for Hungarian Catholicism
and perhaps even the Hungarian Republic.

133
Three key activities have led to this judgment. First, as Bishop, Mindszenty was in a position to hasten the
process of baptism, which in hindsight can (and is) rightly seen as a form of rescue (the efficacy of which
depended on whether 'Jewishness' was determined along religious or ethnic lines). Mindszenty refused to
accommodate this, maintaining that the period of 6 months of catechism was necessary. In two other cases,
Mindszenty showed more sensibility and initiative, namely against the deportation of Catholics of 'Jewish'
ethnicity and the forbidding of the usage of the property of deported Jews. See Balogh, Mindszenty, 69-72.
134
Ibid, 22.
135
Ibid, 16.
136
Kenez, Hungary, 171.
137
Immediately after the November election, Mindszenty rabidly protested against the (legal) abolition of the
Monarchy in Hungary, a cause which few others shouldered. There had not been a King in Hungary since 1918
(with the possible exclusion of Charles' abortive attempts to take power in 1920 and 1921) and although Horthy
had run Hungary on what some have termed a 'semi-feudal' basis, the Hungarian interwar government was
certainly no Monarchy. See Kenez, Hungary, 173.

30
Alongside Serédi and Mindszenty, there was a third force within the Catholic Church in
Hungary which represented and propagated very different segments of society and ideals during
the period under discussion. Pope Pius XI's Quadragesimo Anno of 1931 had laid the
foundation for a series of organizations in Hungary which would attempt to embrace its
principles, assuming slightly more 'radical' characteristics as the position of the Church
hierarchy became palpable.138 The most important of these for this work, KALOT or Katolikus
Agrárifjúsági Legényegyesületek Országos Testülete (National Federation of Catholic-Agrarian
Youth) was formed in 1935 by Jenő Kerkai SJ, dr. György Farkas and József Ugrin with the
express purpose of fostering a cadre of leaders from agrarian society (of which a majority of
Hungarians belonged) capable of assuming active roles within the "economic and political
leadership" of their country and represented a beacon of faith-based progressivism. 139 The
group rejected the assumption that "the transformation of the lower classes to the proletariat
was inevitable, but likewise opposed the large landed estates and capital within Hungary and
any assumed 'right' concerning their existence."140 During the prewar years, KALOT held free
seminars and courses throughout Hungary, which sought to promote education and a sense of
identity, both with each other as farmers and field laborers, but also as Catholics and men. The
organization is described by one author as a "cross between the YMCA [Young Men's Christian
Association] and 4-H [an American organization designed to impart technological
developments in farming to rural youth]."141 By 1942, the organization had trained some 15,000
youth leaders.142 In 1938, a key figure joined KALOT, Töhötöm Nagy SJ, who became the

138
See Balogh, Mindszenty, 37f.
139
In Peter Kenez's work, he refers to KALOT and its leadership as "anti-semitic" and as having advanced
"...some of the same deamnds and subscribed more or less to the same worldview as the Hungarian Nazis, the
Arrow Cross Party of Ferenc Szálasi" this is glaringly false and would otherwise be laughable were the charge(s)
not so serious. KALOT was diametrically opposed to the Arrow-Cross Party for the entirety of its existence and
never embraced (as an organization) anti-Semitic ideals. There are two known statements of Kerkai which can be
construed as anti-Semitic, and which would be used at his show-trial in 1949, however the weight/importance of
these, as well as their context are heavily debatable. Cf. József [Varga], [Bűnös nemzet] vagy kényszerű csatlós.
Adalékok Magyarország és a Duna-medence kortörténetéhez I. rész 1918-1939 [Guilty Nation or Involuntary
satellite? A short history of Hungary and the Danubian basin, Part I, 1918-1939] (Budapest 1991). Accessible
at: http://www.corvinuslibrary.com/tortenelem/vargaj.pdf Thanks are likewise owed to Margit Balogh who
promptly responded to and refuted a pair of citations of her work appearing in Kenez's book claiming the above.
140
Cf. Varga, Bűnös nemzet. The 'right' to such estates and land ownership was a hold-over from medieval
Hungary, and something which even following the Ausgleich in 1867 was not undone. The only serious attempt
made at land reform in Hungary came during the turmoil following the end of the First World War, when the
Social Democrats under Mihályi Károlyi followed by the Communists under Béla Kún started reform programs.
It is notable that Károlyi, himself owner of a large estate, was one of the few Hungarians who volunteered their
estates for dismemberment. See also: John Mason, Hungary’s Battle for Memory. In: History 50/3 (2000) 28-34.
This citation 31.
141
Varga, Bűnös nemzet, 103.
142
Ibid, 104f.

31
organization's vice president. The organization was supported chiefly by donations and
promoted progressive ideas not distant from the principles of Christian Socialism.
Between 1944 and 1946, the actions of the organization drew the ire of first the Arrow-Cross
and later Mindszenty, particularly following the latter's ascendancy to the Primacy. This can
be traced to a handful of factors which made the organization appear to be progressively further
adrift and disconnected from Mindszenty's control. KALOT enjoyed strong relations with the
Smallholders party, primarily owing to their rural-centric ideologies and constituencies. This
was bolstered by KALOT's participation in the Magyar Front, beginning in May 1944, of which
the Smallholders were also a member. In the aftermath of October 16th, the KALOT leadership
was targeted for arrest, however both Ugrin and Nagy SJ managed to slip across to Soviet lines
and link up with the Debrecen government. They were able to ensure the organization's survival
and legitimacy, both in the eyes of the provisional government and more importantly, the Soviet
occupation authorities. 143
Beginning in the summer of 1945, Nagy SJ acted as a frequent courier between Hungary and
Rome, assisting in talks between the Pope and the Soviet occupation forces regarding a modus
vivendi between the Catholic Church and the Soviet Union. Mindszenty, initially supportive of
Nagy's mission (for he believed it would secure Vatican support for his own policy) came to
resent Nagy's role as interlocutor as it became ever more apparent that his suggestions were not
coming to fruition or being heeded and that the real purpose of Nagy's trips was on behalf of
the Pope and the Soviets. Adding to this, Nagy was seen as the driving force behind the rebukes
which Mindszenty received from the Pope regarding his actions in Hungary. 144 Mindszenty also
perceived KALOT as coming ever more into Communist orbit. In a circular letter of 1946, he
stripped the organization of his support stating that "he no longer considers it a religious
organization...[and orders] the leaders of KALOT to justify their seemingly pro-Soviet
behavior." 145 KALOT was supported "by the entire Jesuit order, Gyula Székfű [one of
Hungary's most prominent historians and ambassador to the Soviet Union], István Balogh [one
of Tildy's secretaries and a Smallholder politician], Ferenc Nagy [Smallholder Prime Minister
from 1946-1947] Dezsö Sulyok [an outspoken parliamentary critic of Soviet occupation and of
his own Smallholder party and their timidity]. István Barankovits [leader of the Democratic

143
These were Ugrin and Nagy SJ who "did everything possible to ensure the continued existence and operation
of the movement." Cf. Ibid, 108.
144
See. 16. July 1946, AE-752's [Töhötöm Nagy] Itinerary, JRX-4227 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 503, WN
18388. See also, 16. May 1946, Rome to Washington, JRX-3153 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 505, WN
18454-18469.
145
Cf. 10. August 1946, Salzburg, LA-734 Source Sarazen in NARA II RG 226, E 108, B 25.

32
People's Party], Béla Kovrig [sociologist and employee of the Ministries for Education and
Religion and Reconstruction] and Béla Varga [together with Tildy, Nagy and Balogh one of the
most important personalities in the Smallholders] agreed that Hungary in no position to change
its policy towards the Soviets, Catholics must fight Mindszenty's plans. Cardinal [Mindszenty]
hopes to provoke a scandal, is largely responsible for Hungary's present plight, will drive
Hungary into further disaster, popularity constitutes a great danger to Hungarian political life
since the people do not realize his reactionary nature. Pontiff in basic agreement with the
policies of KALOT but not prepared to rebuke Mindszenty until he has signed statements from
Hungarian bishops."146 Ultimately, Mindszenty won, perhaps with the help of the Hungarian
Communist Party, which likewise saw KALOT/Vatican overtures with the Soviets as
undermining to their own position within the country.147 The organization was disbanded in
July 1946, shortly after an attack against two Soviet soldiers was swiftly linked to a former
(1943) member.148 Nagy would first be recalled to Rome before relocating to Uruguay and later
Argentina in 1947.

2.12 Conclusion Chapter 2

The first chapter of this work has sought to demonstrate and explain the various factors and
conditions, politically, with regards to intelligence and in a confessional sense within Hungary
from March of 1944, stretching up until the elections of November 1945, and in the case of the
Catholic Church, until the summer of 1946 which formed and shaped those individuals to be
discussed in later chapters. The four foundations (political/general history, intelligence history,
the MFM and church history) serve to illuminate the actions, motivations and backgrounds of
the Hungarians which the Americans would encounter and in some cases employ in Rome and
elsewhere in Italy. They also function as a background for the events which would transpire,
helping to clarify them within a general context.

3.1 American Intelligence Services: Overview of the OSS

Attention must now be turned to the second cornerstone of this work, namely that of the
American Intelligence Services, the administrative and structural intricacies of which must be
discussed. The main organization to be examined, the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter

146
Cf. Ibid.
147
Kenez advances the theory that collaboration between the Hungarian Communist Party and Mindszenty was
responsible for the destruction of KALOT. He notes that Nagy enjoyed "excellent relations with the Soviet High
Command" and that "...it is unlikely that the Russians on their own would have turned against the organization."
Cf. Kenez, Hungary, 278-281.
148
The gunman, István Pénzes, whose body was located burned in an attic, was found lying alongside an
(unburned) KALOT membership card. Ibid, 138.

33
OSS) played host to a wide variety of branches which performed varying functions and were
staffed and emphasized accordingly. For the purposes of this work, two of the most prolific
branches of the organization are to be explored, as well as individual regional and supra-
regional commands, and finally, on a 'micro-level' two individual desks within these commands.
In July of 1941, the Office of the Coordinator of Information (hereafter COI) was formed, with
William Donovan, a highly decorated World War I veteran and personal (albeit not political)
friend of Franklin D. Roosevelt heading the organization.149 The central figure and namesake
of scores of works, it is sufficient to say that Donovan enjoyed the confidence of the
Commander-in-Chief and although not lacking in powerful enemies, had an equally large
complement of powerful advocates. Donovan was neither stranger to controversy nor offset by
failure, so long as results could eventually be achieved.150 It was for a combination of these
reasons, mostly linked to his bearishness, that out of the COI, on the 13th of June, 1942 the
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was formed, by Presidential Directive and subordinated to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).151 Although he is continually subject to, it should be said, not
unwarranted criticism, Donovan did have moments of absolute genius and the mark he left on
intelligence, particularly in the US is undeniable. One such moment shows through in a June
1941 memo that states "Strategy without information upon which it can rely is helpless.
Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose." 152
This statement concisely summarizes the polarity of what would become OSS; namely the
ability to function effectively, based on the application of intelligence gleaned from reliable
sources.
As an organization OSS was tasked with a wide breadth of duties. What would today be termed
HUMINT (human intelligence) was collected both abroad (via SI or Secret Intelligence) and

149
Nearly every work which discusses the OSS, or American intelligence during World War II begins with ever
more detailed character sketches of Donovan, his relationship to Roosevelt, his place within American politics
and so on. This 'tradition 'will be skipped in this work, and instead an analytical and detailed review of the
organizational structure of the OSS (which is rarely part and parcel) will be substituted in its place. The author
directs the reader, should they be inquisitive regarding Donovan to Anthony C. [Brown], The Last [Hero]. Wild
Bill Donovan (New York 1984), Strategic Services Unit History Project [SSU HP], The [Secret] War Report of
the OSS.(New York 1976) and Douglas [Waller], [Wild] Bill Donovan: The Spymaster who created the OSS and
modern American espionage (New York 2011).
150
Donovan's approach to and utilization of black (secretive) and white (open) propaganda was one of the chief
impulses for the formation of the OSS out of the COI. Cf. Lawrence H. [McDonald], The OSS and its [Records],
78-102 in The [Secrets War]. The Office of Strategic Services in World War Two, George [Chalou] (Ed.).
(Washington, 1992).
151
Donovan's COI escapades earned that organization the wrath of J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, the disdain
of Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State and the jealousy of Army and Navy intelligence chiefs. Cf.
McDonald, Records in Ibid.
152
Cf. Nelson [MacPherson], American Intelligence in War-time [London]. The Story of the OSS. (London,
2003) Citation of the original appears on page 49 and is from 10. June 1941, William Donovan, Memorandum of
Establishment of Service of Strategic Information in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 70.

34
from various foreigners or refugees living in the United States (via FNB or Foreign Nationalities
Branch). This was in turn analyzed and processed by R&A (Research and Analysis). By and
large, such material (or the most valued materials) was understandably of a strategic nature (i.e.
relating to troop movements, tactical deployments, industrial bases, infrastructure etc.) however,
also included political, economic and miscellaneous matters. Morale and Special Operations
(MO and SO respectively) organized missions into hostile territory aimed in the first instance
at disrupting the enemy psychologically and in the second, tactically. SO Branch made ample
use of contact with various European resistance and underground movements at times achieved
153
via the efforts of the New York City and London based Labor Branch. The
counterintelligence branch of OSS (X-2, sometimes referred to as CE or CI) is recognized as
the shield (and in latter years, an effective sword as well) of the organization but was originally
formed to function as liaison with the British officers handling the sensitive ULTRA decrypts
of German SIGINT (Signals Intelligence), a role which ultimately made it into an elite within
an elite.154 By and large, the branches listed here comprise the bulk of sources in this thesis,
although further offices and auxiliary sections did exist within OSS. Those described can be
divided into Intelligence (SI, X-2, R&A, FNB) and Strategic Services (SO, MO), the latter of
which play a minor role in this work. While this is a rather 'official' overview of how the
organization was meant to be seen, and perhaps in Washington, did see itself, it is imperative
to stress that this structure lost rigidity and the differences between sections blurred in Europe,
and in particular in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MedTO) as the war progressed.
For example, by 1944, both X-2 and SI were conducting operations which not only overlapped,
but also fulfilled roles envisioned originally for the (by then) largely defunct Special Operations
branch. This chasm would only grow as the war came to an end with SI and X-2 emerging as
the two most preeminent branches of the OSS and SSU, seconded only by the R&A branch
(which would become a part of the Department of State in 1945).155

153
Cf. Richard Harris [Smith], OSS. The [Secret History] of America's First Central Intelligence Agency.
(London, 1972) 12f.
154
Michael [Warner], The Office of Strategic Services,[ America's first] Intelligence Agency (Washington DC,
2007). A section of text, believed to be an excerpt concerning X-2 from the above cited work is available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/oss/art07.htm. Last viewed 09.04.2015. Unfortunately, the link to a PDF of the full book (published
in 2000 and purportedly available in the CIA's digital library) does not work, and despite a request concerning its
status (whether re-classified, or simply the result of a broken link) remains unanswered. The link to the book is
visible at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs.
155
The justification for this is spelled out in a document published in 1946, when the War Department was
reviewing the activities and actions of OSS and SSU (see SSU sub-chapter below), one of the steps taken when
deciding what to do with the remnants of the two organizations. The document states that "in some areas,
operations which would normally be described as SI operations either for the reason that SI has no local

35
3.2 X-2 & SI
It is prudent to examine the two most critical branches to this work, namely SI and X-2, referred
to so candidly by one researcher as "the coaches, the clever men, the quarterbacks."156 X-2 was
created to act as American liaison for ULTRA decrypts, first as a branch within SI in March
1943.157 The British, however, "expressed an unwillingness to exchange counter-intelligence
information with SI." and thus, on the 15th of June, 1943, X-2 was re-constituted as a branch
independent of SI, reporting directly to Donovan. The chief of X-2 was, for the entire length of
this study, James R. Murphy. 158 While the connection between ULTRA decrypts and
Counterintelligence may seem tenuous, when one takes into consideration the usage of these
same decrypts to apprehend and often enough 'play-back' nearly all German agents sent into
Britain up until that time, (known as Double-Cross' or XX operations from which the American
'X-2' is purported to have been derived) the reasoning for doing so becomes more apparent.159
Per (Revised) Order No. 13, June 15 1943 commissioning X-2, its functions were "(1) To collect
data concerning espionage and subversive activities of the enemy; (2) To analyze the data
received, exchange data with interested agencies and to take action thereon; (3) To take
measures to protect the operational security of OSS and to prevent the penetration of American
espionage and similar activities; (4) To cooperate with other counter-espionage agencies of the
Allies; (5) To prepare secret lists of subversive personalities in foreign areas for the Theater
Commanders and such other government agencies as the Director might designate."160 This
order would be interpreted within X-2 as requiring its officers "(1) To establish and operate
throughout the world, exclusive of the Western Hemisphere, a counter-intelligence espionage
organization, to cover and operate in all theaters of war and in such other parts of the world as
the national interest and the military operations of the United States warranted. (2) To effect

representatives or that there is no longer any substantial distinction between the two types of investigations since
the enemy factor has disappeared [were conducted by X-2]." See 4-6. March 1946, Supplementary Joint Survey,
X-2 Branch in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 314, WN10847.
156
Robin [Winks], [Cloak] and Gown. Scholars in the Secret War (New York, 1987) 61.
157
Per General Order No. 13 of 1 March 1943, a Counter-Intelligence division within the SI Branch was
established. See 4-6. March 1946, Supplementary Joint Survey, X-2 Branch in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 314,
WN 10847 and SSU HP, Secret, 190.
158
Murphy was "a lawyer who had worked with Donovan in the Department of Justice...a slim, quiet-voiced man
of utter loyalty who won the admiration and affection of all who worked with him and who showed a fine eye as
a recruiter." Cf. Winks, Cloak, 260f.
159
Robin Winks disputes this, suggesting that there were several names for the Counterintelligence Branch
proposed by a group he dubs the ’founding core’ (James Murphy, Norman H. Pearson, Dana Durand, John
McDonough, Robert Blum and Hubert Will) of the branch, however, subsequent research has discounted what
Winks designates as „folklore”. Cf. Winks, Cloak, 263. For subsequent research see Warner, America's First as
well as 'Timothy [Naftali], [Artifice]: James Angleton and X2 Operations in Italy, 218-245 in Secrets War,
Chalou (Ed.).
160
See 4-6. March 1946, Supplementary Joint Survey, X-2 Branch in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 314,
WN10847.

36
operational security of OSS." 161 In line with these directives, X-2 undertook two forms of
operations during the war, "(1) It sent representatives to several neutral countries to establish
stations; (2) It organized special military counter-intelligence detachments to operate in the
European theatre." 162 These representatives, at least in neutral countries received State
Department cover as attaches, a trend which would become commonplace among the successor
organizations of the OSS.
On a more meta-level, Counterintelligence entailed "a distinct and independent intelligence
function. It embraces not only the protection of the intelligence interests of the government it
serves, but, by control and manipulation of the intelligence operations of other nations, it
performs a dynamic function in discerning their plans and intentions, as well as in deceiving
them. An effective counter-espionage organization is therefore an intelligence instrument of
vital importance to national security."163 A final duty which X-2 carried out was that of vetting,
or verifying the reliability (both political and otherwise) of SI agents.164 It should be mentioned
that vetting was also undertaken by the Security Branch of OSS, which functioned outside of
the Operations and Services groups, being subordinated to the Director's Office in an auxiliary
capacity, however this was carried on first and foremost for those employees working on US
soil, and with the advent of X-2 Branch, continually under that section's direction.165
Within a year of formation, X-2 Branch had grown to over 500 personnel comprising 16 field
stations.166 The necessity for real-time utilization of ULTRA decrypts in the field led to the
formation within X-2 of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Units (SCI's). These acted as a
bridge between the raw ULTRA decrypts in London and mid-level and senior military
commanders and OSS officers in the field, removing processing and turn-around time. SCI
Units were tasked with “accompany[ing] Allied invading forces in continental Europe and
perform[ing] counterintelligence operations using ULTRA intercepts...[and also] included the
operation of double agents...in collaboration with British Deception Service.”167 The role of the

161
Ibid.
162
Ibid.
163
Cf. SSU HP, Secret, 189.
164
Cf. Strategic Services Unit History Project [SSU HP] The [Overseas] Targets. War Report of the OSS Vol. II
(New York, 1976), 92.
165
Security Branch "was responsible for the establishment and maintenance of such protective measures as shall
be necessary or advisable in order to safeguard and make secure the OSS, its operations, members, property and
records, and the areas, offices and buildings which is occupies or uses." X-2 did work with Security branch in
that "most of the names investigated by Security were submitted to X-2 for further check. X-2, in turn,
frequently called on Security for confirmation or supplementary investigation of names or cases of possible
counter-espionage interest." Cf. SSU HP, Secret, 134 but also 87-89 for Security during the COI era.
166
Cf. Winks, Cloak, 264f.
167
Cf. Robert [Crowden], A [Pioneering] Experiment: OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II. In:
Studies in Intelligence [SI], 58/2 (2014) 65-75.

37
SCI units will assume particular importance when discussing X-2 Italy and counterintelligence
operations in the Mediterranean (where they were known as SCI/Z units).
With the cessation of hostilities in Europe, X-2 performed many of the same functions as those
outlined above, but also began the “collection and reporting of information concerning (1) the
intelligence services indigenous to each area and (2) the activities of foreign intelligence
services in that area.”168 Additionally, the end of the war and the outflow of former enemy
combatants, war criminals, civilians, displaced persons, refugees and others actually meant
more work for X-2. Herein, it is possible to see how X-2 grew to assume pre-emptive
capabilities and expertise as opposed to merely preventative ones and maintained force levels
following the cessation of the war in Europe being one of the few branches of OSS to actually
increase in size and importance in the postwar period.
Turning our attention to SI and its functions, its beginnings can be traced to the COI when a
similarly functioning branch was headed by David K.E. Bruce, a prominent lawyer who had
married into one of the wealthiest and most influential families in the United States, the
Mellon's.169 SI "opened field stations, trained case officers, ran agent operations and processed
reports in Washington." 170 The beginnings of SI Branch are somewhat difficult to arrange
owing to several seemingly conflicting histories of this period.171 Before Bruce, there were COI
and OSS representatives in London, however, for the purposes of this study, the official history
of the London SI Office is used. 172 Bruce's successor at the helm of SI was Whitney H.
Shepardson, an aide at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and a former director of the
Woodrow Wilson Foundation. 173 Shepardson assumed his new duties on the 1st of June,

168
See 4-6. March 1946, Supplementary Joint Survey, X-2 Branch in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 314, WN
10847.
169
See Smith, Secret History, 163-165.
170
See Warner, America's First, Secret Intelligence available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-
of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/oss/art06.htm. Last accessed 09.04.2015.
171
In Dulles, Master of Spies, Bruce is referred to as “London Station Chief”. In Casey he is introduced as “the
European Chief of OSS”; Sir Robin Brook describes him as the “combined head of SI and SO”. MacPherson
begins Bruce’s tenure as chief of SA/B from December 1941. Winks offers what is perhaps the most precise
description of Bruce's functions barring the official branch history with the following: “When Donovan first set
up undercover operations he had begun with a Special Activities branch of two divisions...SI was referred to as
SA/B...being a designation originally given by using the last initial of the division chief at the time: David K.E.
Bruce, head of SI.” See James [Srodes], [Allen Dulles]. Master of Spies (Washington DC 1999) 215. Joseph E.
[Persico], Casey. From the OSS to the CIA (New York 1990) 58. Sir Robin [Brook], The London Operation: The
[British] View, 69-73 in Secrets War, Chalou (Ed.). Winks, Cloak, 259f and MacPherson, London, 71.
172
MacPherson notes that William D. Whitney came as COI representative to London in October of 1941, and
was replaced in July of the following year by William Phillips. See [War Diary], SI Branch OSS London,
Volume 1, Introductory Survey of establishment, activities and plans of SI/ETO (European Theater of
Operations) in Covert War 2. The [Spy Factory] and Secret Intelligence, John [Mendelsohn] (Ed.). See also
MacPherson, London, 50, 56 and 71.
173
See MacPherson, London¸75-77 and Srodes, Dulles, 91.

38
1942.174 One month later, William P. Maddox, who would go on to become SI Chief in the
Mediterranean Theater of Operations, arrived in London fulfilling a capacity as Shepardson's
deputy.175 Maddox and Shepardson concerned themselves with "the collection and transmittal
to Washington, for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of strategic information from the
intelligence organizations, and particularly from the secret intelligence organizations, of the
British and other Allied governments in London."176 This entailed "representatives of SA/B
establish[ing] and carefully cultivat[ing] close and confident relations with the officials of each
available source of information and obtain[ing] an intimate knowledge of how their intelligence
was obtained and appraised, so as to weigh its credibility and put it in its proper context when
actioning it to Washington."177
In January of 1943, Maddox was elevated to acting head of SI London, becoming chief of the
branch on the 13th of March. Shepardson would divide his time between Washington and
London for the rest of the war.178 On the 4th of June 1943, OSS London officially became a
military detachment, known as OSS Detachment ETOUSA (European Theater of Operations,
US Army) although it would be periodically referred to as SI London.179 Maddox would head
SI London until the spring of 1944 (his successor, Colonel John Haskell took over on the 1st of
May 1944).180 Maddox was transferred, following the fall of Rome, to spearhead Mediterranean
SI Operations which were coordinated from Algiers prior to July 1944 and the establishment of
OSS facilities in southern Italy and Sicily.181

3.3 OSS MedTO

OSS in the Mediterranean was re-designated, as of the 11th of May 1944 as '2677th Regiment
OSS (Provisional)'and attached to HQ NATOUSA (Headquarters North African Theater of
Operations US Army) with that unit's allotment of some 2,000 personnel being established

174
See War Diary in Spy Factory, Mendelsohn (Ed.).
175
Ibid.
176
Ibid.
177
Ibid.
178
Here it is perhaps confusing why Shepardson was promoted so frequently. This author popstulates that since
Shepardson was head of SA/B, he oversaw SI Operations as a whole, which were at that point in time, based
almost entirely in London, thereby making him the first chief of SI London (and bestowing upon him the
anachronistic title of Chief of SI London) when in reality he fulfilled the duties of both Chief of SI London and
(thereby) Chief of SI Branch [in Europe] from June 1942 until the end of that year. As his responsibilities grew
and diverged, the war expanded, and OSS found its feet, it was necessary for a unique head of SI London to be
designated. See Warner, America's First, Secret Intelligence at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-
study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/oss/art06.htm. Last accessed 09.04.2015.
179
This date is fairly close to the date (18. September 1943) that OSS London would "acquire the authority to
function as the primary US intelligence service in the ETO [European Theater of Operations]." Cf. MacPherson,
London, 59. See also War Diary in Spy Factory, Mendelsohn (Ed.).
180
See War Diary in Spy Factory, Mendelsohn (Ed.).
181
Cf. SSU HP, Overseas, 86.

