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OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi

Respect
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi

Respect
Philosophical Essays
Edited by
R IC HA R D D E A N A N D O L I V E R SE N SE N

1
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi

1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© the several contributors 2021
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2021
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021933368
ISBN 978–0–19–882493–0
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198824930.001.0001
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi

For Dina Abou Salem and Serena Dean.

For Lily Sensen.

OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi

Contents

Acknowledgments ix
List of Contributors xi
Introduction xiii
Richard Dean and Oliver Sensen
1. Respect: A History 1
Remy Debes

I . O N W HAT R E SP E C T I S

2. A Conversive Theory of Respect 29

Philip Pettit
3. Respect for Persons and Public Justification 55
Gerald Gaus
4. The Phenomenology of Kantian Respect for Persons 77
Uriah Kriegel and Mark Timmons
5. How to Treat Someone with Respect 99
Oliver Sensen

I I . R E SP E C T I N M O R A L T H E O RY

6. Respect and the Dynamics of Finitude 121

Carla Bagnoli
7. The Peculiar Idea of Respect for a Capacity 140
Richard Dean
8. Beyond Respect and Beneficence: An Ideal of Appreciation 157
Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
9. Valuing Our Humanity 171
Christine M. Korsgaard
10. On a Kantian Form of Respect: “Before a Humble Common
Man . . . My Spirit Bows” 192
Stephen Darwall
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi

viii Contents

I I I . A P P L IC AT IO N S O F R E SP E C T

11. Self-­Respect, Arrogance, and Power: A Feminist Analysis 207

Robin S. Dillon
12. Self-­Respect under Conditions of Oppression 232
Serene J. Khader
13. A Lack of Respect in Bioethics 252
Samuel J. Kerstein
14. Treating Disabled Adults as Children: An Application
of Kant’s Conception of Respect 270
Adam Cureton
15. Species Egalitarianism and Respect for Nature: Of Mice
and Carrots 289
Lucia Schwarz

Index 303
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Dina Abou Salem for her assistance with many technical
details in the preparation of this book. Richard Dean would like to thank the
Office of the Provost and the Office of Research, Scholarship, and Creative
Activities at California State University Los Angeles for providing reduced teach-
ing hours, through a RSCA assigned time award, during part of the production of
this volume.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi

List of Contributors

Carla Bagnoli is Professor of Philosophy, University of Modena & Reggio Emilia.

Adam Cureton is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee

Knoxville.

Stephen Darwall is Andrew Downey Orrick Professor of Philosophy at Yale University.

Richard Dean is Professor of Philosophy at California State University, Los Angeles.

Remy Debes is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Memphis.

Robin S. Dillon is Professor Emerita at Lehigh University.

Gerald Gaus is the late James E. Rogers Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Arizona.

Thomas E. Hill, Jr. is Emeritus Kenan Professor of Philosophy at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Samuel J. Kerstein is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maryland.

Serene J. Khader is Jay Newman Chair in the Philosophy of Culture at Brooklyn College
and Professor of Philosophy and Women’s and Gender Studies at the CUNY
Graduate Center.

Christine M. Korsgaard is Arthur Kingsley Porter Research Professor of Philosophy at

Harvard University.

Uriah Kriegel is Professor of Philosophy at Rice University and Director of Research at the
Jean Nicod Institute.

Philip Pettit is Laurance S. Rockefeller University Professor of Human Values at Princeton

University and also Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy at the Australian
National University.

Lucia Schwarz is a PhD candidate at the University of Arizona.

Oliver Sensen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University.

Mark Timmons is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona.

OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 31/03/21, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 30/03/21, SPi

