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Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History
 Practical Necessity,
Freedom, and History
From Hobbes to Marx

DAVI D J A M E S

1
 3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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© David James 2021
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First Edition published in 2021
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and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
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ISBN 978–0–19–884788–5
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198847885.001.0001
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TJ Books Limited
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 Contents

Abbreviations ix

Introduction 1
1. The Concept of Practical Necessity and the Question of Freedom 1
2. Practical Necessity and Historical Necessity 11
1. Hobbes’s Argument for the Practical Necessity of Colonization 16
1. Practical Necessity and Human Nature 16
2. Freedom and Human Nature 19
3. Colonization 26
4. The Contingency of Colonization 30
5. Hobbes’s Science of History 37
2. Practical Necessity and History I: Rousseau’s Second Discourse 42
1. Moral Freedom and Historical Contingency 42
2. Stasis 48
3. The Role of Practical Necessity in Rousseau’s Genealogy of Society 55
4. The Reconciliation of Freedom and Necessity 66
5. Subjectivity and History 71
3. Practical Necessity and History II: Kant on Universal History 79
1. Practical Necessity, Normative Necessity, and Historical Necessity 79
2. Good Comes from Evil: Unsociable Sociability and the Creation
of Legal and Political Order 85
3. Universal History and Historical Necessity 92
4. Hegel and Marx on the Historical Necessity of the Terror 101
1. The Role of Practical Necessity in Hegel’s Analysis of the Terror 101
2. Absolute Freedom and Law 103
3. Absolute Freedom and the Historical Necessity of the Terror 110
4. Marx on the Historical Necessity of the Terror 118
5. Practical Necessity, Ethical Freedom, and History: Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right 125
1. Freedom, Right, and History 125
2. Ethical Freedom 130
3. The Role of Practical Necessity in Civil Society 134
4. Colonization, Global Freedom, and the (Premature) Transition
to World History 140
5. Freedom and World History 155
viii 

6. The Compatibility of Freedom and Necessity in Marx’s Idea of

Communist Society 162
1. Freedom, Necessity, and Self-Realization 162
2. The Incompatibility of Freedom and Necessity in Capitalist Society 166
3. Freedom in the Communist Realm of Necessity 176
4. The True Realm of Freedom 184
7. Practical Necessity and Historical Necessity in Historical
Materialism 192
1. Historical Materialism and Historical Necessity 192
2. Practical Necessity: The Struggle over the Length of the
Working Day 198
3. Historical Necessity and Surplus Practical Necessity 210

Bibliography 223
Index 227
 Acknowledgments

The writing of this book was supported by an Alexander von Humboldt Research
Fellowship for Experienced Researchers, for which I am deeply grateful. I would
like to thank Rahel Jaeggi for agreeing to host me at the Humboldt-Universität zu
Berlin and for her hospitality during my stay in Berlin. I am indebted to two
anonymous readers for Oxford University Press, whose comments have resulted
in what are, I hope, some significant improvements to the manuscript that they
read.
The book contains substantially revised material that appears in the following
articles: ‘Hobbes’s Argument for the “Naturalness” and “Necessity” of Colonization’,
History of Political Thought 38(3) (2017), published by Imprint; ‘The Compatibility
of Freedom and Necessity in Marx’s Idea of Communist Society’, European Journal
of Philosophy 25(2) (2017), published by Wiley; ‘Practical Necessity and the
Fulfilment of the Plan of Nature in Kant’s Idea for a Universal History’, Journal of
the Philosophy of History 13(1) (2019), published by Brill; and ‘Hegel and Marx on
the Necessity of the Reign of Terror’, Hegel Bulletin 41(2) (2020), published by
Cambridge University Press.
 Abbreviations

Writings of Hobbes
DC On the Citizen (De Cive), ed. and trans. Richard Tuck and Michael
Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Cited by
chapter and paragraph number except for The Epistle Dedicatory, which
is cited by the page number of the English translation.
EL The Elements of Law Natural and Politic, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies, 2nd edn
(London: Frank Cass, 1969). Cited according to part, chapter, and
paragraph number.
CEW The Collected English Works of Thomas Hobbes, ed. Sir William Molesworth
(London: Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1997). Cited by volume and page number.
L Leviathan, Volume 2: The English and Latin Texts (i), ed. Noel Malcolm
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012). Cited by chapter number and original
pagination.

Writings of Rousseau

CGP Considerations on the Government of Poland, in The Social Contract and

other later political writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997). Cited by section and paragraph number.
DI Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, in The
Discourses and other early political writings, ed. and trans. Victor
Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
GM From of the Social Contract or Essay about the Form of the Republic
(Known as the Geneva Manuscript), in The Social Contract and other later
political writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997). Cited by book, chapter, and paragraph number.
LM Letters Written from the Mountain, in Letter to Beaumont, Letters Written
from the Mountain, and Related Writings (The Collected Writings of Rousseau,
Vol. 9), eds. Christopher Kelly and Eve Grace, trans. Christopher Kelly and
Judith R. Bush (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2001).
OC Œuvres complètes, 5 vols, eds. Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond
(Paris: Gallimard, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1959–95). Cited by volume
and page number except in the case of Du Contrat Social and Du Contrat
Social (Première Version, Manuscrit de Genève), both of which are cited
by book, chapter, and paragraph number, and Considérations sur le
Gouvernement de Pologne, which is cited by section and paragraph number.
PF Political Fragments, in Social Contract, Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary
for a Hero, Political Fragments, and Geneva Manuscript (The Collected Writings
x 

of Rousseau, Vol. 4), eds. Roger D. Masters and Christopher Kelly, trans. Judith
R. Bush, Roger D. Masters, and Christopher Kelly (Hanover: University Press
of New England, 1994). Cited by page number.
RSW Reveries of the Solitary Walker, trans. Peter France (London: Penguin, 2004).
SC Of the Social Contract, in The Social Contract and other later political
writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997). Cited by book, chapter, and paragraph number.
SW The State of War, in The Social Contract and other later political writings, ed.
and trans. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Writings of Kant
AA Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, ed. Königliche Preußische (later Deutsche)
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Reimer/de Gruyter, 1900–).
CBHH ‘Conjectural Beginning of Human History’, in Anthropology, History, and
Education, eds. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
CF The Conflict of the Faculties, in Religion and Rational Theology, eds. Allen
W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1996).
CJ Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
E ‘An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?’, in Practical
Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996).
GMM Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, trans. and
ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
IUH ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’, in Anthropology,
History, and Education, eds. Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
R Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, in Religion and Rational
Theology, eds. Allen W. Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
TPP ‘Toward Perpetual Peace’, in Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary
J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

The above writings are all cited according to the AA (Akademieausgabe) volume and page
numbers, which are provided in the respective English translations.

