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Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion

Metaphysics, Sophistry,
and Illusion
Toward a Widespread Non-Factualism
by
MARK BALAGUER
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
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© Mark Balaguer 2021
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First Edition published in 2021
Impression: 1
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DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868361.001.0001
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For Emily and Drew

Table of Contents
Acknowledgments xi
1. Introduction 1
1.1 A Synopsis of This Book 1
1.2 The Ways in Which My View Is and Isn’t Anti-Metaphysical 7
1.3 What I Say Here Isn’t Really True 9
PART I NON-FACTUALISM
2. Against Trivialism and Mere-Verbalism (and Toward a Better
Understanding of the Kind of Non-Factualism Argued for in
This Book) 13
2.1 Opening Remarks 13
2.2 Two (or Three) Kinds of Anti-Metaphysicalism 14
2.3 Non-Mere-Verbalist Non-Factualism 19
2.4 Some General Remarks about Metaphysical Problems 20
2.5 Against Metametaphysical Verbalism 25
2.6 A Recipe for Finding Non-Verbal Debates 37
2.7 Against Actual-Literature Verbalism 39
2.8 Why Trivialism Without Metametaphysical Verbalism Is
Metaphysically Uninteresting 41
2.9 Two Kinds of Non-Factualism 43
3. How to Be a Fictionalist about Numbers and Tables and Just
about Anything Else 45
3.2 The Mathematics-Based Argument Against Non-Factualism 46
3.3 A Theory of Objective Fictionalistic Mathematical Correctness 52
3.4 FBC-Fictionalism to the Rescue 63
3.5 Do FBC-Fictionalists Unwittingly Commit to Abstract
Objects? 70
3.6 Generalizing the Fictionalist Strategy (or Fictionalist Views
of Other Kinds of Objects) 71
3.7 The Response to the Objection to Non-Factualism 78
3.8 A Recipe for Responding to Section-2.4-Style Arguments 79
3.9 A Possible Slight Alteration to What I’ve Said Here 79
3.10 A Worry and a Response 80
viii   
4. Non-Factualism about Composite Objects (or Why There’s No

Fact of the Matter Whether Any Material Objects Exist) 83
4.2 Is the Composition Question Trivial? 87
4.3 Against Necessitarianism 90
4.4 Against Contingentism 106
4.5 The Law of Excluded Middle 115
4.6 From Tables to Composite Objects 116
4.7 Pushing the Argument Further 116
4.8 Un-weird-ing the View (at Least a Little) 119
5. Non-Factualism about Abstract Objects 123
5.2 The Argument for Non-Factualism: Part 1 124
5.3 The Argument for Non-Factualism: Part 2 134
5.4 Against Necessitarian Platonism and Anti-Platonism 137
5.5 Objections and Responses 151
6. Modal Nothingism 161
6.2 Modal Primitivism, Analyticity, and the Lingering
Truthmaking Question 164
6.3 What Is Modal Nothingism? 168
6.4 How Modal Nothingism Could Be True (and How TMW
Could Be False) 180
6.5 The Literali’s Argument for <Modal Nothingism> 181
6.6 The Argument for Modal Nothingism 187
6.7 The Possible-Worlds Analysis and Modal Error Theory 188
6.8 Modal Literalism and Semantic Neutrality 194
6.9 Logic 195
6.10 The Counterfactuals of Chapter 3 Revisited 196
6.11 Metaphysical Possibility and Necessity 197
PART II NEO-POSITIVISM
7. What Is Neo-Positivism and How Could We Argue for It? 201
7.2 What Is Neo-Positivism? 201
7.3 Why Neo-Positivism Isn’t Self-Refuting 203
7.4 How to Argue for Neo-Positivism: The General Plan 205
7.5 Step 1 of the Neo-Positivist Argument: How to Decompose a
Metaphysical Question 205
7.6 Step 2 of the Neo-Positivist Argument 209
7.7 Appendix on Scientism 214
   ix
8. Conceptual Analysis 218