Introduction
Richard Dean and Oliver Sensen

Respect plays a prominent role in both everyday pre-­philosophical moral

thinking and in contemporary moral philosophy.
Ordinary moral discussion is often framed in terms of demands for respect or
complaints about being disrespected. A recognition of the status a person has due
to her personhood, accomplishments, or position, as well as concerns about peo-
ple being “used” or undervalued, all draw on a broader recognition of the impor-
tance of respect. Furthermore, arguments for expanding the sphere of moral
concern to include non-­human animals, nature, or artistic creations are often
presented in terms of respect.
Respect also is a fundamental concept in recent moral philosophy. It is a widely
held view that there is a characteristic typical of competent human adults, such as
autonomy, rationality, or the capacity for morality, that grounds a requirement to
respect them. This respect for persons is often thought to be the basis for a variety
of more particular duties, or even the basis of all duties. This is especially the case
in practical ethics, when, for instance, debates in bioethics appeal to a require-
ment of respect for the autonomy of patients. And respect is invoked as often in
philosophy as it is in everyday arguments, when it comes to expanding the scope
of morality beyond competent, adult human beings.
Yet basic questions about the concept and role of respect have received less
attention than might be expected, given the centrality of respect in moral
discourse.
The aim of this volume is to further the research on this crucial moral concept
of respect. The goal is not to offer a comprehensive, encyclopedic handbook that
covers all aspects of the topic, nor is the focus of the book mainly historical.
Rather, the aim is to give some leading experts in the field, as well as some
younger thinkers with fresh approaches, a chance to give their thoughts, and to
point the research on respect in new directions. There is no expectation that the
authors will all arrive at any consensus in the end, but the hope is that the arguments
offered for different views will spark further exploration of the topic of respect.
Of course, some influential ideas about respect loom large in many of the
essays (Stephen Darwall’s distinction between recognition respect and appraisal
respect is a conspicuous example), and Immanuel Kant undeniably casts a long
shadow over the volume. But it is worth saying explicitly that the essays do not all
presuppose a shared starting point about the importance of respect, or what
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 30/03/21, SPi

xiv Introduction

respect is, and still less do they assume the infallibility of the views on respect of
any particular philosopher, even Kant. The discussions of respect in this book
include many diverging ideas, and significant doses of various types of skepticism.
The volume will be divided into three parts, following an introductory histori-
cal essay. The three parts are not presumed to encompass all possible areas of
interest regarding respect, but just comprise a rough grouping of essays by theme.
Part I deals roughly with the question of what respect is, its nature and its basis.
Part II deals with questions about the proper role of respect in moral theory. Does
respect serve as a unique foundation for morality or is it one moral concern
among many? What exactly ought to be respected, and which different types of
respect are appropriate and morally significant? Part III deals with more practical
issues of applying requirements of respect.
The short descriptions below capture the main issues dealt with in each chap-
ter, but of course do not lay out the authors’ arguments in detail.
Chapter 1. Remy Debes provides a historical background for the prominent
role that respect plays in current moral discussion. But, true to the spirit of this
volume as philosophical rather than encyclopedic, Debes does not just describe
texts and list dates. Instead, he raises doubts about the standard story about the
rising influence of the idea of respect for persons, that it comes mainly and
directly from Immanuel Kant. Debes offers evidence that by the time Kant’s writ-
ings gained influence in the English-­speaking world, the movement toward the
importance of respect for all persons already was well underway, albeit often
using terminology other than “respect.” This movement grew partly among moral
and political philosophers, and political activists, but Debes emphasizes that it
also arose in underappreciated literary writing, often written by women and men
of color.

Part I. On What Respect Is

Chapter 2. Philip Pettit develops an account of the fundamental nature and basis
of respect. Pettit’s “conversive” theory of respect draws on the fact that our unique
command of language provides us with a “special means of mutual influence,”
making us accessible to each other’s understanding. Our conversive nature is nec-
essarily accompanied by some shared standards for what ought to count as rea-
sons for believing something, and for what one ought to desire or intend. To act
respectfully is to act from a robust commitment to treat you as a conversive part-
ner, to present you with reasons for forming beliefs and intentions, rather than
just trying to elicit these through any means that are causally effective.
Chapter 3. Gerald Gaus argues that respect for persons is not an independent
ground for requiring that social morality must be publicly justified. Instead,
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Introduction xv

respect is built into the structure of social morality, because social morality
involves recognizing one another as sources of a moral summons to follow rules.
So mutual respect for persons is a social achievement, not a requirement underly-
ing morality. The authority of rules of social morality derives from this structural
nature of social morality. But because one may face a gap between one’s individual
moral reasoning and social morality, no particular rule of social morality, includ-
ing rules about whether coercion is justified, necessarily overrides one’s own
moral conclusions.
Chapter 4. Uriah Kriegel and Mark Timmons apply to the feeling of respect an
approach that has become common in understanding other mental phenomena,
such as emotions. They distinguish the functional role of respect in moral philos-
ophy (for instance, the types of treatment that respect leads to), which is described
third-­personally, from the phenomenological account of what it feels like to expe-
rience respect, which is described first-­personally. Since discussions of respect in
analytic philosophy have focused almost entirely on its third-­person functional
role, shifting our attention to the phenomenological experience of respect may
provide valuable new insights.
Chapter 5. Oliver Sensen analyses what, more concretely, one must do to
respect someone. In order to find a universal criterion of respect, Sensen first dis-
tinguishes different usages of “respect,” such as “not using someone as a mere
means,” “gaining another’s consent.” Sensen argues that—while these usages are of
central importance in our everyday life—they are not the universal respect that
we always owe to all others. Rather, he argues, universal respect consists in not
exalting oneself above others, which itself consists in not breaking rules that we
regard as objectively necessary. The discovery of these necessary rules is largely
an empirical matter that involves universal human needs, cultural norms, and
giving others a voice in how they are treated. If one does not make an exception
to these rules, one’s behavior is respectful toward all others.