39
within the OSS' framework, outside of the military's own force allotments.182 During this time,
the existing OSS infrastructure, particularly that of Italian SI in Sicily was reorganized in the
wake of intensifying disputes between that section's predominantly Italian-American members
and new (non-Italian) arrivals from London and the US concerning a wide variety of issues.183
The 2677th Regiment represented a compromise between US (Military) Theater Commanders
in MedTO and the OSS hierarchy in Washington in that "To meet Theater requests and priorities,
it was essential that the OSS staff be sufficiently flexible to contribute wherever possible, while
at the same time following or adapting original branch responsibilities as necessity [Sic!] or as
time permitted."184 In practice, OSS MedTO functioned as a sort of hybrid unit; it was on paper
a military formation (Regiment) had a clear command and rank structure, drew from military
stores, but was allowed a degree of independence by Theater commanders so long as when
called upon, it was able to contribute or provide assistance in active (military) operations and
plans. "The pattern of OSS development in MedTO was virtually the reverse of that in ETO. In
London, the need for meticulous planning, liaison and coordination, both with SHAEF
[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force] and with British and other national
counterparts of OSS, had resulted generally in the formation of a large and complete overhead
staff which then created a working organization to fit the specific assignments. In MedTO,
small units devoted their full efforts from the beginning to the double task of developing initial
penetrations and contacts wherever possible inside enemy occupied territory, while at the same
time establishing themselves with AFHQ [Allied Forces Headquarters] and the individual
armies and services."185 Furthermore, whereas in London, OSS had cooperated extensively with
the British intelligence services, in MedTO the situation is described as "... those of
complementary services, independent in their activities."186
Apart from operational autonomy, another important facet of OSS operations in MedTO was
the widespread activity of individual units and the aggressive and influential measures taken by
mid and junior-level commanders and officers. "After the departure of the original OSS Theater
chief in October 1943, succeeding high-echelon personnel, frequently taking over a functioning
organization of progressively experienced field operatives engaged in developing intricate
operations on a large scale. They, therefore gave the operating sections wide autonomy and

182
It should be noted that NATOUSA and METO (Mediterranean Theater of Operations) merged in July of 1944
forming MedTO. See SSU HP, Secret, 208 and SSU HP, Overseas, 83.
183
These disputes are wholly outside the scope of this work, and largely irrelevant to Hungarian operations,
however more information can be found in Max [Corvo], The OSS in [Italy], 1942-1945 (New York 1990).
184
Cf. SSU HP, Overseas, 86.
185
Cf. SSU HP, Overseas, 85.
186
Cf. Ibid.

40
served more as high-echelon liaison officers, supporting and facilitating field activities than as
actual field commanders."187 OSS Operations in the Mediterranean were overseen by Colonel
Edward C. Glavin beginning in September/October of 1943 up until the cessation of hostilities
in Europe in May 1945.188 With the reorganization of the Regiment in July of 1944, the 2677th
rebased to Caserta, with elements encamping themselves in Bari, Rome and as time progressed,
other liberated Italian cities.189 Organizationally, the 2677th was composed of four companies
(A-D) with Company B being the most important for this study, as it was "an administrative
unit with jurisdiction over all OSS operations mounted from the area of Bari and Brindisi.
Activities from Company B into the Balkans and Central Europe were controlled directly from
Regimental Headquarters." 190 Maddox, serving under Glavin as head of SI in the 2677th
oversaw 4 desks; Italy (headed by Vincent Scamporino, based from Rome), Central Europe
(headed by Howard Chapin, based in Bari) Balkans (headed by Robert Joyce, also Bari) and
Reports (headed by Ted Ryan). All branches save Reports are of varying importance in this
work, however particular attention will be paid to operations arising from Chapin's Central
European Branch (christened SICE, or Secret Intelligence Central Europe, explained in the next
sub-chapter). Although the nomenclature 'Balkans' would periodically include Hungary, Joyce's
Balkan operations were focused by and large on the territories of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,
Bulgaria and Albania (Greece being a British preserve) with Hungary not figuring greatly into
their domain, contrarily to the interpretation of Balkans within Mediterranean X-2 (explained
in the sub-chapter 'X-2 MedTO/SCI Unit Z').

3.4 SICE & the Hungarian Desk

Secret Intelligence Central Europe (SICE) was led by Lt. Colonel Howard M. Chapin, a
graduate of Dartmouth and a former advertising executive at the General Foods Company.191
Chapin had enlisted in November of 1942 and applied officially for OSS service in February of
1943. 192 In March, he became the Acting SI North African Theater Officer (based in
Washington), subordinated to Whitney H. Shepardson. Between February and May of 1944
(then) Major Chapin alternated between North Africa and Washington, finally heading to Italy
in May of 1944 to assume command of the "then unorganized Central European Section of the

187
Nowhere was this truer than in X-2 MedTO and the SCI/Z Units. See Ibid.
188
Cf. Arthur L. [Funk], The OSS in [Algiers], 166-182 in Secrets War, Chalou (Ed.), 170.
189
Cf. SSU HP, Overseas, 86.
190
Cf. Ibid, 88.
191
See Howard Chapin Personnel File in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 117.
192
Since his date of enlistment, he had worked at OSS as an 'Area supervisor'. See NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B
117.

41
 193
Secret Intelligence Branch." SICE was "charged with...collecting, evaluating and
disseminating military, political and economic information of value to the allied forces against
enemies of the United States...the area of responsibility included Austria, southern Germany,
Czechoslovakia and Hungary."194 The report continues "At that time [June 1944] the Secret
Intelligence Branch, OSS, MedTO had no intelligence links into any of these countries.
Personnel available to assist in the work consisted of four men with some language and/or area
knowledge and a group of eight agent prospects." Chapin was "...able, within a relatively short
time, to develop a closely coordinated workable organization; prepare for dispatch a small
group of fully trained and brief agents and proceed on a new and expanding program of agent
recruiting and training."195 In August of 1944, Chapin's temporary posting to Chief SICE was
made permanent.196 The total staff of the section was to be set at 15 (although this would rise
to around 60 within less than a year), divided between Czechoslovakian, German-Austrian and
Hungarian desks, as well as a Training Area. 197 Plans for the desk were already floated in May
of 1944, before Chapin left Washington with Gerhard van Arkel, of the Labor Desk (in London)
functioning as the first (temporary) commander of SICE. SICE was originally based, at least
organizationally in Algiers, however in June moved to Bari. An advance base under Robert
Joyce, the future head of the SI Balkans desk was likewise set up in Bari.198
SICE represented the unification of a wide-range of Central European experts under one
organizational entity who had hitherto been strewn across the Near-East and North Africa.
Following the formation of SICE, Abraham Gilmore Flues (future Commanding Officer or CO
of the Budapest City Team) and Paul Lienau came from Cairo while Earl Fuller (the first and
perhaps most permanent head of the Hungarian Desk within SICE) journeyed from Algiers.
Other experts, specifically those for Hungary, would over the coming months likewise rally in
Bari under SICE. The first major attempt by SICE to penetrate Central Europe was via
Yugoslavia with the assistance of the Tito Partisans, in line with its objectives of "[being able]
to establish secret intelligence and counter espionage networks in Austria, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia and to accomplish the foregoing by establishing a mission at an advanced base

193
1. June 1945, William P. Maddox to Commanding General MTOUSA, Recommendation for Award [Legion
of Merit] in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 117.
194
Ibid.
195
Ibid.
196
4. August 1944, Edward J. Green, USNR to Intelligence Officer [Robert P. Joyce], Request for Major Chapin
in NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 14.
197
30. June 1944, Howard M. Chapin, Acting Chief SICE to Commanding Officer SBS; Organization of Section
in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 268, WN 11312.
198
24. May 1944, (Washington) Glavin and Chapin to Washington, London, Cairo, Berne, Naples, No. 3567 in
NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 100.

42
in Jugoslavia [Sic!] for purposes of recruiting, training and maintaining a Headquarters base."199
Chapin had optimistic plans for accomplishing the tasks his section had been given; within two
months of assuming command he cabled Washington that he hoped to train between "ten and
twenty SI agents for Central Europe...at villas near Bari [of] Slovaks, Hungarians, Czechs and
possibly some Germans."200 Earl Fuller, a Texas oilman who had worked on Hungarian oilfields
until 1940 was the first (and third) head of the Hungarian desk within SICE, serving in that
capacity from the 15th of June (when he was transferred from Algiers, where he had been
working on Spanish matters) until the 10th of August 1944, when he departed for the US on
temporary assignment on behalf of the Hungarian desk.201 Although he was an "earnest and
loyal man, willing to work hard on the projects assigned to him", Chapin had the following to
say after one month of collaborating "We have, however, been disappointed in him in some
respects. As head of the Hungarian Desk, he has not proven qualified to undertake full
responsibility nor have we felt we could trust him to proceed on his own initiative. He is
distinctly not an administrator, organizer or planner but much more field operator type."202
Perhaps most damning for Fuller was the following "So far, he is distinctly handicapped by his
incomplete education and his lack of broad knowledge of Hungarian affairs. He is thoroughly
familiar with one area of Hungary around the oil fields which he drilled some years ago, and is
able to converse, although not fluently, in the language. Consequently, his contacts with parts
of the more considerably cosmopolitan Hungarian group in Rome have been limited in scope
and productiveness."203 Subsequently, Chapin made the decision not to remove or 'can' Fuller,
but to dispatch him to the United States to conduct research work for the Hungarian Desk,
essentially removing him from operational oversight, without imparting any perceived sleight;
the lieutenants acting as Fuller’s deputies taking over in his stead.204 Fuller's successor was 1st
Lt. Nicholas Doman, a naturalized American citizen (b. 1913, Budapest as Miklós Domán).205

199
10. May 1944, Program for OSS Penetration of Central Europe, Including: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia
in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 100.
200
27. July 1944, Bari to Algiers (Relay) No. 373 in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 100.
201
4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA II,
RG 226, E 99, B 36.
202
Cf. 28. July 1944, Howard M. Chapin to Whitney H. Shepardson in NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 14.
203
Cf. 28. July 1944, Howard M. Chapin to Whitney H. Shepardson in NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 14.
204
4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA II,
RG 226, E 99, B 36.
205
Despite Doman's membership in the Catholic Association for Peace, and attendance of the famous Fasori
Evangelical Gimnázium in Budapest, his family was, at least in name Jewish, although according to an interview
he gave, despite "occasional Jewish education [in school] were not active practitioners". He "practically never"
attended Synagogue, his family did not maintain a Kosher household and he remembers only celebrating
Christmas "in a secular, not a religious sense" in Hungary while a young boy. At the age of 19, "he and some
relatives converted to Catholicism....for well-being reasons." Peculiar for the time is that none of Doman's
personnel files make mention of his 'Jewishness' (which was often interchanged with ethnicity/nationality). See

43
Doman possessed all of the qualifications which Fuller did not; he held a law degree from the
University of Colorado, was a Professor at the University of Chicago and Williams and Mary
College, spoke in addition to Hungarian and English, French, Spanish and German fluently and
had written several books for the OSS on various topics, mostly concerning Central Europe.
For all of his qualifications, however, he also embodied many deficiencies which Fuller, or
other heads of the desk did not. Doman, prior to his posting to Bari, was based in Cairo where
he had earned a horrible reputation. An unsigned letter describes him as "...the smart operator,
the guy who looks for angles, the smiling, smooth talking guy who is never quite sincere, who
never looks quite in your eye when he talks. Added to this is an aggressiveness which is quite
irritating."206 Even when Chapin was discussing his disappointment with Fuller, he found space
to mention Doman stressing "We [SICE staff] are not too sanguine about [him] in view of the
warning you have given us. Nevertheless, everyone agrees that he is one of the leading
American experts on Hungary and should be better qualified than Fuller."207 Chapin's intuition
would prove correct as Doman lasted little more than a month in Bari with his reassignment
being requested in the middle of September 1944. Chapin would write "During the six weeks
that Lt. Doman has been assigned to the Hungarian Desk, his political approach to the
Hungarian personalities and the intelligence operations projected for Hungary have made it
impossible for him to deal with these personalities and operations objectively and without
prejudice. Since OSS intelligence operations must be non-political, the judgement of a Desk
Chief should be as free from political bias or complication as possible. Lt. Doman's judgement
is invariably colored by an involved political attitude and by political manipulations." 208
Precisely what Chapin was referring to will be explained later (see Roman Colony Hungarians
and Bowery/Dallam and Luttor subchapters), however it suffices to say that Doman found
himself morally at odds with anyone who had in any way been part of the Horthy government,
viewing them en masse as Fascists.209 Aside from his political views, Chapin also found Doman

Nicholas Doman Personnel File in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 192 and "War Crimes Trial Participant Nicholas
Doman Testimony", interview conducted in 1998 by the USC Shoah Foundation, available at
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NW8KPA3Qz3I.
206
1. August 1944, Unknown [Possibly John Fistere of Morale Operations] to Eugene Warner, MO Rome in
NARA II, RG 226, E 139, B 132.
207
4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA II,
RG 226, E 99, B 36.
208
21. September 1944, Howard M. Chapin to Commanding Officer Company B. Re-assignment of Officer in
NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 14.
209
Doman attempts to hide this in his regular reports, however in the after-action report penned at the end of the
war, he makes abundantly clear his sentiment regarding the Horthy government. It is ironic that the man who
bore the brunt of most of his criticism during his short time in Bari, Zsolt Aradi, was, in many ways quite similar
to Doman, but nonetheless, seen as compromised owing to his position within the Hungarian government. For

44
wholly improper for the helm of the Hungarian Desk "Lt. Doman’s relations and those of his
desk with the rest of HQ have been unwarrantably difficult and strained. Abrupt, dictatorial and
unreasonable with subordinates and has unnecessarily created organizational problems. His
approach to the problem of penetration for intelligence purposes has in general been impractical
and unrealistic. He has failed to define objectives clearly, to plan operations with a view to the
practical difficulties to be encountered, to work with sufficient attention to the numerous and
arduous details of preparing teams for infiltration into enemy territory and has consistently been
hasty and ill-considered in operational planning."210 Doman was dismissed around the 20th of
September 1944 and replaced by Tibor Keszthelyi, on a temporary basis.211
Keszthelyi (b. 1909, Fiume, today Rijeka, Croatia), "racial origin...Hebrew, although physical
as well as mental characteristics are non-Hebrew" had come to the US in 1939 and attended 3
years of university before enlisting in November 1942.212 He became an American citizen in
August of 1943. He is described as a "man of courage, ingenuity and [possessing the]
intelligence required [for OSS work]"; he spoke Hungarian, English, German, Italian and
French fluently and the embodiment of "an ideal type of agent'"213 Keszthelyi was brought into
the OSS by Francis Kalnay, who would later go on to become the X-2 Balkans Chief in Bari
(see X-2 MedTO/SCI Unit Z and SSU-Austria/Italy).214 Keszthelyi was originally earmarked
for penetration of Hungary, however until this could be effected successfully (in the aftermath
of the Sparrow Mission) such operations were temporarily suspended. During the summer of
1944, with the volatile war situation suggestions were made to penetrate Hungary overland,
either via Rumania or as eventually came to be, via Yugoslavia with Keszthelyi landing near to
the city of Požega, in Slavonia on the 26th of August 1944 as part of the Toledo mission,
returning to Bari on the 18th of September 1944.215 Upon Keszthelyi's return to Bari, he was
promoted to acting head of the Hungarian Desk, while simultaneously being prepared to enter
Hungary via Slovakia, in which weeks before a military coup had taken place. Keszthelyi would
leave Bari for what would be his final mission on the 7th of October 1944 as leader of the
Bowery/Dallam team, a sub-group of the Downes/Houseboat mission to Slovakia (see

Doman's after-action report see 15. June 1945, Nicholas Doman, Report on Field Conditions in NARA II, RG
226, E 210, B 340 WN 13342-13351.
210
21. September 1944, Howard M. Chapin to Commanding Officer Company B. Re-assignment of Officer in
NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 14.
211
20. Septemebr 1944, Howard M. Chapin to All SICE Desk Heads NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
212
Cf. Tibor Keszthelyi Personnel File in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 402.
213
Ibid.
214
Cf. Tibor Keszthelyi Personnel File in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 402.
215
25. September 1944, Gilmore Flues to Howard Chapin, Toledo Mission in NARA II, RG 226, E UD-124, B
28.

45
Bowery/Dallam and Luttor sub-chapter).216 Fuller had, in the run-up to Doman's dismissal been
recalled from the US and he arrived at the beginning of October, where he again led the
Hungarian desk, this time until the 16th of April 1945.217
From the end of April until the dissolution of the OSS in 1945, the Hungarian Desk in SICE
would be chaired by Martin Himler (b. 1888 as Márton Himler in Pasztor, Hungary), the former
Hungarian MO officer in Bari. Himler had a colorful past as a journalist who had left Hungary
in 1908 and proceeded to found his own all-Hungarian utopian mining company in the
Appalachian Mountains during the 1920's.218 Himler had worked for the MO branch in the
Mediterranean, spending time in Cairo before coming to Bari (Doman had likewise been
attached to MO in Cairo). In 1944, he was included into the Budapest City Team (see Budapest
City Unit sub-chapter) and following Fuller's discharge in April of 1945, took over the
Hungarian Desk (which would over the summer of 1945 be renamed the Hungarian Section)
which moved with the rest of SICE from Bari to Caserta, shortly before departing for Austria.219

3.5 X-2 MedTO/SCI Unit Z

The second supra-regional branch crucial to this study is X-2 MedTO. X-2 in MedTO was
headed nominally by Captain (later Major) Graham Erdwurm, however as mentioned
previously, area level commanders, in line with the realities of operating in an enemy-occupied
country (Italy) were given far more autonomy than they had enjoyed in London. In a candid
report in 1949, James J. Angleton, who by that time was directing the CIA's Office of Special
Operations (OSO) wrote "through directives signed by 109 (General Donovan) X-2 was given
a special status within OSS...all X-2 units reported directly to the Ryder Street X-2 component
in London [X-2 London] or, when special source materials were not involved, directly to
Washington with info copies to London. In all instances, X-2 maintained the closest contact
with A.C.S (Acting Chief of Security), G-2 American (Military Intelligence) in AFHQ (then
General George Smith)." 220 As such Erdwurm had the "difficult but not impossible task of

216
This will be explained in greater detail below, see 27. January 1945, Chief SICE to Chief X-2, Operational
History, Dawes and Associated Team Slovakia in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 22.
217
4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA II,
RG 226, E 99, B 36.
218
There is at the time of writing an 'autobiography' of Martin Himler in the works and set for publication in
2015. See http://www.appalachianhistory.net/2014/11/saving-himler-house.html last accessed 05.03.2015.
219
The exact date when this change was affected is unknown to the author, and is complicated by the fact that
Fuller was most likely only a figurehead for the Hungarian Desk with the actual planning and work coming from
several sources to be explained below, one of whom was most certainly Himler. See 28. July 1945, Flues to
Amzon, Paris, London, Rome in NARA II, RG 226, E 88, B 645 and 19. September 1945, OSS MedTO Report
August in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.
220
8. August 1949, Memo to the Assistant Director of Special Operations, Interviews with Subject of CIA No.
[Redacted] in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 13, Robert Bishop Volume II.

46
giving the 2677th Regiment Command the satisfaction or sensation that they were in fact
controlling the OSS counter-espionage functions (without disclosing to them anything of import)
and, at the same time securing [Sic!] from the Regimental Commander the logistic support
necessary for the X-2 units in the field. In effect Erdwurm, according to instructions from Mr.
James R. Murphy, was to be nothing more than a ‘buffer’ charged with protecting the
independence of X-2 and the existence of special sources at the command level...He was not to
exercise an executive role or to have details concerning X-2 activities..."221 What this meant
was that the officer in charge of forward X-2 operations in MedTO (SCI/Z and its sub-branches)
was the de facto commander of X-2 operations in the theater, with Erdwurm only serving as a
figurehead. Therefore, in following X-2 operations in Italy, it is key to ignore rank and chain-
of-command, and pay attention rather to the commanders of the forward operating units.
Until January 1944, X-2 had played a "negligible role" in the North African and Sicilian
Campaigns.222 Here, we should not underestimate the role played by a growing SI/X-2 rivalry,
particularly following the landings in Sicily in 1943, in fostering inter-agency hostilities.223 X-
2's subordinate role in MedTO changed in January 1944 with arrival of Major Andrew H.
Berding, the first 'forward' X-2 commander. Berding's operations were based in Naples, then
later in Rome and finally in Florence.224 His unit was for all intents and purposes, the face of
X-2 in MedTO. Berding commanded the forward operations of X-2 until September of 1944
during which he initiated and maintained X-2 contacts with Italian (Republican) Military, Naval
and Civilian Intelligence and Counterintelligence but also ensured that forward operations of
X-2 were concerned first and foremost with "the clean-up of stay-behind agents for the Army
and [also] good starts [being] made toward longer-range counter-espionage operations."225 In
July of 1944, after Rome had fallen, the distinction between Erdwurm's command and (what
was then) Berding's was made clearer when X-2 operations in Italy were designated as Security
and Counter-Intelligence Unit Z (hereafter SCI/Z, but also referred to in documentation as
SAINT Rome), which despite its name (designating it as a forward operating intelligence unit)
performed all functions of an X-2 station.226 In August of 1944, a special Balkans X-2 sub-
station was opened in Bari (referred to variously as X-2 Balkans, SAINT Bari and later, SCI/Z

221
Ibid.
222
Cf. SSU HP, Overseas, 92.
223
X-2 officers expressed their distaste for the close cooperation between SI and La Cosa Nostra, or the Sicilian
mafia. See Ibid.
224
See SSU HP, Overseas, 92 and Naftali, Artifice in Secrets War, Chalou (Ed.).
225
Ibid.
226
The term SAINT appears in OSS records beginning in 1944. It is an abbreviation for Security and
(Counter)Intelligence. For information on the formation of SCI/Z see See SSU HP, Overseas, 93.

47
Venice) commanded by Francis Kalnay, a naturalized Hungarian-American author. 227 X-2
Balkans was established as a "semi-autonomous unit until X-2 coverage of the Balkans from
within was adequate, or until such time as it became apparent that the bulk of the unit's
operations were concerned with persons and organizations located in Italy."228 Kalnay figures
as a key personality in this work whose unique position was not lost on Angleton. "Francis
Kalnay is a foreign-born American of Hungarian origin [who] was the remarkable exception of
being one of the only X-2 officers who was indoctrinated [instructed] in special sources
[ULTRA decrypts] even though he was of foreign birth." 229 X-2 Bari functioned as "the
Headquarters for all Balkan X-2 operations, including Hungary."230 Berding's tenure came to
an end in September of 1944, when, following rapid Allied advances in Italy during the spring
and summer, as well as several incidents during the summer, changes were needed.231 This
coincided with the chaotic counter-intelligence situation within Allied occupied Italy. 232
German and Italian stay-behind networks, as well as infiltration agents were presenting a
mounting challenge.
In September of 1944, Robinson O. Bellin was brought in to take over from Berding.233 Bellin
would only be head of SCI/Z for a few months (he was transferred on the 5th of December to
London from where he would go on to see further action in Belgium, Germany, and in 1946,
Hungary). 234 In his article on Angleton's Counterintelligence Operations in Italy, Timothy
Naftali attempts to summarize the departures of Berding and Bellin in quick succession, and
cites an October 10th message from Erdwurm stating that it was "imperative" for Angleton to
report to Italy at once, however this should not be construed as owing to poor performance on

227
Kalnay's codename has been determined by the author to be BB-7. For information on X-2 Bari and Kalnay
see NARA II, RG 226, E 196, B 25.
228
1. October 1945, X-2 Balkans Progress Report for September 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.
229
8. August 1949, Memo to the Assistant Director of Special Operations, Interviews with Subject of CIA No.
[Redacted] in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 13, Robert Bishop Volume II.
230
11. April 1945, BB-7 [Kalnay] X-2 Balkan Headquarters, Bari to Commanding Officer, Headquarters 2677th
Regt; Transfer of X-2 Bari to new base, JBX-03-1104 in NARA II, RG 226, E 196, B 25.
231
See Naftali, Artifice in Secrets War, Chalou (Ed.).
232
See Naftali, Artifice in Secrets War, Chalou (Ed.).
233
Bellin's precise assignment before coming to Italy is not discernible to this author, although it is believed that
he operated within an SCI unit in Southern France and was tasked with European X-2 operations from the time
of his arrival to the Theater (late February/early March 1944) until his he was temporarily commissioned a
Captain on the 7th of September in that same year, and made Commander of SCI/Z. His personnel records only
show him departing the US for 'overseas duty' on the 11th of February 1944, with the next entry referring to his
promotion in September. Supporting this theory is mention made of a 'Bellin...who would later go on to become
part of OSS Italy' serving as one of Ms. Lussier's 'French Liaisons'. See; Betty Lussier, Intrepid Woman: Betty
Lussier's Secret War, 1942-1945 (Annapolis 2010) 179, 187. For Bellin's personnel file see NARA II, RG 226, E
224, B 47.
234
See NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 47.

48
the part of Bellin.235 As mentioned above, Erdwurm was not deeply involved in the affairs of
X-2 in MedTO, acting only as a sort of 'liaison'. Also, despite the cable, Bellin would remain
in Italy until the 7th of December despite Angleton arriving in MedTO on the 28th of October.236
While it seems unlikely that Angleton was brought in owing to grave failures or shortcomings
of Bellin, what is certain is that Angleton's arrival signalled the culmination of a process began
nearly a year prior with the appointment of Berding. Over the next year, expounding upon the
work began by Berding in January of 1944, Angleton would turn SCI/Z and X-2 into the
preeminent American clandestine service in Italy.
James Jesus Angleton (hereafter referred to only as James Angleton or Angleton) was the son
of another OSS officer (James Hugh Angleton).237 The younger Angleton had been educated at
Yale and Harvard, where despite his intellect, attained only mediocre marks, excelling in Poetry
and English Literature.238 When Angleton was drafted, he was purportedly given three choices
for military employment; as an assessor of lost/stolen equipment in North Africa, a position
with the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), or with the new and 'mysterious' OSS.239
Angleton chose the latter and was assigned first to Washington and the Italian SI Desk there
(his family had spent years in Italy during his childhood). Here, Angleton "bearded" the head
of X-2, James Murphy, who having obviously been impressed had the former transferred within
2 months to London to learn Counterintelligence and be instructed on ULTRA.240 Despite his
age (26) Angleton was assimilated into the existing London X-2 setup and although seen as

235
First, both Berding and Bellin would continue their careers within OSS and X-2 (Berding would spearhead X-
2 operations in (occupied) Germany while Bellin manned the solitary 'X-2 Budapest' from early 1946 until the
end of that year). Both of these stations were not only important, they were frontline. Second, Bellin's
commission to Captain was only a temporary one, meaning that he may have been envisioned solely as a stop-
gap solution to an ongoing problem. Third, in discussion with Naftali, Bellin himself credited Angleton's
appointment as being the direct result of an operational 'disaster' which took place shortly after he assumed
command (but had been planned by his predecessor). This operation was 'designed to root out stay-behind agents
in Rome' See Naftali, Artifice in Secrets War, Chalou (Ed.).
236
See NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 18.
237
The CIA Chief Historian, David Robarge, during a panel at the 'Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James
Angleton and his influence on US Counterintelligence' Conference, held at the Wooddrow Wilson Center at
Georgetown University on March 29th, 2012 described the literature on Angleton as "highly partisan...only a
handful of items stand out for approaching objectivity...a short list of very good books and a long list of ones that
peddle mythology, misimpressions and recycle old grudges." He singles out Robin Winks' chapter in Cloak and
Gown on Angleton as "one of the best". See Conference Report, Moles, Defectors and Deceptions; James
Angleton and his influence on US Counterintelligence, 91f. available at:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/moles_defectors_and_deceptions_james_angleton_conference_re
port_0.pdf. A video of the conference (and Robarge's remarks) is likewise available on Youtube. For the chapter
in Winks' work concerning Angleton see: Winks, Cloak, 322-438. Another work which is recommended by the
CIA for consultation concerning Angleton is Tom [Mangold], [Cold Warrior]. James Jesus Angleton: The CIA's
Master Spy Hunter (New York 1991).
238
See Mangold, Cold Warrior, 34-36.
239
Cf. Winks, Cloak, 340.
240
Ibid, 340f.