8.2 What Is a Concept? 220
8.3 Three Metaphilosophical Views 221
8.4 Why the Decompositional View Is False 225
8.5 A Quick Argument for the Relevance of Facts about the Folk 227
8.6 Pruning the List of Fact Types that Hybrid Theorists Might
Think Are Relevant 230
8.7 Why the Ordinary-Language View Is Correct 232
8.8 Scientism about Conceptual-Analysis Questions 239
8.9 Five Worries 240
8.10 Why It Wouldn’t Undermine Neo-Positivism if the Hybrid
View Were Right 246
8.11 If Concepts Were Mental Objects . . . 247
9. Widespread Non-Factualism 248
9.2 Some Examples of Non-Factualism 249
9.3 Some Examples of Scientism 265
9.4 Neo-Positivist Humility 270
10. A Worldview 271
References 275
Index 287
Acknowledgments
I’ve been working on this book for a long time, and a lot of people have read parts
of it (or other works of mine that were, in some sense or other, early versions of
parts of this book) and offered helpful feedback. Thanks are due (at least!) to the
following people: Brad Armour-Garb, Jody Azzouni, Sara Bernstein, Daniel
Bonevac, Otávio Bueno, Ross Cameron, Joe Campbell, Rebecca Chan, Sam
Cowling, Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Russell Dale, Matti Eklund, Nina Emery,
Hartry Field, John Martin Fischer, Chris Franklin, Carl Ginet, Patrick Girard,
Ricardo Gomez, Alex Grzankowski, Terry Horgan, Eli Hirsch, Manyul Im, Robert
Jones, Robert Kane, Jerry Katz, Arnie Koslow, Uriah Kriegel, Fred Kroon, Jim
Landesman, Matt Leonard, Maureen Linker, Michael Liston, Heather Logue, Ned
Markosian, Dave MacCallum, Penelope Maddy, Russell Marcus, Storrs McCall,
Michael McKenna, Colin McLarty, Henry Mendell, Elliott Mendelson, Yiannis
Moschovakis, Michael Nelson, Daniel Nolan, Timothy O’Connor, Josh Parsons,
Derk Pereboom, Josh Rasmussen, Mike Raven, Kate Ritchie, Mike Resnik, Gideon
Rosen, Raul Saucedo, Stephen Schiffer, Scott Shalkowski, Stuart Shapiro, Ted
Sider, Shel Smith, Michael Strevens, Jack Spencer, Amie Thomasson, Patrick
Todd, Kelly Trogdon, Kadri Vihvelin, Adam Vinueza, Michael Weisberg, David
Widerker, Wai-hung Wong, Steve Yablo, and Ed Zalta. I have almost certainly
forgotten to list some other people who have offered feedback on works of mine
that has been helpful in the writing of this book. For that, I apologize.
Special thanks, for reading and providing helpful feedback on large chunks of
this book, are due to Talia Bettcher, Michaela McSweeney, and David Pitt. And
extra special thanks go to David Builes for reading and giving me useful feedback
on a draft of the entire manuscript.
I would also like to thank Stephan Leuenberger and Jared Warren, who served
as referees for the book for Oxford University Press and who gave me useful
feedback on the penultimate draft. And, finally, I would like to thank Peter
Momtchiloff for helpful discussions regarding the overall structure of the book.
1
Introduction
1.1 A Synopsis of This Book
In this book, I’ll do two things. First, I’ll introduce a novel kind of non-factualist
view and argue that we should endorse views of this kind in connection with a
wide class of metaphysical questions—most notably, the abstract-object question
and the composite-object question (i.e., the questions that ask whether there are
any such things as abstract objects and composite objects). Most of the argument
for this claim will come in Part I, but section 9.2 is relevant to this as well. Second,
in Part II, I’ll explain how my non-factualist views fit into a general anti-
metaphysical view that I call neo-positivism; and I’ll explain how we could go
about arguing that neo-positivism is true; and I’ll take a few first steps toward
filling the argument in.
In general, if MQ is a metaphysical question, then non-factualism about MQ is
the view that there’s no fact of the matter what the answer to MQ is. It’s important
to note, however, that there are multiple kinds of non-factualist views; in
Chapter 2, I’ll clearly articulate the kind of non-factualist view that I’ll be arguing
for in this book. For now, let me just note that my non-factualist views are
importantly different from the kinds of anti-metaphysical views that have been
popular in the philosophical literature. Most notably, they’re different from views
of the following two kinds:
Trivialism about MQ: There’s a fact of the matter about the answer to MQ, but
it’s an utterly trivial fact—along the lines of the fact that all bachelors are
unmarried, or the fact that there are no married bachelors. More specifically,
the facts that settle MQ aren’t substantive metaphysical facts; they’re just semantic
facts (together perhaps with uncontroversial empirical facts).
Mere-Verbalism about MQ: The debate about MQ is merely verbal (I’ll have a
good deal to say about what this means in Chapter 2).
Trivialist and/or mere-verbalist views have been endorsed by, e.g., Hume (1748),
Carnap (1950), Putnam (1987, 1994), Parfit (1995), Sosa (1999), van Fraassen
(2002), Hirsch (2002, 2009), Sidelle (2002, 2007), Schiffer (2003), Thomasson
(2007, 2009a, 2015), Chalmers (2011), and Rayo (2013). In Chapter 2, I’ll argue
that mere-verbalist views are false, and I’ll argue that given the falsity of
Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion: Toward a Widespread Non-Factualism. Mark Balaguer, Oxford University Press (2021).
© Mark Balaguer. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868361.003.0001
2 
mere-verbalist views, trivialist views become completely uninteresting from an

