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Sextus Empiricus Against the Arithmeticians
Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Philosophia Antiqua
a series of studies on ancient philosophy
Editorial Board
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K.A. Algra (Utrecht)
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J.H. Waszink†
W.J. Verdenius†
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volume 167
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Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Sextus Empiricus
Against the Arithmeticians
Translated with an Introduction and Commentary
By
Lorenzo Corti
LEIDEN | BOSTON
Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Sextus, Empiricus, author. | Corti, Lorenzo, translator.

Title: Against the arithmeticians / Sextus Empiricus ; translated with an
introduction and commentary by Lorenzo Corti.
Other titles: Pros arithmetikous. English | Sextus Empiricus Against the
arithmeticians
Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2023] | Series: Philosophia antiqua,
0079-1687 ; volume 167 | A translation and commentary of Sextus’ part IV,
of Against the professors, known as Pros arithmetikous. | Includes
bibliographical references. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2023027011 (print) | LCCN 2023027012 (ebook) |
ISBN 9789004679498 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004679504 (e-book)
Subjects: LCSH: Skepticism—Early works to 1800. |
Arithmetic—Philosophy—Early works to 1800. | Mathematics, Greek—Early
works to 1800. | Sextus, Empiricus. | Skeptics (Greek philosophy)
Classification: LCC B621.P542 E5 2023 (print) | LCC B621.P542 (ebook) |
DDC 149/.73—dc23/eng/20231003
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023027011
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023027012
Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface.
issn 0079-1687
isbn 978-90-04-67949-8 (hardback)
isbn 978-90-04-67950-4 (e-book)
DOI 10.1163/9789004679504
Copyright 2024 by Lorenzo Corti. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
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Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Contents
Acknowledgements vii
Introduction 1
1 Sextus’ Life and Works 1
2 Against the Professors: a Glance at Sextus’ Targets, Method,
and Sources 6
3 Against the Arithmeticians: an Introductory Overview 14
4 Originality and Interest of the Present Work 17
Translation 24
Commentary
1 M IV 1: Quantities, Number, and Arithmetic 31

1 Textual Remarks 31
2 Sextus’ Distinction of Continuous and Discrete Quantities and Its
Aristotelian Origin 34
3 Arithmetic, Philosophy of Number, and Sextus’ Strategy in M IV 42
2 M IV 2–10: The Derivation System, the Old Academy, and Posidonius 53

2 Notes on the Translation 56
3 What Is the Ultimate Origin of the Dogmatic Doctrine Described
in M IV 2–10? 57
4 Sextus’ Accounts of the Pythagorean Doctrine at M IV 2–10
and at M IV 92–109, and Posidonius 67
3 M IV 11–20: Sextus’ Attack on the One 84

2 The Two ‘Platonic’ Characterisations of the One (M IV 11) 85
3 The Argument in Support of the Platonist Conception of the One
(M IV 11–13) 93
4 The First Cluster of Arguments against the Platonist Conception
of the One (M IV 14–18) 104
5 The Second Argument against the Platonist Conception of the One
(M IV 18–20) 114
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vi contents
4 M IV 21–2: Sextus’ Attack on the Two 132

2 Sextus’ Argument against the Number Two: M IV 21–2 in the Light
of M X 308–9 132
3 The Origin of the Puzzle: Plato, Phaedo 96e–97b, 101 b–c 135
4 Number and Generation: PH III 164–5 and M X 323, 328–30 140
5 M IV 23–30: Sextus’ Attack on Number Conceived of as the Result

of the Subtraction of a Unit 147
1 Introduction 147
2 M IX 311–20 and PH III 88–93 149
3 M IV 23–30 in the Light of the loci similes 153
4 M IV 24–5: Number, Whole, and Substance 159
6 M IV 31–4: Sextus’ Attack on Number Conceived of as the Result

of the Addition of a Unit 166
1 Introduction 166
2 M IV 31–2: Number, Units, and Conceptual Parts 166
3 M IV 33: Number, Addition, and Generation 177
Conclusion 190
Bibliography 207
Index of Citations 215
General Index 223
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Acknowledgements
This book is one of the outcomes of my research project on ‘Scepticism,

Metaphysics and Sciences in Greek Antiquity’. The investigations from which
the book stems have been carried out (along with other investigations) through
several stages at different institutions. The first was a post-doctoral stay at the
Faculty of Classics, University of Cambridge from 2007 to 2010 funded by the
Swiss National Science Foundation (PA0011-115325), during which my advi-
sor was David Sedley. This was followed by a research stay at the ENS Ulm
from 2011 to 2013 funded by the European Research Council (FP7-Marie Curie
IEF-275852), where my advisor was Marwan Rashed. The third stage was
accomplished in 2016, when I was invited by Katja Vogt to spend the Fall Term
as a visiting scholar at Columbia University in New York and had the oppor-
tunity to present the results of my research there (where my respondent was
Richard Bett), at the University of Princeton (where I was invited by Benjamin
Morison) and at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore (where I was invited
by Richard Bett). Finally, during my soutenance d’HDR at the University of
Lille in June 2019 I had the privilege of discussing a first draft of the whole
manuscript with the members of my committee Thomas Bénatouïl (garant
d’HDR), Jonathan Barnes, Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, Katerina Ierodiakonou,
Alain Lernould and Benjamin Morison. This and all the subsequent drafts
of the manuscript were prepared at the Archives Henri-Poincaré (UMR 7117)
in Nancy.
The present book could not have been written without the support of
these institutions and it has greatly benefitted from the generous remarks
of these scholars: I am immensely grateful to them all. I am also indebted to
Dominic O’Meara, who offered useful suggestions at the very first stage of the
project, to the organisers and to the audiences of other seminars and confer-
ences at which different parts of this book were presented and discussed, to
Myrto Hatzimichali, who read several portions of it, as well as to the anony-
mous referee at Brill, who provided very helpful and constructive comments
on points of detail. Chapters 1 and 4 include the results of two of my published
articles: ‘Scepticism, Number and Appearances: the ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη and
Sextus’ Targets in M I–VI’, Philosophie Antique 15 (2015), pp. 123–147; ‘Sextus,
the Number Two and the Phaedo’, in S. Delcomminette, Pieter d’Hoine and
Marc-Antoine Gavray (eds.), Ancient Readings of Plato’s Phaedo, Leiden, Brill,
2015, pp. 90–106: I am grateful to the editors and the publishers for permitting
me to reuse this material. Finally, my greatest thank you goes to Diana and
Alba. This book is for them, with love.
Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4
Introduction
1 Sextus’ Life and Works1
Ancient scepticism had two main varieties: the Pyrrhonian, inaugurated by

Pyrrho of Elis, and the Academic, associated with a particular historical phase
of Plato’s Academy. Pyrrhonian scepticism had a long history, in the course of
which it assumed significantly different forms. Its main representative for us
is Sextus Empiricus, a medical doctor and philosopher of the second century
AD, the only Pyrrhonian whose works have survived. At the beginning of his
manifesto of Pyrrhonism, the Outlines of Scepticism, Sextus distinguishes three
types of philosophers: the Dogmatists, the Academics, and the sceptics. The
Dogmatists are those who, as a result of their philosophical investigations,
believe that they have discovered the truth; the Academics are those whose
investigations have led them to deny the possibility of such a discovery; the
sceptics are those who continue their investigations, since they have not dis-
covered the truth. It is among the latter that Sextus counts himself (PH I 1–4).
According to Sextus’ account, the sceptics have a defining characteristic.
They possess the ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and
are thought of, so that, because of the equal strength of the opposing things,
the sceptics suspend judgement in these things and gain tranquillity (PH I 8).
Thus, Sextus presents the sceptic as an inquirer capable of suspending his
judgement on any issue of his inquiry. He asks: ‘Is it the case that p?’, where p is
a proposition concerning one of the non-evident objects the Dogmatists hold
tenets about – things like Providence or the atoms (‘Does Providence exist?’,
‘Is the world made of atoms and void?’). As a meticulous inquirer, he collects
whatever can be taken to speak for each of the two possible answers to his
question. And here ἐποχή supervenes; it appears to the sceptic that neither of
the claims is more persuasive than the other: he can judge neither that p nor
that not-p.
1 I employ the following standard abbreviations to refer to the works of Sextus: PH I, II and III
(Outlines of Scepticism, books I, II and III); M VII–VIII (Against the Logicians, books I and
II); M IX and X (Against the Physicists, books I and II); M XI (Against the Ethicists); M I–VI
(Against the Professors): M I (Against the Grammarians), M II (Against the Rhetoricians), M III
(Against the Geometers), M IV (Against the Arithmeticians), M V (Against the Astrologists),
M VI (Against the Musicians). For full titles of works of other authors see the Index Rerum.
© Lorenzo Corti, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004679504_002 Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

2 Introduction
Sextus’ time and place are difficult to determine;2 the main evidence for
them is the following. The latest personality surely mentioned in Sextus’ writ-
ings is the Emperor Tiberius (PH I 84), who died in 37 AD. Another passage
(PH I 222) probably refers to Menodotus, a doctor whose precise dates are
uncertain but who must have flourished in the first part of the second century
AD. The Christian writer Hippolytus copied, in his Refutation of All Heresies,
several passages from Sextus. The Refutation was written some time before
235 AD; therefore Sextus wrote before this date. In his Life of Timon (IX 116),
Diogenes Laertius gives a list of the Pyrrhonian persuasion. The list ends with
the names of Menodotus, Herodotus, Sextus, and Sextus’ student Saturninus.
An appealing textual conjecture by Nietzsche makes Saturninus a contempo-
rary of Diogenes; if so, although the dates of Diogenes are uncertain, we might
take his text to suggest the late second century as Sextus’ floruit.3
As for the scene of Sextus’ writings, a passage from the Outlines suggests
that Sextus was not writing in Alexandria (PH III 221); another passage per-
haps excludes Athens (PH II 98). But this evidence is not conclusive; and if
most scholars believe that Sextus probably taught in Rome (it appears that
his teacher Herodotus was at least for a while a celebrated physician in Rome:
Galen, On pulses, 3.751K), others see nothing to rule out Alexandria, Athens,
or Pergamum.
A little more can be said on Sextus’ profession: Sextus was a philosopher
and a doctor: for he refers to Asclepius, god of medicine, as ‘the originator of
our science’ (M I 260), and he wrote medical works (M VII 202). Furthermore,
Sextus’ name suggests that he belongs to the Empirical school of medicine –
something which is also asserted by Diogenes Laertius (IX 116) and
Pseudo-Galien (Introduction 14.683K). This last point is puzzling. For Sextus
himself raises the question whether medical Empiricism is the same as scepti-
cism; he insists that it is not; and he adds that the Methodical school would be
2 This biographical sketch follows the accounts by Barnes (in J. Annas and J. Barnes, Sextus
Empiricus. Outlines of Scepticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 20002, pp. xi–xiv)
and Blank (Sextus Empiricus. Against the Grammarians, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998,
pp. xiv–xvii): for an overview of the more recent contributions to the issue (none of which
is conclusive) see R. Bett, Sextus Empiricus. Against Those in the Disciplines, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 1–5, with references.
3 Based on a learned piece by Jouanna (‘Médicine et philosophie: sur la date de Sextus
Empiricus et celle de Diogène Laërce à la lumière du Corpus galénique’, Revue des Études
Grecques, 122.2 (2009), pp. 359–90), Bett takes the complete lack of reference to Sextus
in Galen (129–216 AD) to suggest a slightly later floruit, namely in the early third century
(Against Those in the Disciplines, cit., pp. 1–2). This is quite possible and, as Bett emphasises,
Jouanna surely makes a strong case for how unlikely it would be for Galen not to refer to
Sextus: however, his argument – as any argument from silence – cannot be conclusive.
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Introduction 3
the most appropriate home for a Pyrrhonist (PH I 236–41). A number of differ-
ent theories have been offered to account for this discrepancy;4 none of them
has gained general acceptance.
Sextus was a prolific author. His medical works are lost. Of his philo-
sophical works, three survive. One, the Outlines of Pyrrhonism (or Outlines
of Scepticism, as the modern translators Annas and Barnes have rechris-
tened it), offers an introductory account of scepticism, giving first a general
account of the nature of Pyrrhonism (PH I) and then a survey of the arguments
which the Pyrrhonians advanced against their adversaries, the non-sceptical
or Dogmatic philosophers. The destructive arguments are arranged in three
sections, corresponding to the three traditional parts of the Dogmatic philoso-
phy: logic (PH II), physics and ethics (PH III). A second work collects a larger
quantity of these destructive arguments, similarly organised in three sections
(M VII–XI). It has been persuasively argued that this second work originally
began with some books, now lost, which corresponded to the first book of the
Outlines.5 A third work, entitled Against the Professors, consists of six essays
directed against six Dogmatic arts: grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic,
astrology, and music (M I–VI).
The order of composition of the three works has been a topic of consider-
able debate. It was once commonly thought, for the most part on the basis of
Janáček’s stylistic investigations, that they were written in the order in which
I have presented them; that M VII–XI was a revised and expanded version of
PH II–III; and that M I–VI was Sextus’ latest work.6 More recently, it has been
4 Cf. D. Blank, Against the Grammarians, cit., p. xvi, n. 13; J. Barnes in J. Annas and J. Barnes,
Outlines of Scepticism, cit., p. xiii.
5 See K. Janáček, ‘Die Hauptschrift des Sextus Empiricus als Torso erhalten?’, Philologus 107,
1963, pp. 271–7 (repr. in id., Studien zu Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius und zur pyr-
rhonischen Skepsis, Berlin and New York, W. de Gruyter, 2008, pp. 124–31). DL IX 116 (and
a corresponding passage in the Suda) refers to Sextus’ ‘ten books of Sceptica’ (τὰ δέκα τῶν
Σκεπτικῶν): these ‘must have been M VII–XI with their beginning, which will therefore have
filled five books’ (J. Barnes, ‘Diogenes Laertius on Pyrrhonism’, in id, Mantissa. Essays in
Ancient Philosophy IV, ed. by M. Bonelli, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2015, pp. 510–83 (first pub-
lished in ANRW II 36.6, 1992, pp. 4241–301), p. 555, n. 187: cf. K. Janáček, τὰ δέκα τῶν Σκεπτικῶν,
in J. Irmscher, B. Doer, U. Peters, and R. Müller (eds.), Miscellanea Critica, Leipzig, Teubner,
1964, pp. 119–21 (repr. in id., Studien, cit., pp. 146–8); J. Blomqvist, ‘Die Skeptika des Sextus
Empiricus’, Grazer Beiträge 2, 1974, pp. 7–14; J. Mansfeld, ‘Number Nine (Diog. Laert. IX 87)’,
Revue de philosophie ancienne 5 (2), 1987, 235–48, p. 237, n. 8.
6 See especially K. Janáček, Prolegomena to Sextus Empiricus, Olomouc, University of Olomouc,
1948 and Sextus Empiricus’ Skeptical Methods, Prague, Universita Karlova, 1972. Janáček’s
arguments confirmed a view which was widely held before him: see e.g. V. Brochard, Les scep-
tiques grecs, Paris, Imprimerie National, 19232, pp. 318–19. More recently, Spinelli’s detailed
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4 Introduction
suggested that not only M I–VI, which probably refers to M VII–XI,7 post-dates
this work, but also the Outlines were written after M VII–XI – and that they
contain a more sophisticated exposition of Sextus’ philosophical notions.8
The scholar who has made the most elaborate case for this revised chronol-
ogy is Bett.9 An excellent status quaestionis has recently been made by Algra
and Ierodiakonou, who focus on the chronological relationship between
PH III and M IX–X in particular.10 As they indicate, the main arguments that
have been used to show that PH is later than M are: (i) the stylistic differences
between the two works as noted by Janáček, which are taken to show that the
two works belong to two different periods; (ii) the fact that M may be seen to
show traces of an earlier form of Pyrrhonism endorsed by Sextus which is not
to be found in PH; and (iii) the fact that the structure of PH is more polished
and accomplished than that of M. None of these arguments, though, is conclu-
sive. The stylistic differences between the two works, even if we take them to
show that they have been composed at two different times, do not tell us the
order in which they have been composed: Bett uses them to reverse Janáček’s
chronology.11 Doubts have been raised over the alleged textual evidence for the
presence in M of an earlier form of Pyrrhonism favoured by Sextus that would
work on M XI tends to support Janáček’s chronology (cf. Sesto Empirico. Contro gli Etici,
Naples, Biliopolis, 1995, at p. 19).
7 M I 35 and III 116 contain what appear to be back references to M IX–X. Furthermore, M
I 26 and 29, II 106 and VI 52 include back references to identifiable passages of M VII–XI
under what presumably was the title of the longer work these books were included in, i.e.
Sceptical Notes (σκεπτικὰ ὑπομνήματα): cf. n. 5 above.
8 For the beginnings of this dissenting opinion, see D. Glidden, ‘Skeptic Semiotics’, Phronesis
28, 1983, pp. 213–55, at p. 246, n. 24; J. Brunschwig, ‘Sextus Empiricus on the Kritêrion:
The Sceptic as a Conceptual Legatee’, in J. Brunschwig, Papers in Hellenistic Philosophy,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 224–43, at p. 228, n. 9 (first published
in J. Dillon and A.A. Long, The Question of Eclecticism, Berkeley, University of California
Press, 1988, pp. 145–75); F. Decleva Caizzi, ‘Sesto e gli scettici’, Elenchos 13, 1992, pp. 277–
327, at p. 284, n. 11.
9 See R. Bett, ‘Sextus’ Against the Ethicists: Scepticism, Relativism, or Both?’, Apeiron 27,
1994, pp. 151–89, at pp. 159–61 and the introductions to his translations of Sextus’ Against
the Ethicists (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997; see also ch. VII with Appendix A, Appendix
C), Against the Logicians (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005), Against the
Physicists (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012; cf. his ‘God: M IX 13–194’, in
K. Algra and K. Ierodiakonou (eds.), Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 33–73, at pp. 34–40), and Against Those in the
Disciplines, cit.
10 See K. Algra and K. Ierodiakonou, Introduction, in Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics,
cit., pp. 1–32, at pp. 3–7.
11 See R. Bett, Against Those in the Disciplines, cit., p. 5, n. 13, with references.
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Introduction 5
no longer be present in PH.12 As for (iii), the fact that PH III is better ordered
than the corresponding sections of M IX and X may be taken to show that the
former post-dates the latter only if we assume that PH III is a revised version of
M IX and X. But the assumption is questionable. For, as Algra and Ierodiakonou
emphasise in their Introduction (p. 7),
it is very conceivable that Sextus … had an even larger store of arguments

at his disposal than we find in M, and his selection from this collection
may just have been different for PH on the one hand and for M on the
other, in accordance with the different purposes of the two treatises …
We should envisage the possibility of explaining the differences between
the two treatises in terms of the different use of common sources, the
possible use of different sources and the difference in purpose and ‘type
of discourse’ between the two works.
12 According to Bett, M VII–XI shows traces of a form of Pyrrhonism that pre-dates Sextus
himself and is featured by the sceptic’s endorsing of negative arguments and their negative
conclusions. Bett finds evidence for this especially in M XI, where Sextus argues that noth-
ing is by nature good or bad (68–95) and says that tranquillity comes from the acceptance
of that conclusion (118, 130, 140). Sextus would thereby be offering a variant of scepticism
that amounts to accepting such conclusions – an early position from which he would have
switched later in his PH, adopting suspension of judgement. Having found other traces
of the endorsement of negative conclusions in Photius’ evidence for Aenesidemus and
in Diogenes’ account of Pyrrhonism in IX 61–108 (Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, ch. 4; cf. P. Woodruff, ‘Aporetic Pyrrhonism’, Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6, 1988, pp. 139–68), Bett comes to the conclusion that that
position was originally Aenesidemean. For sceptical assessments of the alleged distinct-
ness of M XI see M. Schofield, ‘Aenesidemus: Pyrrhonist and “Heraclitean”’, in A.M. Ioppolo
and D.N. Sedley (eds.), Pyrrhonists, Patricians and Platonizers: Hellenistic Philosophy in the
Period 155–86 BC, Naples, Bibliopolis, pp. 271–338; R.J. Hankinson, ‘Aenesidemus and the
Rebirth of Pyrrhonism’, in R. Bett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism,
cit., pp. 105–19; D. Machuca, ‘Moderate Ethical Realism in Sextus’ Against the Ethicists?’, in
id. (ed.), New Essays on Ancient Pyrrhonism, Leiden, Brill, 2011, pp. 43–18; and especially
B. Morison, ‘Scepticism in Against the Ethicists’, Sképsis XI (20), 2020, pp. 134–141; for inter-
pretations of Aenesidemus’ position that makes it much closer to the Pyrrhonism of PH
see the contributions by Schofield and Hankinson just mentioned; for some evidence of
disagreement on Bett’s interpretation of Diogenes’ account of Pyrrhonism cf. his ‘God:
M IX 13–194’, cit., p. 38, n. 11. The chronological aspect of Bett’s view is challenged by Algra
and Ierodiakonou, who, reflecting on Sextus’ physical loci, raise doubts on whether the
differences between M and PH can be taken to point to two different attitudes on Sextus’
part to the alleged earlier form of Pyrrhonism (and therefore to point to two different
chronological stages): see their Introduction, in Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics, cit.,
at pp. 6–7, 21–2).
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6 Introduction
These remarks encourage a third chronological view that is distinct from the
familiar two, namely that PH and M were written during the same period for
different purposes and for different audiences. This option is certainly intrigu-
ing and worth exploring, but has not gained (uniform) scholarly acceptance
so far. For in the book edited by Algra and Ierodiakonou, Bett makes a strong
case for his view that the differences between the physical loci in PH and M
can hardly be explained by the different purposes or intended audiences of the
two works and point rather to the fact that M was composed earlier than PH.13
By contrast, the piece by Betegh in the same volume concludes that ‘there
are indications that the chapter on body in M IX as we have it is later than
the corresponding part of PH III’14 and adduces passages in M that make it
hard to believe that either of these treatises should be seen as the source for
the other. Thus, the most recent contribution on the question of chronologi-
cal priority confirms Barnes’ verdict that supporters of the two oldest views
have yet to produce reason to persuade a neutral observer15 – and suggests that
the same should be said about the third alternative put forward by Algra and
Ierodiakonou.16 One great merit of their contribution, though, is to emphasise
that we cannot even hope to get a clearer picture of the chronology of Sextus’
works if we do not get a better understanding of his sources and his use of
them in each of his different treatises. The present volume may offer some
contributions to this preliminary work as far as M IV and its loci similes are
concerned.17
2 Against the Professors: a Glance at Sextus’ Targets, Method,

and Sources
Against the Professors is often characterised as Sextus’ more mature work. In

PH and M VII–XI, as we have indicated, Sextus provides a sceptical attack on
the three constituent parts of philosophy – logic, physics, and ethics – and
13 See R. Bett, ‘God: M IX 13–194’, cit., pp. 34–40; cf. (in the same volume) S. Bobzien, ‘Time:
M X 169–247’, pp. 275–323, at p. 291, n. 40: ‘The two passages on time (in PH and M) are …
consistent with, and mildly supportive of, the Bett Hypothesis that M is earlier than PH’.
14 See G. Betegh, ‘Body: M IX 359–440’, in K. Algra and K. Ierodiakonou (eds.), Sextus
Empiricus and Ancient Physics, cit., pp. 130–78, at pp. 174–5.
15 J. Barnes, in J. Annas and J. Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism, cit., p. xiv.
16 We may add that the fact that there are no unambiguous cross-references between
PH and M makes the question of chronological priority hard to settle: see K. Algra and
K. Ierodiakonou, Introduction, cit., p. 7 and n. 20.
17 See section 2, n. 25 and sections 3 and 4 below.
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Introduction 7
recommends suspension of judgement over every object of inquiry. In M I–VI,

by contrast, the targets are more specific: Sextus trains his fire on alleged sci-
ences or branches of putative knowledge (μαθήματα), and the scepticism he
encourages often seems to be moderate – or rational – in its scope and nature.
M I–VI is structured in three main parts. After a proem (I 1–8) the work
divides into two parts: first, a brief general discussion (I 9–40) and then a par-
ticular treatment of individual sciences. In the particular treatment Sextus
deals with six μαθήματα in six books: with grammar in M I, with rhetoric in
M II, with geometry in M III, with arithmetic in M IV, with astronomy in M V,
and with music in M VI. The topics discussed by Sextus in M I–VI constituted
a set of liberal arts or τέχναι which later formed the trivium and the quadriv-
ium. This set included also logic or dialectic, which Sextus does not discuss in
Against the Professors because – it has been argued – he has already dealt with
it as one of the three parts of philosophy.18
Several features of M I–VI indicate that it was written as a single treatise.
The plan of the whole work, characterised both by general arguments against
all sciences and by special arguments against individual sciences, is indicated
at M I 8; the transitions from one topic to the next are clearly marked and
often explained;19 there are several internal cross-references;20 and the con-
clusive sentence shows that the author took the plan to have been successfully
achieved.21
The proem provides crucial information about the method and the sources
used by Sextus all throughout M I–VI.22 Sextus opens his treatise by mention-
ing the attack on the sciences made by some philosophical predecessors. He
says that although both the Epicureans and the Pyrrhonists before him had
attacked the professors of the liberal studies, they did so with wholly different
attitudes and motivations. The Epicureans criticised the liberal studies on the
18 See J. Barnes, ‘Scepticism and the Arts’, in J. Barnes, Proof, Knowledge, and Scepticism.
Essays in Ancient Philosophy III, ed. by M. Bonelli, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2014
(first published in R.J. Hankinson (ed.), Method, Medicine and Metaphysics, Edmonton
(Alberta), Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988), pp. 512–35, at pp. 514–5; on the rela-
tionship between the set of disciplines attacked by Sextus and those forming the trivium
and the quadrivium see E. Spinelli, ‘Pyrrhonism and the Specialized Sciences’, in R. Bett
(ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2010, pp. 249–52, with references.
19 M I 41, 320; II 1, 113; IV I, 34; V 106.
20 M I 106; II 48, 59; III 116; IV 4; V 1; VI 4, 28, 30, 56.
21 Cf. M VI 68.
22 On the proem of Against the Professors see J. Barnes, ‘Scepticism and the Arts’, cit.,
pp. 515–518; cf. D. Blank, Against the Grammarians, cit., pp. xlii–xliv of the Introduction
(where he also discusses the locus similis M VI 4–6) and pp. 69–86 of the Commentary.
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8 Introduction
grounds that they do not contribute to the achievement of wisdom (M I 1).

The Pyrrhonists did not do so for this reason – for this would imply holding a
Dogmatic view. Their attack arose rather from the fact that they had with sci-
ences the same experience they had with philosophy: just as they approached
philosophy with the desire of attaining truth, but were confronted with equi-
pollent conflict and irregularity of things and suspended their judgement,
so too with the liberal studies they sought to learn the truth, but discovered
equally difficult problems. Sextus concludes by saying that, since he belongs
to the same persuasion as the Pyrrhonists, he will try to select and present the
arguments brought most effectively against the liberal studies (M I 5–7).23
In a later passage from his Against the Musicians, M VI 4–6, Sextus recalls
the distinction between Dogmatic and Pyrrhonian arguments he has made
in the proem. Having indicated that he will only attack music understood
as the ‘science of melody’, Sextus distinguishes between two kinds of attack
that had been made on it. Some people tried to show, in a Dogmatic way, that
music is not necessary for happiness, but rather harmful, while others ‘more
aporetically’ devoted themselves to destroying the fundamental principles of
the musicians in order to destroy all of music. In the rest of the treatise Sextus
indulges in both attacks. He starts by putting forward the Dogmatic polemic
against music – a set of arguments of an Epicurean origin aiming to show that
music is not useful for life (M VI 7–37).24 He then launches the ‘more aporetic’
attack (M VI 38–68): and this amounts to showing that music does not exist,
since its alleged subject matter (melodies and rhythms) does not exist.
In introducing the whole of his attack on the liberal studies, Sextus pres-
ents himself as selecting the best arguments – from both the sceptic and the
Epicurean camp – and making them his own. He proposes to rehearse existing
arguments rather than constructing new ones: he poses as an excerptor and a
23 On the basis of some syntactical oddities of the passage (and in particular of sections 1–4),
Blank suggests that Sextus has adapted it from a Pyrrhonian source. He further observes
that Sextus uses the expression ‘the followers of Pyrrho’ (οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πύρρωνος) only in M I 1
and 5 – a periphrasis which also appears in Photius’ summary of Aenesidemus. Following
Decleva Caizzi (‘Sesto e gli scettici’, cit., at pp. 293–6), Blank takes it as probable that the
expression refers to the earliest Pyrrhonists (Against the Grammarians, cit., pp. 70, 73).
With the exception of a couple of references in PH (I 7 and 234), Pyrrho is mentioned
only in M I (1, 2, 5, 53, 272, 281, 305, 306) in the Sextan corpus. The fact that Timon is also
mentioned in M I–VI may be taken to indicate that the interest of the Pyrrhonians for the
μαθήματα is datable to the beginning of the Pyrrhonian tradition (see G. Dye and B. Vitrac,
‘Le Contre les géomètres de Sextus Empiricus: sources, cibles, structure’, Phronesis, 54/2,
2009, pp. 155–203, at p. 158). Decleva Caizzi, based on the large numbers of references to
Pyrrho and Timon, conjectures that the subject discussed in M I in particular represents
part of the original stock of Pyrrhonism (‘Sesto e gli scettici’, cit., p. 318).
24 See D. Blank, Against the Grammarians, cit., pp. xlii–xliii.
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Introduction 9
compiler; and in his Against the Musicians, as we have seen, he acts as such. In
general, as Barnes has emphasised,
a detailed analysis of M I–VI tends to confirm that Sextus is essentially

excerpting – and it confirms too that the Epicureans, whose hostility
towards the liberal studies was notorious, were a major source. … But
we should not suppose that Sextus drew exclusively on Pyrrhonian and
Epicurean sources. For Book II, Against the Rhetoricians, a wealth of par-
allel materials shows both that Sextus’ discussion is tralaticious and also
the Peripatetic and the Academics – and to some extent the Stoics too –
provided a quantity of sceptical fodder.25
So Sextus’ attack on the τέχναι includes arguments of a Pyrrhonian origin and

arguments of a Dogmatic (mostly, but not exclusively, Epicurean) origin. Are
they characterised by some distinctive marks? In the two loci mentioned above
Sextus provides some clues. He presents the Epicureans as attacking the τέχναι
by claiming that they are not useful for life and wisdom, something for which
we also have abundant extra-Sextan evidence26 – so that, in most cases, argu-
ments featuring this conclusion are likely to come from the Garden.27 With
reference to the arguments of a Pyrrhonian origin, Sextus denies that they
25 J. Barnes, ‘Scepticism and the Arts’, cit., pp. 515–16. The question of the sources of Sextus’
arguments in M I–VI and of their original targets is a taxing one. In the present work, we
will ask and answer the question with reference to M IV, in the form and within the limits
indicated in section 4 below. Within this framework, we will also refer to the question of
Sextus’ sources in M III as it has been tackled by the secondary literature (and in particu-
lar by the most recent piece on the matter, that by Dye and Vitrac). As far as the other four
books composing M I–VI are concerned, the following contributions constitute a good
starting point to deal with the issue. On M I, see D. Blank, Against the Grammarians, cit.,
at pp. xl–l of the Introduction, with references to his Commentary; on M II, see J. Barnes,
‘Is Rhetoric an Art?’, in id., Mantissa, cit., pp. 80–105 (first published in DARG Newsletter 2,
1986, pp. 2–22), esp. at pp. 84–7; cf. D. Karadimas, Sextus Empiricus against Aelius Aristides.
The Conflict between Philosophy and Rhetoric in the Second Century A.D., Lund, University
Press, 1996, at pp. 162–241, for a discussion of the arguments adduced by Sextus and
Aristides; but note the reviews by J.J. Flinterman (Mnemosyne 53, 2000, pp. 108–12) and
M.B. Trapp (The Classical Review 47, 1997, pp. 291–2), who both argue that the author
does not manage to establish his main conclusion, namely that the arguments by Sextus
(and Aristides) are distinctive of the later second century AD; on M V, see E. Spinelli,
Sesto Empirico. Contro gli Astrologi, Naples, Bibliopolis, 2000, at pp. 13–51; on M VI, see
D.D. Greaves, Sextus Empiricus. Against the Musicians, Lincoln and London, University of
Nebraska Press, 1986, at pp. 24–36.
26 Cf. D. Blank, Against the Grammarians, cit., pp. xxvii, xxx–xxxii, xliii.
27 But not in all cases: for instance, ‘the arguments bearing on the utility of rhetoric are
ascribed by Sextus not to the Epicureans but to the Academics: M II 20’ (J. Barnes,
‘Scepticism and the Arts’, cit., p. 523, n. 27).
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10 Introduction
attacked the usefulness of sciences; and those that Sextus puts forward against
music, as we have seen, appear to have a characteristic pattern: a given science
does not exist insofar as its subject matter does not exist.
The account of the whole of Sextus’ polemic against the sciences offered
by Barnes is of great help here. Barnes detects two kinds of attack in M I–VI: a
more moderate one and a less moderate one. The most frequent form which
Sextus’ conclusions take is ‘X is not an art’.28 Sextus adopts the definition of
τέχνη which had been first propounded by Zeno of Citium and which came
to be almost universally accepted, according to which ‘every art is a system
of co-exercised apprehensions directed to an end useful for life’.29 According
to this definition, an art essentially is a systematic body of knowledge. It con-
sists of general principles and theorems which apply to particular cases – and
therefore requires a subject matter which is open to methodical or systematic
treatment; it must tell us something about the nature of things; and it must
be useful. Thus, often the arguments used by Sextus conclude that X is not an
art, because X does not satisfy any of the defining conditions of an art. This is
argued for in different ways. In some cases, the alleged τέχνη at stake (gram-
mar, rhetoric) is taken not to be an art insofar as it has no useful end;30 in other
cases (grammar, rhetoric, music), insofar as it purports to deal with nature,
with a methodical subject, while in fact it deals with a conventional and unme-
thodical matter, which is not open to methodical treatment;31 in other cases
(astrology), insofar as it fails to inform us about the nature of things because
the nature of things is in their case remote from our understanding.32
Other parts of M I–VI, however, feature a different, less moderate kind
of attack. In his general discussion of μαθήματα (M I 9–40), Sextus adduces
arguments against the existence of the subject of learning, the teacher, the
learner, and the mode of learning: he argues that no science exists on the
grounds that no subject of learning, no teacher, no learner, no mode of learn-
ing exists.33 Portions of the particular treatment of individual sciences appear
28 See e.g. M I 179, 181, 219, 254; II 12, 15, 16, 18, 24, 26, 43, 48, 49, 50, 60; III 21.
29 The definition is mentioned in M II 10 (cf. 49, 85).
30 Cf. e.g. M I 98 (grammar); II 20–47 (rhetoric).
31 Cf. e.g. M I 187, 221, 254 (grammar); II 10–47 (rhetoric); VI 19–20 (music).
32 Cf. e.g. M V 54; 95.
33 See M I 9 and 38 (Sextus’ general strategy), 10–30 (subject of learning), 31–4 (teacher
and learner), 35–8 (mode of learning). These arguments, typically Pyrrhonian in tone,
are paralleled in PH III 252–6 and M IX 218–40. Blank suggests that Sextus’ allusion to
the ‘the followers of Pyrrho’ as bringing the attack on the disciplines in general in M
I 1 (see n. 23 above) should probably be read as an indication that Sextus has at least
one Pyrrhonian source for his general attack on the arts in M I 1–38, and also for M VI 5,
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Introduction 11
to be on the same wavelength. Thus in M I we find, among other things, argu-

ments concluding that there is no such thing as a sentence, so that grammar
has no subject matter – and therefore does not exist. In the central part of
his attack on rhetoric in M II, Sextus argues that since there are no λόγοι and
there is no such thing as τὸ εὖ λέγειν, rhetoric does not exist. M III argues, inter
alia, that there are no points, lines, planes, or bodies – that geometry has no
subject matter. M IV argues that there are no numbers – that arithmetic has
no subject matter. And the ‘more aporetic’ attack in M VI, as we have seen,
amounts to showing that music does not exist, since its alleged subject matter
(melodies and rhythms) does not exist. The individual arts in the canonical
heptad turn out, each on the inexistence of its own alleged subject matter, to
be non-existent: since there are no words, no numbers, no tunes, there is no
such thing as grammar, as arithmetic, as music.34
These two kinds of attack are the expression of two different forms of scep-
ticism: a moderate one – corresponding to the first kind of arguments; and a
radical one – corresponding to the second kind of arguments. And although,
as we have mentioned above, the question of Sextus’ ultimate source is often
problematical and a matter of conjecture, the historical origin of the coexis-
tence of the two kinds of attack in Against the Professors is easy to determine.
Sextus is drawing on a variety of traditions. One of these, the Pyrrhonian, was
radically sceptical and aimed at suspension of judgement over the existence
of sciences; it supplies the second kind of attack. Another of the traditions
where Sextus refers to the ‘more aporetic’ attack on music (Against the Grammarians, cit.,
pp. xlviii–xlix). For a debate about Sextus’ dependence upon earlier Pyrrhonian literature
see K. Janácěk, ‘Eine anonyme skeptische Schrift gegen die Astrologie’, Helikon 4, 1964,
pp. 290–6; M. Marcovich, ‘Textkritisches I zu Hippolyt Refutatio B.III–X’, Rheinisches
Museum für Philologie 107, 1964, 139–58. As Blank also indicates (Against the Grammarians,
cit., pp. 85–6), extra-Sextan evidence for a Pyrrhonian general attack on sciences is to be
found in Philo of Alexandria, Flight and Discovery 209–11. Here the author, commenting
on Genesis 16.12 (‘his hands shall be against all men, and all men’s hands against him’),
refers to the sceptic, whom he calls a ‘rustic sage’ (ἀγροικόσοφος), as the mover of such
global attacks: ‘this is the way of the sophist, who puts on an excessive scepticism and
delights in eristic debates. He is also the one who shoots at all the representatives of the
sciences [οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων: the same expression used at M I 1], opposing each of them
in public and private, and is targeted by them as well when they justifiably defend the
dogmas to which their soul has given birth as if they were their own children’. Note that
the use of ἀγροῖκος to qualify the radical sceptic is also to be found in Galen: he mentions
the ἀγροικοπυρρώνειοι, who say that they do not know their own affects (Diff. Puls. VII,
711K; cf. Praen. XIV, 628 K).
34 Cf. e.g. M I 121–41, 156–8 (grammar); II 48–59 (rhetoric); III 21, 29, 36, 90–1, 107 (geometry);
IV 1, 10, 22, 23, 34 (arithmetic); VI 38–68 (music).
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12 Introduction
was Dogmatic, and in most cases Epicurean: and this provides the first kind
of attack.35
As previously mentioned, in the single treatises composing M I–VI Sextus is
in the business of arguing against the views that the Dogmatists held about the
τέχναι (ἀντιρρεῖν) and denying them. In doing so, he puts forward arguments
for negative conclusions: in particular, his more radical attack includes argu-
ments for the non-existence of a given discipline based on the non-existence
of its alleged subject matter. On the other hand, after the proem ‘there is no
mention of suspension of judgement: indeed, Sextus’ usual noun and verb
for suspending judgement (ἐποχή, ἐπέχω) make virtually no appearance after
the introductory remarks, and never again in programmatic contexts (M I 28,
157; II 99)’.36 This has raised a question about Sextus’ attitude in Against the
Professors: in putting forward his negative conclusions, is Sextus indulging in
negative dogmatism – is he accepting that a given art does not exist, since its
alleged subject matter does not exist?
As emphasised by Blank,37 a certain lack of sceptical tone had long been
noted in M I–VI – and explained in different ways. Pappenheim attributed it
to Sextus’ youthful lack of mastery of the sceptical tools.38 Once it was thought
that M I–VI was a late work, however, the alleged Dogmatic tendencies in
this work were attributed to Sextus’ restful return to what were assumed to
be his youthful themes after the rigorous attacking of the philosophers.39
Alternatively, these tendencies have been attributed to Sextus’ sources.40 More
recently, Janácěk noted differences in vocabulary among Sextus’ three extant
works and took them to indicate a trend, ‘the sceptical evolution towards the
Dogmatic ἀναίρεσις (or destruction)’. PH is characterised by the presentation
of opposing Dogmatic views provoking the sceptical ἐποχή; M VII–XI, while
featuring the sceptical modus operandi of showing equipollence leading to
suspension of judgement, also contains several instances where the sceptics
say ‘we destroy’ (including disagreements where the opposition is between a
Dogmatist who posits a view and a sceptic who denies it). This tension, accord-
ing to Janácěk, is resolved in M I–VI, where suddenly the frequency of the
term ἀντίρρησις increases, while ἐποχή disappears. The beginning of M I–VI,
35 See J. Barnes, ‘Scepticism and the Arts’, cit., pp. 525–7, 530–1.
36 R. Bett, Against Those in the Disciplines, cit., p. 12.
37 Cf. D. Blank, Against the Grammarians, cit., p. li.
38 E. Pappenheim, De Sexti Empirici librorum numero et ordine, Berlin, Nauck, 1874, pp. 16 ff.
39 See A. Russo, Sesto Empirico. Contro i matematici, Bari, Laterza, 1972, pp. viii ff., n. 2.
40 E. Zeller, Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer historischen Entwicklung, iii.2, Leipzig,
O.R. Reisland, 19235, p. 51, n. 2.
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Introduction 13
M I 1–40, which includes the proclamation of sceptical intentions (6–7), is taken

by Janácěk to be ‘extraneous’ (Sextus Empiricus’ Skeptical Methods, pp. 172 ff.).
This latter move strikes me as quite disputable. The more convincing and
balanced way to deal with the matter appears to me to be the one adopted by
Barnes. As we have seen, he hears two voices in M I–VI: the Epicurean, attack-
ing useless disciplines, and the Pyrrhonian, arguing from the non-existence of
the subject matter of the alleged τέχναι. According to Barnes, Sextus included
both voices in an attempt to offer the sceptical doctor of the soul a collection
of arguments of differing sorts and strength, in order to cure the intellectual
diseases of the Dogmatists, that is to say beliefs, according to their differing
sorts and strength.41 Barnes assumes that the sceptical arguments conclud-
ing that a given subject matter or a given art does not exist are to be taken as
the equipollent counterpoise to the technicians’ arguments leading to oppo-
site conclusions. And this must be correct, since ‘the set up of M I–VI, with the
contrast of “dogmatic” and “aporetic” parts (cf. M I 5, VI 4–5) makes it clear that
the sceptical arguments for “non-existence”, etc., which occur in the “aporetic”
parts are meant to be non-dogmatic’.42
Thus, if we read Sextus’ negative conclusions in M I–VI in the light of the
proem, we should not take them as a sign of Sextus’ negative dogmatism – of
the fact that he is accepting that a given art does not exist, since its alleged
subject matter does not exist. We should rather take these conclusions as one
part of the equipollent structure in virtue of which Sextus purports to provoke
Pyrrhonian ἐποχή over the existence of a given science – a structure which also
includes arguments in favour of the existence of that science, which Sextus
does not mention. It is significant that in his most recent overview on the issue,
Bett, the scholar who has claimed to have found traces of Sextan ‘negative dog-
matism’ in other parts of Sextus’ corpus,43 concludes that
we do not need to accuse Sextus of negative dogmatism in M I–VI … [T]he

impression of negativity has a historical explanation, without our need-
ing to conclude that Sextus himself means to endorse the conclusions of
the negative arguments. … [W]e are at liberty to understand suspension
of judgement as the considered purpose of the work.44
41 Cf. Barnes, ‘Scepticism and the Arts’, cit., pp. 534–5.

42 Blank, Against the Grammarians, cit., p. lii; for further evidence in favour of Barnes’ view
cf. id, pp. lii–lv.
43 Cf. n. 12.
44 See R. Bett, Against Those in the Disciplines, cit., pp. 11–15, at pp. 14–15.
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14 Introduction
By ‘historical explanation’, Bett refers to the very likely possibility that Sextus
draws the arguments for negative conclusions from authors belonging to an
earlier phase of Pyrrhonism – as Barnes and Blank had already suggested. I will
come back to this in the last part of the Conclusion, where I will raise the issue
to date the source of Sextus’ arguments – and therefore their original target.
3 Against the Arithmeticians: an Introductory Overview
Let us have a closer look at M IV. The treatise is articulated in three parts. In
the first one (IV 1) Sextus announces his aim: to destroy number – that is to say,
to show that number does not exist, and therefore that the discipline which
is constructed to handle it, the ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη, does not exist either. In the
second part (IV 2–10) Sextus sketches what he introduces as a ‘Pythagorean’
philosophy of number. This is a system characterised by two principles, the one
and the two, from which every number and geometrical item, and ultimately
every being, is derived. In the third part (IV 10–34) Sextus objects in various
ways to the principles of this system, i.e. to the notions of the one (11–20) and
of the two (21–2); and he ends by putting forward arguments against the intel-
ligibility of the processes which are supposed to generate numbers, that is to
say subtraction and addition (23–34).
Despite the fact that Sextus calls his adversaries ‘Pythagoreans’, who ‘ascribe
great power to number, urging that the whole of nature is governed by them’
(M IV 2),45 Sextus’ focus does not seem to be Pythagoras, but rather philos-
ophers who, using some texts by Plato and his immediate successors in the
Old Academy, have developed a doctrine of the incorporeal – and of number
in particular.46 As we will see in detail in chapter 2, the point was made by
Burkert in his seminal study Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism.47
In addition to M IV, Sextus raises his objections to the Dogmatic conception
45 Sextus, M IV 2: οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων Πυθαγορικοὶ μεγάλην ἀπονέμουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς
ὡς τῆς τῶν ὅλων φύσεως κατ’ αὐτοὺς διοικουμένης.
46 As noticed by Barnes (‘Scepticism and the Arts’, cit., pp. 524–5), Sextus’ criticism is not
addressed directly against the ordinary activities of counting or calculating, and in a par-
allel passage (PH III 151) Sextus seems to accept such activities: ‘so far as ordinary custom
goes, we speak, without holding opinions, of numbering things and we accept that there
are such things as numbers. But the superfluities of the Dogmatists have provoked an
argument against number too’ (ὅσον μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ συνηθείᾳ καὶ ἀδοξάστως ἀριθμεῖν τι φαμὲν
καὶ ἀριθμὸν εἶναί τι ἀκούομεν· ἡ δὲ τῶν δογματικῶν περιεργία καὶ τὸν κατὰ τούτου κεκίνηκε
λόγον. Translation by Annas and Barnes.
47 See W. Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard
University Press, 1972, pp. 53–83.
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Introduction 15
of number in two other loci: the final part of his attack on Dogmatic phys-
ics in the Outlines of Scepticism (PH III 151–67) and in Against the Physicists
(M X 248–309). Although M IV and these passages are not identical, they share
a common structure. Sextus, first of all, reports a version of what he labels
as a ‘Pythagorean’ doctrine, in which the one and the two play a prominent
role (PH III 151–6; M X 248–84; cf. M IV 2–10); he then attacks the conception
of number as it is characterised in this system (PH III 156–67; M X 284–309;
cf. M IV 10–34). To these loci we should add a passage of Against the Logicians
in which Sextus, putting forward an account of the Pythagorean criterion of
truth, describes the so-called Pythagorean doctrine without attacking it after-
wards: M VII 92–109.
Sextus’ four accounts were considered among the most important later
sources for Pythagoreanism, along with the Pythagorean Commentaries
excerpted by Alexander Polyhistor (contained in DL VIII), the Life of
Pythagoras excerpted by Photius and the reports of the doxographer Aëtius.
All these sources ascribe to the Pythagoreans a doctrine characterised by two
principles, the one and the two, and a system in which the geometrical items
(the point, the line, the surface, and the solid) are somehow derived from the
first four numbers. Burkert persuasively argued that the doctrine of the Two
Principles and of the Derivation System is not a Pythagorean doctrine, held
by Pythagoras or one of his followers, but an achievement of Plato and the
Academy, which had its origin in Plato’s Timaeus and unwritten doctrines, and
the works of his pupils Speusippus and Xenocrates.48
So Sextus, in M IV 1, tells us that he wants to show that number does not
exist, in order to show that the alleged science that has number as its sub-
ject matter, the art of arithmetic, does not exist either. But what exactly does
he discuss in the rest of the treatise? The question deserves full scrutiny and
will be appropriately dealt with in chapter 1. It is already important to empha-
sise, however, that different theoretical approaches to number were taken in
Greek Antiquity, two of which are particularly relevant for our purposes. The
first is represented by books VII, VIII and IX of Euclid’s Elements, the so-called
‘arithmetical books’,49 which constitute the only Greek document preserved
devoted to the theory of numbers and proceeding in a demonstrative way.
The second approach is constituted by the philosophical and mathematical
48 In this respect, it is significant that Sextus, in PH III 156, ascribes to the Pythagoreans the
same argument which he ascribes to Plato in M IV 11–13 – an argument which aims to
show that number is something different (has an independent existence) from the count-
able items.
49 By Euclid himself, who in book 10, Demonstration 9.100, refers to them as the ἀριθμητικοί.
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16 Introduction
account of numbers contained in texts by neo-Pythagorean or Platonist

authors: the Introduction to Arithmetic by Nichomachus of Gerasa; the com-
mentaries on Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic – in particular, that by
Iamblichus of Chalcis; and also the arithmetical sections of the Mathematics
Useful for Understanding Plato by Theo of Smyrna.
The two approaches differ radically. Euclid’s number theory is devoted to
unit and number. It has no explicitly philosophical or metaphysical content
(insofar as it does not discuss the principles of arithmetic or the nature of the
existence of unit and number), and has a deductive structure. The reflection
to which Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic is devoted also deals with the
particular kind of discontinuous quantity Euclid’s number theory deals with:
number. But it differs from the latter at least in two respects. First: it inqui-
ries into the nature of the existence of number and discusses the principles of
arithmetic at several places. Second: the content of Nicomachus’ Introduction
does not have a deductive structure; it has rather an expository character.
Now, given these differences, it is pretty clear that Sextus, in M IV, does
not discuss something along the lines of the content of Euclid’s arithmetical
books, but rather something along the lines of the content of Nicomachus’
Introduction. And coherently, Sextus’ discussion of arithmetic is permeated
by philosophy and metaphysics. This will be clear in the light of the detailed
analysis of Sextus’ attack which will be provided in chapters 3–6 of the present
volume; here a few examples will illustrate the point. Sextus’ arguments against
the number one (in M IV 11–20 and loci similes) attempt to show that this exists
neither in countable items nor apart from them. In other words, they address
the metaphysical question whether numbers are substances or accidents of the
countable items. In the same passages, Sextus questions the possibility, for
the number one, to be conceived of as a Platonic Form which each countable
items shares in – again, a metaphysical question concerning the nature of the
existence of number and its relationship with countable items. And Sextus’
arguments against subtraction in M IV 23–30 turn on the question whether
a number n is different from n units or amounts to the collection of them –
a numerical instance of a general mereological puzzle much discussed in
Antiquity: is a quantitative whole the same as its quantitative parts? Although
the point has rarely (if ever) been made, several parts of Sextus’ works tacitly
deal with matters that we would consider as metaphysical: and Sextus’ discus-
sion of number is an eminently clear example of this phenomenon.
The fact that Sextus, in M IV, does not discuss something akin to Euclid’s arith-
metical books, but rather something in the vein of Nicomachus’ Introduction is
quite interesting, particularly if we consider it in the light of what Sextus does
in the preceding essay, Against the Geometers. In this treatise, in keeping with
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Introduction 17
the general strategy he adopts in M IV I, Sextus wants to show that geometry