Writings of Hegel

EL Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)

Erster Teil: Die Wissenschaft der Logik, in Werke, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and
Karl Markus Michel (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1969–71), Vol. 8.
English translation: The Encyclopaedia Logic: Part I of the Encyclopaedia of
  xi

Philosophical Sciences with the Zusätze, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting,

and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991). Cited according to paragraph
(§) number. R indicates a remark that Hegel himself added to the paragraph,
while A indicates an addition derived from student lecture notes.
LPWH Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Volume 1: Manuscripts of the
Introduction and the Lectures of 1822–3, ed. and trans. Robert F. Brown and
Peter C. Hodgson with the assistance of William G. Geuss (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 2011).
PhG Phänomenologie des Geistes, eds. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich
Clairmont (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1988).
PR Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und
Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, in Werke, ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl
Markus Michel (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1969–71), Vol. 7. English
translation: Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. A. W. Wood, trans.
H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Cited
according to paragraph (§) number. R indicates a remark which Hegel
himself added to the paragraph, while A indicates an addition derived from
student lecture notes. The only exception is the Preface, which is cited by the
page number of the German edition followed by that of the English
translation.
PR 1819/20 Philosophie des Rechts. Die Vorlesung von 1819/20 in einer Nachschrift, ed.
Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983).
PR 1821/22 Die Philosophie des Rechts. Vorlesung von 1821/22, ed. Hansgeorg Hoppe
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2005). Cited by paragraph (§) number.
PS Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1977). Cited by paragraph (¶) number.
VPW1 Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Berlin, 1822–23,
transcribed by Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim, Heinrich Gustav Hotho,
and Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, in Vorlesungen:
Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte, Vol. 12, ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting,
Karl Brehmer, and Hoo Nam Seelmann (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1996).
VPW2 Vorlesungsmanuskripte II (1816–31), ed. Walter Jaeschke, in Gesammelte
Werke, Vol. 18 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1995).
VRP Vorlesungen über Rechtsphilosophie 1818–1831, ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting, 4 vols.
(Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1973–4). Cited by volume and page
number.

Writings of Marx
EW Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and Gregor Benton (London:
Penguin, 1992).
Cap. 1 Capital: Volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes (London: Penguin, 1990).
Cap. 3 Capital: Volume III, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1991).
G Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolaus (London: Penguin, 1993).
GI The German Ideology, ed. C. J. Arthur, 2 edn (London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1974).
xii 

HF The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism. Against Bruno Bauer and
Company, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 4
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975).
LA ‘Marx to Pavel Vasilyevich Annenkov. 28 December 1846’, in Karl Marx and
Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 38 (London: Lawrence & Wishart,
1982).
LPW Later Political Writings, ed. and trans. Terrell Carver (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996).
MEGA Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim
Zentralkomitee der Kommunistichen Partei der Sowjetunion and Institut
für Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen
Einheitspartei Deutschlands/Internationale Marx-Engels-Stiftung
Amsterdam (Berlin: Dietz Verlag/De Gruyter, 1975–). Cited by section
(Roman numeral), volume (Arabic numeral), and page number.
MEW Marx-Engels-Werke, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim
Zentralkomitee der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag, 1956–90). Cited by volume and page number.
MP Misère de la philosophie: réponse à la Philosophie de la misère de
M. Proudhon (Paris: A. Frank, 1847).
QFT ‘Speech on the Question of Free Trade’, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,
Collected Works, Vol. 6 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976).
PP The Poverty of Philosophy. Answer to the Philosophy of Poverty by
M. Proudhon, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 6
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1976).
 Introduction

What you will have I’ll give, and willing too;

For do we must what force will have us do.
Shakespeare, Richard II, 3.3.204–05

1. The Concept of Practical Necessity and

the Question of Freedom

The idea that freedom consists in the absence of constraints and the question of
what counts as a constraint on freedom are central themes in social and political
philosophy. There is, for example, the debate between liberals and neo-
republicans. Neo-republicans accuse liberals of focusing on actual unjustifiable
interference in the lives of others. This liberal freedom is purely ‘negative’ in that it
consists only in the absence of such interference. Protecting this freedom will
require the removal and prevention of constraints of the relevant type, leaving
individuals free to do what they desire to do, even though they may lack the ability
or power to do it.¹ Neo-republicans, in contrast, claim that the mere threat of
arbitrary interference by an agent with the power to interfere in the lives of others
counts as a constraint on freedom, so that it is not only a matter of the removal or
prevention of actual unjustifiable interference in the lives of others.² The freedom
in question is nevertheless also an essentially negative one, though this time there
is the absence of potential as well as actual unjustifiable interference. Moreover,
both the negative liberal idea of freedom and the neo-republican idea of freedom
as non-domination assume that there is a clearly identifiable agent that is the
source of any unjustifiable actual or potential interference in the life of another
agent. Thus only the nature of that which must be absent if an agent is to be
classed as free distinguishes the neo-republican idea of freedom from the liberal
one, in that neo-republicans extend the constraints on freedom to include poten-
tial unjustifiable interference in the lives of others, whereas classical liberalism
restricts them to cases of actual unjustifiable interference in addition to legal

¹ This understanding of freedom is defended in Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty, in which
negative freedom is said to represent the only genuine idea of freedom, and we are therefore warned not
to confuse freedom with the lack of opportunity to do something because of economic or social causes.
² See Pettit, Republicanism and Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, 82ff.

