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The Panoptic Sort
 The Panoptic Sort
A Political Economy of Personal Information

O S C A R H . G A N DY, J R .

Second Edition

1
 3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of
excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2021

First Edition Published in 1993 by Westview Press, Inc.

Second Edition Published in 2021 by Oxford University Press

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in
any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly
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University Press, at the address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Names: Gandy, Oscar H., author.
Title: The panoptic sort : a political economy of personal information /​
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2021] |
Originally published by Westview in 1993. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021003300 (print) | LCCN 2021003301 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197579411 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197579428 (paperback) |
ISBN 9780197579442 (epub) | ISBN 9780197579435 (updf) | ISBN 9780197579459 (online)
Subjects: LCSH: Privacy, Right of—​United States. | Records—​Access control—​United States.
Classification: LCC JC596.2.U5 G36 2021 (print) |
LCC JC596.2.U5 (ebook) | DDC 323.44/​830973—​dc23
LC record available at https://​lccn.loc.gov/​2021003300
LC ebook record available at https://​lccn.loc.gov/​2021003301

DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197579411.001.0001

1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Paperback printed by LSC Communications, United States of America
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America

Note to Readers
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information in regard to the subject
matter covered. It is based upon sources believed to be accurate and reliable and is intended to be
current as of the time it was written. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged
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techniques should be used, including checking primary sources where appropriate.

(Based on the Declaration of Principles jointly adopted by a Committee of the

American Bar Association and a Committee of Publishers and Associations.)

You may order this or any other Oxford University Press publication
by visiting the Oxford University Press website at www.oup.com.
 Contents

List of Tables and Figures  vii

Acknowledgments  ix
Foreword  1
1. Prologue  15
Introduction  15
The Diverse Theoretical Origins of Panoptic Thinking  17
2. Information and Power  29
Introduction  29
A Question of Power  32
Panopticism  36
Structuration  40
Technology, Markets, and Culture  50
3. Operating the Panoptic Sort  71
Data and the Panoptic Sort  71
Government Information Gathering  73
The Corporate Data Machine  78
Data Processing  90
A Technology of Power  100
List Vendors  111
4. Corporate Perspectives on the Panoptic Sort  117
In Pursuit of the Corporate View  117
The Telemarketing View  125
Direct Marketing Association  127
Robert Posch and Corporate Opinion Leadership  129
The Mail Survey  131
Corporate Policy and Practice  134
Business Perspectives on the Panoptic Sort  146
5. Relationships and Expectations  147
In Search of Public Perceptions  147
The Group Interviews  150
Thinking About Privacy  151
Defining Privacy Invasions  152
Profiles  153
Technology of Surveillance and Limits on Data Gathering  156
vi Contents

Data Sharing Limits  159

The Capsule View  160
6. The Social Origins of Views on Privacy  163
Introduction  163
The Penumbra of Fear  163
A Question of Trust  166
How Did You Get My Name?  168
Can They Really Do That?  170
There Ought to Be a Law!  171
Oppositional Tendencies  174
Structuration, or the Social Origins of Social Opinion  177
In Search of Social Explanations  177
Summary  204
7. A Data Protection Regime  205
Need We Involve the Law at All?  205
Personal Privacy and Data Protection: A Tangled Web  206
The Heritage of Warren and Brandeis  210
A Question of Dignity and Other Intangible Injuries  214
All of This and Democracy Too?  218
A Complex of Informational Rights  218
Information Privacy and Corporate Speech  222
Who’s the Enemy Here?  223
Sensitive Information  228
Reasonable Expectations and the Destructive Gales of Technology  231
Fighting Back  233
The Marketplace Solution  235
Public Policy and the Panoptic Sort  239
Fair Information Practices  253
8. Conclusion  257
And So to Conclude  257
What Is to Be Done?  260
Afterword  263

Notes  285
About the Book and Author  333
Index  335
 List of Tables and Figures

Tables

3.1 Personal contributions to machine-​readable, network-​linked data files  82

4.1 Corporate tendencies  136
4.2 Marketing techniques  137
4.3 Actors seen as responsible for the escalation of the customer information issue 138
4.4 Correlates of business practices  139
4.5 The association between organizational characteristics and marketing
techniques  141
4.6 Rotated factor matrix—​business information orientations  143
4.7 Multivariate analysis of variance factor scores with three
independent variables  145
6.1 Organizational rankings by trustworthiness  167
6.2 Orientation toward a legislative response  173
6.3 Social origins of orientations toward the panoptic sort  178
6.4 Correlations between explanatory factors  196
6.5 Multivariate influences on privacy orientations (hierarchical regression)  197

Figures

6.1 Conservatism and age  185

6.2 Political cynicism  186
6.3 Trust in government by age  186
6.4 Trust in business by age  187
6.5 Extent of concern by age  187
6.6 Failed to apply by age  188
6.7 Fear of technology by age  189
viii List of Tables and Figures

6.8 Trust index by age  190

6.9 Trust of insurers by age  191
6.10 Trust of data handlers by age  191
6.11 Trust, class, and exposure  202
6.12 Trust, class, and history  203
6.13 Trust, life cycle, and exposure  203
6.14 Trust, life cycle, and history  204
 Acknowledgments

This project has been a long time in development. It began to pick up steam once
I decided to move from Howard University to the University of Pennsylvania.
George Gerbner is largely responsible for that move and for many of the good
things that have happened as a result. Among those things was an introduction to
Ken Laker, the head of Penn’s computer science department and guiding force for
the Penn/​AT&T Telecommunications Technology Program that provided three
years of support for my research. Ben Peterson’s confidence in my potential led
an understandably cautious organization to eventually pair me with Emmanuel
Gardner, whose generous assistance led to my national telephone survey. With
the AT&T grant, and with support from the Annenberg School, I was privileged
to work with a continually changing but always wonderful team of graduate re-
search assistants including Jerry Baber, Todd Kristel, Eleanor Novek, Catherine
Preston, Michael Schunck, Nikhil Sinha, Beth Van Horn, and Csilla Voros.
As I began to share my thoughts about privacy and the panoptic sort, I was
pleased to be included in the stream of comment and conversations about tech-
nology, rights, and responsibilities. Although we did not always agree, I value
the advice and counsel of Ed Baker, Mary Culnan, Janlori Goldman, Jim Katz,
Gary Marx, Robert Posch, Priscilla Regan, James Rule, Rohan Samarajiva, and
Alan Westin. As the final hours approached and it seemed as though I would
never take the next critical step, Kathleen Jamieson made an offer that I could
not refuse. Time off and an implied deadline made it both possible and neces-
sary to transform boxes into pages. Her support and encouragement are much
appreciated.
I would also like to thank Herb Schiller and Gordon Massman whose perse-
verance put me in the capable hands of Shena Redmond, Sabina Vanish, and the
other good folks at Westview who have helped to finish this project in good form
and in record time.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge the continued support and understanding
of my wife, Judy, whose gentle counsel and editorial insights were always on call.
For our daughter, Imani, who always wanted to know “how many pages is it?”
I can now say “ask your mom!”
With regard to the realization of this second edition, I am pleased to express
my appreciation to David Lipp with regard to the final production management,
and to Monesha Mohandas for her specialized work in this regard. Thanks are
also due to David Birkenkamp from Routledge, and Meghan Vortherms from
x Acknowledgments