anti-metaphysical point of view (in other words, even if they’re strictly speaking
true, they’re metaphysically irrelevant). Moreover, I’ll also explain very clearly in
Chapter 2 how my non-factualist views differ from trivialist and mere-verbalist
views.¹
(The non-factualist views that I’ll argue for in this book are also very different
from the kinds of scientistic anti-metaphysicalism that have been endorsed by
people like van Fraassen (2002), Ladyman and Ross (2007), Maudlin (2007), Ney
(2012), Chakravartty (2013), and Ismael (2013). This point will emerge in
Chapter 7.)
In Chapter 4, I’ll argue for a non-factualist view of the composite-object
question. In other words, I’ll argue that there’s no fact of the matter whether
there are any such things as composite objects like tables and cats and planets,
where a composite object is an object that has proper parts. Moreover, at the end of
Chapter 4, I’ll argue for the more general (and much more radical) claim that
there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any material objects at all—
including mereological simples (i.e., objects without proper parts) and the uni-
verse. My argument for non-factualism about the composite-object question is
based on arguments against the necessitarian and contingentist views of that
question. Roughly speaking, the idea is that there isn’t a fact of the matter about
whether there are any composite objects like tables and cats and planets because
there isn’t a necessary fact about this and there also isn’t a contingent fact about it.
In Chapter 5, I’ll argue for a non-factualist view of the abstract-object question.
In other words, I’ll argue that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any
such things as abstract objects like numbers and propositions, where an abstract
object is an object that’s non-physical, non-mental, non-spatiotemporal, unex-
tended, and acausal. My argument for non-factualism about the abstract-object
question is similar in certain ways to the Chapter-4 argument for non-factualism
about the composite-object question, but it’s also somewhat different. Roughly,
the argument is based on an argument for the claim that the sentence ‘There are
abstract objects’ is catastrophically imprecise—i.e., so imprecise that it doesn’t
have any truth conditions and doesn’t have a truth value.
In section 9.2, I’ll argue (pretty briefly) that arguments of the kinds that I use in
Chapters 4 and 5 can be used to motivate non-factualist views of a broad class of
metaphysical questions—e.g., questions about Aristotelean properties, tropes,
material constitution, (non-trivial) essential properties, and non-natural moral
facts.
¹ We’ll see in Chapter 2 that mere-verbalism can be combined with non-factualism, and indeed, that
some of the people mentioned in the text are mere-verbalist-style non-factualists; but as I’ll make very
clear in Chapter 2, the non-factualist views that I’ll be arguing for in this book are not of the mere-
verbalist kind.
.      3
The claim that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any objects of the
above kinds—i.e., abstract objects like numbers and material objects like planets
and electrons—gives rise to an obvious problem. There are extremely good
reasons to think that (a) our mathematical theories commit to the existence of
abstract objects, and (b) our scientific theories (and many of the claims that we
make in ordinary discourse) commit to the existence of both abstract objects and
material objects. But if this is so, then my non-factualist views seem to imply that
our mathematical and scientific theories (and many of our ordinary-discourse
claims) are not true; it seems that if my non-factualist views are right, then at best,
there’s no fact of the matter whether our mathematical and scientific theories
are true.
You might think this result is unacceptable, but in Chapter 3, I argue that it’s
not. I do this by arguing for a fictionalist view according to which there’s an
objective kind of correctness that applies to our mathematical and scientific
theories, even if those theories aren’t strictly true; more specifically, on the view
I develop, whenever realists about abstract objects and material objects say that a
mathematical or empirical theory (or an ordinary-discourse claim) is true, non-
factualists can say that the given theory (or ordinary claim) is for-all-practical-
purposes true. And I use this result to explain why our mathematical and empirical
theories are useful to us, why they seem right to us, and why it wouldn’t matter—
i.e., wouldn’t be harmful to our purposes—if they weren’t strictly speaking true.
The idea, then, is that non-factualism about the existence of kind-K objects is to
be combined with fictionalism about our discourse about kind-K objects—in
particular, a kind of fictionalism that implies that our claims about kind-K objects
can be for-all-practical-purposes true, even if there’s no fact of the matter whether
they’re strictly and literally true.
In arguing for fictionalist and non-factualist views (in Chapters 3–5), I rely in a
couple of different ways on certain kinds of modal claims. But this gives rise to
another worry about my view. For (a) I’m putting my view forward as a kind of
anti-metaphysicalism, and (b) you might think that anti-metaphysicalists can’t
countenance the existence of modal truths—because you might think that we can’t
commit to the existence of modal truths without also committing to some heavy-
duty metaphysical theory, like Lewisian realism about possible worlds, or platon-
ism (i.e., realism about abstract objects), or some sort of strong essentialist view
according to which every object has a non-trivial essence.
I respond to this worry in Chapter 6 by arguing for a theory of modality that
I call modal nothingism. Roughly speaking, modal nothingism is the view that
there are certain kinds of modal claims that are such that (a) they’re true (or
substantively true—more on what this means in Chapter 6), and (b) there’s
nothing about reality that makes them true. I’ll argue in Chapter 6 that modal
nothingism is true and that it gives us a metaphysically innocent view of modal
discourse, including certain kinds of counterfactuals. In particular, it gives us a
4 
metaphysically innocent view of the kinds of modal claims that I commit to in this
book; more specifically, it enables me to say that these modal claims are true
without committing myself to any controversial metaphysical claims—indeed,
without committing myself to any claims about the nature of reality at all.
Moreover, as I point out at the end of Chapter 6, when we combine modal
nothingism with the arguments of Chapter 3, we get a metaphysically innocent
view of logic and mathematics as well.
In Chapter 7, the first chapter of Part II, I introduce neo-positivism. Neo-
positivism is similar—in broad brush strokes, not in detail—to the view that
I think Hume is getting at in the following passage from the very end of the
Inquiry (1748):
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we
make? If we take in our hand any volume—of divinity or school of metaphysics,
for instance—let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning
quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning
matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain
nothing but sophistry and illusion.
One way to think of Hume’s view here is as suggesting that there’s a (presumably
exhaustive) division of the kinds of claims we can make (or the kinds of arguments
we can mount, or some such thing) into (a) mathematical (and perhaps logical
and analytic?) claims and/or arguments, and (b) empirical-scientific claims and/or
arguments, and (c) claims and/or arguments that are . . . well, not good, or not
legitimate, or some such thing. The neo-positivist view that I articulate in
Chapter 7 involves a similar (but also importantly different) trichotomy. Very
roughly, neo-positivism is the view that for any metaphysical question MQ, MQ
decomposes into some component subquestions, call them Q₁, Q₂, Q₃, etc., such
that for each of these subquestions—i.e., for each Qi—one of the following three
anti-metaphysical views (or some combination of them) is true:
(i) metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Qi (where, very roughly, this

is the view that Qi asks about the truth value of a modal sentence that’s
metaphysically innocent in the sense that it doesn’t say anything about reality
and, if it’s true, isn’t made true by reality); or
(ii) scientism about Qi (where, very roughly, this is the view that Qi is an
ordinary empirical question about some contingent aspect of physical reality,
and we can’t settle Qi with a priori philosophical arguments); or
(iii) non-factualism about Qi (where, again, this is the view that there’s no fact of
the matter about the answer to Qi).
.      5
This is extremely rough; in Chapter 7, I’ll give more precise formulations of neo-
positivism, scientism, and metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism.
You might think that neo-positivism is self-refuting. For you might think that
it’s neither a modal claim nor a physical-empirical claim, and so you might think
that neo-positivism entails that we should endorse non-factualism about the
question of whether neo-positivism is true. I’ll respond to this worry in
Chapter 7. In a nutshell, my response is that neo-positivism isn’t self-refuting
because we can endorse scientism about the question of whether it’s true. Roughly
speaking, the idea is that (a) neo-positivism is an empirical claim about a certain
finite cluster of actual, real-world questions (namely, the questions that are
actually discussed by actual metaphysicians); and (b) we should motivate neo-
positivism with an empirical argument—in particular, by showing that neo-
positivism is true of a randomly selected sample of actual metaphysical questions
and then arguing by induction that it’s probably true of all metaphysical
questions.²
At the end of Chapter 7, I propose a two-step strategy for arguing for neo-
positivist views of specific metaphysical questions. Step 1 is to decompose the
original metaphysical question into some subquestions, and step 2 is to argue that
neo-positivism is true of all of the subquestions. On the method of decomposition
that I propose, one of the component subquestions is always (or almost always) a
conceptual-analysis question (or something like a conceptual-analysis question)—
where a conceptual-analysis question is just a question like ‘What is free will?’, or
‘What is knowledge?’, or ‘What is a person?’ So, for example, the question ‘Do
human beings have free will?’ decomposes into the following two subquestions:
The what-is-free-will question: What is free will?; is it libertarian-freedom?; is it