does not exist, since it has no object – there are no points, lines, planes, or bod-
ies. Sextus mentions no geometer but Eratosthenes (M III 28) and no title of
geometrical treatise. The identity of his adversaries and his sources has been
profitably debated in the last thirty-five years; and the debate has followed a
clear trend. Heiberg, the modern editor of Euclid, uses Sextus as a witness of
the Euclidean tradition. He believes that Sextus read the Elements; he is fol-
lowed by Heath.50 This position is nuanced by Mueller and Cambiano in the
1980s and ’90s. They suggest that the provenance of Sextus’ targets is not imme-
diately obvious and that they were likely to include, in addition to geometers
such as Euclid and Heron, some philosophers, presumably Stoics, who took
the definitions of some fundamental notions such as point, line, and solid as
relevant to philosophy. Most recently, Dye and Vitrac both follow and contrib-
ute to this scholarly trend.51 They argue that Sextus’ attack on the foundations
of geometry does not aim at refuting the sophisticated presentations of this
discipline offered by Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius, Pappus or Eutocius, but
rather the use of geometry made by mathematicians and philosophers to pro-
vide a model for the physical world along the lines of Plato’s Timaeus in a cycle
of mathematical studies preparatory to philosophy, imparted in some philo-
sophical schools at Sextus’ time.
This raises an important issue: why does Sextus, wanting to show the inex-
istence of the subject matter of geometry and arithmetic (respectively in
M III and in M IV), focus on treatises of philosophy of mathematics rather than
mathematics? The question will be tackled in chapter 1, section 3.
4 Originality and Interest of the Present Work
Why a book on M IV – why this book on M IV? The last forty years have seen
considerable progress in studies devoted to Sextus.52 But if some parts of his
opus have been carefully analysed, others have received little attention. This
has been the destiny of parts of Sextus’ Against the Professors. In 1988 Barnes
qualified this treatise as ‘Sextus’ most puzzling work’ and complained that
50 J.L. Heiberg and E.S. Stamatis, Euclidis Elementa, vol. 4, El. xi–xiii, Leipzig, Teubner 1973,
p. lxxii; cf. T.L. Heath, Euclid. The Thirteen Books of the Elements, Cambridge, Cambridge
51 Cf. G. Dye and B. Vitrac, ‘Le Contre les géomètres de Sextus Empiricus’, cit., at p. 171.
52 For an overview on secondary literature, see D. Machuca (ed.), New Essays on Ancient
Pyrrhonism, cit., pp. 1–2; for a systematically organised bibliography see R. Bett (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, cit., pp. 314–45.
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18 Introduction
‘the secondary literature on M I–VI is not vast’.53 Some twenty years later Dye
and Vitrac, authors of the most recent study devoted to one of the six treatises
composing M I–VI, Against the Geometers, observed that this is ‘an enigmatic
text, which has not received the attention it deserves, although it constitutes a
remarkable source for the history of geometry and reports an ingenious attack
on a particular use of geometry’.54 In a note, they added that if some stud-
ies on Against the Professors had appeared, very few of them concerned M III
and M IV.55 As for Against the Arithmeticians, this treatise had enjoyed just a
quick coup d’oeil by Brisson.56 The scantiness of secondary literature on M IV
has been no doubt compounded by the state of the Greek text and the read-
ability of modern translations. The standard edition, provided by Mau,57 is not
always satisfactory and needs to be emended in the light of the loci similes.58
Francophone readers could use Delattre’s recent translation; Anglophones
must content themselves with the 1949 Loeb translation;59 and no reader could
hope to improve her understanding of this difficult text by means of a com-
mentary, since none was provided.
The state of the secondary literature on Against the Professors in general,
and on Against the Arithmeticians in particular, has been recently improved by
two publications: the volume Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics, edited
by Keimpe Algra and Katerina Ierodiakonou and published in 2015, and the
book Sextus Empiricus: Against Those in the Disciplines, by Richard Bett, pub-
lished in 2018. The first offers the proceedings of the eleventh Symposium
Hellenisticum on Sextus’ Against the Physicists; it includes a paper by Tad Bren-
nan on the section of this work devoted to numbers, M X 248–309, which is one
of the Sextan loci similes to Against the Arithmeticians. The second publication
is a new English translation of Sextus’ Against the Professors, with introduction
53 See the first edition of Barnes’ ‘Scepticism and the Arts’, cit., at p. 77, n. 44.
54 See G. Dye and B. Vitrac, ‘Le Contre les géomètres’, cit., at p. 156. The translation is mine.
55 See Dye and Vitrac, ‘Le Contre les géomètres ’, cit., p. 156, n. 3.
56 See Brisson’s ‘Contre les arithméticiens ou contre ceux qui enseignent que les nombres
sont des principes’, in J. Delattre (ed.), Sur le Contre les professeurs, Villeneuve d’Ascq,
Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3, 2005, pp. 67–77. In addition, I should mention two
papers of mine: ‘Sextus, the Number Two and the Phaedo’, in S. Delcomminette et al.
(eds.), Ancient Readings of Plato’s Phaedo, Leiden, Brill, 2015, pp. 90–106; ‘Scepticism,
Number and Appearances: the ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη and Sextus’ Targets in M I–VI’, Philosophie
Antique 15, 2015, pp. 123–47.
57 Sexti Empirici Opera, vol. 3: Adversus Mathematicos I–VI, ed. J. Mau, Leipzig, Teubner,
19612.
58 See the textual remarks at the beginning of chapters 2, 3 and 4 of the present volume.
59 See P. Pellegrin (ed.), Contre les Professeurs, Paris, Seuil, 2002; Sextus Empiricus IV, transl.
and notes by R.G. Bury, London and Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1949.
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Introduction 19
and notes, which includes, at pp. 184–93, the translation of and the notes on
Against the Arithmeticians. As Bett kindly indicates, this latter part of his work
has benefitted from his reading of my translation and of parts of my commen-
tary on M IV prior to publication, as well as from our discussions of them in the
context of the papers I presented in New York and Baltimore in 2016.60
Although these two recent publications are valuable for my study on Against
the Arithmeticians, they are no substitute for such a study. For the contribu-
tion by Brennan does not concern M IV and its specific features, but a locus
similis – although an important one; and the contribution by Bett amounts to
nine pages and does not aim at offering the in-depth commentary, both from
an historical and a philosophical point of view, which I would like to offer to
the readers of Against the Arithmeticians.
Indeed, Against the Arithmeticians does not deserve to be neglected. As
we have mentioned, Sextus’ loci were considered among the most important
later sources for Pythagoreanism. Burkert stopped this scholarly trend by argu-
ing that the bulk of the doctrine of the Two Principles and of the Derivation
System described therein is not an achievement of Pythagoras, but of Plato
and the Academy. If this is so, then, despite appearances, the background of
Sextus’ passages (and the loci similes to read with them) will not be – say –
Aristotle’s account of Pythagoreanism, but rather Plato’s works (the Timaeus,
the Phaedo, the Philebus, and the Parmenides), Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’
fragments, Aristotle’s criticism of the Ideal numbers in Metaphysics Alpha, Mu
and Nu, as well as the texts belonging to the neo-Pythagorean tradition. So the
question of Sextus’ adversaries and their doctrine in Against the Arithmeticians
and loci similes proves to be of great interest for the history of the murkier side
of Platonism.
An equally important (and equally difficult) historical question is raised by
the anti-arithmetical arguments put forward by Sextus. We have seen in sec-
tion 2 above that, by his own admission, Sextus in his Against the Professors is
essentially an excerptor – and that he draws his arguments against the τέχναι
both from Dogmatic and Pyrrhonian antecedent sources. In the case of M IV
Sextus’ attack is radical in nature – it aims at showing the inexistence of the art
of arithmetic on the grounds of the inexistence of number; it thereby betrays
a Pyrrhonian origin. But if it appears that the remote origins of the issues that
Sextus discusses and of the arguments he puts forward are to be found respec-
tively in the Platonist and in the Pyrrhonian traditions, it is not at all clear by
what route they travelled to Sextus. In other words, we may ask about Sextus’
60 See R. Bett, Sextus Empiricus: Against Those in the Disciplines, cit., p. 28, n. 5; p. 188, n. 13;
p. 190, n. 21.
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20 Introduction
arithmetical discussion the seminal questions Barnes asked about Sextus’

mereological discussion:
There are two connected problems. (i) What are Sextus’ sources and how
did he use them? (Did he, for example, copy from, say, Aenesidemus or
Agrippa?) (ii) Against which Dogmatists did those sources direct their
energies? (E.g. did Agrippa attack his own contemporaries?)61
Furthermore, far from being solely of historical importance, M IV has a

remarkable philosophical value too; for it deals with crucial issues in the
ancient metaphysics and philosophy of mathematics. As we will see in chap-
ter 3, Sextus’ arguments against the number one turn on the nature of its
existence – and touch upon the metaphysical question whether numbers
are substances or accidents. This problem, stated and faced by Aristotle in
Metaphysics Mu and Nu, might be considered the most important issue in
the ancient philosophy of mathematics. The issue was tackled by Plato (and
his followers) and then by Aristotle (and his followers); and Platonists and
Aristotelians have two opposite views on the matter. In the same passages,
Sextus argues that if the Idea of one is unique, then each countable item par-
ticipates either in the whole of it, or in a part of it; and both possibilities are
problematical. In this case too, Sextus’ argument touches on a sensitive meta-
physical issue: it is a numerical instantiation of the ‘Dilemma of participation’,
raised by Plato in Parmenides 131A–C and widely discussed in the Platonic
tradition. And the general puzzle of which Sextus considers a numerical
instantiation in his attack on subtraction, the question whether a quantita-
tive whole is the same as its quantitative parts, was also a locus classicus in
ancient mereological discussions and beyond: it has Pre-Socratic origins in the
celebrated ‘growing argument’ by Epicharmus, was tackled by Plato and widely
debated in the Academy, and was even discussed by Hegel, possibly under the
influence of Sextus.
I do not mean to say that the arguments we find in Sextus’ text are always
ingenuous or illuminating. This is not so; and M IV and the loci similes are rich in
sophisms. But the philosophical questions that Sextus tackles concern serious
and deep metaphysical issues; and some of the sophisms he offers are instruc-
tive. For they reveal the peculiarity of numerical predicates, or the problems
61 See J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, in id., Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient
Philosophy I, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 429–83 (first published in J. Barnes
and M. Mignucci (eds.), Matter and Metaphysics, Naples, Bibliopolis, 1988, pp. 59–92), at
p. 437.
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Introduction 21
raised by the Platonic notion of participation, or the puzzling consequences of

confounding the operation and the function of subtraction; and they feed our
reflection on these difficult issues.
Despite its importance for the history of philosophy and for the ancient
philosophy of mathematics, the study of Against the Arithmeticians suffers
from gaps in both primary and secondary literature, as the sketch of the cur-
rent state of research provided above indicates. The aim of this book is to
contribute to filling these gaps in the form of a new translation of Against
the Arithmeticians, with extensive commentary. Why write a commentary
on the work? The standard reason, ancient as well as modern, for writing a
commentary is that the text is obscure.62 And the reason perfectly suits our
case: for it can hardly be denied that the text of M IV is extremely dense and
rather cryptic. Thus, the primary aim of this book is to provide a philosophical
elucidation and understanding of Sextus’ arguments in M IV by means of a
systematic comparative analysis of them along with the pertinent Sextan loci
similes and Dogmatic literature. In order to do that, the book also deals with
the above-mentioned historical questions – for instance in chapter 2, where we
inquire into the source used by Sextus for his account of the Pythagorean doc-
trine in M IV 2–10, or in chapters 5 and 6, where we discuss the origin of Sextus’
attack on subtraction and addition, or in the Conclusion, where we reflect on
the possible date of the variant of the arithmetical system faced by Sextus. But
it is important to indicate that these questions, in the present volume, are by
and large ancillary to the understanding of the text. In other words, the his-
torical questions have been treated essentially insofar as they contribute to an
understanding and evaluation of Sextus’ treatise – and the book does not aim
at providing an exhaustive treatment of these extremely complicated issues.
The translation follows Mau’s second edition of the Greek text (1961),
except where indicated in the textual remarks. These include references to the
proposals made in other editions, translations and studies that I sometimes
consider and follow (or reject).63 The commentary is divided into six chap-
ters, each dealing with a portion of Sextus’ treatise, followed by a Conclusion.
Chapter 1 is devoted to M IV 1. Here Sextus distinguishes two kinds of quan-
tity, magnitude and number, which are the subject of geometry and arithmetic
respectively, and he announces his aim: to destroy number and to show that
62 See e.g. J. Barnes, ‘Metacommentary’, in J. Barnes, Method and Metaphysics, cit., pp. 195–211
(first published in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 10, 1992, pp. 267–81); J. Mansfeld,
Prolegomena: Questions to be Settled before the Study of an Author, or a Text, Leiden, Brill,
1994, pp. 23–6, 149–61.
63 For the passages from the other works by Sextus, I usually offer the translations by Annas
and Barnes and by Bett mentioned in the Bibliography, sometimes slightly modified.
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22 Introduction
the art which is constructed to handle it does not exist. Sextus’ distinction goes
back to Aristotle, Categories 6, 4b20–5a14 and Physics VI 1, 231a21–b1. This chap-
ter analyses the Aristotelian background of Sextus’ distinction and the nature
of his discussion. Chapter 2 is devoted to M IV 2–10, where Sextus describes
the ‘Pythagorean’ doctrine of the Two Principles and of the Derivation System.
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of Sextus’ account and of the
Sextan and Dogmatic loci similes (in particular M VII 92–109, PH III 151–167
and M X 248–309), with an emphasis on the origin of the doctrine in the Old
Academy and its development in the neo-Pythagorean tradition. The view that
the intermediate source used by Sextus in M IV is likely to be Posidonius is
presented and defended.
Chapter 3 is devoted to Sextus’ attack on the one in M IV 11–20. This is struc-
tured in a presentation of two (alleged) Platonic characterisations of the one
(M IV 11), followed by an argument in support of them (M IV 11–13), and two
arguments against them (in M IV 14–18 and 18–20 respectively). Similarly, in
PH III 151–67 and M X 248–309 Sextus firstly presents the Dogmatic charac-
terisation of number as something different from numbered objects, and
offers some remarks in its support (PH III 156–7; M X 285–7), and then attacks
it (PH III 157–63; M X 288–98). The chapter provides a comparative analy-
sis of the Sextan passages. These are read in the light of the debate on the
nature of the existence of numbers faced by Aristotle in Metaphysics Mu and
Nu. The chapter also inquires into the relationship between Sextus’ mereo-
logical argument against the possibility of conceiving of the number one as
a Platonic Idea, and the Dilemma of Participation it stems from. Chapter 4 is
devoted to Sextus’ attack on the two in M IV 21–2. M X 302–9 and PH III 164–6
present parallel arguments. Sextus’ objections stem from Plato’s Phaedo
(96e–97b). The chapter provides a comparative analysis of Sextus’ arguments
and of their relationship with the puzzle raised by Plato. Chapter 5 comments
on M IV 23–30, where Sextus attacks the possibility of conceiving of a number
as the result of the subtraction of a unit from another number. The Sextan
parallel passages (M IX 280–320 and PH III 85–93) clearly show the mereo-
logical context into which his attack on subtraction is inserted: the argument
about the subtraction of a unit from a given number is supposed to show the
impossibility of subtracting a part from its whole or from another part of the
same whole. The section provides a comparative analysis of the sceptic attacks
on subtraction in the light of Sextus’ discussion of the Dogmatic concepts of
part and whole. Chapter 6 deals with M IV 30–4, where Sextus puts forward his
attack on the possibility of conceiving of a number as the result of the addition
of a unit to another number. The chapter offers an analysis of the arguments in
the light of the Sextan parallel passages (M IX 326–8 and 321–5, PH III 94–5 and
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Introduction 23
M I 166–8) and their background, constituted by a Stoic mereological position

in vogue in the Hellenistic Era and ascribable to Posidonius and Mnesarchus,
as well as by Epicharmus’ Growing Argument and the use the Academics made
of it against the Stoics. The Conclusion inquires into the presuppositions of
Sextus’ arguments and their appropriateness for their target. This leads to a
close scrutiny of the features of the system discussed by Sextus in M IV: the
examined evidence suggests that they belong to now lost monistic variants of
the system, probably datable to the first century BC.
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Translation
[1] Since one kind of quantity, which is called ‘magnitude’ and is mainly dealt
with by geometry, belongs to continuous bodies, while the other, which is
number and is the subject matter of arithmetic, belongs to discrete [bodies],
let us proceed with our inquiry, turning from the principles and theorems of
geometry to those which concern number. For, once number is destroyed, the
art which is constructed about it will not exist either.
[2] Speaking generally, then, the Pythagorean mathematicians ascribe a
great power to numbers, on the grounds that the nature of all things is governed
by them. Hence, they used always to proclaim ‘All things are like numbers’; and
they swore not only by the number, but also by the man who revealed it to
them, Pythagoras, whom they treated as a God for his skill in arithmetic: they
said: ‘Nay, by the man who taught our soul the Tetraktys, source possessing the
roots of Nature ever-flowing’.
[3] They called ‘Tetraktys’ the number which is composed of the first four
numbers. For one, two, three and four make ten; and this is the most perfect
number, since once we have reached it we go back to the unit and start count-
ing afresh. They called it a ‘source possessing the roots of Nature ever-flowing’
because, according to them, the rationale of the structure of everything lies in
it: for instance, that of the body and that of the soul – it will be enough to recall
these as examples.
[4] One, then, is a sort of underlying principle productive of the structure
of all the other numbers, while two is productive of length. For, as in the case
of the geometrical principles we indicated first what a point is and then, after
that, what is a line – which is taken to be length without breadth, so, in the
present case, the one corresponds to the point, while the two to the line and to
length: for the mind in conceiving it moved from one place to another: and that
is length. [5] Three was set over breadth and surface; for the mind went from
one place to another: and with the extension in breadth having been added to
the extension in length, surface is conceived. And if one considers, in addition
to the three, a fourth unit, i.e. a fourth point, the pyramid comes to be, a solid
body and shape; for it has length, breadth, and depth; so that the rationale of
the body is comprised in the number four.
[6] And that of the soul as well: for, they say that just as it is by harmony that
the whole world is governed, so are animals ensouled. The perfect harmony
is held to consist in three concords: the fourth, the fifth, and the octave. The
fourth concord depends on the epitrite ratio, while the fifth on the hemiolic
ratio, and the octave on the double ratio. [7] A number is called epitrite if it is

Translation 25
constituted by a whole number and a third of it, as is eight in relation to six:

for it comprises six and a third of it, i.e. two. A number is called hemiolic when
it comprises a number and the half of it, as is nine in relation to six: for it is
constituted by six and the half of it, i.e. three. A number is called double when
it is is equal to two equal numbers, as is four in relation to two: for the former
is twice the latter.
[8] Now, these being the facts and there being, according to our starting
principle, four numbers (one, two, three, and four), in which – as we said – the
Idea of soul is comprised according to the harmonic ratio, four is the double of
two, and two is the double of one – on which the octave depends; [9] three is
the hemiolic of two (for it includes two itself and half of it), and thus supplies
the fifth concord; four is the epitrite of three – on which depends the fourth
concord. Hence, it was plausible for the Pythagoreans to say that the number
ten is the ‘source possessing the roots of Nature everflowing’.
[10] That they ascribed a great power to numbers is quite clear from these
things – which we said just by way of example. For their account of numbers
is extensive; but we shall refrain here from setting it out at length and instead
turn to our reply, taking as our starting point the unit: this is the principle of all
number, and once it is destroyed, there is no number either.
[11] Plato, then, shaping the concept of the one for us in a rather Pythagorean
way, says ‘One is that without which nothing is called one’, or ‘that by sharing
in which each thing is called both one and many’. For a plant, say, or an animal
or a stone, is called one; it is not one in virtue of the account which is proper
to it, though, but is conceived as one by sharing in the one – this being none of
those items. [12] For neither plant nor animal nor stone nor any other count-
able item is the real one. For if plant or animal is the one, certainly everything
which is not a plant or an animal will not be called one; but a plant is called
one, as is an animal and a thousand other things. [13] Therefore the one is none
of the countable items, but rather that by sharing in which each thing comes
to be both one and many – one in its own right, and many by collection of
individual things. Again, plurality is none of the many things such as plants,
animals or stones; for these are called many by sharing in it, and it itself is not
among them.
[14] Well, such is the Idea of the one conceived of by Plato’s followers; let
us add our remarks. Either the Idea of the one is different from the countable
particulars, or it is conceived with those items which share in it. But it does
not exist in its own right, since no one other than the particular countable
items is conceived of as existing. Therefore, it remains to say that it is con-
ceived in those items which share in it; but again, this is problematical. [15] For
if a countable log is one by sharing in the unit, then what is not a log will not
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26 Translation
be called one; but it is so called, as shown above. Therefore the unit, by sharing
in which each countable particular is called one, does not exist. [16] Further,
what many items share in is many, and not one; the countable items are many
and indeed infinite; therefore, each countable item is not one by sharing in
the unit. [17] So, just as man in general, which some people conceive as a mor-
tal rational animal, is neither Socrates nor Plato (since, if so, nobody else will
be called man), and does not exist in its own right nor along with Plato and
Socrates (since it would be observed as a particular man), the one too, which
is conceived of as existing neither along with the countable particulars nor in
its own right, is eo ipso inconceivable. [18] The same should be said for the two,
the three and in general – to cut things short – for all numbers.
It is also possible to argue as follows. The Idea of the one, by sharing in
which something is called one, is either one Idea or else there are several Ideas
of the one. But if there is just one Idea, it will not be shared by several items; for
if A – to make ourselves clear – possesses all the Idea of the one, then B, which
does not possess it, will not be one. [19] Nor indeed can it be the case that it
has parts, in order that the items which share in it may be many; for firstly, each
item will be one by sharing not in the Idea of the one, but in a part of it; and
also, they conceive of the unit as indivisible and partless. If, on the other hand,
there are several Ideas of the one, so that each of the countable items ranked as
units shares in an Idea of its own, then either the Idea of A and that of B share
in a common Idea, in virtue of which each of them is called one, or they do not.
[20] If they do not share in a common Idea, then all the items will also have
to be ranked as units even though they do not share in the Idea – something
they do not want; if, on the other hand, they share in a common Idea, then the
initial difficulty will be raised: for, how could the two items share in a single
Idea? So much, then, concerning the unit; and once it is destroyed, all number
is destroyed.
[21] Still, let us add the remarks about the number two. This is formed by
the conjunction of units in a way which also creates a certain puzzle – a puzzle
which Plato himself has previously raised in his On the soul. For, once a unit is
juxtaposed to another unit, in virtue of the juxtaposition either something
is added or subtracted, or nothing is either added or subtracted. But if nothing is
added or subtracted, the number two will not result from the juxtaposition of
a certain unit to another unit. [22] If, in virtue of the juxtaposition, something
is subtracted, there will be a diminution of the one, and the number two will
not be formed. And if something is added, the two items will not make two, but
four: for the additional two, the unit and the other unit compose the number
four. Therefore, the number two will be nothing. And the same difficulty may
be raised for any number, so that, because of this, nothing is a number.
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Translation 27
[23] Still, since numbers are conceived of as a result of the addition or the
subtraction of a unit, it is clear that if we show each of the two to be impos-
sible, the existence of numbers will vanish as well. First of all, let us talk about
subtraction, making ourselves clear by means of examples. [24] The unit sub-
tracted from the given ten is subtracted either from the whole ten or from the
remaining nine. But it is subtracted neither from the whole, as we will show, nor
from the nine, as we will also make clear; therefore, nothing is subtracted from
the given ten. For, if the unit is subtracted from the whole of it, either the ten
is different from the particular units, or it is the collection of the units which is
called ten. [25] But the ten is not different from the particular units; for if these
are destroyed, there is no ten either – and equally, if the ten is destroyed, the
units do not exist anymore. And if the ten is identical to the units, i.e. if the par-
ticular units are the ten, it is clear that if the subtraction is made from the ten,
it will be made from each unit (since the particular units are the ten), so that
the removal will be not of just one unit, but of ten; therefore, the unit is not
subtracted from the whole ten. [26] And the removal of unit will not be made
from the remaining nine either; for, after its removal, how could the given nine
be preserved? But if the unit is removed neither from the whole ten nor from
the remaining nine, no number will exist as a result of subtraction.
[27] Besides, if the unit is removed from the nine, it is removed either
from the whole of it or from its last unit. But if the unit is subtracted from the
whole nine, there will be a removal of the nine: for, since the particular units
are nine, what is subtracted from each unit will compose number nine. [28]
And if the subtraction is made from the last unit, then first of all it will be
shown that the last unit, which is partless, in fact has parts – and this is absurd;
furthermore, if the unit is removed from the last unit, it will not be possible for
the nine to remain intact.
[29] Besides, if the unit is removed from the ten, either the ten which it
is removed from exists, or it does not exist. But the removal cannot be made
from the existing ten (for, as long as the ten persists, it is not possible to sub-
tract anything from it qua ten – otherwise it will not be ten anymore), nor
from the non-existing ten: [30] for, nothing can be subtracted from what does
not exist. But it is impossible to conceive of anything apart from existing and
not-existing; therefore, nothing is removed from the ten.
These arguments have shown that it is impossible to conceive any number
as a result of subtraction; [31] and it is easy to show, by means of analogous
puzzles, that it is not possible to do that as a result of addition either. For – once
again – if a unit is added to the ten, it should be said that either the addition is
made to the whole ten, or to its last part. But if the unit is added to the whole
ten, since the whole ten is conceived along with all the particular units, the
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28 Translation
addition of one unit which has been made to all the particular units will have
to be an addition of ten. [32] But that is absurd: for it will follow that, as a result
of the addition of the unit, the ten becomes twenty – and this is impossible.
Thus, it should not be said that the unit is added to the whole ten. But not to
its last part either: for the ten will not increase, since the increase of one part
is not ipso facto an increase of the whole ten. [33] In general and in all cases,
either the unit is added to the ten while this remains, or the unit is added to
the ten while this does not remain. But it will never be added to the ten while
it remains (since it will not remain ten), nor while it does not remain – for the
addition cannot be made to the ten, if it actually does not remain.
[34] But since number, as I said, is conceived as existing as a result of addi-
tion or subtraction, and we have shown that neither of them exists, it must be
said that nothing is a number. Thus, now that we have gone through all these
puzzles in detail against the geometers and the arithmeticians, let us make a
new start and make our reply to the astronomers.
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Commentary
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Chapter 1
M IV 1: Quantities, Number, and Arithmetic
1 Textual Remarks
All the editors read the opening of M IV (section 1, lines 1–4 in the edition by
Mau) as follows:
Ἐπειδὴ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς συνεχέσι σώμασιν, ὃ δὴ μέγεθος καλεῖται,
περὶ ὅ ἐστι μάλιστα ἡ γεωμετρία, τὸ δὲ ἐν διεστῶσιν, ὅπερ ἀριθμὸς καθέστη-
κεν, περὶ ὃν ἡ ἀριθμητικὴ καταγίνεται …
As already noticed by some scholars, this characterisation of the mathemathi-

cal disciplines is grounded on a distinction between quantities that ultimately
derives from Aristotle1 (from his Categories in particular) and no doubt became
generally accepted. In section 2 we will deepen the issue and read Sextus’
account in the light of its origin. But before doing that, it is important to tackle
a controversy à propos a textual detail of the passage. Scholars have under-
stood the contrast between συνεχῆ and διεστῶτα mentioned by Sextus in two
different ways. Most of them (Bett, Dye and Vitrac, Delattre, Russo, Bury) have
taken it to be that between continuous bodies and discontinuous (or discrete)
things. Brisson, however, supplies σώμασιν after διεστῶσιν and understands the
contrast as being between continuous and discrete bodies.
The syntax of the passage seems to speak strongly in favour of the choice
made by Brisson. If we read the text in the way he suggests, we have two
options. Either we take Sextus himself to produce such a characterisation in
introducing his discussion of arithmetic, or we take Sextus to have copied a
text in which geometry and arithmetic were so characterised. Brisson adopts
the first option. If I understand him correctly, he takes the contrast between
continuous and discrete bodies to be a sign of the fact that Sextus, in M IV,
is interested in discrete numerable bodies; and he explains Sextus’ angle by
urging that he wants to attack numbers conceived of as the principles or
paradigmatic causes of the world, and in particular of perceptible entities – a
1 G. Dye and B. Vitrac, ‘Le Contre les géomètres de Sextus Empiricus: sources, cibles, structure’,
Phronesis, 54/2, 2009, pp. 155–203, at p. 165.

32 Chapter 1
doctrine rooted in the Old Academy and adopted by the Middle Platonists.2 I
am not convinced by Brisson’s view. In M IV, Sextus attacks number insofar as
it is the subject matter of a specific τέχνη, arithmetic, and he aims at showing
the non-existence of the latter by showing the non-existence of the former – as
he explicitly says (1) and as he does with other τέχναι in other portions of his
Against the Professors.3 He questions the existence of numbers, and he does
this not only by arguing that they cannot be the principles of perceptible bod-
ies that the Platonists want them to be.
As for the second option, Greek literature offers no other account of geom-
etry and arithmetic explicitly grounded on a distinction between bodies.4
The characterisation itself appears problematical. We may take σῶμα either
in a geometrical sense (along the lines of point, length, and surface) or in a
non-geometrical sense (as contrasted with the soul), and in both cases it
is not necessary for something to be a body in order for it to be studied by
arithmetic – that is to say, countable. This truth lies at the heart of the accounts
of the Pythagorean doctrine provided by Sextus, both in M IV (cf. e.g. 11–13,
where incorporeal universal items like man or plant are featured as being
countable) and in the loci similes: the principles of existing things cannot be
the Forms precisely insofar as these incorporeal items are countable (M X 258;
cf. PH III 153); both bodies and incorporeal items are countable (M VII 101–4).5
The Pythagorean characterisation of the mathematical disciplines closest to
M IV 1, the one we find in Nicomachus, is coherent with this truth and takes
the objects of geometry and arithmetic to be entities, be they perceptible or
intelligible.6 As for Sextus, he appears to be well acquainted with the fact that
the distinction continuous vs. discrete is not restricted to bodies, since in his
discussion of geometry he applies it to incorporeal geometrical items such as
circles.7 However, the characterisation is only apparently problematical: for it
does not imply that only bodies are countable. It simply says that arithmetic
2 See L. Brisson, ‘Contre les arithméticiens ou contre ceux qui enseignent que les nombres sont
des principes’, in J. Delattre (ed.), Sur le Contre les professeurs, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Université
Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3, 2005, pp. 67–77, at pp. 69–70, 77.
3 On this ‘radical attack’ see section 2 of the Introduction.
4 For a useful survey of ancient Greek classifications of mathematical disciplines see B. Vitrac,
‘Les classifications des sciences mathématiques en Grèce ancienne’, Archives de Philosophie 25
(2), 2005, pp. 269–301.
5 On the nature and relationships of the four accounts of the Pythagorean doctrine offered by
Sextus see chapter 2, section 2 infra.
6 Nicomachus’ account will be examined in section 3 of this chapter.
7 See M III 66–70, where Sextus asks whether the circles allegedly described by the revolving
of a straight line are continuous with one another (συνεχεῖς ἀλλήλοις) or separate from one
another (διεστῶτας ἀπ’ ἀλλήλων); cf. 34, where Sextus wonders whether the points to which
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M IV 1: Quantities, Number, and Arithmetic 33
studies the property that belongs to discrete bodies – it does not say that it
belongs to these discrete items only.
Furthermore, there is an account of the two mathemathical disciplines
that might be taken to present close similarities with Sextus’ and that is worth
mentioning. The account is contained in a miscellaneous work by a Byzantine
scholar (probably datable to the ninth century AD) who put forward excerpts
from several authors. The work includes 138 anonymous definitions or expla-
nations of mathemathical notions, of which the first 132 are ascribable to
Heron of Alexandria.8 A portion of definition 135, devoted to geometry, reads
as follows:
What is the end of geometry? Its end is nearly the same as that of arith-
metic, except that it tries to grasp the properties belonging not to discrete,
but to continuous substance.9
Most scholars, with the notable exception of Tannery, ascribe the definition to
Geminus of Rhodes,10 a Greek scientific writer of wide-ranging interests who
is usually considered to have been a Stoic, and is often said to have been a dis-
ciple of Posidonius (first century BC).11 If the Stoic attribution is correct, then
we may understand the occurrence of ‘substance’ in Definition 135 in the sense
of ‘material, corporeal substrate’12 – so that we would find here a characteri-
sation of arithmetic and geometry grounded on a distinction between kinds
of corporeal items along the lines of M IV 1. We may add that other features of
the account of the mathematical disciplines in M IV 1 at least appear to have
a Stoic colour. For the term διεστῶτα is used to indicate the third class of
a line allegedly amounts are conceived as touching one another (ψαύοντα ἀλλήλων) or as
not touching.
8 See G. Giardina, ‘Héron d’Alexandrie’, in R. Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes
antiques, Supplément, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2003, pp. 87–103, at p. 95.
9 Τί ἐστι τέλος γεωμετρίας; Τέλος ἐστὶ ταύτῃ παραπλησίως τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ, πλὴν τοῦ ζητεῖν κατα-
λαβεῖν οὐ τὰ τῇ διωρισμένῃ, ἀλλὰ τὰ συνεχεῖ οὐσίᾳ συμβάντα.
10 So F. Hulsch, Heronis Alexandrini geometricorum et stereoticorum reliquiae, Berlin, Wei-
demann, 1864, p. 247 and J.L. Heiberg, Heronis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt omnia,
vol. 4, Teubner, Leipzig, 1912, p. 97; contra P. Tannery, La géométrie grecque, Paris, Editions
Jacques Gabay, 1887, pp. 43–6. For a brief and very informative account of the controversy
see J. Evans and J.L. Berggren, Geminos’ Introduction to the Phenomena, Princeton, Prince
ton University Press, 2003, at p. 244.
11 On Geminus’ life and works see J. Evans and J.L. Berggren, Geminos, cit., pp. 1–110; some
reflections on Geminus’ Stoicism are to be found at pp. 23–7.
12 Cf. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge
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34 Chapter 1
σώματα in the Stoic threefold distinction of bodies reported by Sextus and

other authors.13 Furthermore, a division of bodies into continuous and dis-
crete appears in a polemic of Alexander of Aphrodisias against the Stoics in
his On Mixture.14 In chapter 3 we will offer evidence for the claim that Sextus
draws the account of the Pythagorean doctrine that he provides in M IV 2–10
from a Stoic text datable to the first century BC – probably by Posidonius. If the
above-mentioned features of the account of the mathematical disciplines in
M IV 1 are genuinely Stoic, then it is tempting to think that it is drawn from a
Stoic or Stoic-influenced text of the same period.
2 Sextus’ Distinction of Continuous and Discrete Quantities and Its

Aristotelian Origin
The treatise opens with a group of three interrelated distinctions which enables
Sextus to characterise the discipline he targets. First, there are two kinds of
items – of bodies in particular: the continuous (συνεχῆ) and the discrete (διε-
στῶτα). Second, there are two kinds of quantity (ποσόν), each of which belongs
to one of the two items distinguished: the first, called ‘magnitude’ (μέγεθος),
belongs to continuous items; the second, called ‘number’ (ἀριθμός), belongs
to discrete items. Third, there are two disciplines, each of which deals with
one of the two kinds of quantities distinguished: magnitude is the subject of
geometry; number is the subject of arithmetic. So Sextus characterises his tar-
get, arithmetic, as a discipline which deals with that kind of quantity, number,
which belongs to discrete items.
The distinction between the two types of quantity on which the Sextan
characterisation is grounded derives from the account of quantity provided
by Aristotle in the Categories (6, 4b20–5a14):15 in order to understand the dif-
ference between the continuous and the discrete in the ancient account of
quantity (and therefore the nature of the discipline introduced by Sextus and
13 See chapter 2, section 4.

14 See Alexander, On Mixture 223.27–30: ‘Next, it would be reasonable that the coherence
produced by the pneuma should be found in all bodies; but this is not so. For some bod-
ies are coherent and some discrete’ (ἔπειτα δ’ εὔλογον μὲν ἦν, ὁποίαν τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος
συνοχὴν γινομένην ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι τοῖς σώμασιν· οὐχ οὕτως δ’ ἔχει. τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστι
συνεχῆ, τὰ δὲ διωρισμένα). Translation by B. Inwood and L.P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy,
Indianapolis/Cambridge, Hackett, 19972, p. 173.
15 In order to indicate discrete items Sextus replaces Aristotle’s outdated διωρισμένα with
διεστῶτα.
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his attack on it) we must begin with Aristotle.16 Ποσόν, or quantity, is the sec-
ond of the ten groups of items, called ‘categories’, which Aristotle lists in the
central part of his Categories:
Of things said without any combination, each signifies either substance

or quantity or quality or a relative or where or when or being-in-a-
position or having or doing or being affected. To give a rough idea, exam-
ples of substance are man, horse; of quantity: four-foot, five-foot; of
quality: white, grammatical; … (Aristotle, Cat. 4, 1b25–29).17
Aristotle is usually taken to offer, here, a theory of classes of predications.

Every time I take a subject, X, to predicate something of it, Y, the predication
does one of the following things: (i) it gives an answer to the question: ‘What
is X?’; (ii) it tells that X is of a certain quantity; (iii) it tells that X is of a cer-
tain quality; and so on for the other seven categories.18 What does it mean,
then, to say that X is of a certain quantity, and what features must X possess in
order to bear such a predicate?
Aristotle develops his account of quantities in chapter 6 of the Categories
(4b20–6a35); he also devotes to the subject chapter 13 in book Delta of the
Metaphysics (1020a7–32) and, occasionally, some other remarks elsewhere in
his corpus. The third group of items listed by Aristotle in the Categories is con-
stituted by ποιόν, or quality: quantities stand alongside qualities, and recalling
some distinctions made by Aristotle in his account of the latter may help in
grasping corresponding crucial distinctions which are absent in his account
of the former.19
Aristotle starts his discussion of qualities in chapter 8 of the Categories as
follows:
16 What follows is not meant to be an exhaustive presentation of the Aristotelian account of

quantities: I will focus on the features of it which are more pertinent for understanding
Sextus.
17 Aristotle, Cat. 4, 1b25–29: Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν
σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποὺ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. ἔστι δὲ
οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον
λευκόν, γραμματικόν … Unless otherwise stated, for the passages from the Categories I offer
the translation by Ackrill (sometimes slightly modified, as in the present case).
18 Cf. J. Barnes, ‘Les Catégories et les Catégories’, in O. Bruun and L. Corti (eds.), Les Catégories
et leur histoire, Paris, Vrin, 2005, pp. 11–80, at p. 14.
19 The approach to the Aristotelian account of quantities which follows stems from the
most fruitful treatment of the matter which I have been able to find: the one offered by
Jonathan Barnes’ ‘Aristotelian Quantities’, in M. Bonelli and F.G. Masi (eds.), Studi sulle
Categorie di Aristotele, Amsterdam, A.M. Hakkert, 2011, pp. 337–69, esp. at pp. 337–45.
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36 Chapter 1
I call a quality that in virtue of which things are said to be items of

such-and-such a quality (Aristotle, Cat. 8, 8b25).20
He thereby distinguishes between qualities or qualitative properties, denoted

by the term ποιότης, and qualitative items, denoted by the term ποιός.
Whiteness, cultivation, and sweetness are qualities; white things, cultivated
things, and sweet things are qualitative items. In addition, in his account of
quality Aristotle deals with the things which possess qualities – things like
bodies, which possess whiteness, or scholars, who possess cultivation. These,
which are distinct both from qualities and from qualitative items, have been
called ‘qualified items’, and it is important to stress that Aristotle uses the term
ποιόν to denote all three kinds of items.21
In his chapter on quantity Aristotle does not make a distinction parallel to
the one he draws at the beginning of his treatment of quality; still, such a dis-
tinction exists. There are quantities or quantitative properties (length, breadth,
weight …), quantitative items (long items, large items, heavy items …), and
quantified items (lines, surfaces, bodies …); and Aristotle uses the term ποσόν
to cover them all.22
Aristotle’s discussion of ποσόν provides both a characterisation of quantity
(of the class of quantitative properties) and a delineation of quantified items –
an indication of some features items must have in order to have quantitative
properties. On the Aristotelian account, a quantity is a kind of property that
admits of degrees, and which is therefore to be contrasted with those proper-
ties which have an all-or-none character (for example being pregnant, or being
crimson); objects possess quantities in much the same way as they possess
other properties – the qualities.23
What does ascribing to something a certain quantitative property amount
to – what do we do when we say that ‘X is of a certain quantity’ on the
20 Aristotle, Cat. 8, 8b25: Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοί τινες λέγονται. The translation is due
to Barnes (‘Aristotelian Quantities’, cit., p. 338, n. 4).
21 Cf. J. Barnes, ‘Aristotelian Quantities’, cit., p. 338.
22 As Ackrill points out (Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1963, p. 91; cf. pp. 77–8), in ch. 6 Aristotle uses no abstract noun for quantity (such
as ποσότης); he employs everywhere the word ποσος, which some interpreters (e.g.
Ackrill) read as the interrogative adjective πόσος, and others (e.g. Barnes: cf. ‘Aristotelian
Quantities’, cit., p. 342, n. 18) as the indefinite adjective ποσόν. More generally, ποσότης is
not found either in the Categories or in book Δ of the Metaphysics; it appears in Met. Z 1,
1028a19 (cf. Barnes, ‘Aristotelian Quantities’, cit., p. 339, n. 7).
23 Cf. J. Barnes, ‘Aristotelian Quantities’, cit., p. 338, who takes as Aristotelian a charac-
terisation of quantity provided by B. Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1966, p. 24.
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Aristotelian account? The question is best approached linguistically.24 The

word ποσός, ‘of a certain quantity’, is an indefinite adjective. The corresponding
interrogative adjective πόσος asks ‘How much?’ or ‘How many?’ – ‘How much?’
when it is attached to a mass term like ‘flour’ or ‘chocolate’, ‘How many?’ when
it is attached to a count noun like ‘eggs’ or ‘books’. Given the two questions
mentioned above, some answers will make sense, or be acceptable; others will
not. Your greengrocer asks you: ‘How many eggs would you like?’ ‘6’, you reply.
‘And how much flour?’ ‘2 kilos’. Yours are acceptable answers to the questions
asked; ‘Oblong’ and ‘Green’ are not. Along these lines, we can say that
you make a quantificational remark insofar as you indicate the measure

of something, insofar as you say how much or how many, insofar as you
give a respectable answer to ‘How much?’ or ‘How many?’.25
As Aristotle says, ‘what a quantity is recognised by is a measure’ (Met. I 1,

1052b20):26 when you determine how much or how many, you determine
how much so-and-so or how many so-and-sos, where ‘so-and-so’ indicates the
pertinent measure. Thus, the interrogative adjectives ‘How much?’ and ‘How
many?’ require nominal support: ‘How many?’ is elliptical for ‘How many Fs?’,
‘How much?’ for ‘How much M?’, and you will typically determine how many
Fs by saying something of the form ‘n Fs’ and how much M by saying something
of the form ‘n measures of M’ – where n is a number. In this account, numbers
appear to be essentially involved in quantificational answers. For these depend
on counting or on measuring; counting, trivially, invokes numbers; and mea-
surement ‘always involves the assignment of numerals to things according to
rule’.27 In order to say how much or how many, you need to specify a number.
The distinction between quantificational remarks of the form ‘n measures
of M’, answering to ‘How much M?’ questions, and quantificational remarks of
the form ‘n Fs’, answering to ‘How many Fs?’ questions, is related to the contrast
between plurality and magnitude:
A certain quantity is a plurality if it is countable, a magnitude if it is mea-

surable; that which is potentially divisible into non-continuous parts
24 Cf. J. Barnes, ‘Aristotelian Quantities’, cit., pp. 342–4.

25 Cf. J. Barnes, ‘Aristotelian Quantities’, cit., p. 343.
26 Aristotle, Met. I 1, 1052b20: μέτρον γάρ ἐστιν ᾧ τὸ ποσὸν γιγνώσκεται.
27 Cf. B. Ellis, Basic Concepts of Measurement, cit., p. 39.
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38 Chapter 1
is called a plurality, into continuous a magnitude (Aristotle, Met. Δ 13,

1020a8–9).28
Some quantified items, the pluralities or aggregates, are countable; others, the
magnitudes, are measurable. Aristotle, here, associates two kinds of quantita-
tive properties to two kinds of quantified items respectively: the property of
being countable – of having countable parts or a certain number n of Fs – to
pluralities, whose parts are non-continuous; and that of being measurable – of
having n measures of M – to magnitudes, whose parts are continuous. And this
indeed is the distinction we find in M IV 1, with the difference that Sextus uses
‘magnitude’ and ‘number’ to denote the two quantitative properties: magni-
tude – i.e. having a certain magnitude – is that kind of quantitative property
which belongs to continuous items; number – i.e. having a certain number of
Fs – is that kind of quantitative property which belongs to discrete items.
On Sextus’ account, in order for an item to have a certain number of Fs, it
must be discrete; in order for it to have a certain magnitude, it must be con-
tinuous. This contrast is put forward by Aristotle at the very beginning of his
discussion of quantity in the Categories:
Of quantities [i.e. of quantified items] some are discrete, others continu-

ous … Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines, surfaces,
bodies, and also, besides these, time and place. For the parts of numbers
have no common boundary at which they join together. For example, if
five is a part of ten the two fives do not join together at any common
boundary but are separate; nor do the three and the seven join together
at any common boundary. Nor could you ever in the case of number find
a common boundary of its parts, but they are always separate. Hence
number is one of the discrete quantities. … A line, on the other hand,
is a continuous quantity. For it is possible to find a common boundary
at which its parts join together: a point. And for a surface, a line; for the
parts of a plane join together at some common boundary. Similarly in the
case of a body one could find a common boundary – a line or a surface – at
which the parts of the body join together (Aristotle, Cat. 6, 4b20–5a14).29
28 Aristotle, Met. Δ 13, 1020a8–9: πλῆθος μὲν οὖν ποσόν τι ἐὰν ἀριθμητὸν ᾖ, μέγεθος δὲ ἂν μετρη-
τὸν ᾖ. λέγεται δὲ πλῆθος μὲν τὸ διαιρετὸν δυνάμει εἰς μὴ συνεχῆ, μέγεθος δὲ τὸ εἰς συνεχῆ …
Translation by Kirwan (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, books Γ, Δ, and Ε, Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1977).
29 Aristotle, Cat. 6, 4b20–5a14: Τοῦ δὲ ποσοῦ τὸ μέν ἐστι διωρισμένον, τὸ δὲ συνεχές … ἔστι δὲ
διωρισμένον μὲν οἷον ἀριθμὸς καὶ λόγος, συνεχὲς δὲ γραμμή, ἐπιφάνεια, σῶμα, ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτα
χρόνος καὶ τόπος. τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ μορίων οὐδείς ἐστι κοινὸς ὅρος, πρὸς ὃν συνάπτει τὰ
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Aristotle’s characterisation sounds as follows. Quantified items are either con-

tinuous or discrete. A quantified item is continuous if it is such that its parts
join together at a common boundary. An example of a quantified continuous
item is a line. A quantified item is discrete if it is such that its parts do not join
together at a common boundary. An example of a quantified discrete item is
number.
Some light on this distinction might be thrown by a second and differ-
ent account of continuity which Aristotle puts forward in the Physics, VI 1,
231a21–b18. Here he ascribes to continuous quantities in particular one feature:
that of being divisible only into divisibles that are always divisible (231b16–17:
πᾶν συνεχὲς διαιρετὸν εἰς αἰεὶ διαιρετά).
Aristotle’s characterisation can be understood in the light of its context.30
In Physics V 3 he defines what it is for one thing to be continuous with another
thing. He begins by defining ‘succession’ (τὸ ἐφεξῆς): one thing succeeds
another thing when it comes after it, in position or in some other way, and
there is nothing between them that is of the same kind (226b34–227a6). A
special case of succession is ‘being next to’ (τὸ ἐχόμενον): one thing is next
to another when it succeeds it and is also in contact with it (227a6), contact
being defined as occurring when (some parts of) the limits of the two things
are in exactly the same place (226b21–3). A special case of being next to is con-
tinuity (τὸ συνεχές): one thing is continuous with another when they are next
to one another and in addition the limits at which they touch are the same
thing, or ‘have become one’, being indeed ‘held together’ as the word συνεχές
implies. Aristotle’s thought evidently is that things which are merely next to
one another need not hold together – one may move leaving the other where
it is – whereas if they are continuous then they move together (227a10–13).31
At the opening of book VI Aristotle recalls the definition of being continu-
ous with he has given in V 3, and appears to suppose that it has also explained
what it is for a single thing to be a continuous thing – or a continuum – though
μόρια αὐτοῦ· οἷον τὰ πέντε εἰ ἔστι τῶν δέκα μόριον, πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει τὰ πέντε
καὶ τὰ πέντε, ἀλλὰ διώρισται· καὶ τὰ τρία γε καὶ τὰ ἑπτὰ πρὸς οὐδένα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει· οὐδ’
ὅλως ἂν ἔχοις ἐπ’ ἀριθμοῦ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν μορίων, ἀλλ’ἀεὶ διώρισται· ὥστε ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς
τῶν διωρισμένων ἐστίν … ἡ δὲ γραμμὴ συνεχές ἐστιν· ἔστι γὰρ λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον πρὸς ὃν τὰ
μόρια αὐτῆς συνάπτει, στιγμήν· καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας γραμμήν, τὰ γὰρ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου μόρια πρός
τινα κοινὸν ὅρον συνάπτει. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔχοις ἂν λαβεῖν κοινὸν ὅρον, γραμ-
μὴν ἢ ἐπιφάνειαν, πρὸς ἣν τὰ τοῦ σώματος μόρια συνάπτει.
30 I owe the sketch which follows to D. Bostock, Space, Time, Matter, and Forms: Essays on
Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 159–60.
31 Aristotle, Phys. V 3, 227a10–13: τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς ἔστι μὲν ὅπερ ἐχόμενόν τι, λέγω δ’ εἶναι συνεχὲς
ὅταν ταὐτὸ γένηται καὶ ἓν τὸ ἑκατέρου πέρας οἷς ἅπτονται, καὶ ὥσπερ σημαίνει τοὔνομα, συνέ-
χηται. τοῦτο δ’ οὐχ οἷόν τε δυοῖν ὄντοιν εἶναι τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν.
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40 Chapter 1
clearly he has not explained this at all (231a21–26). The idea at stake in his
argument must be that if a quantity is a continuum, then its parts must be con-
tinuous with one another – so that his argument runs more or less as follows.
If a quantified item is continuous, then its parts must be continuous with one
another – i.e., as Aristotle puts it in Physics V 3, their extremities must be one;
or, as he puts it in Cat., the parts of the quantity at stake must join together at a
common boundary. Now two indivisible quantities cannot have any boundary
or extremity in common – since they do not have any boundary or extremity
at all. So a continuous quantity cannot be divided into indivisible parts. The
fact that a continuous quantity cannot be divided into indivisible parts derives
from the fact that the parts of a continuous quantity must be continuous with
one another, i.e. they must share a common boundary.
Following White, we might formulate the Aristotelian characterisation
of continuous quantities in a way which emphasises such a relationship: what
is continuous cannot be divided into parts which are both jointly exhaustive
(i.e. such that no part of the original whole is left out) and mutually disjoint (i.e.
such that none of them overlaps with any other); what is discrete or discontin-
uous can be divided in parts so characterised.32 This enables us to understand
why a line is an example of a quantified continuous item. Take a line AB, and
divide it into two segments, AC and DB. Either C = D or C ≠ D. In the former
case there is an overlap, the two segments containing a point in common. In
the latter case either there is a gap between C and D so that the division is not
exhaustive, or else C is to the right of D, so that there is an overlap.33
Aristotle’s characterisation of continuous and discrete items and his indica-
tion of line as an example of continuum appear understandable. By contrast,
his main example of discrete items, number, is far from being clear. What does
Aristotle mean by ‘number’; and how can we make sense of his talking of the
boundaries of number? Scholars have different views on the matter. Ackrill
claims that it is surely aggregates whose parts are countable that Aristotle has
in mind. Under this assumption, though, his claim that the parts of numbers –
i.e. of aggregates or groups – have no common boundary is false: the fingers
of a hand join together to make one hand, but they remain five fingers. If
Aristotle was talking about natural numbers such as 1, 2, 3, …, his point could
32 Cf. M.J. White, The Continuous and the Discrete: Ancient Physical Theories from a Contem-
porary Perspective, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 8.
33 We need to be careful in specifying what is to count as an overlap. It cannot be a matter
of having some part in common, since points are not parts of lines. It might do to say that
two lines overlap if they have at least one point in common. (If they have a part, i.e. a seg-
ment, in common, then a fortiori they have points in common.)
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have been that there is no sense in saying that number 3 touches or joins on
to number 4.34 Bodéüs takes Aristotle to neglect the gap between abstract
numbers and numbered items. He recognises that Aristotle’s characterisa-
tion of discrete does not hold of multiplicities, and explains it on the ground
that ‘it is the collection of individuals with no reciprocal contact that gives the
idea of countable multiplicity’. The Aristotelian claim according to which the
parts of a number are not in contact would refer to the idea that while points
might be in contact, numbers cannot be so – consecutive numbers are not
in contact.35
Some light on the matter might be thrown by Cattanei’s recent analysis of
Cat. 6, 4b20–5b10.36 In the Metaphysics Aristotle reports the Euclidean defi-
nition of number in terms of ‘multitude of units’ (πλῆθος μονάδων);37 in the
Categories, though, he does not mention it. Here, as we have seen, number
is characterised as a whole. The parts of a given number, say 10, are smaller
natural numbers whose sum amounts to the number at stake – e.g. 5 and 5,
or 7 and 3. The numerical parts are discrete: they are not in contact with one
another in such a way that the limit (ὅρος) of one part coincides with that of
the other. So any number (say 3) which constitutes a part of a given number
(10) is taken to have limits, but not to share them with the other parts of the
number (7).
34 Ackrill’s view that ‘when [Aristotle] lists numbers with lines, surfaces, etc., it is surely numer-
able aggregates that he must have in mind’ (Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione,
cit., p. 93; cf. 94) appears to be grounded on the remark that in the passage at stake
Aristotle lists the owners of quantitative properties: lines, surfaces, solids, etc. (see p. 91).
Barnes appears to share Ackrill’s view: ‘Aristotle is thinking not of the natural numbers (1,
2, 3, etc.) but rather of numbers of things; not, as the Greeks put it, of the numbers which
count but of the numbers which are counted’ (‘Aristotelian Quantities’, cit., p. 367). The
Ancients did not think that 1 and 0 were numbers. So the contrast at issue, here, is that
between understanding ἀριθμός as referring to the members of the set of natural numbers
2, 3, 4, etc., or understanding it as referring to a plurality. On this distinction, cf. B. Russell,
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, London, Allen and New York, Macmillan, 1919,
pp. 11–12: ‘A particular number is not identical with any collection of terms having that
number: the number 3 is not identical with the trio consisting of Brown, Jones, and
Robinson. The number 3 is something which all trios have in common, and which distin-
guishes them from other collections. A number is something that characterises certain
collections, namely, those that have that number’.
35 Cf. R. Bodéüs (ed.), Aristote. Catégories, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2001, pp. 104–5: he refers
to Aristotle, Phys. V 3, 227a27–30.
36 E. Cattanei, ‘Aristotele, Categorie 4b20–5b10. Le quantità in senso proprio’, in M. Bonelli
and F.G. Masi (eds.), Studi sulle Categorie di Aristotele, cit., pp. 135–55.
37 Arist. Met. I 1, 1053a30; cf. Μ 8, 1083a6.
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42 Chapter 1
Cattanei argues that this conception of number corresponds in many

ways to the characterisation of number 10 to be found in the fragments of
Speusippus’ On the Pythagorean Numbers (fr. 122 Isnardi Parente) as well as in
other sources which seem to go back to the Ancient Pythagoreans. The theory
at stake in these texts is that of figured numbers: its supporters represent the
sequence of natural numbers {2, 3, 4, 5…} through arrangements of rows of
points, for instance as follows:
.. … …. …..
This might explain Aristotle’s claim that numbers, insofar as they are discrete
quantities, have parts which ‘have no common boundary at which they join
together’. If you take this arrangement of points, ‘…..’, to represent number 5,
and these other arrangements, ‘…’ and ‘..’, to represent its jointly exhaustive
parts – number 3 and number 2 respectively – then the limits of these arrange-
ments (their points) cannot be in contact. Of course, given the arrangements
‘…’ and ‘..’, it is possible to conceive an arrangement of points in which they
share a limit, i.e.: ‘….’. But this does not represent a number of which ‘…’ and ‘..’
are jointly exhaustive parts – it does not represent number 5.
We are now able to read Sextus’ presentation of his target in the light of
the Aristotelian account from which it derives. Consider a quantified item –
an item of which you can say that it is ‘of a certain quantity’. It is a plurality
if it is countable, a magnitude if it is measurable. A plurality is divisible in
non-continuous parts – parts which are both exhaustive and mutually dis-
joint; a magnitude is divisible in continuous parts – parts which are either
exhaustive or mutually disjoint. Items of the first kind possess a certain
quantitative property, number; items of the second kind possess a different
quantitative property, magnitude. Any item of the first kind is such that it
admits question-answer pairs of the form ‘How many Fs?’-‘n Fs’; any item of
the second kind is such that it admits question-answer pairs of the form ‘How
much M?’-‘n measures of M’. The discipline attacked by Sextus deals with the
quantitative property held by items of the first kind: number.
3 Arithmetic, Philosophy of Number, and Sextus’ Strategy in M IV
In M IV 1, Sextus announces that he wants to show that the there is no art or

