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Belief and Counterfactuals
Belief and
Counterfactuals
A Study in Means-End Philosophy
FRANZ HUBER
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199976119.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Sheridan Books, Inc., United States of America.
In memoriam Ida Huber
Contents
Preface ix
1. Introduction 1
2. Belief First 20
2.1 Ideal Doxastic Agents 20
2.2 Belief and Ends 23
2.3 Conditional Belief and Belief Revision 26
3. Belief Revision 35
3.1 The AGM Theory of Belief Revision 35
3.2 Systems of Spheres 45
3.3 Iterated Belief Revision 50
4. Conditional Belief 62
4.1 Ranking Theory: Static Rules 62
4.2 Ranking Theory: Dynamic Rules 71
4.3 Iterated Belief Revision Revisited 81
5. Why Should I? 93
5.1 The Consistency Argument 93
5.2 The Consistency Argument Continued 104
5.3 The Consistency Argument Completed 116
5.4 Hypothetical Imperatives 121
5.5 Conditional Obligation and Conditional Belief 130
5.6 Appendix: Proofs 137
6. Applications in Epistemology 149
6.1 Conceptual Belief Change and Logical Learning 149
6.2 Learning Indicative Conditionals 159
6.2.1 Further examples. 168
6.3 In Defense of Rigidity 170
Bibliography 177
Index 191
Preface
This book and the second volume are about belief and counter-
factuals, as well as their relation. Belief is central to epistemology.
It occurs when an agent such as a person or, perhaps, computer
program holds something to be true. Counterfactuals figure promi-
nently in metaphysics. They are if -then claims, or conditionals,
about what would have been the case if certain conditions had
obtained. One aspect of their relation that I will focus on is a
question in the epistemology of metaphysics.
In the way I will engage with it, epistemology is a normative
discipline. I will study how agents should believe, as opposed to
what they do believe. More precisely, I will study how agents
should believe on the hypothesis that they have certain ends such
as holding true and informative beliefs. In the way I will engage
with it, metaphysics is subordinate to epistemology insofar as
metaphysical theses are necessary conditions for the satisfiability
of epistemological norms. Given an instrumentalist understanding
of normativity, this means that metaphysical theses are necessary
conditions for the possibility of attaining ends from epistemol-
ogy. How exactly this “transcendental” metaphysics is supposed
to work is a complicated matter. I will try to explain it in this
introduction.
Broadly speaking we can distinguish four approaches to under-
standing belief. Representationalists such as Fodor (1975) and Mil-
likan (1984) claim that holding a belief consists in the possession
of a mental representation with a propositional content. Disposi-
tionalists and their predecessors, behaviorists, claim that holding
a belief consists in certain acts or dispositions to act, such as the
disposition to act as if the propositional content of the belief was
Belief and Counterfactuals: A Study in Means-End Philosophy. Franz Huber, Oxford University Press.
© Oxford University Press 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199976119.003.0001
2 belief and counterfactuals
The actual world may, but need not be among the possible
worlds that are most normal from its point of view. If it is, the
counterfactual α γ is true in the actual world if, and only if,
the default conditional α ⇒ γ is. Otherwise the counterfactual may
be false while the default conditional is true. However, the converse
case cannot occur for a counterfactual of this kind.
Ida is certain that it is more normal for it to be sunny on
Wednesday and her to have lunch in the park than for it to be
sunny that day and her not to have lunch in the park. This may
be because she is certain that she would have lunch in the park if it
was sunny on Wednesday. In this situation Ida should believe that
she will have lunch in the park on the assumption that it is sunny on
Wednesday. When an agent is certain of a default conditional, but
no “overriding” information, she should believe its consequent, or
then-part, on the assumption that its antecedent, or if -part, is true.
This normative principle relating belief in a default conditional
and conditional belief is an approximation of the royal rule. Some
counterfactuals imply the corresponding default conditionals, and
an agent may believe a default conditional because she believes the
corresponding counterfactual. Therefore, this approximation also
connects belief in some counterfactuals and conditional belief. This
connection will be explored in chapters 7 and 10.
The plan for the remainder of this book and the second volume
is as follows. In chapter 2 I will first discuss which agents I am
focusing on, as well as which cognitive ends I am assuming them to
have. Then I will describe how this relates to conditional belief and
belief revision. Chapter 3 will first present the AGM theory of belief
revision (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, & Makinson 1985). Then I will
focus on the problem of iterated belief revision. In chapter 4 I will
show how this problem finds a solution in ranking theory, which
was introduced in Spohn (1988) and is most comprehensively
discussed in Spohn (2012).
Chapter 5 will first answer the question of why conditional
beliefs should obey the ranking calculus. Then I will discuss the
underlying view of normativity. I will conclude with a note on the
introduction 9
VI. Every Jew shall Cease from Labor on Sunday, and on all
Appointed Holidays.
There is no doubt that he is plainly an enemy of the Catholic
religion who does not treat Sunday with due reverence. Hence, while
we are pursuing those who deny or disobey our faith, we hereby
decree with Divine sanction, that if any Jew, of either sex, should do
any work on Christmas, or on any other sacred holiday, or on
Sunday, or should spin, or weave, or perform any labor beyond that
which the honorable custom of good Christians permits; such a
transgressor shall have his head shaved, and shall receive a
hundred lashes for his insolence; and where slaves, of either sex,
are found occupied in such labors, they, also, shall be liable to the
punishment aforesaid. The masters of said slaves, where they permit
them to labor in this manner, shall be compelled to pay a hundred
solidi to the royal treasury. Those days which shall be devoutly
observed by the Jews, are the following, to wit: the Festival of the
Holy Virgin Mary, during which the glorious Conception is celebrated;
the Festivals of the Nativity and Circumcision; Holy Week and
Easter; the day of the Discovery of the Cross; the Day of the
Ascension; Pentecost; Sundays throughout the entire year; and all
the days that are venerated by true believers in the doctrines of
Christ.