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Exploring the Basic Income Guarantee
Series Editor
Karl Widerquist, Georgetown University in Qatar, Doha, Qatar
Basic income is one of the most innovative, powerful, straightforward,
and controversial proposals for addressing poverty and growing inequali-
ties. A Basic Income Guarantee (BIG) is designed to be an unconditional,
government-insured guarantee that all citizens will have enough income
to meet their basic needs. The concept of basic, or guaranteed, income
is a form of social provision and this series examines the arguments for
and against it from an interdisciplinary perspective with special focus on
the economic and social factors. By systematically connecting abstract
philosophical debates over competing principles of BIG to the empir-
ical analysis of concrete policy proposals, this series contributes to the
fields of economics, politics, social policy, and philosophy and establishes a
theoretical framework for interdisciplinary research. It will bring together
international and national scholars and activists to provide a compara-
tive look at the main efforts to date to pass unconditional BIG legislation
across regions of the globe and will identify commonalities and differences
across countries drawing lessons for advancing social policies in general
and BIG policies in particular.
Robert E. Wright · Aleksandra Przegalińska
Debating Universal
Basic Income
Pros, Cons, and Alternatives
Robert E. Wright Aleksandra Przegalińska
American Institute for Economic Kozminski University
Research Warsaw, Poland
Great Barrington, MA, USA
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Open AI for helping them to feel comfortable with
the major pro and con points made in this book and for drafting the
bibliographic essay section of this book. They also thank another “AI,”
the American Institute for Economic Research (AIER), for financial
support. Most directly, AIER paid the expenses of the authors and twelve
conferees to travel to Nashville, Tennessee where they discussed the
merits and problems of an earlier draft of this book over parts of three
days. Each of the conferees at that book manuscript conference—Trey
Carson, Shale Lewis, Douglas MacKay, Sergei Nirenburg, Audrey Reford,
Craig Richardson, Ravi Roy, Ant Sammeroff, Alex Schmid, Fabian Wendt,
Robert Whaples, and Karl Widerquist—offered valuable suggestions and
advice that greatly improved the final product in numerous ways, great
and small. None, however, should be implicated in any of the book’s
remaining imperfections. The same should be said of AIER’s Brad DeVos
and Phil Magness, who both contributed in significant ways although
they were unable to attend every conference session. Other scholars,
including Tony Gill, also read and helped us to improve earlier drafts.
AIER’s Amelia Janaskie helped to create the better-looking figures found
throughout the text. Finally, we wish to thank the GPT-3 transformer for
its somewhat chaotic, but ultimately valuable input.
v
Contents
1 UBI Basics 1
Political Ideologies and UBI 5
Waves of Interest in UBI 9
This Book’s Goals 17
References 19
2 In Favor: Something for Everyone 23
References 29
3 Opposed: Less for All 31
References 37
4 In Favor: Safety from Artificial Intelligence 39
References 44
5 Opposed: No Country for New Robots 47
References 54
6 In Favor: Another Weapon Against Climate Change 57
References 60
7 Opposed: The Centralized Control Conceit 63
References 67
8 Opposed: Too Dear or Too Little 69
References 76
vii
viii CONTENTS
References 121
Index 135
List of Figures
ix
x LIST OF FIGURES
xi
CHAPTER 1
UBI Basics
The authors also could not make a sweeping summary statement about
Universal or Unconditional Basic Income (UBI). This book describes
reasons to adopt and to reject UBI from various scientific and ideological
perspectives. It should be interpreted as suggestive rather than compre-
hensive, a brief introduction to major lines of debate rather than a policy
proposal. Thus far, most articles and books about UBI support its adop-
tion, raising the specter, given its recent global salience, that UBI might
be implemented in one or more nations without due consideration of its
possible adverse effects.