science of arithmetic since its alleged subject matter, number, does not exist.
But what does Sextus discuss about in the rest of his treatise – which kind
of reflection on number does elicit Sextus’ attention? In order to tackle this
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question, it is important to distinguish several theoretical approaches to num-

ber that were taken in ancient times. The first is represented by books VII, VIII
and IX of Euclid’s Elements, the so-called ‘arithmetical books’,38 which con-
stitute the only surviving Greek document devoted to the theory of numbers
and proceeding in a demonstrative way. A second approach is constituted by
the philosophical and mathematical account of numbers contained in texts
by neo-Pythagorean or Platonist authors. We may mention here Nichomachus
of Gerasa (first-second century AD) and his Introduction to Arithmetic; the
commentaries on Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic – in particular, that
by Iamblichus of Chalcis (third–fourth century AD) which, despite its tradi-
tional title, is a treatise on numbers based on the Introduction rather than a
commentary on it;39 and also the arithmetical sections of the Mathematics
Useful for Understanding Plato by Theo of Smyrna (second century AD). In
some parts of these works by Theo and Iamblichus we find, in addition to the
philosophical and mathematical account of numbers, a description of alleged
mystic or symbolic properties of the first ten numbers.40 Nicomachus himself
indulged in these arithmological ponderings, not in his Introduction but in a
lost writing called Θεολογούμενα ἀριθμητικῆς. Parts of the compilation which
has come to us under that title, was edited by Ast, and used to be ascribed
to Iamblichus may derive from Nicomachus’ lost work.41 A third and different
approach is represented by the ᾽Αριθμητικά by Diophantus of Alexandria, an
algebraic work of crucial importance for the history of the discipline. This is
a collection of 130 problems giving numerical solutions for determinate equa-
tions (those with a unique solution), and indeterminate equations.42
Let us focus in particular on the first two approaches, starting from Euclid’s
arithmetical books. These are constituted by a set of 22 Definitions of terms,
followed by three sets of Propositions, i.e. truths about the things denoted
38 By Euclid himself, who in book 10, Demonstration 9.100, refers to them as the ἀριθμητικοί.
39 Cf. the remarks by Robbins in M.L. D’Ooge (ed.), Nichomachus of Gerasa. Introduction to
Arithmetic, with studies in Greek arithmetic by F.E. Robbins and L.C. Karpinski, New York,
The Macmillan Company, 1926, p. 126.
40 Cf. e.g. Iamblichus, in Nic. 11.1–26; Theo, Expositio, 94.1–106.11. I owe both the point and the
references to B. Vitrac (ed.), Euclide. Les Éléments, vol. 1–4, Paris, PUF, 1990–2001, vol. 2,
p. 474.
41 Cf. T.L. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1921, vol. 1,
p. 97. For a sketch of Nicomachus’ arithmological approach and its antecedents see the
remarks by Robbins in M.L. D’Ooge (ed.), Nichomachus of Gerasa, cit., pp. 89–92; the same
approach is to be found in Anatolius of Alexandria.
42 Cf. J.J. O’Connor and E. Robertson, ‘Diophantus of Alexandria’, in Mac Tutor History
of Mathematics Archive, St. Andrews, 1999 (http://www.history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk
/Biographies/Diophantus.html).
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44 Chapter 1
by the terms just defined. The Definitions and the Propositions concern the
properties of and relationships between two items: (i) unit; and (ii) numbers.
Let us consider an example of Euclid’s modus operandi: his definitions of unit,
number, and numbers prime to one another on one side, and Proposition I
on the other:
Df. 1. A unit is that by virtue of which each of the things that exist is called
one. Df. 2. A number is a multitude composed of units … Df. 12. Numbers
prime to one another are those which are measured by a unit alone as
common measure …
Proposition I. Two unequal numbers being set out, and the smaller
being continually subtracted in turn from the greater, if the number
which is left never measures the one before it until a unit is left, the origi-
nal numbers will be prime to one another (Euclid, Elements, VII).43
Two things are worth noting. First: the content of the arithmetical books, as
the content of the other books of the Elements, is characterised by a deductive
structure: the Propositions are derived from the Definitions by way of deduc-
tions. Given the definitions of unit, number, and numbers prime to one another,
it follows that Proposition I is true.44 Second: there is no philosophy of number
or metaphysics in Euclid’s text, at least in the following sense. Euclid is practis-
ing arithmetic: he does not discuss or argue for the principles of arithmetic;
furthermore, Euclid does not deal with the metaphysical question of what it is
for a number to exist: he just assumes that it exists.45
43 Euclid, Elements, VII: Μονάς ἐστιν, καθ’ ἣν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἓν λέγεται. Ἀριθμὸς δὲ τὸ ἐκ
μονάδων συγκείμενον πλῆθος… Πρῶτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί εἰσιν οἱ μονάδι μόνῃ μετρούμενοι
κοινῷ μέτρῳ … Δύο ἀριθμῶν ἀνίσων ἐκκειμένων, ἀνθυφαιρουμένου δὲ ἀεὶ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἀπὸ
τοῦ μείζονος, ἐὰν ὁ λειπόμενος μηδέποτε καταμετρῇ τὸν πρὸ ἑαυτοῦ, ἕως οὗ λειφθῇ μονάς, οἱ ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ἀριθμοὶ πρῶτοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔσονται. Translation by T.L. Heath, Euclid. The Thirteen
Books of the Elements, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 19262, slightly modified.
44 And in Euclid’s text Proposition I is followed by its proof.
45 But doesn’t Euclid at least appear to take one of the two main metaphysical lines on num-
bers drawn in Antiquity? The Platonists argued that numbers exist independently from
countable items; the Aristotelians claimed that the existence of the former amounts to
that of the latter. To put the point linguistically, number words have an adjectival (‘One
leg is good, two legs is better’) and a substantival (‘Two is twice one’) use. It is the substan-
tival use of number words – the one we adopt when we do arithmetic – which insinuates
that numbers have a separate existence from countable items. One way to neutralise the
point and argue for the Aristotelian position is to suggest that the substantival use is para-
sitical upon the adjectival use – i.e., roughly, that the meaning of the substantive ‘two’ is
to be explained by reference to the meaning of ‘two Fs’ (see J. Barnes, ‘Metaphysics’, in
J. Barnes (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge, Cambridge University
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Let us now consider the second theoretical approach to number distin-

guished above; and let us deal, in particular, with Nicomachus’ Introduction
to Arithmetic. This treatise, as its title suggests, is an introduction to the ἀριθ-
μητικὴ τέχνη. This discipline is characterised at the beginning of the treatise
in contrast with other sciences, on the basis of a distinction between beings:
Beings, then, both those properly so called and those so called by homon-
ymy (that is, both the objects of thought and the objects of perception),
are some of them unified and continuous, for example, an animal, the
universe, a tree, and the like, which are properly and peculiarly called
‘magnitudes’; others are discontinuous, in a side-by-side arrangement,
and, as it were, in heaps, which are called ‘multitudes’, a flock, for instance,
a people, a heap, a chorus, and the like. Wisdom, then, must be consid-
ered to be the science of these two Forms [i.e. magnitude and multitude].
Nicomachus then specifies that the science in question cannot be a science

of magnitude and multitude per se, but of something separated from each of
them: of quantity, set off from multitude; and of size, set off from magnitude.
He concludes that
since of quantity one kind is viewed by itself, having no relation to any-

thing else, as ‘even’, ‘odd’ … and the other is relative to something else
and is conceived of together with its relationship to another thing, like
‘double’, ‘greater’, ‘smaller’ … it is clear that two sciences will lay hold
of and deal with the whole investigation of quantity: arithmetic, abso-
lute quantity; and music, relative quantity (Nicomachus, Introduction to
Arithmetic I.2.4–3.1).46
Press, 1995, p. 87). Now Euclid defines ‘unit’ – i.e. the things arithmeticians refer to when
they say that 10 contains 3 more units than 7 – in terms of ‘one’, the ordinary adjective we
use in answering e.g. the question: ‘How many legs did Long John Silver have?’; and inso-
far as he takes the substantive ‘unit’ to derive from the corresponding adjective, one might
think that he is implicitly taking an Aristotelian line (rather than a Platonist line) on the
metaphysical question of what it is, for a number, to exist. This is a tempting thought; but
the temptation is appeased by the fact that Euclid’s definition of ‘unit’ (Μονάς ἐστιν καθ’ ἣν
ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἓν λέγεται) is actually quite close to the definition of ‘one’ which Sextus
ascribes to Plato (ἕν ἐστιν οὗ μηδὲν χωρὶς λέγεται ἕν) in M IV 11.
46 Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic I.2.4–3.1: Τῶν τοίνυν ὄντων τῶν τε κυρίως
καὶ τῶν καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοητῶν τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν, τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα καὶ ἀλληλου-
χούμενα, οἷον ζῶον, κόσμος, δένδρον καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, ἅπερ κυρίως καὶ ἰδίως καλεῖται μεγέθη, τὰ
δὲ διῃρημένα τε καὶ ἐν παραθέσει καὶ οἷον κατὰ σωρείαν, ἃ καλεῖται πλήθη, οἷον ποίμνη, δῆμος,
σωρός, χορὸς καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια. Τῶν ἄρα δύο εἰδῶν τούτων ἐπιστήμην νομιστέον τὴν σοφίαν
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46 Chapter 1
He then distinguishes between two sciences which deal with size: geom-
etry on one side, and astronomy on the other.47 Let us focus on the crucial
steps of Nicomachus’ presentation. There are two kinds of beings (ὄντα): the
properly-called beings (i.e. the objects of thought: νοητά), and the beings by
homonymy (i.e. the objects of perception: αἰσθητά). In both cases we can dis-
tinguish further between beings which are unified and continuous (ἡνωμένα
καὶ ἀλληλουχούμενα), e.g. the living being, the world, the tree, which are called
magnitudes (μεγέθη); and beings which are divided and juxtaposed and as
in heaps (τὰ δὲ διῃρημένα τε καὶ ἐν παραθέσει καὶ οἷον κατὰ σωρείαν), which are
called multitudes (πλήθη), e.g. a flock, a people, a chorus. We have then the
distinction of four sciences: two of them, arithmetic and music, deal with two
different aspects of the first kind of beings – multitudes; and the other two,
geometry and astronomy, with two different aspects of the second kind of
beings – magnitudes.
Nicomachus’ Introduction is articulated in four parts, each dedicated to one
of four fundamental themes concerning numbers. For every theme Nicomachus
puts forward a classification of concepts constituted by a set of Definitions, fol-
lowed by examples. The classifications are the following: (i) the classification
of numbers considered in themselves, starting from the fundamental opposition
even vs. odd, and of the species which those two genera split into; (ii) the clas-
sification of the numerical ratios, according to the ten categories of the relative
quantity; (iii) the classification of the figured numbers; (iv) the account of the
theory of the ten proportions, which extends beyond arithmetic, but which is
treated here, because it constitutes a subject preliminary to the ensemble of
the mathematical studies.48
In several loci of the Introduction, in addition to (and mixed with) his expo-
sition of the mathematical properties of number, Nicomachus offers some
… ἐπεὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ τὸ μὲν ὁρᾶται καθ’ ἑαυτό, μηδεμίαν πρὸς ἄλλο σχέσιν ἔχον, οἷον ἄρτιον, περιτ-
τόν … τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλο πως ἤδη ἔχον καὶ σὺν τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσει ἐπινοούμενον, οἷον διπλάσιον,
μεῖζον, ἔλαττον … δῆλον ὅτι ἄρα δύο μέθοδοι ἐπιλήψονται ἐπιστημονικαὶ καὶ διευκρινήσουσι
πᾶν τὸ περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ σκέμμα, ἀριθμητικὴ μὲν τὸ περὶ τοῦ καθ’ ἑαυτό, μουσικὴ δὲ τὸ περὶ τοῦ
πρὸς ἄλλο. For this and the other passages from Nicomachus’ IA I offer the translation by
D’Ooge, slightly modified.
47 On the classification of mathematical sciences in Nicomachus, its antecedents in Plato’s
Republic and its relationship with the classification offered by Geminus and witnessed in
Proclus, In Eucl. 38–42 see Robbins in M.L. D’Ooge (ed.), Nichomachus of Gerasa, cit., at
p. 184, n. 1; B. Vitrac, ‘Les classifications des sciences mathématiques en Grèce ancienne’,
cit., pp. 269–301.
48 I owe this sketch of the structure of the Introduction to B. Vitrac, Euclide. Les Éléments,
cit., vol. 2, p. 475.
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reflections on the principle, or principles, of arithmetic. Thus, at IA I.8.2 we

read that
unit alone, because it does not have two numbers on either side of it, is
half merely of the adjoining number; hence unit is the natural starting
point of all number (Nicomachus, Introduction to Arithmetic I.8.2)49
Nicomachus’ point may be grasped in the light of his previous remarks (IA
I.8.1). Consider the sequence of natural number 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 … With the
exception of 1, every number in the sequence is half the sum of the two on
either side of itself, and half the sum of those next in either direction, and
of those next beyond them, and so on. Thus, 5 is half the sum of 3 + 7, of 2 +
8, and so on. The number 1 (here identified with the unit), however, does not
have such a property: for it is half of its successor (2), and does not have any
number preceding it in the sequence: therefore it is by nature the starting
point of all numbers in the sequence. Elsewhere (IA II.17.1, 18.1 and 4, 19.1, 20.2)
Nicomachus indicates and provides reasons for thinking that the ἀρχαί of all
numbers and of all things are sameness and otherness: sameness is further
held by Nicomachus to be identical with the unit, and otherness, with the two
(IA II.18.1; also 17.2; 18.4).
Thus, the content of the Introduction to Arithmetic is characterised by a cou-
ple of features that are opposite to the ones we emphasised à propos Euclid’s
Elements VII, VIII and IX. First of all, as has long been noticed, Nicomachus’ dis-
cussion is not laid out as a deductive science. Heath, for instance, observes that
it is a very far cry from Euclid to Nicomachus. In the Introductio arith-

metica … there are no longer any proofs in the proper sense of the word:
when a general proposition has been enunciated, Nicomachus regards
it as sufficient to show that it is true in particular instances; sometimes
we are left to infer the general proposition by induction from particular
cases which are alone given.50
49 Nicomachus of Gerasa, Introduction to Arithmetic I.8.2: μονωτάτη δὲ ἡ μονὰς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν

ἑκατέρωθεν αὐτὴν δύο ἀριθμοὺς ἑνὸς μόνου τοῦ παρακειμένου ἥμισύς ἐστιν· ἀρχὴ ἄρα πάντων
φυσικὴ ἡ μονάς.
50 T.L. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics, cit., vol. 1, pp. 97–8. In his introduction to the
more recent French translation of Euclid’s Elements, Caveing observes that ‘the Euclidean
form is the demonstrative form which puts forward the reasons why the results of a sci-
ence are necessarily true: it is distinct from other forms of expositions, which we have
also specimens of – e.g. Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic, in which these reasons
are not given, but the results are commented on from other points of view’ (in B. Vitrac,
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48 Chapter 1
Second, and more importantly for our aims, in some parts of Nicomachus’
Introduction we do find some pieces of (neo-Pythagorean) metaphysics and
philosophy of number. Nicomachus tackles the question of what it is, for num-
ber, to exist (and of course he takes a Platonist line on the matter: number has
an existence independent from numerables), and with the question whether
there is any kind of item whose existence depends on that of number, and any
kind of item on whose existence that of number depends. Furthermore, he
tries to elucidate, to explain, and to justify the principle(s) of arithmetic.
Now given those two different approaches to numbers, which of them elicit
Sextus’ attention in Against the Arithmeticians? The content of M IV 2–34 will
be analysed in detail in the next chapters of this volume, but a quick glance at it
suffices to answer the question. In M IV 2–10 Sextus offers a sample of the discus-
sion of numbers in which he is interested. This is a sketch of the ‘Pythagorean’
philosophy of number: some philosophers, based on the Timaeus and other
texts by Plato and his immediate successors in the Old Academy, built up a
system in which all beings in the universe are allegedly shown to derive from
numbers. Since the system is grounded on two principles, the Platonic notions
of the one and the two, Sextus objects in various ways to the former (11–20)
and to the latter (21–2), and he ends by putting forward arguments against the
intelligibility of the processes which are supposed to generate numbers, that is
to say subtraction and addition (23–34).
It is pretty clear that Sextus, in M IV, does not discuss something along the
lines of the content of the arithmetical books of the Elements with people
like Euclid;51 he rather discusses something along the lines of the account of
number that may be found in the Introduction to Arithmetic with people like
Nicomachus.52 And this is an interesting fact, particularly if we consider it in
Euclide. Les Éléments, cit., vol. 1, p. 114). In the same work Vitrac, after having made a
comparison between Euclid’s and Nicomachus’ classification of even and odd number,
emphasises the very strict deductive structure which characterises Euclid’s sequence
and is absent in Nicomachus’ one, and explains this fact by suggesting that ‘the human
intervention implied by a demonstration would risk making the reader believe in a con-
ventional character of arithmetic’s results. But these results, from Nicomachus’ point of
view, are an objective reality independent of our grasp of it, which it is right to describe,
not to justify’. The translations are mine.
51 Least of all does Sextus discuss works like Diophantus’ attack on algebraic treatise with
people like him.
52 And also people like Theo, and Platonist or neo-Pythagorean approaches to ἀριθμητική
which accounted for mystic and symbolic features of numbers in addition to their mathe-
matical and metaphysical properties. As Brisson observes, ‘Sextus’ systematic demolition
calls into question anything which could be taught by the Neo-Pythagoreans in the
first centuries of our era’, and that is ‘a theoretical context in which naturally converge
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the light of what Sextus does in the preceding essay, Against the Geometers. In
this treatise, consistent with the general strategy he adopts in M IV I, Sextus
wants to show that geometry is not really an art, since it has no object. He
starts by attacking the procedure of the geometers (and others) of ‘postulat-
ing their geometrical first principles by hypothesis’53 (7–17). Sextus indicates
that his targets are the ὑποθέσεις understood in a specific sense, according to
which ‘we call hypotheses the first principles of proofs: for an hypothesis is the
postulating of a fact for the establishing of something’ (III 4); he then attacks
the reasonableness of accepting any such first principle (7–17).54 He subse-
quently tries to show the falsity, inconsistency, and unacceptability of some of
the principles of geometry in particular (18). Sextus attacks first the definitions
of fundamental notions such as point, line, surface, and body (19–93), and then
derived notions such as straight line, angle, and circle (94–107). Sextus’ purpose
is to show that the objects of the alleged geometrical truths are inconceivable.
Some of his arguments concern the relation between geometrical objects of n
dimensions (lines, surfaces, solids) and objects of n-1 dimensions (points, lines,
surfaces); others directly attack definitions, for instance on the grounds that
there is some incoherence in them.55 In a final section (108–16), Sextus trains
his fire on the theorems or derived truths of geometry – in particular, on the
possibility of bisecting a given straight line.
Pythagoreanism and Platonism, just as it was the case in the Old Academy of Speusippus
and Xenocrates and in Middle Platonism’ (‘Contre les arithméticiens ou contre ceux qui
enseignent que les nombres sont des principes’, in J. Delattre (ed.), Sur le Contre les profes-
seurs, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3, 2005, pp. 67–77, at p. 70).
The translation and the italics are mine.
53 Sextus, M III 1: ἐξ ὑποθέσεως αἰτεῖσθαι τὰς τῆς γεωμετρίας ἀρχάς. The translation of the pas-
sages from M III is by J. Barnes, The Toils of Scepticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1990, p. 95.
54 Sextus Empiricus, M III 4: κατὰ τρίτην ἐπιβολὴν ὑπόθεσιν καλοῦμεν ἀρχὴν ἀποδείξεως, αἴτη-
σιν οὖσαν πράγματος εἰς κατασκευήν τινος. As Barnes (The Toils of Scepticism, cit., pp. 90–6)
has shown, Sextus’ targets here are the hypotheses in a broad Aristotelian sense – the first
or primary or primitive principles from which the remaining truths or theorems of a sci-
ence are derived. Sextus has in mind a method of proof which begins by someone laying
down certain propositions as first principles, an act which commits him to their truth and
constitutes the starting point in the demonstration of a theorem. Sextus rightly supposes
that this method is not peculiar to geometers, but common to anyone supposing that all
knowledge depends on some principles; thus, before raising specific difficulties against
some geometrical principles, he attacks the reasonableness of accepting any principle by
means of the hypothetical mode (for a sharp analysis of Sextus’ attack, see Barnes, The
Toils of Scepticism, cit., pp. 96–112).
55 Cf. I. Mueller, ‘Geometry and Scepticism’, in J. Barnes, J. Brunschwig, M.F. Burnyeat,
M. Schofield (eds.), Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 69–95, at pp. 71–2.
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50 Chapter 1
What are Sextus’ sources and at whom does he aim his refutations? The
origin of Sextus’ arguments and the identity of his adversaries have been profit-
ably debated in the last 35 years. Sextus mentions no geometer but Eratosthenes
(M III 28) and no title of geometrical treatise. As Dye and Vitrac point out,56
Heiberg, the modern editor of Euclid, uses Sextus as a witness of the Euclidean
tradition for Definitions I.2, 4, 8, 15 and Proposition I.10, which he would men-
tion in M III 29, 94, 100, 107 and 109. Heiberg believes that Sextus read the
Elements (and that he had a correct text in comparison to that of Iamblichus);57
he is followed by Heath.58 This position is nuanced by Mueller. He takes Sextus’
target to be ‘Euclidean geometry’: if it is clear that Sextus puts forward and
attacks (among other things) variants of Euclid’s definitions of line, surface,
body, straight line, and circle, the provenance of Sextus’ targets and arguments
is not immediately obvious: and Mueller stresses the relationship between
some of them and Stoic and Epicurean philosophising. Cambiano adds further
details: he suggests that Sextus’ targets were likely to include, in addition to
geometers such as Euclid and Heron, some philosophers, presumably Stoics,
who took the definitions of some fundamental notions such as point, line, and
solid as relevant to philosophy. As for his arguments, Cambiano finds it likely
that Sextus drew from both the Epicureans and the Academics.59
Most recently, Dye and Vitrac have contributed to this scholarly trend. They
argue that such technical geometrical treatises by Euclid and his colleagues
as the Elements were used in the framework of a specialised education, while
other more elementary writings, geometrical introductions, were used in a
cycle of mathematical studies propaedeutic to philosophy imparted in some
philosophical schools at Sextus’ time.60 The existence of these geometri-
cal elementary handbooks is suggested by Nicomachus himself (who in his
Introduction to Arithmetic II.6.1 mentions an Introduction to Geometry),61 but
none of them has survived. According to Dye and Vitrac, then, Sextus’ attack
on the foundations of geometry does not aim at refuting the sophisticated
presentations of this discipline offered by Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonius,
Pappus or Eutocius, but rather the use of geometry made by mathematicians
56 Cf. G. Dye and B. Vitrac, ‘Le Contre les géomètres de Sextus Empiricus: sources, cibles,
structure’, Phronesis, 54/2, 2009, pp. 155–203, at p. 168.
57 Cf. J.L. Heiberg and E.S. Stamatis, Euclidis Elementa, vol. 1–5, Leipzig, Teubner, 1969–1977,
vol. 4, p. lxxii.
58 Cf. T.L. Heath, Euclid. The Thirteen Books of the Elements, cit., pp. 62–3.
59 Cf. I. Mueller, ‘Geometry and Scepticism’, cit.; G. Cambiano, ‘Philosophy, Science and
Medicine’, in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of
Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 585–614.
60 G. Dye and B. Vitrac, ‘Le Contre les géomètres’, cit., pp. 200–1.
61 Cf. T.L. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics, cit., vol. 1, p. 97.
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and philosophers to provide a model for the physical world along the lines
of Plato’s Timaeus.62 An important trace of this use is to be found in DL VII
135, where Diogenes Laertius reports that the Stoic Apollodorus of Seleucia
(second-first century BC) provided a disjunctive characterisation of basic
geometrical notions in the context of a treatise entitled Physics63 – and pre-
sumably devoted to an account of the physical world. In his attack on point,
line, surface, and body in M III 18–93, Sextus would not be referring to Euclid’s
Elements, but either to Stoic or Academic treatises in philosophy of mathemat-
ics, or to Pyrrhonian or Epicurean anti-geometrical writings attacking these
treatises;64 and in his attack on the derived notions of straight line, angle, and
circle in M III 94–107 and on the geometrical theorems in 108–16, containing
four out of the five Euclidean items that Heiberg thought he could identify,
Sextus would draw from Epicureans attacking Euclid.65
Let us reflect on the features of M III and M IV we have highlighted so far.
In both of them, Sextus aims at showing the inexistence of the mathemati-
cal science at stake (geometry and arithmetic) by showing the inexistence of
its subject matter. In both, Sextus’ direct interlocutors appear or turn out to
be philosophers of mathematics rather than practising mathematicians. Why
does Sextus, wanting to show the inexistence of the subject matter of the two
mathematical disciplines, focus on treatises of philosophy of mathematics
rather than mathematics? Let us ask this question about M IV in particular.
We have seen that Nicomachus’ Introduction aims inter alia at discussing and
giving the reader some reasons for thinking that the principles of arithmetic,
the ones stating what unit and numbers are, are true, and are good candi-
dates for being the right definitions of unit and numbers – that the starting
points of arithmetic are well chosen. These reasons are not discussable within
mathematics – that is to say, they are not discussable by mathematicians who
are in the business of practising mathematics like Euclid in his Elements. Thus
Euclid, in his arithmetical books, cannot and does not argue for or discuss the
principles of arithmetic: he posits them without justifying them.
It is a feature of Against the Professors that it often launches its attacks on
the various arts by showing that there exists no object for the alleged science
to study. As we have just emphasised, this holds for M IV in particular. But if
one is to offer arguments against the existence of numbers, as Sextus does in
M IV, clearly one is in the business of rejecting the very definitions and starting
62 G. Dye and B. Vitrac, ‘Le Contre les géomètres’, cit., p. 171.

65 G. Dye and B. Vitrac, ‘Le Contre les géomètres’, cit., pp. 179–80.
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52 Chapter 1
points of arithmetic. So Sextus is doing something similar to Nicomachus: he is

looking at the definitions and principles of arithmetic. But where Nicomachus
sought to elucidate and illuminate and argue for them, Sextus wants to find
arguments to show that unit and number cannot be the sort of thing that these
axioms or principles want them to be.
Thus, the following picture of Sextus’ target, sources, and direct interloc-
utors in M IV emerges. Sextus’ target is the art of arithmetic as practised by
the arithmeticians. Sextus undermines that art by offering counterarguments
to its principles – the definitions of unit and number: for these counterargu-
ments would lead one to suspend one’s judgement as to whether numbers are
real or not, and that in turn would undercut the epistemic foundations of the
art. In doing so, Sextus draws from and interacts with Dogmatic philosophers
of mathematics, who provided arguments in favour of the standard defini-
tions of unit and number, rather than with practising mathematicians, who
could not and did not do so.66 In other words, Sextus discusses with people
like Nicomachus the foundations of the art or science of number practised by
people like Euclid – for if he manages to provoke suspension of judgement on
the existence of the foundations, then he manages to provoke suspension of
judgement on the existence of the art. In this respect, Sextus follows a strategy
quite close to the one he adopts in M III. The strategy amounts to discussing
the foundations of the art because, if these are destroyed, then everything else
falls down.
66 This account of Sextus’ strategy owes much to some remarks put forward by Benjamin
Morison during my soutenance d’HDR. Morison invited me to explain the fact that
Sextus focuses on Nicomachus’ theoretical approach to number (rather than on Euclid’s
approach) by referring to the fact that Sextus wants to interact with those who argue for
the principles of arithmetic – since he is in the business of arguing against them.
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Chapter 2
M IV 2–10: The Derivation System, the Old

Academy, and Posidonius
1 Textual Remarks
The text edited by Mau is quite problematical when it comes to the number
four. At M IV 3, it reads as follows: τετρακτὺς δὲ προσηγορεύετο παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὁ ἐκ
τῶν πρώτων ⟨δʹ⟩ ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος ‘τέταρτος ἀριθμός’ (‘They called “Tetraktys”
the fourth number composed of the first four numbers’). A number composed
of the first four numbers cannot itself be the fourth number – that is to say, the
number 4; and the quotation marks which Mau adds are neither legitimate nor
helpful. The expression ‘fourth number’ (τέταρτος ἀριθμός) appears in Mau’s
text in two other loci, M IV 5 and 9: in order to get clearer on the matter, let us
look at the three passages together, starting from the manuscripts.
At M IV 3, the manuscripts diverge:
ὁ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος τέταρτος ἀριθμός (ELVr)

ὁ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος τέσσαρα ἀριθμός (ζ).
At M IV 5, all the MSS read:
ὥστε ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ ἀριθμῷ τὸν τοῦ σώματος περιέχεσθαι λόγον.
At M IV 9, all the MSS read:
ὥστε εἰκότως τὸν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς εἰρῆσθαι πηγὴν
ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ’ ἔχουσαν.
Thus, as Theiler has pointed out, there is no tradition for the choice of the car-
dinal or ordinal number.
There are two main readings of these passages: one is provided by Bekker
and followed by Bury; the other is offered by Mau, who accepts the emenda-
tion by Mette at IV 3 and 9. Let us display the two readings side by side:

54 Chapter 2
Mau (Mette) Bekker
M IV 3 τετρακτὺς δὲ προσηγορεύετο παρ’ τετρακτὺς δὲ προσηγορεύετο παρ’

αὐτοῖς ὁ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ⟨δʹ⟩ ἀριθ- αὐτοῖς ὁ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων τεσσά-
μῶν συγκείμενος ‘τέταρτος ἀριθμός’. ρων ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος δέκα
ἀριθμός.
M IV 5 ὥστε ἐν τῷ ‘τετάρτῳ’ ἀριθμῷ τὸν ὥστε ἐν τῷ τέσσαρα ἀριθμῷ τὸν
τοῦ σώματος περιέχεσθαι λόγον. τοῦ σώματος περιέχεσθαι λόγον.
M IV 9 ὥστε εἰκότως τὸν ‘τέταρτον ὥστε εἰκότως τὸν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸν
ἀριθμὸν’ παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς παρὰ τοῖς Πυθαγορικοῖς εἰρῆσθαι
εἰρῆσθαι πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ’
ῥιζώματ’ἔχουσαν. ἔχουσαν.
In M IV 5, I take ‘τέσσαρα’ to be right. In any case, it certainly gives the right

sense. For if we keep the received reading, then we must surely understand ‘the
fourth number’ to refer to the number 4. In the context (and there are a dozen
parallels),1 we move from 1 = point, to 2 = line, …, to x = solid. Plainly, x must be
a number; plainly it can only be the number 4.
As far as M IV 3 is concerned, as Mau indicates in his apparatus, maybe
Bekker is right in introducing δέκα, if the archetype featured the Herodian
note for ten, Δ. However, I prefer a less intrusive emendation, stemming from
a note by Bett.2 Although he accepts and translates the text by Mau, in a note
he explores a different reading, based on a remark by Delattre.3 According to
this reading, the archetype read either ὁ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων δʹ ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος
ἀριθμός or ὁ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων τεσσάρων ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος ἀριθμός. The copist,
then, would have misplaced the mention of the number 4 after συγκείμενος
and either misunderstood δʹ as meaning ‘fourth’ or changed τεσσάρων into
τέταρτος. I am persuaded by this explanation; in any case, I think that the best
sense is achieved if we read
τετρακτὺς δὲ προσηγορεύετο παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὁ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ⟨τεσσάρων⟩ ἀριθ-

μῶν συγκείμενος ἀριθμός
1 For the closest loci similes see below, n. 39.

2 R. Bett, Sextus Empiricus. Against Those in the Disciplines, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2018, p. 185, n. 4.
3 See P. Pellegrin (ed.), Contre les Professeurs, Paris, Seuil, 2002, p. 357, n. 1.
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M IV 2–10: The Derivation System, the Old Academy, and Posidonius 55
(cf. the locus similis M VII 94; for a comparison of the accounts of the Tetraktys
provided by Sextus in M IV and VII, cf. infra).
As far as M IV 9 is concerned, the translators follow either the reading by
Mau (Bett, Delattre, Russo) or the one by Bekker (Bury). It is true that a branch
of the pertinent Pythagorean literature identifies the Tetraktys with the num-
ber 4 (cf. e.g. Anatolius, De decade 32) or ascribes to the number 4 the features
that in M IV 2–10 are ascribed to the Tetraktys (cf. e.g. Philo, De opificio mundi
47–52; De Vita Mosis II 116); a passage from Lucian (second century AD) also
witnesses this shift, by representing Pythagoras as saying ‘What you suppose is
four is really ten, and a perfect triangle, and our Oath’ (Vitarum auctio 4, 4–5: ἃ
σὺ δοκέεις τέσσαρα, ταῦτα δέκα ἐστὶ καὶ τρίγωνον ἐντελὲς καὶ ἡμέτερον ὅρκιον). The
question is whether Sextus’ M IV may be taken to belong to this branch – as
all the translators imply. I cannot see why: as Sextus says in IV 3, the Tetraktys
is the number 10. We might explain the presence of τέσσαρα in the received text
by indicating that the archetype wrote δʹ and by taking his δʹ as a misreading of
δέκα. I take the right reading to be δέκα in lieu of the received τέσσαρα.
At M IV 5, line 15, Delattre follows Bekker and prints the text of the MSS
while Mau, accepting a supplement by Bury, prints a different text:
Mau (Bury) Delattre
ποθὲν γάρ ποι ⟨καὶ πάλιν ποι⟩ ἐφέρετο ὁ νοῦς ποθὲν γάρ ποι ἐφέρετο ὁ νοῦς
Bett and Russo accept Bury’s supplement. This, as Mau indicates, comes
from a possible reading mentioned by Bekker in his apparatus. It is justified
by reference to the locus similis M VII 100 in which, if we accept an emenda-
tion suggested by Bekker and accepted by both Bury and Mau, the surface is
taken to correspond to the number three insofar as we move from one point to
another point and again to another point (⟨ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ὁ τρία ἀριθμός⟩
ποθὲν γάρ ⟨που⟩ πάρεστιν ἡ γραμμή, τουτέστιν ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημεῖον καὶ πάλιν
ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ ἄλλο σημεῖον). I think that there is no need for Bury’s supple-
ment and follow Delattre in reading the text of the MSS. For if we read the
transmitted text in its context, we find the standard sequence 1 = point, 2 =
line, 3 = surface, 4 = solid:4 after the generation of the line, associated with
the number two (ποθὲν γάρ ποι ἐφέρετο ὁ νοῦς), comes that of the surface,
associated with the number three (καὶ προστιθεμένης τῇ κατὰ μῆκος διαστάσει
4 For other loci mentioning the sequence see below, n. 39.
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56 Chapter 2
τῆς κατὰ πλάτος διαστάσεως ἐπιφάνεια νοεῖται) followed by that of the body,
associated with the number four (ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπιθεωρήσῃ τις τῇ τριάδι τετάρτην
μονάδα, τουτέστι τέταρτον σημεῖον, γίνεται πυραμίς, στερεὸν σῶμα καὶ σχῆμα).5 It
should be emphasised that even on this reading the passage is compatible with
M VII 100 – that is to say, with the idea that it is by introducing a third point
that the surface is conceived: for a comparative analysis of the two loci, see sec-
tion 2 below. The formula ποθὲν γάρ ποι comes from Aristotle (see e.g. De caelo
IV, 4, 311b33, where it is used to indicate locomotion understood as the kind of
motion which brings it about that something changes its place). Proclus takes
the formula to express a characteristic of the line: see In Eucl. 99.1 Friedlein: it
is with the line that we have ‘the change from one point to another’ – that is to
say, the coming into being of length.
At M IV 7, line 5–6, Mau accepts a supplement by Bury and prints the
following text:
διπλασίων δὲ προσαγορεύεται ὁ δυσὶν ἀριθμοῖς ⟨ἴσοις⟩ ἴσος, ὡς ὁ τέσσαρα πρὸς

τὸν δύο.
Bett, Delattre, and Russo follow Mau; none of these scholars, though, argues
for Bury’s supplement. This may be justified by the fact that a number (say 7)
can be equal to the sum of two numbers (say 3 and 4) without being the double
of another whole number. I accept the supplement.
2 Notes on the Translation
οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων Πυθαγορικοὶ: scholars have two different views on this
expression. Some of them (Delattre, Brennan) understand it as ‘the Pythago-
rean professors’, while others (Bury, Russo, Brisson, Bett) take it to mean ‘the
Pythagorean mathematicians’ and to refer to the mathemathical, as opposed
to the acousmatic, Pythagorean faction. For a contrast is attested in later
sources between two groups of Pythagoreans, the ἀκουσματικοί, who followed
the oral praecepts of Pythagoras known as the ἀκούσματα, and the μαθηματικοί,
who were concerned with more scientific matters – mathematics.6 Within the
5 I am grateful to Alain Lernould for suggesting this reading as well as the references which
follow.
6 See Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 5.9.59; Porphyry, V. Pyth. 36–7; Iamblichus, VP 81, 87–8;
Comm. Math. 76.16–78.5. Scholars have different views on this issue: Burkert and many oth-
ers think that the Pythagorean split into two factions occurred in the fifth century and is
already found in the testimony of Aristotle; Zhmud maintains that there was no split at all,
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Sextan corpus, the expression οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων occurs only in M I–VI. It
is true that, as Brennan indicates,7 Sextus uses it several times to denote, in
general, ‘the professors of liberal studies’ (M I 1, 35, 40, 49). However, in the
mathematical treatise preceding M IV, Sextus uses this expression to refer
specifically to mathematicians – to scholars interested in some aspects of
mathematics, i.e. geometers (M III 2, 17, 59).8 Since nothing in IV 2 speaks for
the choice made by Delattre and Brennan, I take the right translation to be ‘the
Pythagorean mathematicians’. However, I do not believe that this expression
refers to the mathematical subgroup within the Pythagorean tradition. For in
the Dogmatic sources mentioned above this faction is indicated by the expres-
sions οἱ μαθηματικοί and οἱ περὶ τὰ μαθήματα, and in the only passage other than
M IV 2 in which the expression οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων is used in a Pythagorean
context (Porphyry, in Harm. 66.18), it refers to scholars who come after and are
different from the Pythagoreans.
3 What Is the Ultimate Origin of the Dogmatic Doctrine Described

in M IV 2–10?
Having put forward a characterisation of the discipline he targets, that is to

say arithmetic (M IV 1), Sextus proceeds by offering a sketch of it (2–10). This
is structured in four main parts. At the very beginning (2) the general theme
of the passage is stated: the Pythagoreans ascribed a great power to numbers
on the grounds that the nature of all things is governed by them. They claim
that all things are like numbers, and that the Tetraktys is the source possess-
ing the roots of nature everflowing. There follows (3) a characterisation of the
Tetraktys and an explanation of its feature of possessing the roots of nature.
The Tetraktys is the number composed of the first four numbers; it is called
a ‘source possessing the roots of nature everflowing’ insofar as the rationale
of the structure of everything lies in it: for instance, that of the body and that
this being the fictional creation of the later tradition (Nicomachus of Gerasa): cf. W. Burkert,
Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press,
1972, pp. 192–208; Ch. Riedweg, Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching, and Influence, Ithaca, Cornell
University Press, 2005, pp. 106–8; L. Zhmud, Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 183–92; P.S. Horky, Plato and Pythagoreanism, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 2013, ch. 1 and 2.
7 ‘Sextus on Number: M X 248–309’, in K. Algra and K. Ierodiakonou (eds.), Sextus Empiricus
and Ancient Physics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 324–63, at pp. 327–8,
n. 7.
8 As Bett rightly observes à propos M III 2, the word μαθήματα may mean ‘disciplines’, but it
also may refer specifically to the mathematical disciplines.
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58 Chapter 2
of the soul. In support of the claim that the rationale of the structure of the
body lies in the Tetraktys, a piece of a metaphysical doctrine is provided (4–5).
The doctrine is characterised by two principles, one and two. One produces the
structure of all the other numbers, while two produces the structure of the
length. To the first four numbers 1, 2, 3, and 4 there correspond four geometrical
items: the point, the line, the surface, and the solid respectively. Finally (6–9),
the claim that the rationale of the structure of the soul lies in the Tetraktys
is grounded on the fact that 1, 2, 3, and 4 contain the fundamental concords
which constitute the harmony whereby the world is ordered and the soul is
constituted.
M IV 2–10 is one of the four accounts of Pythagorean doctrine provided by
Sextus, along with PH III 151–6, M X 248–84 and M VII 92–109. In the case of
the first three loci, the description of the Pythagorean doctrine is followed by
Sextus’ attack on it (M IV 11–34, PH III 156–67 and M X 284–309 respectively),
while in M VII Sextus confines himself to putting forward the Pythagorean
criterion of truth. In all these passages Sextus labels the proponents of the doc-
trine he presents as the ‘Pythagoreans’,9 so that the Sextan loci were considered
among the most important later sources for Pythagoreanism, along with the
Pythagorean Commentaries recorded by Alexander Polyhistor and transmit-
ted by Diogenes Laertius in his Life of Pythagoras (DL VIII 25–33),10 the Life of
Pythagoras excerpted by Photius and the reports of the doxographer Aëtius.11
This scholarly trend was stopped by Burkert’s seminal study Lore and Science
in Ancient Pythagoreanism.12 Burkert persuasively argued that most of the
doctrine witnessed by Sextus and the other later sources is not Pythagorean;
it is rather an achievement of Plato and the Old Academy, which has its ori-
gin in Plato’s Timaeus and unwritten doctrines and the works of his pupils
9 οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου (PH III 152 and 163), οἱ περὶ τὸν Σάμιον Πυθαγόραν (M X 248), οἱ περὶ
Πυθαγόραν (M X 250), οἱ Πυθαγορικοί (PH III 157, M VII 92 and 94, X 255, 262, 282, 288, 291,
M IV 9), Πυθαγορικῶν παῖδες (M X 270), οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων Πυθαγορικοὶ (M IV 2). In M X
261 Sextus ascribes the introduction of the one as the principle of the existing things to
Pythagoras himself.
10 On which see A.A. Long, ‘The Eclectic Pythagoreanism of Alexander Polyhistor’, in
M. Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century BC, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2013, pp. 139–59.
11 For a concise but careful overview on the doxography of ancient philosophy see the
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy s.v. by Jaap Mansfeld (2020).
12 See W. Burkert, Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism, cit., pp. 53–83. (This is the
English edition, translated with revisions, from Weisheit und Wissenschaft: Studien zu
Pythagoras, Philolaos und Platon, Nürnberg, Verlag Hans Carl, 1962). Parts of Burkert’s
view were anticipated by Zeller and De Vogel.
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Speusippus and Xenocrates. Burkert’s view has a crucial importance for our
understanding of the tradition Sextus’ adversaries belong to, and needs to be
presented in some detail.
The accounts of Pythagoreanism provided by the four above-mentioned
sources are not identical – and later we shall focus on some of their differ-
ences. However, they share some essential features. First, they ascribe to the
Pythagoreans a doctrine characterised by two principles, one (or unit) and
two. We have already seen that Sextus, in M IV 4–5, mentions one as a prin-
ciple producing the structure of all the other numbers and two as producing
the structure of the length. The two principles appear in his other accounts
of the Pythagorean doctrine too. At M X 261, Sextus reports that
Pythagoras said that the first principle of existing things is the unit … and
this, being added to itself, in virtue of otherness produces the so-called
indefinite two.
A little later, we read that
the rest of the numbers were produced from these, the one always limit-
ing and the indefinite two generating two and extending the numbers to
an infinite amount. Hence they say that of these principles the unit has
the position of the active cause, and the two that of the passive matter
(Sextus, M X 277).13
13 Sextus, M X 261: ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἀρχὴν ἔφησεν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν μονάδα … καὶ ταύτην … ἐπι-
συντεθεῖσαν δ’ ἑαυτῇ καθ’ ἑτερότητα ἀποτελεῖν τὴν καλουμένην ἀόριστον δυάδα – cf. M X 276;
277: οἱ λοιποὶ ἀριθμοὶ ἐκ τούτων [sc. τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος καὶ τῆς μονάδος] ἀπετελέσθησαν,
τοῦ μὲν ἑνὸς ἀεὶ περατοῦντος, τῆς δὲ ἀορίστου δυάδος δύο γεννώσης καὶ εἰς ἄπειρον πλῆθος
τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἐκτεινούσης. ὅθεν φασὶν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ταύταις τὸν μὲν τοῦ δρῶντος αἰτίου λόγον
ἐπέχειν τὴν μονάδα, τὸν δὲ τῆς πασχούσης ὕλης τὴν δυάδα … Cf. PH III 153–4: ‘[153] … The ele-
ments of the things which exist are the non-evident and incorporeal numbers which are
observed in everything. But not all numbers – only the one and the indefinite two, which
comes from the one by addition, and by participation in which particular twos become
two. [154] It is from these things, they say, that the other numbers which are observed
in numbered objects are generated …’ ([153] … τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων εἰσὶν οἱ ἄδηλοι καὶ
ἀσώματοι καὶ πᾶσιν ἐπιθεωρούμενοι ἀριθμοί. καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ’ ἥ τε μονὰς καὶ ἡ κατὰ ἐπισύν-
θεσιν τῆς μονάδος γινομένη ἀόριστος δυάς, ἧς κατὰ μετουσίαν αἱ κατὰ μέρος γίγνονται δυάδες
δυάδες. [154] ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους γίνεσθαι ἀριθμούς, τοὺς ἐπιθεωρουμένους τοῖς ἀριθ-
μητοῖς …) The two principles are absent in Sextus’ account of the Pythagorean doctrine
in M VII 92–109: their absence, however, might be explained away by reference to Sextus’
needs in this passage: see section 2.
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60 Chapter 2
One and the two are mentioned at the beginning of the Commentaries
excerpted by Alexander:
The first principle of all things is the unit. From the unit the indefinite
two subsists as matter for the unit, which is cause. From the unit and the
indefinite two issue numbers … (DL VIII 25)14
as well as in Aëtius’ account:
Among their [scl. of the Pythagoreans] principles are the unit and the
indefinite two. For him [scl. Pythagoras], one of the principles is directed
toward the active or formal cause … and the other toward the passive or
material (Aëtius 1.3.8).15
The same basic outline underlies Photius’ account of Pythagoreanism. Along-

side the unit, which is ‘the first principle of all things’ (Bibliotheca 439a19:
πάντων ἀρχή), stands the indefinite two; and ‘from the unit and the two’ come
the numbers (439a2: πάντα εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνῆγον ἔκ τε τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς
δυάδος)’.16 More generally, the presence of the two principles is discernible in
all the neo-Pythagorean tradition from Eudorus to Numenius via Mod-
eratus as well as in later accounts of Pythagoreanism such as the one by
14 DL VIII 25: ἀρχὴν μὲν τῶν ἁπάντων μονάδα· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος ἀόριστον δυάδα ὡς ἂν ὕλην τῇ
μονάδι αἰτίῳ ὄντι ὑποστῆναι· ἐκ δὲ τῆς μονάδος καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου δυάδος τοὺς ἀριθμούς …
15 Aëtius 1.3.8: πάλιν δὲ τὴν μονάδα καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον δυάδα ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς. σπεύδει δὲ αὐτῷ
τῶν ἀρχῶν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν αἴτιον καὶ ἀίδιον … ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ὑλικόν …
In the last three accounts mentioned above, the unit is presented as the (active) cause
and the two as the (passive) matter. Although the Stoic colour of this terminology has
been noticed, it has not been taken to bear too heavy a doctrinal weight. Thus, Long
observes that ‘Alexander’s account of principles … is quite consistent with Stoicism’; in
particular, as in his Pythagoreanism, ‘so too in early Stoicism we have … a pair of anti-
thetical and coordinate principles, one active the other passive, with the passive principle
standing to the active one in a relation of matter to form’. These (and other) Stoic affini-
ties, however, do not cast doubt on the primarily Academic and Peripatetic origin of
Alexander’s Pythagorean principles: they rather suggest that he ‘wanted to mark doctri-
nal convergences between so-called Pythagoreanism and Stoicism, probably because the
latter was the dominant philosophy at the time of composing this account’ (‘The Eclectic
Pythagoreanism of Alexander Polyhistor’, cit., p. 149). As for M X 277, Bronowski suggests
that this passage witnesses a way of speaking generally about passive matter, without any
explanation and reference to a particular school, that Sextus also adopts when he attacks
the Dogmatic notion of cause at M IX 216, 237, 252 (The Stoics on Lekta, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2019, p. 134).
16 Cf. W. Burkert, Lore and Science, cit., p. 58.
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Hippolytus – although the role and status of them is not the same in each
author.17
17 Eudorus of Alexandria (first century BC) offers a monistic version of the Pythagorean
doctrine, in which a highest one is set above the two principles of the unit and the indefi-
nite two, to each of which are associated opposite features: cf. Eudorus apud Simplicius,
In Phys. 181.10–15 (translation by Baltussen): ‘It must be stated that the Pythagoreans
said that the One was the principle of all things according to their highest account, but,
according to their second account, that there were two principles of the things which are
brought to completion, the One and the nature contrary to that; of all the things that are
conceived of as contraries they list the preferable under the One, but the inferior under its
contrary nature’ (κατὰ τὸν ἀνωτάτω λόγον φατέον τοὺς Πυθαγορικοὺς τὸ ἓν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων
λέγειν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν δεύτερον λόγον δύο ἀρχὰς τῶν ἀποτελουμένων εἶναι, τό τε ἓν καὶ τὴν ἐνα-
ντίαν τούτῳ φύσιν. ὑποτάσσεσθαι δὲ πάντων τῶν κατὰ ἐναντίωσιν ἐπινοουμένων τὸ μὲν ἀστεῖον
τῷ ἑνί, τὸ δὲ φαῦλον τῇ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐναντιουμένῃ φύσει). The two principles are later identi-
fied as the unit and the two (29–30). Burkert traces the introduction of a highest one
back to Parmenides 137c–141d and suggests that Eudorus also looks back to Xenocrates
and Crantor (Lore and Science, cit., p. 60, n. 45); on Eudorus’ principles cf. M. Bonazzi,
‘Eudorus of Alexandria and Early Imperial Platonism’, in R.W. Sharples and R. Sorabji
(ed.), Greek and Roman Philosophy 100 BC–200 AD, vol. II, London, Institute of Classical
Studies, 2007, pp. 365–77, at pp. 367–71; id., ‘Pythagoreanising Aristotle: Eudorus and the
Systematisation of Platonism’, in M. Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism
in the First Century BC, cit., pp. 160–86, at pp. 171–9. Moderatus of Gades (first century
AD) identifies the one and the two as the principles and transposes the Pythagorean
number doctrine into logical-conceptual language: cf. Porphyry, V. Pyth. 49–51: ‘[49] The
Pythagoreans … being unable to explain in words the incorporeal Forms and the first
principles had recourse to the representation by numbers. Thus, they call “one” the ratio-
nale of the unit, of identity, of equality … [50] As far as the rationale of the otherness and
of the inequality is concerned … they call it “double” and “two” … [51] The same account
holds for all the other numbers: for every number is ranked under certain powers. For
example, there is something in nature that has a beginning, a middle and an end: and to
this Form and to this nature they associated the number three … The same holds for the
other numbers [sc. for the ten] …’ ([49] οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, μὴ ἰσχύοντες λόγῳ παραδιδόναι τὰ
ἀσώματα εἴδη καὶ τὰς πρώτας ἀρχάς, παρεγένοντο ἐπὶ τὴν διὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν δήλωσιν. καὶ οὕτως
τὸν μὲν τῆς ἑνότητος λόγον καὶ τὸν τῆς ταυτότητος καὶ ἰσότητος … ἓν προσηγόρευσαν … [50]
τὸν δὲ τῆς ἑτερότητος καὶ ἀνισότητος … δυοειδῆ λόγον καὶ δυάδα προσηγόρευσαν … [51] ὁμοίως
δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· πᾶς γὰρ κατά τινων δυνάμεων τέτακται. πάλιν γὰρ
ἔστι τι ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. κατὰ τοῦ τοιούτου εἴδους
καὶ κατὰ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως τὸν τρία ἀριθμὸν κατηγόρησαν … καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων δ’ ἀριθμῶν ὁ
αὐτὸς λόγος). The pivotal role of all the numbers of the ten in this passage is reflected in
a text from Theo’s Expositio, 20.5–11, which Burkert also takes as expressing Moderatus’
views. Theo says that the ‘later’ Pythagoreans had introduced the unit and the two as
principles of numbers, while ‘the disciples of Pythagoras’ had posited as principles ‘all
the numerical terms set out in the series, by virtue of which the even and the odd are
conceived: for instance, the principle of each three in the perceptible items is the three,
that of each four in the perceptible items is the four, and so for all the other numbers’
(πάσας κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς τὰς τῶν ὅρων ἐκθέσεις, δι’ ὧν ἄρτιοί τε καὶ περιττοὶ νοοῦνται, οἷον τῶν ἐν
αἰσθητοῖς τριῶν ἀρχὴν τὴν τριάδα καὶ τῶν ἐν αἰσθητοῖς τεσσάρων πάντων ἀρχὴν τὴν τετράδα καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν κατὰ ταὐτά): in other words, ‘they had posited the system of number
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62 Chapter 2
A second feature of the Pythagorean doctrine according to many later