Hachette, and special thanks to Gordon Massman, my editor at Westview for

the original book who provided considerable help and support in tracking
down the different publishers thereby facilitating the transfer of my rights to the
book. I am, of course, grateful to Seeta Gangadharan and Seda Gürses whose
interventions with Alex Flach helped to put the idea of a second edition on
the table at OUP. But of course, most of the heavy lifting fell on Alex’s capable
shoulders. And finally, I am pleased to express my gratitude to my former dean,
colleague and advisor, Michael Delli-​Carpini, for his careful, insightful and
most valuable reading and editorial guidance with regard to the Foreword and
Afterword chapters. He bears no blame for the several important references
and citations that I still managed to leave out.
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr.
 Foreword

Not long ago, I was given the opportunity to reflect on what was accom-
plished with the publication of The Panoptic Sort in 1993 and to offer some ad-
ditional thoughts about what remained to be explored about these concerns.1
This Foreword will serve the purpose of calling your attention to some of the
contributions that have been made to this area and my thinking since its ini-
tial publication. Although I have never considered myself a historian, I have
come to see the value of exploring some early writing with the aid of references
to examples of scholarly writing that has amplified, challenged, perhaps even
corrected mischaracterizations of what was taking place at the time of the orig-
inal publication. It is my hope that you will find these references useful in your
own assessments of what I had set forth. And, in an effort to associate them more
closely with the issues to be considered, I have placed them in the kind of sequen-
tial order that is traditionally followed in a Preface, something that was neglected
in the first edition.
The Prologue, or Chapter 1, was intended to set forth a working definition
of the sociotechnical system that I referred to as the “panoptic sort,” beginning
with reference to its application to the evaluation of individuals seeking finan-
cial credit. It called attention to the kinds of data, or information, that had been
selected as a basis for evaluating the suitability of each candidate for such an
important opportunity to improve their life chances. Although passing note is
made of the assumptions being made by Jürgen Habermas about how rational
discourse was supposed to produce human understanding, far more extended
reference is made to the contributions made to my understanding of panoptic
strategies by Karl Marx, especially with regard to the continuing value of explo-
ration of the relationships between the economic base and superstructure.
Related contributions, especially relevant these days with regard to the in-
ternet and social media, have re-​emerged as part of ongoing debates about the
nature of productive and nonproductive labor
Jacques Ellul’s contributions are primarily associated with the increasingly
central role of technology within society, and with particular relevance for our
understanding of the panoptic sort as it continues to evolve. This is especially
true with regard to the extent that technology has a mind of its own—​something
of the sort that we are beginning to see in the developments taking place within
computing and algorithmically derived societal interventions. Max Weber’s

The Panoptic Sort. Second Edition. Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/​oso/​9780197579411.003.0001
2 Foreword

contributions, especially those related to the nature and importance of rational-

ization, and the importance of knowledge in shaping the distributions of power
within society, invite our attention to the ways in which both shape and are
shaped by their incorporation into the legal system.
Two of the more important influences on my thinking about the panoptic
sort were the writings of Michel Foucault and Anthony Giddens. From Foucault,
I borrowed the concept of panopticism, as it became the driving force behind
my thinking about power and social control. While the structural dimensions
of a design for a prison by Jeremy Bentham came to be overemphasized in much
writing about panopticism, Foucault applied his disciplinary approach to sur-
veillance and classification, and his experimental approach to the determination
of which interventions made the most sense with regard to prisoners, students,
as well as the managers of the public health system. Like Weber, Foucault under-
stood the nature of some of the complex relationships between knowledge and
power. Going beyond the disciplinary function of control through the denial of
opportunity, and the punishment of disobedience, Foucault called our attention
to the creative or generative impact of sociotechnical systems, helping to pro-
duce more and more types of individuals in need of surveillance, assessment, and
eventually, behavioral intervention.
Anthony Giddens’ contributions to my thinking about the panoptic sort and the
multidimensional technologies of discrimination that continue to emerge in order
to shape our lives and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of efforts at the pro-
duction of influence, really have no comparison. His theory of structuration finds
something of a midpoint between theories of hegemonic domination, the gentle
processes of cultivation, described by George Gerbner as applied to the role of the
mass media, and the nearly absolute denial of external influence by some of the
more extreme cultural theorists of a not too distant moment in time. Giddens’ no-
tion of distanciation is especially useful as a way to understand the operation of
power from afar; not limited to a central tower but distributed throughout a net-
work of elements later characterized by Haggerty and Ericson as part of “the sur-
veillant assemblage” that facilitated the generation of the “data doubles” with, and
against which we are continually being compared.2 His emphasis on the variety of
settings and locales in which surveillance of interactions and relations come to be
defined through analysis has influenced some of the ways in which the nature of
the panoptic sort as a process is revealed throughout the rest of the book.
The serious work of describing the panoptic sort began with a focus in
Chapter 2 on the nature and use of information and power in the variety of
ways that were made possible through its operation in different sectors of the
economy, and in society more generally. What is striking, and actually a bit em-
barrassing upon reflection after all these years, despite its place in the chapter’s
title, is the fact that “information” is never defined in this lengthy chapter.
 Foreword 3

Instead, the introduction jumps immediately to its uses. There is really no jus-
tification for this failure to define, given the important contribution to our un-
derstanding of the meaning of information provided by Russell Ackoff, back in
1989. Unfortunately for me, the greatest number of citations to his comments on
the ordering of the essential values associated with its generation and use came
after the publication of some of his “greatest hits” in 1999.3
Ackoff suggested that an ounce of information was worth a pound of data,
while an ounce of knowledge was worth a pound of information, and an ounce
of understanding was worth a pound of knowledge. The value of wisdom was not
estimated, and it is worth reflecting on why that particular computational chal-
lenge had not been pursued. The distinction between data, what we generally
refer to as information, is actually quite important, and we’ll explore that distinc-
tion more closely when we explore the actual operation of the panoptic sort as
presented in Chapter 3.
With power as the primary point of emphasis in that chapter, it begins with a
brief introduction to the three primary functions of processes that are involved
in the sorting process: identification, classification, and evaluation, or assess-
ment. Although there continue to be differences of opinion with regard to the
meaning of identification, I did then and continue to underscore the meaning
of identification as being linked primarily, for a variety of functional purposes,
to a single individual. While classification is also an aspect of identification, the
fact is that the data used for the classification of an individual is likely to be used
to identify other individuals who share similar attributes or characteristics. The
sharing of characteristics among variously sized groups of people raises increas-
ingly troublesome concerns about the kinds of rights that people may have or
claim, regarding the collection and use of data and information about them as
individuals, as well as members of groups. John Cheney-​Lippold provides an ex-
tensive and insightful examination of what he refers to as “characterization,” and
as we will later explore in more depth, the manner in which this process comes
to be dominated through the use of sophisticated computers for automated algo-
rithmic processing of masses of data.4
The kinds of power that matter to us today, and appear likely to matter
to people like us well into the future, have been described by economists like
Randall Bartlett, Samuel Bowles, and Herbert Gintis, in addition to the central
contributions made by Marx, Foucault, Giddens, Weber, and Ellul which are
explored in some detail in this chapter. Only the briefest of introductions to the
role played by information technology is included in this chapter, although it
has become a central focus of our contemporary concerns as they relate to the
use of computers. Somewhat more critically, their ability to collect, process, and
evaluate the knowledge, inferences, and behavioral interventions that might be
designed and implemented by autonomous machines is emphasized.
4 Foreword