49
peculiar by those around him, was viewed favorably and liked. 241 He received several
assignments in 1944, however, the precise chronology and order of these is disputed. What is
certain is that by the fall of 1944, Angleton had risen to the rank of Captain (from Corporal at
the time of enlistment) and held in actuality the "simulated rank of Major."242 While in London,
Angleton had utilized ULTRA decrypts extensively and become an expert on their
implementation in counterintelligence operations, specifically on the 'science' of apprehending
enemy agents and playing them back to the enemy. It was most likely for this reason that
Angleton was dispatched to Italy to neutralize what were seen as very dangerous stay-behind
agent networks. Naftali refers to Angleton's approach as "Total Counterespionage" with the
addition that "Angleton was a political Realist. He assumed that all governments have secrets
that other governments want....When Angleton asked why a country spied, he did so not in
search of moral justification but because countries often betray intentions in what they spy for.
He believed that a counterespionage service had to have an insatiable appetite for information
about foreign activities so as to be in a position to restrict, eliminate, or control the ways by
which other states collected their intelligence."243 Angleton would remain in Italy until 1947;
from November 1944 until April 1945, he was head of SCI/Z in Rome, from April 1945 until
December 1945 of X-2 Italy and from then until November 1947 of SSU Italy.244
Naftali divides Angleton's tenure in Italy into two distinct phases; the undertakings of the first
period (from November 1944 until August 1945) characterized as being operations conducted
mostly "as an extension of military security' while the second phase, from late 1945 until
November 1947 being one of 'long-range counterespionage'" 245 This fits generally with the
pattern of developments within X-2 Balkans, where the first contacts with Hungarians were
viewed extremely cautiously (and defensively) with a network being established in the late
summer and early fall of 1945 out of them. Finally, as a general evaluation of Angleton, Winks
states “None of the achievements of SCI/Z, or of X-2, or later of SSU were completely or even

241
Ibid, 263f. and 345-347.
242
Winks' chronology of Angleton in 1944 appears to be rather convoluted and contradictory. He states for
example on page 350 that "Angleton was transferred to Italy in late August as the commanding officer of SCI
Unit Z." but several lines down writes "Then there was...that return to Italy in November as Commander of SCI
Unit Z, until March 1945..." Bellin's records show that he was commander of SCI/Z from the 7th of September
1944 until the 4th of December, and it is likewise known that Bellin took over from Berding, who had been
commander of SCI/Z from its formation in January. For these reasons, Winks' chronology of Angleton's
activities in 1944 is dismissed by this author, pending further research, in favor of that which can be roughly
established from personnel records. See Winks, Cloak, 350 and NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 47.
243
See Naftali, Artifice in Secrets War, Chalou (Ed.), 220.
244
Ibid, 236 n. 10.
245
Ibid, 220f.

50
largely of Angleton's own making, of course, but the initiative and the insight to see how a
product might be improved were often his.”246

3.6 OSS Austria

As the war in Europe came to an end, it was imperative that Chapin's SICE relocate to an area
more fitting to its intended targets and in particular, where it could put its expertise to best use.
For all intents and purposes, OSS Austria can therefore be understood as SICE with a new name.
OSS Austria was activated on 21st August 1945, by General Order No. 13 of US Forces in
Austria (USFA).247 However, there was a full OSS unit responsible for and located in Austria
since at least the middle of June 1944.248 "The activation [in August] did not signalize the birth
of an infant organization, but conferred official unit status upon an organization which has
operated continuously in Austria longer than any other agency of the U.S. Government, military
or civilian."249 As of the 31st of August, OSS Austria totaled 194 persons, military and civilian,
among its ranks. This number would decrease significantly into 1946. The unit's de jure
headquarters was Vienna however, Salzburg was the de facto center of the unit, boasting a
whopping 137 of the 194 total staff.250 Other detachments were based in Linz, Zell-am-See and
Trieste. Nearly all operations were run from Salzburg, with Vienna functioning largely only as
the headquarters of R&A. The CO of the unit was Lt. Col. Charles W. Thayer, with Chapin
and Flues his deputies. Chapin was additionally intelligence officer and Alfred C. Ulmer Jr.,
Chief of SI. The chief of X-2 was Major Edward P. Barry. Unlike SICE, OSS Austria was
subordinated to United States Forces in Austria (USFA) which was itself a component of US
Forces European Theater (as opposed to MTOUSA/MedTO to which SICE had belonged). The
Hungarian SI Section, still commanded by Martin Himler, was based in Salzburg and one of

246
Winks¸Cloak, 352.
247
28. September 1945, W.B. Kantack, Reports Officer to The Director, Monthly Report OSS Austria,
Attachment I, Copy of General Order Number 1 in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.
248
'An OSS unit for Austria' was activated on the 17th of June according to a report from Chapin, however there
had been OSS units before this in Innsbruck and Klagenfurt. See 23. June 1945, Howard Chapin to Acting
Commander of Security, G-2 in NARA II, RG 226, E 125, B 49.
249
28. September 1945, W.B. Kantack, Reports Officer to The Director, Monthly Report OSS Austria in NARA
II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.
250
'The first entry of US officers into Vienna occured on 3 June 1945, when, in response to a Russian invitation,
a very small party of American, French and British representatives visited the capital for a series of zoning
conferences.' The interpreter for the Senior American Representative, Brigadier General Flory was Lt. Col.
Charles Thayer, the [soon-to-be] head of OSS Austria. Thayer participated in several such meetings as
interpreter, also functioning in this capacity for the Commander of USFA, General Mark Clark. For information
on OSS Austria see 28. September 1945, W.B. Kantack, Reports Officer to The Director, Monthly Report OSS
Austria in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34. For the information concerning Thayer as interpreter see 4. September
1945, Secretariat to Director OSS, Progress Report Detachment A, OSS Austria in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B
34.

51
the most productive formations in the entire outfit.251 Himler and his small staff endeavored to
locate, apprehend and interrogate Hungarian war criminals scattered throughout (American
occupied) Austria but also branched into the gathering of positive intelligence within Hungary.
During the late summer and early fall of 1945 concern grew over the feasibility, practicality
and value of launching long-range operations which would be terminated within a short time.252
The problem is summarized as follows "Not only [will we] cancel all long-term projects,
including such matters as the recruitment and training of specialized personnel, but the already
serious personnel problems of the organization will multiply. OSS Austria is faced with the
necessity of releasing some of its best personnel because of their eligibility for discharges from
the service. It has had to release some of its best civilians because they felt it necessary to return
to their civilian occupations."253 The first progress report of OSS Austria suggests three steps
which might be taken to combat the difficulties the branch was facing "a) Hold until the last
minute those who are eligible to go home, persuading them of the importance of the job, b)
bolster the morale of those who must stay anyway and c) set up a recruitment and training
program to provide replacement."254 Realistically, the author of the report states that "The first
two alternatives are equally unfeasible in view of the fact that none of the personnel feel that
sacrifices on their part are justifiable in the name of a dying organization."255 In fact, less than
two weeks later, the first hammer fell, when the liquidation of SI Austria was proclaimed,
entailing the shuttering of the Linz, Zell-am-See and Trieste out-stations in ten day increments,
beginning on the 1st October; by the 1st of November there was to be "one Reports officer and
enlisted man for Vienna" but nothing further.256

251
Cf. 28. September 1945, W.B. Kantack, Reports Officer to The Director, Monthly Report OSS Austria in
NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.
252
Cf. Ibid.
253
Cf. Ibid.
254
Cf. Ibid.
255
Cf. 28. September 1945, W.B. Kantack, Reports Officer to The Director, Monthly Report OSS Austria in
NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.
256
22. September 1945, Alfred C. Ulmer Chief SI to Charles Thayer, CO, Liquidation of SI, Austria in NARA II,
RG 226, E 210, B 509, WN 19051.

52
3.7 SSU257
With Executive Order 9621 of September 20th , 1945, "all OSS personnel, records, property and
funds were transferred, either to State Department, the Department of War or terminated."258
The OSS was abolished, effective October 1st, 1945.259 Those elements of OSS which had been
transferred to the War Department were designated the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) the chief
(operational) purpose of which was to 'provide and maintain clandestine intelligence coverage
of the world by means of secret intelligence and counter-espionage.' 260 The Research and
Analysis and Presentation branches were transferred to the State Department.261 In essence, the
War Department would maintain the SSU as a sort of caretaker organization "held available for
central intelligence when established." 262 Administratively, the War Department (and by
extension, the SSU) was to "continue the program of liquidation of activities and personnel no
longer necessary or desirable and to preserve as a unit such of these functions and facilities as
are valuable for permanent peace-time service or which may be required for theater
commanders or occupational authorities." 263 Thus, it is improper to refer to the War
Department as having 'saved' the OSS or to the SSU as a continuation of the OSS since many
functions which OSS had performed were terminated (or in the case of R&A) transferred to
other government agencies. Additionally, SSU was never envisioned as a permanent
organization, but rather a transitional one. As such, the financial situation within SSU is best
characterized by the motto of doing 'more with less'.
General John Magruder was chosen as the person to oversee SSU activities by the Secretary of
War, Robert Patterson.264

257
This section of the thesis is added owing to the lack of substantial secondary literature on SSU, particularly
compared to that of its predecessor, the OSS. Luckily enough, over the past 25 years, significant (albeit
scattered) previously withheld records of the SSU have been released, permitting those researchers with enough
patience, to construct a complete history of that organization. The most useful sources this researcher has
encountered among these files are several lengthy directives and reports concerning the constitution of the
organization, its functions, and its operating procedures. Due to the short (and somewhat confused) life of SSU,
it is difficult to ascertain whether these directives were implemented in full, however, they do provide at least a
point upon which further research can tackle individual issues and intricacies.
258
19. January 1946, John Magruder to Assistant Secretary of War, Status of the SSU in NARA II, RG 226, E
210, B 309, WN 13154-13156.
259
14. March 1946, Report of Survey of Strategic Services Unit under CIG Directive No. 1 in; NARA II, RG
226, E 210, B 314, WN 10846.
260
29. November 1945, Outline plan of the Strategic Services Unit in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 309, WN
13154-13156.
261
14. March 1946, Report of Survey of Strategic Services Unit under CIG Directive No. 1 in; NARA II, RG
226, E 210, B 314, WN 10846.
262
14. February 1946, Establishment of Clandestine Collection Service for Foreign Intelligence in NARA II, RG
226, E 210, B 309, WN 13154-13156.
263
19. January 1946, John Magruder to Assistant Secretary of War, Status of the SSU in NARA II, RG 226, E
210, B 309, WN 13154-13156.
264
Cf. Ibid.

53
3.8 SSU Austria/Italy
SSU Austria was in all but name a direct descendant of OSS Austria. The Progress Report for
November of 1945 indicates personnel problems, particularly within SI Branch. "A basic
nucleus" was maintained however productivity did drop (from 140 reports in October to 104 in
November). With an eye to the future, the problems SSU Austria was facing (and in particular
the SI branch) were no different than those being tackled in Washington and across SSU's
branches. The sense of uncertainty pertaining to the future permeated throughout SSU as a
whole and thus is not surprising to be found referenced in progress reports from October 1945
until the spring of 1946. A sense of optimism is prevalent however, at least with regards to the
transition of the organization from a (quasi) military one to a purely civilian entity.265 December
would be the most trying month for SI in SSU Austria, but by January the Branch was on the
upswing again, working at about 75% efficiency compared to November.266
Its duties were manifold and included conducting undercover intelligence operations in
occupied Austria; "Support undercover intelligence operations in Hungary and Rumania and
direct specific operations against Yugoslavia, through Trieste. The main intelligence targets
included subversive movements and groups within Austria, especially the U.S. Zone, and
Russian activities and potentialities throughout the above and immediately surrounding Balkan
areas and to serve as base for financial transactions in Southern European currencies."267
SSU Austria remained under the stewardship of Lt. Colonel Charles W. Thayer until the middle
of January 1946268 after which it was commanded by the former Chief of SI, Alfred C. Ulmer
Jr.269 who would fulfill the two capacities simultaneously, "wearing both hats".270 Ulmer would

265
3. December 1945, Henry C. Fleischer (for Alfred C. Ulmer, Chief SI) to CO SSU Austria, Progress Report
SI for November 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 177, WN 7790.
266
Undated, Robert D. Brewster, Reports Officer to CO SSU Austria, Progress Report for January 1946 in
NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 177, WN 7790.
267
Cf. SSU Mission to Austria in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 325, WN 13157.
268
Thayer, like Ulmer as an SI man had arrived at the end of October 1944 as a Major to Belgrade. One month
following, he was promoted to Lt. Colonel becoming CO of SI in the American (OSS) Mission in Belgrade. He
held this post until the middle of April 1945 when he rotated to the United States for temporary duty. He would
subsequently, upon his return to Europe later that month, be named Branch Chief of OSS Austria. See NARA II,
RG 226, E 224, B 771.
269
Ulmer (b. 1917), a Princeton graduate was in many ways similar to Angleton. He had seen extensive service
with OSS as Reports Officer in Istanbul and Cairo, had prepared Austrian missions and ultimately became Chief
of SI in Salzburg, all at a very young age. Unlike Angleton, however, he was plagued by the absence of his wife
(who was stateside) and longed for "a normal married life". See NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 793. Concerning
Angleton's marital problems in 1945 see Mangold, Cold Warrior, 43.
270
The leadership dynamic within OSS/SSU Austria is a very interesting (and at the onset, confusing) one.
Chapin had been head of SICE, which was the direct predecessor of OSS/SSU Austria, however Thayer was
named Branch Chief of the latter. From communications between Chapin and Thayer it appears as though the
two were on equal footing with regards to rank and command, with neither imposing themselves
administratively upon the other, the end result being that they worked quite well together. Both held the rank of
Lt. Colonel, with Chapin being Deputy Commander of OSS/SSU Austria, OSS/SSU Austria's Intelligence

54
lead SSU Austria until June of 1946. X-2 (or SCI/A) in Austria was headed by Major Phillip
Edward Barry271, except for a spell when he was stateside, and the desk was led by Captain
Jules Konig.272 Here we come to another interesting facet of OSS/SSU Austria, which was
experienced similarly by Angleton in Italy under slightly different conditions. X-2 and SI
branches in OSS/SSU Austria were merged with SI representing the dominant organization (the
opposite happened in Italy, where Angleton's X-2 assumed preeminence). A November memo
from Chapin to Thayer plainly states "Because of an inexplicable Branch situation here, it is
impossible for General Magruder, or any one else to authorize you to merge the two Branches
formally. However, [Frank] Wisner [liaison officer to the Gehler Organization, the predecessor
to the German Federal Intelligence Service, the BND] is returning to Germany with full
authority to put X-2 personnel to work in and on SI projects, either partially or exclusively as
he may wish. Any one who has had the slightest experience with agent operations fully realizes
that the technique of agent penetration is the same regardless of the nature of the end result. I
am certain that Barry [X-2] and Ulmer [SI] recognize the desirability of merging their
penetration, and that the closest integration of their operations would save manpower, eliminate
duplication and overlapping and provide a much more efficient intelligence production."273
Like SSU Austria, SSU Italy represented little more than a name change for an existing
organization, all the while maintaining the same personnel. Atop X-2 and SSU Italy sat
Angleton. Whereas power was divided in OSS/SSU Austria between Chapin, Thayer and later
Ulmer, Angleton was the heartbeat of X-2 and later SSU Italy. Administratively, Headquarters
was moved from Caserta to Rome in the late summer of 1945 and William Maddox assumed
command of OSS MedTO. 274 SI in Italy, following the departure of SICE/OSS Austria to
USFET was liquidated gradually, with the Turin, Milan and Palermo bases being shuttered by
31 July 1945 and the most important sources being turned over to X-2.275 Operationally, SI,
X-2 and R&A maintained small (often single man) out-stations in Rumania, Albania and Trieste
(the last of which would be transferred to OSS Austria in August 1945). As in Austria, the

Officer and the head of Scandinavian-Central European Intelligence within SI. Ulmer was OSS/SSU Austria's
Chief of SI.
271
In some reports he is referred to as Edward P. Barry, however is presented by his colleagues and direct
superiors as 'Phil' or Phillip Barry.
272
13. November 1945, Washington to Vienna No. 0927 in NARA II, RG 226, E 88, B 654. See also 1.
December 1945, Jules Konig, Monthly Progress Report X-2 for November 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B
177, WN 7790.
273
1. November 1945, Chapin to Thayer in NARA II, RG 226, E 215, B 6, WN 26165-26170.
274
Undated, believed to be August 1945, Mediterranean Theater of Operations Report for July 1945 in NARA II,
RG 226, E 99, B 34.
275
Undated, believed to be August 1945, Mediterranean Theater of Operations Report July 1945 in NARA II,
RG 226, E 99, B 34.

55
capabilities of OSS Italy were consistently drawn down, in the run-up to October of 1945, the
only exception being Angleton's Counter-Intelligence Branch which "maintained a high rate of
productivity in useful and interesting reports concerning the activities of personnel who are, or
have been, employed by enemy and other intelligence services. The branch has conducted
several important investigations, the results of which have been almost exclusively instrumental
in bringing about the apprehension of former agents of enemy countries."276 This branch, via
its SCI/Z units continued focusing on the liquidation of the German Intelligence systems with
30 arrests taking place in July "directly attributable to the works of the SCI/Z units in Milan,
Turin, Genoa, San Remo and Rome."277

3.9 X-2 Balkans/SCI/Z Venice

X-2 Balkans (or SCI/Z Venice), headed by Francis Kalnay would come to function as one of
Angleton's links to OSS/SSU Austria following the detachment of that organization from
MedTO, however it had operated since August of 1944 in the theater. The reasons for this
liaison were not entirely official and it is the thesis of this author this relationship can be
attributed to the envisioned Budapest City Team, which had seen members of X-2 Balkans and
SICE prepare and collaborate together, starting in the autumn of 1944; united by both their
common mother-tongue (Hungarian) and shared experiences owing to mutual 'ethnic'
backgrounds (with the exception of perhaps Stephen Streeter, all Hungarian-born personnel of
the Budapest City Unit were in some way or definition "Jewish" although none were practicing).
It was only logical that the relationships began in that unit would continue long after its
deactivation and the diaspora of its members. In August of 1945, evidence of this shows in
several operations entailing the ‘loaning’ or ‘sharing’ (often begrudgingly) of agents and
collaboration orchestrated by the two sections. 278 What the Budapest City Unit did for X-2
Balkans was to provide its personnel with a platform for forming their own relationships and
contacts among SICE’s Hungarian personnel and assets.
X-2 Balkans, would remain in Rome until the beginning of October before relocating to Venice
in October 1945.279 The unit would also undergo a name change (to SCI/Z Venice and the 'local
cover name Number 6 Liaison Unit') as well as reorganization (coming officially under X-2
Italy, being formally attached to CIB, Thirteenth Corps) following a conference of Angleton,

276
19. September 1945, Progress Report 2677th Regiment OSS (Prov.) for August 1945, OSS MedTO Report in
NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.
277
Undated, believed to be August 1945, Mediterranean Theater of Operations Report July 1945 in NARA II,
RG 226, E 99, B 34.
278
31. August 1945, X-2 Balkans Progress Report for August 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.
279
1. October 1945, X-2 Balkans Progress Report for September 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 34.

56
Major Hostler, the X-2 Officer in Rumania and Francis Kalnay on the 28th of September in
Rome. 280 Kalnay would continue to remain in charge with Angleton's approval until both
agreed that "the unit is on a sound operating basis, at which time BB-7 [Kalnay] will consider
his mission accomplished and will be ready to return to the States."281 Bucharest was to be
divorced from SCI/Z Venice and re-constituted as an independent unit. In October, Stephen
Streeter was brought in to SCI/Z Venice, after having been discharged from the Army. Elmer
'Stephen' Streeter, (b. 1906 as Elemer Strasser in Szentkereszt, now Svätý Kríž, Slovakia) was
Kalnay's field man. Streeter was raised speaking Hungarian, Czech, Slovak and German later
in life adding French and English to his repertoire. Streeter attained a Law Doctorate from
Karlova University in Prague in 1927 adding a Bachelor's Degree in Psychology (minor in
History) from Komensky University in Bratislava before serving in the Czechoslovak Army
from 1931-1933 and in 1938 as a 1st Lieutenant. Streeter came to the US in 1940, residing in
New York City, before moving to Detroit in 1941 to work on his Master Degree in Sociology
(minor Psychology) at Wayne University. Despite his maternal Hungarian relatives, Streeter
referred to his racial origin as Czechoslovak.282 With regards to his character he was "a man of
sound intelligence, a liberal democrat, and humanist, thoroughly reliable and entirely Anti-Nazi
and Anti-Fascist."283 After enlisting in July, Streeter was recommended to the OSS at the end
of August 1943 and by the middle of December was en route to Cairo for a posting to SO
Branch there. He was promoted to T/3 (pay equivalent of Staff Sergeant) shortly after his
arriving in Cairo.284 In March of 1944 he was slated to go to Istanbul to head the Hungarian
desk there, however most likely in the aftermath of the Sparrow Mission, as well as the
Dogwood fiasco, his transfer was overlooked and/or postponed.285 Streeter remained in Cairo
where he prepared 2 quick reference tables on Balkan and Near Eastern countries and assisted
MO in the writing and preparation of propaganda materials destined for Hungary, where he
surely worked alongside both Himler and Doman and most likely also Keszthelyi. 286 In
September of 1944, Streeter joined X-2 and was transferred to Bari where he was half of the X-

280
Ibid.
281
Ibid.
282
See Stephen Streeter Personnel File in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 752.
283
See Stephen Streeter Personnel File in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 752.
284
Ibid.
285
The records at the author's disposal do not reference Streeter from April 1944 until November of that year; it
is believed that he waited in Cairo for branch deployment. 22. March 1944, Unknown to Captain Subhi Sadi,
Istanbul Organization in NARA II, RG 226, E 92, B 87.
286
6. April 1945, Saint Bari, BB-7 [Kalnay] to JJ-1 [Murphy], Personnel, JBX-003-604 in NARA II, RG 263, E
ZZ-18, B 13, Robert Bishop Volume I.

57
2 component of the Budapest City Team (see Budapest City Unit sub-chapter). 287 At Bari,
Streeter was the "only intelligence-interrogation officer at this [X-2 Balkans] desk."288 In March
of 1945, with the Budapest City Team being repeatedly denied access to the city by the Soviets,
it was requested by Kalnay that Streeter be detached from the City Team, given a commission
and indoctrinated in Most Secret. 289 Streeter would hereafter remain part of X-2, being
discharged during the summer (most likely September), but immediately rehired as a civilian.
He would then be released on the 30th of September, but rehired on the 1st of October into SSU
as an X-2 Field Intelligence Officer, his duties being "To recruit and handle agents and sub-
agents who furnish counter-intelligence material and trace individuals being sought. To prepare
reports based on material obtained from agents and other sources. To interrogate enemy agents
and suspects. To translate documents of counter-intelligence nature and to De-brief personnel
returning from the field." His paygrade was CAF-9 (the Civilian pay schedule for government
work being based on a range of 1 to 15 with 1 being the lowest and 15 being the highest).290 As
of 19 October 1946, Streeter was employed by SSU, the notice informing of his termination on
the 19th of October suggests that he was again terminated and re-hired similarly to what had
happened a year prior when OSS was liquidated and reconstituted as SSU. Documentation from
1948 shows Stephen Streeter (still) living in Rome and working for the IRO (International
Refugee Organization).291

3.10 Conclusion Chapter 3

With an organizational, personnel and administrative guide provided for the OSS and its
successor organizations, it is possible to see the process by which several very large and
(seemingly) complicated entities, under the umbrella of the OSS, can be broken down first into
various branches (such as SI and X-2) and further divided into various supra-regional and
national entities (SICE and OSS, later SSU Austria on the one hand and X-2 Balkans, SCI/Z
Venice on the other) based for the majority of this study within one single Theater Command
(MedTO). In Europe, by the middle of 1944, this command was unmistakably the center for

287
See 7. November 1944, Dr. W.L. Langer, Chief R&A to Edward H. Dodd Jr. MedTO, Personnel for City
Teams in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
288
6. April 1945, Saint Bari, BB-7 [Kalnay] to JJ-1 [Murphy] JBX-003-604, Personnel in NARA II, RG 263, E
ZZ-18, B 13, Robert Bishop Volume I.
289
Streeter's commission was very important as at 39 years old, with two university degrees, and being fluent in
6 languages, he found himself banished to the enlisted mess for meals. 26. March 1945, X-2 Bari, BB-7 [Kalnay]
to JJ-1 [Murphy], JBX 010-2603, A brief survey of X-2 Balkan operations. Personnel Requirements and future
plans in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 13, Robert Bishop Volume I.
290
See Stephen Streeter Personnel File in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 752.
291
12. November 1948, Rome to Washington, KAPOK 476, Zsolt Aradi in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3,
Zsolt Aradi Vol. III.

58
Hungarian activities (and had even before played a key role, although intelligence, personalities
and operations were planned from other stations, such as Istanbul and Berne). By the spring of
1944, Chapin's SICE and (several months following) Kalnay's X-2 Balkans had emerged as the
two pre-eminent OSS appendages concerning themselves with Hungary with only minimal
assistance coming from the previously twin hotspots of Bern and Istanbul. Later in 1944, as we
will see in the next chapter, members of these two sections would come together to form a joint
unit envisioned for activation within Budapest (the Budapest City Unit), however, as the
strategic situation changed, and various problems occurred in and emanated from Rome, a
schism within Hungarian operations and planning developed rather quickly, reaching a boiling
point at the end of the war in Europe, thereafter rising and falling on a semi-monthly basis.

4.1 Case Studies

This section of the thesis will examine several key events and operations occurring from the
summer of 1944 until slightly more than a year late, and the end of September, 1945 As
operations often continue or evolve in form and composition, parts of these studies
understandably stretch beyond September 1945. In this chapter, information from the previous
two chapters will be of utmost importance as a backdrop in explaining the intricacies and
developments witnessed in southern Italy by OSS personnel, particularly at Bari in the offices
of SICE and X-2 Balkans.

4.2 The Roman Colony Hungarians

The city of Rome was liberated by elements of General Mark Clark's Fifth Army on the 5th of
June 1944. In the aftermath arose a diplomatic conundrum as Axis diplomats accredited to the
Vatican found themselves suddenly in the midst of Allied armies. The German invasion of
Hungary in March of 1944 had struck a particularly sour note with most Hungarian diplomatic
representatives abroad. Baron Gábor Apor, the Hungarian minister to the Vatican, was no
exception to this.292 Indeed, following the selection of the Anglophile Miklós Kállay as Prime
Minister and Jenő Ghyczy as Foreign Minister in 1943, a revamping of the already pro-Allied
Hungarian Foreign Ministry was undertaken with an eye to facilitating peace negotiations with
the British and Americans across Europe.293 Ultimately, one benefit that can be gleaned from
this well-intentioned, yet poorly executed period in Hungarian diplomacy was that pro-German

292
Apor stated to Robert P. Joyce during a conversation at the end of June 1944 that he "had no contact
whatsoever with Hungary and simply did not know what was happening in his country." adding "All ministers
abroad with exception of one in Ankara refused to join the [Sztójay] regieme." See 30. June 1944, Robert P.
Joyce, Conversation with Baron Apor in NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 14.
293
The intricacies of this are covered extensively in the author's Bachelor Thesis. See Bare, Sparrow.