Hume-freedom?; is it Frankfurt-freedom?; etc.
The which-kinds-of-freedom-like-abilities-do-we-have question: Which kinds of
freedom-like abilities do humans have? I.e., are humans libertarian-free?; and are
they Hume-free?; and so on.³
In Chapter 8, I’ll argue that conceptual-analysis questions (e.g., the what-is-free-

will question, the what-is-a-person question, and so on) are completely settled by
facts about us—in particular, by psychological facts about what we mean by our
words—and I’ll argue that, given this, we should endorse scientism about
conceptual-analysis questions. As we’ll see in Chapters 7 and 9, this makes things
² You might wonder how neo-positivism could be an empirical claim given that (a) it’s a claim about
questions, and (b) questions are presumably abstract objects. I’ll address this worry in section 1.3.
³ When I say that the do-we-have-free-will question decomposes into these other two questions, all
I mean is that if we could answer these two new questions, then we would have all the information we
would need (and obviously more) to answer the do-we-have-free-will question. So I’m not claiming
that my decompositions are the uniquely correct decompositions. I’ll say more about this in Chapter 7.
6 
much easier for neo-positivists; for it follows from this that, in every case, once
neo-positivists decompose the original metaphysical question into its component
subquestions, they’ll already have a ready-made account of the conceptual-
analysis question, and so they’ll only have to worry about the other subquestions
of the original metaphysical question. E.g., in connection with the do-we-have-
free-will question, neo-positivists will only have to worry about the which-kinds-
of-freedom-like-abilities-do-we-have question. And as we’ll see in Chapters 7 and
9, the nice thing about these other subquestions—the ones that remain after we
decompose the original metaphysical question and dispense with the conceptual-
analysis question—is that they’re couched in terms of art that have clear, stipu-
lated definitions. So, e.g., the which-kinds-of-freedom-like-abilities-do-we-have
question asks about libertarian-freedom, and Hume-freedom, and so on; and,
importantly, the term ‘free will’ doesn’t appear at all in that question.
As will become clear in Chapter 7, the job of arguing that neo-positivism is true
of each and every metaphysical question is an enormous job—much too big for
one book. Now, if we dedicated a very long book to the task, we might be able to
produce a decent inductive argument of the kind mentioned in the paragraph
before last—an argument in which we showed that neo-positivism is true of a
sample of metaphysical questions and then concluded, via induction, that it’s
probably true of all metaphysical questions. But I won’t try to produce such an
argument in this book; all I want to do here is start the argument. As I’ve already
pointed out, in Chapters 4 and 5, I’ll argue for non-factualist views of the abstract-
object question and the composite-object question. And in Chapter 9, I’ll say a few
words about how we could argue for neo-positivist views of a few other meta-
physical questions. I’ll focus mostly on cases in which I think the main contro-
versial subquestions are non-factual; but at the end of Chapter 9, I’ll say a few
words about a few cases in which I think neo-positivists should endorse scientistic
views, rather than non-factualist views, of the main controversial subquestions.
The remarks of the last few paragraphs—about how I think we should go about
arguing for neo-positivism—are extremely brief. I’ll say much more about this in
Chapters 7–9; but it should already be clear from what I’ve said here that while
neo-positivism is similar in spirit to Hume’s view, the argument that I think we
should use to motivate neo-positivism is completely unlike Hume’s argument
(and it’s also unlike the arguments of the logical positivists—e.g., Carnap (1928,
1934, 1950)—who held similar views).
Finally, Chapter 10 is a very short chapter in which I briefly articulate the
worldview that’s implied (or at least suggested) by the arguments of the rest of
the book.
.          ’  - 7
1.2 The Ways in Which My View Is and Isn’t

Anti-Metaphysical
1.2.1 Non-Factualism as an Anti-Metaphysical View (In at Least One Way): You

might wonder why neo-positivism—and, more specifically, its three subviews (i.e.,
scientism, non-factualism, and metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism)—count
as anti-metaphysical views. I’ll say a bit more about this in Chapter 7, but since
this book is mostly concerned with non-factualist views, I want to say a few words
here about why I take views of this kind to be anti-metaphysical. You might try to
resist the idea that non-factualist views are anti-metaphysical by saying something
like the following:
Insofar as non-factualist views are views that we can hold in response to

metaphysical questions, they seem to be metaphysical views.
I have two things I want to say in response to this worry. First, there are obviously
multiple things we might mean by the term ‘anti-metaphysical’, and I don’t claim
to be using it in the only reasonable way. So I want to acknowledge that there
might be some reasonable ways of talking on which the non-factualist views that
I argue for in this book don’t count as anti-metaphysical. Second, I just want to
explain why I think it’s reasonable to say that non-factualist views are anti-
metaphysical in at least one obvious sense; the reason is that non-factualist
views entail that there’s something wrong with the relevant metaphysical
questions—in particular, they entail that there are no right answers to these
questions. Now, different kinds of non-factualism will give us different stories
about why there are no right answers to the relevant questions, and some kinds of
non-factualist views might seem less anti-metaphysical than others. But according
to the versions of non-factualism that I’ll be arguing for in this book, the reason
that there are no right answers to the relevant metaphysical questions is (roughly)
that the language in which these questions are formulated is catastrophically
imprecise, and so the sentences that state the competing answers to these ques-
tions are indeterminate. Given this, I think it’s reasonable to say that according to
non-factualist views of this kind, there’s something wrong with the relevant
metaphysical questions, and so I think it’s reasonable to say that non-factualist
views like this are anti-metaphysical in at least one reasonable sense. But, again,
I don’t want to deny that there might be other kinds of non-factualist views that
seem less anti-metaphysical or that there might be some reasonable senses of
‘anti-metaphysical’ according to which my non-factualist views aren’t anti-
metaphysical.
1.2.2 Two Ways in Which My View Is Not Anti-Metaphysical: Before moving

on, I want to point out two ways in which my position in this book is not
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perpetually. ¹⁷And as for thee, if thou wilt walk
before me as David thy father walked, and do
according to all that I have commanded thee,
and wilt keep my statutes and my judgements;
¹⁸then I will establish the throne of thy
kingdom, according as I covenanted with
David thy father, saying, There shall not fail
thee a man to be ruler in Israel. ¹⁹But if ye turn
away, and forsake my statutes and my
commandments which I have set before you,
and shall go and serve other gods, and
worship them: ²⁰then will I pluck them up by
the roots out of my land which I have given
them; and this house, which I have hallowed
for my name, will I cast out of my sight, and I
will make it a proverb and a byword among all
peoples.
16. for ever] Compare xxx. 8.
²¹And this house, which is so high, every one

that passeth by it shall be astonished, and
shall say, Why hath the Lord done thus unto
this land, and to this house?
21. which is so high] The Hebrew must be rendered by a past
tense, which was high—as though the speaker spoke from a later
standpoint than the age of Solomon. That interpretation, however, is
clumsy; and in all probability the reading in Chronicles is simply an
attempt to improve an erroneous text in Kings. There the original
reading probably was “and this house shall become ruins; every one
who passes by,” etc.
²²And they shall answer, Because they forsook

the Lord, the God of their fathers, which
brought them forth out of the land of Egypt,
and laid hold on other gods, and worshipped
them, and served them: therefore hath he
brought all this evil upon them.
22. they shall answer] Render, men shall say.
Chapter VIII.
1‒6 (compare 1 Kings ix. 10, 11, 17‒19).
Solomon’s Cities.
¹And it came to pass at the end of twenty

years, wherein Solomon had built the house of
the Lord, and his own house,
1. twenty years] Compare 1 Kings vi. 38, vii. 1.
²that the cities which Huram had given to