Practical Necessity, Freedom, and History: From Hobbes to Marx. David James, Oxford University Press (2021).
© David James. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198847885.003.0001
2  , ,  

constraints that are necessary to secure personal freedom and social order. In this
book, I extend the notion of constraint by focusing on practical constraints other
than ones generated by actual physical or legal constraints or the threat of
arbitrary interference in the lives of others whose source is, in each case, a clearly
identifiable agent.
On the one hand, this extension of the notion of constraint will show that, if a
condition of genuine social and political freedom is to be established, the concept
of freedom itself must be extended beyond a purely negative one, whether it
concerns only the absence of actual unjustifiable interference or possible unjus-
tifiable interference as well, to include the idea of self-determination. This is
because the exercise of the capacity for self-determination by individuals and
collective social and political agents is required to gain control over social and
historical conditions and forces that generate avoidable practical constraints on
human agency that do or may interfere in people’s lives. On the other hand,
although the extent or intensity of these constraints can be reduced through the
exercise of the capacity for self-determination, many of the constraints them-
selves cannot be entirely removed. This is because they are generated by basic
features of the human condition as we know and experience it. Subjection to
these constraints is therefore an inescapable element of human societies. These
features of the human condition include the facts that human beings have
material needs that they can typically satisfy only by cooperating with one
another, that the desire to gain and control access to goods and resources is an
actual or a potential source of social conflict, and that war is an actual or a
potential evil for humankind.
In addition to such features of the human condition, the sources of the type of
practical constraint that I have in mind include social and historical processes in
which agents are caught up. These processes are, or appear to be, beyond the
control of individual agents. Actual or potential interference in the lives of others
need not, therefore, be directly attributable to a clearly identifiable social or
political agent. At the same time, however, these social and historical processes
are shaped by the decisions and actions of individual and collective agents. Thus,
although the most obvious threat to human freedom is the type of constraint
associated with the use of force or the threat of its use, as captured by Rousseau’s
statement that ‘To yield to force is an act of necessity, not of will; at most it is an
act of prudence’ (OC 3 [SC]: 1.3.1), this statement can be extended to include less
obvious, but no less freedom-endangering, ways in which agents are made to act
contrary to how they might otherwise have acted. These ways include how an
agent might act from ‘prudence’, in the sense that he or she acts on the basis of an
immediate, overriding interest but not in the way that he or she would have
chosen to act if other meaningful, suitably attractive options had been, or had
appeared to be, available to him or her in the relevant situation. This brings me to
  3

the concept of practical necessity, which I shall first explain and then relate to the
concept of freedom.
The concept of practical necessity concerns the notion of being constrained to
do something because one has reasonable grounds to believe that there are no
other meaningful, suitably attractive options available to one as an agent in a
particular situation. At the same time, a fundamental, overriding human interest
motivates an agent to act in conformity with the relevant constraints. If, however,
the agent concerned had believed that another meaningful, suitably attractive
option was available to him or her, this agent would in all likelihood have acted
differently from how he or she did in fact act, whereas, as it stands, an agent is
constrained to do that which he or she would prefer not to do because he or she
finds it unattractive (e.g. contrary to his or her main goals in life, incompatible
with his or her highest values, degrading, humiliating), as opposed to something
that is merely less preferable to that which he or she really desires to do. The agent
nevertheless has a compelling reason for pursuing the relevant course of action
and accepting the constraints that it imposes on him or her. Reasons of the
relevant kind would include the desire to avoid harm and the desire to satisfy
one’s basic material needs. Indeed, the concept of practical necessity implies that
the end in question will be one that an agent cannot renounce except at great cost
to him- or herself. Although self-preservation and the desire to attain the means to
it are obvious sources of practical necessity in this regard, we shall see that it can
have sources other than strict natural necessity.
There might, however, have been other options available to the agent con-
cerned without him or her being aware of them. Given the possibility of
unrecognized options, there may not, in fact, be any absolute practical necessity.
The importance of an agent’s beliefs here becomes evident. Although an agent’s
beliefs concerning the options available to him or her may not be true ones, his
or her situation, together with the role played by other agents and powerful
social forces in creating it, may explain how he or she came to hold these beliefs,
which in this respect can be classed as justified, if not true, beliefs. Since the
concept of practical necessity that I have in mind concerns not only the absence
of other meaningful and more attractive options, but also potentially mistaken
beliefs about what options are in fact available to an agent in a particular
situation, determining the true extent of what is possible will be key to explaining
how human beings can liberate themselves from avoidable constraints, that is to
say, ones that are not imposed on them by fundamental, inescapable features of
the human condition. I shall now use an example drawn from a work of
literature in order to explain what I mean.
In Bertolt Brecht’s play Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder (Mother Courage and
Her Children), the eponymous heroine, a sutler during the Thirty Years War,
explains in the following way how she got her name:
4  , ,  

Courage heiß ich, weil ich den Ruin gefürchtet hab, Feldwebel, und bin durch das
Geschützfeuer von Riga gefahrn mit fünzig Brotlaib im Wagen. Sie waren schon
angeschimmelt, es war höchste Zeit, ich hab keine Wahl gehabt.³
I am called Courage because I feared being ruined, sergeant major, and drove
through the gunfire at Riga with fifty loaves of bread in the wagon. They were
already mouldy, it was about time, I had no choice.

Although there may appear to be something comical and irrational about Mutter
Courage’s decision to risk her life in order to sell mouldy loaves of bread, she is in
fact compelled by the situation in which she finds herself to undergo the dangers
to which she so clearly exposes herself, because her livelihood depends on selling
her wares at the same time as war rages around her. We can therefore say that
Mutter Courage is genuinely subject to practical necessity in the intended sense
because no other meaningful, suitably attractive options were available to her,
even if she was not literally forced to pursue the course of action from which her
name derives. We may therefore also say that Mutter Courage’s beliefs concerning
the practical necessity to which she was subject were true ones. Nevertheless, there
is a sense in which this practical necessity is not absolute that goes beyond how
Mutter Courage had a choice between suffering financial ruin together with its
consequences and risking being killed by gunfire in an attempt to reach a place
where she could sell her loaves. For the ultimate cause of the lack of other
meaningful, suitably attractive options is a state of war, which determines and
structures the choices available to the agents caught up in it. This is an example of
how practical necessity has its source in forces that remain external to the agents
who are subject to the constraints on their agency that such forces generate. If,
however, war is not considered to be an inescapable feature of the human
condition because one can conceive of ways in which human beings might prevent
it by means of collective action, then it would be possible to remove the practical
constraints to which someone like Mutter Courage is subject because of war.
The concept of practical necessity can then be thought to occupy a grey area
between the following two notions of practical necessity. On the one hand, there is
the notion of that which one ‘ought’ to do, in the sense that it is advisable for one
to do it, given an end or interest that one has. This notion of practical necessity
does not exclude the pursuit of other, potentially more costly, options. On the
other hand, there is the notion of something that one absolutely ‘must’ do because
no other options are available and the end or interest is one that no human being
could reasonably be expected to renounce.⁴ Since, as indicated above, the concept
of practical necessity that I have in mind is compatible with the concept of

³ Brecht, Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder, 9.