After the chapter offers more details about contributions of Foucault,

Giddens, and Marx to our understanding of panopticism, our focus shifts to the
role of technology in the transformations taking place within capitalist nations.
The criticism directed against the technicism of Ellul’s descriptions of this trans-
formative force has been extensive. Yet I believe that the kinds of consequential
decisions that have been taken by powerful actors who actually shared his views
seem likely to shape our foreseeable futures.
James Beniger provided us with a well-​detailed assessment of the central role
being played by information technology as an enabler of the instrumental ra-
tionalization privileged by Weber. But like the contributions made by Frank
Webster and Kevin Robins, Beniger’s emphasis was more critical of managerial
pursuits of efficiency through a form of Social Taylorism that contributed to un-
expected conflicts and crises within the capitalist production system. The devel-
opment of management systems, of which the panoptic sort was merely one of
many types, was oriented toward the redistribution of power among different
sets of actors and institutions—​a process that continues to this day. This effort
toward the rationalization of control, both by managers of capitalist firms, as well
as by managers of governmental systems, is focused primarily on information
technologies.
Changes in the nature of information technologies, many of which were the
focus of scholarly writing about The Information Age that were of central con-
cern to these managers were discussed in terms of speed, reliability, and ease
of operation. A related feature was miniaturization, which facilitated the addi-
tion of more and more subsystems, including microprocessors capable of com-
pleting more and more calculations of data being gathered from more and more
remotely networked sources. While much of the focus was on information and
the nature of its collection, storage, and processing, this moment in time was also
marked by the rise of this kind of information as a commodity.5 This develop-
ment, which helped to generate intense debates about the nature of ownership
rights, including those associated with concerns about privacy, would become a
central issue in public policy deliberations.6
In Chapter 3, we turned our attention more specifically to the operation of
the panoptic sort as a discriminatory technology. It is here that the influence of
Klaus Krippendorff becomes central to my attempts to make this process more
meaningful as a technology. But it also came to be understood as a technolog-
ical operation that was increasingly dependent upon social theory, including
communications, than one might ordinarily assume when talking about tech-
nological systems. This theoretical emphasis is clear in Krippendorff ’s definition
of content analysis as a “technique for making replicable and valid inferences
from data to their context.” However, as you will see as we move a bit further
through the process as I see it, especially with regard to the developments in
 Foreword 5

the processing of “big data,” context is increasingly being cast aside, despite its
importance. I invite you here to consider the important contribution made by
Helen Nissenbaum in her book about “privacy in context,” and the claims being
made by individuals that “contextual integrity” is something of value that should
be respected like other important societal norms, that vary among people situ-
ated in different societal domains.7
It is probably worth noting here, that while Nissenbaum’s book is focused on
concerns about privacy, my first reference to privacy did not come until the end
of Chapter 2. There it was framed in quite critical terms because of the manner
in which it had generally been discussed in the United States. Those discussions
tended to ignore the manner in which that data gathering and analysis enhanced
the power of bureaucratic agencies, both public and private. Instead, surveillance
was the term of art that I emphasized. This began with Christopher Dandeker’s
reference to surveillance early in the Prologue. It ended with references to it in
the final chapter that were made with regard to feedback loops, whereby the use
of the panoptic sort led to growing mistrust among the public. Unfortunately,
this mistrust called for still more of the surveillance that continues to threaten
our democracies.
While privacy is an important focus of concern, the rise of surveillance as a
critical scholarly and political focus has been impressive. The study of surveil-
lance has become an academic major, primarily at the graduate level, and its
success can be attributed largely to the efforts of David Lyon and his colleagues
and students at Queens University in Kingston, Ontario, and around the globe.8
A highly influential journal, Surveillance & Society, which Lyon helped to de-
velop, publishes articles that examine the nature and consequences that flow
from surveillance in all of its forms.9 A Handbook of Surveillance Studies added to
the resources available to support the development of research and scholarship
in this area.10
Surveillance makes use of a variety of techniques and strategies to transform
large bodies of data gathered by different means from a multitude of sources
into information, knowledge, and applications designed to increase control
over targets, some of which may have been selected on the basis of potential
use. While I take due note of the important role played by government surveil-
lance, including the importance of government data, such as that gathered by the
Census Bureau to decision-​making within business and industry,11 the primary
focus of this chapter and much of the book is not on the government. Instead, its
focus is on the profit-​seeking firms engaged in the capture and exploitation of the
value to be derived from the gathering and transformation of information about
global populations.
Characterization of the corporate data machine begins with the demand for
and use of information about the labor force, beginning with their applications
6 Foreword

for employment. It moves fairly quickly to consideration of the kinds of data and
information being gathered about consumers, such as that gleaned from surveys,
interviews, and somewhat more indirectly, from records of transactions. A some-
what more specialized method for the gathering of data and information comes
from carefully designed experiments, very few of which involve the kinds of in-
formed consent that had become traditional, if not a formal requirement within
academic institutions.
The transformation of all this data into meaningful information and know-
ledge depends upon increasingly sophisticated processing, informed in part by
theoretical models, but made increasingly efficient in recent times through com-
putational techniques guided by artificial intelligence and machine learning.
A fairly early exploration of developments taking place in the area of artificial
intelligence by Philip Agre made a particularly important contribution to schol-
arly understanding of these developments. This was primarily because of the way
he explored the links between technological development and those taking place
within the humanities and social sciences.12
The literature in this area is developing quite rapidly, increased in part through
the development and growth in academic specializations in data science. Vasant
Dhar provides a useful introduction to the variety of ways in which data sci-
ence, especially that applied to predictive applications, differs substantially from
applications we have traditionally associated with statistics.13 While there is
increasing concern being expressed about the negative consequences flowing
from developments in data science, some critical scholars, such as Jonathan
Cinnamon, have attempted to identify some of the socially beneficial outcomes
that might emerge from the development of “a grassroots data science.”14 Still
others have focused their energies on finding ways to overcome the problems of
bias and error that continue to be identified in much of this work.15
Even back in 1990, when this book was being written, the statistical tech-
nology involved in the identification of population clusters that could facilitate
the use of segmentation strategies that facilitated the delivery of more effective
and efficient advertisements, as well as in attempts at behavioral “nudges,”16 had
already begun to be used within commercial and governmental spheres. The
closing section of this lengthy chapter revisits the important distinctions be-
tween some key terms in order to underscore their roles within the operation
of the panoptic sort. There are important distinctions that ought to be drawn
between classifications as a form of identification and a variety of “documentary
tokens,” like licenses and birth certificates, that are used to facilitate the devel-
opment of confidence that actions being taken apply to particular individuals.
While classifications are also parts of identificatory processes, their application
is not primarily orientated toward particular individuals but toward particular
types of individuals.
 Foreword 7