sources is the derivation of the world from numbers. The point develops from
the unit and the perceptible world from the point in the hierarchical succession
line, plane, solid. As a rule, the number one is characterised as corresponding
to the point, the two to the line, the three to the plane, and the four to the
solid. We are already familiar with Sextus’ sketch of the system in M IV 4–5; his
account in M X runs as follows:
[278] The point is classified under the category of the unit; for as the unit
is something indivisible, so too is the point, and in the same way as the
unit is a sort of principle in numbers, so too is the point a sort of prin-
ciple in lines. So that the point occupies the status of the unit, but the
line is perceived as coming under the type of the two; for both the two
and the line are conceived in terms of a transition. [279] Besides, what
is conceived as a breadthless length between two points is a line. So the
line will be correlated with the two, but the plane with the three: it is per-
ceived not merely as length, with which the two was correlated, but has
also taken on an additional third dimension, breadth. [280] And given
concepts’ (Lore and Science, cit., p. 60, n. 43. It has recently been argued that not only the
quoted passage but the whole arithmetical and arithmological section in Theo’s Expositio
come from Moderatus: see F.M. Petrucci, Teone di Smirne. Expositio rerum mathemati-
carum ad legendum Platonem utilium, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin, 2012, at pp. 41,
306–23, and the Conclusion of this volume). Furthermore, Moderatus draws from the
Parmenides a doctrine of the levels of the one which Plato is supposed to have taken
from the Pythagoreans: cf. Porphyry apud Simplicius, In Phys. 230.35–231.2 (translation by
Mueller): ‘As Moderatus also recounts … [Plato] following the Pythagoreans … proclaims
the first One above Being and all substance, and say that the second One, which is what
really is and is intelligible, is the Forms, and he says that the third, the domain of soul,
participates in the One and the Forms …’ (ὡς καὶ Μοδέρατος ἱστορεῖ οὗτος γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς
Πυθαγορείους τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἓν ὑπὲρ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον
ἕν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ὄντως ὂν καὶ νοητὸν, τὰ εἴδη φησὶν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ τρίτον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὸ ψυχικόν,
μετέχειν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν …). Numenius of Apamea (second century AD) ascribes a
radical dualism to Pythagoras: the indefinite two is coexistent with the Divinity, i.e. the
unit, and the relation of the two is that of form and matter: cf. Chalcidius, In Platonis
Timaeum Commentarium 295 (translation by Magee, slightly modified): ‘Numenius, a fol-
lower of Pythagoras’s teaching, in refuting with Pythagoras’s doctrine (with which he says
the Platonic one agrees) this Stoic doctrine of principles, says that Pythagoras referred to
God by the name “unit” and to matter by “two” …’ (Numenius ex Pythagorae magisterio
Stoicorum hoc de initiis dogma refellens Pythagorae dogmate (cui concinere dicit dogma
Platonicum) ait Pythagoram deum quidem singularitatis nomine nominasse, simvam vero
duitatis …). In the account provided by Hippolytus (third century AD), Pythagoras posited
the ‘unborn unit’ (ἀγέννητον μονάδα) as first principle, from which the two and all the
other numbers were generated (Hippolytus, Refutatio 6.23.1).
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three points, two opposite one another at an interval, the third at the
midpoint of the line produced from the two, but at a different interval, a
plane is produced. And solid shape and body, for example the pyramidal
one, are classified as a foursome. For if on the top of the three points,
lying as I said before, another point is put from above, a pyramidal shape
of a solid body is produced; for it now has the three dimensions: length,
breadth and depth (Sextus, M X 278–80).18
These two main features ascribed to the Pythagorean doctrine by later

accounts, the two principles and the derivation system, are shown by Burkert
18 Sextus, M X 278–80: [278] τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὸν τῆς μονάδος λόγον τετάχθαι·ὡς γὰρ ἡ μονὰς
ἀδιαίρετόν τι ἐστίν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ὃν τρόπον ἡ μονὰς ἀρχή τις ἐστὶν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς, οὕτως
καὶ τὸ σημεῖον ἀρχή τις ἐστὶν ἐν γραμμαῖς. ὥστε τὸ μὲν σημεῖον τὸν τῆς μονάδος εἶχε λόγον, ἡ
δὲ γραμμὴ κατὰ τὴν τῆς δυάδος ἰδέαν ἐθεωρεῖτο·κατὰ μετάβασιν γὰρ καὶ ἡ δυὰς καὶ ἡ γραμμὴ
νοεῖται. [279] καὶ ἄλλως·τὸ μεταξὺ δυεῖν σημείων νοούμενον ἀπλατὲς μῆκος ἔστι γραμμή. τοί-
νυν ἔσται κατὰ τὴν δυάδα ἡ γραμμή, τὸ δὲ ἐπίπεδον κατὰ τὴν τριάδα, ὃ μὴ μόνον μῆκος αὐτὸ
θεωρεῖται καθὸ ἦν ἡ δυάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρίτην προσείληφε διάστασιν τὸ πλάτος. [280] τιθεμένων
τὲ τριῶν σημείων, δυεῖν μὲν ἐξ ἐναντίου διαστήματος, τρίτου δὲ κατὰ μέσον τῆς ἐκ τῶν δυεῖν
ἀποτελεσθείσης γραμμῆς, πάλιν ἐξ ἄλλου διαστήματος, ἐπίπεδον ἀποτελεῖται. τὸ δὲ στερεὸν
σχῆμα καὶ τὸ σῶμα, καθάπερ τὸ πυραμοειδές, κατὰ τὴν τετράδα τάττεται. τοῖς γὰρ τρισὶ σημεί-
οις, ὡς προεῖπον, κειμένοις ἐπιτεθέντος ἄλλου τινὸς ἄνωθεν σημείου πυραμοειδὲς ἀποτελεῖται
σχῆμα στερεοῦ σώματος· ἔχει γὰρ ἤδη τὰς τρεῖς διαστάσεις, μῆκος πλάτος βάθος. In the sub-
sequent sections (M X 281–2) Sextus ascribes to the ‘later Pythagoreans’ a second version
of the Derivation System, characterised by just one principle, the one; in this version,
the line comes to be through a continuous movement (ῥύσις) of the point, the plane
through movement of the line, and the solid through movement of the plane. Based
on this difference, Schmekel (Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen
Zusammenhange, Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchandlung, 1892, pp. 403 ff.) constructed two
opposed neo-Pythagorean Derivation Systems, a monistic one traced back to Posidonius,
and a dualistic one transmitted by Antiochus; this conjecture, however, is ‘far from cer-
tain’ (Burkert, Lore and Science, p. 54, n. 6). Despite Sextus’ emphasis on the difference
between the two systems, the two ideas get mixed together (cf. M VII 99–100). For the
Sextan account of the Derivation System in M VII 94–100 and its parallels in the Dogmatic
literature, see section 4 infra and n. 39; his account in PH (III 154) runs as follows: ‘It is
from these [sc. the one and the indefinite two], they say, that the other numbers which
are observed in countable items are generated and the universe is constructed. For points
are analogous to ones, lines to twos (lines are observed between two points), surfaces to
threes (they say that a surface is the breadthways flux of a line towards another point
lying to its side), and bodies to fours (a body is the raising of a surface to some superjacent
point)’: ἐκ τούτων γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους γίνεσθαι ἀριθμούς, τοὺς ἐπιθεωρουμένους τοῖς ἀριθμη-
τοῖς, καὶ τὸν κόσμον κατασκευάζεσθαι λέγουσιν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σημεῖον τὸν τῆς μονάδος ἐπέχειν
λόγον, τὴν δὲ γραμμὴν τὸν τῆς δυάδος (δύο γὰρ σημείων μεταξὺ θεωρεῖσθαι ταύτην), τὴν δὲ
ἐπιφάνειαν τὸν τῆς τριάδος (ῥύσιν γὰρ εἶναί φασι τῆς γραμμῆς εἰς πλάτος ἐπ’ ἄλλο σημεῖον ἐκ
πλαγίου κείμενον), τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὸν τῆς τετράδος· ἐπανάστασιν γὰρ γίγνεσθαι τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐπί
τι σημεῖον ὑπερκείμενον.
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64 Chapter 2
to have originated in the Old Academy.19 The concepts of the unit (or one)
and the two and their role of producing all the other natural numbers were
seemingly first stated by Plato himself in his oral teachings.20 Our principal
source for them, and in particular for the lecture On the Good, is constituted by
the comments of Aristotle.21 An outline of the elements of these views more
pertinent for our aims may run as follows. The highest principle of Platonic
ontology is the one; alongside it22 stands the indefinite two, a principle that
is also described as great-and-small, many-and-few, exceeding-and-exceeded,
and unequal.23 The two is responsible for every kind of multiplicity, con-
trast, and change in the realm of being, as against the unity, identity, constancy
brought about by the one. One is identical with the good; the indefinite two is
the ground of all evil. It is also called not-being.24 In Aristotle’s terminology, the
two principles are related as form and matter.
Both principles bring about numbers from themselves. First, the number
two comes to be, as the indefinite two is limited by the one and transformed
to the definite number two which consists of two equal units;25 then, the
19 For the account that follows cf. Burkert, Lore and Science, cit., pp. 17–23.
20 It is Aristotle who, in a passage from the Physics (IV 2, 209b15), incidentally mentions
Plato’s ‘so-called unwritten doctrines’ (λεγόμενα ἄγραφα δόγματα) as providing an account
of the ‘participant’ (μεθεκτικόν or μεταληπτικόν) different from the one at stake in Timaeus,
52. The ἄγραφα δόγματα of Plato are not elsewhere alluded to by Aristotle under this
expression. Ross (Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1936, p. 566) suggests that
they are probably to be identified with Plato’s lectures On the Good, as Simplicius does in
In Phys. 545.23. For a lively sketch of the alleged evidence for the unwritten doctrines by
Plato see Burkert, Lore and Science, cit., pp. 17–21. As is well known, their actual existence
is the object of a vast debate nourished by Cherniss and his followers on the one side
and the Gaiser-Krämer school and its heirs on the other: for a couple of useful overviews
(from opposite angles) see C.J. De Vogel, Rethinking Plato and Platonism, Leiden, Brill,
1986, at pp. 3–56; F. Fronterotta, ‘Une énigme platonicienne. La question des doctrines
non-écrites’, Revue de philosophie ancienne 11 (2), 1993, pp. 115–57.
21 Fragmenta 27–31 Rose.
22 As Burkert indicates, in these views there is no mention of any derivation of the indefinite
two from the one, and the later so-called ‘Pythagorean’ tradition presents monistic as well
as decidedly dualistic interpretations of the system (Lore and Science, cit., p. 21, n. 27).
Evidence for both of them is to be found in Sextus: see n. 18.
23 Aristotle, Fr. 28 = Alexander, In Met. 56.8 ff., Simplicius, In Phys. 453.33 ff.; Aristotle, Met.
Ν 1, 1087b7. The doubts about the possibility of ascribing the expression ‘indefinite two’
to Plato raised by Ross (Plato’s Theory of Ideas, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1951, p. 184;
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, corrected edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953, vol. I, p. 169) are
taken by Burkert to be dissolved by a fragment of Speusippus first published in 1953 (Plato
Latinus III 38): cf. Lore and Science, cit., p. 21, n. 28.
24 Aristotle, Phys. I 9, 192a7.
25 Aristotle, Met. Μ 7, 1081a23; 8, 1083b23; Ν 4, 1091a24; Fr. 28 = Alexander, In Met. 56.8–35.
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other numbers arise in the natural succession three, four, five, etc.:26 Aristotle,
however, emphasises the impossibility of deriving in this way numbers other
than those of the type 2n.27 The numbers that arise in this way are independent
entities, which cannot be combined in arithmetical calculations; their units
are οὐ συμβλητοί or ‘not comparable’.28
The first step in the derivation of the world from numbers, often cited by
Aristotle, is the sequence of geometrical dimensions: to the number two there
corresponds the line, to the three the plane, to the four the solid. It is recognised
that both Speusippus and Xenocrates worked out this derivation;29 Speusippus
26 Aristotle, Met. Μ 6, 1080a24, 33; 7, 1081a21, 1081b30.

27 Aristotle, Met. Ν 3, 1091a10: for further details and references see Burkert, Lore and Science,
cit., p. 22, n. 33.
28 Aristotle, Met. Μ 6, 1080a23; 7, 1081b35; on Aristotle’s use of ἀσύμβλητος in the sense of
‘incomparable’ cf. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, cit., vol. II, p. 427.
29 Speusippus, Fr. 122 Isnardi Parente (= [Iamblichus], Theologoumena Arithmeticae)
84.10–11: ‘For the one is equivalent to the point, the two to the line, the three to the tri-
angle, the four to the pyramid’ (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν στιγμή, τὰ δὲ δύο γραμμή, τὰ δὲ τρία τρίγωνον,
τὰ δὲ τέσσαρα πυραμίς) and 85.22–3: ‘For the first principle in magnitudes is the point, the
second is the line, the third is the surface, and the fourth is the solid’ (πρώτη μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ
εἰς μέγεθος στιγμή, δευτέρα γραμμή, τρίτη ἐπιφάνεια, τέταρτον στερεόν). Xenocrates, Fr. 178
Isnardi Parente2 (= Themistius, In libros Aristotelis ‘De anima’ paraphrasis, 11.27–12.1): ‘So
they made the elements of the animal-itself (i.e. of the intelligible world) the primary
among the eidetic numbers: the Form of the one, that of the primary two, that of the
primary three, and that of the primary four. For since all the first principles of the per-
ceptible world must be displayed in the intelligible one, and since the perceptible world
is constituted by length, breadth and depth, they claimed that the primary two was the
Form of length, since length extends from unit to unit – and that is to say, from point to
point; and that the primary three was the Form of length together with breadth, since the
triangle is the primary plane figure; and that the primary four was the Form of length,
breadth and depth, in that the pyramid is the primary solid. All this can be grasped from
Xenocrates’ On Nature’ (τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοζῴου, τουτέστι τοῦ κόσμου τοῦ νοητοῦ, στοιχεῖα τὰ
πρῶτα ἐποίουν τῶν εἰδητικῶν ἀριθμῶν τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέαν καὶ τὴν τῆς πρώτης δυάδος καὶ τὴν
τῆς πρώτης τριάδος καὶ τὴν τῆς πρώτης τετράδος· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ δεῖ πάντως
τὰς ἀρχὰς παρεμφαίνεσθαι τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, ὁ δὲ αἰσθητὸς ἐκ μήκους ἤδη καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους,
τοῦ μὲν μήκους ἰδέαν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ἀπεφήναντο δυάδα· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἑνὸς ἐφ’ ἓν τὸ μῆκος, του-
τέστιν ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημεῖον· τοῦ δὲ μήκους ἅμα καὶ πλάτους τὴν πρώτην τριάδα· πρῶτον
γὰρ τῶν ἐπιπέδων χρημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ τρίγωνον· τοῦ δὲ μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους τὴν πρώ-
την τετράδα· πρῶτον γὰρ τῶν στερεῶν ἐστὶν ἡ πυραμίς. ταῦτα δὲ ἅπαντα λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ
περὶ φύσεως τοῦ Ξενοκράτους); cf. Fr. 23 Isnardi Parente2 (Aristotle, Met. Ζ 2, 1028b24–27):
‘Some say Forms and numbers have the same nature, and other things come after them,
e.g. lines and planes, until we come to the substance of the heavens and to the sensible
bodies’ (ἔνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα,
γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά): for other references
to this view in the Metaphysics see Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, cit., vol. II, p. 163. For the
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66 Chapter 2
has the point at the beginning as corresponding to the one.30 According to

Burkert, Aristotle also quite clearly ascribes to Plato the derivation of line,
plane, and solid ‘after the numbers’:31 here the ‘unlimited two’, the ‘great and
small’, appears as ‘short and long’, ‘broad and narrow’, ‘deep and shallow’.32
Burkert also finds plausible that Aristotle ascribed to Plato himself the deriva-
tion of the line from the number two, of the plane from the three, and of the
solid from the four, although he recognises that the two passages on which this
ascription is grounded, Aristotle Metaphysics Ζ 11, 1036b12 ff. and Ν 3, 1090b20
ff., are quite controversial.33
If we consider Sextus’ account of his target in M IV in the light of the preced-
ing remarks, the following picture emerges. In M IV Sextus attacks a discipline,
the ἀριθμητική τέχνη, which some of his Platonist contemporaries (people like
Nicomachus of Gerasa and Theo of Smyrna) devoted themselves to – we have
seen in the previous chapter. So it is plausible that these are Sextus’ adversaries.
On the other hand, most of the doctrine that Sextus presents in illustrating the
ἀριθμητική τέχνη ultimately comes from the Old Academy. But if this is clear,
it is far from clear how the transmission from the Old Academy to Sextus took
place. And this raises a question: from which source, intermediate between
him and the Old Academy, did Sextus draw the account of the ‘Pythagorean’
doctrine he puts forward in M IV?
passages from Aristotle I offer the revised Oxford translation edited by Barnes (some-
times slightly modified).
30 Aristotle, Met. Μ 9, 1085a31–33: ‘Others generate magnitudes from the point – and the
point is thought by them to be not the one, but something like the one’: τὰ μεγέθη γεν-
νῶσιν … ἕτεροι δὲ ἐκ τῆς στιγμῆς (ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ αὐτοῖς δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐχ ἓν ἀλλ’ οἷον τὸ ἕν). As
Ross (Aristotle’s Metaphysics, cit., vol. II, p. 456) comments, ‘we find here the view that
the formal principle was the point, considered as analogous to the One; cf. 1085b27. The
persons who held this view are identified by Aristotle with those who took the material
principle to be οἷον πλῆθος, and we saw … that Speusippus is meant. It could not be either
Plato or Xenocrates that is referred to, for they did not believe in points (for Plato cf. Met.
Α 9, 992a20)’.
31 Burkert finds evidence for this in the passages where Aristotle raises questions about the
relation of the ideal magnitudes so produced to the intermediate realm of mathematical
magnitudes (Met. Α 9, 992b13 ff.; Μ 6, 1080b23 ff.; 9, 1085a7 ff.): he argues that since neither
Speusippus nor Xenocrates accepted this intermediate realm, the reference must be to
Plato (Lore and Science, cit., p. 23, n. 41).
32 Aristotle, Met. Α 9, 992a10 ff.; Μ 9, 1085a7 ff.; Ν 1, 1088b4 ff.; 2, 1089b11 ff.; περὶ φιλοσοφίας,
78.20 ff. Ross.
33 Cf. Lore and Science, cit., p. 24, n. 45.
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4 Sextus’ Accounts of the Pythagorean Doctrine at M IV 2–10

and at M VII 92–109, and Posidonius
According to Burkert, of the four passages in which Sextus describes the

Pythagorean doctrine, two pairs are more closely connected with each other
than with the rest, from the point of view both of their content and of their
source. The discussion on number in PH III 151–67 is repeated in much greater
detail in M X 248–309. Here we find a detailed exposition of the doctrine of
ideal numbers, followed by a refutation of the concept of participation and
separation. As far as the ultimate source of the doctrine sketched in these pas-
sages is concerned, Burkert observes that, because of a remarkable agreement
with Hermodorus’ account of Plato’s doctrine of principles, the text has rightly
been employed in the reconstruction of these Platonic theories; and he con-
jectures that it must derive, by a roundabout route, from one of the records of
Plato’s lecture On the Good.34 It is scarcely possible to determine the immedi-
ate source Sextus is following; it is later than Epicurus, who is cited in it, and
even later than Asclepiades of Bythynia.35
34 For a sceptical assessment of this widespread approach see R. Granieri, ‘Hermodorus of

Syracuse and Sextus Empiricus’ “Pythagoreans” on Categories and Principles’, Classical
Quarterly 73, 2023. Here the author argues in particular against the possibility of reading
Hermodorus’ fragment (Simplicius, In Phys. 247.30–248.18) and Sextus’ M X 262–275 as a
record of Plato’s oral teaching offering essentially the same categorial scheme. Still, he
considers it possible (and even quite likely) that Hermodorus’ and Sextus’ classifications
originated in a common debate that began in the Academy.
35 Burkert, Lore and Science, cit., pp. 53–4, cf. p. 18. M X 248–63 is taken by Krämer and Gaiser
to express Plato’s doctrine – according to the latter, via Xenocrates and an intermediate
neo-Pythagorean source of the first century BC or first century AD: cf. Testimonia pla-
tonica. Le antiche testimonianze sulle dottrine non scritte di Platone, transl. by V. Cicero,
Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 1998, pp. 274–5. Theiler (‘Einheit und unbegrenzte Zweiheit von
Platon bis Plotin’, in J. Mau and E.G. Schmidt, Isonomia, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1964,
p. 91) mentions Eudorus among the possible intermediate sources. Isnardi Parente (‘Sesto,
Platone, l’Accademia Antica e i Pitagorici’, Elenchos 13, 1992, pp. 120–68) agrees that the
bulk of the doctrine reported by Sextus in M X is derived from sources in the Old Academy,
especially Xenocrates. She is followed by Thiel (‘Xenokrates. Tradition oder Innovation?’,
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie XXIX, 2007, pp. 307–37). Some doubts about these
identifications have been recently raised by Brennan, who argues that the state of our
evidence precludes any confident pronouncements about the original sources of the doc-
trine (‘Sextus on Number: M X 248–309’, cit., at pp. 327–9, 334–6). For a useful overview
of the scholarly debate on M X 248–283 see Th. Szlezák, ‘The Indefinite Dyad in Sextus
Empiricus’s Report (Adversus Mathematicos 10.248–283) and Plato’s Parmenides’, in
J.D. Turner and K.C. Corrigan (eds.), Plato’s Parmenides and Its Heritage. Volume 1. History
and Interpretation from the Old Academy to Later Platonism and Gnosticism, Atlanta,
Society of Biblical Literature, 2010, pp. 79–91.
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68 Chapter 2
M IV 2–10, as we have seen, deals with the relationship between math-

ematical proportion and nature; and the same subject is treated much more
extensively, in a different order, and with some lacunas under the heading ‘On
the Criterion’ in M VII 92–109.36 In M VII 93 Sextus mentions Posidonius who,
commenting on the Timaeus, provided some instantiations of the likeness
principle, on which Sextus grounds his claim that the Pythagorean criterion
of truth is number. After a brief analysis, Burkert concludes that it is probable
that Sextus’ accounts of Pythagoreanism in M VII 92–109 and in IV 2–10 were
both transmitted by way of Posidonius.37 In the next pages I will take Burkert’s
stance. I will first argue that M VII 92–109 and IV 2–10 draw from the same
source, and then defend the view according to which this source is Posidonius
from some recent objections.
As I understand it, the account of Pythagoreanism provided by Sextus in
M VII 92–109 is characterised by a remarkable continuity and unity, which is
important to emphasise.38 Sextus first indicates that the Pythagorean criterion
of truth is number and then shows what led the Pythagoreans to adopt this
view. They did so on the basis of two claims: (a) the principle of the constitu-
tion of everything is number; and (b) like is known by like, i.e. knower and
known must belong to the same kind. After mentioning Philolaus, Empedocles,
and Posidonius as instantiating and endorsing (b), Sextus comes to the core
of his subject and explains that the Pythagoreans, claiming (a) in addition to
(b), were led to take number as the criterion of truth. If everything is consti-
tuted by number and like is known by like, then reason, the human faculty
of judging and knowing, must be constituted by number too (93). The rest of
the passage (94–109) reports first how the Pythagoreans expressed the view
according to which nature is mathematically constructed; then, and more
importantly, how the Pythagoreans argued for it. The Pythagoreans claimed
that nature is mathematically constructed by uttering two slogans: ‘All things
are like numbers’ and ‘The Tetraktys is a source possessing the roots of nature
everflowing’ (93–4). They argue for this claim by showing that it holds for sev-
eral items: the whole universe (95–9); the body and the incorporeal (99–100);
36 J.E. Raven, Pythagoreans and Eleatics, Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1966, pp. 105 ff., attributes all
four reports to the same source. However, after the publication of Burkert’s work, most of
the scholars have followed him in considering Sextus’ four Pythagorean loci according to
the two pairs mentioned above: see e.g. Mansfeld, who takes M IV 2–10 to be ‘a doublet of
M VII 92–109’ (The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract περὶ ἑβδομάδων Ch 1–11 and Greek Philosophy,
Assen, Van Gorcum, 1970, p. 158, n. 8), and Gaiser, who observes that M IV 2–10 and
M VII 92–109 seem to depend on a later branch of the tradition on which PH III 151–67
and M X 248–309 depend (Testimonia platonica, cit., p. 262, n. 94).
37 Cf. Burkert, Lore and Science, cit., pp. 54–6.
38 I stress the point, since it has been neglected by Robbins and Reinhardt and just sketched
by Burkert (followed by Mansfeld).
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everything which is known (101–5); the affairs of life and the products of skills
(105–9). The end of the passage repeats that this evidence justifies the view
about the mathematical structure of reality (and therefore the claim that the
criterion of truth is number: 109).39
The beginning of the Pythagorean account provided by Sextus in M VII
virtually coincides with its counterpart in M IV. Let us display M IV 2–3 and
VII 93–5 side by side:
M IV 2–3 M VII 93–5
[2] Καθόλου μὲν οὖν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν [93] … ἦν δὲ ἀρχὴ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ὑπο-
μαθημάτων Πυθαγορικοὶ μεγάλην ἀπο- στάσεως ἀριθμός· διὸ καὶ ὁ κριτὴς τῶν
νέμουσι δύναμιν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς ὡς τῆς πάντων λόγος οὐκ ἀμέτοχος ὢν τῆς τού-
τῶν ὅλων φύσεως κατ’ αὐτοὺς διοικου- του δυνάμεως καλοῖτο ἂν ἀριθμός. [94]
μένης. ὅθεν καὶ ἀεί ποτε ἐπεφώνουν τὸ καὶ τοῦτο ἐμφαίνοντες οἱ Πυθαγορικοὶ
ἀριθμῷ δέ τε πάντ’ ἐπέοικεν, ὀμνύοντες ποτὲ μὲν εἰώθασι λέγειν τὸ ἀριθμῷ δέ τε
οὐ μόνον τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν πάντ’ ἐπέοικεν, ὁτὲ δὲ τὸν φυσικώτατον
ὑποδείξαντα αὐτοῖς τοῦτον Πυθαγόραν ὀμνύναι ὅρκον οὑτωσί, οὐ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ
ὡς θεὸν διὰ τὴν ἐν ἀριθμητικῇ δύνα- κεφαλᾷ παραδόντα τετρακτύν, παγὰν
μιν, λέγοντες οὐ μὰ τὸν ἁμετέρᾳ ψυχᾷ ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώματ’ ἔχουσαν, τὸν
παραδόντα τετρακτύν, παγὰν ἀενάου μὲν παραδόντα λέγοντες Πυθαγόραν
φύσεως ῥιζώματ’ ἔχουσαν. [3] τετρα- (τοῦτον γὰρ ἐθεοποίουν), τετρακτὺν δὲ
κτὺς δὲ προσηγορεύετο παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὁ ἀριθμόν τινα, ὃς ἐκ τεσσάρων τῶν πρώτων
ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ⟨τεσσάρων⟩ ἀριθμῶν ἀριθμῶν συγκείμενος τὸν τελειότατον
τρία καὶ τέσσαρα δέκα γίνεται ὅς ἐστι ἀπήρτιζεν, ὥσπερ τὸν δέκα· ἓν γὰρ καὶ
τελειότατος ἀριθμός, ἐπείπερ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα δέκα γίνεται.
φθάσαντες πάλιν ἀναλύομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἔστι τε οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρώτη τετρακτύς,
39 The exposition of the ‘Pythagorean’ doctrine in M VII 94–100 finds very close parallels,
in addition to M IV 2–10, in portions of the De opificio mundi by Philo of Alexandria (first
century BC–first century AD), of the Expositio by Theo of Smyrna (second century AD),
and of the De decade by Anatolius (third century AD): on the Pythagorean slogans and the
characterisation of the Tetraktys cf. M VII 94 and IV 2–3 with Philo, Op. 47, Anatolius, De
decade 32 and Theo, Expositio 87.5–6, 93.17–94–9; on the fundamental proportions resid-
ing in the Tetraktys cf. M VII 95–8 and IV 6–9 with Op. 48, De decade 32 and Expositio 93.21
ff.; on the derivation of the geometrical items from numbers cf. M VII 99–100 and IV 4–5
with Op. 49, 98, Expositio 96.1–5, 97.17–20, 100.20, 101.11 and De decade 30–1 (see fur-
ther [Iamblichus], Theologoumena arithmeticae 20.9, 23.11 ff.; Proclus, In Eucl. 97.17 ff.,
114.25–115.1). In addition, a sketch of the correspondence between the first four numbers
and the four basic geometrical items as well as of the fundamental proportions is to be
found at Philo, De vita Mosis 2.115.
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70 Chapter 2
(cont.)
M IV 2–3 M VII 93–5
μονάδα καὶ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ποιούμεθα τὰς [95] πηγὴ δὲ ἀενάου φύσεως λέλεκται
ἀριθμήσεις. πηγὴν δὲ ἀενάου φύσεως παρόσον κατ’ αὐτοὺς ὁ σύμπας κόσμος
ῥιζώματ’ ἔχουσαν εἰρήκασιν αὐτὸν κατὰ ἁρμονίαν διοικεῖται …41
διὰ τὸ κατ’ αὐτοὺς ἐν αὐτῷ τὸν λόγον
τῆς ἁπάντων κεῖσθαι συστάσεως, οἷον
εὐθέως τοῦ τε σώματος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς·
ἀπαρκέσει γὰρ τούτων ὑποδειγματικῶς
μεμνῆσθαι.40
The two passages contain the same sequence of claims expressed almost in the
same terms. Both accounts mention first the two Pythagorean slogans and
then the definition of the Tetraktys; and also the subsequent explanation of
the claim that Tetraktys is the source of nature everflowing is virtually the
same. For M IV 3 reads that the Tetraktys is so called insofar as the ratio of
the structure of everything lies in it, while M VII 95 justifies this claim on the
grounds that the whole universe (ὁ σύμπας κόσμος) is governed by harmony. But
‘the whole universe’, here, must be understood as ‘everything’, since the same
claim at M VII 98 is reformulated in terms of πάντα (κατὰ δὲ τὴν τέλειον ἁρμο-
νίαν πάντα διοικεῖται); and the harmony is constituted by three concords which
depend upon the ratios holding among the first four numbers. Thus, saying
that the whole universe is governed by harmony (M VII 95) amounts to saying
that the ratio of the structure of everything lies in the Tetraktys (M IV 3) – i.e.
in the ratios holding among its composing numbers.
Starting from the last sentence of section 3, the account in M IV diverges
from that in M VII: for the latter goes on arguing for the mathematical structure
40 For a translation of these and the other sections of M IV 2–10 cf. supra.
41 Sextus, M VII 93–5: ‘[93] … The principle of the constitution of everything is number.
And this means that reason, the judge of all things, could also be called number, since
it is not without a share in its power. [94] And in pointing this out the Pythagoreans are
sometimes in the habit of saying “All things are like numbers” and at other times swear-
ing the ultimate physicists’ oath, as follows: “Nay, by the man who handed down to us the
Tetraktys, source possessing the roots of nature everflowing”. By “the man who handed
down” they mean Pythagoras (for they made him a god), and by the “Tetraktys” they mean
a certain number. Since it is put together out of the first four numbers it produces the
most perfect number, ten; for one and two and three and four make ten. And this number
is the first tetraktys, [95] and is called a “source of nature everflowing” insofar as the entire
universe, according to them, is governed by harmony …’.
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of nature à propos several items (the whole universe: 95–9; the body and the
incorporeal: 99–100; everything which is known: 101–5; the affairs of life and
the products of skills: 105–9), while in M IV 3 Sextus announces that he will
confine himself to two cases, that of the body (4–5) and that of the soul (6–9),
because these examples are sufficient for his needs, and then (4) he mentions
the one and the two as principles producing respectively the structure of all
number and length. However, the Derivation System on which the mathemati-
cal structure of the body is grounded in M IV 4–5 appears in M VII 100 too:
M IV 4–5 M VII 100
[4] ἡ μὲν οὖν μονὰς ἀρχή τις ὑπόκειται ἀλλ’ ἦν γε ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς στιγμῆς ἡ μονὰς
τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἀπεργαστικὴ ἀδιαίρετος οὖσα, καθὼς καὶ ἡ στιγμή,
συστάσεως, ἡ δὲ δυὰς μήκους ἐστὶν ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γραμμῆς ὁ δύο ἀριθμός, ⟨ἐπὶ
ἀπεργαστική. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν γεω- δὲ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ὁ τρία ἀριθμός⟩· πο-
μετρικῶν ἀρχῶν ὑπεδείξαμεν πρῶτον, θὲν γάρ ⟨που⟩ πάρεστιν ἡ γραμμή,
τίς ἐστιν ἡ στιγμή, εἶτα μετ’ αὐτὴν ἡ τουτέστιν ἀπὸ σημείου ἐπὶ σημεῖον καὶ
γραμμὴ μῆκος ἀπλατὲς τυγχάνουσα, τὸν πάλιν ἀπὸ τούτου ἐπὶ ἄλλο σημεῖον· ἐπὶ
αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡ μὲν δὲ τοῦ στερεοῦ σώματος ὁ τέσσαρα· ἐὰν
μονὰς τὸν τῆς στιγμῆς ἐπέχει λόγον, ἡ δὲ γὰρ τρισὶ σημείοις τέταρτον ἐπαιωρήσω-
δυὰς τὸν τῆς γραμμῆς καὶ τοῦ μήκους· μεν σημεῖον, πυραμὶς γίνεται, ὅπερ δὴ
ποθὲν γάρ ποι ἐχώρησεν ἡ διάνοια ταύ- πρῶτόν ἐστι στερεοῦ σώματος σχῆμα,
την ἐννοουμένη, τοῦτο δ’ ἦν μῆκος. [5] ἡ κατὰ λόγον οὖν ἡ τετρακτὺς πηγὴ τῆς
δὲ τριὰς ἐπὶ τοῦ πλάτους καὶ τῆς ἐπιφα- τῶν ὅλων φύσεως ἐστίν.42
νείας ἐτέτακτο· ποθὲν γάρ ποι ἐφέρετο ὁ
νοῦς. καὶ προστιθεμένης τῇ κατὰ μῆκος
διαστάσει τῆς κατὰ πλάτος διαστάσεως
ἐπιφάνεια νοεῖται. ἀλλὰ κἂν ἐπιθεωρήσῃ
τις τῇ τριάδι τετάρτην μονάδα, τουτέ-
στι τέταρτον σημεῖον, γίνεται πυραμίς,
στερεὸν σῶμα καὶ σχῆμα· καὶ γὰρ μῆκος
ἔχει καὶ πλάτος καὶ βάθος· ὥστε ἐν τῷ
τέσσαρα ἀριθμῷ τὸν τοῦ σώματος περιέ-
χεσθαι λόγον.
42 Sextus, M VII 100: ‘But corresponding to the point is the unit, which is indivisible (as is
the point, too), and corresponding to the line is the number two, and corresponding to
the surface is the number three; for the line comes from somewhere, that is from point
to point and again from this one to another point. And corresponding to the solid body
is four; for if over three points we hang over a fourth point, a pyramid comes into being,
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72 Chapter 2
Furthermore, the argument showing the mathematical structure of the soul in

M IV 6–9 is the same as that which supports the mathematical structure of the
whole universe in M VII 94–8:43
M IV 6–9 M VII 94–8
[6] καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς· ὡς [94] … ἔστι τε οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμὸς πρώτη
γὰρ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον κατὰ ἁρμονίαν τετρακτύς, [95] πηγὴ δὲ ἀενάου φύσεως
λέγουσι διοικεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ζῷον λέλεκται παρόσον κατ’ αὐτοὺς ὁ σύμπας
ψυχοῦσθαι. δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ τέλειος ἁρμονία κόσμος κατὰ ἁρμονίαν διοικεῖται, ἡ δὲ
ἐν τρισὶ συμφωνίαις λαμβάνειν τὴν ἁρμονία σύστημά ἐστι τριῶν συμφωνιῶν,
ὑπόστασιν, τῇ τε διὰ τεττάρων καὶ τῆς τε διὰ τεσσάρων καὶ τῆς διὰ πέντε
τῇ διὰ πέντε καὶ τῇ διὰ πασῶν. ἡ μὲν καὶ τῆς διὰ πασῶν, τούτων δὲ τῶν τριῶν
οὖν διὰ τεσσάρων ἐν ἐπιτρίτῳ κεῖται συμφωνιῶν αἱ ἀναλογίαι ἐν τοῖς προειρη-
λόγῳ, ἡ δὲ διὰ πέντε ἐν ἡμιολίῳ, ἡ δὲ μένοις τέσσαρσιν ἀριθμοῖς εὑρίσκονται, ἔν
διὰ πασῶν ἐν διπλασίονι. [7] ἐπίτριτος τε τῷ ἓν κἀν τῷ δύο κἀν τῷ τρία κἀν τῷ
δὲ λέγεται ἀριθμὸς ὁ ἐξ ὅλου τινὸς τέσσαρα. [96] ἦν γὰρ ἡ μὲν διὰ τεσσάρων
ἀριθμοῦ συνεστηκὼς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τρίτου συμφωνία ἐν ἐπιτρίτῳ λόγῳ κειμένη, ἡ δὲ
μέ- ρους ἐκείνου, ὡς ἔχει ὁ ὀκτὼ πρὸς διὰ πέντε ἐν ἡμιολίῳ, ἡ δὲ διὰ πασῶν ἐν
τὸν ἕξ· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸν ἓξ περιέ- διπλασίονι. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς
σχηκε καὶ τὸ τρίτον αὐτοῦ, τουτέστι τοῦ τρία ἐπίτριτος ὤν, ἐπείπερ ἐξ αὐτοῦ
τὴν δυάδα. ἡμιόλιος δὲ καλεῖται, ὅταν καὶ τοῦ τρίτου μέρους αὐτοῦ συνίσταται,
περιέχῃ ἀριθμὸς ἀριθμὸν καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ περιέσχηκε τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνίαν·
ἐκείνου, ὡς ἔχει ὁ ἐννέα πρὸς τὸν ἕξ· [97] ὁ δὲ τρία τοῦ δύο ἡμιόλιος ὤν, ᾗ ἐκεῖ-
συνέστηκε γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ ἓξ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ νόν τε περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ αὐτοῦ,
ἡμίσεος αὐτοῦ, τουτέστι τῶν τριῶν. ἐμφαίνει τὴν διὰ πέντε συμφωνίαν· ὁ δὲ
διπλασίων δὲ προσαγορεύεται ὁ δυσὶν τέσσαρα τοῦ δύο καὶ ὁ δύο τῆς μονάδος
ἀριθμοῖς ⟨ἴσοις⟩ ἴσος, ὡς ὁ τέσσαρα διπλασίων καθεστὼς περιληπτικός ἐστι
πρὸς τὸν δύο· δὶς γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν τῆς διὰ πασῶν. [98] ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ τετρακτὺς
περιέσχηκεν. [8] ἀλλὰ γὰρ τούτων ἀναλογίαν τῶν λεχθεισῶν συμφωνιῶν
which after all is the first form of solid body. It is reasonable, then, that the Tetraktys is the
spring of the nature of the whole’.
43 And M IV 6 refers to the claim that the whole universe is governed according to harmony
which is argued for in M VII 95–8.
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(cont.)
M IV 6–9 M VII 94–8
οὕτως ἐχόντων, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχῆθεν ὑποβάλλει, αἱ δὲ συμφωνίαι τῆς τελείου
ὑπόθεσιν τεσσάρων ὄντων ἀριθμῶν, τοῦ ἁρμονίας εἰσὶ συμπληρωτικαί, κατὰ δὲ
τε ἑνὸς καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα, τὴν τέλειον ἁρμονίαν πάντα διοικεῖται,
ἐν οἷς ἐλέγομεν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦδε χάριν πηγὴν ἀενάου φύσεως ῥιζώ-
ἰδέαν περιέχεσθαι κατὰ τὸν ἐναρμόνιον ματ’ ἔχουσαν εἰρήκασιν αὐτήν.44
λόγον, ὁ μὲν τέσσαρα τοῦ δύο καὶ ὁ
δύο τῆς μονάδος ἐστὶ διπλασίων, ἐν ᾧ
ἔκειτο ἡ διὰ πασῶν συμφωνία, [9] ὁ δὲ
τρία τοῦ δύο ἡμιόλιος (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸν
τὸν δύο περιέσχηκε καὶ τὸ ἥμισυ τού-
του, ὅθεν καὶ τὴν διὰ πέντε συμφωνίαν
ὑποβάλλειν), ὁ δὲ τέσσαρα τοῦ τρία
ἐπίτριτος, ὑπέκειτο δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἡ
διὰ τεσσάρων συμφωνία.
The analogies between the two accounts of Pythagoreanism provided by

Sextus in M IV 2–10 and VII 92–109 show that he has drawn both from the
same source. The differences between them are to be explained by means of
Sextus’ different needs. In M IV Sextus wants to attack the ἀριθμτικὴ τέχνη – to
argue that it is not an art – by showing that its alleged subject matter, number,
does not exist (M IV 1). In order to do that, Sextus proceeds in an admirably
44 Sextus, M VII 94–8: ‘[94] … And this number is the first Tetraktys, [95] and is called a
“spring of everlasting nature” insofar as the entire universe, according to them, is admin-
istered in accordance with harmony. And harmony is a system of three musical intervals,
the fourth, the fifth, and the octave; and the proportions of these three intervals are found
in the numbers mentioned before – one, two, three, and four. [96] For the interval of a
fourth lies in a 4:3 ratio, that of a fifth in a 3:2 ratio, and that of an octave in a 2:1 ratio.
Hence the number four, being a third more than three (since it is constituted out of the
three itself plus a third of three) contains the interval of a fourth; [97] three, being a half
more than two (inasmuch as it includes that number plus a half of it) reveals the intervals
of a fifth; and four, being double two, as well as two, being double one, are able to con-
tain the octave. [98] Since, then, the Tetraktys furnishes the proportions of the intervals
mentioned, and the intervals are such as to complete the perfect harmony, and everything
is administered in accordance with perfect harmony, it is thanks to this that they have
called it a “spring holding the roots of everlasting nature”’.
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74 Chapter 2
economical way: he focuses on the principle of all number (and that is to say,
the one or unit: M IV 11–20),45 as well as on the way in which it is supposed
to produce the number two (M IV 21–2) and in general all number, by way of
either subtraction (M IV 23–30) or addition (M IV 31–3). Thus, Sextus needs
to extract from his source a sketch of the Dogmatic discipline and a couple of
examples – he has no need, in particular, to give a detailed account of the way
in which the multifarious elements of the world derive from number. In M VII
Sextus’ aim is different: he wants to show why the Pythagoreans took number
to be the criterion of truth, and therefore how they argued for the claim that
any knowable item in the world has a mathematical structure. In order to do
so, it is crucial to show that the nature of things which do not identify with
numbers is numerical – that they are derived from numbers; it is pointless to
refer to the fact that the numbers are derived from numerical principles. This
explains both the absence of the reference to the generation of numbers and
the abundance of examples of non-numerical items derived from numbers
which characterise M VII 92–109.46
Where does Sextus draw his accounts from? At the end of the nineteenth
century, Schmekel argued that Sextus’ exposition of the Pythagorean criterion
of truth in M VII 92–109 was ultimately derived from Posidonius. Schmekel’s
arguments concerning the unity and consistency of M VII 92–109 and the ulti-
mate authorship of Posidonius have been reinforced by Burkert and have won
the acceptance of Mansfeld and Sedley, who also provide further evidence.47
However, Kidd includes Sextus’ sentence with the reference to Posidonius at
M VII 93 among the dubia fragments of the Stoic philosopher (F 85); and in his
commentary he argues that there is no reason to extend Posidonius’ presence
in Sextus’ text beyond that single statement.48 Kidd is most recently followed
45 For once unit is destroyed – and that is to say, shown to be non-existent – all numbers are
shown to be non-existent (M IV 10: τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν λόγων ἀπὸ μονάδος ποιησάμενοι, ἥτις ἀρχὴ
παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ καθέστηκε καὶ ἧς ἀναιρουμένης οὐδ’ ἔστιν ἀριθμός).
46 We could reasonably doubt whether M IV 2–10 and VII 94–100 draw from the same source
if there were differences between the two Sextan texts which we could not explain by
appealing to the fact that Sextus has abridged the same material in two different ways
according to his different needs; and this does not seem to be the case.
47 Cf. A. Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa in ihrem geschichtlichen Zusam-
menhange, cit., pp. 404 ff.; Burkert, Lore and Science, cit., pp. 54–6; Mansfeld, The
Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract περὶ ἑβδομάδων, cit., pp. 156–7; D. Sedley, ‘Sextus Empiricus and
the Atomist Criteria of Truth’, Elenchos 13, 1992, pp. 19–56, at pp. 24–5, 30–4 and The Phi-
losophy of Antiochus, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 88–9.
48 Cf. I. Kidd, Posidonius. The Commentary, vol. II.I, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1988, pp. 337–43. In the light of this, Sedley’s statement that ‘it is … a matter of
virtual consensus that he [sc. Posidonius] is the source of the long Pythagorean passage
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by Long.49 Here I do not aim to present an exhaustive account of this debate.

I believe that several points in Schmekel’s and Burkert’s arguments resist Kidd’s
criticism and suggest that the Pythagorean doxography reported by Sextus in
92–109 reached him via Posidonius. In the next lines I will put forward the
most important pieces of evidence for this claim showing why Kidd’s criticism
does not seem to be effective on them.50
We have seen that at M VII 93 Sextus quotes Posidonius as providing
instances of the likeness principle in commenting on the Timaeus:
And, as Posidonius says in expounding Plato’s Timaeus, ‘Just as light is

apprehended by sight, which is luminous, and sound by hearing, which
is airy, so too the nature of everything ought to be apprehended by some-
thing akin to it, namely reason’ (Sextus, M VII 93).51
As we know, Sextus goes on to explain that the Pythagoreans came to con-

clude that reason is number based on the belief that nature is mathematically
constructed, and then puts forward the evidence they provide in support of
this belief.
It is clear that Sextus’ quotation of Posidonius includes the instances
of the likeness principle and the claim about the affinity between reason
and the nature of everything which appear in 93.52 The question is whether
Sextus derives also the rest of his account of Pythagoreanism (93–109) from
in M VII 92–109’ (‘Sextus Empiricus and the Atomist Criteria of Truth’, cit., p. 30) is hardly
acceptable.
49 Cf. A.A. Long, ‘The Eclectic Pythagoreanism of Alexander Polyhistor’, cit., pp. 144–5.
50 Schmekel, drawing on Sextus’ reference at M VII 93 (text at n. 51), assumed that Sextus,
M VII 92 ff. derives from a commentary on the Timaeus of Plato written by Posidonius.
The assumption of the existence of such a commentary has been heavily contested. It
was aptly criticised by Reinhardt (Poseidonios, Munich, O. Beck, 1921, pp. 416 ff.), whose
denial was generally accepted (e.g. by Jaeger, Wilamowitz, Edelstein, Cherniss, Pohlenz,
Laffranque, Theiler). Two later attempted defences of the existence of Posidonius’ com-
mentary, provided by Taylor and Abel, are rejected by Kidd (cf. Kidd, Posidonius, cit.,
p. 339; for details of the debate, cf. pp. 338–40). However, I should stress that the question
whether M VII 92–109 derives from Posidonius (and the evidence in support of this pos-
sibility, provided by Schmekel and others, which I will discuss) does not depend on the
question whether Posidonius wrote such a work; so in the next pages I will leave the latter
issue aside.
51 Sextus, M VII 93: καὶ ὡς τὸ μὲν φῶς, φησὶν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὸν Πλάτωνος Τίμαιον ἐξηγούμενος,
ὑπὸ τῆς φωτοειδοῦς ὄψεως καταλαμβάνεται, ἡ δὲ φωνὴ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀεροειδοῦς ἀκοῆς, οὕτω καὶ ἡ
τῶν ὅλων φύσις ὑπὸ συγγενοῦς ὀφείλει καταλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ λόγου.
52 The fact, observed by Kidd (Posidonius, p. 342), that φωτοειδές is a common term in debate
obviously does not imply that Sextus is not quoting from Posidonius.
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76 Chapter 2
Posidonius.53 Nothing in 93–109 suggests that Sextus continues or stops quot-

ing the Stoic philosopher: there is no explicit syntactical link of rupture or
continuity with Sextus’ reference to Posidonius in 93.54 However, several fea-
tures of the passage provide evidence for a Stoic handling of the Pythagorean
material – and some of them appear to betray a specifically Posidonian touch.
All throughout M VII 92–109 καταλαμβάνειν is used in the sense of
‘knowing’,55 and Schmekel referred it to the Stoic notion of κατάληψις.56 Kidd
observes that this use of καταλαμβάνειν is ‘hardly exclusively Stoic’.57 This is
true. Still, there is one occurrence of κατάληψις in the passage that points to
the Porch: the one included in the characterisation of expertise in terms of ‘a
system made up of apprehensions’ (πᾶσα τέχνη ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων)
in M VII 109: for Sextus ascribes this characterisation to the Stoics and sys-
tematically mentions it in discussing Stoic views.58 Furthermore, in support of
Schmekel’s suggestion, Mansfeld has recalled a Stoic characterisation of αἴσθη-
σις witnessed by Aëtius: αἰσθησίς ἐστιν ἀντίληψις δι’αἰσθητηρίου ἢ κατάληψις.59
Mansfeld appears to suggest that this characterisation of αἴσθησις may underlie
the instances of the likeness principle provided by Posidonius ap. Sextum at
53 Reinhardt took the explanation of the Pythagorean Tetraktys at M VII 94–100 to be

an interpolation introduced by Sextus in the middle of a section which derives from
Posidonius, ‘a piece of book learning that Sextus could have gotten from anywhere’
(Poseidonios, cit., p. 416). However, this hypothesis has been refuted by Burkert, who
rightly stresses the continuity of the whole passage: cf. Lore and Science, cit., pp. 54–5.
54 Kidd rightly stresses that while the Posidonian remarks on the Timaeus quoted by Sextus
reflect Posidonius’ own philosophy, what follows them is a piece of ‘Pythagorean’ doc-
trine, ‘for Posidonius did not hold either that the principle of the structure of things
was number, nor that the soul was ἀριθμός’ (Posidonius, cit., p. 341). This, however, does
not imply that Sextus does not keep drawing from Posidonius: since the ‘Pythagorean’
doctrine is quite pertinent for the characterisation of the soul provided in the Timaeus,
Posidonius’ reflection on the latter could easily have included the former.
55 See the occurrences at M VII 92 (ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου τὸ ὅμοιον καταλαμβάνεσθαι πέφυκεν) and 93
(text at n. 51), where the use of the likeness principle is ascribed respectively to Philolaus
and Posidonius, and those at 101, where it is argued that everything that is apprehended
by a human being, be it a body or an incorporeal, is not apprehended without the concep-
tion of number (101: πᾶν τὸ καταλαμβανόμενον ἀνθρώπῳ, φασίν, ἤτοι σῶμά ἐστιν ἢ ἀσώματον·
ἐάν τε δὲ σῶμα ἐάν τε καὶ ἀσώματον, οὐ χωρὶς τῆς τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐννοίας καταλαμβάνεται).
56 Cf. Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, cit., pp. 407–8.
57 Kidd, Posidonius, cit., p. 343.
58 See e.g. PH III 188: ‘The Stoics … say that an expertise is a system of apprehensions which
have been exercised together’ (οἱ Στωικοὶ … τέχνην δὲ εἶναί φασι σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων
συγγεγυμνασμένων); cf. 241, 251; M VII 373, XI 182, 183.
59 Aëtius 4.8.1 (= SVF II, 850); cf. Mansfeld, The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract περὶ ἑβδομάδων, cit.,
p. 157, n. 3.
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M VII 93 in which sensory perception is at stake: light is apprehended by sight

and sound by hearing.
At M X 218 Sextus witnesses that, according to orthodox Stoicism, time is
one of the four kinds of incorporeals along with sayables, void, and place.60
At M VII 101–4, he reports a piece of the Pythagorean doctrine arguing that
everything that is apprehended by man, be it a body or an incorporeal, is not
apprehended separately from number. Now in the argument in favour of that
claim as far as the ἀσώματα are concerned, time is explicitly qualified as an
incorporeal:
The same reasoning applies in the case of incorporeals, if in fact even

time, which is incorporeal, is grasped by number (Sextus, M VII 104);61
this suggests that the Pythagorean number theory reported by Sextus was dis-
cussed by a Stoic.62
At M VII 102, the view that body is not apprehended separately from num-
ber is grounded on the claim that some bodies are
from things fastened together, like ships and chains and cabinets, oth-
ers from unified things, which are held together by a single holding (like
plants and animals), and others from things standing apart (like choruses
and armies and flocks) (Sextus, M VII 102)
– and in all cases they have numbers insofar as they consist of multiple things.63
The argument appears to have been handled by a Stoic: for a threefold distinc-
tion corresponding to the tripartion of bodies into συναπτόμενα, ἡνωμένα, and
διεστῶτα, as well as the use of the word ἕξις to denote a unifying property of a
body and the examples of the ship and of the army are ascribed by Simplicius
to the Porch:
60 Sextus, M X 218: οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς φιλόσοφοι … τῶν γὰρ τινῶν φασι τὰ μὲν εἶναι σώματα, τὰ
δὲ ἀσώματα, τῶν δὲ ἀσωμάτων τέσσαρα εἴδη καταριθμοῦνται ὡς λεκτὸν καὶ κενὸν καὶ τόπον καὶ
χρόνον.
61 Sextus, M VII 104: ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐστὶ λόγος, εἴγε καὶ χρόνος ἀσώματος ὢν
ἀριθμῷ λαμβάνεται …
62 I owe the point to Mansfeld, The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract περὶ ἑβδομάδων, cit., p. 194,
n. 212.
63 Sextus, M VII 102: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐκ συναπτομένων ὡς πλοῖα καὶ ἁλύσεις καὶ
πυργίσκοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἡνωμένων, ἅπερ ὑπὸ μιᾶς ἕξεως συνέχεται, ὡς φυτὰ καὶ ζῷα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώ-
των ὡς χοροὶ καὶ στρατιαὶ καὶ ποῖμναι· — ἀλλ’ ἐάν τε ἐκ συναπτομένων ἐάν τε ἐξ ἡνωμένων ἐάν
τε ἐκ διεστώτων, ἀριθμοὺς ἔχει παρόσον ἐκ πλειόνων συνέστηκεν.
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78 Chapter 2
They [i.e. the Stoics] call qualities ‘havable’, and allow what is havable
to exist only in the case of unified things; whereas in the case of things
which exist by contact, like a ship, or by separation, like an army, they rule
out there being anything havable, or there being found in their case any
single thing consisting of breath or possessing a single principle, such as
to achieve a realisation of a single tenor (Simplicius, In Cat. 214.26–30).64
The same tripartition and examples appear at M IX 78, ‘a very Posidonian