Part II. Respect in Moral Theory

Chapter 6. Carla Bagnoli argues that Kant’s conception of respect as a moral

feeling is crucial to any constructivist theory of practical reason because it
provides the only satisfactory account of how moral commands carry subjective
authority—how they motivate moral agents. Without positing a feeling of respect,
a constructivist theory can explain objective reasons for action, but not why they
are subjectively binding. In particular, a feeling of respect plays this role of
accounting for subjective authority better than the “reflective endorsement” of moral
ends or actions that has been proposed by prominent Kantian constructivists.
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xvi Introduction

Chapter 7. Richard Dean examines the popular strategy of developing a system

of moral duties based on respect for some capacity possessed by all persons. Dean
argues that not only is there a deep ambiguity in the concept of a “capacity,” as
either a mere potential or as a developed and stable ability or characteristic, but
that several prominent moral theories based on respect for a capacity trade prob-
lematically on this ambiguity. Dean suggests that the prevalence of this mistake is
evidence that such a strategy for developing moral theories is not viable.
Chapter 8. Thomas E. Hill, Jr. breaks with two conventional approaches in
moral philosophy. Hill eschews the recent tendency to focus either on duties or
on virtues, and instead emphasizes the importance of moral attitudes. And Hill
specifically steps outside the usual framework of Kantian ethics by developing
and defending the importance of a moral attitude besides respect and benefi-
cence, namely the attitude of appreciation. The attitude of appreciation is espe-
cially important in personal relationships, although it includes recognizing and
responding positively to the distinctive features possessed by many sorts of
things, not just persons.
Chapter 9. Christine Korsgaard reexamines her earlier positions on the value
of humanity, and the treatment and respect that befit an end in itself. She articu-
lates a version of these ideas in which one can see non-­human animals as ends in
themselves. Korsgaard first points out that we can value our own moral nature
without thinking that beings without such a nature are of lesser value, just as one
can value one’s identity as a parent without thinking less of non-­parents. She then
distinguishes different ways of understanding what is involved in valuing human-
ity or rational nature, and proposes that one aspect of valuing a being as an end in
itself is thinking that the being’s good matters and is worthy of consideration.
This sense of being an end in oneself can apply to non-­human animals, even if
they do not share the rationality of typical human beings.
Chapter 10. Stephen Darwall returns to a recurring theme in his work, address-
ing the problem of how respect for persons as such is compatible with special
respect for people with good moral character. Darwall draws on Kant’s texts,
especially the passage from The Critique of Practical Reason about a “humble
common man” of upright character, to develop a rich account of various types of
respect, supplementing his now-­familiar distinction between recognition and
appraisal respect with finer distinctions like “social respect” and “honor.”

Part III. Applications of Respect

Chapter 11. Robin Dillon reconsiders the question of whether arrogance is

compatible with self-­respect. Dillon’s previous position on the issue was that
arrogance involves a failure to recognize the true source of one’s own value, as a
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 30/03/21, SPi

Introduction xvii

rational being with the status to demand equal respect. So arrogance and self-­respect
are antithetical. In this chapter, Dillon revises her position, taking into account
differences in power in societies. For people who are oppressed, arrogance (claiming
more than society thinks is appropriate) may be compatible with, or even necessary
for, self-­respect. Neither people within a society, nor we as observers, can claim
an objective perspective in adjudicating the issue of whether these claims are
warranted, or excessive. Furthermore, it may be objectively true that, in some
circumstances, arrogance is a necessary tool for overcoming oppression.
Chapter 12. Serene Khader argues against the widespread view that oppressed
people have a self-­ regarding obligation to resist complying with oppressive
norms, in order to preserve their self-­respect. Khader notes that the cost of non-
compliance is often underestimated. Flouting oppressive norms often poses sub-
stantial threats to an agent’s welfare and even her self-­respect, and compliance
may express self-­respect, by affirming a commitment to the importance of her
own projects and to gaining the means to pursue them. Khader offers an alterna-
tive way of maintaining self-­respect in the face of oppression, namely to cultivate
knowledge of the oppressive situation faced by oneself and one’s group, and to
develop a normative perspective that recognizes and seeks to rectify injustices.
Chapter 13. Samuel Kerstein points out that although respect is a commonly
deployed concept in bioethics, requirements of respect usually amount to respect
for autonomy, or for giving proper weight to the choices made by competent per-
sons. Kerstein argues that increased emphasis on another sense of respect, respect
for the worth of persons, will greatly enrich discussions in several areas of bioeth-
ics, including physician-­assisted dying, distribution of medical resources, and
ethical considerations regarding procreation.
Chapter 14. Adam Cureton points out that the intuitively plausible claim that it
is disrespectful to treat mentally competent adults as if they were children gives
rise to a puzzle, within a Kantian framework. It seems possible to fulfill basic
Kantian duties of respect toward adults with disabilities, by respecting their basic
rights, for example, and recognizing their intrinsic worth, while still treating
them like children. So how is it disrespectful to offer unwanted paternalistic assis-
tance to a disabled person, or to speak to her condescendingly, if one is otherwise
treating her as an end in herself? Cureton points out that Kant not only describes
duties of respect toward rational beings in general, but also suggests that specific
forms of respectful treatment may be appropriate for particular people because of
their particular situation or station. Cureton proposes that treating disabled
adults like children typically involves miscategorizing their “station” of being
competent adult decision makers.
Chapter 15. Lucia Schwarz urges a reconsideration of the implications of species
egalitarianism, which is an essential element of the position in environmental
­ethics that Paul Taylor calls “respect for nature.” Species egalitarianism’s claim that
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 30/03/21, SPi