⁴ For a more on how an ‘ought’ or ‘must’ is relative to an agent’s reasons and motives, see Williams
‘Practical Necessity’.
  5

possibility, it cannot be completely reduced to a ‘must’ of this kind. Yet, given how
it is equally a matter of fundamental human ends and interests and an objective
lack of other meaningful options or the justified belief that there are no such
options, it would also be inappropriate to speak of a course of action that is merely
‘advisable’. Moreover, even if it is not a matter of strict natural necessity, these
ends and interests may be ones that agents living in a certain type of society during
a particular historical period cannot reasonably be expected to ignore or renounce,
so that, from the standpoint of these social and historical agents, the relevant
constraints will appear to be very real ones. In such cases, it would still make sense
to claim that an agent is forced, or believes him- or herself forced, to do something
at the same time as he or she is not literally forced to do it because at least one
other, less attractive or, as in the case of Mutter Courage, equally unattractive
option is in fact available to him or her. In the writings of Thomas Hobbes, Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, G. W. F. Hegel, and Karl Marx, we shall
encounter forms of practical necessity of the relevant kind that are bound up
with historical and social processes in which agents happen to be caught up. I shall
now summarize the key features of the concept of practical necessity by turning to
a much earlier text in which it explicitly plays a central role.
The text in question is The History of the Peloponnesian War, in which the
ancient Greek historian Thucydides employs the concept of necessity (anankē) to
explain the dispute between Athens and Sparta that resulted in these two states
and their respective allies going to war with each other. The proximate cause of
this dispute is the way in which the growth of Athens as an imperial power
‘brought fear to the Lacedaemonians and forced them to war [anankasai es to
polemein]’.⁵ In relation to the concept of practical necessity, this statement is
relevant for a number of reasons.
To begin with, it draws attention to the subjective aspect of practical necessity,
which concerns how individuals or groups view a situation in which they find
themselves, and especially what they think this situation requires of them, given
their ends and interests. This subjective aspect also concerns emotional and psy-
chological responses to a situation, such as fear or confidence. The agents them-
selves believe that objective features of a situation present them with a limited range
of options and perhaps no genuine options at all. The extent of the practical
necessity experienced by an agent will therefore in part depend on his or her beliefs
concerning the options available to him or her in a particular situation.
An agent’s appraisal of the situation, together with the emotional or psycho-
logical responses that it produces in him or her, can be right or wrong in so far as
they do or do not correspond to objective features of the situation and the options
that are in fact available to him or her. Even when an agent is wrong about how

⁵ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, i. 23.

6  , ,  

limited or non-existent the options are, the false beliefs about them can never-
theless be explained in terms of objective features of the situation, such as
asymmetries in power, whether real or imagined, that enable one agent to
influence the beliefs of another agent, or the impossibility of gaining the know-
ledge required to arrive at a correct assessment of the situation. For example, each
member of the government of a nation may feel compelled to go to war with
another nation, resulting in a declaration of war, whereas the threat posed by this
rival nation has in fact been overestimated because of how it has been able to
create the illusion of growing military power and an increasing preparedness for
war. This means that there was, in effect, no genuine practical necessity to go to
war. The members of the government of the nation that declared war may
nevertheless have genuinely feared the perceived threat and there may have
been some prima facie reasons in favour of their assessment of the situation,
such as misleading reports provided by otherwise reliable sources. Agents can then
become subject to further constraints as a result of actions based on false but
partially justified beliefs about the situation confronting them. Thucydides states
in the following passage how war has consequences that generate constraints that
lead people to act differently from how they might otherwise have acted:

[I]n peace and prosperity both states and individuals have gentler feelings,
because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war,
which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster
and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition.⁶

Thucydides’ explanation of the causes of the outbreak of the war between Athens
and Sparta and their respective allies relates to another key feature of the concept
of practical necessity. This concerns the way in which practical necessity figures in
the reasons that agents can give others for their actions. This is of particular
significance in connection with Thucydides’ historical method, which partly
consists in presenting various speeches often with one speech followed by another
speech which seeks to convince others of the rightness of an opposing claim. The
appeals made to practical necessity in some of these speeches are instructive
because they alert us to the significance of a speaker’s intentions and the back-
ground against which certain claims are made. One example is the Athenians’
appeal to the necessity of establishing an empire and undertaking the harsh
measures associated with this task so as to preserve the political independence
and power of Athens.⁷ This example of what is alleged to be a matter of objective
practical necessity implies the concept of power and makes plain the relevance of
existing power relations, for Thucydides has an Athenian claim that ‘you know as

⁶ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, iii. 82.

⁷ See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, i. 75–76, vi. 18.
  7

well as we know that what is just is arrived at in human arguments only when the
necessity on both sides is equal, and that the powerful exact what they can, while
the weak yield what they must’.⁸ Thus it is assumed to be common knowledge that
human beings who lack sufficient power tend to become resigned in the face of
that which they believe themselves unable to resist or change, however unjust they
may consider it to be. From this it follows that getting others to believe in the
practical necessity of something in that any attempt on their part to resist it would
be futile represents a reliable means of making them do what you want them to do
or stopping them from doing what you do not want them to do.
The following key claims concerning the concept of practical necessity have
now been identified:

1. Practical necessity has both an objective aspect and a subjective aspect. The
objective aspect concerns objective features of a situation which, in con-
junction with an agent’s ends and interests, limit the options available to this
agent. The subjective aspect concerns both an agent’s beliefs about the
practical constraints generated by a situation in which he or she finds
him- or herself and the emotional and psychological responses that accom-
pany these beliefs.
2. An agent’s assessment of the practical constraints that a situation generates
can have emotional and psychological effects that result in actions that he or
she would not otherwise have chosen to perform and may serve to prevent
effective action altogether.
3. An agent can be right or wrong with regard to the objective aspect of
practical necessity. The subjective aspect may therefore involve false beliefs
whose emotional and psychological effects constrain this agent. Despite the
ultimate falsity of these beliefs, the existence of them may be explained in
terms of certain objective features of the situation, such as asymmetrical
power relations that exist within a society or between states. In this respect,
the beliefs are to some extent justified ones.
4. In a situation in which there are significant differences in power, yielding to
the demands of the stronger party may be a matter of practical necessity
because it is, or seems to be, the only real option available to the weaker
party. Thus the practical constraints to which an agent is subject will in
many cases depend on how much power, whether real or imagined, this
agent possesses relative to other agents.
5. It may well be in one agent’s interest to make another agent believe in the
practical necessity of doing or not doing something, even when it is not a
case of genuine practical necessity because other meaningful options do in

⁸ Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, v. 89.