passage, where this conceptual scheme is the basis for cosmic συμπάθεια’65
(cf. M IX 79–80), as well as in three Stoic fragments.66
The presence of the Stoic philosopher has been detected in particular in two
other sections of 92–109. M VII 107–8 includes a story, otherwise not recorded,
about the construction of the Colossus of Rhodes, the island where Posidonius
lived and taught.67 Furthermore, and more importantly, both M VII 99 and 104,
if read in the light of 119, appear to have a Posidonian origin. At M VII 99, point,
line, and surface are mentioned as incorporeal items.68 M VII 101–4 argues that
everything which is known, be it a body or an incorporeal, consists of number –
an argument which, as we have seen, at 102 and at 104 presents traces of a
Stoic handling. The end of the passage, 104, repeats the claim about the incor-
poreal items referring back to 99: for point, line, and surface are mentioned
in 104 among the incorporeal things ‘we were talking about a little earlier’.69
64 Simplicius, In Cat. 214.24–30: τὰς γὰρ ποιότητας ἑκτὰ λέγοντες οὗτοι [sc. οἱ Στωικοὶ] ἐπὶ τῶν
ἡνωμένων μόνων τὰ ἑκτὰ ἀπολείπουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ συναφὴν οἷον νεὼς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ διά-
στασιν οἷον στρατοῦ μηδὲν εἶναι ἑκτὸν μηδὲ εὑρίσκεσθαι πνευματικόν τι ἓν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἕνα
λόγον ἔχον, ὥστε ἐπί τινα ὑπόστασιν ἐλθεῖν μιᾶς ἕξεως. Translation by T. Long and D. Sedley,
The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 170; for
some reflections on the Stoic ἕξις see pp. 174 and 289.
65 Sedley, ‘Sextus Empiricus and the Atomist Criteria of Truth’, cit., p. 31, n. 24; the point
appears to stem from Reinhardt (Kosmos und Sympathie, Munich, Beck, 1926, pp. 34 ff.),
who also persuades Burkert (Lore and Science, cit., p. 54, n. 10).
66 SVF II 366 (= Plutarch, Con. praec. 142F), 367 (= Plutarch, Def. or. 426A), 368 (= Achilles,
Isagoge 14).
67 Cf. Reinhardt, Poseidonios, cit., p. 419.
68 Sextus, M VII 99: ‘Besides, both body and the incorporeal (from which everything derives)
are conceived by way of ratios of these four numbers. For we get the appearance of a line,
which is length without breadth, from a running point, and we create breadth, which is
a kind of surface without depth, from a running line, and from a running surface a solid
body comes into being’: καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ κατὰ τοὺς λόγους τῶν τεσσάρων τούτων ἀριθμῶν τό τε
σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἀσώματον νοεῖται, ἐξ ὧν τὰ πάντα (στιγμῆς γὰρ ῥυείσης γραμμὴν φαντασιούμεθα,
ἥτις ἐστὶ μῆκος ἀπλατές, γραμμῆς δὲ ῥυείσης πλάτος ἐποιήσαμεν, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐπιφάνειά τις ἀβα-
θής, ἐπιφανείας δὲ ῥυείσης στερεὸν ἐγένετο σῶμα).
69 Sextus, M VII 104: ‘The same reasoning applies in the case of incorporeals, if in fact even
time, which is incorporeal, is grasped by number, as is evident from years and months
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The Stoic behind 104 refers to a characterisation that he has provided in 99:
so both passages were treated by a Stoic. The indication is confirmed in 119.
Here Sextus indicates that Plato, in the Timaeus, demonstrates that the soul is
incorporeal by saying:
if sight in apprehending light is right away luminous, and hearing, in dis-

cerning air being struck (which is sound), is right away observed to be
airy, and smell in picking up vapours is definitely vaporous, and taste in
picking up flavours is flavour-like, then necessarily the soul too, in grasp-
ing the incorporeal ideas, such as those in numbers and those in the limits
of bodies, becomes an incorporeal sort of thing (Sextus, M VII 119).70
Sextus refers to Timaeus 45B–C and 37A–C, where the likeness principle is
applied to sight and soul respectively, but does not quote Plato: his account is ‘at
best a creative paraphrase’.71 Is this paraphrase Sextus’ own invention? It pres-
ents traces of Stoic handling: for it includes ‘the Timaeus (67A–C) definition of
sound as a blow caused by air … rewritten in Stoic terms as ἀέρα πεπληγμένον
(cf. SVF II 139–41)’.72 More specifically, the paraphrase reports almost verba-
tim the remarks produced by Posidonius in commenting on Plato’s Timaeus
as reported by Sextus at M VII 93. Furthermore, the expression τὰ πέρατα τῶν
σωμάτων is reminiscent of Posidonius’ characterisation of the soul witnessed
by Plutarch (see infra).73 Thus it is likely that the paraphrase is Posidonian.74
And since it refers to the incorporeal geometrical items mentioned in 99 and
and days and hours. Similarly with the point and line and surface, and the other things
we were talking about a little earlier, referring the concepts of them, too, to numbers’: ὁ δ’
αὐτὸς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων ἐστὶ λόγος, εἴγε καὶ χρόνος ἀσώματος ὢν ἀριθμῷ λαμβάνεται, ὥς
ἐστι συμφανὲς ἀπὸ ἐνιαυτῶν τε καὶ μηνῶν καὶ ἡμερῶν καὶ ὡρῶν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ στιγμὴ καὶ
γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπιφάνεια, καὶ τἆλλα περὶ ὧν καὶ μικρῷ πρότερον διελέχθημεν, ἀνάγοντες καὶ τὰς
τούτων νοήσεις εἰς ἀριθμούς.
70 Sextus, M VII 119: εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις, φησί, φωτὸς ἀντιλαμβανομένη εὐθύς ἐστι φωτοειδής, ἡ δὲ
ἀκοὴ ἀέρα πεπληγμένον κρίνουσα, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τὴν φωνήν, εὐθὺς ἀεροειδὴς θεωρεῖται, ἡ δὲ ὄσφρη-
σις ἀτμοὺς γνωρίζουσα πάντως ἐστὶν ἀτμοειδὴς καὶ ἡ γεῦσις χυλοὺς χυλοειδής, κατ’ ἀνάγκην καὶ
ἡ ψυχὴ τὰς ἀσωμάτους ἰδέας λαμβάνουσα, καθάπερ τὰς ἐν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς πέρασι τῶν
σωμάτων, γίνεταί τις ἀσώματος.
71 R. Bett, Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2005, p. 26, n. 52.
72 Sedley, ‘Sextus Empiricus and the Atomist Criteria of Truth’, cit., p. 31, n. 27.
73 Cf. Kidd, Posidonius, cit., p. 343.
74 Kidd (Posidonius, cit., pp. 342–3) argues that there are severe difficulties in thinking that
M VII 119 was orientated or coloured by Posidonius, since it contains an interpretation of
the Timaeus which implies that the soul is incorporeal, and Posidonius ‘certainly did not
believe that’. But this does not imply that Posidonius could not have ascribed this claim
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80 Chapter 2
104, i.e. ‘the incorporeal ideas such as those in the limits of the body’, it seems
likely that 99, 104, and 119 have the same origin: Posidonius.
Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that Posidonius had a strong interest in
some of the Pythagorean issues discussed in M VII 93–109 and likely that
he wrote on the subject. M VII 93 surely implies that Posidonius discussed
the principle according to which like is known by like in commenting on the
Timaeus.75 Now in the Timaeus the soul – the human faculty responsible for
knowing – is created as a number pattern, as the physical world is made up of
mathematically determined triangles. So the issues included in 93–109 – and
in particular the idea according to which the soul is a number since nature is
mathematically constructed – could easily have been treated by Posidonius in
the context of his remarks about the Timaeus. That this is not unlikely is sug-
gested by the fact that Aristotle himself followed a similar line of thought in his
On the soul, where he brought Plato’s psychological theories and the theory of
ideal numbers into connection.76
to Plato. (Interpreting an author by ascribing to him claims does not imply that the inter-
preter believes them to be true).
75 Cf. also Kidd, Posidonius, cit., p. 339: ‘There is no doubt that Posidonius was particularly
interested in the Timaeus, for surviving attested reference is frequent: Frs. 28, 31, 49, 141,
149, 205, 291’.
76 See Aristotle, De Anima I 2, 404b8–26: ‘Those who [looked to the fact that what has soul
in it] knows or perceives what exists, identify soul with the principle or principles of
nature … Thus Empedocles declares that it is formed out of all his elements, each of them
also being soul; his words are “For ᾿tis by Earth we see Earth, by Water Water, by Ether
Ether divine, by Fire destructive Fire, by love Love, and Hate by Cruel Hate”. In the same
way Plato in the Timaeus fashions the soul out of his elements; for like, he holds, is known
by like, and things are formed out of the principles or elements. Similarly also in the lec-
tures “On Philosophy” it was set forth that the Animal itself is compounded of the Idea
itself of the one together with the primary length, breadth, and depth, everything else
being similarly constituted. Again he puts his view in yet other terms: Mind is the unit,
science or knowledge the two (because it goes undeviatingly from one point to another),
opinion the number of the plane, sensation the number of the solid; the numbers are by
him expressly identified with the Forms themselves or principles, and are formed out
of the elements; now things are apprehended either by mind or science or opinion or
sensation, and these same numbers are the Forms of things’ (ὅσοι δ’ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ
αἰσθάνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς … ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ἐκ τῶν
στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτως, γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώ-
παμεν, ὕδατι δ’ ὕδωρ, αἰθέρι δ’ αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον, στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος
δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων
ποιεῖ· γινώσκεσθαι γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ
τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως· ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν
τὸ ἕν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ τὰ δύο (μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ’ ἕν), τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ
τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο, εἰσὶ δ’ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων,
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In his De animae procreatione in Timaeo Plutarch witnesses of a definition of

soul put forward by Posidonius:
Posidonius and his followers declared the soul to be the form of that which
is everywhere extended, constituted according to number which encom-
passes concord (Plutarch, De an. procr. 1023 B, included in 1023B–D = F 141
Kidd;77 cf. 1030F–1031B).
Merlan has argued that this definition, which characterises the soul by means
of three mathematical items – i.e. the number, the geometrical, and math-
ematical harmony – draws from the definitions of Xenocrates (who said
that the soul is a self-moving number), Speusippus (who defined the soul in
geometrical terms), and a third one, which may or may not be original with
Posidonius.78 We may add that the definition of the soul by Posidonius as cited
by Plutarch has several features in common with the Academic characterisa-
tion of the soul witnessed by Sextus in M IV 8, according to which ‘the Idea of
the soul is encompassed in the first four numbers according to the harmonic
κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα τὰ μὲν νῷ, τὰ δ’ ἐπιστήμῃ, τὰ δὲ δόξῃ, τὰ δ’ αἰσθήσει· εἴδη δ’ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ

οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων). My point stems from a remark by Burkert, Lore and Science, cit.,
p. 56 and n. 21: granting that Sextus’ source is Posidonius and pointing out that Aristotle,
at 404b9–11, has the same quotation from Empedocles as Sextus at M VII 92, Burkert takes
it for obvious that ‘Posidonius is in part dependent from Aristotle’.
77 Plutarch, De an. procr. 1023 B: [οἱ περὶ Ποσειδώνιον] ἀπεφήναντο τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδέαν εἶναι
τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ κατ’ἀριθμὸν συνεστῶσαν ἁρμονίαν περιέχοντα. Kidd (Posidonius, cit.,
pp. 530–1) remarks that although there is a strong presumption that Plutarch used some
intermediary sources for this essay (such as Eudorus), that does not preclude the basic
information provided by Plutarch from correctly representing Posidonius’ view.
78 For Xenocrates, see Aristotle, De Anima 404b27–8 (= Fr. 85 Isnardi Parente2; cf. Fr. 86–106):
‘Some thinkers, accepting both premisses, viz. that the soul is both originative of move-
ment and cognitive, have compounded it of both and declared the soul to be a self-moving
number’ (ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικὸν οὕτως, ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ
ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ’ ἑαυτόν); for Speusippus, see Iamblichus,
De Anima, in Stobaeus, Eclogae I xlix 32 (I, 363.26–364.5 = Fr. 96 Isnardi Parente): ‘Next,
I propose to list carefully those who relate the essence of the soul with mathematical
essence. Of this the first kind is figure, which is the limit of extension, and extension itself.
In these very terms it was defined by Severus the Platonist, while Speusippus defined it
as “the form of the omni-dimensionally extended”’ (Μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα τοὺς εἰς μαθηματικὴν
οὐσίαν ἐντιθέντας τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ψυχῆς καταλέγω διευκρινημένως. Ἔστι δὴ γένος ἕν τι αὐτῆς
τὸ σχῆμα, πέρας ὂν διαστάσεως, καὶ αὐτὴ ⟨ἡ⟩ διάστασις. Ἐν αὐτοῖς μὲν οὖν τούτοις Σεβῆρος
ὁ Πλατωνικὸς αὐτὴν ἀφωρίσατο, ἐν ἰδέᾳ δὲ τοῦ πάντῃ διαστατοῦ Σπεύσιππος …); transl. by
J.F. Finamore, Iamblichus De anima, Leiden, Brill, 2002. I owe the sketch of the point made
by Merlan (From Platonism to Neoplatonism, The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 19602, pp. 34–5) to
Mansfeld, The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract περὶ ἑβδομάδων, cit., p. 160.
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82 Chapter 2
ratio’. For this alludes to the fact that the first four numbers include the har-
mony according to which the Idea of the soul is constituted, insofar as they
provide the 4:3; 3:2 and 2:1 ratios characterising the concords which make up
the harmony; and the same basic idea is at stake in the definition witnessed
by Plutarch, where the numbers according to which the soul is constituted are
said to include the concord.
Let us review the evidence we have collected so far. Posidonius was interested
in the doctrines of the Old Academy. He used features of them (Speusippus’
and Xenocrates’ definitions of the soul in mathematical terms) for his own
mathematical characterisation of the soul. He commented on the Timaeus, in
which the soul is created as a number pattern and from which these Academic
doctrines stem.
In M VII 92–109 Sextus provides an account of Pythagoreanism which
should actually be treated as evidence for the Old Academy. Its basic feature
is the characterisation of reason (the soul faculty responsible for knowing) in
mathematical (numerical) terms, which influenced Posidonius’ psychological
theory. At the beginning of this account, Sextus quotes a couple of remarks
from Posidonius’ reflection on the Timaeus, which could easily have included
observations on the mathematical nature of the soul. The rest of the Sextan
passage betrays traces of a Stoic (if not specifically Posidonian) handling of
the Pythagorean doctrine. Where does Sextus draw his account from? No cer-
tainty is reachable on the matter, but I take the collected evidence to be strong
enough to suggest that the whole Pythagorean section derives as historical
doxography from Posidonius.79
Did Posidonius draw from an earlier Hellenistic Pythagorean source? The
claim was made by Robbins at the beginning of the twentieth century.80
Robbins tried to prove that Posidonius apud Sextum draws on an earlier
treatise on which other arithmological writers would also depend in various
ways. He points out that Varro (apud Aulum Gellium, I 20) provides scien-
tific information comparable to that of Posidonius ap. Sextum – as well as
79 Kidd (Posidonius, cit., pp. 340–3) argues that (a) there is no reason to extend the
Posidonian fragment in the sense of information on Posidonian philosophy beyond its
immediate reference, i.e. M VII 93; and (b) there would be severe difficulties in thinking
that M VII 92–109 derives as historical doxography from Posidonius. I reject (b) – and
I should stress that, as far as I have seen, Kidd’s observations do not affect the remarks
I have provided in support of my rejection.
80 Cf. F.M. Robbins, ‘Posidonius and the Sources of Greek Arithmology’, Classical
Philology 15, 1920, pp. 309–22; ‘The Tradition of Greek Arithmology’, Classical Philology 16,
1921, pp. 97–123.
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other arithmological lore about the number seven.81 He assumes that Varro
and Posidonius draw from the same source, an anonymous Pythagorean trea-
tise, and concludes that this would have to be placed earlier than ca. 100 BC.
However, as rightly pointed out by Mansfeld, the fact that Varro and Posidonius
provide two sets of arithmological claims which partly coincide does not imply
that they draw from a common source that includes all of them. Furthermore,
the fact that Varro used an arithmological source in no way implies that this
must have been as old as that – just as the fact that he used the Vetusta Placita
does not imply that they were written ca. 100 BC.82
This leaves the possibility that Posidonius has drawn from an earlier
Hellenistic source ungrounded, but open. However, I find some of the remarks
produced by Mansfeld against this possibility rather persuasive. We know that
Posidonius was interested in the psychological theories of the Old Academy,
and that his characterisation of the soul presupposes those of Xenocrates and
Speusippus. It is natural to suppose that he studied the original works of
Speusippus and Xenocrates, and not a handbook reporting their ideas on the
matter. This makes it rather implausible that he derived the arithmological
doctrines reported in M VII 92–109, which concern precisely the mathematical
structure of soul and nature and are mainly based upon ideas current in the
Old Academy, from a Hellenistic arithmological Anonymous.83
81 Cf. Robbins, ‘Posidonius and the Sources of Greek Arithmology’, cit., pp. 319–20.
82 Cf. Mansfeld, The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract περὶ ἑβδομάδων, cit., pp. 158–9.
83 Cf. Mansfeld, The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract περὶ ἑβδομάδων, cit., p. 160.
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Chapter 3
M IV 11–20: Sextus’ Attack on the One
1 Textual Remarks
At M IV 13, lines 8–11, Bury, following Bekker, prints the text of the MSS, while
Mau, accepting the emendations by Heintz,1 prints a different text:
Bury (Bekker) Mau (Heintz)
οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἐστι ⟨τὸ⟩ οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἐστι ⟨τὸ⟩ ἕν, τὸ
ἕν. τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕκαστον, ἓν μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὗ ἕκαστον ⟨μετέχον ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ
ἕκαστον πολλὰ δὲ ἀθροισμῷ, μετέ- γίνεται·⟩ ἓν μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἕκαστον,
χον, ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ γίνεται τῶν καθ’ πολλὰ δὲ ἀθροισμῷ [μετέχον, ἕν τε καὶ
ἕκαστον. πολλὰ γίνεται] τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον.
D. and J. Delattre follow Bekker. The text provided by Bekker, though, presents
some oddities. First, and syntactically, the position of μετέχον and the repeti-
tion of ἕκαστον are bizarre. Second, and semantically, Bekker’s text ascribes to
the Platonists a claim (viz. that the Form of one is both the one and the many of
the individual things) which is not implied by the characterisations of the one
provided in M IV 11 and can hardly be attributed to Plato’s followers – insofar as
a crucial move in Platonic metaphysics amounts to distinguishing the Form F
(say, the Equal itself) from its imperfect perceptible instances (e.g. the equality
between two sticks).2 The text by Heintz is coherent with the second charac-
terisation of the one in M IV 11 and provides a clarification of it (see section 2
below): I follow Mau in accepting his emendations.
At M IV 14, line 18–19, I accept the supplement οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν εἴγε conjectured
by Bekker and accepted by Bury and Heintz: see section 4 below.
At M IV 18, lines 9–10, I reject the supplement ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ πολυμερής ἐστιν· εἰ
δὲ ἀμερής introduced by Mau: see section 5 below.
At M IV 19, lines 16–21, I accept the emendations put forward by Mau: see sec-
tion 5 below.
1 See W. Heintz, Studien zu Sextus Empiricus, Halle, 1932, p. 277.

2 For this example cf. Plato, Phaedo 74c–d.

M IV 11–20: Sextus ’ Attack on the One 85
2 The Two ‘Platonic’ Characterisations of the One (M IV 11)
Sextus’ attack on the one or unit is structured in the presentation of two

allegedly Platonic characterisations of the one (M IV 11, cf. 13), followed by an
argument in their support (in 11–13) and two groups of arguments against them
(in 13–18 and 18–20 respectively). Similarly, in PH III and M X Sextus firstly
presents a Dogmatic characterisation of number and some remarks in its sup-
port (PH III 156–7; M X 285–7), and then attacks it (PH III 157–63; M X 288–98).
The two ‘Platonic’ characterisations of the one provided by Sextus run as
follows: ⟨τὸ⟩ ἕν ἐστιν
(i) οὗ μηδὲν χωρὶς λέγεται ἕν

(ii) οὗ μετοχῇ ἕκαστον ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ λέγεται.
A little later (M IV 13), Sextus offers a second, more complete version of the
second characterisation, according to which ⟨τὸ⟩ ἕν ἐστιν
(ii*) τὸ δὲ οὗ ἕκαστον μετέχον ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ γίνεται· ἓν μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ἕκα-
στον, πολλὰ δὲ ἀθροισμῷ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον.
According to (i), the existence of the one is a necessary condition for an item
to be one thing; according to (ii) and (ii*), the share (or participation) in the
one causes or explains the fact that a given item is both one thing and many
things.3 Taken together, the characterisations suggest that the participation in
the one is not just a (possible) cause, but the (necessary) cause of the fact that
a given item is both one thing and many things.
Let us focus on the second characterisation. In M IV 11 and 12, the ἕκαστον is
instantiated, in particular, by τὸ φυτόν, τὸ ζῶον, ὁ λίθος. Following the transla-
tion by Annas and Barnes of the occurrences of these expressions in PH III,
I take the definite article in the Greek here to act as universal quantifier: τὸ
φυτόν means ‘plant’ or ‘plants’: each countable item (in particular, each item
like plant, animal or stone) is, by participation in the one, both one thing and
many things.
The two characterisations provided by Sextus do not appear in Plato’s
extant works. In order to get clearer on their origin and meaning, let us start by
having a look at the closest Sextan loci similes. Variants of the claim according
3 The causal role played by the participation in the one for each countable item being one
thing is emphasised in the locus similis PH III 156: an animal is one thing ‘in virtue [κατά] of
something else, outside it and observed in it, in which each animal participates and because
of which [διὰ] it comes to be one thing’.
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86 Chapter 3
to which the one is that by participation in which each countable item is (or
comes to be, or is said, or is conceived as) one thing appear frequently in the
account of the Pythagorean doctrine in PH III and M X.4 The clause that this
participation causes each item being both one thing and many things, however,
appears nowhere else in Sextus.
The claim that each universal like plant, animal or stone is both one thing
and many things is implied by another Sextan locus outside M IV. At M X 258
Sextus explains that, according to the ‘Pythagoreans’, the Platonic Ideas or
Forms cannot be the principles of all existing things, since numbers can be
predicated of them. More precisely, each Form taken separately is said to be
one thing, while taken in conjunction with one or more other Form(s) is said
to be two or more things (ἑκάστη ἰδέα κατ’ ἰδίαν μὲν λαμβανομένη ἓν εἶναι λέγεται,
κατὰ σύλληψιν δὲ ἑτέρας ἢ ἄλλων δύο καὶ τρεῖς καὶ τέσσαρες). An analogous claim
is later applied to the one itself, which is taken to be ‘both one thing and many
things, one in itself, many in virtue of what it encompasses’ (M X 286: τὸ δὲ οὗ
ἕκαστον μετοχῇ νενόηται ἕν, ἐκεῖνο ἕν τέ ἐστι καὶ πολλά, ἓν μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτό, πολλὰ δὲ
κατὰ περίληψιν).
Some light on these formulations may be shed by Philebus, 14b–17a.5 In this
passage, Socrates invites Protarchus to consider the apparently problematical
claim according to which ‘one is many and many is one’ (ἓν τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ
ἓν πολλὰ).6 The claim is not grounded on the fact that a given perceptible item
enjoys incompatible properties or can be divided into quantitative parts.7 The
problematical cases rather concern Forms: first, the fact that a Form like colour
is at the same time one (in kind or genus) and many (insofar as it includes dif-
ferent and incompatible parts or species like black and white);8 and second,
the fact that a Form like man is at the same time one thing and infinitely many
things – namely the particulars which are called men.9 Socrates suggests that,
following the Ancients, we must acknowledge that the things which are said
to exist always (that is to say, the Forms) are constituted by the one and the
4 ‘is one thing’ (εἶναι ἕν): PH III 162 (bis); ‘comes to be one thing’ (γίνεσθαι ἕν): PH III 156 (cf. n. 3
above), 158; ‘is said to be one thing’ (ἓν λέγεται): M IV 18, M X 261, 285, PH III 160, 162; ‘is con-
ceived as one thing’ (ἓν νοεῖσθαι): M X 262 (where the items concerned are, in particular, the
countable units), 286 (bis), 293. At M X 258, number is characterised as that by participation
in which is number ‘is predicated’ (ἐπίκατηγορεῖσθαι), in particular, of the Forms.
5 The passage is usefully indicated by Delattre in a footnote at the second characterisation of
the one provided by Sextus in M IV 11.
6 See Philebus, 14b–c.
7 See Philebus, 14d–e.
8 Cf. Philebus, 12e–13a.
9 Cf. Philebus 15b. A train of thought similar to the one just sketched appears in Parmenides,
129a–130a.
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many and that they include the limit and the unlimited.10 He then encourages
recognising the genus species relationships whereby many varied species are
unified in a single genus: instead of hopping back and forth from a genus term
to the indefinite number of particulars we should carefully map out the vari-
ous kinds, the subspecies of every genus.11
The formulations in M IV and M X 258 converge on the claim that each Form
is both one thing and many things. Philebus 14c–17a sheds some light on this
claim: each Form F is both one thing (namely, one Form) and many things,
either insofar as we may regard it as the collection of the particular Fs which
participate in it (this is the case considered in M IV 13), or insofar as it embraces
several species (this is the case considered in M X 258).12
Now the second characterisation of the one in M IV further suggests that it is
because it participates in the one that each Form F is both one thing and many
things. The first part of this claim is unsurprising, insofar as it is an instance
of the standard Platonic claim according to which anything which is F is F in
virtue of its participation in the Form of F. But why should the fact that a Form
is many things be due to its participation in the one?
In order to grasp the importance of this question, it is important to recall
Plato’s view on what explains the fact that something is one thing or many
things as it results from a passage from the Phaedo. In order to try to satisfy
Cebes and prove that the soul is immortal, Socrates deems it necessary to
enquire into the cause or explanation ‘of each thing’s coming to be, perishing,
and existing’ (96a: τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται
καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι). Socrates recalls his youthful struggle with such an inquiry. The
10 Cf. Philebus 16c–e.

11 Cf. Philebus 17a–18e.
12 The expression κατὰ σύλληψιν, in M X 258, has been understood in two different ways.
Isnardi Parente takes it as a reference to the internally organised complexity of a Form:
each Form or Idea is ‘multiple, insofar as it comprehends other Ideas in itself’ (see ‘Sesto,
Platone, l’Accademia Antica e i Pitagorici’, Elenchos 13, 1992, pp. 120–68, at p. 144; cf. id,
‘Senocrate in Sesto Empirico’, Rivista di Storia della Filosofia 63 (3), 2008, pp. 477–83, at
p. 480). Brennan (‘Sextus on Number: M X 248–309’, in K. Algra and K. Ierodiakonou
(eds.), Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2014, pp. 324–64, at pp. 334–6) takes the complexity at stake to be external: someone may
take the Form of horse, that of triangle, and that of justice together as a plurality, and
call them three Forms, without thinking that any of them is internal to the others. This
is true. However, the ‘Pythagorean’ claim reported by Sextus in M X 258 (and a parallel
Pythagorean claim reported in PH III 153) is distributive: according to it, each Form (and
not several Forms taken together, as Brennan’s interpretation suggests) is said to be two
or more things. This does not seem compatible with Brennan’s reading; so I stand with
Isnardi Parente.
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88 Chapter 3
struggle concerns, in particular, what explains the fact that something is or

comes to be two things. After having wrongly thought that it was because of
the processes of division and addition, Socrates comes to the right conclusion
that the Forms are the causes of the facts at stake, and invites Cebes to stick to
such a conclusion:
Wouldn’t you beware of saying that when one is added to one, the addi-
tion is the cause of their coming to be two, or when one is divided, that
division is the cause? You’d shout loudly that you know no other way
in which each thing comes to be, except by participating in the pecu-
liar Being of any given thing in which it does participate; and in these
cases you own no other cause of their coming to be two, save partici-
pation in twoness: things that are going to be two must participate in
that, and whatever is going to be one must participate in oneness.
You’d dismiss those divisions and additions and other such subtleties
(Phaedo, 101b–c).13
It is because of its participation in the Form of one (and not, say, in the Form of
two) that everything is or comes to be one thing; it is because of its participa-
tion in the Form of two (and not, say, in the Form of one) that everything is or
comes to be two things; and so on. Doesn’t this imply that by participating in
the Form of one something can be just one thing, and not many? And that in
order for it to be or come to be many things, it should participate in the Form
of many? In the light of these remarks, the second characterisation of the one
ascribed by Sextus to Plato in M IV 11 and 13 and presumably endorsed by some
Platonists appears to be quite anti-Platonic.
Is it really so? Let us go back to the Phaedo. A few pages after inviting Cebes
to confine himself to the explanations referring to the Forms described above,
Socrates comes back to this issue. He invites Cebes to consider heat, cold,
snow, and fire, and leads him to the conclusion that, albeit heat is a different
thing from fire and cold from snow, snow does not admit heat or fire cold. He
then comments on these facts:
13 Plato, Phaedo 101b–c: Τί δέ; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προστεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι
ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως
πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις
οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ’ ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου
μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας
καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας ἐῴης ἂν χαίρειν … For the passages from
the Phaedo I offer the translation by Gallop (sometimes slightly modified, as in the pres-
ent case).
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‘The situation, then, in some cases of this kind, is as follows: not only is
the Form itself entitled to its own name for all time; but there’s some-
thing else too, which is not the same as the Form, but which, whenever
it exists, always has the character of that Form. Perhaps what I mean will
be clearer in this further example: the odd must, surely, always be given
this name that we’re now using, mustn’t it?’ ‘Certainly.’ ‘But is it the only
thing there is – this is my question – or is there something else, which
is not the same as the odd, yet which one must also always call odd, as
well as by its own name, because it is by nature such that it can never be
separated from the odd? I mean the sort of thing that happens to three,
and to many other instances. Consider the case of three. Don’t you think
that it must always be called both by its own name and by that of the odd,
although the odd is not the same as three? They aren’t the same, yet three
and five and half the entire number series are by nature, each of them,
always odd, although they are not the same as the odd. … Thus we shall
say, shan’t we, that three will sooner perish, will undergo anything else
whatever, sooner than abide coming to be even, while remaining three?’
‘Indeed we shall,’ said Cebes (Phaedo, 103e–104c).14
Socrates’ point in this passage appears to be the following. A Form is entitled

to its own name for all the time: a Form F must always be F. But in addition to
the Form F there are other items, different from it, which always have the char-
acter of that Form. These are the items which are by nature such that they must
always be F. The examples considered by Socrates (cold and snow, heat and
fire, odd and three) are cases of this kind. The cold is necessarily cold. The
snow is not to be identified with the cold. However, it has such a nature that it
necessarily is cold. The odd is odd. Three is not to be identified with the odd.
14 Plato, Phaedo, 103e–104c: Ἔστιν ἄρα, ἦ δ’ ὅς, περὶ ἔνια τῶν τοιούτων, ὥστε μὴ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ
εἶδος ἀξιοῦσθαι τοῦ αὑτοῦ ὀνόματος εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐκ ἐκεῖνο,
ἔχει δὲ τὴν ἐκείνου μορφὴν ἀεί, ὅτανπερ ᾖ. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῷδε ἴσως ἔσται σαφέστερον ὃ λέγω· τὸ γὰρ
περιττὸν ἀεί που δεῖ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος τυγχάνειν ὅπερ νῦν λέγομεν· ἢ οὔ;
Πάνυ γε.
Ἆρα μόνον τῶν ὄντων—τοῦτο γὰρ ἐρωτῶ—ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι ὃ ἔστι μὲν οὐχ ὅπερ τὸ περιττόν,
ὅμως δὲ δεῖ αὐτὸ μετὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ὀνόματος καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖν ἀεὶ διὰ τὸ οὕτω πεφυκέναι ὥστε τοῦ
περιττοῦ μηδέποτε ἀπολείπεσθαι; λέγω δὲ αὐτὸ εἶναι οἷον καὶ ἡ τριὰς πέπονθε καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.
σκόπει δὲ περὶ τῆς τριάδος. ἆρα οὐ δοκεῖ σοι τῷ τε αὑτῆς ὀνόματι ἀεὶ προσαγορευτέα εἶναι καὶ τῷ
τοῦ περιττοῦ, ὄντος οὐχ ὅπερ τῆς τριάδος; ἀλλ’ ὅμως οὕτως πέφυκε καὶ ἡ τριὰς καὶ ἡ πεμπτὰς καὶ
ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἅπας, ὥστε οὐκ ὢν ὅπερ τὸ περιττὸν ἀεὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐστι περιττός … ἢ
οὐ φήσομεν τὰ τρία καὶ ἀπολεῖσθαι πρότερον καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πείσεσθαι, πρὶν ὑπομεῖναι ἔτι τρία
ὄντα ἄρτια γενέσθαι;
Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη ὁ Κέβης.
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90 Chapter 3
However, it has such a nature that it is necessarily odd. In general, Socrates

invites us to consider the fact that, given two different Forms F and G, and
granted that the G must always be G, it might also be the case that the F has
such a nature that it also is necessarily G: he invites us to consider the proper-
ties that something has in virtue of its nature.
The reason for which Socrates mentions such a case becomes evident a little
later, when he makes clear to Cebes that it plays a major role in his account of
explanations:
ʻThen please repeat it from the start; and don’t answer in the exact terms
of my question, but in imitation of my example. I say this, because from
what’s now being said I see a different kind of safeness beyond the answer
I gave initially, the old safe one. Thus, if you were to ask me what it is, by
whose presence in a body, that body will be hot, I shan’t give you the old
safe, ignorant answer, that it’s hotness, but a subtler answer is now avail-
able, that it’s fire. And again, if you ask what it is, by whose presence in a
body, that body will ail, I shan’t say that it’s illness, but fever. And again,
if you asked what it is, by whose presence in a number, that number will
be odd, I shan’t say oddness, but unit; and so on. See whether by now you
have an adequate understanding of what I want’. ‘Yes, quite adequate’.
(Plato, Phaedo 105b–c).15
A body is hot. Now consider the question: ‘Why is that body hot?’ A safe, but
ignorant reply amounts to say: ‘That body is hot because it participates in hot-
ness’. A subtler answer, grounded on the fact that anything which has fire in it
is by nature hot, is the following: ‘That body is hot because it has fire in it, and
anything which has fire in it is by nature hot’. Number 3 is odd. Now consider
the question: ‘Why is the number 3 odd?’ A safe, but ignorant reply amounts to
say: ‘The number 3 is odd because it participates in oddness’. A subtler answer,
grounded on the fact that any number which has an unpaired unit in it is by
nature odd, is: ‘The number 3 is odd because it has an (unpaired) unit in it –
when it is divided in two equal parts, it leaves over a unit in the middle; and any
15 Plato, Phaedo 105b–c: Πάλιν δή μοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ἀρχῆς λέγε. καὶ μή μοι ὃ ἂν ἐρωτῶ ἀποκρίνου, ἀλλὰ
μιμούμενος ἐμέ. λέγω δὴ παρ’ ἣν τὸ πρῶτον ἔλεγον ἀπόκρισιν, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ ἐκείνην, ἐκ τῶν νῦν
λεγομένων ἄλλην ὁρῶν ἀσφάλειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἔροιό με ᾧ ἂν τί ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐγγένηται θερμὸν ἔσται,
οὐ τὴν ἀσφαλῆ σοι ἐρῶ ἀπόκρισιν ἐκείνην τὴν ἀμαθῆ, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν θερμότης, ἀλλὰ κομψοτέραν ἐκ
τῶν νῦν, ὅτι ᾧ ἂν πῦρ· οὐδὲ ἂν ἔρῃ ᾧ ἂν σώματι τί ἐγγένηται νοσήσει, οὐκ ἐρῶ ὅτι ᾧ ἂν νόσος, ἀλλ’
ᾧ ἂν πυρετός· οὐδ’ ᾧ ἂν ἀριθμῷ τί ἐγγένηται περιττὸς ἔσται, οὐκ ἐρῶ ᾧ ἂν περιττότης, ἀλλ’ᾧ ἂν
μονάς, καὶ τἆλλα οὕτως. ἀλλ’ ὅρα εἰ ἤδη ἱκανῶς οἶσθ’ ὅτι βούλομαι.
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number which has an unpaired unit in it – any number which, when divided in
two equal parts, leaves over a unit in the middle – is by nature odd’.16
At 101b–c Socrates invited Cebes to stick to explanations of the form
x is F because it participates in the Form F.
Now he considers explanations which involve the couples of Forms he dis-

cussed with Cebes at 103e–104c–that is to say, couples of Forms F and G such
that if something is G, then it is by nature F. In these cases, Socrates suggests, an
explanation of the form ‘x is F because it participates in the Form of F’ is safe,
but uninformative. A subtler explanation is one of the form: ‘x is F because it
participates in the Form of G, and if something is G, it is by nature F’. In other
words, Socrates puts forward a general schema of explanation which replaces
the one suggested in 101 as being more informative:
x is F because it is G – and being G by nature implies being F.
Now this schema of explanation is quite interesting for our aims. For an
instance of this schema may well ground the problematical part of the second
characterisation of the one in M IV 11 and 13 – namely the following:
x is many because it is one – and being one by nature implies being many.
But how could the fact that a given countable item is many things be due to the
fact that it is one thing? In the passage from the Philebus which appears to be
quite relevant for this claim, 14b–17a (see above), a Form like colour is charac-
terised as being many things insofar as it is one whole including many parts. In
the light of this, the best way to explain the above-mentioned claim seems to
me to take it to hold for universal items like Forms, and to be reminiscent of a
mereological characterisation of the one – to read ‘one’, in this formula, as ‘one
whole’. Under this hypothesis, our crucial formula may be restated as follows:
Each universal item is many (parts) because it is one (whole) – and being
one (whole) by nature implies being many (parts).
16 In other words, any odd number (e.g. 3) is greater by one than a certain even number (in
our case, 2). I understand the word μονάς at 105c6 in the way suggested by Hackworth
(Plato’s Phaedo, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958, p. 158, n. 2), and that is to
say as ‘unit’: cf. Gallop, Plato. Phaedo, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 210.
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92 Chapter 3
I suggest that this view underlies the second characterisation of the one in
M IV. By participation in the one each universal is both one (whole) and many
(parts, i.e. its particulars); and it is many (parts) insofar as it is one (whole). The
fact that this characterisation of the one applies to universal items is strongly
suggested by the clause following it: a given item is many things ‘by collec-
tion of individual things’ (ἀθροισμῷ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστον). The phrase is an hapax
in Sextus, but in M IX 313 Sextus uses a similar expression to characterise the
number ten as a ‘collection of individual units’ (ἀθροισμὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονά-
δων: cf. M X 295). The expression καθ’ ἕκαστον is used, in ancient logical context,
to denote individual predicates – i.e. predicates holding of exactly one item, as
opposed to predicates holding of several objects. For instance, ‘man’ is such as
to be predicated of several objects, while ‘Socrates’ is not.17 This suggests that
the whole-parts relationship that the author of the second characterisation
has in mind is that holding between a Form like animal and its particulars, i.e.
individuals like Socrates and Callias, rather than its species.18
At the end of M IV 13 Sextus adds that plurality (πλῆθος) is that by shar-
ing in which many things [τὰ πολλὰ] ‘such as plants, animals or stones … are
called many’. Isn’t this contradictory with the second characterisation of the
one explained above, according to which it is by sharing in the one that ἕκαστον
is both one and many things? It is not. For while ἕκαστον refers to intelligible
Forms or universal items, denoted by names in the singular like φυτὸν, ζῷον and
λίθος, τὰ πολλὰ refers to pluralities or multitudes of perceptible particular items
denoted by names in the plural like φυτᾶ, ζῷα and λίθοι. It is only the plurality
of the latter that needs to be explained by reference to τὸ πλῆθος.19
17 For a list of ancient references and a discussion of this distinction see J. Barnes, Porphyry.
Introduction, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2003, pp. 77–80 and 325–9.
18 There is a second way of explaining the problematical claim that is worth mentioning.
The view underlying the second characterisation of the one in M IV may be the following:
‘x is many things because it is unified – and being unified by nature implies being many
things’. (In order for something to be many things, it must be unified; and in order for it
to be unified, it must be one F – it must participate in oneness.) The claim may be taken
to hold, in particular, for Forms. It is because it is unified that each Form is both one thing
and many things: if it was not unified, it could not be both one thing and many things.
That is to say: if there is no unification, there may be several things, but there is not one
item being (both one thing and) several things.
19 An analogous train of thought is to be found at M X 287, where Sextus reports the Platonic
characterisation of τὸ πλῆθος as that by share in which each of the pluralities which is
shown in countable items, such as those of plants (φυτᾶ) and animals (ζῷα), is conceived
of as a plurality. On the argument in support of this characterisation cf. n. 23.
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3 The Argument in Support of the Platonist Conception of the One

(M IV 11–13)
Having presented the two Platonist characterisations of the concept of the

one, Sextus puts forward an argument to which those characterisations – or
rather a feature they share – are due. Indeed, they both imply a distinction
between the numerable or countable items on one side (things like plants, ani-
mals or stones, each sample of which is said to be one thing),20 and something
in virtue of which they are so called, characterised in the way we have seen and
called ‘the one’ (τὸ ἕν), ‘the real one’ (τὸ ὄντως ἕν) and ‘the Idea of one’ (ἡ τοῦ
ἑνὸς ἰδέα) a few lines below,21 on the other.
Why should one accept this distinction, then? Here is a sketch of the argu-
ment in its support, from which confusion and repetitions have been removed.
I use the example provided by Sextus; [] indicates what I take to be underlying
premises.
1. Any plant is called one thing.

2. [If any plant is called one thing, then it is called one thing either in vir-
tue of the account which is proper to it, or not in virtue of the account
which is proper to it.]
3. If any plant is called one thing in virtue of the account which is proper
to it, then if something is not a plant, it cannot be called one thing.
4. Now something which is not a plant, say an animal, is called one thing.
5. Therefore any plant is called one thing not in virtue of the account
which is proper to it.
6. [If any plant is called one thing not in virtue of the account which is
proper to it, then it is called one thing by participating in something,
the one, which is neither plant nor any other countable item.]
7. Therefore any plant is called one thing by participating in something,
the one, which is neither plant nor any other countable item.
---
8. The one is neither plant nor any other countable item.
In order to deepen our understanding of the argument, let us have a look at

the Sextan loci similes. In PH III 156–7 and M X 285–7 Sextus reports two argu-
ments, parallel to the one we have just seen, by means of which the so-called
20 These are indicated as τὰ ἀριθμητὰ (M IV 12), τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητὰ (14), τὸ ἀριθμητὸν F
(ξύλον: 15); examples of them are plants, animals, stones, logs.
21 Cf. M IV 12, 14.
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94 Chapter 3
‘Pythagoreans’ try to show that number is something different apart from the
countable items. Let us focus on the passage from the Outlines:
[156] [The Pythagoreans] try to establish that numbers are something dif-
ferent apart from numbered objects, arguing that if an animal (say) is, by
its own definition, one thing, then a plant, since it is not an animal, will
not be one thing. But a plant too is one thing. Therefore an animal is one
thing, not insofar as it is an animal, but in virtue of something else, out-
side it and observed in it, in which each animal participates and because
of which it comes to be one thing. … [157] Therefore numbers are not the
objects numbered but possess an existence of their own apart from them
in virtue of which they are observed in the numbered objects and are ele-
ments (PH III 156–7).22
This passage contains several claims which are pertinent for our inquiry. First,
corresponding to step 7 of our argument in M IV there we find a view that may
be stated as follows:
Any plant is one thing by participating in something else, the number

one, which is different from plants and from any other countable item, is
outside them and is observed in them.
Secondly, corresponding to the conclusion of our argument in M IV the pas-

sage from the Outlines features a conclusion that may be formulated thus:
The number one is something different apart from plants and from any
other countable item.
Thirdly, in M IV 11–13 and in the loci paralleli the items at stake are not just
plants, but numerable or countable items (ἀριθμητά) – in particular, those
countable items which are perceptible objects (αἰσθητά),23 and this suggests
a version of the argument generalised to any countable item/sensible object.
22 PH III 156–7: [156] [οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Πυθαγόρου] ὅτι ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ
κατασκευάζουσι, λέγοντες ὅτι εἰ τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἐστίν, εἰ τύχοι, ἕν, τὸ φυτόν,
ἐπεὶ μή ἐστι ζῷον, οὐκ ἔσται ἕν· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ φυτὸν ἕν· οὐκ ἄρα τὸ ζῷον, ⟨ὡς ζῷον⟩, ἕν ἐστιν,
ἀλλὰ κατά τι ἕτερον ἐπιθεωρούμενον ἔξωθεν αὐτῷ, οὗ μετέχει ἕκαστον καὶ γίνεται δι’ αὐτὸ ἕν. …
[157] οὐκ ἄρα τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ἀλλ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ ταῦτα, καθ’ ἣν καὶ
ἐπιθεωρεῖται τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς καὶ ἔστι στοιχεῖον.
23 Cf. M X 285, where the ‘Pythagoreans’ are taken to claim that ‘none of the countable items,
for instance the perceptible things which fall under our senses, is the one, but is called
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Fourthly, and finally, both PH and M conclude that numbers – number one
in particular – are the elements of things.24
We will come back to these two last points later. For the moment, let us
focus on the main question at stake in the argument: that is to say, the question
whether the number one is something different, outside and apart from count-
able items – plants, for instance. What is the exact meaning of this claim? In
order to get clearer on it, it is crucial to go back to the discussion on num-
bers provided by Sextus in the Outlines and to grasp its basic structure. The
crucial passage is PH III 157. Sextus has just put forward the Pythagorean (i.e.
Platonist) claim that ‘numbers are something different apart from numbered
objects’ and two arguments in its support – one of which is the argument in
PH III 156–7 quoted above. Sextus then elucidates what he is going to do in the
rest of his discussion of numbers:
Once they [scl. the Pythagoreans] had concluded in this way that num-
bered objects are not numbers, the puzzle against numbers entered the
scene. It is argued that if numbers exist they are either the numbered
objects themselves or something different, outside and apart from
them. But numbers are neither the numbered objects themselves, as the
Pythagoreans have proved, nor something different apart from them, as
we shall suggest. Therefore numbers are nothing (PH III 157).25
Sextus’ discussion of numbers in the Outlines is thus grounded on an exclu-

sive and exhaustive disjunction. If numbers exist, they are either the countable
items or something different, outside and apart from them. But the first dis-
junct does not hold (as the Pythagoreans show by means of the arguments
reported in PH III 156–7). And the second disjunct does not hold either (as
one by participation in the one which is, as it were, primary and elemental’ (τῶν ἀριθ-
μητῶν, οἷον τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ ὑποπιπτόντων, μηδὲν εἶναι ἕν, μετοχῇ δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς τοῦ ὡσανεὶ
πρώτου καὶ στοιχείου ἕν τι καλεῖσθαι). The text in M X 285–6 is extensively corrupt (see
R. Bett, Sextus Empiricus. Against the Physicists, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2012, p. 132, n. 29), and the argument about the one it contains is not intelligible. I suggest
to emend the text and to understand the argument in the light of the parallel argument
about plurality in 287. Thus, as far as the conclusion is concerned, I take ἕν in terms of τῷ
ὄντι ἕν in the light of the argument in 287, in which πλῆθος is patently taken as short for
τῷ ὄντι πλῆθος.
24 Cf. the conclusion in M X 285 quoted at n. 23.
25 PH III 157: Οὕτως οὖν ἐκείνων συναγαγόντων, ὅτι ἀριθμὸς οὔκ ἐστι τὰ ἀριθμητά, παρεισῆλθεν
ἡ κατὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπορία. λέγεται γάρ, ὅτι εἰ ἔστιν ἀριθμός, ἤτοι αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ
ἀριθμὸς ἢ ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ἔξωθεν· οὔτε δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ὡς ἀπέδειξαν
οἱ Πυθαγορικοί, οὔτε ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα, ὡς ὑπομνήσομεν· οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμός.
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96 Chapter 3
Sextus shows by means of the arguments he puts forward in PH III 157–63).

