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Contemporary Scientific Realism
Contemporary Scientific
Realism
The Challenge from the History of Science
Edited by
T I M O T H Y D. LYO N S A N D P E T E R V IC K E R S
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190946814.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
Contents
PA RT I H I S T O R IC A L C A SE S F O R T H E D E BAT E
PA RT I I C O N T E M P O R A RY S C I E N T I F IC R E A L I SM
Index 375
1
History and the Contemporary Scientific
Realism Debate
Timothy D. Lyons1 and Peter Vickers2
1Department of Philosophy
Durham University
peter.vickers@durham.ac.uk
The scientific realism debate began to take shape in the 1970s, and, with the publica-
tion of two key early ’80s texts challenging realism, Bas van Fraassen’s The Scientific
Image (1980) and Larry Laudan’s “A Confutation of Convergent Realism” (1981),
the framework for that debate was in place. It has since been a defining debate of
philosophy of science. As originally conceived, the scientific realism debate is one
characterized by dichotomous opposition: “realists” think that many/most of our
current best scientific theories reveal the truth about reality, including unobservable
reality (at least to a good approximation); and they tend to justify this view by the
“no miracles argument,” or by an inference to the best explanation, from the success
of scientific theories. Further, many realists claim that scientific realism is an empir-
ically testable position. “Antirealists,” by contrast, think that such a view is lacking in
epistemic care. In addition to discussions of the underdetermination of theories by
data and, less commonly, competing explanations for success, many antirealists—in
the spirit of Thomas Kuhn, Mary Hesse, and Larry Laudan—caution that the his-
tory of science teaches us that empirically successful theories, even the very best
scientific theories, of one age often do not stand up to the test of time.
The debate has come a long way since the 1970s and the solidification of its frame-
work in the ’80s. The noted dichotomy of “realism”/“antirealism” is no longer a
given, and increasingly “middle ground” positions have been explored. Case studies
of relevant episodes in the history of science show us the specific ways in which a
realist view may be tempered, but without necessarily collapsing into a full-blown
antirealist view. A central part of this is that self-proclaimed “realists,” as well as
“antirealists” and “instrumentalists,” are exploring historical cases in order to learn
Timothy D. Lyons and Peter Vickers, History and the Contemporary Scientific Realism Debate In: Contemporary Scientific
Realism. Edited by: Timothy D. Lyons and Peter Vickers, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2021.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190946814.003.0001
2 Contemporary Scientific Realism
the relevant lessons concerning precisely what has, and what hasn’t, been retained
across theory change. In recent decades one of the most important developments
has been the “divide et impera move,” introduced by Philip Kitcher (1993) and
Stathis Psillos (1999)—possibly inspired by Worrall (1989)—and increasingly
embraced by numerous other realists. According to this “selective” strategy, any re-
alist inclinations are directed toward only those theoretical elements that are really
doing the inferential work to generate the relevant successes (where those successes
are typically explanations and predictions of phenomena). Such a move is well
motivated in light of the realist call to explain specific empirical successes: those the-
oretical constituents that play no role, for instance, in the reasoning that led to the
successes, likewise play no role in explaining those successes. Beyond that, however,
and crucially, the divide et impera move allows for what appears to be a testable re-
alist position consistent with quite dramatic theory-change: the working parts of a
rejected theory may be somehow retained within a successor theory, even if the two
theories differ very significantly in a great many respects. Even the working parts
may be retained in a new (possibly approximating) form, such that the retention
is not obvious upon an initial look at a theoretical system but instead takes consid-
erable work to identify. This brings us to a new realist position, consistent with the
thought that many of our current best theories may one day be replaced. Realism
and antirealism are no longer quite so far apart, and this is progress.