Another random document with
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estado y causas en que la
pobreza se conserua y cria, y avn
augmenta como es en la vida que
por remedio escogeis. En verdad
que el que viuiendo en
seruidunbre le pareçe huyr la
pobreza no puedo sino afirmar
que grandemente a sí mesmo se
engaña, pues sienpre veo al tal
menesteroso y miserable y en
neçesidad de pedir, y que le den.
Miçilo.—Yo quiero, gallo,
responder por mí y por aquellos
que la neçesidad los trae a este
vibir, con los quales comunicando
muchas vezes con mucho gusto y
plazer me solian dezir los
fundamentos y razones con que
apoyauan y defendian su opinion,
que a muchos oy dezir que
seguian aquella vida del palaçio
porque a lo menos en ella no se
temia la pobreza, pues que
conforme a la costumbre de otros
muchos honbres trabajauan auer
su cotidiano mantenimiento de su
industria y natural soliçitud,
porque ya venidos a la vejez,
quando las fuerças faltan por
flaqueza o enfermedad, esperan
tener alli en qué se poder
mantener.
Gallo.—Pues veamos agora si
esos dizen la verdad. Mas antes
me pareçe que con mucho mayor
trabajo ganan esos tales el
mantenimiento que quantos en el
mundo son. Porque lo que alli se
gana hase de alcançar con
ruegos; lo qual es más caro que
todo el trabajo, sudor y preçio
conque en el mundo se pueda
comprar. Quanto más que avn
quieren los señores que se
trabaje y se sude el salario; y de
cada dia se les augmentan dos
mil negoçios y ocupaçiones[1112]
para el cunplimiento de las[1113]
quales no basta al honbre la
natural salud y buena dispusiçion
para los acabar[1114]; por lo qual
es neçesario venir a enfermedad
y flaqueza y cuando los
señores[1115] sienten a sus
criados que por su indispusiçion
no los pueden seruir y abastar a
sus negoçios los despiden de su
seruiçio, casa y familia[1116]. De
manera que claramente ves ser
engañados por esa razon, pues
les acarreó el palaçio más
miseria, enfermedad y trabajo,
lleuauan[1117] quando a él fueron.
Miçilo.—Pues dime agora tú
gallo; pues no te pareçe que los
miseros como yo sin culpa
podrian elegir y seguir aquella
vida por gozar (siquiera) de aquel
deleyte y contentamiento que da
vibir en aquellas anchas y
espaçiosas casas, habitaçion y
morada de los dioses y de sola
persona real? enhastiados y
mohinos destas nuestras
miserables y ahumadas choças
que más son pozilgas de puercos
que casas y habitaçion de
honbres; y ansi mouidos[1118]
someternos a su seruiçio, avnque
no se goze alli de más que de la
vista de aquellos marauillosos
tesoros que estan en aquellos
suntuosos aparadores de oro[1119]
y de plata, bagillas y tapetes y
otras admirables riquezas que
entretienen al honbre con sola la
vista en deleyte y contentamiento,
y avn comiendo y beuiendo en
ellos, casi en esperança de los
comer y tragar?
Gallo.—Esto es, Miçilo, lo
verdadero que primero se auia de
dezir, que es causa prinçipal que
mueue a los semejantes honbres
a trocar su libertad por
seruidumbre, que es la cobdiçia y
ambiçion de solo gustar y ver las
cosas profanas, demasiadas y
superfluas; y no el ir a vuscar
(como primero deçiades) lo
neçesario y conueniente a vuestra
miseria[1120], pues eso mejor se
halla[1121] en vuestras choças y
pobres[1122] casas aunque
vaçias[1123] de tesoro, pero ricas
por libertad, y esas esperanças
que dezis que prometen los
señores con la conuersaçion de
su generosidad, digo que son
esperanças vanas, y de
semejante condiçion que las
promesas con que el amante
mançebo entretiene a su amiga,
que nunca le falta vna esperança
que la dar de algun suçeso, o
herençia que le ha de venir,
porque la vanidad de su amor, no
piensa poderla conseruar sino
con la vana esperança de que
algun tienpo[1124] ha de tener
grandes tesoros que la dar, y ansi
ambos dos confiados de aquella
vanidad llegan a la vejez
mantenidos de solo el deleyte que
aquella vana esperança les dio,
abiertas las bocas hasta el morir,
y se tienen estos por muy
satisfechos porque gozaron de vn
contentamiento que les entretubo
el viuir, avnque con trabajo y
miseria. Desta manera se an los
que viben en el palaçio, y avn es
de mejor condiçion la esperança
destos miseros amantes que la de
que se sustentan los que viuen de
salario y merçed, porque aquellos
permaneçen en su señorio y
libertad, y estos no. Son como los
compañeros de Ulixes, que
transformados por Cyrçes en
puercos rebolcandose en el suçio
çieno estimauan en más gozar de
aquel presente deleyte y
miserable contentamiento que ser
bueltos a su humano natural.
Miçilo.—¿Y no te pareçe, gallo,
que es gran feliçidad y cosa de
gran[1125] estima y valor tener a la
contina comunicaçion y
familiaridad con ylustres,
generosos prinçipes y señores,
aunque del palaçio no se sacasse
otro bien ni otro prouecho, ni otro
interes?
Gallo.—Ha, ha, ha.
Miçilo.—¿Y de qué te ries, gallo?
Gallo.—Porque nunca oí cosa
más digna de reyr. Porque yo no
ternia por cosa más vana que
comunicar y asistir al Rey más
prinçipal que en el mundo ay, si
otro interes no se sacasse de alli:
¿pues no me sería igual trabajo
en la vida que auer de guardar
tanto tienpo aquel respeto, aquel
sosiego y asiento, miramiento y
seueridad que se deue tener ante
la presençia y acatamiento de la
gran magestad del Rey? Agora,
pues que emos tratado de las
causas que les traygan a estos a
vibir en tal estado de
seruidunbre [1126], vengamos
agora a tratar los trabajos,
afrentas y injurias que padeçen
para ser por los señores elegidos
en su seruiçio, y para ser
preferidos a otros que estan
oppuestos con el mesmo deseo al
mesmo salario; y tanbien veremos
lo que padeçen en el proçeso de
aquella miserable vida, y al[1127]
fin en que acaban[1128]. Quanto a
lo primero es neçesario que si has
de entrar a viuir con algun señor,