59
or pro-Nazi diplomats within the Foreign Service represented a distinct minority from 1943
until the summer of 1944.
Apor was exemplary of the typical Horthy government functionary; he hailed from a noble
family (his brother Vilmos, who would be shot by the Soviets in April of 1945 for protecting
refugees, among them Jews, was the bishop of Győr) possessed little (if any) sympathy for
Nazism, Communism or Hitler (viewing him as most of Horthy's confederates did; a no-name
upstart who had ignored social rank and order). Apor (b. 1889) educated at the Jesuit Collegium
Kalksberg in Vienna and the Szent István gymnasium in Kalocsa, had served in the First World
War as a Major in the Artillery, posted thereafter to the Hungarian missions in Vienna, Berlin,
Warsaw and Paris before being named 'Envoye Extraordinaire et Minitre Plenipotentiare' to the
Vatican on January 19, 1939.294 Politically, Apor was as most of Horthy's entourage would
claim to be, a Legitimist, eternally nostalgic with regards to the Habsburgs but, as later records
would show, a pragmatist and realist (when compared to someone such as Mindszenty, for
example).295 Apor's 'legman' in Rome was Zsolt Aradi (b. Zombor, Kingdom of Hungary, today
Sombor, Serbia, 1908) to "a Jew from Szolnok who had converted to Catholicism" and an
"Aryan Catholic" from Gyöngyös, Aradi had attended elementary school from 1914 until 1918
in Magyaróvár (today the amalgamated Mosonmagyaróvár) and Vienna, later visiting high
school in Trenčín (then Czechoslovakia) and Kaposvár from 1919-1925, finally enrolling at the
University of Budapest Law School from 1926-1931.296 Beginning in 1928, he worked as a
free-lance journalist, founding the Roman Catholic 'Socialist' review Korunk szavak (Words of
our times). He also edited the periodicals Usker (Új kor; New Age) and Vigilia, before joining
the Nemzeti újság ([The] National Newspaper) where he likewise rose to the position of
Editor.297 From June 1941 until June 1943, he was the Press Attaché at the Hungarian consulate

294
See http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/A/Apor.html last accessed 11.03.2015.
295
Apor rebuked Mindszenty or several occasions, insisting during one such incident that Hungary's "only
option” (in the post-war period) was to cooperate with the Soviets. See 16. May 1946, JRX-3151 in NARA II,
RG 226, E 108A, B 227.
296
Again, this would be what is today known as the ELTE in Budapest. See n. 41. Quote cf. Undated, Report on
conversations with Hungarian personalities in Rome by Major J.D. Stewart (Political Advisor, Political Warfare
Board, Bari), Major A.F. Dunlop (Head of the Hungarian Section, P.W.B.) and Captain R. Lorimer (P.I.C.) in
NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
297
It is interesting to note that while Aradi referred to these bi-monthly reviews and periodicals as “Socialist” in
1944 during his first interrogation by Allied forces, by 1953 they had become (in his own words) “progressive,
in a European sense.” It is possible that Aradi used the word Socialist not realizing its political overtones (he was
an ardent anti-Communist and anti-Fascist). For Aradi’s first interrogation see Report on conversations with
Hungarian personalities in Rome by Major J.D. Stewart (Political Advisor, Political Warfare Board, Bari), Major
A.F. Dunlop (Head of the Hungarian Section, P.W.B.) and Captain R. Lorimer (P.I.C.) in NARA II, RG 263, E
ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I. For Aradi’s 1953 statement see 30. September 1953, Zsolt Aradi to Mr. Lang
(Private correspondence) in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II. For additional biographical
information on Aradi see: 21. October 1947, Chief FBM to COPS. Recommendation for use of Aradi, Appendix
I in RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II.

60
in Milan, and from June 1943 until shortly before the fall of Rome in June 1944 performed the
same duties at the Hungarian delegation to the Holy See in Rome. Apor and Aradi had worked
together even while the latter was in Milan with Aradi stating "On Apor's request, I went twice
a month to Rome [from Milan] to maintain my contacts in the Vatican and to be able to work
only on the Vatican."298 Although little is known of the precise relationship, it is possible that
owing to his lack (Aradi’s) of a diplomatic passport, he was protected by Apor in exchange for
information and services; Apor is cited by Aradi as his "largest source of aid."299 The pair
possessed excellent contacts in Rome, diplomatic, ecclesiastical and political, not just among
Hungarians, but from across Europe and the world.
The exact date of engagement between Apor, Aradi and OSS is difficult to ascertain definitively,
however, it was effected in June of 1944, shortly after the liberation of the Italian Capital. Aradi
states that "During June 1944, Colonel [Valerian Lada]-Mocarski established contact with me
in Rome...ask[ing] whether or not I would be willing to volunteer for intelligence work in a
high-ranking organization incorporated within the US Army. I answered in the affirmative."300
According to OSS records, "Shortly after the arrival of the Allies in Rome, the Hungarian
Minister to the Vatican [Apor] was approached by OSS Balkan [SI] Desk officials [Robert P.
Joyce, Valerian Lada-Mocarski] seeking specialized personnel for recruitment. Apor
recommended his press attache Aradi, who was shortly released from the Legation's suite for
services with the OSS in Bari (Major Chapin, Lt. Doman). Aradi's transfer to OSS took place
at the beginning of July." 301 A slightly different story is told in another account involving
Marchese Theodoli, "one of the best diplomats of Italy on the conference of Versailles (and
who would subsequently work with the OSS under the covername ROSE). The old Marchese
Theodoli [Sic!] arranged the first contact between Apor and Lada-Mocarski [Sic!] after the
liberation of Rome. Theodoli's son is known in the OSS under the name ’Giulio’ closely
connected to Apor also because of his wife, who is of Hungarian origin."302 From this collage
of reports we come to the conclusion that Apor most likely suggested Aradi as a contact man

298
17. August 1945, Bart Ferry to Chapin, Biographies of aliens who desire visas for entrance to the US. In
NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II.
299
Aradi only received a diplomatic passport in February of 1944, before leaving the Hungarian diplomatic
service in protest two months later. Between May and June, he was reportedly in hiding in Rome. For
information on Aradi's lack of a diplomatic passport see 17. August 1945, Bart Ferry to Chapin, Biographies of
aliens who desires visas for entrance to the US. In NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II, for the
'biggest inspiration' quote see undated biographical information in Ibid.
300
Cf. 6. September 1944, Aradi to Chapin/Joyce in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
301
Cf. 8. Otober 1944, X-2 Rome to Major Chapin, Gabriel Apor. in NARA II, RG 226, E 174, B 273.
302
Undated, Zsolt Aradi to Howard Chapin; Contact of Hungarian Diplomats with Russian Circles in NARA II,
RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.

61
between himself and the Americans with this offer being subsequently taken up. This led to
Aradi being "engaged" by SICE on the 6th of July 1944.303
At nearly the same time Aradi, Apor, and two other Roman Hungarians (Dr. Sándor Lenart,
and Béla Kury) inspired the formation of the "Free Hungarian Association."304 This Committee
began small, meeting on the 2nd of July and consisting of only 15 members, however, with
regards to later recruitment and usage by the OSS, out of its members would come a cadre of
assets. The association's express goals were "a) To try to enlist the sympathies of the Foreign
Offices in London and Washington, b) to approach other free Hungarian groups with a view to
forming a common policy; groups named being Diplomats Committee, Karolyi's group in
London, Bakach-Bessenyei's [Sic!] group in Berne, Eckhardt's group in the US (this as an
afterthought) c) endeavour to organize and foster resistance in Hungary d) Advise on Hungarian
affairs e) obtain radio time and other facilities for the promotion of propaganda to Hungary."305
Four members of this group would go on to play prominent roles within the OSS; Aradi, Gyula
Magyary, a priest, László Kiss, a film director and Pál Kovacs, a labourer.
The latter three would be recommended "without qualification" by Aradi and Apor to Chapin
and Fuller for work within OSS.306 Magyary was 43, a professor of criminal law and Papal
Chamberlain.307 Kiss (b. 1904, Debrecen) had "a long record of service with the British and
American armies during a period of several months in Rome while the city was occupied by
the Germans"308 He had lived in Buenos Aires, Paris and Rome, working in the film industry.309
According to Chapin, he had a letter from "a high-ranking officer of Field Marshal Alexander's
staff praising him for the excellent intelligence work he had performed for the British prior to
the liberation of Rome."310 Kovács (b. 1902 Petesháza, today Petišovici in Slovenia, in the north
of the country) was a "highly trained precision tool mechanic; chemist" and came recommended
from Aradi. 311 All four (Aradi, Magyary, Kiss and Kovács) were attached to the Hungarian
desk at SICE, however their appointments were anything but seemless.

303
Cf. 28. July 1944, Chapin to Finance Officer in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
304
13. September 1945, Hungarians in Italy, Free Hungarian Movement in Rome, JBX-209 in NARA II, RG
226, E 108A, B 202.
305
Cf.. Undated, Report on conversations with Hungarian personalities in Rome by Major J.D. Stewart (Political
Advisor, Political Warfare Board, Bari), Major A.F. Dunlop (Head of the Hungarian Section, P.W.B.) and
Captain R. Lorimer (P.I.C.) in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
306
8. September 1944, Chapin to Security Office, Company B in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
307
13. September 1944, Doman to Kalnay, Personal state of agents in NARA II, RG 226, E 212 , B 3, WN
20776.
308
8. September 1944, Chapin to Security Office, Company B in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
309
22. September 1944, Saint Bari to Saint Caserta in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
310
15. June 1945, Nicholas Doman Report on Field Conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 340, WN 13342-
13351.
311
Cf. 22. September 1944, Saint Bari to Saint Caserta in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.

62
In the disorganization which followed the liberation of Rome, the Allied intelligence players
rushed to secure sources, agents, and information. This saw not only X-2 and SI competing in
the city, but also the Americans and the British. Thus, before Aradi was met by Lada-Mocarski,
he had already held talks with British intelligence officers and given interviews. Aradi states
"Before I talked to Col. Mocarski, I had reported to PWB [Psychological Warfare Branch, an
Anglo-American propaganda unit] during my first days following the occupation of Rome. I
gave them a detailed biography through Lt. Pearson, a British officer who spoke Hungarian. I
clarified my positions with the Allied authorities because I was no longer considered to be in
the diplomatic service since before the break of the Hungarian Legation to the Holy See with
the Budapest regime, the Hungarian government had suspended me and recalled me to Budapest.
I then resigned my position."312 The interview with Pearson took place sometime between the
occupation of the city by the Allies and the 20th of June (when the report was issued). The
reports on these meetings would form the backbone for Aradi's (and other Hungarian's from
Rome) subsequent problems with security clearances and vetting. There were several reasons
for this and apply to members of the Hungarian community in varying degrees. According to
an X-2 Balkans investigation undertaken in September of 1944 these reasons were "a) All of
them are enemy aliens and were until the fall of Rome officially or otherwise in contact with or
to a certain degree under the control of the Nazis or Fascists, b) key members of this group were
until recently in the service of the Horthy regime maintaining contact with functionaries of that
still enemy government, c) Baron Apor...is an intimate friend of Horthy and was in possession
of a secret W/T set and an operator imported from Hungary. His former associates at the
legation, Rev. [Ferenc] Luttor, the present Hungarian representative to the Vatican is admittedly
pro Nazi (this from Apor) and associates with the Japanese and German representatives to the
Holy See d) Attention was called to [Viktor] Szasz, Hungarian representative with the Quirinal
(under Swedish protection) and a certain [Fraenkel Miklós] Vasvary whose whereabouts have
not been clearly established e) before joning OSS, some of these subjects were in British service;
others are known to the British as OSS agents."313
It is prudent to examine each of these charges so as to arrange (and refute) them accordingly as
by such a process it is possible to determine which represented legitimate concern (or, as is the
advantage in hindsight, were rooted in fact) and which were not. The first and second points,
are indicative either of the ignorance, or more likely, the (over)caution of OSS officers. OSS
actions earlier in 1944, involving specifically the collaboration between representatives of the

312
Cf. 6. September 1944, Aradi to Chapin/Joyce in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
313
Cf. 22. September 1944, Saint Bari to Saint Caserta in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.

63
Kállay government and the OSS contradicted directly the notion that the usage of enemy
nationals would be unprecedented or in any way ground-breaking. In Stockholm, OSS and State
Department officials had met since at least 1943 with accredited members of the Hungarian
government; in Istanbul, a network of Central European agents, prominent and numerous
among them many Hungarians (including officers representing the Hungarian General Staff)
was seen as folly only after it was realized that certain members passed information to the
German Abwehr (the so-called Dogwood network), to say nothing of the relationship between
Berne, Istanbul and other stations with the Hungarian General Staff which gave birth to the
Sparrow Mission. 314 Were OSS officers aware of these activities, then they were certainly
treading on the side of caution, especially considering how devestating the Dogwood fiasco had
been, not just for Istanbul and its station commander, Lanning MacFarland, but for SI and OSS
as a whole.315 In its aftermath, it was agreed that enemy nationals and agents would be handled
more carefully.316
The third point, namely Apor's wireless set was the result of a measure taken late in 1943 by
the Kállay government following the German occupation of Rome in September of that year
(communications facilities in that city would be supervised by the Germans until the liberation
of Rome).317 Further negating any threat this radio set posed, was that Apor had reported it
immediately to the OSS and offered usage of it (interestingly enough to X-2).318 Ferenc Luttor
was almost certainly a German sympathizer, and quite likely an informant, but he was neither
liked nor befriended with either Aradi or Apor, but rather a colleague in the Legation. Szász,
the Hungarian representative in Rome would logically have contact with Apor, and even so the
charges levelled against the former concern his "dilligent distribution of anti-Trianon
propaganda." 319 The final charge presents what is perhaps the most serious and important

314
The Dogwood network which began to unravel in the spring of 1944 was a massive blow to OSS efforts to
work with 'enemy nationals' and badly burned SI as a branch. Compounding this was that the network was
composed primarily of Hungarians, not all of whom were connected to the German intelligence services, but in
its aftermath were all viewed with suspicion. In the ensuing investigation and cleanup, new and stricter controls
were implemented, particularly with regards to the handling of enemy nationals as sources of intelligence and as
agents. See Bare, Sparrow.
315
Ample documentation of the Dogwood affair is to be found in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 200, WNs 8548-
8850, 8751-8765 and 8775.
316
See 18. August 1944, Rolfe Kingsley Jr. to Frank Wisner (Chief of Mission Istanbul), Collaboration with the
SI branch and defecting enemy agents in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 200, WN 8775.
317
See 7. September 1944, Chapin and Doman to Berding in NARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 8, WN 23231-23250.
318
See Ibid.
319
This propaganda is neither described in scope or detail; it is important to remember that Trianon remains to
this day the most traumatic event in recent Hungarian history for many Hungarians, attached the same (and often
more) national importance than issues of genocide among other cultures/nations. Cf. Undated, Major J.D.
Stewart, Major A.F. Dunlop, Captain R. Lorimer, Report on conversations with Hungarian Personalities in Rome
in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.

64
allegation, namely that the Hungarian Community was by and large tied to the British Secret
service(s). Aradi had admittedly contacted the British and other members of the group had
worked for them; however, he had been declared "unsuitable for employment in the British
service" largely owing to his proximity to Apor and Szász. It likewise appears that other
members of the colony were briefly albeit unsuccessfully employed by the British and/or
rejected outright. In summation, barring the case of Ferenc Luttor, it is possible to present an
organized rebuttal to the notion that Aradi or Apor were enemy agents or attempting to penetrate
OSS as most information appears to be sensationalist (i.e. the radio set which Apor had reported
during his first meeting with OSS officers) or grounded in association-by-nationality (i.e. that
Luttor and Aradi were friendly with one another). That apart from the connection to the British,
there was nothing amiss with the group is hinted at in a report prepared to assist in the
interrogation of Ferenc Luttor in 1946, "The chief concern was not the employment of these
Hungarians as ex-enemy nationals, but the linkage with the British intelligence services."320
The first stirrings of a ’witch-hunt’ of sorts came in August, little over a month after Aradi's
engagement. Captain (later Major) Louis Kubler, the security officer for Company B wrote to
Chapin on the 7th of August 1944 that a background check on Aradi, Kovács and Kiss (Kubler
erronesouly refers to him as Laszlo Kovacs) made in Rome had found "nothing of a derogatory
nature" but that the "existing facilities were extremely limited" and thus that "all precautions be
taken in the use of these personnel and that any classified information which does not pertain
directly to an operation in which they are engaged, be withheld from said personnel." 321 Two
days later, Donald Daley a security officer in Bari forwarded the results of an investigation into
another member of the Free Hungarian Association, Imre Tóth to Captain Kubler. It was
recommended in the summary of this report that "Major Chapin be apprized of the fact that
Aradi has evidently had considerable contact with the British and could possibly be working
for them as well as this organization."322 Tensions subsided for two weeks, until the 26th of
August when security disapproval was sanctioned for Kovács, Magyary and Aradi. There were
grounds to believe that Kovács' operational integrity had, following an incident in Rome, been

320
Cf. 25. January 1946, JJ-1 [Murphy] and DH-140 [Klassen] to BB-8 [Angleton] X 3559 in NARA II, RG 226,
E 214, B 4, WN 24860-24877.
321
Cf. 7. August 1944, Kubler to Chapin, Kovacs Pal, Kovacs Laszlo, Aradi Zsolt in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-
18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
322
Tóth had worked for the British and was "being released [to the Americans]". Aradi is described by the British
officers questioned as a "friend of many years standing with [Imre Tóth]" and further, "[along with Apor] the
source of all information [regarding Tóth]" Cf. 9. August 1944, Daley to Kubler, Toth Imre (Investigation of) in
NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.

65
"very seriously compromised."323 Magyary had a similar problem, but the damage was limited
'only' to members of an "Allied agency." Aradi's disapproval stemmed (again) from his
connection to the British and the amount of information they had "not only on subject but on
the entire Hungarian colony in Rome."324 Kubler notified Chapin of the verdict on the 1st of
September. 325 Chapin, recognizing the value of Aradi, Magyary and Kovacs, disputed the
decision, however, Doman, who had replaced Fuller in August, was firmly on the side of Kubler,
meaning that SICE was divided. The opposition to the Hungarians can be dissected; Doman
was not opposed to the Hungarian colony en masse, but (it apears) only Aradi and Apor as is
demonstrated by several requests he passed to his superiors,including Major Kubler at the end
of August.326 Doman lays bare his problems in Bari with the Hungarians in his Report on Field
Conditions, composed once the war had ended.327 He states "At the time of my arrival in Bari
the state of the Hungarian Desk was about as follows: Several Hungarians were interviewed in
Rome by Fuller and Aradi. Aradi was most enthusiastic about three men particularly; Rev.
Magyary, Toth and Paul Kovacs...To put matters briefly, intelligence operations were definitely
in an embryonic stage. However, there was abundant enthusiasm among all concerned. The
approach might be characterized as 'Recruit anybody, anywhere, at any price. I was told (and
confirmed it with my own observation) that although Mr. Fuller was the nominal head of the
desk, all initiative and every recommendation on policy and personnel originated with Aradi,
an extremely capable and intelligent individual. In short, Aradi ran the desk. Col. Chapin and

323
"Another individual by the name of Kovács was asked by an Italian acquaintance (unknown): ‘Oh you are
still here? I thought you were going on a mission to Hungary?’” Kovács was indeed being trained to be dropped
into Hungary and would arrive there in October. Cf. 26. August 1944, Unknown to Lt. Cmdr. G.G. Perry, USNR
Security Officer in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
324
Cf. Ibid.
325
1. September 1944, Kubler to Chapin in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
326
In the first of these, Doman asks for Francis Moly (the cover name for Gyula Magyary) to be landed as part of
the Toledo mission in Yugoslavia, in the second request, Doman asks for security clearance for László Kiss and
in the third Doman again states that Magyary is being prepared for "a mission to contact resistance groups with
[the] ultimate objective of bringing about the defection of Hungary from Germany." From the second instance,
we can ascertain that his problems with Aradi and Apor had nothing to do with their connection to the British as
he states (of Kiss) "For several months, he has been working for ISLD [Interservice Liaison Department, the
cover name for the British Secret Intelligence Service or SIS] and more recently in the picture branch of PWB.
Captain Hunter and Captain Young, both of ISLD Rome have spoken most favorably of him...It is assumed that
the British have fully checked him as far as security is concerned since he was engaged in highly confidential
work." For Moly see 27. August 1944, Doman to Lt. Holt Green, Francis Moly, and for Kiss see 30. August
1944, Doman to Security Officer, both in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172. For the third notice see 13.
September 1944, Doman to Kalnay, Personal data of agents in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 178, WN 7334.
327
Attached to this report is a statement from the Chief of SI in OSS (Whitney H. Shepardson) who
acknowledges the controversy surrounding the employment of "the Hungarian nationals named in the report" and
states that there is 'justification for each of the conflicting opinions. However, since Lt. Colonel Chapin was
charged with over-all responsibility for Hungarian operations it was entirely proper that his decisions, approved
by his superiors, should prevail." Cf. 15. June 1945, Nicholas Doman, Report on Field Conditions in NARA II,
RG 226, E 210, B 340, WN 13342-13351.

66
Mr. Joyce seem to have had unlimited confident in him...Mr. Fuller was, I regret to say, merely
a rubber stamp."328 Doman's estimation of Fuller's authority is not wholly inaccurate; Chapin
himself, as noted in the previous chapter, was not particularly satisfied with his capabilities,
and his praise for Aradi indicates that he found the latter to be far more able than the former.
At this juncture in his brief time at Bari, Doman claims he wanted to "accept the program of
the 'old regime' and implement their commitments" expressing distrust (initially) only with
regards to Imre Tóth.329 Doman's distrust concerning Aradi and Apor however, came to light
later when he references "A strange attitude...toward Baron Apor...So far as I could observe, he
was the mentor of the Hungarian Desk in the eyes of Mr. Joyce, Col. Chapin and Mr. Aradi.
Considering the fact that Mr. Aradi was his press attache and Magyary his friend and adviser,
the Hungarian desk of SICE came very near to becoming a Bari branch of the Hungarian
Legation to the Holy See. The Hungarians who were hired from Rome made no bones about
their primary allegiance to Apor. Magyary, for instance, refused to go on any mission which
was not approved by Apor...He was permitted to go to Rome to see Apor [before his
mission]."330
Doman's real issue with Apor is apparent near the end of his report when he states that "[he]
belongs to a group of feudal aristocrats who are hopelessly compromised in the eyes of the
Hungarian people. Soviet occupation of Hungary appeared inevitable. In view of the opposition
to Apor already voiced by mouthpieces of the Soviets, it seemed to me more than unwise to
ride into Hungary with the entourage of Apor. I felt that we would arouse Soviet suspicion if
we tried to infiltrate men into Hungary who are undisguisedly anti-Russian."331 Here, we can
discern that Doman's concerns did not stem (as did Kubler's and Kalnay's) from the connections
of certain Hungarians to pro-Germans or Nazis, but rather to their insuitability vis-a-vis the
Soviets and most likely socio-economic nuances.
Nevertheless, Doman did raise several valid points; the relationship between Aradi and
Magyary to Apor warranted suspicion, particularly within the realm of covert action and in the
pursuit of operational secrecy. However, it must be recognized, as stated in the second chapter,
that resistance in Hungary (excepting the extremely small Communist underground) maintained
loyalty to Horthy (and was nationalist in character) while being unqestionably anti-German and

328
Cf. 15. June 1945, Nicholas Doman, Report on Field Conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 340, WN
13342-13351.
329
Ibid.
330
Cf. 15. June 1945, Nicholas Doman, Report on Field Conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 340, WN
13342-13351.
331
Ibid.

67
anti-Nazi. Apor, one of Pál Teleki's closest and most trusted friends was a known member of
ME-IV, the predecessor to the MFM and is described in one X-2 report as being an MFM
contact.332 Domokos Szent-Iványi stops short of bestowing upon him definitive membership,
referring to him rather as an "MFM informant."333 Turning to Aradi, he had, between May and
June of 1943 travelled to Switzerland to meet with Géza Soós, the report describing him and
his travel companion, Tamás de Perczel (Apor's Secretary) as "Apor's representatives." 334
While Aradi's position (if any) within the MFM can only be postulated (and probably did not
exist) the fact remains that he was trusted enough by Apor to be sent to meet with Soós.335
Additionally upon the latter's arrival in Italy in December of 1944, Soós and Aradi met on
several occasions (for example, Aradi debriefed Soós on certain Hungarian matters).336 Thus,
this author postulates that Apor's group in Rome (which can be said to, at the minimum include
himself, Aradi and Magyary) was organized paralell to, but not as a component of the MFM.
Apor's 'Free Hungarian Association' in Rome, held similar ideals to those of the MFM,
proclaiming openly its anti-German posture and being politically all-encompassing. However,
unlike the MFM, it was not interested in maintaining Hungary's independence or autonomy, but
attributed the utmost importance to making diplomatic arrangements with the British and
American governments, undoubtedly at the urging of its leadership. Thus, already possessing a
clear structure, leadership and rapport with the existing Hungarian resistance, the group
required only materiale and logistical support. Naturally, it was realized quickly that the
interests of the OSS and Apor in almost all places overlapped and that assistance provided to
the Americans by the gruop would be help well-rendered. Supposing this, which represents no
great leap of faith, we have no reason to believe that the help which Apor, Aradi, Magyary and
other Roman colony Hungarians provided to the OSS was anything but genuine as the ends of
the two groups were the same. Even Apor's non-dismissal or resignation after the formation of
the Sztójay government is not nearly as damning as it seems. Delving into Apor's records, it is

332
The report states that Apor was "in contact with MFM by means of W/T communication with Horthy Miklos
Jr. in Budapest", This couled with Náday's intructions from Szent-Iványi to contact Apor in Rome suggest that
the latter was at the very least trusted by the MFM leadership, if not part of it. Cf. 3. January 1945, Saint Bari to
Saint Washington, Contacts of the Hungarian Resistance Movement (Magyar Fuggetlensegi Mozagalom or
MFM) , JBX 002-103 in NARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 44, WN 20413-20417.
333
Cf. Szent-Iványi, Independence, 317.
334
Cf. 3. January 1945, Saint Bari to Saint Washington, Contacts of the Hungarian Resistance Movement
(Magyar Fuggetlensegi Mozagalom or MFM) , JBX 002-103 in NARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 44, WN 20413-
20417.
335
Cf. Ibid.
336
The question concerning the relationship between Soós and Aradi will be revisited in a later chapter. One such
debriefing is 26. April 1945, Sarazen [Aradi] to Chief SI/MedTO and Chief SICE; Reports based on interviews
with the two MFM representatives Soos and Hadnagy concerning Cardinal Seredi's part in Horthy's abdication in
NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B Zsolt Aradi Vol. II.

68
revealed that 2 days after the German occupation of Hungary in March of 1944, the Baron had
cabled Horthy declaring the new government unconstitutional and renouncing loyalty to it;
Horthy's reply "begged him to continue as a personal favor."337 In Doman's own report he states
that he was informed by Mr. Pershall, MO's Area Operations Officer for the Mediterranean that
Apor was "being groomed by OSS/Washington for a high position - perhaps Prime Minister -
in Hungary."338 Finally, supporting Apor's case are events taking place after the 15th/16th of
October, in one instance involving the leadership of the anti-Nazi and anti-German Hungarian
resistance, which sought Apor's counsel and guidance and in another when Apor pledged
loyalty to the Debrecen government in February of 1945, which earned him condemnation from
the Vatican.339
Apart from his ever-intensifying ties to SICE, Apor had also been interviewed on several
occasions by X-2 representatives. During one instance, in a cable from Robinson Bellin,
Angleton's predecessor as CO of SCI/Z to Chapin, the former wrote that "an operation using
Apor's radio set is feasible, but would fall into the domain of SI rather than X-2" implying that
by October, at the very latest, the radio was seen as above board. In fact, Bellin's report to
Chapin concerning Apor states "The explanations advanced by Apor...seem satisfactory.
Remains for us to get the operation cleared away from our own end, should be done quickly as
possible in order to make up for the time and opportunities which have slipped away."340
Despite the amassed evidence to the contrary, Kubler and Doman were not alone or swayed
from their distrust of the principal figures of the Hungarian community in Rome. Kalnay too
had decided that blanket disapproval for the Roman Hungarians was warranted. His reports on
the matter (reflecting the view of X-2 Balkans) are milder in tone than those of Doman (which
were biased politically) and Kubler (which were very obviously influenced heavily by British
information). At the same time he expressed his disapproval, Kalnay stated that "Zsolt or any
of the individuals concerned could be used to great advantage by OSS as sources of information
or in an advisory capacity. The employment of these people as personnel attached to the desk
or penetration agents in the opinion of X-2 is considered risky."341 On the 22nd of September,
Kubler would be informed that the security disapproval had been rescinded on high, and several

337
Cf.. Undated, Report on conversations with Hungarian personalities in Rome by Major J.D. Stewart (Political
Advisor, Political Warfare Board, Bari), Major A.F. Dunlop (Head of the Hungarian Section, P.W.B.) and
Captain R. Lorimer (P.I.C.) in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
338
15. June 1945, Nicholas Doman, Report on Field Conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 340, WN 13342-
13351.
339
6. February 1945, Crabbe [Aradi] to Reports Office, in NARA II, RG 226, E 125, B 49.
340
Cf. 8. October 1944, X-2 Rome to Major Chapin, Gabriel Apor, Investigations made by this office in NARA
II, RG 226, E 174, B 273.
341
23. September 1944, Saint Bari to Saint Caserta in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.