Solomon, Solomon built them, and caused the
children of Israel to dwell there.
2. the cities which Huram had given to Solomon] According to 1
Kings ix. 12, 13 it was Solomon who gave Huram cities. Huram
however was not pleased with them (1 Kings ix. 12, 13), and from
this fact the English translators of 1611 concluded that Huram
rejected them and “restored” them. No reconciliation of these
different versions is tenable; and it is to be supposed that the
Chronicler’s tradition is unhistorical—the idea that the wealthy
Solomon could not or did not purchase what he required from Huram
except by parting with a portion of the territories of Israel was
repugnant, if not incredible, in the Chronicler’s day.
built them] i.e. fortified them.
³And Solomon went to Hamath-zobah, and

prevailed against it.
3. Hamath-zobah] The two kingdoms of Hamath and Zobah are
distinguished from one another (1 Chronicles xviii. 3, 9 = 2 Samuel
viii. 3, 9), Hamath apparently being north of Zobah. It is probable
however that Hamath as the name of a city belonged to more than
one place, and Hamath-zobah may be a southern namesake of the
well-known Hamath the great (Amos vi. 2).
prevailed against it] No mention of this campaign is made

elsewhere. It may be a genuine tradition preserved only in
Chronicles. On the other hand, this statement and the reference to
the store-cities built in Hamath (verse 4) may be due to nothing
except the mention of Tadmor in the wilderness (itself an error, see
following note). If Solomon built far-off Tadmor, then (the Chronicler
thinks) he must also have subdued the region of Hamath.
⁴And he built Tadmor in the wilderness, and all

the store cities, which he built in Hamath.
4. Tadmor in the wilderness] Palmyra (Bädeker, Palestine⁵, p.
344) is meant, a city on an oasis north-east of Damascus half-way
between Damascus and the Euphrates. Apart from this passage of
Chronicles it first appears in history in b.c. 34, when it was
threatened with attack by Mark Antony. This silence of history for a
thousand years casts a doubt on the belief that Tadmor (Palmyra) is
as old as the time of Solomon, and the doubt is strengthened by a
reference to the parallel passage (1 Kings ix. 18), for there (1) the
text (Kethīb) has “Tamar,” with “Tadmor” as marginal reading (Ḳerī),
and (2) Tamar (Tadmor) is associated with Gezer, Beth-horon, and
Baalath, cities either in Judah or on its borders. Probably therefore
the marginal reading “Tadmor” in 1 Kings is due to the influence of 2
Chronicles, and the text of 1 Kings (“Tamar”) is correct. The city built
by Solomon was a Tamar in the south of Judah.
⁵Also he built Beth-horon the upper, and Beth-

horon the nether, fenced cities, with walls,
gates, and bars;
5. Beth-horon the upper] Not mentioned in the parallel passage
(1 Kings ix. 17) which however has Gezer. The site of Gezer has
recently been explored with extremely interesting results (see e.g.
Macalister, Bible Side-lights from the Mound of Gezer). The
Chronicler probably omits the name of Gezer, because he had no
liking for the tradition that Solomon married a daughter of Pharaoh (a
heinous sin in the eyes of the Chronicler’s contemporaries), and
according to 1 Kings ix. 16 Gezer was presented to Solomon by the
Pharaoh as the dowry of his daughter.
⁶and Baalath, and all the store cities that

Solomon had, and all the cities for his
chariots, and the cities for his horsemen, and
all that Solomon desired to build for his
pleasure in Jerusalem, and in Lebanon, and in
all the land of his dominion.
6. Baalath] A city in the tribe of (the southern) Dan not far from
Gezer and Beth-horon (1 Kings ix. 18).
cities for his chariots] See note on i. 14.
7‒10 (= 1 Kings ix. 20‒23).

Solomon’s Task-workers.
⁷As for all the people that were left of the

Hittites, and the Amorites, and the Perizzites,
and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, which were
not of Israel;
7. Hittites ... Jebusites] See notes on 1 Chronicles i. 13‒15.
⁸of their children that were left after them in

the land, whom the children of Israel
consumed not, of them did Solomon raise a
levy of bondservants, unto this day.
8. consumed not] But in Kings, were not able to consume, a
displeasing remark, which the Chronicler therefore softened down.
a levy of bondservants] Compare the notes on ii. 2, 17.
⁹But of the children of Israel did Solomon

make no servants for his work; but they were
men of war, and chief of his captains, and
rulers of his chariots and of his horsemen.
9. and chief of his captains] Read (with 1 Kings ix. 22) and his
princes and his captains. The statements of this verse must be
read in connection with 1 Kings v. 13 ff., xii. 4 ff., whence it appears
that, though Solomon did not actually reduce any Israelite to
permanent slavery, yet he imposed upon his own people a corvée
which was felt to be very burdensome.
¹⁰And these were the chief officers of king

Solomon, even two hundred and fifty, that
bare rule over the people.
10. And these were the chief] After this preface (compare 1 Kings
ix. 23) we expect both here and in 1 Kings a list of these persons;
compare 1 Chronicles xi. 10 ff., xii. 1 ff. Possibly the text of 1 Kings
suffered at an early date, and the list was missing when the
Chronicler wrote.
two hundred and fifty] According to 1 Kings ix. 23, five hundred
and fifty. On the other hand the under-overseers are reckoned at
three thousand six hundred in 2 Chronicles ii. 18 as against three
thousand three hundred in 1 Kings v. 16. The total number therefore
of overseers of all kinds is given both in 1 Kings and 2 Chronicles as
3850.
11 (= 1 Kings ix. 24).