As Paul Starr suggested with regard to value of self-​classifications offered

by individuals, there continue to be disagreements about how much corpo-
rate actors should rely on such personal identifications that are being offered
by members of population groups defined by race, ethnicity, or gender. As was
noted by James Anderson, the identities of consumers were increasingly being
defined in terms of tastes, preferences, and commonalities among people per-
ceived by others as being similar.17 Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Starr noted some
of the pragmatic considerations shaping systems of segmentation and classifi-
cation.18 However, Gilad Edelman went so far as to suggest that behaviorally
targeted advertising ought to be banned because of the harms being generated
within the economy and the political process.19
A rather different dimension of a process that emphasized distinctions, was
the increasingly important attempts to predict the future. Prediction, often used
retrospectively in order to test a hypothesis by estimating the distribution of
variables in a previously excluded segment of the dataset, was increasingly being
used to estimate the distribution of those variables in datasets yet to be gathered.
Concerns about discrimination were being raised because predictions about
future behavior were being used to make decisions about eligibility for credit,
medical intervention, criminal sentencing, and parole, and a variety of other
opportunities that if denied, would surely affect the quality of life for individuals,
their families, and the communities in which they lived. This focus on predicting
the future, understood as the management of risk as seen through an actuarial
lens, was only briefly limited to insurance. Soon after, it came to dominate stra-
tegic planning and decision-​making more generally.
The identification of strategic targets for advertising and persuasive commu-
nication efforts represented the side of risk management that was never far from
view. Attention was soon focused on discovering how would predictions of be-
havioral responses by members of market segments contribute to profitability
and competitive advantage. The emergence of specialist firms like the Claritas
Corporation made good use of government data and negotiated access to spatial
classifications, originally created for the design and administration of the 1990
U.S. Census. When combined with creative distinctions between populations
defined by the characteristics of these neighborhoods, they enabled the transfor-
mation of targeting into a high art. As more firms got into the business of facil-
itating commercial and political targeting, yet another service sector emerged.
This one was focused on the generation and sale, or at least transactional use of
massive lists of individuals, that had been classified and rated on the basis of their
predicted behavior and financial or strategic value. 20
In the center of all this communicative activity was the development of tel-
ecommunications networks that improved the process of remotely connecting
personal and corporate computers to share data and facilitate the targeting of
8 Foreword

discriminatory messages.21 The development of the internet, and the rapid rise
of social media in what became known as the “platform economy,”22 was soon
followed by a dramatic shift in the nature of direct marketing industry. This shift
was marked by the use of increasingly sophisticated algorithmic selection and
recommendation systems and services operating online.23 Part of that activity
was being focused on the development of multisided markets in which members
of the public were no longer simply passive consumers of media content, but they
were actively contributing to that content as producers of what to some seemed
like exhibitionist self-​promotion, as well as pointed social commentary.24 At that
point, the panoptic sort took a dramatic leap into the future that we are experi-
encing today.
In Chapter 4, I focused my attention on trying to understand how the cor-
porate sector understood where it was and where it was hoping to go in the
Information Age. This effort began initially with a focus on three major corpo-
rate actors: The American Express Corporation (AMEX), TRW, and Equifax.
The initial assessment was based primarily on corporate annual reports, but
Equifax stood out from the group. It did so primarily because of its utilization of
the knowledge, expertise, and global reputations of Louis Harris and his surveys,
and those of Alan Westin. Westin was a leading expert in the privacy field, as
well as a social scientist who relied upon large public opinion surveys, often
funded by corporate sponsors to shape policy and understanding of privacy as
a social concern. Because it had not developed into the kinds of public-​private
partnerships (P3s) that have more recently become the norm within technolog-
ically transformed “smart cities,”25 none of the currently dominant global firms
were included in this analysis.
After exploring the role of the telemarketing industry and the Direct
Marketing Association, which represented its interests within the public policy
realm, I developed a survey that was intended to characterize the perspectives of
the direct marketing industry.
Not surprisingly, the willingness of these corporate executives to participate
in a survey about the nature of their strategic orientations was really quite low,
with only 139 usable documents out of the 859 surveys that were mailed out.
Tables in the chapter indicated the correlations and other relationships between
a set of common practices, including expressions of concern about security and
the possibility that customer information would emerge as an important re-
source. Additional predictors included the market sectors in which these firms
operated.
Among the most important factors explaining these multivariate relationships,
one measuring corporate concern about negative consumer reactions to their
use of transaction generated and other personal information (TGI) was signifi-
cantly linked to a large number of predictors. Corporate concerns about public
 Foreword 9