69
days later, Chapin informed Aradi that he, along with Mr. Joyce, Major Kubler and "others for
whom or with whom you will be working are completely agreed" concerning confidence in him
(Aradi) and the work in which he would be engaged.342 However, Chapin had merely provided
for a short interlude and it is doubtful whether he had won Kubler over to Aradi and the other
Roman Hungarians as on the 10th of October, Graham Erdwurm cabled Washington reporting
that "Security, MO [the Hungarian branch of which Himler was Chief] and Doman [are] lined
up against Chapin, Joyce (Intelligence Officer) and Greene (Commanding) [turning] Bari [into]
an armed camp."343 Erdwurm's cable to Washington contained very little new information and
analysis of it reveals how many small incidents and nuances were moulded into a single,
potential series of accusations and what constituted grounds for security disapproval of the
group; MO Bari was of the same opinion as Doman, and their verdict on the Roman Hungarians
mirrors that which Doman would nearly a year later report. The only new piece of information,
or, the only truly incriminating one, is a line referring to Aradi "[going] to Rome and [being]
seen in the company of Msgr. Luttor, the present Hungarian envoy to the Vatican' on the 3rd of
October."344 This single mention, unable to be located in original or to be sourced in the name
file on Aradi is the only piece of evidence which might indicate Aradi's complicity in events to
unfold over the coming weeks and months.345

4.3 Bowery/Dallam and Luttor

Ferenc Luttor, mentioned above, figures as the only confirmed Sztójay/Szálasi agent/informant
connected to the Roman Hungarians recruited by, or working with the OSS. This is made
unmistakebly clear during events which would take place from the middle of October 1944
until the spring of 1945. The case of Luttor is interesting, owing to the apparent lack of certainty

342
Cf. 30. September 1944, Chapin to Aradi in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
343
Cf. 10. October 1944, Saint Caserta, BB-068 [Graham Erdwurm]) to Saints Washington and London, JBX-
002-1010 in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
344
Cf. Cf. 10. October 1944, Saint Caserta, BB-068 [Graham Erdwurm]) to Saints Washington and London,
JBX-002-1010 in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
345
This ‘extremely reliable report’ (graded A-2) should logically appear in Aradi's comprehensive CIA name file
(which it does not) or in the other records gathered by this author over several years pertaining to the Hungarian
Desk of SICE, Zsolt Aradi, Ferenc Luttor and the Roman Hungarians. Furthermore, in the two reports in which it
is mentioned, no reference number is provided (as is commonplace) for the information, only date of receipt (3.
October) and grade (A-2). This does not negate its existence, as it may have come from a different American
service, or perhaps even a foreign agency such as ISLD. It stands to reason, however, as Apor and Luttor were
not speaking with one another (they broke definitively after Apor's renunciation of the Sztójay government in
July of 1944) and Aradi was of partial Jewish ancestry, that the vehemently anti-Semitic and pro-Sztójay Luttor
would not be someone Aradi would communicate with. For Apor's non-communication with Luttor see; 7.
September 1944, Chapin and Doman to Berding and 8. October 1944, X-2 Rome to Major Chapin, Gabriel Apor,
both in NARA II, RG 226, E 174, B 273. For Luttor's anti-Semitism see n. 319.

70
attached to his betrayal, despite what appear to be ample warnings and documentation. These
strech well into the middle of 1946.346
Ferenc Luttor (b. 1886, Székesfehérvár) attended seminary in Veszprém, heading later to the
Pázmáneum in Budapest being ordained in August of 1908. He then went to Vienna where he
became a choir chaplain, attending the Augustineum. In 1912, he went to Pápa before departing
for the Institum Teutonicum in Rome where he undertook studies in History and Archaeology.
He returned to Hungary in 1914, teaching Canonical Law and History in Veszprém and
Balatonfüred.347 In 1928, he was named Hungarian Counsellor Eccelleastique (Ecclesiastical
Advisor) to the Vatican until July of 1944 when he was made Apor's successor as charge
d'affaires to the Vatican of the Sztójay government.348 He is described bluntly as a "known anti-
Semite, pro-German and anti-Royalist...Catholic hierarchy regarded Luttor as a man who would
take advantage of opportunities to promote his own interests and those of the political party in
power without regard for principle. Once reprmanded by Bishop Rem [Sic!; Pehm] (now
Cardinal Mindszenty) for expressing extremist views...During the German occupation [of
Rome] Luttor [then] in charge of the Hungarian Academy [Collegium Hungaricum], refused to
give refuge to persecuted anti-Fascists. On 20 August 1944 made a speech to the Roman
Hungarians urging them to support the Sztojay government. Now maintains he never swore
allegiance to Sztojay, nor after 15 October Szalasi but only agreed to reprssent his government.
Received and replied to the Perzesinsky letter in which the writer identifies himself as a
Hungarian Nazi official."349
Luttor's alleged conspirator in Rome was (Vitez) Viktor Szász-Sommer. Szász, unlike Apor had
neither resigned nor made such overtures either following the German occupation of March,
nor the installation of Sztójay. Szász had served in Rome since 1924 as counsellor at the
Hungarian legation, 'magyarizing' his name from the German Sommer to Szász in 1936. He
was a friend of Horthy, having served with him in the Austro-Hungarian Navy.350 The exact

346
A report made by Stephen Streeter at the end of January 1946 bluntly states "Luttor, on the US black list, has
been increasingly active in the political field to the astonishment and resentment of the pro-Allied and
democratic Hungarians, who cannot understand why the Allied authorities have given Luttor a Laissez-Passer.
They fail to understand why the Allied Authorities tolerate the dealings of this former Nazi." Cf. 28. January
1946, X-2 Italy, Summary of Hungarian Activities in Rome for period of Dec. 1945, JZX-5925 in NARA II, RG
226, E 108A, B 263.
347
Cf. http://lexikon.katolikus.hu/L/Luttor.html last accessed 15.03.2015
348
See. 7. September 1944, Chapin and Doman to Berding and 8. October 1944, X-2 Rome to Major Chapin,
Gabriel Apor, both in NARA II, RG 226, E 174, B 273.
349
`Cf. 19. February 1946, Source AE-753 [László Véress] , JZX-6185 in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 265.
350
Cf. László [Csorba], A Rómái magyar [követ] jelenti, A magyar-olasz kapcsolatok története 1945-1956
[Happenings in the Hungarians Embassy in Rome. History of the Hungarian-Italian relationship, 1945-1956.]
(Budapest 2011), 16, n. 72. Original citation from MOL [Magyar országos leveltár, Hungarian National
Archives] XIX-J-1-w. Humánpolitikai Főosztály [Human Resources Department].

71
(political) position of Szász compared to that of Luttor is complicated owing to conflicting
stories concerning his activities in Rome during the German occupation. A statement made in
1946 by the head of the Italian Jewish Community in Rome claims that Szász had taken part in
“rescue activities” honoring him in the process.351 The information on Szász, at least in the OSS
files is of a patchwork nature. He is described in one hand-written report as "55, office manager,
neutral political attitude, Volksdeutsche origin." 352 In another he is referred to as "Age 56,
Hungarian national of German origin, Legation Councillor. Administrative manager of the
Hungarian Legation to the Quirinal for the last 20 years. He is known as pro-German and a
Nazi sympathizer. His three children speak fluent German and Italian but only broken
Hungarian." 353 Finally, a third report, written by the British refers to the Councillor as
"Protecting interests of Hungary in Rome. Both parents were German. A Hungarian blimp.
Maintains contact with Apor, Kovacs and Arady [Sic!]. Still diligently distributing anti-Trianon
propaganda. He appears to be acting in accordance with international law but the question of
his legal position ought to be investigated. In the meantime, no British officer should have
contact with him."354The third man complicit in Luttor's 'network' was the 33 year old Tíbor
Hegedűs, "janitor of the Hungarian academy who, perhaps only beginning in the Summer of
1945, acted as Luttor's courier."355
The charges against Luttor stem mostly from his 'betrayal' of the Bowery/Dallam operation,
which was one of the Dawes teams, dispatched to the CFI (Czechoslovak Forces of the Interior)
airstrip at Tri Duby (about 10km south of Banska Bystrica) in the liberated zone of Central

351
Csorba deliberates on the rescue activities of Szász in the leadup to and aftermath of the Fosse Ardeatine
massacre by German troops in Rome at the end of March 1944. Csorba claims that Szász was responsible for
rescuing Jews held in prison from execution and ensured that they received Hungarian documents. The
discrepancy stems from an X-2 report from July 1945 which mentions Szász's rescue efforts, describing them
unflatteringly with the following "When the racial laws were introduced in Italy, he [Szász] made a good deal of
money by issuing to Hungarian Jews in Italy documents certifying their Aryan origin." Although this does not
dispute the notion that he helped rescue Jews, should the report prove true, his motives were anything but
humanitarian; additionally, no mention is made of him offering aid during the massacares in late March. For the
X-2 report see 2. August 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-175 [believed, numbers only partially
legible] Luttor Ferenc Dr. Hungarian Minister to the Vatican and his contacts in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B
3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II. and Csorba, követ, 16.
352
It should be noted that the man being interrogated was appointed to the Hungarian mission in Bellagio by the
Szálasi government in February of 1945, he had previously been air attache in Rome from 1940-1943. He is
described by the former Commander-in-Chief of the Hungarian Air Force (László Háry) who flew to Italy in
February 1945 as a "Hungarian Nazi." Cf. 31`. May 1945, Interrogation Report Col. Elemer Toth (Hungarian
Air Force) in NARA II, RG 226, E 190B, B 35. For comments from General Háry see 13. March 1945, Saint
Bari to Saint London, Interrogation Report Part I: The Escape of General László Háry and Sándor Magyar-
Wilczek from German-occupied Hungary, JBX-115 in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 201.
353
Cf. 30. July 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-178 in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 201.
354
Cf.. Undated, Report on conversations with Hungarian personalities in Rome by Major J.D. Stewart (Political
Advisor, Political Warfare Board, Bari), Major A.F. Dunlop (Head of the Hungarian Section, P.W.B.) and
Captain R. Lorimer (P.I.C.) in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I.
355
Cf. 30. July 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-178 in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 201.

72
Slovakia. 356 Although operating from the same landing zone at Tri Duby as many other
missions of Allied personnel, the Bowery/Dallam team was unique in that it consisted of (what
are believed to be) the only Hungarian-speaking members of any of the missions dispatched
between September and October of 1944 to Slovakia by the OSS. The purpose of the mission
was to penetrate Hungary, deliver two Hungarians to the border and only afterwards return for
extraction from Slovakia. The group was led by the aforementioned Tíbor Keszthelyi, and kept
in radio contact with Bari/Caserta by Stephen Catlos, it also consisted of Gyula Magyary
(codename Francis/Frances Moly) and Pál Kovacs (codename Stephen Cora). Keszthelyi was
to effect "arrangements with the CFI underground to infiltrate the two civilian agents [Magyary
and Kovacs] across the Hungarian border near the vicinity of Budapest and then return to Dawes
HQ for evacuation."357 However, the Bowery/Dallam mission's importance is comprehensible
only within the context of the time. Potentially war-changing, Moly was "carrying an important
message to Horthy on behalf of AFHQ and certain dissident Hungarian ministers in foreign
capitals [among them Apor]."358
The original Bowery mission is known to have entailed the usage of personnel from Cairo who
were to be trained in Bari before departing to Hungary by way of Yugoslavia.359 The earliest
mention of a mission with the name of Bowery is at the beginning of August 1944. By
September, on account of the difficulties encountered receiving permission from Marshall
Tito's (leader of the Yugoslav Partisans) Headquarters to transit into Hungary during the Toledo
mission (elements of which likewise intended to penetrate into Hungary), the focus was shifted
to Transylvania.360 Beginning in August, SICE plans for entry into Hungary were folded into a
similar operation being coordinated from Madid.361 At the end of March 1944, representatives
of the US mission to Spain had contacted "trusted members of the former staff of the Hungarian

356
The Dawes and Houseboat teams were the first and commanding groups which operated in Slovakia. Other
teams, such as Bowery/Dallam were under their (operational) command. A well-written and informative
overview of the OSS missions into Slovakia is provided in Jim [Downs], World War II; OSS [Tragedy] in
Slovakia (Oceanside, CA 2002). Another resource concerning the Dawes mission is in the meticulously
compiled handbook for records on Mauthausen in The Mauthausen Concentration Camp Complex: World War II
and Postwar Records. Amy Schmidt, Gurdrun Loehrer (Eds.) (Washington DC 2008).
357
Cf. 27. January 1945, Chief X-2 to Chief SICE, Operational History, Dawes and Associated Teams Slovakia.
In NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 22.
358
Cf. 17. April 1945; Chapin to Chief SI, Abbreviated Summary of the Bowery Mission in NARA II, RG 226,
E 210, B 340, WN 13342-13351.
359
See 1. August 1944, Chapin to Shepardson and Foster, SICE Weekly Report #4 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210,
B 504, WN 18963.
360
These difficulties amounted to Soviet pressure on Tito's HQ to stall any American entry into Hungary Cf. 12.
September 1944, Chapin to Shepardson and Foster, SICE Weekly Report #9 in NARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 8,
WN 23231-23250.
361
See 15. August 1944, Captain George C. Corbett to CO Company B, Bari, No. 412 in NARA II, RG 226, E
154, B 14.

73
Legation" encouraging them to establish contact with "potential resistance groups" within
Hungary; in August this bore fruit as the "embassy's informants, among which is the son of the
ex-Premier of Hungary and former First Secretary of the Hungarian Legation, Count Gabor
[sic!] Bethlen" informed the Americans that they can communicate with "a well-grounded
resistance movement."362 It was via this contact that the dispatch of a signal plan and cipher
set was arranged via courier from Madrid to Budapest. 363 What happened precisely to this
courier is unknown, but a report from October of 1944 suggests that he vanished in Germany
sometime in September.364 In the interim, Bari awaited further instructions but did not base its
own plans around those which had arisen in Madrid. Lt. Doman proposed infiltrating via
Transylvania and was highly interested in going on the mission himself, however, for this Soviet
permission was required, ultimately the same problem encountered as infiltration via
Yugoslavia. 365 In September, the mission composition likewise changed with Imre Tóth
(codename Shorty) being scrubbed reluctantly (according to Chapin and Joyce) from the
mission.366 Sgt Steve Catlos367 and Cpl. Bela Herczeg, two naturalized Americans of Hungarian

362
The description of the group in the message resembles certain elements of the Magyar Front or perhaps even
a hold-over from the diplomatic overtures of the Kállay government, but almost certainly was not tied closely to
the MFM. Nevertheless, the two groups were almost certainly working to similar ends The [sic!] applied to
Count Bethlen's name is owing to a historical error on the part of the document's author; Count Gábor Bethlen
was an early modern (16th century) member of the Bethlen family, the ex-Premier the author is referring to is
István Bethlen, who served as Prime Minister from 1921-1931. See 15. August 1944, Captain George C. Corbett
to CO Company B, Bari, No. 412 in NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 14.
363
The exact details of this knot in the Bowery mission are complex to trace owing to the involvement of several
OSS stations and State Department officials, however it is believed that in the middle of August, a State
Department representative in Madrid effected contact with a "group of Hungarian diplomats who wish moral
support from the Allies". Shepardson instructed Chapin to tie in this operation with his own "Hungarian plans" in
Bari. Cf. 10. August 1944, Shepardson to Joyce and Chapin in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 35 and See 12.
September 1944, Chapin to Shepardson and Foster, SICE Weekly Report #9 in ARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 8,
WN 23231-23250.
364
18. October 1944, Caserta to Keszthelyi in NARA II, RG 226, E 136, B 26.
365
12. September 1944, Chapin to Shepardson and Foster, SICE Weekly Report #9 in NARA II, RG 226, E 211,
B 8, WN 23231-23250 and 17. September 1944, Doman to Joyce, Project Outline for Hungarian Desk in NARA
II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
366
Tóth was a Roman colony Hungarian who had found his way into OSS around the same time as Magyary and
Kovács and was (according to Doman) recommended by Aradi. He was claimed by his colleagues at parachute
training school to be "A Charlatan, a liar [and someone] only a fool would volunteer to go on a mission with."
He claimed to be a Communist, but expressed extreme nationalist sympathies to Doman, nonetheless, he was not
believed to be an enemy agent or in their pay, simply "an egotistical man, without principles or scruples, who
would sell out most anyone to improve his own standing....undisciplined and unable to get along with people of
normal temperament." Tóth had come to OSS after being dropped by the ISLD owing to his temperament. Cf. 2.
September 1944, Doman to Acting Chief SICE in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
367
Sgt. Steve Catlos, had left Hungary in 1927 at the age of 8, moving to Pittsburgh with his parents. He had
grown up speaking Hungarian at home but learning English in school. He is described as "quiet, serious minded
and not hesitant in volunteering." Cpl. Bela Herczeg, 31 was born in Jászberény and left Hungary in 1940
moving to NYC. Herczeg is described as "a man of spirit and physical courage. A Hungarian Jew, he refused to
sit in the back rows assigned to Jews and on this score fought two duels...came to this country [USA] as a
merchant seaman but worked steadily to get into the Army...Tough, athletic, happy person." Cf. 13. September
1944, Doman to Kalnay, Personal Data of Agents in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B, 178, WN 7334 and NARA II,

74
origin were added in his place.368 It is not known precisely why only Sgt. Catlos was dispatched
to Hungary with Bowery, and there are conflicting exlpanations given for the non-inclusion of
Herczeg. Doman purpotedly claimed after the war that Herczeg had come down with some sort
of sickness. 369 Even if not afflicted with a malady, there were two very good reasons for
Herczeg to be grounded; first, it is believed that there would have been little need for his SO
capabilities and second, his "Semitic appearance” may have put him at a disadvantage when
meeting with Hungarians.370
As mentioned above, on the 18th of September, Keszthelyi returned to Bari, assuming temporary
command of the Hungarian desk until Fuller had arrived back from the US. With this, the team's
roster was complete. By the 19th, at the very latest, it had been decided to land the mission in
Slovakia, in what was then called the 'Bowery II' team. 371 In his after-action report, Fuller
records the name of the team which finally did infiltrate Slovakia in October (consisting of
Kesztherlyi, Catlos, Magyary and Kovács) as 'Dallam.'372 Thus, a mission which had been in
planning since at least two months, and had undergone numerous additions and changes,
including collaboration between various elements in Bari (Joyce’s Balkan desk and Chapin’s
SICE worked together on the project, at least at inception) and even other OSS staions (Madrid)
was primed for insertion. This occurred on the 7th of October as Bowery/Dallam left Bari,
landing at Tri Duby. Magyary and Kovács were escorted by Keszthelyi and Catlos to
Nagykürtös (today Vel'ký Krtíš in Slovakia) where they were handed over to Hungarian guides

RG 226, E 224, B 113 and 3. March 1944, Mr. Russel Place to Lanning MacFarland in NARA II, RG 226, E 92,
B 87.
368
Chapin had an eye on both Herczeg and Catlos for some time, expressing his interest in having them come to
Bari already in July. Herczeg came at the end of that month with Catlos arriving in September. It was envisioned
that they would assist Doman in penetrating Hungary via Rumania. Catlos would act as Doman's radio operator
and Herczeg would organize SO operations in Hungary. They were released to Bari, however, Doman's plan to
infiltrate via Transylvania was cancelled. Catlos was added to the Bowery team on the 12th of September as
replacement for T'óth. Cf. 24. July 1944, Chapin to Lt. Deranian and 28. Juy 1944, Chapin to Joyce, both in
NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172 and 2. September 1944, Chief SO to Joyce in NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 54.
369
The author cannot attest to the validity of the work cited here as a whole, however mentions only a reference
in the book, made to that work's author (David Wise) presumably during an interview; Cf. David Wise,
Molehunt. The Secret Search for Traitors that shattered the CIA (New York 1992) 44f.
370
Although the report states that he was "not of noticeable Semitic appearance" and was in fact a "rather good
looking fellow" a training officer would later remark that the "hardly noticeable qualification [would] genuinely
have to be so." Regrettably, the author has not yet been able to find photographs of Herczeg. Cf. 3. March 1944,
Mr. Russel Place to Lanning MacFarland and 29. March 1944, Captain Subdi Sahi to Place both in NARA II,
RG 226, E 92, B 87.
371
Bowery II called for Keszthelyi and "two enlisted men" (presumed to be Catlos and Herczeg) to be landed in
Slovakia; in Slovakia, the two enlisted men would man a radio conection to Bari, with Keszthelyi transiting into
Hungary. In Hungary, he would create a courier link to the radio transmitter and pass information back to
Herczeg and Catlos for transmittal to Bari. Cf. 19. September 1944, Chapin to Shepardson and Foster, SICE
Report #10 in NARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 8, WN 23231-23250.
372
Someone penciled in 'Dallas' above the word 'Dallam' in Fuller's report. Cf. 4. June 1945, William
Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.

75
on the evening of the 11th of October. 373 The group was to cross the border shortly before
midnight at Varsány.374 Owing to "enemy activity" (presumably German) in the area, Catlos
and Keszthelyi immediately set about returning to Tri Duby. Keszthelyi decided to impart
Magyary with only one of five signal plans (Alfalfa) so that if caught, the other plans would not
be compromised.375 The next day, Magyary proceded to his nearby hometown of Vámosladány
(present day Mýtne Ludany in Slovakia) and was given clerical garb by the local priest, who
following a mass, accompanied him to the town of Zselíz (today Želiezovce in Slovakia) from
where Magyary took a train to Esztergom intending to meet with his close-friend the Prince-
Primate. The Prince-Primate, upon meeting Magyary, immediately hid him while Magyary
explained his mission. Serédi acknowledged Magyary’s undertaking and provided him with the
means to get to Budapest (again by train) where Magyary contacted a friend who was professor
of law at the University of Budapest and told him to alert Horthy to his arrival. At 9 AM on the
14th of October, General Pál Pongracz, a member of the Regent's military cabinet retrieved
Magyary and brought him to the Royal Palace, where he met with various officers of the
Regent's military cabinet discussing with them his mission.376 At 9 PM on the 14th, nearly 12
hours later, Magyary had his audience with Horthy, telling him "I am of the Apor group. I come
from the Allies, we outside the country see that the war is already lost for Hungary, it is high

373
No approximations are provided for the towns and settlements described over the following few pages. They
are all very near to one another (within a radius of a few kilometers) and with the exclusion of Esztergom, all in
president-day Slovakia.
374
Cf. 12. October 1944, Keszthelyi to Chapin No. 108 in NARA II, RG 226, E 136, B 34.
375
Bowery/Dallam brought at least 5 signal plans with it, intended for distribution to various groups. These
signal plans were named Alfalfa, Stockton, Marlboro, Dallam and its alternate, Mallad. Alfalfa was meant for the
group which had been contacted via Madrid; it is claaimed to include "the Boss [believed to be Regent Horthy],
his son [Nicky Horthy Jr.], the old count [believed to be ex-Premier Bethlen] and the Chief of Staff [General
János Vörös]" Stockton was for Miklós Csomóss (a Hungarian underground leader affiliated with the Magyar
Front and MFM). Dallam and Mallad are believed to have been intended for use by Kovács and his network, or
for communications between Keszthelyi and Bari while the end-recipients of Marlboro are unknown, however it
is believed to have been related to the plans origiating from Madrid and was possibly a secondary circuit for
Alfalfa; ultimately Marlboro was dropped by the 21st of October and cancelled by the 10th of November with no
communications received. Cf. 12. October 1944, Keszthelyi to Chapin No. 108 in NARA II, RG 226, E 136, B
34. and 21. October 1944, Keszthelyi to Chapin #191 in NARA II, RG 226, E 139, B 29 and 1. October 1944,
Marlboro Circuit in NARA II, RG 226, E 154, B 42.
376
The officers mentioned, besides General Pál Pongracz are General Ántal Vattay and Colonels Gyula Tószt
and Debreceny. General Vattay was one of the officers who convinced Horthy to surrender in the early morning
of October 16th, although it is not believed that he was pro-German, but rather a realist who wanted to ensure his,
and the Regent's survival. In January of 1945, he was demoted and handed over to authorities by the Arrow-
Cross for disloyalty (or infidelity; the words are interchangeable in Hungarian). He was considered by Szent-
Iványi to be incompetent and naive but no mention is made of him being a pro-German. Colonel Tószt, the
Regent's aide, coded messages to the Faraghó delegation in Moscow along with the widow of István Horthy,
ultimately committing suicide (Magyary claims he was shot dead by the Germans by Monday, Szent-Miklósy
and Szent-Iványi report suicide). Tószt was also responsible for liaising with the Hungarian air force to organize
covert flights of Hungarian officials (such as General Náday, see Delegations from Hungary - Náday mission
sub-chapter) No information was found on the other two Generals (Pongrácz and Debreceny) See, Szent-Iványi,
Independence, 319 and Szent-Miklósy, Movement, 89-95.

76
time that we made ourselves active as such, Hungary should surrender unconditionally to the
United States, Great Britain and USSR."377 Horthy concurred stating "The interests of Hungary
are more important than my personal safety, I would be willing to put my head under the
guillotine if it would save Hungary." All told, Magyary and Horthy spoke for an hour and a
half.378 Magyary held that he had provided Horthy with the stimulus to make the announcement
on the 15th citing that he "recognized words and phrases from their conversation." Thereafter,
Magyary took refuge first in a Fraciscan monastery before heading to a cousin and finally, to
the St. Margaret Institute, where the Mother Superior sheltered him.379 On the 11th of February,
he made himself known (purportedly as an American agent) to the Soviets upon their seizure
of Budapest. He was returned to Italy in March of 1945, following a lengthy spell of questioning
by the Soviets.380
Pál Kovács had split with Magyary upon nearing the Hungarian frontier, likewise making his
way to Budapest. Kovács' assignment had been to organize resistance, specifically among
Hungarian factory workers. Kovács and Magyary met once in Budapest, at a time most likely
shortly before or after the German coup.381 Kovács made contact in Budapest with a man he
had met in Rome several years before, Géza Kértesz.382 Kértesz had returned to Hungary in
September of 1943 and was an association football trainer. Kovács purportedly informed

377
This statement, coupled with mentions of Apor in both Szent-Iványi's and Szent-Miklósy's memoirs on the
MFM lend yet more support to the notion that Apor was operating his own organization in Rome which was
independent of, yet analog to and in harmony with the MFM.
378
Fuller claims the conversation lasted for 40 minutes Cf. 4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William
Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
379
Again, Fuller adds more detail to Magyary's report, claiming that the radio man whom Magyary was to
contact (part of the operation originating from Madrid) was found to have long since been executed. The identity
of this radio man is not known however it is believed that he was to begin operating on the above mentioned
Alfalfa circuit. 'Alfalfa' was initiated on 14 October to be used by "persons unknown receiving in the vicinity of
Budapest" see n. 375. Magyary brought "code books, listening plans, crystals and ciphers" to Alfalfa to replace
those “materials brought from Madrid” to be used to communicate with Bari, either via the Dallam circuit or by
other means. “The purpose of Dallam team is to establish a solid circuit with Bari as close as possible to the
Alfalfa and Marianna group[s]. The "Marianna Group is that resistance network surrounding Miklós Csomoss”
which included the first post-Communist Prime Minister of Hungary, Árpád Göncz. Therefore, the groups
around Horthy, Csomóss and Kovács were to be unified, at least in OSS planning. The importance of these radio
circuits, despite their confuse nature, should not be underestimated; a supplementary report states that Keszthelyi
was to organize “the first sortie of the 15th Air Force if he reached Budapest” using Dallam, or its alternate
Mallad, most certainly in collaboration with Kovács and his group. Cf. 4. June 1945, William Shepardson to
William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36. See also Alfalfa and
Dallam information in Undated, Alfalfa Circuit in NARA II, RG 226, E 135, B 63 and NARA II, RG 226, E 154,
B 42.
380
The above is paraphrased largely from Magyary's report which he gave upon returning to Bari and is found in
17. April 1945; Chapin to Chief SI, Abbreviated Summary of the Bowery Mission in NARA II, RG 226, E 210,
B 340, WN 13342-13351.
381
Cf. 4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA
II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
382
This information is paraphrased from documents concerning the investigation of the case with regards to
beneficiary payments to the widows for the death of their husbands and loved ones in service of the OSS to be
found in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 177, WN 7639.