xviii Introduction

every living thing has equal inherent worth appears to lead to counterintuitive
conclusions, such as that killing a human being is no worse than killing a
­dandelion. Species egalitarians have generally responded by explaining that s­ pecies
egalitarianism is compatible with recognizing moral differences between killing
different types of living things, and that some killing is morally permissible.
Schwarz raises doubts about whether this deflationary defensive strategy is philo-
sophically justified, and suggests that taking seriously the supposedly repugnant
implications of species egalitarianism may have a salutary effect on the over-
all debate.
Taken together, we hope that this loose collection of innovative essays on
respect will encourage further research on this central topic in moral philosophy.
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 30/03/21, SPi

1
Respect
A History
Remy Debes

Respect is a knotty concept. Derived from the Latin respicere (“to look round or
back,” “to notice,” “to pay attention to”), its English-­language lifespan is marked
by scores of connotations, some of which cut in distinctly different directions.1
Even after we delimit our interest to the subject of this volume, respect for per-
sons, we must still work through the much-­ discussed distinction between
“appraisal” and “recognition” forms of respect (Darwall 1977). The first names a
positive evaluative attitude expressed towards a person for some character merit,
moral or non-­moral, such as her chess skills or industry or benevolence. In this
sense, respect is similar to admiration or esteem, and carries connotations of
honor and awe. It is something we feel towards another person. The second, by
contrast, names a way of thinking about others. It is a deliberative disposition to
give appropriate weight to some feature of a person in deciding how to act in
relation to her.2 By adapting our choices or plans in light of the given feature, we
show that we “recognize” the person in question. In this sense, respect connotes
“heed,” “consideration,” “concern,” or “deference.”
Making matters more complicated, notice that the possible features of a person
which might ground such recognition respect are diverse. It could be a person’s
feelings about a political issue, their social status, or their professional rank.
Indeed, any fact about a person that one might take as a reason for choosing one
plan or action over another is a candidate for showing recognition respect. For
example, you can show recognition respect to your taller opponent’s greater
reach, by deciding to position yourself an extra step away, or by swapping your
sword for a spear. Most relevant to the subject of this volume, however, is to con-
sider the way we call on one another to adapt our plans or choices in light of the
basic worth or dignity of human beings. When we do this—when we take a per-
son’s human dignity as the relevant feature for revising or foregoing our plans or
choices—we respect persons as persons. Or, as we sometimes say, “just because”
they are persons. Call this the moralized connotation of recognition respect.
This semantic tangle, however, isn’t the main challenge for investigating the
history of respect. For those interested in the moralized concept of respect, espe-
cially as it figures in the anglophone world, there is a much harder question.

Remy Debes, Respect: A History In: Respect: Philosophical Essays. Edited by: Richard Dean and Oliver Sensen,
Oxford University Press (2021). © Remy Debes. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198824930.003.0001
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She went away into the house, knowing bitterly that she left Miss Egan
and Higgins thinking of her with pity.
As she climbed the worn stair carpet to the north wing, she knew
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done, filled with trickiness and boredom and deceits, but pleasant, too, in
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THE END
Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island
June 4, 1925
St. Jean-de-Luz, B. P., France
July 21, 1926
Typographical errors corrected by
the etext transcriber:
lay figure=> clay figure {pg 6}
sarcely giving=> scarcely giving
{pg 205}
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