and governmental opposition to commonplace and increasingly sophisticated

segmentation and targeting continue to be measured by surveys and critical ana-
lyses being conducted around the globe. Among those worthy of your review,
I recommend a small number here.26
Chapter 5 is focused on the developing perspectives among the general public
regarding what they understood about the nature of the panoptic sort, revealed
primarily through their views on corporate informational practices. A small set
of focus groups were used in the development and implementation of a larger
U.S. national sample survey. Among the more important considerations that
emerged from the focus groups was the still troublesome problem of identifying
and evaluating the nature of the harms that are believed to flow from corporate
and governmental collection and use of TGI. Although the participants reflected
a generalized naive view regarding governmental limitations on data sharing,
the general sense derived from those informative sessions was that information
gathered for marketing purposes was not harmful.
Chapter 6 presented a secondary analysis of three datasets acquired through
the Louis Harris Data Center, that included a number of surveys for which Alan
Westin served as an academic adviser. It is important to note that all of the com-
mercial sponsors for these surveys were in the insurance industry, and many of
the questions reflected the corporate/​industrial concerns about privacy and sur-
veillance policy.27 My own surveys administered in 1988–​1989 were financed
primarily from a grant received from AT&T, and I hasten to note that some of
the reviewers from the company expressed concern about how some of those
questions had been framed.
A variety of issues and concerns were covered within these surveys. Among
the most important were those related to the nature of public anxiety about
violations of privacy and trust, the means by which personal information had
been gathered, and the extent to which these practices had actually been barred
or should be barred by government regulation. Giddens’ notion of structuration
was used as a framework for identifying the social origins of the respondents’
expressed opinions in these areas, as well as the willingness of a small segment of
respondents who invested time, energy, and resources in order to resist surveil-
lance and protect their privacy interests.
Explanatory variables included the standard sociometric indicators of race,
gender, age, and education, as well as job categories and political orientations.
Factor analysis was used to reduce the number of variables used to explain
responses to particular questions. Membership in a particular age cohort
emerged as an important predictor of respondents’ orientations toward privacy
and surveillance. Many of these relationships were curvilinear, with younger and
older cohorts being more similar in terms of their trust in general, and their trust
in insurers, than segments we might have considered to be at greater risk.
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 2. Nationality Must be Respected. No territory should be
transferred from one nation to another against the will of the
inhabitants, nor should any readjustments be made which might
breed fresh wars. National boundaries should coincide as far as
possible with national sentiment. No terms of settlement should be
regarded as satisfactory if they impose upon any nation such harsh
and humiliating terms of peace as would be inconsistent with its
independence, self-respect, or well-being. All idea of revenge
should, of course, be rooted out.
3. Limitation of Armaments. Since the policy of huge national
armaments has lamentably failed to preserve peace, competition in
armaments should end. The nations should agree to have no military
forces other than those maintained for international police duty.
Militarism should be abandoned by all nations, because they
recognize the absolute futility of force as a means of advancing the
moral or material well-being of any country. To facilitate the
elimination of militarism, the conditions of peace should stipulate that
all manufactories of arms, armaments, and munitions for use in war
shall hereafter be national property. No private citizen or corporation
should be permitted to engage in such manufacture.

Program of Women’s Peace Party

Organized in Washington, January 10, 1915.
1. The immediate calling of a convention of Women’s Peace
neutral nations in the interest of early peace. Party.

2. Limitation of armaments, and the nationalization of their

manufacture.
3. Organized opposition to militarism in our own country.
4. Democratic control of foreign policies.
5. The further humanizing of governments by the extension of the
franchise to women.
6. “Concert of Nations” to supersede balance of power.
 7. Action toward the gradual organization of the world to substitute
law for war.
8. The substitution of an international police for rival armies and
navies.
9. Removal of the economic causes of war.
10. The appointment of our Government of a commission of men
and women, with an adequate appropriation, to promote international
peace.

Program of Women’s Peace Party

Washington, January, 1916.
1. That no increased appropriations for war preparations be voted
during the present session.
2. That a joint committee be appointed to conduct a thorough
investigation with public hearings, and report within the next six
months upon the following matters:
a. The condition of our military and naval defenses with special
reference to the expenditures of past appropriations;
b. The probability of aggressive action by other nations against the
United States by reason of antagonism with respect to race,
trade, national expansion, property holding in foreign lands and
other causes of war;
c. The possibility of lessening by legislative or diplomatic action the
sources of friction between this country and other nations.
3. That action be taken to secure by our Government the
immediate calling of a conference of neutral nations in the interest of
a just and early peace. (To that end we endorse the principles
embodied in House Joint Resolution 38.)
4. That action be taken to provide for the elimination of all private
profit from the manufacture of armaments.
5. That action be taken which shall provide Federal control over
unnaturalized residents.
 6. That action be taken to bring about the creation of a joint
commission of experts representing Japan, China, and the United
States to study the complex and important question at issue between
the Orient and the United States and make recommendations to the
various governments involved.
7. That action be taken to convene the Third Hague Conference at
the earliest possible moment and that all voting American delegates
shall be civilians who represent various important elements in the
country, including if possible the business, educational and labor
interests and women, and that the delegates from the United States
be instructed to advocate world organization and a peaceful
settlement of all international difficulties.
One change was made in the platform adopted by the party a year
ago. Economic pressure, instead of an international police, was
urged as a substitute for rival armies and navies.

New York Peace Society

In the platform of the New York Peace Society New York Peace
appear these five “conditions of a permanent Society.
peace”:
1. A union of a sufficient number of Powers to guarantee
permanent peace by the maintenance of military force which can be
used at need as a police against any Power which threatens
hostilities.
2. A treaty which shall not only arrange the boundaries of the
States and their colonies, but also guarantee the territories so
established against attack either from within or without the league.
3. The removal of enmities. (a) By making peace in a generous
spirit at the close of the present war, and before the forces on either
side shall have been completely crushed. (b) By respecting racial
affiliations in the adjustments of territory made in the treaty of peace.
4. A renewal of the conferences at The Hague, the meetings to be
held so frequently as to constitute a Standing Committee of the
nations for promoting measures of common interest, and for
removing in their incipient stages causes of contention.
5. A treaty agreement to refer all differences within the league for
adjudication either to arbitration or to a permanent court.
“The present war,” says the platform in part, “has made it clear that
the arming of all nations menaces the peace of all. A common
reduction of armaments under an international agreement seems to
present itself as the sole condition of tolerable security and welfare
of all. Such a consummation would give to humanity its own possible
compensation for the unparalleled tragedy of the war.”

Socialist Party of America

Socialist Party of
I. Terms of peace at close of present war America.

must be such as to protect the nations from future wars and

conserve the identity of the smaller nations.
1. No indemnities.
2. No transfer of territory, except upon consent and by vote of the
people within the territory.

II. International Federation—United States of the World.

1. Court or courts for the settlement of all disputes between
nations.
2. International congress, with legislative and administrative
powers over international affairs, and with permanent committees in
place of present secret diplomacy.
3. International police force.

III. National disarmament.

1. National disarmament shall be effected immediately upon the
adoption of the peace program by a sufficient number of nations, or
by nations of sufficient power so that the international police force
developed by the terms of the program shall be adequate to insure
the protection of the disarmed.
2. No increase in existing armaments under any circumstances.
3. Pending complete disarmament the abolition of the manufacture
of armaments and munitions of war for private profit.
4. International ownership and control of strategic waterways, such
as the Dardanelles, Straits of Gibraltar, and the Suez, Panama and
Kiel Canals.
5. Neutralization of the seas.

IV. Extension of democracy.

1. Political democracy.
(a) The declaration of offensive war to be made only by direct vote of
the people.
(b) Abolition of secret diplomacy and the democratic control of
foreign policies.
(c) Universal suffrage, including woman suffrage.
2. Industrial democracy.
Radical social changes in all countries to eliminate the economic
causes of war, such as,
(a) Federation of the working classes of the world in a league of
peace.
(b) Socialization of the national resources, public utilities and
fundamental equipment of industry of the nations.
(c) Elimination of all unearned income.
(d) Immediate and progressive amelioration of the conditions of
labor.