The House of Pharaoh’s Daughter.
¹¹And Solomon brought up the daughter of

Pharaoh out of the city of David unto the
house that he had built for her: for he said, My
wife shall not dwell in the house of David king
of Israel, because the places ¹ are holy,
whereunto the ark of the Lord hath come.
¹ Hebrew they are.
11. for he said, My wife, etc.] These words are an addition by the
Chronicler. In 1 Kings iii. 1 it is said simply that Solomon brought
Pharaoh’s daughter into the city of David until his own house was
finished.
My wife shall not dwell] Render, No wife of mine shall dwell.
12‒16 (compare 1 Kings ix. 25).

Solomon’s arrangements for the Temple Worship.
This paragraph is in the main an expansion of 1 Kings ix. 25.
¹²Then Solomon offered burnt offerings unto

the Lord on the altar of the Lord, which he
had built before the porch,
12. on the altar of the Lord, which he had built before the porch]
This refers to the great brasen altar of burnt-offering (iv. 1). In 1
Kings the statement is that Solomon burnt incense upon the altar
that was before the Lord (referring to the altar of incense; compare
Exodus xxx. 1‒10). Such an act, according to the Chronicler, was of
the nature of trespass, being punished in the case of Uzziah with
leprosy (xxvi. 16), and was therefore not to be attributed to so great
a king as Solomon.
¹³even as the duty of every day required,

offering according to the commandment of
Moses, on the sabbaths, and on the new
moons, and on the set feasts, three times in
the year, even in the feast of unleavened
bread, and in the feast of weeks, and in the
feast of tabernacles.
13. on the sabbaths, and on the new moons] The writer in Kings
confines Solomon’s sacrificial duties to three times in the year, i.e.
on the three great feasts specified at the end of this verse. The
Chronicler adds the weekly and monthly festivals, in conformity with
the developed ritual of the Priestly Code.
¹⁴And he appointed, according to the

ordinance of David his father, the courses of
the priests to their service, and the Levites to
their charges, to praise, and to minister before
the priests, as the duty of every day required:
the doorkeepers also by their courses at every
gate: for so had David the man of God
commanded. ¹⁵And they departed not from the
commandment of the king unto the priests and
Levites concerning any matter, or concerning
the treasures.
14. of David] Compare 1 Chronicles xxiv.‒xxvi.
to praise, and to minister before the priests] Compare 1

Chronicles xxiii. 28.
David the man of God] Targum David the prophet of the Lord (a
correct paraphrase). Compare Nehemiah xii. 36.
¹⁶Now all the work of Solomon was prepared

unto the day of the foundation of the house of
the Lord, and until it was finished. So the
house of the Lord was perfected.
16. Now all the work of Solomon was prepared] Render, So all
the work of Solomon was established.
unto the day ... was perfected] LXX. offers a much shorter and
smoother text, from the day on which it was founded until Solomon
perfected the house of the Lord. This reading is probably right.
17, 18 (= 1 Kings ix. 26‒28).

Solomon’s Fleet.
¹⁷Then went Solomon to Ezion-geber, and

to Eloth, on the sea shore in the land of Edom.
17. to Ezion-geber, and to Eloth] In 1 Kings Ezion-geber which is
beside Eloth on the shore of the Red Sea. Strictly speaking it was at
the head of the Gulf of Akaba, the eastern arm of the Red Sea.
Compare xx. 36 and Deuteronomy ii. 8.
¹⁸And Huram sent him by the hands of his

servants ships, and servants that had
knowledge of the sea; and they came with the
servants of Solomon to Ophir, and fetched
from thence four hundred and fifty talents of
gold, and brought them to king Solomon.
18. sent him by the hands of his servants ships] The words would
seem to imply that Huram had ships transported overland from the
Phoenician coast to the Gulf of Akaba! Either the Chronicler has
phrased the matter carelessly, or perhaps the text should be altered
to conform with Kings, where it is merely said that Solomon built
ships in Ezion-geber—probably with the help of Huram—and that
Huram helped to man them.
Ophir] The situation of this oft-mentioned place is not known. It

has been identified with some part of the coast (a) of India, (b) of
Africa, (c) of Arabia. The last identification is the most probable;
Ophir appears as the name of an Arabian tribe (Genesis x. 29). The
name is variously written in the LXX. but usually with an initial “S,”
Sophir(a), which has been supposed to refer to India.
four hundred and fifty talents] So LXX., but in 1 Kings “four

hundred and twenty” (so Hebrew, in LXX. B “a hundred and twenty”).
Chapter IX.
1‒12 (= 1 Kings x. 1‒13).
The Visit of the Queen of Sheba.
¹And when the queen of Sheba heard of the

fame of Solomon, she came to prove Solomon
with hard questions at Jerusalem, with a very
great train, and camels that bare spices, and
gold in abundance, and precious stones: and
when she was come to Solomon, she
communed with him of all that was in her
heart. ²And Solomon told her all her questions:
and there was not any thing hid from Solomon
which he told her not. ³And when the queen of
Sheba had seen the wisdom of Solomon, and
the house that he had built,
1. Sheba] An important district in Arabia Felix, the seat of a
kingdom. See notes on 1 Chronicles i. 9, 32; also Barnes on 1 Kings
x. 1.
hard questions] Hebrew ḥidoth, “dark sayings” (Proverbs i. 6); the

singular is translated “riddle” (Judges xiv. 12‒18).
⁴and the meat of his table, and the sitting of

his servants, and the attendance ¹ of his
ministers, and their apparel; his cupbearers
also, and their apparel; and his ascent by
which he went up unto the house of the Lord;
there was no more spirit in her.
¹ Hebrew standing.
4. and their apparel] The phrase is repeated probably through an

error of transcription; it occurs once only in the parallel place in 1
Kings.
his ascent by which he went up] Render (if the text be sound),
his manner of going up, i.e. the pomp with which he went up (so
Targum); but it is better, with LXX. and Peshitṭa, to read the burnt
offerings which he used to offer, a rendering which is right in 1 Kings
x. 5 (compare Revised Version margin). The difference of reading
between Chronicles and 1 Kings in the Hebrew is slight.
⁵And she said to the king, It was a true report

that I heard in mine own land of thine acts ¹,
and of thy wisdom.
¹ Or, sayings.
5. of thine acts] Literally of thy matters; the reference is quite

general.
⁶Howbeit I believed not their words, until I

came, and mine eyes had seen it: and,
behold, the half of the greatness of thy
wisdom was not told me: thou exceeded the
fame that I heard. ⁷Happy are thy men, and
happy are these thy servants, which stand
continually before thee, and hear thy wisdom.
6. the greatness of thy wisdom] Compare 1 Kings x. 7, “thy
wisdom and prosperity.”
⁸Blessed be the Lord thy God, which