77
Kértesz that he was a member of the US Army and had parachuted into Slovakia with an
American lieutenant, Tibor Keszthelyi. According to Kértesz's widow, Kovács had claimed to
be chief organizer of the "OSS Totis-Dallam group" and asked for Kértesz's assistance in
creating a resistance group. Kértesz agreed and contacted his friends, organizing a network
around their apartment at the Grof Zichy Jenő Utca 40.383 The Dallam group met there nearly
every night, excepting those when Kovács would be hidden in Rákospálota, a suburban district
of Budapest.
The Dallam group "observed German troop movements, airforce concentrations, prepared
crytograph messages in the shop of Gyula Toghia and forwarded the messages by courier to
Leva in Slovakia, where an OSS short wave radio was located. They also purchased German
uiforms and small arms (financed by Toghia)."384 On the 6th of December, before the group
could take action, they were rolled up. The reasons for this have been reported as relating to
Kovács' indiscretion in a bordello he frequented, however, this is only partially true. 385
According to the postwar autopsy of the operation, Kovács had attracted the attention of a
prostitute at a bordello, Mária Benyi and became a regular client, visiting her at her apartment.
Kovács informed her of his role within the American secret service. This, Benyi recanted to her
pimp, Gábor Dosa, a Seargent and Arrow-Cross Party member. Dosa disliked the amount of
attention Benyi paid to Kovács and so, on the 6th of December, in the late afternoon when
Kovács visited Benyi and she asked Dosa to leave, he walked to the Headquarters of Hungarian
Counterintelligence and within half an hour returned with several detectives who arrested
Kovács.386 Kovács had a notebook on his person which carried the names of the members of
his network as well as their addresses; his network was finished within a matter of hours. On
the 5th of February Ernő and Miklós Jánosik were executed, the day after, István Tóth and Géza

383
The members of this group, according to an investigator hired (after the war) to research the case were (in
order of joining) Béla Jánosik, Gyula Toghia, Sándor Toghia, Tíbor Toghia, Tíbor Holecska, Ernő Jánosik,
Miklós Jánosik, István Tóth and István Jánosi. Cf. Undated, Andrew Szentgyorgy (sp.) Investigation into the
causes of the arrest and execution of OSS agent Pal Kovacs and five Hungarian operators in NARA II, RG 226,
E 210 B, 177, WN 7639.
384
Cf. Undated, Andrew Szentgyorgy (sp.) Investigation into the causes of the arrest and execution of OSS agent
Pal Kovacs and five Hungarian operators in NARA II, RG 226, E 210 B, 177, WN 7639.
385
See Duncan [Bare], The [Curious] Case of Aradi Zsolt. In: [JIPSS] (Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and
Security Studies) 8/1 (2014), 7-22. This citation page 14 and Charles Fenyvesi, Két ügynök: a monsignore és a
szerelő [Two agents: the monsignor and the repairman]. In:Valász [Answer] 4 (2001). Accessible at:
http://www.flagmagazin.hu/magyar_millenium/magyar_-_usa_titkos_targyalasok_a_ii_vh-ban_4. Last accessed
14.03.2015.
386
Cf. Undated, Andrew Szentgyorgy (sp.) Investigation into the causes of the arrest and execution of OSS agent
Pal Kovacs and five Hungarian operators in NARA II, RG 226, E 210 B, 177, WN 7639.

78
Kértesz and on the 11th, Pál Kovács. The rest of the network survived the war, being freed by
the Russians.387
Keszthelyi and Catlos would remain in Slovakia, at first since it was believed by the former that
he would have an opportunity to penetrate into Hungary, and barring that, could assist Magyary
and Kovács.388 Ultimately, this decision would cost Keszthelyi his life and Catlos a great deal
of pain. They both encamped with CFI forces and the rest of the Dawes and Houseboat teams
until the Tri Duby airstrip became inoperable (near the end of October), in the leadup to which,
evacuation (by air) had been rendered impossible by German air superiority.389 On the 28th of
October, Lt. Green, commander of the Houseboat and Dawes missions split the OSS and SOE
personnel remaining in Slovakia into 4 groups to minimize the likelihood of capture during the
estimated five days needed to trek to Soviet lines. The group then proceded overland, through
the Slovakian hinterland, all the time hounded by German patrols. On the 10th of November,
during a firefight with German forces, a horse carrying a radio and its acoutrements was shot,
falling and landing on top of Catlos.390 On the 12th of December, Keszthelyi was captured while
on reconnaissance with another American officer.391 By the 26th of December, Catlos was part
of a much smaller group, of less than 5 people, who had eluded the Germans, Hlinka Guardists
(Slovak government loyalists) and Ukrainian auxiliaries. This group continued east, towards
Soviet lines. Catlos hid in a forrester's lodge from the 11th of January until the 29th. In the interim,
the rest of his group had managed to get through to what ended up being Rumanian lines, before
being passed off to Soviet intelligence officers. After recovering Catlos, the group was
debriefed and thereafter given a period of convalesence in February in Hungary. Once fit, Catlos
was to be sent to Odessa for repatriation to Bari, but while in Bucharest was able to contact
OSS officers and shorten his, and his companion's journey.392 Tibor Keszthelyi did not fare as
well. Following capture, he and many other personnel of Houseboat/Dawes were brought to

387
Szentgyörgyi's investigation included interviews with Benyi and the surviving members of the Totis-Dallam
network, as well as photographs and information on the group's jailers and interrogators. These were Lt. Col.
László Szíta, Gyula Tóth and Béla Rácz. See Undated, Andrew Szentgyorgy (sp.) Investigation into the causes
of the arrest and execution of OSS agent Pal Kovacs and five Hungarian operators in NARA II, RG 226, E 210
B, 177, WN 7639.
388
Cf. 12. October 1944, Dawes and Keszthelyi to Chapin No. 105 in NARA II, RG 226, E 136, B 34.
389
See 5. June 1945, Sgt. Catlos and PFC. Kenneth V. Dunlevy to Commanding General MTOUSA in NARA II,
RG 226, E 224, B 113, Catlos, Steven, 4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's
report on field conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36 and 27. January 1945, Chief SICE to Chief X-2,
Operational History, Dawes and Associated Team Slovakia in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 22.
390
See 20. August 1945, Otto G. Pitz, to Adjutant General, War Department, Recommendation for the Award of
the Purple Heart to Sgt. Steve J. Catlos in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 113.
391
See 5. June 1945, Sgt. Catlos and PFC. Kenneth V. Dunlevy to Commanding General MTOUSA in NARA II,
RG 226, E 224, B 113.
392
See, Ibid.

79
Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Over the next few weeks, he was tortured before being
executed in January.393
The role which Ferenc Luttor played in the entire Bowery/Dallam affair arises from information
which the Prince-Primate supplied to Magyary, upon his arrival in Esztergom. During their
meeting, the Prince-Primate told Magyary that Luttor had denounced him to the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry, with the claim that he was "working for the Allies, recruiting partisans in
southern Italy against Hungary."394 While held to be true, it is remarkable that Magyary, upon
returning in March, neglected to mention the matter until August. It is possible that Magyary
did not have an opportunity or did not feel comfortable speaking about the topic until the war
had ended and he could be certain that Luttor was not working for the Americans. Perhaps most
interesting is not the denunciation, but rather its substance. While at face value, the details
appear irrelevant, the lack of concrete information about operational plans or happeninngs is
indicative not of what Luttor knew, but of what he did not know. The timeliness of his
denunciation is its only danger. Luttor had been met with open hostility on the 20th of August
while in attendance at a meeting of the Free Hungarian Association in Rome, during which he
attempted to convince the group to swear allegiance to the Sztójay government.395 It is likely
that Magyary, Apor and/or Aradi spoke out against his statements (unfortunately, the OSS
records do not provide minutes of the meeting) and it would only require a minimum of
knowledge to determine that any one of the three who spoke against him were working, at least
in one way or another with the Americans. Even an accusation, unfounded or untrue that they
were working for the Americans would be well within Luttor's power and modus operandi.
Speaking against a leak of sensitive information are the release of several Hungarian prisoners
of war who had been recruited by Doman in mid-August, envisioned as operational personnel,
as well as the severance of the relationship between Imre Tóth, who was an acquaintance of
Luttor and had joined OSS with Magyary and Kovács.396 Tóth had trained with Magyary and

393
See Unknown Author, OSS Operations end with Agent's Executions in Mauthausen from
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ww2/ossops.html#17 last accessed 22.03.2015. See also Siegfried
[Beer], Inspection of Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Ein früher Bericht des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes
OSS aus dem befreiten Österreich [An early report of the American Intelligence Service, the OSS, from liberated
Austria]. In Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, Jahrbuch [Documentation Archives of the
Austrian resistance, Yearbook] (1992) 107-119.
394
Cf. 25. January 1946, JJ-1 [Murphy] and DH-140 [Klassen] to BB-8 [Angleton], Msgr. Francois Luttor and
certain C.E. aspects in the employment of Hungarian nationals in Italy and Central Europe, X3559 in NARA II,
RG 226, E 214, B 4, WN 24860-24877.
395
Cf. 19. February 1946, Source AE-753 [László Véress], JZX-6185 in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 265.
396
Cf. 2. September 1944, Doman to Acting Chief SICE in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172 and 13. September
1944, Doman to Kalnay, Personal state of agents in NARA II, RG 226, E 212 , B 3, WN 20776.

80
Kovács, and had complaints lodged against him by the latter and Cpl. Herczeg. 397 His training
was such that he did not know operational details, but personalities and could extrapolate that
an operation into Hungary was in planning. Further, Luttor appears to have never been either
engaged or employed by the OSS in Rome or Bari. Turning our attention to Aradi's supposed
meeting with Luttor on the 3rd of October, we have grounds to clear him of any wrong-doing.
Surely, if Aradi had been passing important information to Luttor, he would have been able to
provide him with confirmation that the infiltration of Magyary and Kovács to Hungary was
imminent (Bowery had been green-lighted on the 21st of September for departure on the 24th,
but had to be postponed owing to bad weather).398 Aradi could have provided Luttor with any
variety of detailed or damaging information about the mission, but was instead only able to
comment (purportedly) that Magyary was recruiting partisans in southern Italy. There is no
mention of anyone coming to Hungary. Finally, supposing that Magyary was protecting his
fellow priest is a moot point; if he had wanted to do this, he could have said nothing (the only
other witness to his confirmation, Jusztinián Serédi had died months before his denunciation).
Therefore, we can with great certainty say that neither Aradi nor Magyary had betrayed any
aspect of the mission to Luttor, and that someone with far less operational access and knowledge
had provided Luttor consciously or perhaps inadvertently with what amounted to chicken-feed
and rumor.

4.4 Delegations from Hungary - General Náday

The afore-mentioned Náday delegation (see Chapter 2) crash landed near Foggia (San Severo)
on the 22nd of September 1944. 399 Along with General István Náday, there were 4 other
passengers on board the German-made Heinkel plane; János Majoros (and his wife), Jenő
Marosán, the radio operator and mechanic, and Lt. Colonel Charles Howie, a British/South-
African artillery officer. 400 The responsibility for organization of the flight cannot be

397
Cf. Ibid.
398
See NARA II, RG 226, E 136, B 34.
399
The minutiae of this mission are compiled from several overlapping sources. For example, in the document
cited here, the date for the crash-landing is given as 25th September, which is incorrect. Cf. 17. December 1944,
David L. Hite, to Intelligence Officer 2677th Regiment, Report on the Naday and Soos parties in NARA II, RG
226, E 210, B 327, WN 13380 and Szent-Miklósy, Movement.
400
Lt. Colonel Charles Howie, a relation of South African Field Marshal Smuts, had escaped from captivity in
Silesia, making his way to Hungary in 1943. There, he managed to carve a position for himself as an informal
link between the British military command and the Hungarian government, meeting several times with the
Regent and purportedly living in the Royal Palace (according to one anecdote, Howie would sing in English very
loudly and indiscreetly whilst showering, which was a constant source of concern for his Hungarian
benefactors). His activities while in Hungary, and in connection with the MFM are reported in both Szent-
Miklósy's and Szent-Iványi's works on the MFM, as well as several other sources. These are Charles T. Howie,
Our man of destiny in 1944 in The Hungarians Digest (New York, 1966), Claerwen Howie [daughter], Agent by
Accident (South Africa 1997) Laura-Louise [Veress], [Clear] the Line, Hungary's struggle to leave the Axis

81
determined definitively, as various persons claim its organization as their own. General László
Háry, who would himself take part in a similar flight in February 1945, told his interrogators
that he was approached by Horthy's aide, Colonel Gyula Tószt in September and asked to
facilitate the mission.401 Háry claims he referred Tószt to János Majoros, a civil pilot, while
Szent-Miklósy states that Majoros was chosen by Major Miklós Balássy and Lieutenant-
Colonel Domokos Hadnagy (to be introduced in the next sub-chapter).402
The group took off from Csákvári, a small town roughly equidistant from Budapest and
Székesfehérvár on the 22nd. 403 According to Szent-Miklósy, a car carrying the passengers
arrived near to the airport as a Heinkel He-111 of the Hungarian Air Force was landing; the
group then jumped from the car and ran to the still taxiing plane which took off due south. 404
The departure, having not been cleared with German air traffic controllers, was signalled for
interdiction by German interceptors, however, the group managed to elude the fighters.405
Once in Italy, the group was seperated; Colonel Howie was vetted and released quickly,
organizing at least one meeting between himself and Field Marshal Wilson. Náday's offer was
however, rejected as Allied commanders were quick to inform Náday and Howie that all
negotiations for surrender must be conducted through the Soviets. The Hungarians of the group
were taken to Caserta for interrogation and processing. 406 Their OSS interrogators included
Zsolt Aradi (Hungarian SI), T/3 Eugene Fodor (Hungarian SI/Interpreter), Lt. Richard V. Burks

during the Second World War (Chapel Hill 1995), Tom Ivie and Paul Ludwig, Spitfires and Yellow Tail
Mustangs, the US 52nd Fighter Group in World War II (Mechanicsburg 2005) and Alan Ogden, Through Hitler's
Backdoor; SOE Operations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 1939-1945 (Barnsley 2010). The
anecdote was relayed to the author by László Ritter and is believed to have originated from various Hungarian
archival documents.
401
During his interrogation in March of 1945, Háry claims that he had been approached by Tószt ('Tost' in the
report) on several occasions acting on behalf of the Regent to facilitate several proposed expeditions of
Hungarians to the western Allies, among them the Náday party, however, Szent-Miklósy asserts that he was
responsible (within the MFM) for organizing the Náday mission. Szent-Miklósy likewise states that he was
helped in this effort by Major Miklós Balássy and Lt. Col. Domokos Hadnagy (who were air force officers and
members of MFM). It is possible that Tószt, who was not part of the MFM and Szent-Miklósy both prepared
different aspects of the mission without knowing of each other's undertakings. See Szent-Miklósy, Movement,
40 and 13. March 1945, Interrogation Report Part I, the escape of General Hary, JBX-115 in NARA II, RG 226,
E 108A, B 201.
402
See Szent-Miklósy, Movement, 13, 52 and 13. March 1945, Interrogation Report Part I, the escape of General
Hary, JBX-115 in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 201.
403
Szent-Miklósy claims that the exit was affected from Székesfehérvár. MacArtney mentions “an obscure
airfield near Pest” [believed to refer not to the eastern half of Budapest, but rather to Pest megye (county)] Cf.
Sándor [Szakály], [Náday] István "'útravalója" ["The journey" of István Náday]. In: Lymbus, [Journal of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences] (2008) 315-319, Szent-Miklósy, Movement, 52 and MacArtney, October, 351.
404
It seems unlikely that the operation could be so precisely (and dramatically) coordinated as Szent-Miklósy
claims; on the same page Szent-Miklósy asserts that Howie was a pilot (he was an artillery officer) so it is
possible that he confused the Náday and Soós escapes. See Szent-Miklósy, Movement, 52.
405
This detail is only reported in Szent-Miklósy's account See Ibid.
406
Cf. 17. December 1944, David L. Hite, to Intelligence Officer 2677th Regiment, Report on the Naday and
Soos parties in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 327, WN 13380.

82
(R&A) and Elliot W. Schryver (R&A).407 Náday is described in a dossier compiled by the above
following several interviews as belonging to "that section of the Hungarian ruling class which
has been consistently pro-Allied."408 The object of the mission is claimed in another report to
have been "to undertake through Baron Apor, Hungarian ambassador, armistice negotiations
with the Allies."409 This does not appear to be the entire story however, as Horthy, Szent-Iványi,
Náday, Majoros, Nicky Horthy and Colonel Howie all confirmed to MacArtney that the goal
of the Náday mission was to "secure the cooperation of Western air-borne or land forces in the
proposed surrender."410 Whether the purpose of the mission was either or both of the above is
inconquesential as little of direct importance arose from the delegation, however, the personnel
who arrived, in particular Marosán and Majoros, would prove to be of great value to the
Americans in later months and years.
At roughly the same time occurred the arrival of Andor Gellért (codename Willard) from
Stockholm. Andor Gellért (b. Gyulafehérvár, today Alba Iulia in Rumaia, 1907) was like Aradi
a journalist and attached to a Hungarian Legation (Stockholm).411 Gellért had since at least 1942
been involved in clandestine communications on behalf of the political department of the
Foreign Ministry with the British and Americans.412 In 1943, his former boss, Antal Ullein-
Reviczky, would join him in Stockholm, spearheading what were the Kállay government's
‘Nordic’ overtures to the western Allies.413 Although known to and working towards similar
goals as the MFM, the two groups cannot be interchanged with one another. 414 Gellért had

407
Cf. 23 November 1944, Abraham Gilmore Flues to Chapin in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
408
Cf. 21. November 1944, Hungary and the Peace: Conversation with Colonel-General Vitez Istvan Naday on
14 November 1944 in NARA II, M 1642, R 103.
409
Cf. 31. January 1945, Bernard A. Towell, Liaison Officer, Hungarian Missions to the Allies in NARA II, RG
226, E 171A, B 65.
410
See MacArtney, October, 351.
411
Cf. Undated, untitled biographical information Andor Gellért in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 178, WN 7334.
412
Gellért, who had previously worked in Berlin, was on very friendly terms with the American legation there.
Upon the German declaration of war in December 1941, the American legation in Berlin moved to Stockholm.
Once posted there in 1942, Gellért was able to resume many of his old contacts. See Szent-Iványi,
Independence, 246-248.
413
Gellért and Ullein-Reviczky met from December 1943 until at least February 1944 with OSS and State
Department representatives on behalf of the Kállay Government. See 20. January 1944, Herschel V. Johnson to
Secretary of State in NARA II, RG 226, M 1642, R 63 and 26. February 1944, Stockholm to Department of
State, Contact with Gellert and Ullein-Reviczky in NARA II, RG 218, E 2, B 91.
414
It is possible to say that the group to which Gellért belonged was that which Prime Minister Kállay had been
tasked with forming by Horthy. This group of minor officials, a handful of diplomats and friends of Kállay
represented an officially sanctioned, government effort to detach Hungary from the Axis by diplomatic means.
The Kállay group would be succeeded by the self-decreed ’Dissident Hungarian ambassadors’ following the
German occupation of March 19th, a loose confederation of those diplomats abroad able to remain either in
neutral countries or those occupied or soon to be occupied by the Western Allies. MFM on the other hand, while
including many officials and members of the Horthy government, was never a recognized extension of any
government. Szent-Iványi refers to Gellért as a man of "inferior quality" although it is not known whether this
refers to his person or his capabilities vis-à-vis other diplomats. Szent-Iványi characterizes the diplomats and
foreign ministry officials around Ullein-Reviczky (including Gellért) as being largely of Jewish extraction, with

83
continuously developed close relations with OSS representatives in Stockholm, however when
this began precisely is unknown.415 He was introduced to the famous Raoul Wallenberg by one
of his American interlocutors, his official date for employment within OSS is the 16th of October
1944. 416 Despite this, he transferred already in September 1944 to Bari, to be part of the
upcoming Budapest City Unit.417 OSS officers in Stockholm referred to his purpose as late as
November 1944 as being a liaison between the Allies and Hungary. 418 The relationship
between Gellért and Soós is difficult to discern from the records, however, it is believed to be
based around contacts with Swedish diplomatic personnnel.419 Two cables present what appears
to be the conenction. Gellért was able to contact Soós through Per Anger and Raoul Wallenberg
and it was claimed that Soós was "equipped with a Swedish signal plan [and that] the entire
affair is in the hands of the Swedes." 420 The report continues to say that "any trustworthy
Hungarian leaving Berne referring to Gellert [would be able to contact] Soos." The connection
between Swedish personnel and Soós is difficult to ascertain as well, however it is known that
Gellért met Wallenberg in Stockholm in 1943 through his friend, Francis Cunningham (2nd
Secretary of the US Legation Stockholm).421 Gellért claims that before Wallenberg departed to
Budapest in the Summer of 1944, he provided him with letters of introduction to around 40
personalities in Hungary, of which Géza Soós was one (Miklós Csomóss, the head of an
underground group operating in Budapest being another). 422 Other postwar documentation
states that Soós (using the codename Schultze) was in contact with Stockholm "both by writing

a slightly negative connotation attached to the phrasing. In discussions, a Hungarian-Swedish colleague, Gellért
Kovács, assured the author that Gellért was a member of the MFM. See Szent-Iványi, Independence, 217, 292.
415
Gellért's engagement is described by the OSS Station Chief in Stockholm, Wilho Tikander as a defection "A
Hungarian diplomat had been induced to defect in Stockholm through the combined efforts of OSS and certain
State Department personnel. Later this defector was flown up to England and there he become one of
OSS'collaborators...This defector from the Hugarian diplomatic service became an aide to the OSS Chief at
Bari." Cf. Undated, Wilho Tikander Manuscript in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 327, WN 13386.
416
See Andor Gellert personnel file in NARA II, RG 226, E 224, B 266.
417
Cr. 25. January 1946, JJ-1 [Murphy] and DH-140 [Klassen] to BB-8 [Angleton] X 3559 in NARA II, RG 226,
E 214, B 4, WN 24860-24877.
418
22. November 1944, Stockholm to London, TX-221 in NARA II, RG 226, E 214, B 1, WN 20987.
419
In an article written in 1974, Gellért cites the fact that Sweden was the only neutral, European country which
maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as being the driving force behind their use as
intermediaries for contacting the Soviets. Cf. Andor [Gellért], A stockholmi [színtér] [The Stockholm scene],
1942-1944 (II.). In: Új [Látóhatár] [New Horizon] 6 (1974) 441-457. This citation 450f.
420
Cf. 6. November 1944, Chapin to Fuller, No. 1175 and 7. November 1944, Fuller to Chapin, No. 1447 both in
NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 204, WN 09022-09036.
421
Gellért is critical of the perception of Wallenberg as a lifelong diplomat; according to him, he was an export-
import businessman who frequently conducted business in Hungary and only in 1944 was provided with
diplomatic credentials. Cf. Gellért, Színtér, 456 in Látóhatár No. 6.
422
Gellért singles out Soós as being the most important of the 40 as he [Soós] was "...not only personally always
at the disposal [of Wallenberg], but provided him with many valuable staff" [Author's translation] in Gellért,
Színtér, 457f in Látóhatár, No. 6.

84
and telephone" and that this was routed to Antal Ullein-Reviczky.423 Upon reaching Italy, Soós
told his interrogators (one of whom was Gellért) that he would "write periodic summaries of
the political situation in Hungary which he got to Willard [Gellért] through the Swedish
[diplomatic] pouch and which Willard turned over to the American Legation in Stockholm.
When it became apparent that this channel was in danger from German pressure, Willard sent
an American radio set to Soós through the Swiss pouch. This Soós never received."424

4.5 The Soós-Hadnagy Mission

Soós began only seriously considering leaving Hungary at the beginning of December 1944;
whether this coincided with the November 22nd razzia against the Committee of Liberation of
the Magyar Front remains to be seen.425 According to Szent-Miklósy, the mission was made on
behalf of the Magyar Front (so as to re-establish communications with the Allies and provide
the Soviets with information concerning the defenses of Budapest) however, according to Soós
and his pilot, Domokos Hadnagy, on behalf of the MFM. 426 A possible explanation for the
discrepancy is that Soós, as one of the, if not the most senior MFM figure still free and in
Hungary felt he had waited long enough for the Soviets to assist (what can now be called) the
Hungarian resistance and was keen to see if the Americans or British would be willing to supply
the Hungarian underground with weapons and limited advisory support (as they had in Slovakia)

423
Soós used several pseudonyms and codenames; "Schultze when in contact with Sweden...Saltzer for contact
with Switzerland, Gizi Neni [sic!] when contacting Hungarians in Switzerland, Pali within underground
movement [MFM], known and sought by name [Pál G.] Gyalakuti by the German secret police." Cr. 22. January
1946, JJ-1 [Murphy] and DH-140 [Klassen] to BB-8 [Angleton], No. 31385 in NARA II, RG 226, E 214, B 4,
WN 24860-24877.
424
The letter which Gellért dispatched to Soós was received on the 5th or 6th of September. It advised him of the
former’s pending relocation to Italy but also, that Horthy should concentrate loyal troops on the southern border
of Hungary. Cf. 14. December 1944, Edward M. Kimball to Chief SICE and CO BDPTCU, Hungarian resistance
movement in NARA II, RG 226, E 125, B 48.
425
According to the account Soós gave to his interrogators in Italy, a certain 'Major Vari' was brought to
meetings of the Committee of Liberation (the planning arm of the Magyar Front) beginning on the 2nd or 3rd of
November. This major claimed to be a Soviet liaison, but was most likely a German or Arrow-Cross plant.
Vary/Vari raised Soós and Hadnagy's suspicion when he claimed that he could”'get representatives to both Rome
and Moscow and planned to break through the German defenses at Szeged with 10,000 French and that he
wanted to land 100,000 Jews on Vienna, as these people ought to shed some blood in their own cause. " At
Vary's urging, the Committee called off sabotage actions planned for the 21st of November. Soós queried friends
within the VKF-2 in the interim and they informed him that Vary was most likely a German agent. Cf. 3.
February 1945, R&A Hungarian Report No. 14; Further aspects of the history of the Hungarian Resistance
Movement in NARA II, RG 226, M 1642, R 103 and Cf. 12. December 1944, Burks to Chapin and Gellert, No.
2574 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 504, WN 18963.
426
Szent-Miklósy's account differs from that which Soós gave to the Allies. Szent-Miklósy writes "the
Hungarian Front, represented by Zoltán Tildy, dispatched Soós and Hadnagy to the headquarters of the Western
powers in Italy to try to restore communications[s] with them and make every effort to save Budapest from
destruction." However Soós begins his account of the mission by stating "The Hungarian Independence
Movement sent the two of us [Soós and Hadnagy] to Italian territory on December 3, 1944, to the allied
headquarters..." Szent-Miklósy claims that, contrary to what Soós stated, the mission was conducted on behalf of
the Magyar Front. See Szent-Miklósy, Movement, 94f.