V. Immediate action.
 1. Efforts to be made in every nation to secure the official adoption
of the above program, by the governing bodies at the earliest
possible date. The adoption of the program (contingent upon its
acceptance by a sufficient number of the nations to ensure its
success) to be immediately announced to the world as a standing
offer of federation.
2. The federation of all the possible peace forces that can be
united in behalf of the above program for active propaganda among
all nations.
3. Efforts through the international and the national organizations
of the Socialist party of all nations to secure universal cooperation of
all socialist and labor organizations in the above program.

David Starr Jordan’s Resolutions as to Rational Terms of

Peace
Whereas, The Great War in Europe is working David Starr
havoc without parallel among the best racial Jordan.
elements in all nations concerned, thereby exhausting the near
future and bringing subsequent impoverishment to the race;
Whereas, An intolerable burden of sorrow and misery is thrown on
the women and children of Europe, those who had no part in
bringing on the war and no possible interests to be served by it;
Whereas, No possible gain, economic or political (the restoration
of Belgium being secured), can compensate any nation for the loss,
distress and misery involved in this war and aggravated by each day
of its continuance;
Whereas, No probability appears that military operations in any
quarter can of themselves bring the war to its end;
Whereas, A sweeping victory tends to leave an increasing legacy
of hate, with seeds of future wars;
Resolved, That the rational interests of the civilized world demand
that the war be brought to a speedy close; and
 Resolved, That a way to honorable and lasting peace may be
possible along the following lines:
1. Recognition of the fact that no nation can establish rule or
dominion over any other civilized nation, large or small, that peace
cannot be maintained by the overruling power of any one nation, but
rather by international agreements of those nations which reject
aggressive war.
2. Guaranteed security to the small States of Europe, with relief of
peoples held in unnatural allegiance.
3. The freedom, under international guarantees, of the High Seas
and of the channels of trade, with immunity of commerce from
belligerent attack.
4. The removal of hampering tariff restrictions.
5. Compensation to Belgium, as determined by impartial
arbitration.
6. The neutralization of Constantinople, with adequate
safeguarding of the rights of Christian and Jewish peoples within the
Ottoman Empire.
7. An international conference to secure terms of peace; with
reduction of national armament, the establishment of a supreme
international tribunal, the maintenance of an international police
force, accompanied by recognition of the stability of International
Law.
May 13, 1915.

SIX LESSONS OF THE WAR

First.—That the various Hague Conventions, Nicholas Murray
solemnly entered into in 1899 and in 1907, have Butler.
been violated frequently since the outbreak of hostilities, and that,
obviously, some greater and more secure sanction for such
Conventions must be provided in the future.
Second.—That in not a few instances the rules and usages of
international law have been thrown to the winds, to the discredit of
the belligerents themselves and to the grave distress, physically and
commercially, of neutral powers.
Of course every one understands that international law is merely a
series of conventions without other than moral sanction. If, however,
the world has gone back to the point where a nation’s plighted faith
is not moral sanction enough, then that fact and its implications
ought to be clearly understood and appropriate punitive action
provided for.
Third.—That any attempt to submerge nationalities in nations
other than their own is certain to result in friction and conflict in the
not distant future. Any attempt to create new nations, or to enlarge or
diminish the area of nations, without having regard to nationality, is
simply to organize a future war.
Fourth.—That the transfer of sovereignty over any given district or
people without their consent, is certainly an unwise, and probably an
unjust, action for any government to take, having regard for the
peace and happiness of the world.
Fifth.—That the international organizations which had been carried
so far in such fields as maritime law, postal service, railway service,
and international arbitration, should be taken up anew and pursued
more vigorously, but upon a sounder and a broader foundation, and
made a certain means of protecting the smaller and the weaker
nations.
Sixth.—That competitive armaments, instead of being an
assurance against war, are a sure cause of war and an equally
certain preventive of those policies of social reform and advance that
enlightened peoples everywhere are eager to pursue.
Nicholas Murray Butler, quoted in N. Y. Times, May
16, 1915.

Chamber of Commerce of the United States

1. A more comprehensive and better-defined Chamber of
sea-law. Commerce of the
U. S.
2. An international court.
 3. A council of Conciliation.
4. International conferences for the better establishment and
progressive amendment of international law.
5. Power to enforce agreement: The organization of a system of
commercial and financial non-intercourse, to be followed by military
force if necessary, to be applied to those nations entering into the
foregoing arrangements and then going to war without first
submitting their differences to an agreed-upon tribunal.
 PEACE PROPOSALS AND PROGRAMS
3. GREAT BRITAIN

Union of Democratic Control

1. No Province shall be transferred from one Union of
Government to another without the consent by Democratic
Control.
plebiscite or otherwise of the population of such
Province.
2. No Treaty, Arrangement, or Undertaking shall be entered upon
in the name of Great Britain without the sanction of Parliament.
Adequate machinery for ensuring democratic control of foreign policy
shall be created.
3. The Foreign Policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at
creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the Balance of
Power; but shall be directed to concerted action between the
Powers, and the setting up of an International Council, whose
deliberations and decisions shall be public, with such machinery for
securing international agreement as shall be the guarantee of an
abiding peace.
4. Great Britain shall propose as part of the Peace settlement a
plan for the drastic reduction by consent of the armaments of all the
belligerent Powers, and to facilitate that policy shall attempt to
secure the general nationalization of the manufacture of armaments,
and the control of the export of armaments by one country to
another.

Fabian Society
London, July 17, 1915.

Proposed Articles of Settlement

The signatory States, desirous of preventing any Fabian Society.
future outbreak of war, improving international
relations, arriving by agreement at an authoritative codification of
international law and facilitating the development of such joint action
as is exemplified by the International Postal Union, hereby agree and
consent to the following Articles:

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A SUPERNATIONAL AUTHORITY

1. There shall be established as soon as possible within the period
of one year from the date hereof (a) an International High Court for
the decision of justiciable issues between independent Sovereign
States; (b) an International Council with the double function of
securing, by common agreement, such international legislation as
may be practicable, and of promoting the settlement of non-
justiciable issues between independent Sovereign States; and (c) an
International Secretariat.

The Constituent States

2. The independent Sovereign States to be admitted as
Constituent States, and hereinafter so described, shall be:
(a) The belligerents in the present war;
(b) The United States of America;
(c) Such other independent Sovereign States as have been
represented at either of the Peace Conferences at The Hague,
and as shall apply for admission within six months from the date
of these Articles; and
(d) Such other independent Sovereign States as may hereafter be
admitted by the International Council.