Therefore numbers do not exist.26
The crucial contrast at stake, all throughout PH III 156–63, is that between
number – the number one in particular:
– having an existence27 of its own apart from countable items (157: ὁ ἀριθ-
μὸς ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει παρὰ ταῦτα scl. τὰ ἀριθμητά);
– being something different, outside and apart from the countable items
(156: ἕτερόν τι ἐστὶν ὁ ἀριθμὸς παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ, cf. 157, 158, 164);
– being something in its own right (158: ἔστι τι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἡ μονάς –
cf. 162, 163; 163: καθ’ ἑαυτόν ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός);
– existing on its own (167: ὑφέστηκε κατ’ ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμός);
– being observed on its own (167: κατ’ ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς θεωρεῖται);
– vs.
– being the countable items themselves (157: αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν ὁ
ἀριθμὸς – cf. 156, 163), or
– having its existence in the countable items (167: ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς ἔχει τὴν
ὑπόστασιν).
The phrases ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν, κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι and κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστα-
σιν are not to be found very frequently elsewhere in Sextus’ corpus: the first
appear three other times (PH II 219, III 99; M I 137), the second four other times
(PH III 41; M IX 346, X 291; M I 130), and the third two other times (M VIII 161;
M IX 338). The Sextan loci where these phrases appear concern beings (in a
26 Cf. PH III 163: ‘But if numbers neither exist in their own right, as we have suggested, nor
are the numbered things themselves, as Pythagoras’ followers have established, and if
there is no option apart from these, then we should say that numbers do not exist’ (εἰ
μήτε καθ’ ἑαυτόν ἐστιν ὁ ἀριθμός, ὡς ὑπεμνήσαμεν, μήτε αὐτὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμός ἐστιν,
ὡς οἱ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου παρέστησαν, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι, λεκτέον μηδὲ εἶναι ἀριθμόν)
and 167: ‘But if numbers neither are observed on their own nor have their subsistence
in the numbered objects, then there are no such things as numbers, so far as the super-
fluities peddled by the Dogmatists go’ (εἰ δὲ μήτε κατ’ ἰδίαν ὁ ἀριθμὸς θεωρεῖται μήτε ἐν τοῖς
ἀριθμητοῖς ἔχει τὴν ὑπόστασιν, οὐδὲ ἔστι τι ὁ ἀριθμὸς ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς περιεργίαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν
δογματικῶν εἰσενηνεγμέναις).
27 On the legitimacy of translating ὑπόστασις and ὑφίστασθαι respectively by ‘existence’ and
‘exist’ see Barnes, Porphyry. Introduction, cit., p. 40: ‘The verb “subsist [ὑφίστασθαι]” and
its associated noun “subsistence [ὑπόστασις]” became vogue words in late Platonic meta-
physics, where scholars discover recondite senses for them; and some Stoics had earlier
given a special meaning to the terms in certain contexts. But the words are common in
Galen and Sextus and Alexander, where they mean “existence” and “exist” … So too in
Porphyry’. As Barnes indicates, Galen notes expressly that ὑφίστασθαι is a synonym of εἶναι
and ὑπάρχειν (Meth. Med. X 155K; Inst. Log. III 2), and Plutarch implies as much (Comm.
not. 1081F).
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couple of cases all beings, in the other some beings: universals like genera and
species or quantitative items like lines and surfaces or wholes). The phrases
themselves qualify the way in which these beings exist or are conceived of,
but the alternative way of existing or being conceived of that Sextus has in
mind is not the same in every passage. Sometimes ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν (having
an existence of its own) is contrasted with being a mere concept or thought
(PH II 219), and elsewhere with having an existence which depends on other
items (PH III 99, M I 137).28 κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι (existing on its own) is opposed
once to being observed only in connection with other items (PH III 41), once to
being included in other items (M IX 346), once to being observed with and to
being included in other items (M X 291), and once to existing dependently from
other items (M I 130).29 The phrase κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν (‘in virtue of its own
existence’) is once used to qualify the way in which some beings are conceived
of as opposed to the way in which the others are – and that is to say, in virtue
of their state in relation to another thing (M VIII 161), and once to qualify the
way wholes are conceived of as existing – as being different from, as opposed
to be identical to, the sum of their parts (M IX 338).30
28 At PH II 219 Sextus asks whether genera and species are conceptions (ἐννοήματα – as the
Stoics take them to be: DL VII 60) or whether they have an existence of their own – a
disjunction which he takes to be exclusive and exhaustive; at PH III 99, he argues that if a
whole identifies to its parts, then it will have no existence of its own – that is to say, inde-
pendently from its parts (cf. J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, in id., Method and Metaphysics:
Essays in Ancient Philosophy I, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 429–83, at
pp. 471–2); on M I 137 see the note that follows.
29 PH III 41: if there are surfaces or lines, then either they exist in their own right (or, as
Sextus says a little later, they ‘exist by themselves’ – καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑπάρχουσαν), or they
are observed only in connection with bodies (μόνον περὶ τοῖς … σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι); at
M IX 346, Sextus argues that the parts of a man exist separately and ‘are not included in
one another’ (οὐκ ἐμπεριέχεται ἀλλήλοις) insofar as each of them ‘has its own separate
place’ (ἴδιον τόπον ἀπείληφεν): a similar train of thought appears at M I 137, where Sextus
mentions the claim that each part of a whole occupies its own place and has an existence
of its own (ἴδιον τόπον ἐπέχοντα καὶ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα); at M I 130, Sextus appears to
wonder whether the parts of a syllable exist by themselves or ‘only in relation to one
another’ (see D. Blank, Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1998, p. 169); at M X 291, Sextus puts forward an argument against the existence
of man in general based on a trilemma whose disjuncts are all problematical: ὁ γενικὸς
ἄνθρωπος either is observed along with the particular men (μετὰ τῶν ἐπ’ εἴδους ἀνθρώπων
θεωρεῖται) or exists on its own (κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑφέστηκεν) or is included in the particular men
(ἐν κατὰ μέρος ἀνθρώποις περιέχεται). On this argument see infra, section 4.
30 At M VIII 161 Sextus reports a twofold ontological distinction on which a sceptical argu-
ment against sign is based: some beings (e.g. white, black, sweet items) are in virtue of a
difference (κατὰ διαφοράν) – i.e. conceived of in virtue of their own existence and abso-
lutely (κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ ἀπολύτως νοεῖται), while the others (e.g. whiter, blacker,
sweeter items) are in a certain state in relation to something (πρός τι πὼς ἔχοντα) – i.e.
conceived of in virtue of their state in relation to another thing and no longer grasped
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98 Chapter 3
It is pretty clear that the contrast at stake in PH III concerns the way in
which number exists; it is not clear what this contrast amounts to. Some
light on the matter may be shed by the occurrences of the phrases κατ’
ἰδίαν ὑφέστῆναι and κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν to be found in a couple of passages
of the commentary to Aristotle’s Metaphysics by Sextus’ roughly contempo-
rary Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Met. 84.28 and 180.12. In the first passage,
Alexander is commenting on Metaphysics Α 9, 990b15–17, where Aristotle
observes that some of the more rigorous arguments in favour of the existence
of Forms lead to the aporetic Third Man Argument.31 This difficulty is taken
by Alexander to be entailed, among other Platonist views, by the hypothesis
that ‘the predicate [i.e. ‘man’] … is not the same as any of the items that it is
predicated of – it is something different apart from them [τὸ κατηγορούμενόν
… μὴ ταὐτὸν ᾖ ἐκείνων τινὶ ὧν κατηγορεῖται … ἄλλο τί ἐστι παρ’ ἐκεῖνα]’32 or, as
Alexander reformulates it a bit later, ‘the predicated [man] is different from
the items that it is predicated of and exists by itself [ἄλλος ὁ κατηγορούμενος ὧν
κατηγορεῖται καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑφεστώς]’.33 As for the second occurrence, Alexander
is commenting on Metaphysics Β 1, 996a4–8, where Aristotle raises the hardest
and most problematical question of all, that is to say ‘whether one and being,
as the Pythagoreans and Plato said, are not attributes of something else but
are the substances of existing things, or this is not the case, but the substratum
absolutely or by themselves (κατὰ τὴν ὡς πρὸς ἕτερον σχέσιν νοούμενα καὶοὐκέτι ἀπολελυ-
μένως λαμβανόμενα, τουτέστι κατ’ ἰδίαν). At M IX 338, Sextus argues that if there exists any
whole either it is different from its parts and conceived of in virtue of its own subsistence
and existence (ἕτερόν ἐστι τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν καὶ οὐσίαν νοεῖται), or
the sum of its parts is said to be a whole: on this passage see infra, ch. 5.
31 Aristotle, Met. Α 9, 990b15–17: ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων οἱ μὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν
ἰδέας, ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἶναι καθ’αὑτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον λέγουσιν.
32 Alexander, In Met. 84.2–7: ‘But if this is so, and what is predicated in common of certain
things, if it were not to be the same as any of those things of which it is predicated, is
something else apart from it (for that is why man-himself is a genus: because, while being
predicated of particular men, it was not the same as any of them), there will be some
third man apart both from particular men such as Socrates or Plato, and from the Idea,
which itself is also numerically one’ (ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ κατηγορούμενόν τινων κοινῶς, ἂν μὴ
ταὐτὸν ᾖ ἐκείνων τινὶ ὧν κατηγορεῖται, ἄλλο τί ἐστι παρ’ ἐκεῖνα (διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ γένος ὁ αὐτοάν-
θρωπος, ὅτι κατηγορούμενος τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα οὐδενὶ αὐτῶν ἦν ὁ αὐτός), τρίτος ἄνθρωπος ἔσται
τις παρά τε τὸν καθ’ ἕκαστα, οἷον Σωκράτη καὶ Πλάτωνα, καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἰδέαν, ἥτις καὶ αὐτὴ μία
κατ’ ἀριθμόν ἐστιν). For the passages from Alexander I offer the translations by Dooley and
Madigan, sometimes slightly modified.
33 Alexander, In Met. 84.27–85.1: ‘For if [the man] predicated is other than those of whom it
is predicated and exists by itself, and man is predicated both of particular men and of the
Idea, there will be some third man apart both from particular men and from the Idea’ (εἰ
γὰρ ἄλλος ὁ κατηγορούμενος ὧν κατηγορεῖται, καὶ κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑφεστώς, κατηγορεῖται δὲ κατά τε
τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ κατὰ τῆς ἰδέας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἔσται τρίτος τις ἄνθρωπος παρά τε τοὺς καθ’
ἕκαστα καὶ τὴν ἰδέαν).
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is something else …’.34 The difficulty raised by Aristotle, observes Alexander,

touches upon the general question ‘whether the principles have an existence
of their own and in their own right [ἐν οἰκείᾳ ὑποστάσει εἰσὶ καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰς],
as individual entities have, or they do not, but are like genera and universals
and common items, whose existence consists in their being predicated of indi-
viduals [οἷς ἐν τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα τὸ εἶναι]’35 – that is to say, as
Alexander adds a bit later, whether the principles exist ‘in the way common
items, which do not have an existence of their own [οὐκ ἔχει κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστα-
σιν], exist, or in the way individual items exist’.36
These Alexandrian parallels, which feature occurrences of the phrases κατ’
ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι and κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν in association with τί εἶναι παρὰ …
just as the Sextan loci do, suggest that the general question underlying PH III
is that of the nature of the existence of universal items, which Sextus is ask-
ing à propos numbers. Sextus wonders whether number is something different
apart from countable items (a particular example of which is constituted by
the perceptible objects) or not; and this dilemma echoes an exclusive and
exhaustive disjunction of major philosophical importance. In the books Mu
and Nu of his Metaphysics, Aristotle faces the question whether mathematical
objects – including numbers – exist separately from perceptible objects37 or
not. This question is tackled by Plato (and his followers) and by Aristotle (and
his followers); and Platonists and Aristotelians have two opposite views on the
matter. Aristotle considers at length the view of Plato and his colleagues, who
contended that mathematical objects exist separately from sensible objects;
he brings a sequence of objections against their view; and he concludes, as it
were by default, that mathematical objects must exist in a derivative way.
34 Aristotle, Met. Β 1, 996a4–8: ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον καὶ πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, πότε-
ρον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ’ οὐσία
τῶν ὄντων; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον …
35 Alexander, In Met. 180.4–6: ἔτι πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐν οἰκείᾳ ὑποστάσει εἰσὶ καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰς ὡς τὰ
καθ’ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ’ ὡς τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ κοινά, οἷς ἐν τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι
τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα τὸ εἶναι.
36 Alexander, In Met. 180.11–13: ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ κοινῶς καὶ καθόλου ζητεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν,
πότερον οὕτως εἰσὶν ὡς τὰ κοινά, ἃ οὐκ ἔχει κατ’ ἰδίαν ὑπόστασιν, ἢ οὕτως ὡς τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα. Cf.
In Top. 355.12–14, where Alexander expresses an analogous view about the genera: ‘Genera
are neither items somehow existing by themselves nor are they bare thoughts without
existence, like the centaur. Rather, their existence is in the items of which they are predi-
cated’ (τὰ γένη οὔτε καθ’ αὑτά ἐστιν ὑφεστῶτά που οὔτε ἐστὶ ψιλὰ χωρὶς ὑπάρξεως νοήματα, ὡς
ἱπποκένταυρος, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις αὐτῶν ἐν τούτοις ὧν κατηγορεῖται).
37 κεχωρισμένα τῶν αἰσθητῶν (Met. Μ 1, 1076a34). Other Aristotelian ways of indicating sepa-
rate existence are παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένα τούτων (1076b13) and παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ (see
e.g. 1076a11).
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100 Chapter 3
In order to understand the issue at stake, it is useful to recall the core of

the Aristotelian project of a science which studies beings qua beings. At the
beginning of book Gamma of his Metaphysics Aristotle presents a discipline –
later called ‘metaphysics’ – which studies the things which exist insofar as they
exist – which, in other words, studies those attributes which hold of entities
in virtue of the fact that they are entities. In dealing with this issue, Aristotle
introduces a distinction of major importance, that between substances and
accidents, which we might represent as follows.
The verb ‘to exist’ (εἶναι) has a primary use, and various derivative uses, each
of which contains in its account the account of the primary use. So consider all
the items which are said to exist. Items of a first kind exist in a primary way –
are such that the account of what it is for them to exist does not include any
reference to what it is for anything else to exist: and these are the substances.
All the other items exist in a derivative or parasitical way – are such that the
account of their existence refers to the existence of some substances: and these
are the accidents. Take folly, for instance. Folly is an accident of foolish human
beings: folly exists insofar as certain existent substances (men) are foolish.
Now in Metaphysics Mu and Nu, when he asks whether mathematical
objects are separated from the sensible objects or not, Aristotle is dealing pre-
cisely with the question of the way in which they exist: are they substances
(as Plato and his colleagues take them to be), or are they rather accidents
and derivative entities (as the Aristotelians think)? And Sextus, when he asks
whether number has an existence of its own apart from the countable items
(as his Platonic adversaries thought) or exist in them, deals with an instance of
the same question.38
Since Sextus’ discussion of numbers in the Outlines appears to be grounded
on the crucial disjunction concerning the status of mathematical items tack-
led by Aristotle in his Metaphysics, it is tempting to read the argument in
38 A couple of centuries after Sextus the neoplatonist Dexippus expresses the same dilemma
in virtually the same terms. At In Cat. 69.6–25 he tackles the question whether number
‘exists in the things that are counted [ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἀριθμουμένοις]’ or ‘it exists by itself
[καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ὑφέστηκε]’ and measures them from outside, like a ruler – a question raised
by Plotinus. Dexippus’ reply is grounded on the contrast between number ‘having its exis-
tence in the things that are counted, as it is observed in the case of the accidents [ἐν τοῖς
ἀριθμουμένοις ἔχειν τὴν ὑπόστασιν ὡς ἐν συμβεβηκότος τάξει θεωρούμενον]’ vs. ‘existing by
itself [καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ὑφεστηκέναι]’, ‘having an existence and subsistence of its own [ἔχειν
ἰδίαν οὐσίαν καὶ ὑπόστασιν]’, ‘existing by its own existence [κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν οὐσίαν ὑφεστη-
κέναι]’ – that is to say, between number being an accident of the countable items or a
substance. The reply amounts to saying that number ‘is present in [παρεῖναι]’ and ‘exists
together with [συνυπάρχειν]’ the things that are counted, but does not have its existence
in them – it has its own existence.
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M IV 11–3 in the light of this background. Let us do so, starting with the exam-
ple of the plants:
1. Any plant is one thing.

2. If any plant is one thing, then it is one thing either in virtue of the
account which is proper to it, or not in virtue of the account which is
proper to it.
3. If any plant is one thing in virtue of the account which is proper to it,
then if something is not a plant, it cannot be one thing.
4. Now something which is not a plant, say an animal, is one thing.
5. Therefore any plant is one thing not in virtue of the account which is
proper to it.
6. If any plant is one thing not in virtue of the account which is proper
to it, then it is one thing by participating in something, the number
one, which is such that the account of its existence cannot contain any
reference to the existence of plants nor of any other countable item.
7. Any plant is one thing by participating in something, the number one,
which is such that the account of its existence cannot contain any ref-
erence to the existence of plants nor of any other countable item.
---
8. The number one is such that the account of its existence cannot con-
tain any reference to the existence of plants nor of any other countable
item.
Understanding this argument calls for answering several questions. Let us start
by asking the following two:
(i) What does it mean for something to be one thing in virtue of the
account which is proper to it (κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον)?
(ii) Why if a plant is one thing not in virtue of the account which is proper
to it, then the number one is such that the account of its existence can-
not contain any reference to the existence of plants?
As far as the first question is concerned, we might notice that premise 3 implies
that if a plant is one thing κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, then if something is one thing, it
is a plant. So it seems that the idea is that a plant is one thing κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον
iff being one thing is either the definition or a property, an ἴδιον, of plants.39 By
39 Note that for any F to be G κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον does not mean to be G in virtue of an
element of the account proper to it (say, an element of the definition of F), but rather
in virtue of the whole account: the account must be proper to it, but the items which
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102 Chapter 3
ἴδιον of something I mean a peculiar feature of it – a feature belonging exclu-

sively to the kind that thing belongs to. Thus ‘being capable of laughing’ is a
property of men: all and only men are naturally given to laugh.
If this is right, then the answer to question (ii) should be the following –
I use Sextus’ example. If any plant is called one thing, but being one thing is not
a feature belonging exclusively to plants, then items which are called one thing
can exist independently from plants – units can exist even if no plant exists.
Therefore, the existence of one does not depend on the existence of plant.
In order to get clearer on the point, let us consider its application to
non-numerical predicates. Consider the following predicates: ‘man’, ‘capable
of laughing’, and ‘animal’. Take, in particular, the two predicates ‘man’ and
‘capable of laughing’. ‘Being capable of laughing’ is an ἴδιον of men: all and
only men can laugh. So if no man existed, nothing capable of laughing would
exist. The existence of something capable of laughing depends on the exis-
tence of man.
Consider, by contrast, the two predicates ‘man’ and ‘animal’. Any man is an
animal, but being an animal is not a peculiar feature of men. So in order for
something to be an animal it is not necessary for it to be a man. Therefore, even
if no man exists, some animals may exist: the existence of animals does not
depend on that of men.
This argument, as I have indicated, concerns non-numerical predicates.
Now some Platonists, treating ‘one’ just as ‘animal’, have applied this argument
to one and plants and have come to the conclusion put forward above.
The argument seems to assume that it is necessary, for any plant, to be one
thing. Now let us assume that one is a predicate on the same wave length as
‘man’, ‘capable of laughing’, and ‘animal’. It is not an accidental predicate of
plants – if this were so, it would be possible not to predicate it of a plant; and
this seems to be false. So it must be that kind of predicate that must necessar-
ily be true of any plant. But one is not an ἴδιον of plants, nor the definition of
plant – if it were either, in order for something to be one it should be a plant.
Therefore one must exist independently from plant.
constitute the account need not be. There are nine other occurrences of κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
λόγον in Sextus: four in a numerical context (PH III 156, 164; M IX 304, X 290), five in an
ethical context (PH III 183; M XI 79 bis, 80, 81) and one in a mereological context (M I 140).
All the occurrences but the last one appear to conform to the use of the formula made by
Sextus in M IV 11: for instance, as far as the ethical loci are concerned, PH III 183 implies
that if choosing is good κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, then good is choosing, and M XI 79–81 implies
that if x is desirable or good κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, then what is good or desirable is x. M I
140, however, reads that the phrase ἄειδε θεὰ Πηληιάδεω Ἀχιλῆος ‘does not even need com-
pletion, since it is complete κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον λόγον’. Here the formula is used differently – for
Sextus surely does not imply that ‘complete’ holds only of the quoted verse: κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον
λόγον is employed in the looser sense of ‘as such’ or ‘in itself’ (as Bury translates).
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Now it appears that Sextus’ Platonists wanted to generalise this argument in

order to arrive at the conclusion that the number one’s existence is indepen-
dent from the existence not only of plants, but of any perceptible object – and
of any countable item. What could have been their modus operandi?
I think it amounted to an induction (on kinds, not individuals). Consider
plants. Any plant is necessarily one thing. But the feature of being one thing
is not peculiar to plants; for an animal too is one thing. Therefore something
which is called one thing exists independently from plants. Now consider
plants and animals. Any of them is necessarily one thing. But the feature of
being one thing is not peculiar to plants and animals; for a log too is one thing.
Therefore something which is called one thing exists independently from
plants and animals. And so on. Now consider all perceptible items. Any of
them is necessarily one thing. But the feature of being one thing is not peculiar
to perceptible items; for a Form too is one thing. Therefore something which is
called one thing must exist independently from perceptible items. And this is
the one. And if you apply this argument to countable items, you will find that
the one exists independently from them.
How does Sextus react to this argument? We will examine his moves in sec-
tions 4 and 5 below. But before doing that, let us make one final remark. The
argument in M IV 11–13 concludes that the number one is a substance – that it
is not an accident of countable items. The parallel arguments in PH III 156–7
and M X 285–7 put forward a further conclusion: the number one is not only
a substance, but an element. What does this latter claim mean, and how is it
grounded in the argument?
In the context preceding the argument in PH III, 151–6, Sextus reports that,
according to the ‘Pythagoreans’, the one and the indefinite two are ‘the ele-
ments of the universe’ (στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου), that is to say ‘the elements of the
things which exist’ (τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων). The number one appears to be hier-
archically superior to the indefinite two, insofar as the latter ‘comes from the
one by addition’ (κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν τῆς μονάδος γινομένη):40 so let us focus on the
number one in particular. Insofar as it is an element, the number one is char-
acterised, in particular, by two features: first, it is observed in everything – for
everything is one thing; and second, it is simple, that is to say it is not composed
of something else. Body is provided as an example of an item composed of
something: ‘bodies are composite, being composed of length and breadth and
depth and resistance or weight’.41 Now since these are features that no body
40 PH III 153.
41 PH III 152: τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι σύνθετα, συνεστῶτα ἔκ τε μήκους καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ
ἀντιτυπίας ἢ καὶ βάρους.
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104 Chapter 3
can lack, it is tempting to take ‘being composed of X’, here, to entail ‘necessar-
ily being X’,42 and to understand the underlying line of thought as follows. The
number one is an element of existing things insofar as it is what everything is
composed of – insofar as anything which exists is necessarily one thing.
A similar train of thought, mixed with other trains of thought, might be
detected in the context preceding the argument in M X 285–7, in particu-
lar 249–62. There again, Sextus reports a Pythagorean doctrine according to
which ‘the unit is the principle of all existing things’ (ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν ὄντων τὴν
μονάδα), by addition to which a second principle is produced, the two (261).
Other candidates for the role of principle of existing things, in particular Ideas
or Forms, are excluded on the ground that each Form is said to be one thing
(and two or more things when taken in conjunction with one or more other
Form(s)): 258.43 Insofar as it is the principle of existing things, the unit is ‘what
constitutes’ (συστατικόν) them; it ‘precedes’ (προηγεῖται) and ‘subsists before’
(προϋφέστηκε) them; it is ‘conceived prior’ (προεπινοεῖται) to them; it is what
the existing things are not ‘conceived apart from’ (οὐ χωρὶς νενόηται). Once
again, the underlying thought seems to be that the number one is the principle
of existing things insofar as anything which exists is necessarily (conceived
as being) one thing – so that if the number one did not exist, nothing at all
would exist, or would be conceived as existing. In this sense, the ‘Pythagoreans’
appear to have taken the existence of anything to depend on that of the num-
ber one: in Aristotle’s terms, to have taken the existing things as accidents of
the one.
4 The First Cluster of Arguments against the Platonist Conception

of the One (M IV 14–18)
The passage containing the first cluster of arguments put forward by Sextus
against the Platonist conception of the one, M IV 14–18, may be divided into
three parts. The first (sections 14–15) includes an argument purporting to
establish that the unit, as conceived by the Platonists, does not exist (see last
sentence of section 15). The second part (section 16) is constituted by an argu-
ment showing that it is not by share of the unit that each of the countable
items is one thing. The third part (section 17) contains a useful comparison
42 On the other hand, if we take this doctrine to be coherent with the arguments about the
one in PH III 156–7, M IV 11–13 and M X 285–7, we should not understand ‘being composed
of X’, here, in the sense of ‘being characterised by X’ – since these arguments imply that
being one thing does not constitute the definition or an ἴδιον of existing things.
43 On M X 258 cf. section 1, and n. 12.
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between the argument about the one put forward in 14–15 and an argument
about man in general.
Let us focus on the first part. The syntax of the argument in sections 14–15
(ἤτοι … ἢ; λείπεται ἄρα …; οὐκ ἄρα …) suggests that it amounts to the presen-
tation of an exclusive and exhaustive disjunction, followed by the rejection
of each of the two disjuncts, and then the conclusion: either the Idea of the
one is different from the countable items (and, as Sextus will imply in consid-
ering this possibility, it exists in its own right), or it is conceived with them;
but the first possibility is to be excluded, and the second possibility too; there-
fore the Idea of the one does not exist. One odd feature of this argument is
that the phrase ‘is conceived as’ appears in one of the disjuncts, but not in
the other. In the presentation of this argument in 17, however, the phrase is
plainly there in both disjuncts (the one is conceived of as existing either in its
own right or along with the countable particulars);44 so we can take this to be
the non-elliptical version of the contrast at stake in the argument in 14–15.45
The structure of the argument, then, appears to be the following:
1. The Idea of the one is conceived as existing either (i) by itself or (ii)
along with the particular countable items.
2. But (i) does not hold.
44 Cf. M IV 17: … τὸ ἓν μήτε σὺν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητοῖς μήτε καθ’ ἑαυτὸ ὑφεστηκὸς νοούμενον
… Another occurrence of the phrase ‘νοεἶσθαι + participle of ὑφίστασθαι’ is to be found at
M IV 34, where Sextus characterises number as ‘being conceived as existing as a result of
addition or subtraction’ (κατὰ πρόσθεσιν καὶ κατ’ ἀφαίρεσιν ὑφιστάμενος νοεῖται).
45 As Barnes (Porphyry. Introduction, cit., pp. 43–6) points out, Alexander of Aphrodisias
appears sometimes to entertain the thought that mathematical items both inhere in
perceptible or particular objects (τὰ δὲ μαθηματικὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, τουτέστι τοῖς αἰσθη-
τοῖς καὶ τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα) and exist in thought (ἐπινοίᾳ: see Alexander, In Met. 52.13–16).
Alexander may be taken to characterise the existence of mathematical items in the way in
which he characterises that of universal or common items: they no longer exist if they are
not being thought of (Alexander, An. 90.6–8). It might be tempting to see Sextus’ second
disjunct in M IV 14 (‘the one is conceived in the items which share in it’) as an instance of
Alexander’s view that mathematical items both inhere in particulars and exist in thought.
However, as we have seen, M IV 17 suggests that Sextus’ disjunct is short for ‘the one is con-
ceived as existing in the particular countable items’, in which there is no trace of the view
that its existence depends on being thought. Sextus’ insistence on νοεῖν and νόησις may be
explained by the fact that he is considering the Idea of one as conceived by Plato (M IV 11)
and his followers (14). Brisson suggests that Sextus’ mention of the νόησις and of the ἰδέα
of the one shows that he is dealing with a middle-Platonist context in which the intel-
ligible Forms are the thoughts of the Demiurge (see ‘Contre les arithméticiens ou contre
ceux qui enseignent que les nombres sont des principes’, in J. Delattre (ed.), Sur le Contre
les professeurs, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Université Charles-de-Gaulle Lille 3, 2005, pp. 67–77, at
p. 72, n. 17).
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106 Chapter 3
3. And (ii) does not hold.

---
4. The Idea of the one is not conceivable as existing.
A second odd feature of the passage is that having rejected the first possibility
(in 14), Sextus does not go on attacking the second (in 15 and 16), but switches
unaccountably from the claim that the Form of the one is conceived (as exist-
ing) with the countable items to the claim that it is (conceived as existing) in
the countable items.46 It might be tempting to change the ἐν at M IV 14, line
20, to σὺν. However, as Heintz has emphasised, the arguments in 15 and 16 are
not directed against the possibility that the one exists along with the countable
particulars47 – that it should be identified as an object alongside them; they
rather attack the claim that the one exists in and is shared by them.
It appears, then, that the contrast that Sextus has in mind, in 15 and 16, is that
between the one conceived as existing by itself vs. conceived as existing in the
countable items. So let us focus on this contrast: what does it mean for a univer-
sal item like one or man to be in the individuals sharing in it rather than to exist
by itself? At M X 287, Sextus reports the Platonist view according to which ‘the
real plurality is not the plurality that is displayed in the countable items’ (οὐκ τὸ
ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμητοῖς δεικνύμενον πλῆθος τῷ ὄντι πλῆθός ἐστιν) – for instance the plu-
rality of the animals (τὸ τῶν ζῴων πλῆθος) or the plurality of the plants (τὸ τῶν
φυτῶν πλῆθος) – but rather that plurality by sharing in which the plurality in
the countable items is conceived of (ἐκεῖνο τὸ οὗ μετοχῇ νενόηται τοῦτο πλῆθος).
It is pretty clear that the plurality in or of animals and plants is the feature or
aspect of them of being many things – a feature or aspect that they come to
possess by sharing in the Form of many. In an analogous philosophical context,
Alexander uses the phrase εἶναι ἐν to express his master’s view that a species
like man or a Form is ‘in’, or predicated of, individual perceptible items, and
exists insofar as it is so predicated – a view that Alexander sometimes appears
to share.48 Thus, at In Met. 121.12–13 Alexander mentions the Aristotelian view
according to which ‘the Form is in that of which it is the Form’ (τὸ εἶδος ἐν
τούτῳ οὗ ἐστιν εἶδος), and at In Top. 60.29–61.1 he claims that the existence of
man is in the individual men.49 This also holds for mathematical items. At
46 As emphasised by Heintz (Studien, cit., pp. 278–9) and rehearsed by Bett (Against Those in
the Disciplines, cit., p. 189, n. 17).
47 Cf. W. Heintz, Studien, cit., Halle, 1932, p. 279.
48 Cf. J. Barnes, Porphyry. Introduction, cit., p. 47 and n. 89. As Ross puts it, ‘Aristotle thought
that the universal exists only as the common elements in the particulars’ (Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, corrected edition, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953, vol. I, p. xlii); my italics.
49 Alexander, In Top. 60.29–61.1 : ‘just as men are the same as one another, so too is man the
same as himself, as genus and as species – for his being is in them’ (ὡς γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι
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In Met. 200.35–201.37 Alexander comments on Metaphysics Β 2, 998a6–19,

where Aristotle mentions and briefly criticises the view according to which
the mathematicals are intermediate between Forms and perceptible items
separated from the former, but not from the latter.50 Alexander characterises
this view as amounting to saying that the mathematicals exist in the percep-
tible items not as being a feature of them (as Aristotle takes them to be),51 but
as being present in them while being different from them (ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς
αὐτὰ [scl. τὰ μαθηματικὰ] λέγουσιν εἶναι, οὐκ αὐτῶν τι ὄντα, ἀλλ’ ἐν τούτοις ὄντα
ἄλλα εἶναι αὐτῶν). There is a sense of ‘being in’ that implies to be a feature or
an aspect of something: and this is the sense in which mathematicals are in
perceptible items according to Aristotle.
An analogous use of εἶναι ἐν, associated with the preposition περὶ, has
been found in Sextus’ later contemporary Porphyry. At the beginning of his
Introduction Porphyry mentions the question whether such universals as gen-
era and species are ‘separable or are in perceptible items and subsist about
them [πότερον χωριστὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ὑφεστῶτα]’. The Greek
commentators took this question to ask about the relation between incorpo-
real genera and species and perceptible bodies, and to offer three possible
answers: either genera and species exist separately from perceptible individu-
als, or they are in them, or they subsist about them. Barnes disagrees. Based on
some pertinent loci of the Greek philosophical literature, he argues that
Porphyry is offering two possible answers rather than three: ‘be in’ and
‘subsist about’ are two expressions for the same thing. The choice of prep-
ositions suggests that if Y is ‘in and about’ X, then Y is a quality or feature
or charachteristic of X (and not, say, a part of X). It is … plain that what is
‘in and about X’ has a one-sided dependence on X: Y is inseparable from
X, inasmuch as its existence depends on the existence of X, but X is not
ἀλλήλοις οἱ αὐτοί, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ὡς γένος καὶ ὡς εἶδος· ἐν ἐκείνοις γὰρ τὸ
εἶναι αὐτῷ).
50 This is an eclectic variant of the doctrine that Aristotle ascribed to Plato according to
which the objects of mathematics are intermediates between the Forms and the percepti-
ble items separated from both. The doctrine is referred to in several loci of the Metaphysics:
for an overview of them see L. Corti, ‘Les Intermédiaires mathématiques dans la
Métaphysique d’Aristote: vue d’ensemble’, in id. (ed.), τὰ μεταξύ : Les Intermédiaires mathé-
matiques chez Aristote, et après, Revue de Philosophie Ancienne 40 (1), 2022, pp. 7–30;
on the eclectic variant see id., ‘Vue d’ensemble’, cit., pp. 11–12, n. 7; on Alexander’s discus-
sion of the Intermediates see (in the same volume) M. Bonelli, ‘Alexandre d’Aphrodise et
l’existence des Intermédiaires’, pp. 113–35.
51 Cf. W.D. Dooley and A.M. Madigan, Alexander of Aphrodisias. On Aristotle Metaphysics 2
and 3, London, Duckworth, 1992, p. 135, n. 195.
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108 Chapter 3
similarly inseparable from Y … The question is therefore this: Does the

species horse, say, exist separately from Bucephalus and the other indi-
vidual horses, or is it merely a feature of those beasts?52
And the question marks the fundamental divide between Platonic and
Aristotelian metaphysics: for Plato favoured the first disjunct, and Aristotle the
second. As Porphyry puts it:
Aristotle considered only the species which are found in matter and said
that they were principles: Plato imagined in addition separable species
and so introduced the paradigmatic principles.53
Platonic species or Forms are separable from their particular instances and
exist independently from them;54 Aristotelian genera and species are in (and
about) individual items: they are features of them and exist dependently from
them.
Thus, the exclusive and exhaustive disjunction underlying M IV 14–16, the
Idea of the one conceived as being different from the countable items and
existing by itself vs. as existing in the countable items, brings us back to the
contrast, put forward by Aristotle in Metaphysics Mu and Nu and reflected in
PH III 156–7, between number being a substance vs. number being an accident
52 Barnes, Porhpyry. Introduction, pp. 44–5. At Sent. 5 ‘the qualities and enmattered forms’
(αἱ δὲ ποιότητες καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα εἴδη) are characterised by Porphyry as being ‘about the bod-
ies’ (περὶ τὰ σώματα) and thus contrasted with ‘the matterless qualities, which exist in
their own right and are not qualities but substances’ (In Cat., 138.30–2: αἱ ἄυλοι ποιότητες
καὶ καθ’ αὑτὰς ὑφεστηκυῖαι οὐκ εἰσὶ ποιότητες ἀλλ’ οὐσίαι). A similar contrast is applied by
Sextus to geometrical items such as surfaces or lines, that either exist in their own right
and by themselves (κατὰ ἰδίαν ὑφεστάναι, καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑπάρχουσαν) or are observed only in
connection with bodies (μόνον περὶ τοῖς … σώμασι θεωρεῖσθαι): see PH III 41 and cf. n. 29.
Occurrences of the expression ‘in … and about …’ pertinent for this use are to be found
e.g. in Aristotle, Cat. 7, 7b38–9, Top. IV 4, 125a33; Alexander, In Top. 342.1–2; Plotinus, Enn.
VI iii 6.25–6 (‘In general, white has being insofar as it is about what exists and in what
exists [ὅλως τὸ μὲν λευκὸν ἔχει τὸ εἶναι, ὅτι περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ ἐν ὄντι]’); Simplicius, In Cat. 84.27–8,
115.12–13, 371.11–12. What is the origin of the twofold expression? Barnes reminds us that
‘in’ is ambiguous (for instance, at Top. II 7, 113a24–32 Aristotle considers the question
whether Platonic ideas are ‘in us’, and this has been interpreted in two ways: that Ideas are
our thoughts; that Ideas are features of us), and suggests that the addition of ‘and about’
was maybe intended to resolve the ambiguity (Porhpyry. Introduction, p. 45, n. 85).
53 Porphyry, In Phys 120: ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τὸ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ μόνον θεασάμενος εἶδος τοῦτο ἔλεγεν
ἀρχήν, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων πρὸς τούτῳ καὶ τὸ χωριστὸν ἐννοήσας εἶδος τὴν παραδειγματικὴν ἀρχὴν
προσεισήγαγε. Cf. Barnes, Porphyry. Introduction, cit., pp. 46–7.
54 For what was taken to be a canonical expression of this thesis cf. Parmenides 130bc; for a
presentation of it by a non-Platonist philosopher cf. Seneca, Ep. lxv 4–7.
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of countable items. In the light of this, the backbone of Sextus’ argument

appears to be the following. If the Idea of the one exists, then it is conceivable
either as existing independently from countable items or as existing insofar as
countable items exist; but neither of these disjuncts holds; therefore the Idea
of the one is not conceivable as existing.
How does Sextus argue against the first disjunct in 14? His argument appears
to be laconic: for Sextus claims that the one does not exist in its own right,
since ‘no one other than the particular countable items is conceived of as
existing’.55 The loci similes in which Sextus rejects this possibility are not help-
ful in grasping Sextus’ point in 14: for either the rejection is not argued for, or
the arguments in its support are different from the one in 14 – and not very
promising. At M IV 17 Sextus suggests that just as man in general does not exist
by itself, the one is not conceivable as existing by itself – and produces no argu-
ment in support of these claims. At M X 288–90, Sextus does put forward an
argument against the Pythagorean view that the real one is not to be identified
with the one displayed in the countable items – that is to say, with the property
55 As indicated in the Textual Remarks, I accept the supplement conjectured by Bekker

and read the following text: ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὑτὴν μὲν ⟨οὐχ ὑφέστηκεν, εἴγε⟩ παρὰ τὰ κατὰ μέρος
ἀριθμητὰ οὐδὲν νοεῖται ἓν ὑποκείμενον. Both Delattre-Pellegrin and Bett prefer to keep the
transmitted text. I am not convinced by their choice. Delattre-Pellegrin understand καθ’
αὑτὴν μὲν παρὰ τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἀριθμητὰ (followed by an implicit ⟨οὐσαν⟩) as an accusa-
tive absolute expressing a hypothesis and translate the text as follows: ‘Si elle [scl. the
Idea of the one] existe en soi à côté des objets dénombrables particuliers, rien ne se
concoit comme sujet un’. Alain Lernould has defended this reading and suggested that
it alludes to the following argument: ‘If the Idea of the one exists separately from the
countable items, nothing is conceived as being one. Now what is not one does not exist
at all. Therefore if the Idea of the one exists separately from the countable items, nothing
exists – and this is absurd’. Sextus would refer here to a reductio based on the convertibil-
ity of being and being one – on the Aristotelian claim that to be is to be one (cf. e.g. Met. Ι 3,
1054a13–19). This reading is interesting, but unconvincing. For the first part of the reductio
assumes what Sextus’ argument is supposed to show – namely that the substantial exis-
tence of the one implies the impossibility for anything to be conceived as being one; and
the second and crucial part of the reductio is a matter of speculation – there is no trace of
it in Sextus’ text. Bett understands the transmitted text differently: ‘But by itself, beyond
the particular things counted, no underlying one is conceived’. This reading strikes me as
both semantically doubtful (why would the one be qualified as ‘underlying’?) and phil-
osophically uncharitable – for, as Bett recognises, Sextus would ‘be simply begging the
question against the Platonic conception’ of the one (Against Those in the Disciplines, cit.,
p. 188, n. 16). As for Bury, he accepts the supplement by Bekker and takes ἓν to refer to the
One with a capital ‘O’ (or the Form of one). Thus understood, Sextus’ argument would be
hopelessely circular: ‘The One does not exist by itself because there exists no One beyond
the countable items’. I prefer to translate ἓν as ‘one’: for, as I hope to show, this allows a
more charitable interpretation of Sextus.
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110 Chapter 3
of each of them of being one thing. The argument runs as follows. Let us apply
to man the same pattern of argument that the Pythagoreans apply to the one
in order to support their view, and it will be clear that it implies an absurd con-
sequence. Man is conceived as a mortal rational animal; for this reason, neither
Socrates nor Plato nor any other particular man is man. For if Socrates was man
insofar as he is Socrates, then Plato would not be man. Therefore every particu-
lar man is not man – man is that by participation in which each of them is
conceived as man. ‘Now this argument’ – Sextus suggests – ‘implies that none
of the particular men is man; and this is absurd. Similarly, the Platonist argu-
ment about the one implies that none of the countable items is one thing. But
this is absurd – and so it is absurd to deny that each countable item is one by
definition’. Sextus’ remarks, however, appear to be quite off target. For the argu-
ment put forward by the Platonists does not state or imply that man cannot be
said of particular men – nor one of countable items. The crucial point of the
Platonists is that Socrates cannot be identified with man, since he is not man
insofar as he is Socrates. But this does not imply that Socrates is not a human
being – as Sextus insinuates. The last locus similis, M X 291–2, is not illuminat-
ing either. Here Sextus indicates that just as man in general does not exist by
itself, so the one cannot be ranked as a universal. Sextus does not argue for his
second claim; as for the first, he indicates that, if so, ‘then the particular men
will not become men by participation in it’. Sextus, here, alludes to a conflict
between the fact that the one is a substance, and the fact that each countable
item is one thing by participation in it. The conflict is important and its nature
will be explored later, but it does not appear to play any role in Sextus’ rejection
of his first disjunct in 14.
So let us go back to this passage. What does the fact that no one other than
the particular countable items is conceived as existing have to do with the claim
that the one does not exist in its own right? The Platonist argument argues that
since any countable item is one thing, but being one thing is neither the defini-
tion nor an ἴδιον of it, the one exists independently from the countable items.
But – here is Sextus’ point – nothing else but the countable items is or can be
conceived as being one thing. In order to unpack Sextus’ point, it is important
to recall the last two steps of the induction on kinds which the Platonist modus
operandi amounts to. From the fact that any perceptible item is necessarily one
thing, but being one thing is not a feature belonging exclusively to perceptible
items, the Platonists come to the conclusion that something which is one thing
must exist independently from perceptible items. They then apply this pattern
of argument to countable items and come to the conclusion that something –
the one – exists independently from them. But – Sextus replies – this latter
version of the argument generalised to countable items does not work, since
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being countable is a feature belonging exclusively to items each of which is

one thing – being one thing is an ἴδιον or the definition of the units. For what
else may be called one thing, apart from countable items? Now Sextus’ point
seems to be correct; however, it doesn’t do the entire job it is supposed to.
For it shows that the Platonist argument is characterised by a false premise,
and therefore that it does not demonstrate what it should demonstrate. Thus,
Sextus shows that the Platonists did not manage to establish that the one exists
independently from the countable items by means of their induction on kinds.
But this does not imply that the claim that the one is a substance does not
hold: it leaves this possibility entirely open.
How does Sextus argue against the second disjunct in 14–15? The central
part of his argument, to be found in 15 (‘… if a countable log is one thing by
share of the unit, then what is not a log will not be called one thing; but it is so
called, as shown above’) presents similarities with the Platonist argument in
11–13, to which it explicitly refers. I take it to run as follows. Any countable log is
one thing. Now if it was one thing by share of the unit, and this was conceived
of as existing in the countable logs, then what is not a log would not be called
one thing. But this is not so; therefore the unit cannot be conceived as existing
in the countable logs – more generally, in the countable items. The argument,
which is grounded on the conflation between the Idea of the one and the unit,
features a crucial inference:56 if the unit is in the countable logs, then what is
not a log cannot be one. How can we explain the inference? I take the underly-
ing thought to be that if the whole of the unit is in the logs sharing in it, then
it can be nowhere else – in no other item, so that nothing but a log can be one.
Thus understood, the argument appears to be reminiscent of the first horn
of the Dilemma of Participation (Parmenides, 129A–130A) – the problemati-
cal view according to which for any Form F, the whole of it is in each of the
individual Fs sharing in it – which underlies M IV 18 and will be discussed in
the next session.
Let us now deal with the second part of our passage (section 16), where
Sextus introduces a new argument. If we stick to the text provided by Mau,
one way to understand this argument is the following. What is shared by many
items is many (that is to say, has many parts). Now the countable items are
many – they are actually infinite; so what is shared by the countable items
must be many (that is to say, must have many parts). But the unit is not many –
it has not many parts: for the unit is partless and indivisible. Therefore, it is not
by sharing in the unit that each of the countable items is one thing.
56 As rightly emphasised by Bett (Against Those in the Disciplines, cit., p. 189, n. 17), who,
however, does not provide an explanation of the inference.
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112 Chapter 3
This argument, which is grounded on the conflation between the Idea of

the one and the unit, will be put forward by Sextus later, in M IV 19, against the
possibility that the Idea of the one has several parts, each of which is shared
by a different countable item. We will deepen our understanding of the argu-
ment in section 5 below, where we will analyse it in the light of the locus similis
M X 294–5.57
57
In this interpretation, Sextus would offer in M IV 16 the same argument that he will offer
in 19. Sextus, however, is careful in introducing section 18–20 as a new set of arguments,
different from the one he put forward in 14–18; for at the beginning of 18 he states: ‘It is
also possible to argue as follows …’ (ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ οὕτως συνερωτᾶν …). So it is tempting to
understand M IV 16 differently. In the next lines I will consider another way of interpret-
ing the argument in this section, a way which is inspired by the translation of the passage
by Bury and which implies a textual emendation. Let us go back to M IV 16. The passage is
composed of three sentences: the first two constitute the two premises of the argument,
the last its conclusion. In the Platonic tradition, the relation of participation in or share
of (μετέχειν) typically stands among the items which possess the property of being F on
the one hand and the Form of F on the other. This, I believe, has encouraged Bury’s under-
standing of the πολλά and the ἕν in the first sentence respectively as Many with a capital
‘M’ (or the Form of many) and One with a capital ‘O’ (or the Form of one), and the μονάδος
in the last sentence as Monad with a capital ‘M’ (or the Form of one). If Bury is right, the
first premise sounds as follows: ‘What many items share in is the Form of many, and not
the Form of one’. The second sentence sounds odd insofar as it appears redundant: it is
odd to say that the countable items πολλά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρα, since if they are infinite, they
are many. One way to justify the presence of the τέ … καὶ formula is to think that πολλά
and ἄπειρα do not qualify the same items and to understand the sentence as follows: the
countable items are many things (insofar as they have many parts) and are also infinite in
number. If we do so, then we should understand the πολλοῖς in the first sentence accord-
ingly: ‘many items’, here, means ‘items which are many things’ (insofar as they have many
parts). If this is correct, then the conclusion which the two premises naturally lead to is
that each countable item cannot be many things by share of the one – and not, as the text
by Mau reads, that each countable item cannot be one thing by share of the one. If, in the
light of this, we emend ἕν to πολλά, the argument appears to be the following:
1. What items which are many things (insofar as they have many parts) share in is the
Form of many, and not the Form of one.
2. The countable items are many things (have many parts) – and are also infinite in
number.
---
3. It is not by share of the Form of one that each of the countable items is many things
(have many parts).
The target would be the second definition of the one, according to which it is ‘that by
sharing in which each thing is both one thing and many things’ (M IV 11, 13). This interpre-
tation has the advantage of construing the argument in 16 as different from the one in 19.
The reading of the Greek on which it is grounded, however, is quite difficult; that is why
I relegate it to a note.
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As a conclusion, let us consider the argument in favour of the Platonic char-

acterisation of the one in M IV 11–13 from a contemporary perspective, focusing
on its philosophical core. Let us consider two instances of the argument.
Take ‘man’ and ‘animal’. Each man is an animal, but being an animal is not a
peculiar feature of men. So in order for something to be an animal it is not nec-
essary for it to be a man. Therefore, even if no man exists, some animals may
exist. Therefore, animals exist independently from men: the existence of ani-
mals does not depend on that of men.
Now consider ‘man’ and ‘one’. Each man is one thing, but being one thing is
not a peculiar feature of men. So in order for something to be one thing it is not
necessary for it to be a man. Therefore, even if no man exists, some units may
exist. Therefore, units exist independently from men: the existence of units
does not depend on that of men.
The fact that the two arguments are taken to be instances of the same pat-
tern of argument relies on the assumption that ‘one’ is on the same wavelength
as ‘animal’: that the predicate ‘one’ applies to individuals just as the predicate
‘animal’ does.
The assumption appears to be vitiated by a category mistake. Both Frege
and Russell have maintained that the adjectival word ‘one’ cannot intelligibly
be predicated of individual things, but only of sets or concepts of individual
things. For example, the phrase ‘The moon is one’ is nonsensical – for, accord-
ing to its syntax, in this phrase the word ‘one’ is predicated of an individual
as such, the moon. By contrast, the phrase ‘The moon is one satellite of the
earth’ makes sense – for, according to its syntax, in this phrase the word ‘one’ is
predicated of a set or concept of an individual thing. To make this statement is
to ascribe a property to the concept earth’s satellite (to say that there is at least
one item, the moon, that falls under this concept, or that there is at least one
item, the moon, which ‘satellite of the earth’ holds of), or to the corresponding
set (to say that the set of the satellites of the earth has at least one member, and
that is the moon).
If this is correct, then the predicate ‘… is one’ must be taken as a short
form of (some instances of) ‘… is one F’. So let us reformulate the second
instance of our argument replacing ‘… is one’ by ‘… is one F’ (in particular, ‘…
is one animal’).
Each man is one animal, but being one animal is not a peculiar feature of
men. So in order for something to be one animal it is not necessary for it to be a
man. Therefore, even if no man exists, some animals may exist. Therefore, ani-
mals exist independently from men: the existence of animals does not depend
on that of men.
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114 Chapter 3
What this argument concludes is not that the units exist independently
from men, but that the animals exist independently from men. And if adjecti-
val numerals are essentially attributive, and ‘… is one’ must be taken as a short
form of (some instances of) ‘… is one F’, then any instance of the argument at
stake will have to be formulated as follows: ‘Each F is one G, but one G is not a
peculiar feature of Fs; …’; and therefore it will not conclude that the units exist
independently from the Fs, but that the Gs exist independently from the Fs.
5 The Second Argument against the Platonist Conception of the One

(M IV 18–20)
In M IV 18–20 Sextus offers a second argument against the characterisation of

the number one put forward by the Platonists. The locus similes M X 293–8 and
PH III 158–63 present variants of the same argument, that in M X being closer
to the argument in M IV. The transmitted text of M IV 18–20, printed by Bekker,
appeared unsatisfactory to Mau. As a result, Mau introduced several supple-
ments, most of which he drew from M X 293–8, accepting the emendations by
Heintz.58 In the following pages, I will first discuss the supplements introduced
by Mau to the transmitted text (some of which I accept, and others I reject).
This will enable me to put forward what I take to be the argument underly-
ing M IV 18–20. I will then use the loci similes to deepen our understanding of
the argument, and, finally, discuss it in the light of its Platonic ancestor, the
‘Dilemma of Participation’ to be found in Plato’s Parmenides, 131 A–C.
The argument in M IV 18–20 (as it appears in the transmitted text), the one
in M X 293–8 and the one in PH III 158–63 share the same basic structure, which
may be sketched as follows. Let us consider the Idea of the one by sharing or
participating in which each countable item is one thing. Either there is one
such an Idea, or there are several Ideas of the one; and both possibilities lead
to difficulties. For the first possibility implies that each countable item shares
either in the whole of the Idea of the one or in a part of it – and both disjuncts
are problematical; and the second possibility, which amounts to admitting the
existence of several Ideas of the one, each of them shared by a different count-
able item, also leads to difficulties.
The first supplement introduced by Mau appears at M IV 18, lines 9–10.
Sextus is considering the possibility that the Idea of the one is unique, before
indicating the puzzles implied by this view. The text provided by Mau runs
as follows:
58 See W. Heintz, Studien, cit., p. 280.
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ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μία ἐστίν, ⟨ἤτοι ἀμερὴς ἢ πολυμερής ἐστιν· εἰ δὲ ἀμερής,⟩ οὐ πολλοῖς
μετέχεται
But if there is just one Idea, ⟨it is either partless or multipartite; and if it
is partless,⟩ it will not be shared by several items
According to Mau’s supplement, the anti-Platonist argument starts by indicat-

ing that if the Idea of the one is unique, it is either partless or multipartite. One
would expect the rest of the argument to show that both disjuncts are prob-
lematical. What is argued in the rest of the argument, however, is that both the
claim that each thing shares in the whole of the Idea of the one and the claim
that it shares in a part of it are problematical. This suggests that the exclusive
and exhaustive disjunction at stake is that each countable item shares either
in the whole or in a part of the Idea of the one – that is to say, the same dis-
junction which appears in the parallel arguments at M X 293 and PH III 158;59
and this disjunction does not amount to, or imply, that the Idea of the one is
either partless or multipartite. I reject this supplement.
At M IV 19, lines 16–21, Sextus puts forward the puzzles entailed by the claim
there are several Ideas of the one. Bekker, followed by Bury, prints the text of
the MSS; Mau accepts the emendations by Heintz and prints a different text:
Bury (Bekker) Mau (Heintz)
εἰ δὲ πλείους εἰσὶν ἰδέαι τοῦ ἑνός, εἰ δὲ πλείους εἰσὶν ἰδέαι τοῦ ἑνός, ⟨ὡς⟩
ἕκαστον τῶν καθ’ ἓν τασσομένων ἀριθ- ἕκαστον τῶν καθ’ ἓν τασσομένων ἀριθ-
μητῶν, ἤτοι τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ δύο, καθ’ ἓν μητῶν ⟨ἰδίας τινὸς μετέχειν ἰδέας⟩, ἤτοι
ἑκάτερον, μετέχει τινὸς κοινῆς ἰδέας ἢ ⟨ἡ⟩ τοῦ Α ⟨καὶ⟩ ἡ τοῦ Β [καθ’ ἓν ἑκάτε-
οὐ μετέχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ μετέχει, δεήσει ρον] μετέχει τινὸς κοινῆς ἰδέας ⟨καθ’ ἣν
καὶ ἅπαντα δίχα τοῦ μετέχειν ἰδέας κατὰ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν προσαγορεύεται ἕν⟩, ἢ
τὸ ἓν τετάχθαι, ὅπερ οὐ θέλουσιν. εἰ δὲ οὐ μετέχει. καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ μετέχει, δεήσει
μετέχει, ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνεισαχθήσεται καὶ ἅπαντα δίχα τοῦ μετέχειν ἰδέας κατὰ
ἀπορία· πῶς γὰρ μιᾶς τὰ δύο μεθέξει;60 τὸ ἓν τετάχθαι, ὅπερ οὐ θέλουσιν. εἰ δὲ
μετέχει, ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς συνεισαχθήσεται
ἀπορία· πῶς γὰρ μιᾶς τὰ δύο μεθέξει;
59 Cf. M X 293: καὶ εἰ μὲν μία, ἤτοι ὅλης μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἢ μέρους τινὸς αὐτῆς,
and PH III 158: ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μία ἐστίν, πότερον ὅλης αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν μετέχειν αὐτῆς
λεγομένων ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς.
60 The translation of the passage by Bury runs as follows: ‘And if there are several Ideas of
the One, each of the numerables ranked as unities (whether it be a one or a two, both
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116 Chapter 3
The transmitted text is problematical in several respects. First, the meaning

of the clause ἤτοι τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ δύο (‘be it a one or a two’), which applies to
each of the countable items, is hardly intelligible.61 Secondly, and indepen-
dently from this, according to the transmitted text, if there are several Ideas
of the one, then either the countable items share in one Idea of the one, com-
mon to them all, or they do not share in such an Idea. However, the existence
of several Ideas of the one was introduced at the beginning of the argument
precisely as an alternative to the claim that the countable items share in a com-
mon Idea of the one. In other words, if we stick to the MSS, the argument in
M IV 18–20 would be characterised by the following hopeless structure: either
all the countable items share in one Idea of the one, or they do not share in
it – they share each in a different Idea of the one. And if they share each in a
different Idea of the one, then either they share in one Idea of the one, or they
do not share in it. Thirdly: the argument, as far as the transmitted text goes,
indicates that if each of the countable items does not share in a common Idea
of the one, then all things, apart from sharing in one Idea, will have to be ranked
as units. But why should this conditional hold? The text provides no answer; an
obvious explanation, given the structure of argument, would be the following:
‘Because the possibility that each countable item is one thing by sharing in a
different Idea of one is to be excluded’. But this is what the argument is sup-
posed to conclude: for it is supposed to show the puzzles implied by the claim
that each countable item is one thing by participating in a different Idea of
the one. Thus, it appears that the conditional at issue is either ungrounded, or
grounded on the conclusion the argument is supposed to lead to.
If we stick to the text of the MSS, M IV 19 does not provide an intelligible
argument against the possibility that there are several Ideas of the one. In order
to get clearer on it, let us have a look at the Sextan closest locus, M X 296–8:
[296] εἰ δὲ πλείους εἶεν ἰδέαι τοῦ ἑνός, ὡς ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν ἰδίας τινὸς
μετέχειν ἰδέας καθ’ ἣν ἓν νοεῖται, ἤτοι ἡ τοῦ Α ἰδέα καὶ ἡ τοῦ Β μετέχουσιν ἑνός
τινος ἰδέας, καθ’ ἣν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν προσαγορεύεται ἕν, ἢ οὐ μετέχουσιν. [297]
καὶ εἰ μὲν οὐ μετέχουσιν, ὃν τρόπον αὗται δύνανται τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐπικατηγορίας
taken singly) participates in a certain common Idea, or it does not participate. But if it
does not participate, all things, apart from participating in an Idea, will have to be ranked
as unities – a conclusion which they reject. And if they participate, the original difficulty
will recur; for how will the twos participate in the Idea?’
61 D. and J. Delattre emend the text to ἤτοι τοῦ Α ἢ τοῦ Β (‘qu’il s’agisse de A ou de B’), fol-
lowing a suggestion by Heintz accepted by Mau (whom they do not mention). With the
emendation, the text – ‘… each of the numerables ranked as units (whether it be A or a B,
both taken singly) …’ – is intelligible, but quite redundant.
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ἀξιοῦσθαι μὴ μετέχουσαί τινος ἐπαναβεβηκυίας τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας, οὕτω δύναται