A major stimulus for, and result of, this progress has been a better under-
standing of the history of science. Each new case study brings something new to
the debate, new lessons concerning the ways in which false theoretical ideas have
sometimes led to success, or the ways in which old theoretical ideas “live on,” in
a different form, in a successor theory. At one time the debate focused almost
exclusively on three famous historical cases: the caloric theory of heat, the phlo-
giston theory of combustion, and the aether theory of light. An abundance of lit-
erature was generated, and with good reason: these are extremely rich historical
cases, and there is no simple story to tell of the successes these theories enjoyed,
and the reasons they managed to be successful despite being very significantly
misguided (in light of current theory). But the history of science is a big place,
and it was never plausible that all the important lessons for the debate could be
drawn from just three cases. This is especially obvious when one factors in a “par-
ticularist” turn in philosophy of science where focus is directed toward partic-
ular theoretical systems. These days, many philosophers are reluctant to embrace
grand generalizations about “science” once sought by philosophers, taking those
generalizations to be a dream too far. Science works in many different ways, in
different fields and in different contexts. It follows that the realism debate ought
to be informed by a rich diversity of historical cases.
It is with this in mind that the present volume is put forward. In recent years
a flood of new case studies has entered the debate, and is just now being worked
History and the Contemporary Scientific Realism Debate 3
through. At the same time it is recognized that there are still many more cases
out there, waiting to be analyzed in a particular way sensitive to the concerns
of the realism debate. The present volume advertises this fact, introducing as it
does several new cases as bearing on the debate, or taking forward the discus-
sion of historical cases that have only very recently been introduced. At the same
time, the debate is hardly static, and as philosophical positions shift this affects
the very kind of historical cases that are likely to be relevant. Thus the work of
introducing and analyzing historical cases must proceed hand in hand with phil-
osophical analysis of the different positions and arguments in play. It is with this
in mind that we divide the present volume into two parts, covering “Historical
Cases for the Debate” and “Contemporary Scientific Realism,” each comprising
of seven chapters.
Many of the new historical cases are first and foremost challenges to the re-
alist position, in that they tell scientific stories that are apparently in tension with
even contemporary, nuanced realist claims. The volume kicks off in Chapter 2
with just such a case, courtesy of Dana Tulodziecki. For Tulodziecki, the miasma
theory of disease delivered very significant explanatory and predictive successes,
while being radically false by present lights. Further, even the parts of the theory
doing the work to bring about the successes were not at all retained in any suc-
cessor theory. Thus, Tulodziecki contends, the realist must accept that in this case
false theoretical ideas were instrumental in delivering successful explanations
and predictions of phenomena.
This theme continues in Chapter 3, with Jonathon Hricko’s study of the dis-
covery of boron. This time the theory in question is Lavoisier’s oxygen theory
of acidity. Hricko argues that the theory is not even approximately true, and yet
nevertheless enjoyed novel predictive success of the kind that has the power to
persuade. Just as Tulodziecki, Hricko argues that the realist’s divide et impera
strategy can’t help—the constituents of the theory doing the work to generate the
prediction cannot be interpreted as approximately true, by present lights.
We meet with a different story in Chapter 4, however. Keith Hutchison provides
a new case from the history of thermodynamics, concerning the successful pre-
diction that pressure lowers the freezing point of water. Hutchison argues that al-
though, at first, it seems that false theoretical ideas were instrumental in bringing
about a novel predictive success, there is no “miracle” here. It is argued that the
older Carnot theory and the newer Clausius theory are related in intricate ways,
such that in some respects they differ greatly, while in “certain restricted situations”
their differences are largely insignificant. Thus the realist may find this case useful
in her bid to show how careful we need to be when we draw antirealist morals from
the fact that a significantly false theory enjoyed novel predictive success.
Chapter 5 takes a slightly different approach, moving away from the narrow
case study. Stathis Psillos surveys a broad sweep of history ranging from
4 Contemporary Scientific Realism
Descartes through Newton and Einstein. We have here a “double case study,”
considering the Descartes–Newton relationship and the Newton–Einstein rela-
tionship. Psillos argues against those who see here examples of dramatic theory-
change, instead favoring a limited retentionism consistent with a modest realist
position. Crucially, Psillos argues, there are significant differences between the
Descartes–Newton relationship and the Newton–Einstein relationship, in line
with the restricted and contextual retention of theory predicted by a nuanced,
and epistemically modest, contemporary realist position.