Covenant Against Aggression

3. It is a fundamental principle of these Articles that the
Constituent States severally disclaim all desire or intention of
aggression on any other independent Sovereign State or States, and
that they agree and bind themselves, under all circumstances, and
without any evasion or qualification whatever, never to pursue,
beyond the stage of courteous representation, any claim or
complaint that any of them may have against any other Constituent
State, without first submitting such claim or complaint, either to the
International High Court for adjudication and decision, or to the
International Council for examination and report, with a view to
arriving at a settlement acceptable to both parties.

Covenant Against War Except as a Final Resource

4. The Constituent States expressly bind themselves severally
under no circumstances to address to any Constituent State an
ultimatum, or a threat of military or naval operations in the nature of
war, or of any act of aggression; and under no circumstances to
declare war, or begin military or naval operations of the nature of
war, or violate the territory or attack the ships of another State,
otherwise than by way of repelling and defeating a forcible attack
actually made by military or naval force, until the matter in dispute
has been submitted as aforesaid to the International High Court or to
the International Council, and until after the expiration of one year
from the date of such submission.
On the other hand, no Constituent State shall, after submission of
the matter at issue to the International Council and after the
expiration of the specified time, be precluded from taking any action,
even to the point of going to war, in defense of its own honor or
interests, as regards any issues which are not justiciable within the
definition laid down by these Articles, and which affect either its
independent sovereignty or its territorial integrity, or require any
change in its internal laws, and with regard to which no settlement
acceptable to itself has been arrived at.

THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL

5. The International Council shall be a continuously existing
deliberative and legislative body composed of representatives of the
Constituent States, to be appointed in such manner, for such periods
and under such conditions as may in each case from time to time be
determined by the several States.
 Each of the eight Great Powers—viz., Austria-Hungary, the British
Empire, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States
of America—may appoint five representatives. Each of the other
Constituent States may appoint two representatives.

Different Sittings of the Council

6. The International Council shall sit either as a Council of all the
Constituent States, hereinafter called the Council sitting as a whole,
or as the Council of the eight Great Powers, or as the Council of the
States other than the eight Great Powers, or as the Council for
America, or as the Council for Europe, each such sitting being
restricted to the representatives of the States thus indicated.
There shall stand referred to the Council of the eight Great Powers
any question arising between any two or more of such Powers, and
also any other question in which any of such Powers formally claims
to be concerned, and requests to have so referred.
There shall also stand referred to the Council of the eight Great
Powers, for consideration and ratification, or for reference back in
order that they may be reconsidered, the proceedings of the Council
for America, the Council for Europe, and the Council of the States
other than the eight Great Powers.
There shall stand referred to the Council for Europe any question
arising between two or more independent Sovereign States of
Europe, and not directly affecting any independent Sovereign States
not represented in that Council, provided that none of the
Independent Sovereign States not so represented formally claims to
be concerned in such question, and provided that none of the eight
Great Powers formally claims to have it referred to the Council of the
eight great Powers or to the Council sitting as a whole.
There shall stand referred to the Council for America any question
arising between two or more independent Sovereign States of
America, not directly affecting any independent Sovereign State not
represented in that Council, provided that none of the independent
Sovereign States not so represented formally claims to be
concerned in such question, and provided that none of the eight
Great Powers formally claims to have it referred to the Council of the
eight Great Powers or to the Council sitting as a whole.
There shall stand referred to the Council for the States other than
the eight Great Powers any question between two or more of such
States, not directly affecting any of the eight Great Powers and
which none of the eight Great Powers formally claims to have
referred to the Council sitting as a whole.
The Council shall sit as a whole for—
(a) General legislation and any question not standing referred to the
Council of the eight Great Powers, the Council of the States
other than the eight Great Powers, the Council for Europe or the
Council for America respectively;
(b) The appointment and all questions relating to the conditions of
office, functions and powers of the International Secretariat, and
of the President and other officers of the International Council;
(c) The settlement of Standing Orders, and all questions relating to
procedure and verification of powers;
(d) The financial affairs of the International Council and International
High Court, the allocation of the cost among the Constituent
States, and the issue of precepts upon the several Constituent
States for the shares due from them;
(e) The admission of independent Sovereign States as Constituent
States; and
(f) Any proposal to alter any of these Articles, and the making of
such an alteration.

Membership of the Council and Voting

7. All the Constituent States shall have equal rights to participation
in the deliberations of the International Council. Any Constituent
State may submit to the International Council sitting as a whole any
proposal for any alteration of International Law, or for making an
enactment of new law; and also (subject to the provisions of these
Articles with regard to the submission of justiciable issues to the
International High Court) may bring before the Council any question,
dispute or difference arising between it and any other Constituent
State.
When the International Council is sitting as the Council of the eight
Great Powers or as the Council of the States other than the eight
Great Powers each of the States represented therein shall have one
vote only.
When the International Council is sitting as a whole or as the
Council for Europe or as the Council for America, the number of
votes to be given on behalf of each State shall be as follows:
As agreed to by the Hague Conference, the relative position of the
States works out into the following scale of votes:

Austria-Hungary, the British Empire, France,

Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United
States of America 20 votes each
Spain 12 ”
The Netherlands 9 ”
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, China, Roumania, Turkey 6 ” ”
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico 4 ” ”
Switzerland, Bulgaria, Persia 3 ” ”
Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Serbia,
Siam 2 ” ”
The other Constituent States 1 vote ”

Legislation Subject to Ratification

8. It shall be within the competence of the International Council to
codify and declare the International Law existing between the
several independent Sovereign States of the world; and any such
codifying enactment, when and in so far as ratified by the
Constituent States, shall be applied and enforced by the
International High Court.
 It shall also be within the competence of the International Council
from time to time, by specific enactment, to amend International Law,
whether or not this has been codified; and any such enactment when
and in so far as ratified by the several Constituent States shall be
applied and enforced by the International High Court.
Whenever any Constituent State notifies its refusal to ratify as a
whole any enactment made by the International Council, it shall at
the same time notify its ratification of such part or parts of such
enactment as it will consent to be bound by; and the International
Council shall thereupon reenact the parts so ratified by all the
Constituent States, and declare such enactment to have been so
ratified, and such enactment shall thereupon be applied and
enforced by the International High Court.
When any enactment of the International Council making any new
general rule of law has been ratified wholly or in part by any two or
more Constituent States, but not by all the Constituent States, it
shall, so far as ratified, be deemed to be binding on the ratifying
State or States, but only in respect of the relations of such State or
States with any other ratifying State or States; and it shall be applied
and enforced accordingly by the International High Court.