85
or, at the very least, help to re-establish communications with Moscow.427 Another explanation
is that Soós wanted the Americans to see him as the head of the MFM, or at the very least, not
as an errand boy for the Magyar Front. It must be noted however, that via the documents and
secondary sources consulted, both Soós and Hadnagy were extremely altruistic and not
interested in personal glory or status.428
Soós left Budapest on the 3rd of December in an army car with the rest of the party, which
included Hadnagy's wife and daughter (both Júdit), Lt. Árpád Toperczer, T/3 István Rákosits
and a Dutch Lt., Baron John Bentinck. 429 At the same time, Hadnagy secured usage of a
Hungarian Heinkel-111 on the grounds that he wanted to test it before it was used to transport

427
This is based on a document in which Gellért and an American member of the Budapest City Unit are sourced
as saying "After failure of Horthy's putsch, Russians seem to have lost all interest in anti-German movement in
Hungary...Russians have broken off contact with the resistance movement in order to have a freer hand in
Hungary...towards the end of November even [having ceased to contact] the Communists [at which time] they
asked Soos to contact the Russians from Italy on their behalf...Soos and Hadnagy sent to Italy to contact the
Anglo-Saxon powers." Cf. 16. December 1944, Edward M. Kimball to Chief SICE and CO BDPTCU,
Hungarian resistance movement (continued) in NARA II, RG 226, E 125, B 48.
428
In what can be termed a 'testimonial' signed by Soós and Hadnagy (to be found in Szent-Miklósy's book) the
two recant their escape, but devote far more space to relating their dissatisfaction with the American (Hungarian)
personnel who interviewed them and misconstrued or misreported their statements. The story goes, upon being
read back finished reports based on information they had supplied, the two were appalled to hear that segments
had been added which they found to be falsified. An example of this is found in [Hungarian] R&A Report # 14,
on page 31 of which is written "[Domokos] Szentiványi fears and hates the Russians." and "In social questions
he [Szent-Iványi] is not in the least progressive and has been characterized as one of those who is prepared for
any social reform which will save the reaction." Soós and Hadnagy both adamantly protested the inclusion of
such remarks in official and widely circulated documents, particularly as Szent-Iványi was a professional
diplomat and had never expressed anti-Russian sympathies to them. Primarily Soós argues that if Szent-Iványi
had, Horthy would have never sent him to the Soviet Union in September. In another section of the report,
Miklós Csomóss is referred to as being "much more pro-American and pro-British than Russophile." a statement
which Soós and Hadnagy claim to have never made as they knew very little of him, and that such an epitaph
would be far more fitting to Szent-Iványi. These documents were composed by 4 members of OSS, they are
Dean [Himler] Willard [Gellért], Carnera [Richard V. Burks] and Henie [Major Thomas Hall]. The material was
almost certainly procured by Himler and Gellért in Hungarian (or translated during meetings) so that Burks and
Hall could evaluate and organize it into reports. In April and May, after several meetings with Himler, it was
agreed that the material would be corrected, however it was either continuously forgotten in Caserta or personnel
were handling it who were not authorized to make the corrections. Finally, in May, Himler promised Soós and
Hadnagy that he had circulated a letter to all recipients based on his personnel knowledge and friendship with
Szent-Iványi; this letter has not been found by the author, although Abram Gilmore Flues, the leader of the
Budapest City Unit did state in January 1945 that Himler claims a "longstanding friendship with Szentivanyi,
Chief of the MFM." For the Soós/Hadnagy testimony see Szent-Miklósy, Movement, 95-100. For the R&A
report referenced in the testimony (Soós and Hadnagy claim it was R&A IV, it was actually R&A XIV) see 3.
February 1945, R&A Report No. 14, Further Aspects of the History oft he Hungarian Resistance Movement (15
October - 9 December 1944) in NARA II, RG 226, M 1642, R 103. For Flues' statement see 5. January 1945,
Flues to Chapin, Budapest City Unit Report for December in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 29.
429
Lt. Baron Bentinck, was an Allied (Dutch) Prisoner of War who was held in what is present day Ukraine. As
the Red Army approached in early 1944, the decision was made to evacuate the camp he was in to Germany.
Bentinck and several compatriots managed to escape from the train they were being transported on and made
contact with Ukrainian national partisans [believed to be UPA], who escorted them to the Hungarian frontier.
Once in Hungary, they were brought near to Lake Balaton to an internment camp, but treated extremely well.
Bentinck eventually was able to get to Budapest, with the help of a former Philips executive and introduced to
Hungarian resistance members. See Balint [Török], Az olaszországi [küldetés] [The Italian Mission]. In: Magyar
[Szemle], 11/7-8 (2002).

86
General Vilmos Hellebronth (Szálasi's Armnaments Minister) to Germany for a conference
with Hitler.430 Hadnagy flew the plane from Budapest to Pápa, a smaller airbase solely under
Hungarian control where he had many friends and acquaintances and remained for close to a
week there, together with the rest of the group.
The small band took off at 9 AM on the 9th of December 1944, intending to reach Rome (and
Gellért).431 If Gellért could not be contacted directly, they hoped he could be notified via the
Vatican Legation (believed to still be under Gábor Apor, but actually headed by Ferenc Luttor
since the late summer).432 Owing to poor visibility and Allied fighter patrols, Hadnagy had to
fly along the Adriatic coast, as opposed to making a bee-line for Rome, thus reaching Foggia.
The hope was that they would be held by the Americans, but they were actually turned over to
the British.433 OSS personnel, such as Aradi, Himler, and Gellért among others had ready access
to Soós and Hadnagy within a matter of days, and the group was moved from Foggia to Caserta
and on the 16th to Bari where they were "in the custody of the Hungarian desk [of SICE]".434
Ultimately, the group would be interrogated from the 13th of December until the 26th of
January.435
Shortly after being taken over by members of SICE, Soós and Hadnagy offered themselves and
the MFM's infrastructure to AFHQ, should it decide to designate targets or wish to launch
operations. 436 At the very latest, by February, Soós and Hadnagy were permitted wide
mobility.437 On the 18th of February, they were introduced to Apor, Náday and an assortment

430
Cf. 14. December 1944, Edward M. Kimball to Chief SICE and CO BDPTCU, Hungarian resistance
movement in NARA II, RG 226, E 125, B 48.
431
Cf. 31. January 1945, Bernard A. Towell, Liaison Officer, Hungarian Missions to the Allies in NARA II, RG
226, E 171A, B 65.
432
Cf. 14. December 1944, Edward M. Kimball to Chief SICE and CO BDPTCU, Hungarian resistance
movement in NARA II, RG 226, E 125, B 48.
433
Cf. Ibid.
434
Cf. 12. December 1944, Burks to Chapin and Gellert, No. 2574 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 504, WN
18963 and 4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in
NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
435
'Interrogation' here is perhaps indicative of something harsher; the group was questioned and 'de-briefed'
during this time. According to the account of Mrs. Hadnagy, whose son generously provided the author with her
memoirs concerning her husband and family, "The American military police came with a jeep to welcome us.
My little talkative daughter made it very friendly. They took us to a dining room and treated us very nicely.
Every one of us was exhausted but happy...After this friendly welcome, the American military police drove us to
the nearest town, Bari. Once in Bari, the English intelligence service and the OSS studied the diplomatic
documents...which describes the situation in Auschwitz." Cf. Júdit Hadnagy, Babbokam's life story
(unpublished, undated, and provided to the author by Dr. Thomas Domokos Hadnagy) See also 17. April 1945,
Chapin to Chief SI, Abbreviated summary of dealing with representatives of the MFM in NARA II, RG 226, E
210, B 340, WN 13342-13351.
436
Cf. 16. December 1944, William P. Maddox to D/AC of S, G-2, Report on Intelligence activities in NARA II,
RG 226, E 125, B 49.
437
It is also worth noting that this coincided with the separation of Lt. Bentinck from the group, who returned to
England in February of 1945. Cf. 4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on
field conditions in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.

87
of Italian officials. 438 By April, it was stated that the Soós/Hadnagy group represented an
"extremely promising source of future intelligence if it can be reestablished in Hungary."439
Officially, they would be 'released' from OSS detainment on the 1st of May 1945, by which
time, Soós was described by Saint Balkan as "one of X-2 Balkans [most] valuable sources of
information"440 This indicated that the breakthrough or connection had been made by Streeter
with what were previously SICE’s sources. Altogether, although the mission was not successful
in encouraging American support for Hungarian underground activities 441 , or establishing
contact between the Hungarian resistance movements and the Soviets, they can lay claim to the
bulk of the (Hungarian) intelligence reports and analyses published by SICE and the Budapest
City unit between December and May 1945.442 Additionally, in the case of Soós and Hadnagy,
both would become members of a very influential and productive X-2 intelligence network in
Rome.

4.6 The Háry Mission

The last of the airborn missions to make contact with the OSS in Italy was the so-called Háry
mission. László Háry was the former commander-in-chief of the Hungarian Air Force (retired
in 1940) and arrived at San Vito (near Ortona) on February 27th, 1945. Háry came in a "German
Focke-Wulf bimotor training plane [out of which] they repeatedly wove a white flag to attract
the attention of Allied soldiers [but which] only evoked friendly gesticulation from ground
personnel."443 Háry travelled along with his wife, son, daughter and Sándor Magyar.444 The

438
Cf. Burks to Lt. Philip J. Conley, Progress Report for two weeks ending 28 February in NARA II, RG 226, E
190, B 172.
439
This statement was made in connection with the entrance of the Budapest City Unit into Hungary, however it
would prove to be applicable also to actions following the definite cancellation of that team. Cf. 19. April 1945,
Edward N. Kimball to Chapin, Activities Report 18 March to 17 April 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 58,
WN 02315.
440
Cf. 16. July 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-002-1607 in NARA II, RG 226, E 211, B 44, WN
20404-20410.
441
With Hungary firmly in the Soviet sphere of occupation, and Budapest under siege by the Red Army, there
was little that western liaison with the remaining resistance cells in the country could accomplish. Nonetheless,
plans were suggested between December and January for a Hungarian-speaking American officer and "50-100
American parachutists, bazookas and 3,000 submachine guns to [to be dropped in Hungary to] raise a force of
15,000 Hungarian 'partisans’." Some 2 weeks after arrival in Italy, Hadnagy and Soós were assisting in the
logistical preparation of such a mission. Cf. 14. December 1944, Edward M. Kimball to Chief SICE and CO
BDPTCU, Hungarian resistance movement and 24. December 1944, Flues to CO 2677th Regt., Report No. 25
both in NARA II, RG 226, E 125, B 48.
442
In December alone “most” of the 36 reports of the Budapest City unit developed from information which the
Soós/Hadnagy party had provided. Cf. 5. January 1945, Major Flues to Chapin, Report Budapest City Unit, 1
December to 5 January in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 29.
443
Cf. 13. March 1945, Interrogation Report Part I, The Escape of General Hary, JBX-111 and JBX-115 in
NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 201.
444
Magyar had flown from Budapest to New York in the first such transatlantic flight in 1931 and was most
likely the pilot of the plane. Cf. 14. March 1945, The Escape of General Laszlo Hary and Sandor Magyar-

88
group had departed from Csepreg, a small Hungarian town near to the Austrian border,
approximately 40 kilometers southeast of Wiener Neustadt. Háry had moved with his family
from their estate at Badacsonytomaj (on Lake Balaton) to Csepreg in 1944. Háry claimed that
he had considered fleeing the country as early as April 1944 following the German occupation,
and although he did not feel specifically threatened, was not at ease. As mentioned previously,
Háry claimed knowledge of and participation in the Náday plan, as well as one other similar
scheme which had not materialized.445 Unlike the Náday or Soós missions, however, Háry was
not a member of, or affiliated with the MFM, Magyar Front or any oppositional group. He had
fled owing to the execution(s) of some acquaintances in Csepreg, precipitated by the
announcement that his plane was to be requisitioned. Háry was acquainted with Baron Apor,
and had met Ferenc Luttor during an inspection of Italian airfields in 1939 while Magyar, apart
from some connections with various air force officers, possessed few contacts of any relevance.
Ultimately, the Háry mission was of little consequence, however one product of it, namely
several interrogation reports, are of mild interest, owing to the contrasting picture they paint of
one key member of the MFM, General Faraghó who Háry claims was “100% Nazi” adding that
“Under his command various atrocities were committed including Újvidék [where between
1941 and 1942 nearly 2,000 Serbs, Jews and other ’dissidents’ were summarily executed in the
aftermath of a handful of alleged partisan attacks on Hungariang garrisons] and he rescued his
underlings from the consequences.”446

4.7 The Budapest City Unit

Although correspondent chronologically to the events depicted across the majority of this work,
the decision was made to address the Budapest City Unit last. The reasons for this are twofold.

Wilczek from German occupied Hungary, First Interrogation Report, Part II, JBX-121 in NARA II, RG 226, E
108A, B 201.
445
This was the 'Bethlen' Plan, to extricate the former Premier from the country, to precipitate a government in
exile. Cf. 13. March 1945, Interrogation Report Part I, The Escape of General Hary, JBX-111 and JBX-115 in
NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 201.
446
The case of Faraghó is indeed contreversial owing to his affiliation, and later stewardship of the Hungarian
Gendarmerie and the role he allegedly played in granting amnesty to those memebrs of the Gendarmerie which
took part in the Újvidék massacre(s). He is alleged to have allowed the chief perpetrators of the massacre to
escape. It is key to note however, that contrary to Háry's statement, Faraghó only assumed command of the
Gendarmerie in November of 1942, nearly a year after the Újvidék massacre and as such, cannot be blamed for
them (directly). Additionally, as one of the founding members of the MFM and recipient of only laudatory
remarks from Szent-Miklósy, Soós and Szent-Iványi , it is highly doubtful that he was "100% Nazi". Háry's
sentiments are echoed only (partially) by another 'intelligence' contemporary, 'Iván Fekete', or General István
Újszásszy who wrote under that alias while in Soviet custody. In a report from the end of August 1948,
Újszásszy contends that Faraghó allowed the perpetrators of the Újvidék massacre to escape. See Interrogation
report Cf. 18. April 1945, Security Intelligence Liaison Office [SILO] Supplementary Interrogation Report on
General Hary, Laszlo, Ex C. in C. Hungarian Air Force. in NARA II, RG 226, E 119A, B 62. 'Iván Fekete' report
in Haraszti et al, Vallomások, 217-218.

89
First, and perhaps most critically, the unit was a hybridization of all of the organizations,
personalities and groups addressed previously. Second, it would be difficult to understand the
rationale and functions of the unit without first understanding the situation in southern Italy,
within SICE and concerning the events of the autumn of 1944. To address the unit without first
mentioning Bowery/Dallam, the Náday or Soós/Hadnagy missions would be confusing. With
these caveats, it should be noted nonetheless that the Budapest City Unit was contemporary
with the events and activities recanted throughout this thesis.
On or near the 20th of September it was reported that "programs have been worked out for
selected cities in the Balkans, Central Europe and one for Italy...Each team will have a CO,
Exec. & Chiefs of SI, X-2, R&A, MO & Services...In case of collapse, teams are in preparation
for Vienna, Budapest, Munich and Prague."447Along with Budapest, similar city units were
envisioned for the rest of Central and Southeastern Europe; a team was already in Bucharest,
those for Belgrade and Tirana were nearing readinness and Sofia and Athens were being
handled by Istanbul and Cairo, respectively. 448 It is possible that the idea for a city unit in
September of 1944 had its roots in suggestions for SO Occupation Teams for Central and South-
Eastern Europe which had been proposed in the fall of 1943.449 This occupation unit was to
"prepare two types of teams to go into Hungary (a) one or more D-Day groups of trained
soldiers speaking Hungarian who can go in and help seize key points when the time comes for
occupation and can show the American uniform for moral(e) [Sic!] effect. (b) A team of ten or
twelve men to be arranged now to go in as soon as Hungary is occupied and work from there,
both in subversive work against neighboring countries with which we may still be at war and
in cooperation with our Hungarian collaborators in putting down the various underground
groups which the Germans are already preparing to leave behind there if they pull out." 450
Manpower needs were "one D-Day group of 45-50 men...50% Hungarian speaking."451 Within
a year, this constellation had not much changed, except that the operational or tactical flavor of
the envisioned unit had been removed. By September 1944, it was planned for any such

447
Cf. Undated [believed to be 20 September] Maddox to SI, Plans for SI, MedTO in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B
35. The breakdown of the team was SI, 14, MO, 1, SO, 2, O[perational]G[roups], 12, R&A, 2, X-2, 1, Serv[ices]
5, Med[ical]. Serv[ices]. 1, Finance, 1, Comm[unications], 4, Photo reproduction, 3. Cf. Undated [believed to be
early 1945] Budapest Team in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
448
Cf. 28. April 1945, Maddox to D/AC of S, G-2, Report on Intelligence Activities 21-28 April and 24. March
1945, Maddox to D/AC of S, G-2, Report on Intelligence Activities 17-24 March both in NARA II, RG 226, E
125, B 49 and Undated [believed to be 20 September] Maddox to SI, Plans for SI, MedTO in NARA II, RG 226,
E 99, B 35.
449
See 8. October 1943, Report and recommendations on SO Program for Hungary in NARA II, RG 226, E 210,
B 65, WN 987.
450
Cf. Ibid.
451
Cf. Ibid.

90
formation to be immediately airlifted into Hungary, should that country capitulate, with
logistical support provided by the 15th Air Force.452 In Bucharest, Sofia and Budapest, the units
were, starting from Decemeber, upon arrival in country to be attached to the local ACC's and
known as ACC/OSS Units.453 The city unit was to work alongside the military G-2 (Army
Intelligence) component present in the ACC for Hungary and had been authorized by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in December.454
The CO for Budapest was for the duration of the unit’s ‘life’ Major Abraham Gilmore Flues,
with Lt. Keszthelyi envisioned as his SI chief.455 The largest (and more or less sole) contributor
to the city units personnel-wise, and particularly to the Budapest outfit was Bari. 456 As
mentioned, these units were to possess all major branches of a theater command on a much
smaller level which, at least in the case of Budapest guaranteed closer cooperation, specifically
between the X-2 and SI branches, which traditionally did not work together. The Budapest City
Unit was thus formed in Bari including "experts on all phases of Hungarians affairs. Several of
these men had personal contacts with a wide groups of the leading figures in Hungarian political,
industrial and military life."457 All told, it consisted of 50 persons, with an advance 'emergency'
party of Colonel Edward Glavin, Strategic Services Officer, Lt. Col. Chapin, Major Flues, Lt.
Cmdr. Frank Wisner (CO Bucharest City Unit) and Lt. George Bookbinder (interpreter) to be
attached to Marshal Malinovsky's 2nd Ukrainian Army Headquarters.458 Subsequent air lifts of
personnel were to round out the mission.459

452
30. September 1944, Flues to Lt. Cmdr. Edward Green, OSS CIty Unit Budapest in NARA II, RG 226, E 190,
B 172.
453
Cf. 14. December 1944, Glavin to Donovan, Plans for Budapest City Team in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 35
and 23. January 1945, John D. Wilson to Allen Dulles, in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
454
See 22. December 1944, [George C.] Marshall to McNarney in NARA II, RG 331, E NND 80153, R 302A.
455
Cf. Undated [believed to be 20 September] Maddox to SI, Plans for SI, MedTO in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B
35.
456
Personalities mentioned already in this work include Keszthelyi (whose death was not yet known), Fuller,
Burks, Gellért, Kiss, Schryver, Himler, Streeter, Catlos and Herczeg. All told, only those personnel already on
assignment (such as Keszthelyi) and the Operational Group detachment (which was located at Siena) did not hail
from Bari. Aradi was not inclucded in the city team, as he was not keen to return to Hungary and it was felt that
Gellért could perform the same functions. Cf. 7. November 1944, Edward H. Dodd to Dr. W.L. Langer,
Personnel for City Teams and Personnel Budapest City Team both in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
457
Cf. 17. April 1945, Edward N. Kimball to Flues, Report on intelligence obtained from MFM leaders in
NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 340, WN 13342-13351.
458
Undated [believed to be early 1945] OSS Budapest in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
459
This documentation directly contradicts statements which Flues made in 1995 and again in 1996 " The job
that we were going to do, was we were going to dropped onto the airfield [presumably the present-day Budapest
Ferihegy International Airport] and secure the airfield, then link up with the Russians...Now I am supposed to go
into Hungary, get the airfield and have the Hungarians know that American troops and combat men were on their
[side; sic!]." It is believed, upon reading another interview with Flues conducted by Siegfried Beer, that Flues
had combined a planned mission from August of 1944 (which had been scrubbed) for an American military
liaison to be dispatched to the Hungarian General Staff, the proposals brought by Soós/Hadnagy for an American
military contingent to be dropped near Lake Balaton and the mission of the Budapest City Unit into one
operation. Additionally, Martin Himler, a ranking member of the mission stated at the end of October 1944 that

91
Throughout January and February of 1945, the Soviet high command stalled OSS and American
military efforts to attain permission for the deployment of the unit. One favored tactic innvolved
the requesting of detailed personnel rosters. 460 Nevertheless, the blame for non-deployment
cannot solely be attributed to Soviet filibustering. One factor which contributed was a change
461
in US Army/OSS policy. The Commanding General for US Army Forces in the
Mediterranean (General Joseph McNarney) and the American military envoy to the Soviet
Union (Major General John R. Deane) found it prudent to request permission for, rather than
simply tell the Soviets that an OSS unit was en-route to Budapest, breaking with what had
hitherto been established procedure (for example, the OSS unit dispatched to Bucharest was
alighted without Soviet permission). 462 McNarney, to his credit was supportive of the unit, and
had issued a direct order for it be established in Budapest.463 The same cannot be said for the
American (military) representative of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, the
aforementioned General Key, who in blocking all attempts at having OSS personnel assigned
to his command, provided the second major obstacle which the Budapest City Unit faced.464

the team was "waiting in Bari until Budapest is captured by the Russians." The only possibility which the author
can ascertain for an accelerated departure for the team would be information concerning the Hungarian
resistance which the Soós/Hadnagy group brought, however this is not supported by any of the documentation
which the author has consulted. For the cited Flues interview See. Foreign Affairs Oral History Project
(Interviewer, Charles Stuart Kennedy) Colonel Abram [sic!] Gilmore Flues, 1995. Available at:
http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Flues,%20Abtam.toc.pdf last accessed 30.03.2015. For the scrubbed mission
see 23. August 1944, Bern to SI, Liaison Officer to Hungary, No. 4610 in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 35. For the
Siegfried Beer interview with Flues see Siegfried [Beer], From Ohio via North Africa, the Middle East and
Yugoslavia to Austria, 1942, Interview with OSS-officer A. Gilmore [Flues]. In JIPSS 5/2 (2011) 126-137.
For information relating to the Balaton plan see n. 441. For the Martin Himler quote see 29. October 1944,
Current Report on MO Bari Branch in NARA II, RG 226, E 144, B 67.
460
Cf. 17. February 1945, Maddox to D/AC of S, G-2, Report on Intelligence Activities 10-17 February in
NARA II, RG 226, E 125, B 49.
461
Donovan had cabled Glavin in December stating "General McNarney should inform (but not ask approval) of
Russian commander of arrival of party which is to have intelligence ad administrative functions" Cf. 21.
December 1944, Donovan to Glavin, No. 16614 in NARA II, RG 226, M 1642, R 87.
462
Cf. 1. January 1945, Glavin to Donovan, Budapest City Team, No. 22869 in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 35.
463
The exact order read "You are to dispatch at the earliest practicaable date, an OSS unit to Budapest. Upon
arrival you are to report location by radio. Whe senior American officer with Allied (Soviet) Control
Commission arrives [General Key] you are to adjust the strength of your uit as he desires. Information has bee
set to the Russian government for transmittal to the senior Russian commander in the field." Cf. 28. December
1944, Glavin to Buxton, OSS in Italy, No. 22024 and Glavin to Buxton, Authorization to Dispatch Budapest
Unit, No. 22034 both in NARA II, RG 226, E 99, B 35.
464
Key was claimed by the American Political Advisor at AFHQ, Carmel Offie (of State) to be "ridiculously
overcautious and timid in his dealings with the Russians." The ambassador designate to Hungary, Arthur
Schoenfeld was in favor of having the OSS operate within Hungary, but preferred that they be attached to the
military delegation, a rather rational request, seeing as OSS was officially a military unit. In another report from
1946, Robinson Bellin states, after working under Key in Budapest that "[he] was opposed to intelligence work
of any nature, in addition to removing SSU, he had sent away two ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence] officers
both of whom had been briefed to secure info from the Russians and I was anxious to see that any intelligence
work the possible exposure of which might embarrass his mission be suppressed." Offie Cf. 9. April 1945, Joyce
to Maddox, Semi-monthly progress report, Rear zone Intelligence, 1-15 April in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B
269, WN 11041-11067. Bellin Cf. 15. July 1946, Bellin to Colonel William Qui, Report on mission in Hungary
in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 348, WN 13589.

92
Ultimately, once the initiative had been passed to the Soviet High Command (and most likely
Stalin himself) any attempt to get any part of the team, no matter how insignificant into
Budapest could be considered ill-fated. The unit would die a slow, and from the documents,
gradual death. From January until March, the progress reports for the unit (most no longer than
two pages) contain only requests for Hungarian written materials such as newspapers and
periodicals, updates on the situation in Moscow and mentions of intelligence collected by Soós
and Hadnagy during their OSS-sponsored (and at times, chaperoned) meetings with various
personalities in Rome.465 Personnel began ‘deserting’ at the end of March.466 The official end
came on the 1st of May 1945 with (final) Soviet refusal for the group to enter Budapest
confirmed, however this had been long coming, and few were surprised when the notice was
received.467 This was all but a formality as by the 28th of April, at the very latest, Maddox had
informed to the Deputy Acting Commander of Military Intelligence that the Budapest city Unit
had been disbanded and that no more clearance would be requested of the Russians for the unit
to enter the city.468
The chief legacies of the Budapest City Unit are twofold. First, it brought those personnel
working on Hungarian issues in Bari and Caserta under one roof, regardless of branch affiliation,
for several months. Although few, if any projects or operations were undertaken, Hungarian
experts from all brances of OSS MedTO were unified under one command. Fuller himself
claims that with the creation of the City Unit, the work of the Hungarian desk was more or less
rerouted.469 The contact established among the three groups of 'Hungarians' in Italy at the time;
Hungarian-Americans, such as Himler, Kalnay, Streeter or Herczeg, those who can be termed
as non-MFM anti-Nazis/Germans Hungarians in American service, such as Gellért and Aradi
and MFM members, such as Náday, Soós and Hadnagy offer the clearest lineage to post-war
American planning for Hungary for the years 1945-1947 and in certain cases, beyond. In
essence, the Budapest City Unit was nothing more than the creation of a single, centralized (and
large) intelligence group within the Mediterranean for Hungarian matters.

465
The progress reports of the Budapest City Unit are available in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
466
Schryver of R&A was moved to Caserta and the newly formed Austrian R&A at the end of March remaining
a part of the BDPTCU should it be granted entry to Hungary. Cf. 31. March 1945, Richard Burks to Major Stuart
Hughes, R&A Progress for two weeks ending 31 March 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.
467
Cf. 4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA
II, RG 226, E 99, B 36.
468
Cf. 28. April 1945, Maddox to D/AC of S, G-2, Report on Intelligence Activities 21-28 April in NARA II,
RG 226, E 125, B 49.
469
The only exception to this being that desk's assumption of custody of the Soós/Hadnagy party in December.
4. June 1945, William Shepardson to William Donovan; Earl Fuller's report on field conditions in NARA II, RG
226, E 99, B 36.

93
Over time, the three groups would change into two, with Aradi and Gellért joining the first
camp and others, while new, but not unknown individuals such as János Majoros (Náday's pilot)
and Tamás de Perczel (Apor's secretary) elected to align themselves to the latter group, which
came under the aegis of Kalnay’s X-2 Balkans detachment. This transition would not be smooth
or ideal, particularly considering the aforementioned difficulties which Soós and Hadnagy
encountered in their dealings with Gellért, Himler (and later, further complications as we will
see) with Aradi. Ultimately, these unpleasantries had the effect of splitting what was most likely
already a fractured 'community'.