Even while the COVID-19 pandemic engrossed the world’s atten-
tion, UBI remained one of the most widely discussed policy topics
in universities, think tanks, and policy circles throughout much of the
globe (Standing 2017, 19). Interest in UBI has been intense enough
to lead to small-scale trials in countries as different as Canada, Finland,
India, Kenya, and Namibia (Uhuru 2019). Interest in UBI will continue
so long as the perception of accelerating technological advancement
persists and so long as politicians in Europe, the Americas, and else-
where believe that it will garner them votes on net (https://www.
redrentabasica.org/rb/; https://partiarazem.pl/2018/04/gdynia-o-bez
warunkowym-dochodzie-podstawowym/; Bravo 2021). As economist
Robert P. Murphy says, “like it or not, this issue is not going away”
(Sammeroff 2019, 15). UBI remains debated in Switzerland, for example,
even though voters resoundingly rejected it in a June 2016 referendum
that promised a monthly income, of a size to be determined by the Swiss
Parliament, to all Swiss citizens (Koltrowitz and Depetris 2016).
1 UBI BASICS 3
Fig. 1.1 The UBI concept illustrated (Source Amelia Janaskie, Research Asso-
ciate at the American Institute for Economic Research)
only £40 for pensioners and young adults not in school, £50 per week for
people aged 20–24, and £20 for children (Crocker 2020, 49).
The UK Citizen’s Basic Income Trust proposal should not be confused
with Britain’s existing Universal Credit program, which ironically is
neither universal nor about credit but a good example of how politi-
cians may trade substance for rhetoric (Standing 2017, 208–11). This
book concentrates on actual UBI policies, not proposals or slogans that
employ its terms to garner support for politicians or their parties. To
qualify as UBI, a policy must make (1) universal; (2) unconditional;
(3) periodic; (4) cash payments to (5) all individuals. The most promi-
nent proponents of UBI, members of the Basic Income Earth (formerly
European) Network (BIEN), contend that only implementation of all
of those five characteristics will ensure achievement of their main goal,
the minimization of poverty and extreme income inequality (Yamamori
2016).
Proponents also contend that UBI, thus defined, may have numerous
additional benefits, including reducing stress, crime, and climate change,
increasing education, entrepreneurship, health, and female independence
from patriarchy (Sammeroff 2019, 145). Proponents also implicitly
promise that UBI will ameliorate various policy “problems,” like income
inequality, without exacerbating other problems or existing natural “diffi-
culties” (Steensland 2008, 20). UBI may also assuage the feelings of those
concerned about the effects of workplace automation on employment and
income.
Skeptics retort that some UBI proponents promise too much. UBI
can come across as too good to be true, like “a Flying Unicorn that
poops rainbows” (Sammeroff 2019, 145). The breathless enthusiasm of
proponents sometimes evokes strong negative reactions. New Zealand
Prime Minister John Key, for example, called UBI “barking mad,” while
Iceland’s finance minister called it “completely ridiculous” (Standing
2017, 110).
The authors of this book find UBI intriguing, neither obviously
ridiculous nor unquestionably beneficial. Careful analysis, not a rush to
judgment, can help students, voters, and policymakers to decide the
best path. While policies occasionally exceed expectations, they more
frequently disappoint. Many public policy proposals that “sound good”
or “look good on paper” create untoward unintended consequences or
negative “knock-on effects.” Usury laws that place caps on the rate
at which money can be borrowed, for example, can hurt the people
1 UBI BASICS 5
immigrants could well result, which most people would certainly count
as a policy failure.
To obviate such difficulties, scholars in the UK developed so-called
microsimulations of UBI’s effects. Computer modeling might have
seemed plausible before similar COVID-19 models proved inaccurate
enough to discredit the method (Wimalawansa 2020). Moreover, the
microsimulations estimate only the immediate effects of UBI implementa-
tion and fail to take expectations into account (Torry 2019, 193–98). As
a result, even their initial projections could prove inaccurate as people
adjust their behaviors before UBI implementation just as they adjust
consumption prior to price increases (Brayton et al. 1997).
In short, instead of being able to predict the consequences of UBI with
some precision and certainty, UBI proponents and skeptics must make
educated guesses and argue from analogy and theory (Heffetz and List
2021). The exercise is thus more political and ideological than scientific.
Ideologies abound but the ideology of most individuals can be lumped
into one of three categories, those who care most about maintaining the
status quo (things as they are), those who care most about individual
liberty, and those who care most about social justice. Generically, those
ideologies, and their followers, can be called conservatives (the Right),
classical liberals, and progressives (the Left), respectively. Classical liberals
prefer keeping governments as small and weak as possible, while conserva-
tives and progressives, sometimes collectively known as statists, often seek
to enlarge the size and power of governments to meet their respective
goals.