Non-Justiciable Issues
9. When any question, difference or dispute arising between two
or more Constituent States is not justiciable as defined in these
Articles, and is not promptly brought to an amicable settlement, and
is of such a character that it might ultimately endanger friendly
relations between such States, it shall be the duty of each party to
the matter at issue, irrespective of any action taken or not taken by
any other party, to submit the question, difference or dispute to the
International Council with a view to a satisfactory settlement being
arrived at. The Council may itself invite the parties to lay any such
question, difference or dispute before the Council, or the Council
may itself take any such matter at issue into its own consideration.
The Constituent States hereby severally agree and bind
themselves under no circumstances to address to any other
Constituent State an ultimatum or anything in the nature of a threat
of forcible reprisals or naval or military operations, or actually to
commence hostilities against such State, or to violate its territory, or
to attack its ships, otherwise than by way of repelling and defeating a
forcible attack actually made by naval or military force, before a
matter in dispute, if not of a justiciable character as defined in these
Articles, has been submitted to or taken into consideration by the
International Council as aforesaid for investigation, modification and
report, and during a period of one year from the date of such
submission or consideration.
The International Council may appoint a Permanent Board of
Conciliators for dealing with all such questions, differences or
disputes as they arise, and may constitute the Board either on the
nomination of the several Constituent States or otherwise, in such
manner, upon such conditions and for such term or terms as the
Council may decide.
When any question, difference or dispute, not of a justiciable
character as defined in these Articles, is submitted to or taken into
consideration by the International Council as aforesaid, the Council
shall, with the least possible delay, take action, either (1) by referring
the matter at issue to the Permanent Board of Conciliators, or (2) by
appointing a Special Committee, whether exclusively of the Council
or otherwise, to enquire into the matter and report, or (3) by
appointing a Commission of Enquiry to investigate the matter and
report, or (4) by itself taking the matter into consideration.
The Constituent States hereby agree and bind themselves,
whether or not they are parties to any such matter at issue, to give
all possible facilities to the International Council, to the Permanent
Board of Conciliators, to any Committee or Commission of Enquiry
appointed by either of them, and to any duly accredited officer of any
of these bodies, for the successful discharge of their duties.
When any matter at issue is referred to the Board of Conciliation,
or to a Special Committee, or to a Commission of Enquiry, such
Board, Committee or Commission shall, if at any time during its
proceedings it succeeds in bringing about an agreement between
the parties upon the matter at issue, immediately report such
agreement to the International Council; but, if no such agreement be
reached, such Board, Committee or Commission shall, so soon as it
has finished its enquiries, and in any case within six months, make a
report to the International Council, stating the facts of the case and
making any recommendations for a decision that are deemed
expedient.
When a report is made to the International Council by any such
Board, Committee or Commission that an agreement has been
arrived at between the parties, the Council shall embody such
agreement, with a recital of its terms, in a resolution of the Council.
When any other report is made to the Council by any such Board,
Committee or Commission, or when the Council itself has taken the
matter at issue into consideration, the Council shall, after taking all
the facts into consideration, and within a period of three months,
come to a decision on the subject, and shall embody such decision
in a resolution of the Council. Such resolution shall, if necessary, be
arrived at by voting, and shall be published, together with any report
on the subject, in the Official Gazette.
A resolution of the Council embodying a decision settling a matter
at issue between Constituent States shall be obligatory and binding
on all the Constituent States, including all the parties to the matter at
issue, if either it is passed unanimously by all the members of the
Council present and voting; or where the proposed enactment does
not affect the independent sovereignty or the territorial integrity, nor
require any change in the internal laws of any State, and where such
enactment shall have been assented to by a three-fourths majority of
the votes given by the representatives present and voting.

The International Secretariat

10. There shall be an International Secretariat, with an office
permanently open for business, with such a staff as the International
Council may from time to time determine.
It shall be the duty of the International Secretariat to make all
necessary communications on behalf of the International Council to
States or individuals; to place before the President to bring before
the Council any matter of which it should have cognizance; to
organize and conduct any enquiries or investigations ordered by the
Council; to maintain an accurate record of the proceedings of the
Council; to make authentic translations of the resolutions and
enactments of the Council, the report of the proceedings, and other
documents, and to communicate them officially to all the Constituent
States; and to publish for sale an Official Gazette and such other
works as the Council may from time to time direct.
Subject to any regulations that may be made by the International
Council, the International Secretariat shall take charge of and be
responsible for (a) the funds belonging to or in the custody of the
International Council and the International High Court; (b) the
collection of all receipts due to either of them; and (c) the making of
all authorized payments.

THE INTERNATIONAL HIGH COURT

11. The International High Court shall be a permanent judicial
tribunal, consisting of fifteen Judges, to be appointed as hereinafter
provided. Subject to these Articles it shall, by a majority of Judges
sitting and voting, control its own proceedings, determine its
sessions and place of meeting, settle its own procedure, and appoint
its own officers. It may, if thought fit, elect one of its members to be
President of the Court for such term and with such functions as it
may decide. Its members shall receive an annual stipend of ——,
whilst if a President is elected he shall receive an additional sum of
——. The Court shall hear and decide with absolute independence
the issues brought before it in conformity with these Articles; and
shall in each case pronounce, by a majority of votes, a single
judgment of the Court as a whole, which shall be expressed in
separate reasoned statements by each of the Judges sitting and
acting in the case. The sessions of the Court shall be held, if so
ordered, notwithstanding the existence of a vacancy or of vacancies
among the Judges; and the proceedings of the Court shall be valid,
and the decision of a majority of the Judges sitting and acting shall
be of full force, notwithstanding the existence of any vacancy or
vacancies or of the absence of any Judge or Judges.

The Judges of the Court

12. The Judges of the International High Court shall be appointed
for a term of five years by the International Council sitting as a
whole, in accordance with the following scheme: Each of the
Constituent States shall be formally invited to nominate one
candidate, who need not necessarily be a citizen or a resident of the
State by which he is nominated. The eight candidates severally
nominated by the eight Great Powers shall thereupon be appointed
Judges by the International Council sitting as the Council of the eight
Great Powers. The remaining seven Judges shall be appointed by
the International Council sitting as a whole, after selection by
exhaustive ballot from among the candidates nominated by the
Constituent States other than the eight Great Powers. On the
occurrence of a vacancy among the Judges nominated by the eight
Great Powers, the State which had nominated the Judge whose seat
has become vacant shall be invited to nominate his successor, and
the candidate so nominated shall thereupon be appointed by the
International Council sitting as the Council of the eight Great Powers.
On the occurrence of a vacancy among the other Judges, each of
the Constituent States other than the eight Great Powers shall be
invited to nominate a candidate to fill the vacancy; and the
International Council sitting as a whole shall, by exhaustive ballot,
choose from among the candidates so nominated the person to be
appointed.
A Judge of the International High Court shall not be liable to any
legal proceedings in any tribunal in any State, and shall not be
subjected to any disciplinary action by any Government, in respect of
anything said or done by him in his capacity as Judge; and shall not
during his term of office be deprived of any part of the emoluments
or privileges of his office. A Judge of the International High Court
may be removed from office by a resolution of the International
Council sitting as a whole, carried by a three-fourths majority.