que vn dia y otro vayas y vengas
con gran continuaçion su casa, y
que nunca te apartes de sus
vmbrales y puerta, aunque te
tengan por enojoso y importuno, y
aunque con el rostro y con el
dedo te lo den a ententer, y
aunque te den con la puerta en
los ojos no te has de enojar, mas
antes has de disimular, y comprar
con dineros al portero la memoria
de tu[1129] nonbre, y que al llegar
a la puerta no le seas importuno.
Demas desto es nesçesario que
te vistas de nueuo con más
sumptuosidad y costa que lo
sufren tus fuerças conforme a la
magestad[1130] del señor que
pretendes[1131] seruir. Para lo
qual conuiene que, o vendas tu
hazienda[1132], o te empeñes para
delante pagar del salario[1133] si al
presente no tienes qué vender, y
con esto has de vestirte del color
y corte que sepas que más vsas o
le aplaze al señor[1134] porque en
cosa ninguna no discrepes ni
passes su voluntad, y tanbien has
de mirar que le acompañes con
gran cordura do quiera que fuere,
y que mires si has de yr adelante,
o detrás: en que lugar, o mano. Si
has de yr entre los prinçipales, o
con la trulla y comunidad de
familia por hazer pompa y aparato
de gente; y con todo esto has de
sufrir con paçiençia aunque
passen muchos dias sin que tu
amo te quiera mirar a la cara, ni
echarte de ver, y si alguna vez
fueres tan dichoso que te quisiere
mirar, si te llamare y te dixere
qualquiera cosa que él quisiere, o
se le viniere a la boca, entonçes
verás te cubrir de vn gran sudor, y
tomarte vna gran congoja, que se
te çiegan los ojos de vna súbita
turbaçion, prinçipalmente quando
ves los que estan al rededor que
se ryen viendo tu perplegidad y
que mudo no sabes qué dezir. En
tanta manera que a vna cosa que
acaso te pregunta respondes vn
gran disparate por verte cortado,
lleno de empacho[1135]. Y a este
embaraço de naturaleza llaman
los virtuosos que delante estan
verguença, y los desuergonçados
lo llaman temor[1136] y los
maliçiosos dizen que es neçedad
y poca esperençia; y tú,
miserable, quando has salido tan
mal desta primera conuersaçion
de tu señor quedas tan mohino y
acobardado que de descontento
te aborreçes, y despues de auerte
fatigado muchos dias y auer
passado muchas noches sin
sueño con cuydado de asentar y
salir con tu intinçion y quando ya
has padeçido mil tormentos y
aflicçiones, injurias y afrentas, y
no por alcançar vn reyno en
posesion, o vna çiudad, sino
solamente vn pobre salario de
çinco mil marauedis, ya que algun
buen hado te faboreçio, al cabo
de muchos dias vienen a
informarse de ti y de tu
habilidad[1137], y esta esperiençia
que de tu persona[1138] se haze
no pienses que le es poca
vfaneza y presunçion al[1139]
señor, porque le es gran gloria
quererse seruir[1140] de honbres
cuerdos y habiles[1141] para
qualquiera cosa que se les
encomiende; y avn te has de
aparejar que han de hazer
examen y informaçion de tu vida y
costunbres. ¡O desuenturado de
ti! que congojas te toman quando
piensas si por maliçia de vn ruyn
vezino que quiera informar de ti
vna ruyn cosa, o que quando
moço passó por ti alguna liuiana
flaqueza, y por no te ver
auentajado, por tener enuidia de
tus padres, o linaje informa mal
de ti, por lo qual estás en ventura,
de ser desechado y excluido; y
tanbien como acaso tengas algun
opositor que pretenda lo que tú y
te contradiga, es neçesario que
con toda su diligencia rodee todas
las cabas y muros por donde
pueda contraminar y abatir tu
fortaleza.
Este tal ha de examinarte la vida
y descubrirte lo que esté muy
oculto y enterrado por la
antigüedad del tienpo[1142] y
sabida alguna falta, o miseria, ha
de procurar con toda su industria
porque el Señor lo sepa. Que
tengo por mayor el daño que
resulta en tu persona saber el
señor tu falta verdadera, o
impuesta, que no el prouecho que
podra resultar de seruirse de ti
todos los dias de su vida.
Considera ¡o Miçilo! al pobre ya
viejo y barbado traerle en examen
su cordura, su linaje, costunbres y
ser; de lo que ha estudiado, qué
sabe, qué ha aprendido; y si
estaua en opinion de sabio hasta
agora, y con ello cunplia, agora
ha de mostrar lo que tiene
verdadero. Agora, pues,
pongamos que todo te suçeda
bien y conforme a tu voluntad.
Mostraste tu discreçion y
habilidad[1143] y tus amigos,
vezinos y parientes todos te
faboreçieron y informaron de ti
bien. El señor te reçibio; la muger
te açepto; y al mayordomo
despensero y ofiçiales y a toda la
casa plugo con tu venida. En fin
vençiste. ¡O bienauenturado
vençedor[1144] de vna gran
vitoria!; mereçes ser coronado
como a trihunfador de vna antigua
Olinpia[1145], o que por ti se ganó
el reyno de Napoles o pusiste
sobre el muro la vandera en la
Goleta. Razon es que reçibas el
premio y corona igual á tus
méritos, trabajos y fatigas. Que de
aqui adelante vibas descansado,
comas y bebas sin trabajo de la
abundançia del señor, y como
suelen dezir, de oy más duermas
a pierna tendida. Mas ante todo
esto es al reues. Porque de oy
más no has de sosegar a comer
ni a beber. No te ha de vagar,
dormir ni pensar vn momento con
oçio en tus proprias miserias[1146]
y neçesidades; porque sienpre
has de asistir a tu señor, a tu
señora, hijos y familia. Sienpre
despierto, sienpre con cuydado,
sienpre soliçito de agradar más a
tu señor, y quando todo esto
huuieres hecho con gran
cuydado, trabajo y soliçitud te
podrá dezir tu señor que heziste
lo que eras obligado, que para
esto te cogio por su salario y
merçed, porque si mal siruieras te
despidiera y no te pagara, porque
él no te cogio para holgar. En fin
mil cuydados, trabajos y
pasiones, desgraçias y mohinas
te suçederan de cada dia en esta
vida de palaçio; las quales no
solamente no podra sufrir vn libre
y generoso coraçon exerçitado en
vna[1147] virtuosa ocupaçion, o
estudio de buenas letras, pero