Chapter 6—courtesy of Eric Scerri—introduces another new historical case,
that once again challenges the realist. This time the theory is John Nicholson’s
atomic theory of the early 20th century, which, Scerri argues, “was spectacu-
larly successful in accommodating as well as predicting some spectral lines in
the solar corona and in the nebula in Orion’s Belt.” The theory, however, is very
significantly false; as Scerri puts it, “almost everything that Nicholson proposed
was overturned.” Hence, this case is another useful lesson in the fact that quite
radically false scientific theories can achieve novel predictive success, and any
contemporary realist position needs to be sensitive to that.
Chapter 7 turns to theories of molecular structure at the turn of the 20th
century. Amanda Nichols and Myron Penner show how the “old” Blomstrand-
Jørgensen chain theory was able to correctly predict the number of ions that will
be dissociated when a molecule undergoes a precipitation reaction. While prima
facie a challenge to scientific realism, it is argued that this is a case where the di-
vide et impera strategy succeeds: the success-generating parts of the older theory
are retained within the successor, Werner’s coordination theory.
The final contribution to the “History” part of the volume—Chapter 8—
concerns molecular spectroscopy, focusing on developments in scientific
“knowledge” and understanding throughout the 20th century and right up to
the present day. Teru Miyake and George E. Smith take a different approach from
the kind of historical case study most commonly found in the realism debate.
Siding with van Fraassen on the view that Perrin’s determination of Avogadro’s
number, so commonly emphasized by realists, does not prove fruitful for re-
alism, and focusing on diatomic molecules, they emphasize instead the extraor-
dinary amount of evidence that has accumulated after Perrin and over the past
ninety years for various theoretical claims concerning such molecules. Taking
van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism as a foil, they indicate that, in this case,
so-called realists and antirealists may really differ very little when it comes to this
area of “scientific knowledge.”
The second part of the volume turns to more general issues and philosoph-
ical questions concerning the contemporary scientific realist positions. This
part kicks off in Chapter 9 with Mario Alai’s analysis of the divide et impera
realist strategy: he argues that certain historical cases no longer constitute
History and the Contemporary Scientific Realism Debate 5
The editors of this volume owe a great debt to the participants of all of these
events, with special thanks in particular to those who walked this path with us
a little further to produce the fourteen excellent chapters here presented. We are
also grateful to the unsung heroes, the many anonymous reviewers, who not
only helped us to select just which among the numerous papers submitted would
History and the Contemporary Scientific Realism Debate 7
be included in the volume but also provided thorough feedback to the authors,
helping to make each of the chapters that did make the cut even stronger. The
volume has been a labor of love; we hope that comes across to the reader.
References
Kitcher, P. (1993). The Advancement of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Laudan, L. (1981). “A Confutation of Convergent Realism.” Philosophy of Science
48: 19–49.
Psillos, S. (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth, London: Routledge.
Van Fraassen, B. (1980). The Scientific Image, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Worrall, J. (1989). “Structural Realism: The Best of Both Worlds?” Dialectica 43: 99–124.
PART I
HISTOR IC A L CASE S
F OR T HE DE BAT E
2
Theoretical Continuity, Approximate
Truth, and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction:
Revisiting the Miasma Theory
Dana Tulodziecki
Department of Philosophy
Purdue University
dtulodzi@purdue.edu
2.1 Introduction
The pessimistic meta-induction (PMI) targets the realist’s claim that a theory’s
(approximate) truth is the best explanation for its success. It attempts to do so
by undercutting the alleged connection between truth and success by arguing
that highly successful, yet wildly false theories are typical of the history of sci-
ence. There have been a number of prominent realist responses to the PMI, most
notably those of Worrall (1989), Kitcher (1993), and Psillos (1999). All of these
responses try to rehabilitate the connection between a theory’s (approximate)
truth and its success by attempting to show that there is some kind of continuity
between earlier and later theories, structural in the case of Worrall and theo-
retical/referential in the cases of Kitcher and Psillos, with other responses being
variations on one of these three basic themes.1
In this paper, I argue that the extant realist responses to the PMI are in-
adequate, since there are cases of theories that were both false and highly
successful (even by the realist’s own, more stringent criteria for success)
but that, nevertheless, do not exhibit any of the continuities that have been
1 It is worth pointing out that this is the case even for the (very) different structural realisms
that abound. In particular, even ontic structural realism, which differs substantially from
Worrall’s epistemic version, shares with Worrall’s approach an emphasis on mathematical con-
tinuities among successor theories (see, for example, Ladyman (1998) and French and Ladyman
(2011)).