delighted in thee, to set thee on his throne, to
be king for the Lord thy God: because thy
God loved Israel, to establish them for ever,
therefore made he thee king over them, to do
judgement and justice.
8. on his throne] To the Chronicler the Israelite throne belongs to
God; the visible king occupies it only as a deputy. Compare 1
Chronicles xxviii. 5, “the throne of the kingdom of the Lord”; 1
Chronicles xxix. 23, “Solomon sat on the throne of the Lord.”
Contrast 1 Kings x. 9.
⁹And she gave the king an hundred and

twenty talents of gold, and spices in great
abundance, and precious stones: neither was
there any such spice as the queen of Sheba
gave to king Solomon.
9. an hundred and twenty talents of gold] A sum so large must be
regarded rather as tribute than as a complimentary gift.
any such spice] i.e. as in 1 Kings “such abundance of spices.”
¹⁰And the servants also of Huram, and the

servants of Solomon, which brought gold from
Ophir, brought algum trees ¹ and precious
stones. ¹¹And the king made of the algum
trees terraces for the house of the Lord, and
for the king’s house, and harps and psalteries
for the singers: and there were none such
seen before in the land of Judah.
¹ In 1 Kings x. 11, almug trees.
10, 11. These verses interrupt the connection in Kings as in

Chronicles They are an interpolation. Verse 12 concludes the
account of the visit of the Queen of Sheba.
10. algum trees] In 1 Kings “almug trees.” Compare ii. 8 (note).

11. terraces] Perhaps “raised paths.” In 1 Kings x. 12 a different
Hebrew word is used, which may mean “railings” (“pillars,”
Authorized Version).
psalteries] compare 1 Chronicles xiii. 8 (note).
in the land of Judah] Here the Chronicler speaks as a man of his

own age. We should expect, land of Israel.
¹²And king Solomon gave to the queen of

Sheba all her desire, whatsoever she asked,
beside that which she had brought unto the
king. So she turned, and went to her own land,
she and her servants.
12. beside that which she had brought unto the king] This means
that the king beside returning the queen the value of her present to
him, also gave her additional gifts; compare 1 Kings x. 13.
13‒28 (= 1 Kings x. 14‒27).

Solomon’s Greatness.
¹³Now the weight of gold that came to

Solomon in one year was six hundred and
threescore and six talents of gold;
13. six hundred and threescore and six] This may be called a
“round” number, for a system of counting based on the number six
was known in ancient times, e.g. among the Assyrians. Taken
literally, the amount, which would be equal to about £4,000,000 and
of course of vastly greater purchasing power than the same sum to-
day, is fantastically large. For similar high figures, compare 1
Chronicles xxii. 14 (note).
¹⁴beside that which the chapmen and
merchants brought: and all the kings of Arabia
and the governors of the country brought gold
and silver to Solomon.
14. chapmen] The English word means “merchant”; compare the
verb, “to chaffer” and the German “Kaufmann.” The Hebrew word
means literally “those who go about” as merchants.
governors] Hebrew paḥoth (plural of peḥah; compare “Pasha”), a

word applied specially to governors of provinces of the Assyrian,
Babylonian, and Persian empires. Presumably governors outside the
land of Israel are here meant.
¹⁵And king Solomon made two hundred

targets of beaten gold: six hundred shekels of
beaten gold went to one target.
15. targets] Hebrew ṣinnah, a word meaning a large shield;
compare 1 Samuel xvii. 7. On the other hand in verse 16 (Hebrew
māgēn) small shields are meant. The English renderings should be
transposed so as to read “shields” in verse 15 and “targets” in verse
16.
six hundred shekels] About 21 lbs. avoirdupois.
went to one target] Render (also in verse 16) were spread upon
one target.
¹⁶And he made three hundred shields of

beaten gold; three hundred shekels of gold
went to one shield: and the king put them in
the house of the forest of Lebanon.
¹⁷Moreover the king made a great throne of
ivory, and overlaid it with pure gold.
16. shields] See note on verse 15.
the house of the forest of Lebanon] So called probably because it

was built of cedar of Lebanon (1 Kings vii. 2). It was in Jerusalem
and seems to have existed as late as the time of Isaiah (Isaiah xxii.
8) when it was in use as an armoury.
¹⁸And there were six steps to the throne, with

a footstool of gold, which were fastened to the
throne, and stays ¹ on either side by the place
of the seat, and two lions standing beside the
stays. ¹⁹And twelve lions stood there on the
one side and on the other upon the six steps:
there was not the like made in any kingdom.
²⁰And all king Solomon’s drinking vessels were
of gold, and all the vessels of the house of the
forest of Lebanon were of pure gold: silver
was nothing accounted of in the days of
Solomon.
¹ Or, arms Hebrew hands.
18. with a footstool of gold, which were fastened to the throne] A

quite different detail takes the place of this in 1 Kings x. 19, and the
top of the throne was round behind. Perhaps both details were found
in the original text of Kings.
²¹For the king had ships that went to Tarshish

with the servants of Huram: once every three
years came the ships of Tarshish, bringing
gold, and silver, ivory, and apes, and
peacocks. ²²So king Solomon exceeded all the
kings of the earth in riches and wisdom. ²³And
all the kings of the earth sought the presence
of Solomon, to hear his wisdom, which God
had put in his heart.
21. For the king had ships that went to Tarshish] Here the
Chronicler misunderstands the parallel passage (1 Kings x. 22, “For
the king had at sea a navy of Tarshish”). “Navy (or ‘ships’) of
Tarshish” (compare Psalms xlviii. 7) is a phrase meaning large ships
fit for long voyages; i.e. such as were the vessels used by the
Phoenicians in trading with Tarshish (i.e. Tartessus in Spain). We
may well compare the use of the title “Indiaman,” for that term came
to be used generally of large trading vessels besides those actually
trading with India. The merchandise mentioned in this verse
doubtless came from the East and not from Tarshish.
apes] These animals were much sought after; they appear

pictured in relief on the Black Obelisk (in the British Museum; among
the tribute received by Shalmaneser II of Assyria.
²⁴And they brought every man his present,

vessels of silver, and vessels of gold, and
raiment, armour, and spices, horses, and
mules, a rate year by year.
24. his present] i.e. his tribute.
armour] A less probable rendering is στακτὴ (“oil of myrrh”) LXX.