aun no es de sufrir de alguno que
por pereza, cobdiçia y ambiçion
desee comunicar aquellas
grandeças y sumptuosidades
agenas que de si no le dan algun
otro interes más que[1148] verlas
con admiraçion sin poderlas
poseer. Agora quiero que
consideres la manera que tienen
estos señores para señalar el
salario que te han de dar en cada
vn año por tu seruiçio. El procura
que sea a tienpo y a coyuntura y
con palabras y maneras que sean
tan poco que si puede casi le
siruas de valde, y pasa ansi que
ya despues de algunos dias que
te tiene asegurado y que a todos
tus parientes y amigos y a todo el
pueblo has dado a entender que
le sirues ya, quando ya siente que
te tiene metido en la red y
muestras estar contento y hufano
y que preçias de le seruir, vn dia
señalado, despues de comer
hazete llamar delante de[1149] su
muger y de algunos amigos
iguales a él en edad, auariçia y
condiçion, y estando sentado en
su[1150] silla como en teatro, o
tribunal, limpiandose con vna paja
los dientes hablando con gran
grauedad y seueridad te
comiença a dezir. Bien has
entendido, amigo mio, la buena
voluntad que emos tenido a tu
persona, pues teniendote respeto
te preferimos en nuestra
compañia y seruiçio a otros
muchos que se nos ofreçieron y
pudieramos reçebir. Desto, pues,
has visto por esperiençia la
verdad no es menester agora
referirlo aqui, y ansi por el
semejante tienes visto el
tratamiento, orden y ventajas que
en estos dias has tenido en
nuestra casa y familiaridad.
Agora, pues, resta que tengas
cuenta con nuestra llaneza, poco
fausto, que conforme a la pobreza
de nuestra renta viuimos
recogidos, humildes como
çiudadanos en ordinario comun.
De la mesma manera querria que
subjetasses el entendimiento a
viuir con la mesma humildad, y te
contentasses con aquello poco
que por ti podemos hazer del
salario comun[1151], teniendo
antes respeto al contentamiento
que tu persona terna de seruirme
a mí, por[1152] nuestra buena
condiçion, trato y familiaridad; y
tambien con las merçedes,
prouechos y fabores que andando
el tienpo te podemos hazer. Pero
razon es que se te señale alguna
cantidad de salario y merçed, y
quiero que sea lo que te pareçiere
a ti. Di lo que te pareçera, porque
por poco no te querria desgraçiar.
Esto todo que tu señor te ha dicho
te pareçe tan gran llaneza y fabor
que de valde estás por le seruir, y
ansi enmudeçes vista su
liberalidad; y porque no ve que no
quieres dezir tu pareçer soys
conçertados que lo mande vno de
aquellos que estan alli viejos,
auarientos, semejantes y criados
de la moçedad con él. Luego el
terçero te comiença a encareçer
la buena fortuna que has auido en
alcançar a seruir tan valeroso
señor. El qual por sus meritos y
generosidad todos quantos en la
çiudad ay le desean seruir y tú te
puedes tener por glorioso, pues
todos quedan enuidiosos[1153]
deseando tu mesmo bien;
avnque[1154] los fabores y
merçedes que te puede cada dia
hazer son bastantes para pagar
qualquiera seruiçio sin alguna
comparaçion, porque parezca que
so color y titulo del salario te
pueda[1155] mandar, reçibe agora
çinco mil maravedis en cada vn
año con tu raçion; y no hagas
caudal desto que en señal de
açeptarte por criado te lo da para
vnas calças y vn jubon, con
protestaçion que no parará aqui,
porque más te reçibe a titulo de
merçed, debajo del qual te espera
pagar; y tú confuso sin poder
hablar lo dexas ansi, arrepentido
mil vezes de auer venido a le
seruir, pues pensaste a trueque
de tu liberdad remediar con vn
razonable salario toda tu pobreza
y neçesidades con las quales te
quedas como hasta aqui, y avn te
ves en peligro que te salgan más.
Sy dizes que te den más, no te
aprouechará y dezirte han que
tienes ojo a solo el interes y que
no tienes confiança ni respeto al
señor; y avnque ves claro tu daño
no te atreues[1156] despedir,
porque todos diran que no tienes
sosiego ni eres para seruir vn
señor ni para le sufrir; y si dixeres
el poco salario que te daua,
injuriaste, porque diran que no
tenias meritos para más. Mira
batalla tan miserable y tan infeliz.
¿Que harás? Neçesitaste a mayor
neçesidad; pues por fuerça has
de seruir confiado solo de la vana
esperança de merçed, y la mayor
es la que piensa la que te haze en
se seruir de ti, porque todos estos
señores tienen por el prinçipal
articulo de su fe, que los hizo tan
valerosos su naturaleza, tan altos,
de tanta manifiçençia y
generosidad que el soberano
poder afirman tenersele[1157]
vsurpado. Es tanta su presunçion
que les paraece que para solos
ellos y para sus hijos y
desçendientes es poco lo que en
el mundo ay, y que todos los otros
honbres que en el mundo viben
son estiercol, y que les basta solo
pan que tengan qué comer, y el
sol que los quiera alunbrar, y la
tierra que los quiera tener sobre
sí; y teniendo ellos diez y
veynte[1158] cuentos de renta y
más, no les pareçe vn marauedi:
y si hablan de vn clerigo que tiene
vn beneffiçio que le renta çien
ducados, o mil, santiguanse con
admiraçion: y preguntan a quien
se lo dize si aquel beneffiçio tiene
pie de altar; qué puede valer; y
muy de veras tienen por opinion
que para ellos solos hizo
naturaleza el feysan, el francolin,
el abutarda, gallina y perdiz y
todas las otras aues preçiadas, y
tienen muy por çierto que todo
hombre es indigno de lo comer.
Es, en conclusion, tanta su[1159]
soberuia y ambiçion destos que
tienen por muy aueriguado que
todo honbre les deue a ellos
salario por quererse dellos seruir;
ya que has visto como eligen los
hombres a su proposito, oye
agora cómo se han contigo en el
discurso de tu seruiçio. Todas sus
promesas verás al reues, porque
luego se van hartando y
enhadando de ti, y te van
mostrando con su desgraçia y
desabrimiento que no te quieren
ver, y procuran dartelo a entender
en el mirar y hablar y en todo el