In the United States today, conservatism is most closely associated
with the Republican party, classical liberalism with the Libertarian party,
and progressivism with the Democratic party. Labels can get confusing,
though, as when Democrats call themselves liberals and people refer to
Left or Right Libertarians. Moreover, parties in other countries employ
different labels, like the conservative “Tories” of Great Britain and the
“Christian Democrats” of Poland. In Europe, and many other parts
of the world, liberal parties are most often associated with left-leaning
parties with progressive social agendas (LGBTQ rights, environmental
issues), but economic policies ranging from free market oriented to more
socialist-leaning.
In terms of overarching economic policies, conservatives tend toward
“capitalism” or ownership of the major means of production by big,
privately-owned businesses. Classical liberals espouse “free markets,” or
8 R. E. WRIGHT AND A. PRZEGALIŃSKA
of high school dropouts because fewer teens will feel economic pressure
to quit school to work. At the same time, however, UBI reduces the need
to obtain a high school degree (Schneider 2017). The predominate effect
will certainly depend on numerous details, like the size of UBI payments
at younger ages and the amount of boredom that schools produce and
which students cannot overcome without dropping out (Nett et al. 2010).
In other words, UBI offers the possibility of meeting everyone’s basic
needs but in the process could jeopardize other aspects of the progressive
social justice agenda. Indeed, some progressive UBI proponents sound
much like classical liberals when they rail against minimum wage laws and
intrusive, coercive means-tested welfare programs (Standing 2017, 191–
98). Other progressives would like to see UBI simply layered atop of
existing policies and programs.
To classical liberal proponents, UBI offers social welfare as cash grants
that preserve the essence of free market competition with minimal incen-
tive distortion but only by threatening innovation and economic growth.
While statists Left and Right relish the central role of government in UBI,
classical liberals hope it could be used to reduce government power by
eliminating complex and expensive means-tested redistribution programs
administered by bloated bureaucracies. But simultaneously they fear that
it could render Leviathan, their name for an all-powerful state, immortal
(Sammeroff 2019, 7).
UBI could do many things, including streamlining the “welfare”
systems of rich countries so that more money goes to those in need
and less into administering need-based programs (Crocker 2020, 61). But
“could” and “will” do not always go together, particularly when politics
are involved. Critics on the Right fear that UBI might simply be layered
on top of existing “entitlements” instead of supplanting them. More-
over, privacy concerns might require expensive layers of bureaucracy to
be added to UBI to prevent double (or triple or more) dipping in soci-
eties, like the United States, where people cannot be expected to have
the necessary identification to vote, let alone to receive money (see, e.g.,
https://www.aclu.org/other/oppose-voter-id-legislation-fact-sheet).
Tästä lähtien oli minulla vain yksi ainoa toivomus: päästä tuon
maalarin oppilaaksi, jonka taulut olivat tehneet minuun niin syvän
vaikutuksen ja pyhittää koko elämäni taiteelle, joka nyt tuntui minusta
siveellisen täydellisentymisen tieltä.
Minäkin odotin häntä ilolla. Tiesin että hän toisi minulle uutta valoa;
sitäpaitsi oli hän parhaan ystäväni jumaloitu veli.
Vihdoin koitti eron hetki. Minun täytyi lähteä hyvin aikaisin aamulla
postivaunuissa, sillä rautateitä ei niillä seuduin silloin vielä ollut. Äitini
nukkui; en tahtonut häntä herättää säästääkseni hänet
jäähyväishetken tuskalta, sillä hän erosi minusta kuitenkin raskaalla
sydämellä, kun lähdin niin pitkälle. Italian matka oli siihen aikaan
vielä vaarallinen. Hiivin hänen vuoteensa ääreen ja otin häneltä
äänettömät jäähyväiset rukoillen palavasti, että Jumala siunaisi
häntä. Sitten lähdin postitalolle, jonne uskollinen sisareni saattoi
minua. Siellä tapasimme Pienokaisen ja hänen veljensä. Syleilin
vielä kerran ystävääni, kättelin vielä kerran veljeä. Hän antoi minulle
kukkavihon, johon oli sidottu kirje; osoitteen sijasta oli siinä
seuraavat Tasson sanat: »I suoi pensieri in lui dormir non ponno.»
(Hänen ajatuksensa eivät voi nukkua.)