καὶ πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν λεγόμενον ἓν μὴ κατὰ μετοχὴν τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας προσα-
γορεύεσθαι ἕν. [298] εἰ δὲ μετέχουσιν, ἡ ἀρχῆθεν μένει ἀπορία· πῶς γὰρ αἱ δύο
ἰδέαι τῆς μιᾶς μετέχουσιν ἰδέας; ὅλης ἑκατέρα, ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς; ὁπότερον γὰρ
ἂν λέγωσιν, ἐπαχθήσονται αἱ μικρῷ πρόσθεν ἀποδοθεῖσαι πρὸς ἡμῶν ἀπορίαι.
If there are several Ideas of the one, and each of the countable items, say A and
B, shares in one of them, then either the Idea of A and the Idea of B share in
some one Idea, or they do not. If they do not share, then just as each of them
has the title of one thing without sharing in any superior Idea of the one, so too
anything which is said to be one thing can be called one thing without sharing
in such an Idea. And if the Idea of the one in which A shares and the Idea of
the one in which B shares share in one common Idea of the one, then we will
have the original difficulty: for they will share either in the whole or in a part of
it – and both possibilities have already be shown to be problematical.
M X 296–8 provides a perfectly understandable argument, of which M IV
appears to offer a lacunose version: I find it reasonable to follow Heintz, as
Mau does, and emend the former locus in the light of the latter. However, I do
not follow Mau in accepting all the emendations provided by Heintz; for it
should be noted that, thus emended, the text suffers from a syntactical oddity.
At M IV 19, lines 18–23, the text by Mau reads as follows:
ἤτοι ⟨ἡ⟩ τοῦ Α ⟨καὶ⟩ ἡ τοῦ Β μετέχει τινὸς κοινῆς ἰδέας …, ἢ οὐ μετέχει. καὶ εἰ
μὲν οὐ μετέχει, … εἰ δὲ μετέχει ...
Since the grammatical subject of μετέχειν is constituted by the Idea of A and the
Idea of B, one would expect not the singular μετέχει, but the plural μετέχουσιν –
which appears in the parallel section at M X 296–8.62 The above-mentioned
text cannot be right since it is ungrammatical, and obviously so. I suggest
emending it by changing μετέχει to μετέχουσιν at lines 18–23 – although I am
uncomfortable with the fact that it is necessary to do it four times.63
62 I am grateful to Richard Bett, who pointed out this syntactical oddity to me: his point stems
from Giusta (‘Review of J. Mau, Sexti Empirici Opera, vol. 3: Adversus Mathematicos I–VIʼ,
Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica 90, pp. 425–32, at p. 432).
63 I agree with Heintz and Mau in thinking that there is no hope of reconstructing the argu-
ment of M IV except by taking it to be a fairly close copy of M X and/or PH III. This, as
Jonathan Barnes has suggested to me, raises a question. Since it is unusual to find such
deep corruption in M I–VI, how could it have occurred? Heintz and Mau provide no
answer to this question. Barnes wonders if the M IV argument wasn’t originally a margi-
nale copied in by someone who had read M X.
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118 Chapter 3
In the light of the preceding remarks, the argument in M IV 18–20 appears

as follows. (‘[]’ indicates what I take to be underlying steps).
Consider the Idea of the one, by sharing in which anything is called one
thing.
1. Either there is one Idea of the one, or there are several Ideas of the one.
2. [If there is one Idea of the one, then either each of the things which
shares in it shares in the whole of it, or each of them shares in a differ-
ent part of it. And both possibilities are problematical, insofar as they
both imply that the Idea of the one is not shared by many items.]
[The first possibility is problematical.] For, if something, say A,
[shares in and therefore] possesses the whole of the Idea of the one,
then another thing, say B, will no longer [possess and therefore] share
in it, and therefore will not be one thing.
[The second possibility is also problematical.] If the Idea of the one
has parts and each of the things which shares in the Idea of the one
shares in a different part of it, then each thing will be one thing by
sharing not in the Idea of the one, but only in a part of it [– and this is
unacceptable]; furthermore the unit, according to them, is conceived
as indivisible and without parts.
3. Now consider the possibility that there are several Ideas of the one, and
that each of the countable items shares in a different Idea. Either these
Ideas share in a certain common Idea of the one, or they do not share
in such a common Idea. [And both possibilities are problematical.]
If these Ideas of the one share in a common Idea of the one, then
the original difficulty will recur; for how will the two items share in
one Idea?
If the Ideas of the one do not share in a common Idea of the one,
then all things will be called units without sharing in an Idea – a con-
clusion which they will reject.
---
A most notable feature of the argument in M IV 18–20 is that the conclusion is

not expressed in the text; we will come back later to this point.
M X 293–8, the Sextan locus closest to M IV 18–20, offers several contribu-
tions to the understanding of the argument in Against the Arithmeticians. The
first contribution concerns premise 2 of our argument. Let us have a look at the
parallel section in M X:
[294] But if the Idea of the one has many parts and each of the countable
things partakes of a part of it, then first, each of the things that there are
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will be partaking not of the Idea of the one, but of a part of it, and for
this reason will no longer turn out to be one; for just as a part of a human
being is not a human being and a part of a word is not a word, so a part of
the Idea of the one is not the Idea of the one, to allow what participates
in it to become one thing. [295] Moreover, the Idea of the one turns out
to be no longer an Idea of one, nor is it one, but multiple. For the one,
insofar as it is one, is constituted as indivisible, and the unit, insofar as it
is a unit, is not split in two; or if it is divided into many, it will become a
collection of multiple units and no longer a unit (M X 294–5).64
The passage provides a reductio ad absurdum of the possibility that the Idea of
the one has parts, each of which is shared by a different countable item. Two
absurd consequences of this view are indicated. The first, in the light of the
context where it appears, may be understood as follows. If each countable item
shares in a part of the Idea of the one, then it does not share in the Idea of the
one itself. Why? The text seems to suggest that, for some predicate F,
x is a part of an F → ¬ Fx
and that ‘Idea’, as as well ‘man’ and ‘word’, are among the predicates for which
the above-mentioned claim holds.65 Thus, a part of an Idea (in particular, of
the Idea of the one) is not the Idea of the one. Now according to the Platonist
characterisation of the one provided by Sextus in M X 285–6 (cf. M IV 11 and
13), it is by sharing in the Idea of the one that each countable item is one thing.
Therefore, if each countable item shares in just a part of the Idea of the one, it
will not be one thing: the possibility that something is one thing by sharing in
a part of the Idea of the one is to be rejected.
The second absurd consequence may be stated as follows. Let us suppose
that we want to conceive of the Form of one as a whole having parts. We cannot
64 M X 294–5: [294] εἰ δὲ πολυμερής ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀριθμητῶν [ἑκάστου]
μέρους αὐτῆς μετείληφεν, πρῶτον μὲν ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων οὐ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας ἔσται μετειλη-
φός, ἀλλὰ μέρους αὐτῆς, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκέτι γενήσεται ἕν· ὡς γὰρ τὸ μέρος ἀνθρώπου οὐκ ἔστιν
ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ μέρος τῆς λέξεως οὐκ ἔστι λέξις, οὕτω τὸ μέρος τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας οὐκ ἔσται ἡ
τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέα, ἵνα καὶ τὸ μετεσχηκὸς αὐτῆς γένηται ἕν. [295] εἶτα ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέα οὐκέτι γίνεται
ἑνὸς ἰδέα, οὐδὲ μία, ἀλλὰ πλείους. τὸ γὰρ ἕν, ᾗ ἕν ἐστιν, ἀδιαίρετον καθέστηκεν, καὶ ἡ μονάς, ᾗ
μονάς ἐστιν, οὐ διχάζεται· ἢ εἴπερ εἰς πολλὰ διαιρεῖται, ἀθροισμὸς πλειόνων μονάδων γενήσε-
ται καὶ οὐκέτι μονάς. Following Bury, I delete ἑκάστου after ἀριθμητῶν. Translation by Bett,
slightly modified.
65 It should be emphasised that the claim according to which, for any predicate F whatsoever,
x is a part of an F → ¬ Fx is false (let F be ‘piece of wood’), and was known to be false at least
since the time when philosophers first talked of homoeomeries.
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120 Chapter 3
conceive of this whole and its parts along the lines that we conceive of a piece
of iron and its parts – that is to say, as one F which can be divided in several Fs.
We would rather have to conceive it as a whole of another kind: as an aggregate
or collection of several units (several Gs) sharing the same definition (that of
being a G) – that is to say, the kind of whole instantiated by a flock of sheep or
by a swarm of bees. And since it is by share in the Form of one that each count-
able item is one thing, each of these Gs should be a Form of the one. But if so,
there will not be just one Form of the one, but several Forms of the one: the
Form of one will amount to a collection of several Forms of one.
Furthermore, as we have already seen, M X 296–8 offers an essential contri-
bution for the formulation and understanding of premise 3 of the argument
in Against the Arithmeticians: it explains why, supposing that there are several
Ideas of the one, each shared by a different countable item, the possibility that
these Ideas share in a common Idea of the one and the possibility that they do
not share in it are both problematical.
Finally, one intriguing feature that M X 293–8 has in common with
M IV 18–20 is that the conclusion is not expressed. The more pertinent claims
in the context are that the account of one provided by the Platonists is prob-
lematical (M X 292: ὁ περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου [λόγος]… ἐστιν ἀπορώτερος), and that
number is nothing (M X 309: τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι τι ἀριθμός).
The other Sextan locus similis to M IV 18–20, PH III 158–63, offers other
crucial contributions to the understanding of the argument in Against the
Arithmeticians. The first contribution concerns the conclusion of this argu-
ment. In order to get clearer on that, let us have a look at the beginning and
the end of the passage from the Outlines. Sextus starts his argument as follows:
[158] We shall establish that numbers are nothing outside and apart from
the numbered objects, basing our argument on the one for the sake of
lucid exposition. If, then, the one is something in its own right, by partici-
pation in which each of the things participating in it becomes one, then
this one is either one or as many as are the things participating in it;66
he then shows that both possibilities are problematical, and concludes:
66 PH III 158: ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲν ἔξωθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ ὁ ἀριθμός, παραστήσομεν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος
τὸν λόγον στήσαντες εὐσήμου διδασκαλίας ἕνεκεν. εἰ γὰρ ἔστι τι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ἡ μονάς, ἧς μετέχον
ἕκαστον τῶν μετεχόντων αὐτῆς γίνεται ἕν, ἤτοι μία ἔσται αὐτὴ ἡ μονὰς ἢ τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέ-
χοντα αὐτῆς ἐστιν.
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[163] … But if the one so called in its own right is neither unique neither
as many as are the items participating in it, then the one in its own right
does not exist at all.67
Thus, the argument in the Outlines parallel to the one we find in Against the
Arithmeticians is clearly a reductio ad absurdum: if the one is something out-
side and apart from the countable items – if it is something in its own right,
then it is either one or as many as are the countable items participating in
it; but both these possibilities are problematical; therefore the one in its own
right does not exist at all – the one is not something outside and apart from
the countable items. And since Sextus has already indicated that the one exists
either by itself or in the countable items, and rejected the second disjunct
(cf. PH III 157 and section 3 above), he can safely conclude that the one does
not exist at all.
The claim reduced ad absurdum in the argument in the Outlines is the fol-
lowing: the one, by participating in which each countable item is one thing, is
something in its own right – it exists independently from the countable items.
Now given the structure of the argument in Against the Arithmeticians and the
Platonist characterisation of the one targeted by this argument, it is reasonable
to think that it is also a reductio and that the claim reduced and the conclusion
put forward are the same as those we find in the Outlines: the argument in
M IV 18–20 wants to show that the one, as characterised by the Platonists, does
not exist – that there is no item of which it is true to say both that it is that by
sharing in which each countable item is one thing and that it exists indepen-
dently from the countable items.
PH III 158–63 also provides elements to get clearer on premises 1 and 2 of the
argument in M IV. First of all, there we find a completer version of the disjunc-
tion at stake in premise 1 of our argument: the one, by participation in which
each countable item is one thing, is either one or as many as are the things par-
ticipating in it (PH III 158). The formulation makes explicit what was implicit in
the corresponding premise of the argument in M IV: the countable items par-
ticipate either all in the same Idea of the one, or each in a different Idea – and
in the latter case, the Ideas of the one will be as many as the countable items.
Premise 2 of the argument in M IV purports to show that both the possibil-
ity that each countable item shares in the whole of the Idea of the one and the
possibility that it shares in a part of it are to be rejected. The rejection of the
first possibility in PH III includes an interesting example:
67 PH III 163: εἰ δὲ μήτε μία ἐστὶν ἡ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν λεγομένη μονὰς μήτε τοσαῦται ὅσα τὰ μετέχοντα
αὐτῆς ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὅλως μονὰς καθ’ ἑαυτήν. The translation of this passage is mine.
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122 Chapter 3
[158] … If it [scl. the one] is one, does each of the things said to partici-
pate in it participate in it as a whole or in a part of it? If one man, say,
possesses all the one, there will no longer be a one in which one horse or
one dog or any of the other things we call one will participate – [159] just
as, if we suppose many naked men and a single cloak which one of them
wears, the rest will remain naked and without a cloak.68
The example is interesting insofar as it shows that the author of the argument
conceives the relationship of participating in (μετέχειν) in terms of an exclu-
sive possession, such as wearing. We will come back to this point.
The rejection of the possibility that each countable item participates in a
different part of the Idea of the one in PH III is grounded on two reasons which
do not appear elsewhere:
[159] … But if each [scl. each of the things said to participate in the one]
participates in a part of it, then first the one will have parts – indeed it
will have infinitely many parts into which it can be divided; and this is
absurd. And secondly, just as a part of ten – two, say – is not ten, so a part
of a one will not be a one; and for this reason nothing will participate in
the one.69
The first reason is grounded on the view that the countable items are infinite
in number. Since this is so, and each countable item is one thing by sharing in
a different part the Idea of the one, this Idea should have an infinite number of
parts – and this is absurd.
The second reason is grounded on the following mereological claim:
Part (x,y) → x ≠ y
which is instantiated by means of a numerical example. The argument may be

stated as follows. If x is a part of y, then x is not identical to y (for instance, if
two is a part of ten, then it is not ten). Therefore a part of a one or unit will not
be a unit. But if this is so – we may add drawing from the parallel argument in
68 PH III 158–9: [158] … ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν μία ἐστίν, πότερον ὅλης αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον τῶν μετέχειν
αὐτῆς λεγομένων ἢ μέρους αὐτῆς; εἰ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσαν ἔχει τὴν μονάδα, εἰ τύχοι, ὁ εἷς ἄνθρωπος,
οὐκέτι ἔσται μονὰς ἧς μεθέξει ὁ εἷς ἵππος ἢ ὁ εἷς κύων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι ἕν,
[159] ὥσπερ καὶ πολλῶν ὑποτεθέντων γυμνῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος ἱματίου καὶ τοῦτο ἑνὸς
ἀμφιασαμένου, γυμνοὶ μενοῦσιν οἱ λοιποὶ καὶ χωρὶς ἱματίου.
69 PH III 159: … εἰ δὲ μέρους αὐτῆς μετέχει ἕκαστον, πρῶτον μὲν ἕξει μέρος τι ἡ μονάς, καὶ ἄπειρά
γε ἕξει μέρη, εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται· ὅπερ ἄτοπον. εἶτα ὡς τὸ μέρος τῆς δεκάδος, οἷον ἡ δυάς, οὔκ ἐστι
δεκάς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ μέρος τῆς μονάδος ἔσται μονάς, διὰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐδὲ μεθέξει τι τῆς μονάδος.
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M X 294, which we have already examined – if each countable item shares in a

part of the Idea of the one, it will not share in the Idea of the one – and there-
fore it will not be one thing.
If, in light of the above, we were to elaborate the closest argument to the
one in M IV 18–20 which it is worth thinking about, we may think of the fol-
lowing one.
Let us suppose that there is something, the Idea of the one, such that: (i) it
exists independently from the countable items; and (ii) each countable item is
one thing by sharing in it.
1. The Idea of the one is either unique or as many as are the countable
items sharing in it – each countable item sharing in a different Idea of
the one.
2. If the Idea of the one is unique, then each countable item shares either
in the whole of it, or in a different part of it. And both possibilities are
problematical, insofar as they both imply that the Idea of the one is
not shared by many items.
The first possibility is problematical. For if a countable item, say A,
shares in (and therefore possesses) the whole of the Idea of the one,
then any other countable item, say B, will not possess (and therefore
will not share in) the Idea of the one, and therefore will not be one
thing – just as, if we suppose many naked men and a single cloak which
one of them wears, the rest will remain naked and without a cloak.
The second possibility is also problematical, for two reasons.
First: if the Idea of the one has parts, and each countable item shares
in a different part of it, then no countable item shares in the Idea of
the one. Indeed, since a part of x is not identical to x, a part of the Idea
of the one is not the Idea of the one. Therefore if each countable item
shares in a part of the Idea of the one, it does not share in the Idea of
the one. But we are under the hypothesis that any countable item is
one thing because it shares in the Idea of one. Therefore no countable
item will be one thing – and this is absurd.
Second: if we were to conceive of the Idea of the one as having
parts – and therefore being a whole, then we would have to conceive
of it as a particular kind of whole – that is to say, as an aggregate or col-
lection of several units (several Gs) sharing the same definition (that
of being a G). And since it is by sharing in the Form of one that each
countable item is one thing, each of these Gs should be a Form of the
one. But if so, there will not be just one Form of the one, but several
Forms of the one: the Form of one will amount to a collection of sev-
eral Forms of one.
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124 Chapter 3
3. If the Ideas of the one are as many as are the countable items, and
each countable item, say A and B, shares in one of them, then either
the Idea of A and the Idea of B share in some one Idea, or they do not.
If they do not share, then just as each of them has the title of one thing
without participating in any superior Idea of the one, so also every-
thing which is called one can be called one without participating in
such an Idea. And if the Idea of the one in which A shares and the Idea
of the one in which B shares share in one common Idea of the one,
then the problematical dilemma put forward in premise 2 will appear
again: will the two Ideas share in the whole or in a part of their com-
mon Idea of one?
---
4. It is not the case that there is something, the Idea of the one, such that:
(i) it exists independently from the countable items; and (ii) each
countable item is one thing by sharing in it.
It seems clear that, from a Platonist point of view, the second horn of the
Dilemma, developed in premise 3, is hopeless – that any Platonist takes it to
be crucial that each countable item shares in the same Idea of the one. So let
us focus on the first horn of the Dilemma, according to which each countable
item shares either in the whole of the Idea of the one or in a part of it.
This part of the argument originates in Plato’s Parmenides, and more pre-
cisely in the so-called ‘Dilemma of Participation’, to be found in the first part of
the dialogue, at 131A–C. In the context preceding the Dilemma of Participation,
Socrates introduces a nascent theory of Forms in response to some arguments
put forward by Zeno. Zeno’s arguments purport to show that plurality is impos-
sible. Their general form, as it appears in this context, is the following:
1. If things are many, then the very same things are both F and not-F.
2. It is impossible for something to be both F and not-F.
---
3. Things are not many.
Socrates replies to Zeno’s argument by putting forward an example which is

supposed to falsify premise (2). Socrates is one insofar as he is one of the seven
people present; but he is also many, and therefore not one, insofar as he has
many different spatial parts.70
70 For this sketch of the context of the Dilemma of Participation cf. V. Harte, Plato on Parts
and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002, pp. 55–60.
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In Socrates’ example, Socrates is one because he participates in the Form of

the one, and he is many because he participates in the Form of many. The fact
that a particular is both F and not-F is not problematical; however, Socrates
stresses that he would be severely perturbed if it were shown that a Form is
both F and not-F – for instance, that the Form of the one is both one and many.
Socrates’ reply is grounded on several claims (cf. 129A–130A). First, there
exist Forms: for instance, multitude and oneness, likeness and unlikeness, rest
and motion; and these Forms exist ‘by themselves’ (καθ’αὑτὸ) and are ‘separated
from the things that participate in them’ (χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα) – so
for instance, there is such a thing as likeness itself apart from the likeness that
we possess.71 Second, it is by participation in those entities that a particular
can come to be F (by participating in the Form of F), not-F (by participating
in the Form opposite to F), and also both F and not-F (by participating in the
Form of F and in its opposite): it is in this way that Socrates can be one, many,
and also both one and many.
To this Socratic move Parmenides reacts by putting forward the Dilemma
of Participation:
‘… Well, tell me; do you think that, as you say, there are Forms, and that
these other things which partake of them are named from them, as, for
instance, those that partake of likeness become like, those that partake
of greatness great, those that partake of beauty and justice just and
beautiful?’
‘Certainly’, said Socrates.
‘Well then, does each participant object partake of the whole Form, or
of a part of it? Or could there be some other third kind of participation?’
‘How could there be?’ said he.
‘Do you think the whole Form, being one, is in each of the many par-
ticipants, or what?’
‘Yes, for what prevents it from being in them, Parmenides?’ said
Socrates.
71 Cf. Parmenides, 130b: ‘“Socrates”, he [scl. Parmenides] said, “your eagerness for discussion
is admirable. And now tell me: have you yourself drawn this distinction you speak of and
separated apart on the one side Forms themselves and on the other the things that share
in them? Do you believe that there is such a thing as Likeness itself apart from the likeness
that we possess, and so on with Unit and Plurality and all the terms in Zeno’s argument
that you have just been listening to?” “Certainly I do”, said Socrates’ (Ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι, ὡς
ἄξιος εἶ ἄγασθαι τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους. καί μοι εἰπέ, αὐτὸς σὺ οὕτω διῄρησαι ὡς λέγεις,
χωρὶς μὲν εἴδη αὐτὰ ἄττα, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὖ μετέχοντα; καί τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὴ ὁμοιότης
χωρὶς ἧς ἡμεῖς ὁμοιότητος ἔχομεν, καὶ ἓν δὴ καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πάντα ὅσα νυνδὴ Ζήνωνος ἤκουες;
Ἔμοιγε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη). Translation by Cornford in E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (eds.),
The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, modified.
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126 Chapter 3
‘Then while it is one and the same, the whole of it would be in many
separate individuals at once, and thus it would itself be separate from
itself’.
‘No’, he replied ‘for it might be like day, which is one and the same, is
in many places at once, and yet is not separated from itself; so each Form,
though one and the same, might be in all its participants at once’.
‘That’, said he, ‘is very neat, Socrates; you make one to be in many
places at once, just as if you should spread a sail over many persons and
then should say it was one and all of it over many. Is not that about what
you mean?’
‘Perhaps it is’, said Socrates.
‘Would the whole sail be over each person, or a particular part over
each?’
‘A part over each’.
‘Then’, said he, ‘the Forms themselves, Socrates, are divisible into parts,
and the objects which partake of them would partake of a part, and in
each of them there would be not the whole, but only a part of each Form’.
‘So it appears’.
‘Are you then, Socrates, willing to assert that the one Form is really
divided and will still be one?’
‘By no means’, he replied (Plato, Parmenides 130E–131C).72
72 Plato, Parmenides 130e–131c: τόδε δ’ οὖν μοι εἰπέ. δοκεῖ σοι, ὡς φῄς, εἶναι εἴδη ἄττα, ὧν τάδε
τὰ ἄλλα μεταλαμβάνοντα τὰς ἐπωνυμίας αὐτῶν ἴσχειν, οἷον ὁμοιότητος μὲν μεταλαβόντα ὅμοια,
μεγέθους δὲ μεγάλα, κάλλους δὲ καὶ δικαιοσύνης δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ γίγνεσθαι;
Πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
Οὐκοῦν ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει; ἢ ἄλλη τις
ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο;
Καὶ πῶς ἄν; εἶπεν.
Πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἓν ὄν, ἢ πῶς;
Τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη;
Ἓν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ
χωρὶς ἂν εἴη. Οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἷον ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν
τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὑτῆς χωρίς ἐστιν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἓν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταὐτὸν εἴη.
Ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἓν ταὐτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἱστίῳ καταπετάσας
πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγῇ λέγειν;
Ἴσως, φάναι.
Ἦ οὖν ὅλον ἐφ’ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἱστίον εἴη ἄν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ;
Μέρος.
Μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν
μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἑκάστου ἂν εἴη.
Φαίνεται οὕτω γε.
Ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται;
Οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.
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The Dilemma appears to be the generalised version, applied to any Form what-
soever, of the disjunction at stake in the argument in M IV 18–20, which was
applied to the Form of the one in particular. Parmenides presents Socrates
with what purport to be exclusive and exhaustive options for participation in
Forms. Either each particular participates in the whole of the Form of F, or in
a part of it – there is no other way of participating; and both possibilities are
problematical.
The reason why the first disjunct is problematical has been well stated by
Allen.73 If a and b participate in the whole Form of F, then the whole Form of F
is in a and the whole Form of F is in b. But if the whole F is in a and the whole
F is in b, and if a and b are separate, then the Form of F will be separate from
itself. And since the claim that a and b are separate implies that they are not
the same (131B, cf. 129D), the claim that F is separate from itself implies that F
is not the same as F, which is absurd.
If, on the other hand, a, b, and all the other particular Fs participate each in a
different part of the Form of F, then each part of the Form will be in a different
particular – and therefore there will not be one Form anymore.
Having added other absurdities implied by this second horn of the Dilemma,
Parmenides leads Socrates to a discouraging conclusion:
‘How, then, Socrates, will other things partake of those Forms of yours, if
they cannot partake of them either as parts or as wholes?’
‘By Zeus’, he replied, ‘I think that this is a very hard question to
determine’
(Plato, Parmenides 131E)74
And, as a matter of fact, Socrates will show that he is not capable of determin-
ing this question; for later he will retreat into saying that what he means by
‘participating in’ is just ‘resembling’:
Parmenides, I think the most likely view is that these Forms exist in nature
as patterns, and the other things resemble them and are imitations of
(For this and the passages from the Parmenides that follow I offer the translation by
Fowler, modified).
73 Cf. R.E. Allen, Plato’s Parmenides, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1997, pp. 129–30.
74 Plato, Parmenides 131e: Τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψε-
ται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα;
Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι.
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128 Chapter 3
them; and this participation they come to have in the Forms is nothing
but their being made in their image (Plato, Parmenides 132C–D).75
Thus, the Dilemma of Participation appears to be a reductio ad absurdum

which leads Socrates to renounce characterising the relation between particu-
lars and Forms in terms of participation, and rather characterise it in terms of
resemblance. The Dilemma relies on some mereological assumptions on the
nature of Forms and on the relation of participation between particulars and
Forms. The Forms are treated as quantitative wholes, constituted by quanti-
tative parts (indeed, they are treated as concrete, spatially extended wholes,
constituted by concrete, spatially extended parts). That a particular partici-
pates in a Form implies that the Form is in the particular; it also implies that
the particular takes a part of the Form away from the Form itself, or receives it
(131D: ἀπολαμβάνειν), and then possesses it (ἔχειν).
So the Dilemma treats any Form F on a par with a quantitative whole like
a cake, and the relation of participation between the particulars Fs and the
form F as implying that the particulars have taken away and possess a certain
amount of the cake. Since all the particular Fs are F, each of them must possess
a certain quantity of the Form of F. Does this quantity amount to a part of the
Form (a slice of the cake), or the whole of it? If each particular participates in
the whole of the Form, then each of them possess the whole of it – and that is
impossible. If each particular participates in a different part of the Form, then
each particular possesses a part of the Form – and that is equally problemati-
cal, insofar as the Form would not be one thing anymore. (There will be parts
or portions of the cake, but the cake will not be there anymore.)
What are we to make of this argument? The most natural way of reacting is,
I guess, to shout: ‘What a sophism!’ Parmenides’ dilemma concerns predica-
tion, more specifically the share of a Form which is present in particulars when
a Form is predicated of them. Now Forms, one might argue, things like justice,
beauty, and oneness, are not the kind of object that can have quantitative (let
alone concrete) parts. So it is wrong to characterise a Form as a quantitative
whole; it is wrong to characterise the share of the Form which is present in a
particular in terms of a quantitative part; and it is wrong to characterise the
relation of participating in (μετέχειν) or partaking of (μεταλαμβάνειν) between
particulars and Forms (between the countable items and the Form of the one)
as the relation of possessing or wearing. Still, this is precisely what we find in
75 Plato, Parmenides 132c–d: … ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη
ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώ-
ματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς.
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Parmenides’ Dilemma of Participation (as well as in Sextus’ argument against

the Form of the one, to be found in Against the Arithmeticians). The premises
of these arguments, taken literally, are meaningless – and so these arguments
are very bad.
But are they hopelessly bad? I mean: is there a genuine philosophical
question – an interesting philosophical point – which lies behind these appar-
ent sophisms?
In order to answer this question, we should recall the fact that the Dilemma
of Participation and the argument in M IV are reductio ad absurdum. Plato, and
the Platonists, talk about particulars participating in, or partaking of, Forms;
and they claim that it is by participating in or partaking of a Form F that a
particular is F:
x is F because x participates in the Form of F.
Plato and the Platonists also claim that the species of a genus are parts of their
genus:
When something is a species of something it is necessarily also a part of

the object of which it is said to be a species (Plato, Politicus 263B).76
But what is the nature of the relation of participation or partaking, and in what
sense of ‘part’ can species be claimed to be parts of their genus? If we take
‘participating in’ as implying ‘being a part of’, and ‘being a part of’ as ‘being a
quantitative part of a quantitative whole’, then absurdities follow. The Dilemma
of Participation and the argument in M IV 18–20 show some of these absurdi-
ties: they purport to show that if we understand μετέχειν and μεταλαμβάνειν as
implying quantitative parthood, then they are inadequate terms and concepts
to describe the relation between particular and Forms. And Socrates, as we
have seen, is impressed enough by Parmenides’ reductio to give up any mereo-
logical characterisation of the relation of participation – for he retreats into
characterising it as ‘resembling’, which does not amount to, or imply, being a
part of something.
But is Socrates justified in doing so? Provided that you cannot characterise
the relation of ‘participating in’ in terms of ‘being a quantitative part of’, isn’t
there another non-peripheral, non-loose sense of ‘part’ by means of which you
can characterise this relation?
76 Plato, Politicus 263B: Ὡς εἶδος μὲν ὅταν ᾖ του, καὶ μέρος αὐτὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος
ὅτουπερ ἂν εἶδος λέγηται …
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130 Chapter 3
In Metaphysics Δ 25 and 26 Aristotle distinguishes five ways in which things

may be called parts or μέρη: (1) ‘that into which a quantity can be divided in
any way’; (2) divisions of quantities which measure their wholes, i.e. aliquot
parts; (3) the parts of a species or genus; (4) the matter and the form of a com-
posite object; and (5) the elements of a definition.
Jonathan Barnes comments:
Speaking roughly, we might say that (1) and (2) pick out real parts, while
(3)–(5) pick out logical parts. Problems will arise if those two types of
part are conflated – indeed, the conflation accounts for some of the oddi-
ties in the Parmenides.77
Aristotle records different philosophical uses that were made, in Antiquity,

of ‘part’ (or rather, of the word μέρος), without distinguishing between real
parts (quantitative parts of bodies, of geometrical figures, of numbers) on the
one hand, and logical parts on the other. Barnes suggests that we should keep
these two relations distinct, in order to avoid paradoxes. Let us follow this
suggestion:
‘being a real part of’ vs. ‘being a logical part of’.
The relation of ‘participating in’ between a particular and the Forms it has a
share of presumably falls under the category of logical part. The question is:
what is the relationship between these two relationships? Is there a use of the
word ‘part’ which ties together its use in real or quantitative contexts and its
use in logical contexts?
This question parallels those that have been asked, in Aristotelian meta-
physical discussions, about terms and concepts such as ‘key’ and ‘healthy’.78
Things are said to be ‘key’ in different ways, and things are said to be ‘healthy’
in different ways. It is one thing for a piece of metal to be a key, and quite
another for a set of symbols to constitute a key; it is one thing for an athlete
to be healthy, and another for a diet to be healthy. Thus, ‘key’ and ‘healthy’
are both homonymous terms; however, there is a difference between them.
The way in which a piece of metal is a key and the way in which a set of sym-
bols is a key are not connected to one central use of the word ‘key’. The word
77 J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, in id., Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 429–83, at p. 438.
78 Cf. J. Barnes, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1995, pp. 74–7.
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‘healthy’ behaves differently: the way in which a diet is healthy is parasitical

upon the way in which an athlete is healthy. In other words, the word ‘healthy’
has a focal, primary use or meaning, and other derivative uses, which are to
be characterised by reference to the former. When it is applied to an athlete,
‘healthy’ is used in a primary way: to say that an athlete is healthy is to say
that he has a body in excellent functioning shape; when it is applied to a diet,
‘healthy’ is used in a derivative way: to say that a diet is healthy is to say that it
is the sort of diet which makes the dieter’s body function excellently. Thus, the
uses of the word ‘healthy’, though different, are all tied together inasmuch as
they are all connected to one central, focal, primary use.
What about ‘part’? Things are said to be parts in different ways. It is one
thing for a back to be a part of a seat and quite another for the equality of these
two sheets to be a part of the Form of equal. Are these uses unified by a central,
focal, primary use of the word ‘part’? If they are, then the Platonists might be
justified in using the concept of part to characterise the relation between par-
ticulars and Forms. If they aren’t, and the non-quantitative use of ‘part’ is a
peripheral, loose one, then to call the equality of these two sheets a part of the
Form of equal is simply misleading: and if another, non-merological charac-
terisation of ‘participation’ is not available, then to say that
x is F because x participates in the Form of F
is to provide a vacuous explanation. This, I believe, is the deep philosophical

question that the dilemmas put forward by Parmenides and Sextus hinted at.
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Chapter 4
M IV 21–2: Sextus’ Attack on the Two
1 Textual Remarks
At M IV 21, line 27, following Bury, I emend ἄπορος (Mau, MS) to ἀπόρως.
At M IV 22, line 6, I expunge the expression καὶ ἑνός (Mau, MS), which does
not make sense and does not appear in the loci similes.1
2 Sextus’ Argument against the Number Two: M IV 21–2 in the Light

of M X 308–9
Having attacked the principle of all numbers by showing the non-existence

of the one or unit in M IV 11–20, Sextus turns his weapons against the number
two. The argument against the two is deployed in M IV 21–2. It is introduced
by Sextus as stemming from some puzzle raised by Plato in his On the Soul
(that is to say, in the Phaedo), a puzzle that challenges the existence of any
number whatsoever along with that of the two (see the last sentence of 22).
M X 302–9 and PH III 164–6 present parallel arguments. The following pages
will be focused on M IV 21–2: we will start from this passage, and then read the
Sextan more relevant loci similes and the passage in the Phaedo which Sextus’
arguments stem from in order to get clearer on it.
The argument against the number two in M IV 21–2 may be sketched as
follows (‘[]’ contains what I take to be underlying premises – step 2 – or inter-
mediary conclusions – steps 7 and 8):
1. The number two is formed by the conjunction of units.

2. [If something is in conjunction with something else, then the former
is juxtaposed to the latter.]
3. If a unit is juxtaposed to another unit, then, because of the juxtaposi-
tion, either (i) something is added or (ii) something is subtracted or
(iii) nothing is either added or subtracted.
4. But (iii) implies the non-existence of the number two: for if nothing is
either added or subtracted, the number two will not exist in virtue of
the juxtaposition of the units.
1 Cf. M X 309: ἐλάσσωσις ἔσται τῆς μιᾶς μονάδος, which suggests that the right reading in
M IV 21–2 is just ἐλάσσωσις ἔσται τοῦ ἑνός.

M IV 21–2: Sextus ’ Attack on the Two 133
5. And (ii) implies the non-existence of the number two: for, if something
is subtracted through the juxtaposition, then there will be a diminu-
tion of a unit, and the number two will not be formed.
6. And (i) implies the non-existence of the number two: for, if something
is added, the two items will not become two things but four; for the
additional two and the unit and the other unit will compose the num-
ber four.
7. [So the number two cannot be formed by the juxtaposition of the
units.]
8. [So the number two cannot be formed by the conjunction of the units.]
---
9. The number two does not exist.
The main line of the argument is the following. The number two is defined
or characterised by the Platonists in a way (and that is to say, as a conjunc-
tion of units: premise 1) which implies an exclusive and exhaustive disjunction
(expressed in premise 3) each member of which is shown to entail the non-
existence of the number two (in premises 4, 5, and 6 respectively).2 The crucial
premise is 6, which is characterised by the same indeterminacy which charac-
terises all the other premises. Sextus considers the possibilities that something
is added, or subtracted, or neither added nor subtracted, but does not indicate
to what it is added or from what it is subtracted. So one trivial but crucial ques-
tion to start from is the following: something is added to what?
The Sextan locus closest to M IV 21–2 is M X 308–9. In the sections immedi-
ately preceding this passage (M X 299–307)3 Sextus has argued that number,
like anything else known by man, may be known either by the senses or by the
intellect. But number is not perceptible and cannot be known by the senses:
for it is known by learning (M X 299–301). Sextus then puts forward three argu-
ments purporting to show that number is not known by the intellect either
(300–7). The first argument (302–4), which he indicates to stem from a pas-
sage from the Phaedo (to be identified with 97a2–5), shows the difficulties we
encounter if we take number to be known by memory through the combination
2 The form of the argument is the following:

(1) Either P or Q or R
(2) If P, then S
(3) If Q, then S
(4) If R, then S
(5) S.
3 On M X 299–309 cf. T. Brennan, ‘Number: M X 248–309’, in K. Algra and K. Ierodiakonou
(eds.), Sextus Empiricus and Ancient Physics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015,
pp. 324–64, at pp. 358–62.
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134 Chapter 4
of certain items (μνήμῃ κατ’ ἐπισύνθεσίν τινων). Sextus wonders ‘why units that
were not conceived as two prior to their conjunction should be conceived as
two after it. How could mere conjunction have this effect?’4 The second argu-
ment (304) seems to be the application of the same pattern of argument to
the particular case of the number ten. The third argument (305–7) reports the
difficulty put forward in Phaedo 97a5–b3 against the idea that the conjunction
and juxtaposition of two units is the cause of those which formerly were not
two becoming two things – a difficulty grounded on the fact that the opposite
processes of division and separation produce the same result. There follows an
argument against the existence of number which closes Sextus’ discussion of
the subject in M X (308–9):
[308] … It is also possible to argue thus. If number is anything, when one

thing is juxtaposed to another, say a unit to a unit, then either something
is added to the units which have been put together, or something is sub-
tracted from them, or nothing is either added to them or subtracted. But
if nothing is either added to them or subtracted from them, the number
two will not exist in virtue of the juxtaposition of one unit to the other –
just as it did not exist before the conjunction. [309] And if something is
subtracted because of their juxtaposition, there will be a diminution of
a unit and the number two will not come into existence. And if some-
thing is added to them, say the two, then the items which ought to be
two things will become four things. Indeed, the number two, which has
been added, was a unit and another unit; thus, when this is added to the
unit and the unit which have been put together, it will make the number
four – and that is absurd. So then, number is nothing (M X 308–9).5
We may sketch the argument at stake in the passage, supplementing some

obvious premises, as follows. If number is anything, then it amounts to the
conjunction and juxtaposition of units. But if a unit is juxtaposed to another
unit, then either (i) something is added to the units which have been put
together; or (ii) something is subtracted from them; or (iii) nothing is either
4 T. Brennann, ‘Number: M X 248–309’, cit., p. 358 ; cf. n. 20 below.

5 M X 308–9: [308] … ἔνεστι δὲ καὶ ὧδε συνερωτᾶν. εἰ ἔστι τι ἀριθμός, ὅτε παρατίθεταί τι ἑτέρῳ, οἷον
τῇ μονάδι ἡ μονάς, τότε ἢ προσγίνεταί τι ταῖς συνελθούσαις μονάσιν ἢ ἀπογίνεται τῶν συνελθουσῶν
ἢ οὔτε προσγίνεταί τι αὐταῖς οὔτε ἀπογίνεται. ἀλλ’ εἰ μήτε προσγίνεταί τι αὐταῖς μήτε ἀπογίνεται
αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν τῆς ἑτέρας τῇ ἑτέρᾳ, ὡς οὐδὲ πρὶν τῆς συνόδου ἐτύγχα-
νεν. εἰ δὲ ἀπογίνεταί τι κατὰ τὴν παράθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐλάσσωσις ἔσται τῆς μιᾶς μονάδος καὶ οὐκέτι
δυὰς γενήσεται. [309] εἰ δὲ προσγίνεταί τι αὐταῖς, οἷον ἡ δυάς, τὰ ὀφείλοντα δύο εἶναι τέσσαρα
γενήσονται. δυὰς γὰρ ἡ ἐπιγενομένη μονὰς ἦν καὶ μονάς· προσελθοῦσα οὖν μονάδι καὶ μονάδι, ταῖς
συνερχομέναις, τὸν τέσσαρα ποιήσει ἀριθμόν· ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἄτοπον. τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι τι ἀριθμός.
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added to them or subtracted from them. But the three possibilities all imply
the non-existence of number; therefore number is nothing.
We find here an argument which shares with the argument in M IV 21–2
the basic terminology (παράθεσις/παρατίθεσθαι for ‘juxtaposition’/‘juxtaposing’,
σύνοδος for ‘conjunction’, προσγίγνεσθαι for ‘adding’, ἀπογίγνεσθαι for ‘subtract-
ing’, ἐλάσσωσις for ‘diminution’) and the main line (the Dogmatic definition
of number entails a trilemma whose disjuncts imply the non-existence of it).
But this is a generalisation of the argument in M IV 21–2 (for, it argues for the
impossibility of conceiving any number, not just the number two, as a conjunc-
tion of units);6 more importantly, it is a less elliptical version of the argument
in M IV, which clarifies some aspects of it. First, as the expression οἷον suggests,
units are taken to be just one example of things which may be juxtaposed and
conjunct. Secondly, the juxtaposition and conjunction of the units are charac-
terised as taking place in time.7 Thirdly, the premise 4, which in M IV was just
affirmed, here is grounded on an allusion to a little argument: the number two
did not exist before the juxtaposition of the units; so if nothing is either added
to or subtracted from them after and because of the juxtaposition, the number
two will still not exist. Fourthly, and crucially, M X 308–9 determines the inde-
terminacy in M IV 21–2: ‘either something is added’ – to what? M IV 21–2 does
not say; M X 308–9 shows that it is ‘to the two units in question’:8 ‘the number
two is added to the units which have been put together’.
3 The Origin of the Puzzle: Plato, Phaedo 96e–97b, 101 b–c
In M IV 21–2, Sextus mentions a puzzle about the number two raised by

Plato in the Phaedo. What are the difficulties put forward by Plato, exactly?
Sextus refers to Phaedo 96e–97b: it is time to have a look at the passage in its
context. In the following lines, I will put forward a slightly modified version of
Gallop’s translation, in which I have inserted square brackets: the reason for
this will be given later.
The context of Phaedo 96e–97b was sketched in chapter 3; here it is
important to recall it and give a few more details. Cebes wants it proved that
our soul is imperishable and immortal (95b–c). This, Socrates points out
6 As indicated above, the final sentence of M IV 22 alludes to such as generalisation: ἡ δὲ αὐτὴ

γένοιτ’ ἂν ἀπορία καὶ ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ, ὥστε μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ τοῦτο ἀριθμόν.
7 As the expressions ὅτε παρατίθεταί τι … τότε ἢ προσγίνεταί τι … and πρὶν τῆς συνόδου suggest.
8 ἢ προσγίνεταί τι ταῖς συνελθούσαις μονάσιν ἢ ἀπογίνεται τῶν συνελθουσῶν; cf. the subsequent
expressions in the plural form αὐταῖς, αὐτῶν, ταῖς συνερχομέναις.
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136 Chapter 4
(95e–96a), calls for a ‘thorough inquiry into the whole question of the cause of
coming-to-be and destruction’ (περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγμα-
τεύσασθαι). When I was younger, Socrates continues (96a–b), I was remarkably
keen on natural science, which dealt with the cause or explanation ‘of each
thing’s coming to be, perishing, and existing’ (96a: τὰς αἰτίας ἑκάστου, διὰ τί
γίγνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστι). But I had absolutely no
gift for this kind of inquiry. For, I was so utterly blinded by this inquiry that
I unlearned things I formerly supposed I knew.
In particular, Socrates believed that
(1) A human being grows by eating and drinking: when from the food flesh
is added to flesh … the small human being comes to be large (96c–d);
(2) Ten is greater than eight because of the accruing of two to the latter
(96e).9
But he no longer believes that he knows the causes of these phenomena. For
on the one hand, Socrates does not accept that
when you add one to one, [it is] either the one to which the addition is
made [that] has come to be two, or the one that has been added and the
one to which it has been added, [that] have come to be two, because of
the addition of one to the other. For, I wonder if, when they were apart
from each other, each was one and they were not two then; whereas when
they come close to each other, this then became a cause of their coming
to be two – the union in which they were juxtaposed (Phaedo, 96e–97a).
On the other hand, Socrates does not believe that
if you divide one, this has now become a cause for [its] coming to be
two – namely division; because if so, we have a cause opposite to the
previous one for [its] coming to be two; then it was their being brought
9 Plato, Phaedo 96c–e: [Σωκράτης] ἐγὼ γὰρ ἃ καὶ πρότερον σαφῶς ἠπιστάμην, ὥς γε ἐμαυτῷ καὶ
τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐδόκουν, τότε ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως οὕτω σφόδρα ἐτυφλώθην, ὥστε ἀπέμαθον καὶ
ταῦτα ἃ πρὸ τοῦ ᾤμην εἰδέναι, περὶ ἄλλων τε πολλῶν καὶ διὰ τί ἄνθρωπος αὐξάνεται. τοῦτο γὰρ ᾤμην
πρὸ τοῦ παντὶ δῆλον εἶναι, ὅτι διὰ τὸ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν σιτίων ταῖς μὲν σαρξὶ
σάρκες προσγένωνται, τοῖς δὲ ὀστοῖς ὀστᾶ, καὶ οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὰ αὐτῶν
οἰκεῖα ἑκάστοις προσγένηται, τότε δὴ τὸν ὀλίγον ὄγκον ὄντα ὕστερον πολὺν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὕτω
γίγνεσθαι τὸν σμικρὸν ἄνθρωπον μέγαν. … καὶ ἔτι γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ δέκα μοι ἐδόκει τῶν
ὀκτὼ πλέονα εἶναι διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ δίπηχυ τοῦ πηχυαίου μεῖζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσει
αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.
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close to each other and added, one to the other; whereas now it’s their
being drawn apart, and separated each from the other (Phaedo, 97a–b).10
A little later, Socrates introduces the Forms, and suggests that they (and not
the things already mentioned) are the causes of the facts at stake. The passage,
which was provided in chapter 3, needs to be quoted again and examined in
further detail:
Then – Socrates said – wouldn’t you be afraid to say that ten is greater
than eight by two, and that this is the cause of its exceeding, rather than
that it’s by numerousness, and because of numerousness? … And again,
wouldn’t you beware of saying that when one is added to one, the addi-
tion is the cause of [their] coming to be two, or when one is divided,
that division is the cause? You’d shout loudly that you know no other way
in which each thing comes to be, except by participating in the pecu-
liar Being of any given thing in which it does participate; and in these
cases you own no other cause of [their] coming to be two, save partici-
pation in twoness: things that are going to be two must participate in
that, and whatever is going to be one must participate in oneness. You’d
dismiss those divisions and additions and other such subtleties (Phaedo,
101b–c).11
10 Plato, Phaedo 96e–97b: Πόρρω που, ἔφη, νὴ Δία ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἴεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν
αἰτίαν εἰδέναι, ὅς γε οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι ἐμαυτοῦ οὐδὲ ὡς ἐπειδὰν ἑνί τις προσθῇ ἕν, ἢ τὸ ἓν ᾧ προ-
σετέθη δύο γέγονεν, ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν καὶ ᾧ προσετέθη διὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου τῷ ἑτέρῳ δύο
ἐγένετο· θαυμάζω γὰρ εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἦν, ἓν ἄρα ἑκάτερον ἦν καὶ οὐκ
ἤστην τότε δύο, ἐπεὶ δ’ἐπλησίασαν ἀλλήλοις, αὕτη ἄρα αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι,
ἡ σύνοδος τοῦ πλησίον ἀλλήλων τεθῆναι. οὐδέ γε ὡς ἐάν τις ἓν διασχίσῃ, δύναμαι ἔτι πείθεσθαι
ὡς αὕτη αὖ αἰτία γέγονεν, ἡ σχίσις, τοῦ δύο γεγονέναι· ἐναντία γὰρ γίγνεται ἢ τότε αἰτία τοῦ δύο
γίγνεσθαι. τότε μὲν γὰρ ὅτι συνήγετο πλησίον ἀλλήλων καὶ προσετίθετο ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ, νῦν δ’
ὅτι ἀπάγεται καὶ χωρίζεται ἕτερον ἀφ’ ἑτέρου. With Gallop, I omit the words ἢ τὸ προστεθὲν
suggested at 96e9 by D. Wyttenbach, which raise a further possibility: ‘the one that was
added’ has become two. In any case, the omission does not bear any weight on my inter-
pretation of the passage.
11 Plato, Phaedo 101b–c: Οὐκοῦν, ἦ δ’ ὅς, τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν
αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος; … Τί δέ; ἑνὶ ἑνὸς προ-
στεθέντος τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο
ἂν λέγειν; καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῴης ὅτι οὐκ οἶσθα ἄλλως πως ἕκαστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὸν τῆς ἰδίας
οὐσίας ἑκάστου οὗ ἂν μετάσχῃ, καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχεις ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ’
ἢ τὴν τῆς δυάδος μετάσχεσιν, καὶ δεῖν τούτου μετασχεῖν τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι, καὶ μονάδος ὃ
ἂν μέλλῃ ἓν ἔσεσθαι, τὰς δὲ σχίσεις ταύτας καὶ προσθέσεις καὶ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς τοιαύτας κομψείας
ἐῴης ἂν χαίρειν …
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138 Chapter 4
So Socrates concludes, in particular, that:
(3) It is not the case that ten is greater than eight by two;
(4) Ten is greater than eight by numerousness and because of the
numerousness.
(5) It is not the case that the addition of a unit to a unit is the cause of
their coming to be two;
(6) It is not the case that the division of something is the cause of its
becoming two; but
(7) The cause of the coming to be of two things is the participation in
twoness.
In his commentary, Gallop points out that in 96e–97b Socrates raises two dif-
ferent questions. The first one is whether any of the things mentioned (the
first unit to which the second unit is added, or both) can properly be said to
‘come to be two’, i.e. what the subject of the predicate ‘come to be two’ could
be; the second question is whether it is the process of addition (πρόσθεσις)
that makes the units two. And – we may add, sticking to Gallop’s translation –
Socrates then tackles only the second of the questions he has raised. For in the
rest of the passage Socrates ignores the question of what can properly be said
to come to be two; he only deals with the question of what is the cause of the
units’ coming to be two, and comes to the conclusion that it is the twoness or
Form of two. But Gallop does deal with the first question he has distinguished:
‘Two’ can be predicated of a pair of items taken together, but of neither

taken singly. ‘One’ can be predicated of either taken singly, but not of
both taken together. … In the light of this, the predicate ‘come to be two’
is, indeed, puzzling. For two items taken singly can never be two, and
taken together they must always be two. A set cannot, it seems, change its
cardinal number, whereas the verb ‘come to be’ suggests that it can. More
generally, how can things ‘come to be F’, where F is a character that they
either always or never possess? Number predicates appear to be such that
things cannot ‘come to’ acquire them.12
Gallop’s translation and commentary of the passages at stake call for a cou-
ple of remarks. His translation of 96e–97a suggests that Socrates raises two
puzzles, and that the first of them turns on what the subject of change is; his
translation of all the other passages suggests that Socrates takes for granted
that what comes to be two are the units; that Socrates then considers only the
12 D. Gallop, Plato: Phaedo, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1975, p. 173.
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second puzzle, i.e. what is the cause of the units coming to be two; and that
Socrates ends by explaining this fact rejecting the addition, and appealing to
the Form of two (see 101b–c).
Both the ancient and modern commentators I have consulted, in discussing
this passage from the Phaedo, have considered the two puzzles distinguished
by Gallop. It is clear, for instance, that Damascius finds puzzling both the
possibility that a unit, or unit A and B, come to be two, and the possibility
of explaining these phenomena by reference to addition or division.13 More
recently, Bostock has suggested that in Phaedo 96e–97a we find an allusion
to the two puzzles mentioned by Gallop;14 so does Menn. Menn has further
argued that the first of the difficulties raised by Plato is a development of a
puzzle we find in a fragment of Epicharmus (fr. 276 Kassel-Austin). The basic
idea runs as follows. If you add something (a unit) to a number, it is not the
same number anymore. Therefore you cannot say that the number has grown.
Similarly, if you add something to a human body, then it is not the same thing
anymore. Therefore you cannot say that the body has grown. According to this
interpretation, the main problem at stake here is that of the identity of items
(a number, a body) through time – throughout the process of growth. Plato
would rehearse the difficulties raised by Epicharmus in order to show that
growth cannot be explained by means of addition, but must be explained by
means of Forms.15
It is worth noting, though, that as far as the Greek is concerned, Socrates
in 96e might be understood as raising only the puzzle about the cause of the
change. To get that interpretation, you just leave out the expressions in square
brackets: [it’s], [that], [that].16 And the fact that this is the only aspect that
Socrates goes on to address encourages this reading.
More importantly, according to Gallop the phenomenon Socrates seeks an
explanation for is that of the units coming to be two. Two passages support this
reading: in 97a4–5 the question is what is ‘the cause of the coming to be two
of the units’ (αἰτία αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι); in 101c4–6, the question is
how to explain ‘the coming to be two’ (δύο γενέσθαι) of the ‘the things that are
13 Cf. The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, Vol. II: Damascius, ed. and trans. by
L.G. Westerink, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1977, pp. 220–1.
14 Cf. D. Bostock, Plato’s Phaedo, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 141.
15 Cf. S. Menn, ‘On Socrates’ First Objections to the Physicists (Phaedo 95e8–97b8)’, Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy 38, 2010, pp. 37–68, esp. at pp. 45–6.
16 Cf. the translation by Long in D. Sedley and A. Long, Plato. Meno and Phaedo, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2010: ‘I don’t allow myself to say even that, when somebody
adds one to one, either the one it was added to has become two, or the one that was added
and the one it was added to became two, on account of the addition of the first to the
second’.
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140 Chapter 4
going to be two’ (τὰ μέλλοντα δύο ἔσεσθαι). However, in all the other cases Plato
indicates the explanandum just by the expression τὸ δύο γεγόγεναι (97a7), τὸ
δύο γίγνεσθαι (97b1), τὸ δύο γενέσθαι (101c1) – Gallop’s possessive adjectives ‘its’
and ‘their’ which I have square-bracketed find no correspondence in the Greek
text. With Gallop, we might take the δύο to act as a predicate and αὐτοῦ/αὐτοῖς
to be implicit in the occurrences of this formula in 97a7, 97b1 – ‘its [i.e. the
unit’s] coming to be two’ – and 101c1 – ‘their [i.e. the units’] coming to be two’.
Alternatively, however, we might take the δύο to act as a subject and no expres-
sion to be implicit in this formula, so that it would read ‘the coming to be of
two things’. In other words, if we stick to the Greek, the phenomenon that Plato
is seeking an explanation for could be not that of a unit or a first and a second
unit coming to be two, but rather the coming to be of two things. The question,
in this case, would not be ‘How can we explain that the units have become
two?’, but rather ‘How can we explain that there are now two things where
there was only one?’; and it might be useful to keep this distinction in mind.
My second remark is about Gallop’s treatment of the first question he dis-
tinguishes: ‘Can any of the things mentioned (the first unit to which the second
unit is added, or both) properly be said to come to be two?’ Gallop’s analysis
encourages a negative answer: none of the things mentioned can be said to
come to be two, since nothing at all can come to be two things. Numerical
predicates apply to sets of items; and a set does not change its cardinality. So
we might think that it is impossible to find an explanation for the fact that
something has become two things, since that is not a fact – and therefore there
isn’t any explanation.
But that would be a mistake. That a set cannot change its cardinal number
is true, and trivial, if we take the word ‘set’ in a technical sense – in the way it is
used in Set Theory; false, and obviously so, if we take ‘set’ in the sense of ‘group’
or the like. For we can say things like ‘The set/group of my teeth has changed its
cardinality more than once’, ‘The number of Italian scholars in Switzerland has
recently increased’, etc. I mean: we cannot react to Gallop’s first puzzle by sim-
ply saying that no sentence of the form ‘The set/group of my teeth has changed
its cardinality’ can express a truth, because this is not so; we have to answer the
puzzle by providing another analysis of the sentence. We have to conciliate
the two truths that a set cannot change its cardinality, but a group can.
4 Number and Generation: PH III 164–5 and M X 323, 328–30
We have seen that in the Phaedo there are traces of two different accounts
of the coming to be of two things: (i) something (either an item or a plurality of
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items) has become two things; (ii) two things have come to be. Most interpret-
ers have taken seriously the first account, and thought that the problem Plato
faces here is how to explain that unit A and unit B have come to be two things;
and Menn has argued that Plato is developing a problem, that of the identity
of number through time, which is taken by Epicharmus to be analogous to
the problem of the identity of body through time. In the light of this distinc-
tion, we might ask which of the two accounts underlies Sextus’ arguments, and
whether Sextus is dealing with the difficulty indicated by Menn.
If we go back to the Sextan arguments we have considered so far, we can
see that Sextus refers to the explanandum at stake in both the ways we have
distinguished – so in M IV 21–2 he says both that τὰ δύο οὐ γενήσεται δύο ἀλλὰ
τέσσαρα and οὐκ ἔσται … ἡ δυάς, δυὰς οὐ γενήσεται; and in M X 308–9 he says
both that τὰ ὀφείλοντα δύο εἶναι τέσσαρα γενήσονται and οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς, οὐκέτι
δυὰς γενήσεται. In order to get clearer on the matter, let us have a look at the
pertinent Sextan loci.
Let us start with the argument against the number two to be found in Sextus’
arithmetical discussion in the Outlines at PH III 151–67. The discussion is struc-
tured in the presentation of the ‘Pythagorean’ philosophy of numbers (151–7),
followed by Sextus’ arguments against the substantial existence of numbers
(157–63)17 and the argument against the number two (164–6), which Sextus
takes to be applicable to any number whatsoever (167). The ‘Pythagorean’ sys-
tem, as sketched by Sextus, is characterised by two principles, the one and the
indefinite two, the latter of which ‘is generated from the one by addition [κατὰ
ἐπισύνθεσιν τῆς μονάδος γινομένη]’ (153). From the one and the indefinite two
‘the other numbers which are observed in numbered objects are generated [ἐκ
τούτων γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους γίνεσθαι ἀριθμούς, τοὺς ἐπιθεωρουμένους τοῖς ἀριθμη-
τοῖς]’ (154). Some details of this second process are provided a little later, in
the context of Sextus’ attack on the two: all the other numbers, the so-called
‘composite [σύνθετοι]’ numbers, are ‘produced by combination [κατὰ σύνθεσιν
ἀποτελεῖσθαι]’: they are ‘compounded and generated from the superordinate
numbers, i.e. the one and the indefinite two [συντίθεσθαί καὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐκ τῶν
ἐπαναβεβηκότων, οἷον τῆς τε μονάδος καὶ δυάδος τῆς ἀορίστου]’ (166).
Sextus’ attack on the two in 164–5 turns precisely on the process of genera-
tion which it is supposed to be produced by. It can be presented as follows:18
17 For an analysis of Sextus’ strategy in PH III 157–63 cf. chapter 3, section 3.