4.8 Return to Rome on to Austria/Conclusion Chapter 4

The cessation of hostilities in Europe offered something akin to a brief respite in the activities
of the various Hungarians now scattered and networked across Italy. For the politically-inclined,
the question of humanitarian aid to Hungary (and Hungarians) was of immediate importance,
as well as the welfare of refugees and displaced persons and the reconstruction, both political
and physical of their country. For others, settlement in Italy was seen as the most viable option,
pending what appeared to be, and was, inevitable Soviet domination of the country. For still
others, hope was held that via services rendered to the Americans, a new life could eventually
be started in the United States as American citizens. Very few, if any of the Hungarians in Rome
seriously considered permanent relocation to the homeland.470
However, this sojourn had not been precipitated by an idyll. As mentioned earlier, the ongoing
saga of the Soós and Hadnagy reports had left those two MFM leaders concerned about the real
motives of their (Hungarian)-American handlers. A second incident would occur in March of
1945 when Aradi hosted a dinner party in Rome, where a Czechoslovak diplomat, Counselor
Albert Dutka (first Secretary of the Czechoslovak legation and liaison officer to the Allied
Control Commission in Rome) was the guest of honor. Aradi and 1st Lt. Richard Burks, the
R&A Chief of the Budapest City Unit (also in attendance) were recording the conversation and
would pass their notes along to R&A (forming the basis for Hungarian Analysis No. 18, titled,
Czechoslovakia's future position in Central Europe; views of Albert Dutka).471 Dutka spoke

470
Soós was involved with the Hungarian Red Cross in Rome and remained in contact with Szent-Iványi and the
new government, being appointed Commissioner for Repatriation of Hungarian in Italy in December. Hadnagy
opened a garage in Rome and worked together with Majoros. Marosán acted as a courier between the MFM
leadership in Hungary and Soós. Thomas de Perczel, Apor's Secretary, moved into the role at the Hungarian
Legation vacated by Aradi since his employment by the Americans, and also established himself as an American
asset. Cf. 18. September 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-003-1809 in NARA II, RG 226, E 212,
B 3, WN 20777 and 17. January 1946, Hungarians in Italy, JZX-5689 in NARA II, RG 226, E 108A, B 262.
471
See 31. March 1945, Richard Burks to Major Stuart Hughes, R&A Progress for two weeks ending 31 March
1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.

94
freely at the meeting, believing himself to be in social company, however later recanted that he
felt tricked by Aradi, since the latter had not informed him that Burks was an OSS officer.
Dutka was reprimanded by the chief of his legation after the latter confronted him with a
"photostatic copy of the discussion which he had received from [their] man in Washington"
which detailed confidential legation matters. 472 Soós and Hadnagy had vouched for Aradi
during his first meeting with Dutka in February of 1945 (purportedly to coordinate
Czechoslovak and Hungarian underground activities) and although Dutka knew that Aradi had
been part of the Hungarian Legation, did not know him personally. In April of 1945, as Soós
was preparing for another trip to Rome, Aradi informed him that contact with Dutka was
prohibited per OSS order. In May, after being released, Soós and Hadnagy proceded to Rome
and met Dutka who acted cold towards the pair, berating them for having tricked him. He
thereafter revealed the entire affair to them, to which they both professed their innocence, doing
so later in writing.473
Essentially, Aradi (and most likely other members of the Budapest City Unit) were using Soós
and Hadnagy to help them gain the confidence of new sources of information, which SICE may
not have normally had access to. Aradi had pulled the same stunt with Polish exile government
representatives in Italy and the Soviet embassy using Soós and Hadnagy in a similar capacity.474
Aradi attempted to make Chapin aware of the need for caution one month before the Dutka
affair became known to Soós and Hadnagy writing "It is a unique opportunity to make contacts
and work out a net of information through Aunt Gisi's party [the Soós/Hadnagy group]; in my
opinion they will collaborate with us willingly but the form must be chosen carefully. I suggest
that no America officer or Willard [Gellért] shoud brief them since if done so, at the
interrogation in Moscow, this fact will be evident. If Willard makes the contacts and briefs them,
it may later damage Willard's position in Hungary. Any special request for collaboration with
Aunt Gisi should be made through me, because they are willing to collaborate with me. I suggest
that we should be working on a certain cutout system through which we can remain in contact
with them in Hungary...In my opinion, Aunt Gisi's security and sincerity are above question,
but we must take into consideration that they could be submerged in the complicated Hungarian

472
Cf. 7. July 1945, Leakage of information from OSS Washington, Source AE-5 [Streeter] in NARA II, RG
226, E 210, B 44, WN 20434.
473
Cf. 7. July 1945, Leakage of information from OSS Washington, Source AE-5 [Streeter] in NARA II, RG
226, E 210, B 44, WN 20434.
474
See 1. March 1945, Crabbe [Aradi] to Chief SI; Poland's New Government in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B
3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. I. For the Russian embassy See 31. March 1945, Richard Burks to Major Stuart Hughes,
R&A Progress for two weeks ending 31 March 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 190, B 172.

95
framework."475 When the dust settled, the Dutka affair would necessitate Aradi's adoption of a
new codename, and would more or less signal the end of his relationship with Soós and
Hadnagy.476
An earlier event, which became a bone of contention at nearly the same time was the return of
Gyula Magyary, and the information he brought with him, specifically concerning the activities
of the (by then) deceased Prince-Primate Jusztinián Serédi. Soós and Hadnagy's account of
Serédi's behavior following the 16th of October suggests that he offered minimal (if any)
resistance to the Szálasi regieme; Magyary's account tells a slightly different tale, namely that
"Serédi supported the Regent in his struggle for armistice...Despite of his monarchistic faith,
Serédi cooperated with Horthy always in the interest of the country...[he] did not accept as legal
Horthy's abdication [but must] save what [could] be saved and therefore he accepted a de facto
situation in which the country was without a Head of State. The Hungarian Nazis wanted to
elect a successor to Horthy as legal regent, but Serédi opposed that and proposed that a ’leader
of the State’ (Államvezető) should be elected in the person of Szálasi. Thus Serédi gave his
agreement and his votes for Szálasi as leader as leader of the State who has de facto power."
The two key issues raised by these revealations were that they contradicted Soós and Hadnagy's
remarks concerning the loyalty of the messenger Horthy had dispatched to Serédi informing
him that the abdication was not voluntary (the aforementioned Father Tóth) and second, the
religion of Soós and Hadnagy (Protestant) vis-a-vis that of Aradi and Magyary (Catholic). Tóth
was rated trustworthy and cooperative with the MFM by Soós; Magyary's account describes
him as "a great talker...[someone] who remained employed in the Foreign Office during the
Sztójay cabinet" implying complicity in the Nazi government and connotating grounds for
mistrust. 477 The personality of Father Tóth was revisited and Soós was interrogated on the
matter, during which he repeated his (and the MFM's) complete confidence in his person.478
Whether Tóth had indeed given Serédi the message which Horthy had entrusted him (per Soós)
or had not (per Magyary) is perhaps endemic of the underlying situation regarding the different
faiths of the two groups. It is possible that both Aradi and Soós saw one another as attempting
to jockey for a sort of moral superiority with regards to their faith in the eyes of the Americans.
Aradi may have interpreted Soós' recantation of Serédi's behavior as an attempt to associate
(his) Catholic Church with the Arrow-Cross and lay the blame for the Szálasi putsch on the

475
Cf. 30. March 1945, Aradi to Chief SICE in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 297, WN 12191-12200.
476
See 26. April 1945, Flues to Mr. Theodor Ryan in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II.
477
Cf. 26. April 1945, Sarazen [Zsolt Aradi]/Moly [Gyula Magyary] to Chief SI/MedTO and Chief SICE in
NARA II, RG 226, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II.
478
Cf. Ibid.

96
shoulders of the Prince-Primate (and thereby, by proxy, to imply collaboration of the Catholic
Church). Conversely, Soós may have viewed Aradi as a Catholic apologist, willing to ignore
events which he had not been party to, so as to conceal collaborationist activities of the highest
Catholic official in Hungary.
Combined, and undoubtedly owing more to the behavior of Aradi, (and to a lesser extent)
Himler and Gellért, the relationship between those Hungarians and Hungarian-Americans
working for SICE was at the breaking point. Too many liberties had been taken, particularly by
Himler and Aradi, and it is not a stretch to believe that Soós, Hadnagy and other MFM men
saw the trio as representing the exact sort of Hungarian which they had opposed, namely that
kind beholden to a foreign power; at the very least, this group had demonstrated that they would
use their compatriots as sources, not work bilaterally with them and to boot would misrepresent
the information provided to them. Owing to the spirit of the times, it must also be mentioned
that Aradi, Gellért and Himler would have been (and were) seen first and foremost as Jews
(despite Aradi's Catholicism). In the forerunner organizations of the MFM, Jews has been
seconded only to Germans as having 'betrayed Hungary' and it is not wholly unlikely that some
bias was attributed to the three, if even on a sub-conscious level.
A showdown was averted before further damage could be done; SICE and its personnel
departed to Austria in June and July of 1945. Aradi, Himler and Gellért became geographically
(if not emotionally) disconnected from those Hungarians remaining in Rome.479 Aradi, Himler
and Gellért would spend the majority of the summer months in Austria coordinating and
organizing the capture of Hungarian war criminals and Arrow-Cross party members. All told,
between May and December, more than 160 such individuals were apprehended, 70 of which
Himler and his unit rounded up in November across southern Bavaria and Austria. The first two
war criminals tried and convicted in Budapest (László Bárdossy and Béla Imrédy) had been
handed over by Himler and his unit.480 With regards to intelligence, the trio maintained a high-
rate of production, with Aradi shifting ever more into Vatican-centric networks and operatives,

479
It would be prudent here to stress that Aradi and Himler do not appear to have attempted to excuse themselves
or their behavior to Soós and Hadnagy. This may be a contributing reason to the appearance of an article in the
Hungarian weekly Igazság, penned by Soós in June of 1946 which 'outed' Aradi as being in American pay. Cf.
14. June 1946, Prague to Vienna in NARA II, RG 263, E ZZ-18, B 3, Zsolt Aradi Vol. II.
480
The small Hungarian unit was aided by Colonel Gyula Kádár, the former head of the VKF-2 and a fervent
anti-Nazi who had been imprisoned by the Germans upon the occupation(s) of Hungary in March and October
but was living in Triftern, Bavaria by the summer of 1945. See 10. July 1945, Hungarian Nazi personalities in
Bavaria and Oberösterreich, LS-376 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 471, WN 17732-17742 and 3. December
1945, Henry C. Fleisher for Alfred C. Ulmer, Progress Report November 1945 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B
177, WN 7790.

97
and Himler and Gellért (the latter believed to be operating under the new codename 'Tokle')
resuming contacts with friends in the new Hungarian coalition government.481
In Rome, X-2 Balkans assumed the responsibility for the Hungarians remaining there as well
as 'new' arrivals.482 Stephen Streeter, who together with Francis Kalnay had been in contact
with most of the members of the MFM in Italy, stepped up efforts beginning in the spring of
1945 culminating in September of 1945, in the formation a network, which would be known as
the "JA Group".483 This group demonstrated what may be seen as an ideal network, inasmuch
as tradecraft was paramount, the agents were not expensive, were ideologically (and
patriotically) motivated, and insulated (and ignorant) of the majority of the other members of
the network. The only problem of the network, was that Stephen Streeter, the direct contact of
the members of the network, was not able to work its members via a cutout as "the JA
[OSS/SSU designation for Balkans] mentality makes it impracticable to handle this chain
through a cut-out."484 Streeter, demonstrating acumen wrote the following about the network
"The person dealing with these agents of JA background should not underrate the vehemence
of national prejudices and personal animosities...The relationship must be direct and based on
their personal allegiance. The mutual distrust and bitter hatred among the JA nations is well
known but it must be born in mind that the cleavage among groups within the nations is also
wide [emphasis added by author]...Speaking the native language(s) gives them reassurance that
their national problems and aspirations are understood. [Observer must be] unbiased,
unpredjudiced, objective and non-committal. Their national aspirations shoud never be
challenged or criticized but an understanding, benevolent attitude should be maintained. Each
individual must be handled seperately. none know of AE-5's [Streeter's] contact with JA
nationalities other than their own. Information received from one should never be mentioned in
any form to others in the same national groups, even if some agents learn about AE-5's dealings
with other co-nationals. Compensation...favors, most not paid in money...Promises should be
made very cautiously and faithfully kept. Many favors are asked. Not all should be granted. All

481
See 3. December 1945, Henry C. Fleisher for Alfred C. Ulmer, Progress Report November 1945 in NARA II,
RG 226, E 210, B 177, WN 7790.
482
Three ‘new’ Hungarians were included with those which X-2 Balkans and SICE had already had dealings.
These were Töhötöm Nagy (Mindszenty's envoy, see The Catholic Church sub-chapter), László Véress, (the
messenger and signatory of the failed 1943 Hungarian armistice, arrived in Rome during Christmas of 1944, a
close friend of Aradi and Gellért) and Imre Mócsy (A Jesuit monk and professor at the Universitana Gregoriana
in Rome). See 18. September 1945, Saint Balkans to Saint Washington, JBX-003-1809 in NARA II, RG 226, E
212, B 3, WN 20777. See also Cf. 25. January 1946, JJ-1 [Murphy] and DH-140 [Klassen] to BB-8 [Angleton],
X 3559 in NARA II, RG 226, E 214, B 4, WN 24860-24877 and Veress, Clear.
483
See 22. January 1946, Information on field personnel, the JA group. Source AE-5 [Stephen Streeter] JRX-
3667 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 314, WN 10845.
484
Cf. Ibid.

98
are anti-Communists, however they accept the viewpoint that the Soviet Union is a power to be
reckoned with in JA lands and that the USSR is an ally of the US." 485 More than half of the
group's agents were Hungarian (10), the rest being Czechoslovak, Macedonian, Yugoslav, and
Bulgarian.486
The group would act first and foremost as Streeter's and Kalnay's eyes and ears within the
Hungarian refugee community, not just in Italy, but across Europe. Second, they would also
provide information from the Hungarian government, and also the Catholic Church and Vatican.
Explaining the group's activities in detail stretches beyond this work, however, it suffices to say
that the JA network in Rome, coupled with the operations of the Hungarian Desk in OSS/SSU
Austria were representative of American activities into and concerning Hungary at the onset of
the Cold War.

5.1 Conclusion: The End of the Beginning

Over the course of this work, U.S. efforts and affairs concerning Hungary in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations have been presented in a compact, yet full-bodied manner. The time from
the spring of 1944 until the late summer of 1945 was one of great upheaval and change, both in
Hungary, the American Intelligence Services and the world at large. Against this backdrop, the
work has been prefaced with a general overview of Hungarian history during the period under
consideration, with particular emphasis placed on the MFM and the Catholic Church, two key
organizations without an understanding of which, comprehension of this work would be nigh
impossible. The MFM, with its strong military, non-Communist and anti-Nazi identity offered
the OSS and its successor organizations a partner which after initial misgivings, was seen as a
viable and well-organized network within certain segments of the American Intelligence
Services, particularly the X-2 Branch. The roots of US involvement with the Catholic Church,
an organization to be used heavily as an intelligence vehicle into Hungary during the early Cold
War can likewise be traced, not only in the person of Zsolt Aradi or Baron Apor, but also in
that of Töhötöm Nagy.
In the third chapter, a basic outline of the OSS was sketched, following by increasingly intricate
sketches of the units and personnel responsible not only for recruiting Hungarians, but also for
directing and utilizing them to the best of their abilities. These efforts in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations took the form of Howard Chapin’s SICE and Francis Kalnay’s X-2

485
See 22. January 1946, Information on field personnel, the JA group. Source AE-5 [Stephen Streeter] JRX-
3667 in NARA II, RG 226, E 210, B 314, WN 10845.
486
Cf. Ibid.

99
Balkans, both of which would undergo name and personnel changes, growing evermore
involved in the roles assigned them as they related to Central Europe in general and Hungary
specifically. Finally, the OSS’ successor, the SSU, was detailed, showing how that organization
carried the standard which Donovan had passed reluctantly, doing ’more with less’.
In the fourth chapter, case studies were presented, tying together the second and third chapters
and the context which they had provided to showcase important and noteworthy events and
accomplishments. Although not want for controversy, the Roman Colony Hungarians and the
Free Hungarian Association offered SICE a first pool of capable and motivated personnel with
assorted specialities and potential uses. Different from the disjointed and often amateurish
efforts of the Foreign Ministry in 1943, and the pro-German infested General Staff and VKF-2
in 1944, contact between the former ME-IV proponent Baron Apor and Horthy's breakaway
office, as well as with Géza Soós and the leadership of the MFM and oversight and support
from SICE guaranteed the success of Magyary's objectives in Bowery/Dallam, an unfortunate
legacy of which is the death of Keszthelyi and Kovács, the wounding of Catlos and the
psychological trauma encountered by Magyary. Ultimately, Bowery/Dallam was linked to the
Náday delegation and may well have had ramifications for the Soós/Hadnagy group. The Náday
delegation was key inasmuch as it brought first mention to SICE concerning the hitherto
unknown MFM. Furthermore, this knowledge allowed planners at SICE to implement long-
standing plans for penetration of Hungary, and the dispersal of radio circuits for maintaining
clandestine contact. Unfortunately, these envoys (Kovács and Magyary) arrived too late to spare
Hungary from the large-scale destruction it witnessed in the twilight of the Second World War
and the sacrifices of the Bowery/Dallam team were, all told, in vain. In the aftermath of the
coup of the 16th of October, the capabilities for resistance were entrusted to the Soviets and left
unused; no amount of submachine guns, bazookas or American advisers could have propped
up a resistance movement which the Soviets were at the very least ignorant to, and at the worst,
distrustful and unsupportive of. The wide and flat terrain of Hungary in no way mirrored the
mountainous and wooded hinterland which the CFI populated in the autumn of 1944. Even the
suggested dropping areas around Lake Balaton, semi-hilled, would have proven barely tenable
in the face of German technical superiority and the quality (veterancy) of those units based in
Hungary by that advanced stage of the war. The same can be said of the envisioned, but never
dispatched Budapest City Unit, the legacy of which finds its echo more among the various
Hungarians and Hungarian-Americans in southern Italy than in Budapest or Debrecen. All of
these events led to the establishment of two clear factions within OSS and later SSU, leading
to two unique centers for both Hungarian Intelligence (Salzburg) and Counterintelligence

100
(Rome) in the postwar and early Cold War period. The two had overlap, but as time wore on,
their differences and deficiencies became ever more apparent.
In general, at the outset, American cooperation with the Hungarians (and the MFM specifically)
can be judged as overly cautious and plagued by suspicion, owing not only to the questionable
experiences in Rome and with enemy nationals elsewhere (particularly in Istanbul as they
related to the Dogwood network) but also the multi-faceted and mis-understood loyalty of the
Roman Colony Hungarians, perceived by several to be endemic of a stay-behind network
leading to the German intelligence services. Attempts by SICE to fuse the Náday and Soós
missions with the non-MFM Roman Colony Hungarians proved unsuccessful and actually only
enlarged the chasm between the two groups as those Hungarian-Americans and Hungarians
already employed by SICE used the new arrivals towards their own (increasingly American)
ends. Fortunately, X-2 Balkans and in particular, Stephen Streeter was more adept at handling
the MFM than Aradi and to a lesser extent, Himler were.
The Roman Colony Hungarians, represented by Aradi and Magyary, later joined by Gellért, at
least partially Catholic, hailing from diplomatic backgrounds, and having spent considerable
time abroad found their place within SI, and Chapin's SICE. Their forte tended more towards
positive intelligence gathering among (and against) their (former) countrymen outside of
Hungary whereas the MFM arrivals from Hungary, by and large Protestant, most from military
backgrounds and dripping with patriotism and nationalism offered something completely
different; an existing underground network with clearly defined politcal goals and aspirations,
wanting only for material support (but not ideological convincing), making them the ideal
partners for X-2 Balkans. In a sense, one could view the Aradi/Apor clique in some way as
committed to engaging in diplomatic intrigue, or even branded by it, when compared to the
MFM members who assumed the mindset of a sort of government-in-exile. In this way, those
Catholic Church officials, not posted directly to Rome (such as Magyary) were far similar to
the MFM than the non-MFM Hungarians employed by OSS and SSU. With their sharply
political and military backgrounds, the MFM, could move far easier among the ideological
refugees scattered throughout Central Europe, supplying invaluable information to Streeter,
Kalnay and ultimately, Angleton. It is not possible or necessary to determine which group
offered the Americans more, or which was more productive; both had their strengths and
weaknesses and provided varying capabilities within a mercurial geo-political situation.
This work ends with the stage set for the first months and years of OSS/SSU operations into
Hungary stretched before us, at least with regards to personnel, nearly in their entirety. In that
sense, this work cannot lay claim to a traditional 'conclusion'. The personnel mentioned over

101
the previous pages would almost all continue working for the OSS, SSU and in some cases,
beyond in various forms and capacities. Research materials not utilized in this work indicate
that cooperation was intense and continuous, at least until 1947. This work thus concludes,
pending a continuation in the form of a doctoral thesis at what the author has decided to term
"the end of the beginning."

102
6.1 Bibliography
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Archival Materials
National Archives and Records Administration, Building II, College Park, Maryland
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M 679 Records of the Department of State Special Interrogation Mission to Germany, 1945-
1946 (DeWitt C. Poole Mission)

Record Group 217 Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS]

E 2 Records of the Administrative Offices of the JCS (Joint Secretariat) 1941-1978

Record Group 226 Records of the Office of Strategic Services

E 88 Overseas Cable Files
E 92 Central Files
E 99 History Office Records
E 108 Washington Registry Intelligence Field Files
E 108A Washington Registry Intelligence Field Files
E 119A London Files relating to German Intelligence Service Personalities
E 125 Bern, Stockholm and Caserta Field Station Files
E 135 Correspondence Files
E 136 Algiers, Austria, Bari, Burma, Cairo, Calcutta, Caserta, Denmark, Kunming, London,
Paris and New York Field Station Files and Washington Headquarters Files
E 139 Cairo, Calcutta, Caserta, Honolulu, New York, Paris, Singapore, Stockholm and Madrid
Field Station Files; and Washington Headquarters Files
E 144 Algiers, Angola, Bari, Belgium, Burma, Cairo and Calcutta Field Station Files and
Washington Planning Files
E 154 Field Station Files
E 171A Personalities Files
E 174 Rome Field Station Intelligence and Personalities Records
E 190 Field Station Files
E 190B Records relating to Resistance History
E 190C Bern Field Station Files
E 196 Washington Office Documents Previously Withheld
E 210 Sources and Methods Files

103
E 211 Sources and Methods Files
E 212 Sources and Methods Files
E 214 Sources and Methods Files
E 224 Sources and Methods Files
E 215 Sources and Methods Files
E 224 Personnel Files
M 1642 Director's Office (Microfilm)
Record Group 242 Foreign Records Seized
Entry T-77 Records of the German Armed Forces (Microfilm)

Record Group 263 Records of the Central Intelligence Agency

E ZZ-18 CIA Name Files [Second Release]

Record Group 331 Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World
War II
NND 80153 Records of the Policy and Control Division

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Tony [Sharp], Stalin's [American Spy]. Noel Field, Allen Dulles & the East European Show
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testültek tagjai elleni megtorláokról a hidegháború kezdeti időszakában. [Proceedings against
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László [Ritter], The [Secret War] between the Soviet Bloc and Yugoslavia, 1948-1955. In: The
Future a Memory: The [Cold War] and Intelligence Aspects. Heiner [Timmermann] (Ed.)
(Zürich et al. 2013) 107-122.

Journal Articles, Book Reviews and Working Papers

Duncan [Bare], Semper Idem: The OSS Sparrow Mission to Detach Hungary from the Axis
Alliance in March 1944. In: Journal for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies [JIPSS]
6/2 (2012) 27-42.

Duncan [Bare], The [Curious] Case of Aradi Zsolt. In: JIPSS 8/1 (2014) 7-22.

Siegfried [Beer], ‘[ARCEL]/CASSIA/REDBIRD’: Die Wiederstandsgruppe Maier-Messner und

der amerikanische Kriegsgeheimdienst OSS in Bern, Istanbul und Algier 1943/1944
[ARCEL/CASSIA/REDBIRD: The Maier-Messner resistance group and the American wartime
intelligence service, the OSS in Bern, Istanbul, Algier during 1943/44]. In:
Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, Jahrbuch [DöW, Documentation
Archives of the Austrian resistance, Yearbook] (1993) 75-100.

Siegfried [Beer], From Ohio via North Africa, the Middle East and Yugoslavia to Austria, 1942,
Interview with OSS-officer A. Gilmore [Flues]. In: JIPSS 5/2 (2011) 126-137.

Siegfried [Beer], [Inspection] of Mauthausen Concentration Camp. Ein früher Bericht des
amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS aus dem befreiten Österreich [An early report of the
American Intelligence Service, the OSS, from liberated Austria]. In: DöW (1992) 107-119.

Siegfried [Beer], [Salzburg] nach dem Krieg. Beobachtungen des US-Geheimdienstes OSS/SSU
über Österreich 1945 [Salzburg after the war. Observations of the US Intelligence Services
OSS and SSU concerning Austria in 1945]. In: Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger
Landeskunde 139 [Reports of the Society for the History of Salzburg] (1999) 117-221.

Siegfried [Beer], Target Central Europe: American Intelligence Efforts Regarding Nazi and
Early Postwar [Austria]. In: Working Papers in Austrian Studies 97/1 (1997) available at:
http://www.cas.umn.edu/assets/pdf/WP971.PDF.

Robert [Crowden], A [Pioneering] Experiment: OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War

II. In: Studies in Intelligence [SI] 58/2 (2014) 65-75.

István [Csicery-Rónay], A magyar [függetlenségi] mozgalom története [The history of the

Hungarian Independence Movement]. In: Magyar [Szemle] (Hungarian Survey) 8/11-12 (1999).

Ferenc [Dávid], A katonai [titkosszolgálatok] az 1945-ös újjászervés időszakában [The military

secret services in the reorganization of 1945]. In: [Kutatási] Füzetek [Research Papers] 20
(2013) 37-66.

Ferenc [Dávid], [Fából] vaskarika”, avagy: a magyar katonai államvédelmi szervek 1945 utáni
újjászervezésének jogi és szervezeti alapja [„Absurdity”, or: the Legal and Organizational
Basis of the Reorganization of Hungarian Military Secret Services after 1945]. In:
Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle [National Security Survey] 1 (2014) 114-132.

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Charles [Fenyvesi], Két ügynök: a monsignore és a szerelő [Two agents: the monsignor and the
repairman]. In: Válasz [Reply] 4/1 (2001).

Andor [Gellért], A stockholmi [színtér] [The Stockholm scene], 1942-1944 (II.). In: Új
[Látóhatár] [New Horizon] 6 (1974) 441-457.

Diane [Lembach], [Failure] to free an enemy: How the dynamics of WWII prevented the success
of OSS operations in Hungary. In: West Point Undergraduate Historical Review, 2/1 (2011) 33-
48.

John [Mason], Hungary’s Battle for [Memory]. In: History 50/3 (2000) 28-34.

Andrea [Pető]. Budapest [Ostroma] 1944-1945-ben - női szémmel. [The battle of Budapest
1944-1945 through women's eyes] In: Budapesti [Begyed] 8/3-4 (2000) 203-220.

Sándor [Szakály], [Náday] István ["úitravalója"] ["The journey" of István Náday]. In: Lymbus,
[Journal of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences] (2008) 315-319.

Nóra [Szekér], Domokos Szent-Iványi and his Book - Part I. In: Hungarian Review, 4/6 (2013).

Balint [Török], Az olaszországi [küldetés] [The Italian Mission]. In: Magyar [Szemle], 11/7-8
(2002).

Digital Sources, Varia

Conference Report, Moles, Defectors and Deceptions; James Angleton and his influence on US
Counterintelligence (March, 2012) Georgetown University, Washington DC.

Hungarian Catholic Lexicon

http://lexikon.katolikus.hu

OSS Operations end with Agent's Executions in Mauthausen from

http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ww2/ossops.html#17

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