Dana Tulodziecki, Theoretical Continuity, Approximate Truth, and the Pessimistic Meta- Induction: Revisiting the
Miasma Theory In: Contemporary Scientific Realism. Edited by: Timothy D. Lyons and Peter Vickers, Oxford University
Press. © Oxford University Press 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190946814.003.0002
12 Historical Cases for the Debate
The PMI received its most sophisticated and explicit formulation in Laudan
(1981, 1984). The argument’s main target is the Explanationist Defense of
Realism, according to which the best explanation for the success of science is
the (approximate) truth of our scientific theories (see, for example, Boyd (1981,
1984, 1990)). Anti-realists employ the PMI to undercut this alleged connection
between truth and success by pointing to the (in their view) large number of
scientific theories that were discarded as false, yet regarded as highly successful.
Laudan, for example, provides a list of such theories that includes, among others,
the phlogiston theory of chemistry, the caloric theory of heat, and the theory
of circular inertia (1984: 121). However, since “our own scientific theories are
held to be as much subject to radical conceptual change as past theories” (Hesse
1976: 264), it follows, the anti-realist argues, that the success of our current the-
ories cannot legitimize belief in unobservable entities and mechanisms: just as
Revisiting the Miasma Theory 13
past theories ended up wrong about their postulates, we might well be wrong
about ours.2
Realist responses to the PMI typically come in several stages: first, realists try to
winnow down Laudan’s list by including only those theories that are genuinely suc-
cessful (Psillos 1999: chapter 5). While, according to Laudan, a theory is successful
“as long as it has worked reasonably well, that is, so long as it has functioned in a va-
riety of explanatory contexts, has led to several confirmed predictions, and has been
of broad explanatory scope” (1984: 110), Psillos argues that “the notion of empirical
success should be more rigorous than simply getting the facts right, or telling a story
that fits the facts. For any theory (and for that matter, any wild speculation) can be
made to fit the facts—and hence to be successful—by simply “writing” the right kind
of empirical consequences into it. The notion of empirical success that realists are
happy with is such that it includes the generation of novel predictions which are in
principle testable” (1999: 100). The specific type of novel prediction that Psillos has in
mind is so-called use-novel prediction: “the prediction P of a known fact is use-novel
relative to a theory T, if no information about this phenomenon was used in the con-
struction of the theory which predicted it” (101). Once success is understood in these
more stringent terms, Psillos claims, Laudan’s list is significantly reduced.
With the list so shortened, the next step of the realist maneuver is to argue that
those theories that remain on Laudan’s list ought to be regarded as (approximately)
true, since they don’t, in fact, involve the radical discontinuity with later theories
that Laudan suggests. Rather than being discarded wholesale during theory-change,
it is argued that important elements of discarded theories get retained: according to
Worrall (1989, 1994), theories’ mathematical structures are preserved, according to
Kitcher (1993) and Psillos (1996, 1999), those parts of past theories that were re-
sponsible for their success are. Because these components are preserved in later the-
ories, the argument goes, we ought to regard as approximately true those parts of
our current theories that are essentially involved in generating their successes, since
those are the parts that will carry over to future theories, just as essential elements
from earlier theories were carried over to our own. As I will show in section 2.4,
however, none of these strategies will work for the miasma theory: despite the fact
that the miasma theory made a number of use-novel predictions, and so counts as
genuinely successful by realist standards, none of the elements or structures that
were involved in those successes were retained by its successor.3
2 Laudan’s argument is usually construed as a reductio (see Psillos (1996, 1999)). For some recent
discussions about how to properly interpret the argument, see Lange (2002), Lewis (2001), and Saatsi
(2005).
3 The miasma case is especially significant in view of the markedly different analysis that Saatsi
and Vickers (2011) provide of Kirchhoff ’s theory of diffraction. Saatsi and Vickers diagnose a specific
kind of underdetermination at work in the Kirchhoff case and argue that “it should not be implausible
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