tratamiento de tu persona. Dizen
que veniste tarde al palaçio y que
no sabes seruir y que no ay otro
hombre del palaçio sino el que
vino a él de su niñez. Si tiene la
mujer o hija moça y hermosa, y tú
eres moço y gentil hombre tiene
de ti zelos, y vibe sobre auiso
recatandose de ti: mirate a las
manos, a los ojos, a los pies.
Mandan al mayordomo que te
diga vn dia que no entres en la
sala y comunicaçion del señor, y
otro dia te dize que ya no comas
en la mesa de arriba, que te bajes
abajo al tinelo a comer, y si
porfias por no te injuriar mandan
al paje que no te dé silla en que te
asientes, y tu tragas destas
injurias dos mil por no dar al vulgo
mala opinion de ti. ¡Quanta
mohina y pesadumbre reçibes en
verte ansi tratar! y ves la nobleza
de tu libertad trocada por vn vil
salario y merçed. Verte llamar
cada hora criado y sieruo de tu
señor. ¿Qué sentira tu alma
quando te vieres tratar como a
más vil esclauo que dineros
costó? Que criado y sieruo te han
de llamar; y no te puedes
consolar con otra cosa sino con
que no naçiste esclauo, y que
cada dia te puedes libertar si
quisieres, sino que no lo osas
hazer porque ya elegiste por vida
el seruir, y quando ya el mundo y
tu mal hado te ven ya desabrido y
medio desesperado, o por
manera de piedad, o por te
entretener y prendarte para mayor
dolor, date vn çevo muy delicado,
vna dieta cordial como a honbre
que está para morir, y suçede que
se van los señores vn dia a holgar
a vna huerta, o romeria, mandan
aparejar la litera en que vaya la
señora y auisan a toda la gente
que esté a punto, que han todos
de caualgar; y quando está a
cauallo el señor y la señora está
en la litera, mandate la señora a
gran priesa llamar. ¿Que sentira
tu alma quando llega el paje con
aquel fabor? Estás en tu cauallo
enjaezado a toda gallardia y
cortesania, y luego partes con vna
braua furia por ver tu señora qué
te quiere mandar[1160]. Y ella
haziendose toda pedaços de
delicadeça y magestad te
comiença a dezir: Miçilo, ven acá;
mira que me hagas vna graçia, vn
soberano seruiçio y plazer. Haslo
de hazer con buena voluntad,
porque tengo entendido de tu
buena diligençia y buena
inclinaçion que a ti solo puedo
encomendar vna cosa tan amada
de mi[1161], y de ti solo se puede
fiar. Bien has visto quanto yo amo
a la mi armenica perrica graçiosa;
está la miserable preñada y muy
çercana al parto, por lo qual no
podre sufrir que ella se quede
acá. No la oso fiar[1162] destos
mal comedidos criados que avn
de mi persona no tienen cuydado,
quanto menos se presume que
ternan de la perrilla, avnque
saben que la amo como a mí.
Ruegote mucho que la traigas en
tus manos delante de ti con el
mayor sosiego que el cauallo
pudieres lleuar, porque la cuytada
no reçiba algun daño en su
preñez; y luego el buen Miçilo
reçibe la perrilla encomendada a
su cargo de lleuar, porque casi
lloraua su señora por se la
encomendar, que nunca a las
tales se les ofreçe fabor que suba
de aqui. ¡Qué cosa tan de reyr
será ver vn escudero gallardo,
graçioso, o a vn honbre honrrado
de barba larga y grauedad lleuar
por medio de la çiudad vna
perrica miserable delante de sí,
que le ha de mear y ensuçiar sin
echarlo él de ver! y con todo esto
quando se apean y la señora
demanda su armenica no le
faltará alguna liuiana desgraçia
que te poner por no te agradeçer
el trabajo y afrenta que por ella
pasaste. Dime agora, Miçilo,
¿quál hombre ay en el mundo por
desuenturado y miserable que
sea, que por ningun interes de
riqueza ni tesoro que se le
prometa, ni por gozar de grandes
deleytes que a su imaginaçion se
le antojen auer en la vida del
palaçio, trueque la libertad, bien
tan nunca bastantemente
estimado de los sabios, que dizen
que no ay tesoro con que se
pueda comparar; y viban en estos
trabajos, vanidades, vurlerias y
verdaderas niñerias del mundo en
seruidumbre y captiuerio
miserable? ¡Quál será, si de seso
totalmente no está pribado, y mira
sienpre con ojos de alinde las
cosas, con que todas se las
hazen muy mayores sin
comparaçion? ¿Quién es aquel
que teniendo algun offiçio, o arte
mecanica, avnque sea de vn
pobre çapatero como tú, que no
quiera más con su natural y
propria libertad con que naçio ser
señor y quitar y poner en su casa
conforme a su voluntad, dormir,
comer, trabajar y holgar quando
querra, antes que a voluntad
agena viuir y obedeçer?
Miçilo.—Por çierto, gallo,
conuençido me tienes a tu opinion
por la efficaçia de tu persuadir, y
ansi digo de hoy más que quiero
más vibir en mi pobreza con
libertad que en los trabajos y
miserias del ageno seruiçio viuir
por merçed. Pero pareçe que
aquellos solos seran de escusar,
a los quales la naturaleza puso ya
en edad razonable y no les dio
offiçio en que se ocupar para se
mantener. Estos tales no pareçe
que seran dignos de reprehension
si por no padeçer pobreza y
miseria quieren seruir.
Gallo.—Miçilo, engañaste;
porque esos muchos más son
dignos de reprehension, pues
naturaleza dio a los honbres
muchas artes y offiçios en que se
puedan ocupar, y a ninguno dexó
naturaleza sin habilidad para los
poder aprender; y por su oçio,
negligençia y viçio quedan torpes
y neçios y indignos de gozar del
tesoro inestimable de la libertad;
del qual creo que naturaleza en
pena de su negligençia los privó;
y ansi mereçen ser con vn garrote
vivamente castigados como
menospreçiadores del soberano
bien. Pues mira agora, Miçilo,
sobre todo, el fin que los tales
han. Que quando han consumido
y empleado en esta suez y vil
trato la flor de su edad, ya que
estan casi en la vejez, quando se
les ha de dar algun galardon,
quando pareçe que han de
descansar, que tienen ya los
miembros por el seruiçio contino
inhabiles para el trabajo; quando
tienen obligados a sus señores a
alguna merçed, no les falta vna