(here and in Kings); also “myrrh,” Peshitṭa of 2 Chronicles.
25‒28. Compare i. 14‒17.

²⁵And Solomon had four thousand stalls for
horses and chariots, and twelve thousand
horsemen, which he bestowed in the chariot
cities, and with the king at Jerusalem.
25. four thousand stalls for horses and chariots] In the parallel
passage (1 Kings iv. 26 = v. 6, Hebrew), forty thousand stalls of
horses for his chariots. Compare also i. 14 (= 1 Kings x. 26) where
1400 stalls of horses for chariots are ascribed to Solomon. This
number is much more likely to correspond with fact, but that does not
affect the probability that the Chronicler would find no difficulty in
crediting Solomon with possessing 4000 or even 40,000, especially
at the close of his reign. The meaning of the word rendered “stalls” is
quite uncertain: it may mean “pair.”
twelve thousand horsemen] So 1 Kings iv. 26 (v. 6, Hebrew); and

2 Chronicles i. 14 (= 1 Kings x. 26).
chariot cities] See note on i. 14.
²⁶And he ruled over all the kings from the

River even unto the land of the Philistines, and
to the border of Egypt.
26. from the River] i.e. the Euphrates.
even unto the land of the Philistines] The Philistines, it is implied,

were able to maintain their independence.
²⁷And the king made silver to be in Jerusalem

as stones, and cedars made he to be as the
sycomore trees that are in the lowland, for
abundance.
27. cedars] Rather, cedar wood.
sycomore] i.e. the fig-mulberry, not now a common tree in

Palestine; compare 1 Chronicles xxvii. 28, note.
the lowland] (Hebrew Shephelah). See G. A. Smith, Historical

Geography of the Holy Land, chapter x. “The Shephelah,” and the
note on i. 15.
²⁸And they brought horses for Solomon out of

Egypt, and out of all lands.
28. And they brought, etc.] Compare i. 16, 17.
29‒31 (= 1 Kings xi. 41‒43).

The Epilogue.
An important section of 1 Kings (xi. 1‒40) giving an account of

Solomon’s patronage of idolatry and of the troubles of his reign is
significantly omitted by the Chronicler: see the note on 1 Chronicles
xxix. 25, p. 168. For the authorities to which the Chronicler appeals
in these verses, see Introduction § 5.
²⁹Now the rest of the acts of Solomon, first

and last, are they not written in the history ¹ of
Nathan the prophet, and in the prophecy of
Ahijah the Shilonite, and in the visions of Iddo ²
the seer concerning Jeroboam the son of
Nebat?
¹ Hebrew words. ² Hebrew Jedai, or, Jedo.
29. the history of Nathan] Compare 1 Chronicles xxix. 29.
Ahijah the Shilonite] 1 Kings xi. 29, xiv. 2 ff.

Iddo] Hebrew Jedai or Jedo (probably a misspelling); compare xii.
15.
³⁰And Solomon reigned in Jerusalem over all

Israel forty years.
30. forty years] The number is a round number; compare Judges
iii. 30, v. 31, viii. 28, xiii. 1.
³¹And Solomon slept with his fathers, and he

was buried in the city of David his father: and
Rehoboam his son reigned in his stead.
31. slept with his fathers] This formula is not used of David (1
Chronicles xxix. 28), doubtless because David’s father was not a
king!
in the city of David] 1 Chronicles xi. 7.
Chapters X.‒XXXVI.
The History of Judah from Rehoboam to
the Exile.
Chapter X.
1‒15 (= 1 Kings xii. 1‒15).
The Conference at Shechem.

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Metaphysics, Sophistry, and Illusion:

Toward a Widespread Non-Factualism

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For Emily and Drew

viii   

4. Non-Factualism about Composite Objects (or Why There’s No

8. Conceptual Analysis 218

1.1 A Synopsis of This Book

mere-verbalist views, trivialist views become completely uninteresting from an

.      3

(i) metaphysically innocent modal-truth-ism about Qi (where, very roughly, this

.      5

The what-is-free-will question: What is free will?; is it libertarian-freedom?; is it

In Chapter 8, I’ll argue that conceptual-analysis questions (e.g., the what-is-free-

.          ’  - 7

1.2 The Ways in Which My View Is and Isn’t

1.2.1 Non-Factualism as an Anti-Metaphysical View (In at Least One Way): You

Insofar as non-factualist views are views that we can hold in response to

1.2.2 Two Ways in Which My View Is Not Anti-Metaphysical: Before moving

²¹And this house, which is so high, every one

²²And they shall answer, Because they forsook

¹And it came to pass at the end of twenty

²that the cities which Huram had given to

built them] i.e. fortified them.

³And Solomon went to Hamath-zobah, and

prevailed against it] No mention of this campaign is made

⁴And he built Tadmor in the wilderness, and all

⁵Also he built Beth-horon the upper, and Beth-

⁶and Baalath, and all the store cities that

cities for his chariots] See note on i. 14.

7‒10 (= 1 Kings ix. 20‒23).

⁷As for all the people that were left of the

⁸of their children that were left after them in

a levy of bondservants] Compare the notes on ii. 2, 17.

⁹But of the children of Israel did Solomon

¹⁰And these were the chief officers of king

11 (= 1 Kings ix. 24).

¹¹And Solomon brought up the daughter of

My wife shall not dwell] Render, No wife of mine shall dwell.

12‒16 (compare 1 Kings ix. 25).

This paragraph is in the main an expansion of 1 Kings ix. 25.

¹²Then Solomon offered burnt offerings unto

¹³even as the duty of every day required,

¹⁴And he appointed, according to the

to praise, and to minister before the priests] Compare 1

¹⁶Now all the work of Solomon was prepared

17, 18 (= 1 Kings ix. 26‒28).

¹⁷Then went Solomon to Ezion-geber, and

¹⁸And Huram sent him by the hands of his

Ophir] The situation of this oft-mentioned place is not known. It

four hundred and fifty talents] So LXX., but in 1 Kings “four

¹And when the queen of Sheba heard of the

hard questions] Hebrew ḥidoth, “dark sayings” (Proverbs i. 6); the

⁴and the meat of his table, and the sitting of

4. and their apparel] The phrase is repeated probably through an

⁵And she said to the king, It was a true report