18 PH III 164–165: [164] Πῶς δὲ καὶ γίνεσθαί φασιν ἐκ τῆς μονάδος τὴν δυάδα οἱ ἔξωθέν τι δοκοῦντες
εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν παρὰ τὰ ἀριθμητά; ὅτε γὰρ συντίθεμεν μονάδα ἑτέρᾳ μονάδι, ἤτοι προστίθεταί
τι ταῖς μονάσιν ἔξωθεν, ἢ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπ’ αὐτῶν, ἢ οὔτε προστίθεταί τι οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται. ἀλλ’
εἰ μὲν οὔτε προστίθεταί ⟨τι⟩ οὔτε ἀφαιρεῖται, οὐκ ἔσται δυάς. οὔτε γὰρ χωρὶς ἀλλήλων οὖσαι αἱ
μονάδες εἶχον τὴν δυάδα ἐπιθεωρουμένην αὐταῖς κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῶν λόγον, [165] οὔτε νῦν τι
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142 Chapter 4
1. Suppose that the number two is generated from the units – that it is
composed by putting a unit together with another unit.
2. When the first unit is put together with the second unit, (i) either
something is added to them from outside, or (ii) something is sub-
tracted from them, or (iii) nothing is either added or subtracted.
3. But (iii) implies the non-existence of the number two: if nothing is
either added or subtracted, there will not be a two. For when the units
were separate from one another there was no two observed in them by
virtue of the account proper to them; nor has anything now come to
them from outside, or been subtracted either, according to the hypoth-
esis. Hence, putting a unit together with a unit will not make a two if
nothing is either subtracted or added from outside.
4. And (ii) implies the non-existence of the number two. For if some-
thing is subtracted, then not only will there not be a two, but the units
will actually be decreased.
5. And (i) implies the non-existence of the number two. For if the two
is added to the units from outside in order that a two may come into
being from them, then what are thought to be two will be four; for we
had one unit and another unit, and if a two were added to them from
outside we would get four.
---
6. [The number two cannot be be composed by putting a unit together
with another unit].
One point about premise 3 is worth stressing. The idea is that something must
have been added/subtracted from outside to/from the units after they have
been put together. Why? Because when the units were separated from one
another, they were not two things by virtue of the account which is proper
to them.
The passage appears to allude to the following Platonist view. The number
two exists in time and is not eternal. It comes into being (or is generated) when
unit A and unit B are put together: before their being put together, the number
two did not exist. It is pretty clear that in this view the coming into being of
the number two is treated along the same lines as the coming into being of a
group of two items – a pair of things. Let us try to get a better handle on this by
αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν προσγέγονεν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἀφῄρηται κατὰ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται δυὰς ἡ
σύνθεσις τῆς μονάδος πρὸς τὴν μονάδα, μήτε ἀφαιρέσεως μήτε προσθέσεως ἔξωθέν τινος γινο-
μένης. εἰ δὲ ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἔσται δυάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ μειωθήσονται αἱ μονάδες. εἰ δὲ
προστίθεται αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν ἡ δυάς, ἵνα ἐκ τῶν μονάδων γένηται δυάς, τὰ δύο δοκοῦντα εἶναι τέσ-
σαρα ἔσται· ὑπόκειται γὰρ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονάς, αἷς προστιθεμένης ἔξωθεν δυάδος ὁ τέσσαρα
ἀριθμὸς ἀποτελοῖτο ἄν.
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means of an example. There was an apple in the basket; then you put another
apple in it, and now there are two apples in the basket. The content of our
basket has undergone a change; how can we explain what has happened? We
cannot do so by simply referring to the properties defining or characterising
the units (the apples) – that is to say, to the properties that they have by virtue
of the account which is proper to them (κατὰ τὸν ἴδιον αὐτῶν λόγον):19 for, when
they were separated, there was no number two (there was no pair of apples in
the basket). We have to say that the units (the apples) have been put together,
and because of this, something – and that is to say, the property of being two,
twoness or duality – has been added to them from outside.20 But this option,
as Sextus argues, is problematical.
Before seeing what the problem amounts to, it is important to notice that
Sextus, in attacking the concepts of coming into being and perishing (γένεσις
καὶ φθορά) just after having attacked number (M X 310–51), reports a couple of
Dogmatic claims which seem to be very pertinent to our passage:
If anything comes into being and perishes, something ought to be added

to something and something subtracted from something, or something
ought to change from something; for coming into being and perish-
ing ought to be produced in some one of these three ways – for example,
in the case of the ten the nine comes into being, and the ten perishes, in
virtue of the subtraction of the unit, and again in the case of the nine, the
ten comes into being and the nine perishes in virtue of the addition of a
19 On this expression see chapter 3, section 3 and n. 39.

20 The same basic idea is at play in the argument put forward by Sextus at M X 302–4, where
he rehearses the difficulty raised in the Phaedo ‘[302] … as how two, when they are on
their own, are not conceived as two, but become two when they are put together. [303]
For if after the coming together they are just as they were before the coming together,
and each of them before the coming together was one, each of them will also be one
after the coming together – since if we allow that something extra gets added to them
after the coming together, beyond what there was, such as the two, the combination of
the two will make four. [304] For if the two gets added as something more to the one and
one that were put together then, since in the two are conceived a unit and a unit, a four
will be formed by the coming together of the one and the one – since the ones that come
together are conceived as two, and the two that gets added to them is double in its nature’
([302] … πῶς τὰ δύο κατ’ ἰδίαν μὲν ὄντα οὐ νοεῖται δύο, συνελθόντα δὲ εἰς ταὐτὸ γίνεται δύο.
[303] εἰ γὰρ τοιαῦτά ἐστι μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον, ὁποῖα ἦν πρὶν τῆς συνόδου, ἦν δ’ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν
πρὶν τῆς συνόδου ἕν, ἔσται καὶ μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον ἑκάτερον ἕν, ἐπεὶ ἂν δῶμεν προσγίνεσθαί τι
αὐτοῖς περισσότερον μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον παρ’ ὃ ἦν, οἷον τὴν δυάδα, ἔσται ἡ τῶν δυεῖν συνέλευσις
τετράς. [304] εἰ γὰρ τῷ συνελθόντι ἑνὶ καὶ ἑνὶ πλεῖόν τι προσγίνεται ἡ δυάς, ἐπεὶ ἐν ταύτῃ μονὰς
καὶ μονὰς νοεῖται, κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἑνὸς συνέλευσιν τετρὰς γενήσεται, δυεῖν μὲν νοουμένων
τῶν συνιόντων, διττῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οὔσης τῆς προσγινομένης αὐτοῖς δυάδος).
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144 Chapter 4
unit. And in the case of things that perish or are generated in virtue of a
shift, the same reasoning applies: for in this way wine perishes and vin-
egar comes into being (M X 323).21
We find here a distinction between three kinds of γένεσις and an example for
each of them. If an item comes into being, then either (i) something is added
to something; or (ii) something is subtracted from something (τί τινι προστί-
θεσθαι / τί τινος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι: the same terms we have found in PH III 164–5);
or (iii) something has changed from something (τι ἔκ τινος μεταβάλλειν). The
examples of the first two kinds of γένεσις are the coming into being of a num-
ber as a result of the addition or subtraction of a unit to/from another given
number; the example of the third kind of γένεσις is the coming into being of
vinegar from wine. The distinction is not an invention by Sextus; for in a paral-
lel passage he ascribes its examples to some Dogmatists:
Apart from addition and subtraction and natural change nothing could
come into being or be destroyed. For instance, it is when ten is destroyed,
they say, that nine is generated, by the subtraction of a unit; and ten is
generated when nine is destroyed, by the addition of a unit; and rust
when bronze is destroyed, by natural change (PH III 109).22
A similar claim is applied in M X 328–30 to the objects which produce appear-

ing (i.e., here, the objects of perception). If an object which produces appearing
comes into being, then it is either from one thing through change (ἐξ ἑνὸς κατὰ
μεταβολήν) or from several things by combination (ἐκ πλειόνων κατὰ σύνθεσιν:
the same term we have found in PH III 164–5). In the first case, an item takes
on one quality in place of another while the same substance remains – as for
example when, while the same liquid remains in the same quantity, the wine
21 M X 323: καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεταί τι καὶ φθείρεται, ὀφείλει τί τινι προστίθεσθαι καί τί τινος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
ἤ τι ἔκ τινος μεταβάλλειν· γένεσις γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ κατά τινα τῶν τριῶν τούτων τρόπων ὀφείλει
συνίστασθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος κατ’ ἀφαίρεσιν τῆς μονάδος γίνεται μὲν ἡ ἐννεάς, φθείρεται δὲ
ἡ δεκάς, καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐννεάδος κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μονάδος γίνεται μὲν ἡ δεκάς, φθείρεται δὲ ἡ
ἐννεάς. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τροπὴν φθειρομένων ἢ γεννωμένων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· οὕτω γὰρ φθείρεται
μὲν ὁ οἶνος, γίνεται δὲ ⟨ὁ⟩ ὄξος.
22 PH III 109: χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων [i.e. πρόσθεσις, ἀφαίρεσις and φυσική μεταβολή] οὔτε γένοιτο ἄν
τι οὔτε φθαρείη, οἷον γοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος φθειρομένης, ὡς φασίν, ἐννεάδα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει
κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μονάδος, καὶ τὴν δεκάδα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος φθειρομένης κατὰ πρόσθεσιν τῆς
μονάδος, καὶ τὸν ἰὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ χαλκοῦ φθειρομένου κατὰ μεταβολήν. The ‘natural change’ at
stake here is change of quality: another example of it is the change of iron from hard to
soft (cf. PH III 107).
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disappears and vinegar is formed.23 Examples of the second γένεσις are the
coming into being of a chain by the concatenation (ἐπισύνθεσις) of links, of a
house by combination (σύνοδος) of stones, of a robe by the weaving together
(συμπλοκή) of woof and warp.24
It is tempting to fuse the two distinctions, and to imagine that we have got
two kinds of generation/destruction, (i) from one thing through change and
(ii) from several things through combination; and that in this latter case either
something is added to something else or something is subtracted from some-
thing else. If there is a γένεσις of an item, then either something has changed
(τι ἔκ τινος μεταβάλλειν), or the item which has come to be has come from sev-
eral things by combination (ἐκ πλειόνων κατὰ σύνθεσιν); and in this latter case,
either something has been added or something has been subtracted.
Which kind of γένεσις is at stake in Sextus’ arguments? If we read them in
the light of the passages just quoted, the following picture emerges. According
to Sextus, his adversaries take number (say the number two) to be generated
or to come into being; and they take it to come into being as a result of the
juxtaposition/addition of units, just as a pair of things (say two apples in the
basket) comes to be as a result of their juxtaposition/addition. They take these
to be instances of the second kind of γένεσις distinguished – i.e. cases of an item
which comes to be from several things, and not cases of the μεταβολή of one
item. Clearly Sextus is not attacking his adversaries for supposing that number
comes to be as a result of the growth of a smaller number, and stressing the
problem of identity-through-time which this alleged μεταβολή would produce.
In other words, he is not raising the difficulty put forward by Epicharmus and
emphasised by Menn. He is rather objecting to the Dogmatic view: he consid-
ers the case of the coming to be of two things – a γένεσις which is the result
23 The same case is provided at M X 39 as an example of μεταβλητική κίνησις, ‘change-related

motion’, in a different context: the account of motion provided by ‘most people, including
Aenesidemus’. These people distinguish between two kinds of motion, the change-related
and the transitional, and take the coming into being, perishing, increase, and diminution
as kinds of change-related motion: cf. M X 37–40.
24 M X 328–30: ἐν τοῖς φαινομένοις θεωρεῖται τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἑνὸς γεννώμενα κατὰ μεταβολήν, τὰ δ’
ἐκ πλειόνων κατὰ σύνθεσιν, καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν κατὰ μεταβολὴν ὁπόσα τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας μενού-
σης ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας μεταλαμβάνει ποιότητα, οἷον ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑγροῦ μένοντος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
πλήθει τὸ μὲν γλεῦκος ἀφανισθῇ, οἶνος δὲ γένηται … ἐκ πλειόνων δὲ κατ’ ἐπισύνθεσιν ὡς ἅλυσις
μὲν κατ’ἐπισύνδεσιν κρίκων, οἰκία δὲ κατὰ σύνοδον λίθων, ἐσθὴς δὲ κατὰ κρόκης καὶ στημόνων
συμπλοκήν. The same distinction is later applied to the objects of thought. If an object of
thought comes into being, then it is either (i) from a being or (ii) from a non-being. But
(ii) is to be rejected (331–2). And if (i), then the object of thought comes into being either
out of one thing or out of multiple things (332). But both the first (332–7) and the second
(338) options are to be rejected.
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146 Chapter 4
of the combination of several items (units) each of which keeps its identity
after the combination – and indicates a puzzle it produces.
The problem at stake in Sextus’ arguments is that of adding duality to
things which were already two. We have apple A (one unit) and apple B (one
unit). When these are juxtaposed so as to become a pair of apples we still
have the unit A and the unit B, plus, now added from outside, their duality.
And 1 + 1 + 2 = 4.25 The puzzle, here, is the one emphasised by Gallop à propos
Phaedo 96e–97a: that of seeing how a set of items can change its cardinality –
how it can ‘come to be two’, if it was already composed of two members. But
the difficulty is only apparent. For the predicate at stake is only puzzling if we
fail to take it as elliptical or schematic – the schema being best represented by
‘come to be two Fs’. If we do so, the general case becomes: of which things can
we say truly that they ‘come to be n Fs’? And of course the answer is: ‘For as
many things as you like’ – there is no difficulty, no puzzle, at all.
In other words, if the question is ‘How can the number n become the
number m?’, the answer is ‘It can’t – numbers can’t change’. If the question is
‘How can n things become m things?’, the answer is ‘In any number of ways’ –
depending of course on what the things are: two pieces of cake can become
four pieces of cake if you cut each piece in two; a list of ten names can become
a list of eleven names if you add a new name to it; a man of 79 years doesn’t
have to do anything to become a man of 80, etc.
If we go back to our scenario in the light of this distinction, the follow-
ing truth emerges. You have two apples in the basket now – before you had
only one. How has that come about? ‘I put another apple in the basket’.26 Did
you add or subtract anything? ‘Yes, of course: I added one apple to the apple
already in the basket’; ‘No, of course: I did not add anything to the two apples’.
So: there were two apples all along? ‘Yes: but there were not two apples in the
basket’. Sextus’ argument, which fails to discover this truth, is a sophism.
The ‘Pythagorean’ theory would have deserved a more radical and effective
criticism. For it concerns cardinal numbers (the ‘natural’ numbers), and aims
at explaining the generation of e.g. the number two. The more radical criti-
cism, which Sextus does not provide, would point out that since numbers are
not generated, there is nothing to explain.
25 M IV 22: δυὰς γὰρ ἡ ἐπιγινομένη καὶ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονὰς τὸν τῶν τεσσάρων ἀριθμὸν συνίστη-
σιν; M X 308: εἰ δὲ προσγίνεταί τι αὐταῖς, οἷον ἡ δυάς, τὰ ὀφείλοντα δύο εἶναι τέσσαρα γενήσονται;
PH III 165: εἰ δὲ προστίθεται αὐταῖς ἔξωθεν ἡ δυάς, ἵνα ἐκ τῶν μονάδων γένηται δυάς, τὰ δύο
δοκοῦντα εἶναι τέσσαρα ἔσται· ὑπόκειται γὰρ μονὰς καὶ ἑτέρα μονάς, αἷς προστιθεμένης ἔξωθεν
δυάδος ὁ τέσσαρα ἀριθμὸς ἀποτελοῖτο ἄν.
26 Cf. M IV 21: παρατεθείσης γὰρ μονάδος ἑτέρᾳ μονάδι; M X 308: ὅτε παρατίθεταί τι ἑτέρῳ, οἷον τῇ
μονάδι ἡ μονάς; PH III 166: συντίθεμεν μονάδα ἑτέρᾳ μονάδι.
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Chapter 5
M IV 23–30: Sextus’ Attack on Number Conceived

of as the Result of the Subtraction of a Unit
1 Introduction
The section is composed of three main parts: first, a sketch of the structure
of the overall attack on addition and subtraction put forward by Sextus in
M IV 24–33 (23); secondly, a sketch of the structure of the overall attack on
subtraction put forward by Sextus in M IV 24–30 (24); and finally, Sextus’ argu-
ments against subtraction (24–30).
The pattern of Sextus’ attack on addition and subtraction is clearly stated:
number is conceived of as the result of the addition or subtraction of a unit;
Sextus’ arguments will show that they are both impossible, and therefore that
number does not exist. Sextus introduces his overall attack on subtraction by
means of an example: let us consider the subtraction of a unit from the num-
ber ten: the unit is subtracted either from the whole ten, or from the remaining
nine; but neither the former nor the latter; therefore nothing is subtracted from
the given ten. (Later on, Sextus further concludes that ‘No number will exist as
a result of subtraction’ – 26; and that ‘It is impossible to conceive any number
as a result of subtraction’ – 30). Consistently with this strategy, Sextus advances
two arguments showing that the unit cannot be subtracted from the whole ten
(A), and two arguments showing that it cannot be subtracted from the remain-
ing nine (B), in a chiasmus: A (24–5), B (26), B (27–8), A (29–30).
The first argument against subtraction from the whole ten (24–5) runs as
follows. The ten from which the subtraction is made is either different from the
particular units or the collection of units. But the ten cannot be different from
the particular units, for these are destroyed if and only if it is destroyed; so, the
ten is the same as the units (i.e. the particular units are the ten). If this is so,
then subtracting a unit from the ten will amount to subtracting a unit from
each of the particular units it amounts to, i.e. subtracting ten units. So the unit
cannot be subtracted from the whole ten.
The second argument against subtraction from the whole ten (29–30)
is the following. The unit is subtracted either from the existing ten or from the
not-existing ten – it is impossible to conceive of anything apart from existing
and not-existing. But the unit is not subtracted from the existing ten (for as
long as this persists, it is impossible to subtract anything from it qua ten), nor

148 Chapter 5
from the non-existing ten (for nothing can be subtracted from a non-existing
item). Therefore nothing will be subtracted from the ten.
The first argument against subtraction from the remaining nine (26) amounts
to a question: How can the nine be preserved after the subtraction of the unit?
The second argument (29–30) is less elliptical: either the unit is subtracted
from the whole nine, or from its last unit. But if from the whole nine, there will
be a subtraction of nine units (cf. the first argument against subtraction from
the whole ten); and if from the last unit, then the unit will not be partless as it
is taken to be; and also, the nine will not be preserved.
M IV 23–30 raises several questions. The overall structure of Sextus’ attack
on subtraction (24) implies that the disjunction ‘The unit is subtracted either
from the whole ten or from the remaining nine’ is exhaustive: how can we
explain this? And after what the nine is supposed to remain? Furthermore,
Sextus puts forward his overall argument against subtraction as leading to
three conclusions: (a) ‘Nothing is subtracted from ten – i.e. from a given num-
ber’ (24); (b) ‘No number will exist as a result of subtraction’ (26); and (c) ‘It is
impossible to conceive any number as a result of subtraction’ (30). What is the
relation between these claims?
The first argument against subtraction from the ten (24–5) presents a dis-
junction: the ten from which the subtraction is made is either different from
the particular units or the collection of units. How are we to understand the dis-
junction? This argument also states that if the unit is subtracted from the ten,
and this is a collection of ten units, then the unit will be subtracted from each
of them. Is there a way of giving plausibility to this prima facie absurd infer-
ence? The second argument against subtraction from the ten (29–30) talks
about the ten’s persisting: after what?
What stands for the first argument against subtraction from the nine
(26) is just a rhetorical question, which needs to be unpacked into a proper
argument. The second argument (27–8) needs clarification too. It puts forward
a disjunction (‘The unit is subtracted either from the whole nine or from its last
unit’) which is supposed to be exhaustive: how can we explain that? Also, the
ground on which the possibility that the unit is subtracted from the nine’s last
unit is rejected (the unit will not be partless as it is taken to be and the nine will
not be preserved) needs clarification. Sextus attacks the Dogmatic notion of
subtraction also in some sections of M IX and of PH III. Both the content and
the context of these loci similes will prove to be crucial for an understanding
of M IV 23–30: in the next section I will present these passages, emphasising
their context and the parts of them which correspond to the arguments in
M IV 23–30; in the subsequent sections I will provide a reading of M IV 23–30
in their light.
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M IV 23–30: Sextus ’ Attack on Number 149
2 M IX 311–20 and PH III 88–93
Sextus’ attack on subtraction in M IX (280–320) takes place within his attack

on the Dogmatic notion of causality (M IX 195–330). The Dogmatists claim that
causes exist, among other things, on the ground that things ‘become, perish,
increase, decrease, move, and rest’ and something must cause these processes
and states (200).1 After offering various arguments against causes, Sextus puts
forward arguments against the existence of the patient – that is to say, of what
is affected by the action of the cause (267–330). At 277, he reports the Dogmatic
claim that ‘if there is something which is affected, then it is affected through
addition, or through subtraction, or through alteration and change’;2 he shows
then that all these processes are problematical (277–328),3 and concludes that
nothing can be affected:
But if these [scl. subtraction, addition, and change] do not exist, what
is affected must not exist either, insofar as being affected occurs in one
of these ways; for no one could conceive of anything as being able to be
affected other than in terms of these methods (M IX 329).4
At 280–320 Sextus deals with subtraction. He firstly (280–307) argues that,

since if one thing is subtracted from another, then either a corporeal item is
subtracted from a corporeal item, or an incorporeal from an incorporeal, or an
incorporeal from a corporeal, or a corporeal from an incorporeal, and none of
these disjuncts hold, nothing is subtracted from anything.
Sextus then puts forward a second argument, which goes from 308 to 320.
In 308 Sextus presents its structure. If one thing is subtracted from another,
then either (i) a whole is subtracted from a whole or (ii) a part from a part or
(iii) a part from a whole or (iv) a whole from a part. But neither (i), nor (ii),
1 M IX 200: πολλῶν γε μὴν γινομένων καὶ φθειρομένων αὐξομένων τε καὶ μειουμένων κινουμένων
τε καὶ ἀκινητιζόντων, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὁμολογεῖν δεῖ τὸ εἶναί τινα τούτων αἴτια, τὰ μὲν γενέσεως τὰ δὲ
φθορᾶς, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐξήσεως τὰ δὲ μειώσεως καὶ ἤδη κινήσεως ἢ ἀκινησίας.
2 M IX 277: Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἔστι τι τὸ πάσχον, ἤτοι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν πάσχει ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ ἑτε-
ροίωσιν καὶ μεταβολήν· οὔτε δὲ πρόσθεσίς τις ἔστιν οὔτε ἀφαίρεσις οὔτε μεταβολὴ καὶ ἑτεροίωσις,
ὡς ὑποδείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα πάσχει τι.
3 Although Sextus argues against subtraction (280–320) and addition (321–7) only, he claims
to have eo ipso argued against change too, insofar as this is understood in terms of them, i.e.
as ‘the removal of one thing and the addition of another’: Ἀλλ’ εἰ μήτε ἀφαιρεῖταί τι τινός, ὡς
ὑποδέδεικται, μήτε προστίθεταί τι τινί, ὡς παρεμυθησάμεθα, φανερὸν ὡς οὐδὲ μετατίθεταί τι ἀπό
τινος ἦν γὰρ ἡ μετάθεσις τοῦ μὲν ἄρσις, τοῦ δὲ πρόσθεσις (M IX 328).
4 M IX 329: μὴ ὄντων δὲ τούτων οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχον ὀφείλει εἶναι, εἴπερ ἦν κατά τινα τούτων τῶν τρόπων
τὸ πάσχειν· ἄλλως γὰρ οὐκ ἄν τις ἐπινοήσειε δυνάμενόν τι πάσχειν εἰ μὴ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς τρόπους.
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150 Chapter 5
nor (iii), nor (iv); therefore nothing is subtracted from anything.5 Coherently,
Sextus argues that (i) is impossible (309),6 and that to state (ii) is inconceiv-
able (310).7 In the subsequent passage 311–20, which is parallel to M IV 24–30,
Sextus aims at rejecting the two remaining possibilities in order to reach his
conclusion. He tries to show that a part cannot be subtracted from a whole or
from a part; and he does so by considering a specific example of whole: that of
number – number ten in particular:
[311] We are left, then, with what seems to be the more probable alterna-
tive, that either the part is subtracted from the whole or the part from the
part. But this, too, is a thing not feasible. Let us consider the statement,
as in the practice of the Sceptics, in the case of number. [312] Let number
ten be given, and from it let a unit be subtracted (M IX 311–12).8
The rest of the passage parallels M IV 24–30. Sextus starts by stating his over-
all argument against subtraction (312), which mirrors the one he advances in
M IV 24: the unit is subtracted either (i) from the ten or (ii) from the nine;
but neither (i) nor (ii); therefore the unit is not subtracted from the ten, and
from this follows that nothing is subtracted from anything.9 Sextus then
puts forward arguments against subtraction from the ten (313–15),10 and
5 M IX 308: Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι τινός, ἤτοι ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ
μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους· οὔτε δὲ ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται οὔτε μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους οὔτε
ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀφ’ ὅλου, ὡς παραστήσομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖταί τι τινός. The conclu-
sion is repeated at 319.
6 M IX 309: τὸ μὲν οὖν ὅλον ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τελέως ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀπὸ
πήχεως ἀφαιρεῖ πῆχυν, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ κοτύλης κοτύλην, ἐπεὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔσται τινὸς ἀφαίρεσις,
ἀλλὰ ὁλοσχερὴς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἀναίρεσις.
7 M IX 310: ἀδιανόητον δέ ἐστι καὶ τὸ ὅλον λέγειν ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. τὸ γὰρ μέρος ἧττόν
ἐστι τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ τὸ ὅλον πλεῖόν ἐστι τοῦ μέρους· ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἥττονος λέγειν τὸ πλέον ἀφαιρεῖ-
σθαι σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀπίθανον.
8 M XI 311–12: [311] λείπεται οὖν τὸ πιθανώτερον εἶναι δοκοῦν, ἢ τὸ μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἀφαι-
ρεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μέρος ἀπὸ τοῦ μέρους. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἀπόρων ἐτύγχανεν. σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸ
λεγόμενον, ὡς ἔθος τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, ἐπὶ ἀριθμοῦ. [312] ὑποκείσθω γὰρ δεκάς, καὶ ἀφαιρεί-
σθω ἀπὸ ταύτης μονάς.
9 M IX 312: οὐκοῦν ἡ ἀφαιρουμένη μονὰς ἤτοι ἀπὸ τῆς ὑποκειμένης δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ ἀπὸ
τῆς μετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος· οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος δὲ οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος
ἀφαιρεῖται, ὡς δείξομεν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος ⟨ἡ⟩ μονάς, ᾧ ἕπεται τὸ μηδὲν μηδενὸς
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι.
10 M IX 313–15: [313] εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς, ἤτοι ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἡ δεκὰς
παρὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μονάδας, ἢ ἀθροισμὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων ἐστὶν ἡ δεκάς. ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν
μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν δεκάδα· καὶ γὰρ ἀναιρεθεισῶν αὐτῶν συναναι-
ρεῖται καὶ ὑποκειμένων πάρεστιν. [314] εἰ δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ἐστι ταῖς μονάσιν ἡ δεκάς, πάντως ἐὰν
λέγωμεν ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα, ἐπεὶ ἡ δεκὰς οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰς μονάδας,
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arguments against subtraction from the nine (315–19), which lead him to
the above-mentioned general conclusion (319).11 The same argument is then
applied to the subtraction of things measured (320).12
Sextus’ attack on subtraction in PH III 85–93 appears in the context of his
attack on the Dogmatic account of principle. Having shown that both active
and material principles are subject to suspension of judgement (PH III 1–55),
Sextus argues against the ways in which they are supposed to produce com-
pounds. Since it is by virtue of some motion in the active principles that the
compounds ought to come about, Sextus targets the six kinds of motion distin-
guished by the Dogmatists: change of place, natural place, increase, decrease,
generation, destruction (63–4). After having dealt with local motion (64–81),
Sextus attacks increase and decrease (82–4). He ends this attack by remarking
that ‘if decrease comes about by subtraction and increase by addition, and if
there is no such thing as subtraction or addition, then there is no such thing
as decrease or increase’ (84),13 and attacks first subtraction (85–93) and then
addition (94–6).
ὁμολογήσομεν τὴν μονάδα ἀφ’ ἑκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς διὰ τὸ σὺν
ταύτῃ νοεῖσθαι τὴν δεκάδα. [315] ἀπὸ πάσης δὲ μονάδος ἀφαιρουμένης καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς τῆς μιᾶς
μονάδος ἔσται ἡ τῆς μιᾶς μονάδος ἄρσις ⟨δεκάδος ἄρσις⟩. ἄτοπον δέ ἐστι τὴν τῆς μονάδος ἄρσιν
δεκάδος λέγειν ἄρσιν ὑπάρχειν. ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ ἀπὸ δεκάδος ἀξιοῦν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι μονάδα.
11 M IX 315–19: [315] … καὶ μὴν ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης ἐννεάδος οὐκ ἂν εἴποιμεν ταύτην ἀφαιρεῖ-
σθαι. εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς, οὐκ ὤφειλεμετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτῆς ὁλόκληρος
θεωρεῖσθαι ἡ ἐννεάς· τὸ γὰρ ἀφ’ οὗ τι ἀφαιρεῖται, οὐ μένει ὁλόκληρον μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν, ἐπεὶ
οὐκ ἔσται γεγονυῖά τις ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀφαίρεσις. [316] καὶ ἄλλως· εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς περιλειπομένης ἐννεά-
δος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς, ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος. οὔτε
δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὅλης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται, ἐπεὶ ἔσται, μὴ ἑτέρας οὔσης παρὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μονάδας
τῆς ἐννεάδος, ἡ μονάδος ἄρσις ἐννεάδος ἄρσις, ὅπερ ἦν ἄτοπον· [317] οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονά-
δος, ἐπεὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός ἐστιν ἡ μονάς, ἔπειτα πῶς ὁλόκληρος ἀπολείπεται
ἡ ἐννεάς, ⟨……⟩ ἀλλ’ οὐ παρὰ μονάδα; εἰ δὲ μήτε ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος αἴρεται μονὰς μήτε ἀπὸ τῆς
περιλειπομένης ἐννεάδος, παρὰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἔστι τρίτον ἐπινοεῖσθαι, λεκτέον μὴ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι
τῆς δεκάδος μονάδα. [318] πρὸς τούτοις· εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος αἴρεται ⟨ἡ⟩ μονάς, ἤτοι ἀπὸ μενού-
σης ἔτι τῆς δεκάδος αἴρεται ἡ μονὰς ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ μενούσης· οὔτε δὲ ⟨ἀπὸ⟩ μὴ μενούσης αἴρεταί ποτε
μονὰς οὔτε ἀπὸ μενούσης· παρὰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπὸ τῆς
δεκάδος μονάς. [319] ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν μενούσης τῆς δεκάδος αὐτόθεν φαίνεται μὴ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἡ
μονάς· ἐφ’ ὅσον γὰρ μένει δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπ’ αὐτῆς. ἀπὸ δὲ μὴ μενούσης πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖ-
σθαι ἄτοπον· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεθῆναί τι δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖταί τι τινός.
12 M IX 320: ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν μετρητῶν ἀφαιρέσεως, οἷον τῆς ἀπὸ χοέως
ἀφαιρουμένης κοτύλης ἢ τοῦ ἀπὸ πήχεως ἀφαιρουμένου παλαιστοῦ. ἢ γὰρ ἀπὸ ὅλου τοῦ χοέως
ῥητέον γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους, καὶ ἤτοι ἀπὸ μένοντος ἢ μὴ μένοντος· ἀπ’ οὐδενὸς
δὲ τούτων, ὡς παρεστήσαμεν· τοίνυν οὐδὲ ταύτῃ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι τινός.
13 PH III 84: εἰ ἡ μὲν μείωσις γίνεται κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ αὔξησις κατὰ πρόσθεσιν, οὐδὲν δέ ἐστιν
οὔτε ἀφαίρεσις οὔτε πρόσθεσις, οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἡ μείωσις οὐδὲ ἡ αὔξησις ἔστι τι.
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152 Chapter 5
Sextus first reports an argument against subtraction used by someone:14 if

one thing is subtracted from another either the equal is subtracted from the
equal, or the greater from the lesser, or the lesser from the greater; but subtrac-
tion comes about from none of these ways; therefore subtraction is impossible.
Sextus then produces a second argument (88–93) closely parallel to the one
in M IX 311–20: if one thing is subtracted from another, either (i) a whole is
subtracted from a whole or (ii) a part from a part or (iii) a part from a whole
or (iv) a whole from a part. But neither (i), nor (ii), nor (iii), nor (iv); therefore
nothing is subtracted from anything (PH III 88 and 93; cf. M IX 308).15 Sextus
rejects (i) and (iii) as incongruous (PH III 88; cf. M IX 309–10).16 He then puts
forward an argument aiming to show that a part cannot be subtracted from
a whole or from a part (PH III 89–93), and he does so as he did in M IX, i.e.
by considering a specific example of whole: that of number – number ten in
particular:
So it remains to say that parts are subtracted either from wholes or from
parts – and this is absurd. For instance – to rest the argument, for the sake
of clarity, on numbers – take ten and let one be said to be subtracted from
it. (PH III 89)17
In the rest of the passage, which parallels M IV 23–30 and M IX 312–19, Sextus
shows that you cannot subtract a unit from number ten. For either (i) you sub-
tract it from the whole ten or (ii) from the part of ten which remains, i.e. nine;
but neither (i) nor (ii); therefore the unit is not subtracted at all (PH III 89:18
cf. M IV 24 and M IX 311–12). He then puts forward an argument which cor-
responds to the first argument against subtraction from number ten which he
14 PH III 85: Ὅτι δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιλογίζονται. Cf. Sextus’ remarks at the
beginning of his section on addition at 94: ‘Addition too has been supposed by them to
be something impossible. What is added, they say, …’ (Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις τῶν ἀδυνάτων
εἶναι παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπείληπται. τὸ γὰρ προστιθέμενον, φασίν …). I will come back to this later.
15 PH III 88: Καὶ μὴν εἰ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος, ἢ ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ
ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους ἢ μέρος ἀπὸ ὅλου. PH III 93: εἰ οὖν μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ ὅλου τι ἀφαιρεῖται μήτε μέρος
ἀπὸ ὅλου μήτε ὅλον ἀπὸ μέρους μήτε μέρος ἀπὸ μέρους, οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό τινος.
16 PH III 89: ὅλον μὲν οὖν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λέγειν ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους ἀπεμφαίνει προδήλως.
17 PH III 89: … λείπεται δὴ λέγειν τὸ μέρος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἤτοι ἀπὸ ὅλου ἢ ἀπὸ μέρους· ὅπερ ἐστὶν
ἄτοπον. οἷον γοῦν, ἵνα ἐπὶ ἀριθμῶν στήσωμεν τὸν λόγον τοῦ σαφοῦς ἕνεκα, ἔστω δεκάς, καὶ ἀπὸ
ταύτης ἀφαιρεῖσθαι λεγέσθω μονάς.
18 PH III 89: …αὕτη οὖν ἡ μονὰς οὔτε ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι δύναται οὔτε ἀπὸ τοῦ
λειπομένου μέρους τῆς δεκάδος, τουτέστι τῆς ἐννεάδος, ὡς παραστήσω· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεῖται.
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offers in M IV and M IX (PH III 90–1;19 cf. M IV 24–5 and M IX 313–15); he adds
an argument against subtraction from number nine, which parallels the argu-
ments in M IV and M IX (PH III 92–3:20 cf. M IV 27–8 and M IX 315–17); and
concludes that ‘If a whole cannot be subtracted from a whole nor a part from
a whole nor a whole from a part nor a part from a part, nothing can be sub-
tracted from anything’ (PH III 93;21 cf. M IX 311).
3 M IV 23–30 in the Light of the loci similes
In the following lines I will focus only on the features of M IX 312–20 and
PH III 88–93 which may help our understanding and evaluation of the differ-
ent parts of M IV 23–30: Sextus’ overall attack on subtraction (M IV 24); Sextus’
two arguments against subtraction from number ten (M IV 24–5 and 29–30);
and Sextus’ two arguments against subtraction from number nine (M IV 26–8).
Let us start with Sextus’ overall attack on subtraction. First of all, M IX 312
offers the complete version of the disjunction crucial to Sextus’ argument: ‘The
unit is subtracted either from the whole ten or from the nine which remains
after the removal (μετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν)’. We will come back to this detail later; let us
ignore it for the moment.
The mereological context of M IX 311–20 and PH III 88–93 clarifies the
above-mentioned disjunction. Sextus has already shown the impossibility of
subtracting a whole from itself and a whole from one of its parts; the argument
about the subtraction of a unit from number ten/nine is supposed to show
the impossibility of subtracting a part from its whole/from another part of the
19 PH III 90–1: [90] εἰ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ ἡ δεκὰς οὔτε ἕτερόν τί
ἐστι παρὰ τὰς δέκα μονάδας οὔτε τις τῶν μονάδων ἀλλ’ ἡ συνέλευσις πασῶν τῶν μονάδων, ἀπὸ
ἑκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ὀφείλει ἡ μονάς, ἵνα ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρῆται τῆς δεκάδος. μάλιστα μὲν
οὖν ἀπὸ μονάδος οὐδὲν δύναται ἀφαιρεῖσθαι· ἀδιαίρετοι γάρ εἰσιν αἱ μονάδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ
ἀφαιρεθήσεται ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος οὕτως. [91] εἰ δὲ καὶ δοίη τις ἀπὸ ἑκάστης τῶν μονάδων
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα, δέκα ἕξει μέρη ἡ μονάς, δέκα δὲ ἔχουσα μέρη δεκὰς ἔσται. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπεὶ
δέκα ἕτερα μέρη ἀπολέλειπται, ἀφ’ ὧν ἀφῄρηται τὰ τῆς μονάδος λεγομένης δέκα μέρη, ἔσται τὰ
δέκα εἴκοσι. ἄτοπον δὲ λέγειν τὸ ἓν δέκα εἶναι καὶ τὰ δέκα εἴκοσι καὶ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον κατὰ αὐτοὺς
διαιρεῖσθαι. ἄτοπον ἄρα τὸ λέγειν ἀπὸ ὅλης τῆς δεκάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μονάδα.
20 PH III 92–3: [92] ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ’
οὗ τι ἀφαιρεῖται οὐ μένει ὁλόκληρον, ἡ δὲ ἐννεὰς μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἐκείνης τῆς μονάδος ὁλό-
κληρος μένει. καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἐννεὰς οὐδέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰς ἐννέα μονάδας, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ ὅλης αὐτῆς
λέγοιτο ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἡ μονάς, ἐννεάδος ἀφαίρεσις ἔσται, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ μέρους τῶν ἐννέα, εἰ μὲν ἀπὸ
τῶν ὀκτώ, τὰ αὐτὰ ἄτοπα ἀκολουθήσει, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος, διαιρετὴν εἶναι φήσουσι
τὴν μονάδα, ὅπερ ἄτοπον. [93] οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς.
21 The text is to be found at n. 15.
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154 Chapter 5
same whole – and thereby to lead to the general conclusion that nothing can
be subtracted from anything.22 The argument against subtraction in M IV 24
and the corresponding one in M IX 311–12 and PH III 88–9 have a common
core. We can represent this as follows:
1. Take a number – say ten, and consider subtracting a unit from it. Either
you subtract the unit from the whole ten, or from a part of it – say nine.
2. But neither the former nor the latter.
3. Therefore no subtraction can be 3. You cannot subtract a part either

made from number ten. from its whole or from another part
4. Number nine is conceived of as of its whole. We already showed that
the result of the subtraction of a you cannot subtract a whole from
unit from number ten. itself or from another part of it. And
--- there is no further possibility.
Number nine does not exist. ---
(M IV 24) 4. You cannot subtract something from
anything.
(M IX 311–12 and PH III 88–9)
Both arguments rely on several assumptions. Any natural number n is a whole;

units – i.e. a unit, and any aggregate of units (any number) smaller than n – are
n’s parts; the subtraction of a unit from a given number (say, ten) or from a part
of it (say, nine) are respectively a case of subtracting a part (one) from its whole
(ten) or from another part of the same whole (nine).
As far as the argument in M IX and PH III is concerned, it is important to
emphasise that in order for it to lead to the general conclusion about wholes,
it must rely not on some specific features of numerical wholes, but on some
features common to all wholes and clearly shown by numerical wholes in par-
ticular. As Barnes underlines, Sextus frequently uses numbers as illustrative
examples of wholes (cf. PH III 89) and he expressly remarks that it is the cus-
tom of the sceptics to use numerical examples (M IX 311). But it is not clear that
the custom is a good one:
22 From the conclusion that ‘The unit will not be subtracted from the ten’ Sextus comes to
conclude that ‘Nothing is subtracted from anything’ (M IX 312, cf. 319; PH III 89 and 93).
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As Plotinus observes, we may speak of the quantitative parts of bodies,

of geometrical figures, of numbers (and, we might add, of groups – clubs,
societies, armies – and even, others might add, of souls); and it is not
evident that all these sorts of quantitative parts have the same formal
properties (IV iii 2).23
Let us turn now to the argument in M IV. In order for it to work, premise 4 must
be taken to mean that ‘being the result of the subtraction of one unit from
number ten’ is a necessary property of number nine – either an essential prop-
erty or an ἴδιον of it. The argument then would run as follows. Nine is defined
or characterised as being the result of the subtraction of one from ten. But it is
impossible to subtract a unit from ten – there is no item which has the prop-
erty of being the result of such a subtraction. Therefore nine does not exist.
We have seen that M IX 312 presents the complete version of the disjunction
at stake in Sextus’ overall attack on subtraction: ‘The unit is subtracted either
from the whole ten or from the nine which remains after the removal (μετὰ
τὴν ἄρσιν)’. The expression μετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν occurs also in M IV 26 where Sextus,
wanting to reject the possibility for a unit to be subtracted from nine, asks:
‘After its removal, how could the given nine be preserved?’24 The question is
rhetorical and stands for the claim that if you subtract a unit from a number
n, n will not be preserved. The claim is hinted at all throughout Sextus’ text,
both in the version restricted to numbers – numerical wholes – and in its gen-
eral version applied to all quantitative wholes; and the former appears to be
grounded on the latter. Thus, in his second argument against the possibility of
subtracting one from ten, Sextus remarks that ‘as long as the ten persists, it is
not possible to subtract anything from it qua ten – otherwise it will not be ten
anymore’ (M IV 29–30;25 cf. M IX 31926); and in his second argument against the
possibility of subtracting one from nine, Sextus hints at the fact that ‘it will not
be possible for the nine to remain intact’ after the subtraction (M IV 28).27 The
point is expanded in M IX 315:
23 J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, in id., Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 429–83, p. 438.
24 M IV 26: καὶ μὴν οὐδ’ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἡ ἆρσις αὐτῆς γίνεται· πῶς γὰρ ἔτι μετὰ
τὴν ἆρσιν αὐτῆς σῶός ἐστιν ἡ ὑποκειμένη ἐννεάς.
25 M IV 29–30: [29] ἐφ’ ὅσον γὰρ μένει χρόνον δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεθῆναι δύναται ὡς
δεκάδος, [30] ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι ἔσται δεκάς.
26 M IX 319: ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν μενούσης τῆς δεκάδος αὐτόθεν φαίνεται μὴ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἡ μονάς· ἐφ’ ὅσον
γὰρ μένει δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπ’ αὐτῆς.
27 M IV 28: εἶτα εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς τελευταίας μονάδος αἴρεται ἡ μονάς, οὐ δυνήσεται ἔτι ὁλόκληρος μένειν
ἡ ἐννεάς. Sextus presents this as a consequence of the unit being subtracted from the
nine’s last unit: εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς τελευταίας μονάδος γίνεται τὰ τῆς ἀφαιρέσεως, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ
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156 Chapter 5
If the unit is subtracted from the nine, after its removal the nine ought
not to be found intact; for that from which something is subtracted
does not remain intact after the subtraction, since otherwise no subtrac-
tion will have been made from it;28
and the argument is fully stated in the parallel PH III 92: you cannot subtract
one from nine, since ‘that from which something is subtracted does not remain
intact; but nine remains intact after the subtraction of this one’.29
The claim that if you subtract a unit from a number n, n will not exist any-
more is grounded on the Dogmatic general claim that if you subtract a part
from its whole, the whole will not exist anymore. The general claim is stated
in PH III 98: ‘A whole is thought to come about by the combination and the
addition of its parts, and cease to be a whole by the subtraction of one or
more of them’;30 repeated in M IX 339: ‘If even one part alone is removed the
whole is no longer observed subsisting as a whole’;31 and implied in PH II 215,
where Sextus talks about quantitative wholes (215–18) by referring to the
items which are taken to be paradigms of wholes – numbers:
Ten is not divided into these things [i.e. one and two and three and four].
For as soon as its first part, i.e. one, is removed … ten is no longer present,
but rather nine – and in general something different from ten.32
It has been persuasively argued that this general claim is false. Corresponding
to the relation of being a part of there is its converse, that of being a whole for:
ἡ τελευταία μονάς, ἀμερὴς οὖσα, δειχθήσεται μεριστὴ τυγχάνειν, ὅπερ ἄτοπον· εἶτα εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς
τελευταίας μονάδος αἴρεται ἡ μονάς, οὐ δυνήσεται ἔτι ὁλόκληρος μένειν ἡ ἐννεάς. The same
holds for M IX 317: see n. 28.
28 M IX 315: εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς, οὐκ ὤφειλε μετὰ τὴν ἄρσιν αὐτῆς ὁλόκλη-
ρος θεωρεῖσθαι ἡ ἐννεάς· τὸ γὰρ ἀφ’ οὗ τι ἀφαιρεῖται, οὐ μένει ὁλόκληρον μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν,
ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔσται γεγονυῖά τις ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀφαίρεσις. Cf. M IX 317 – where I accept Rüstow’s addi-
tion: ἡ μονάδος ἄρσις … οὔτε ἀπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης μονάδος, ἐπεὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἀμερὴς καὶ ἀδιαίρετός
ἐστιν ἡ μονάς, ἔπειτα πῶς ὁλόκληρος ἀπολείπεται ἡ ἐννεάς, ἀλλ’ οὐ ⟨μειοῦται⟩ παρὰ μονάδα;
29 PH III 92: ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπολειπομένης ἐννεάδος ἀφαιρεῖται ἡ μονάς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀφ’ οὗ τι
ἀφαιρεῖται οὐ μένει ὁλόκληρον, ἡ δὲ ἐννεὰς μετὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἐκείνης τῆς μονάδος ὁλόκληρος
μένει.
30 PH III 98: κατὰ μὲν γὰρ συνέλευσιν καὶ πρόσθεσιν τῶν μερῶν τὸ ὅλον γίγνεσθαι δοκεῖ, κατ’
ἀφαίρεσιν δέ τινος ἤ τινων παύεσθαι τοῦ ὅλον εἶναι.
31 M IX 339: … κἂν ἓν μόνον μέρος ἀναιρεθῇ, μηκέτι θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὅλον.
32 PH II 215: ὅταν λέγῃ τις διαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δεκάδα εἰς μονάδα καὶ δύο καὶ τρία καὶ τέσσαρα, οὐ
διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ἡ δεκάς. ἅμα γὰρ τῷ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτῆς ἀρθῆναι μέρος, ἵνα κατὰ συγχώρησιν
νῦν τοῦτο δῶμεν, οἷον τὴν μονάδα, οὐκέτι ὑπόκειται ἡ δεκάς, ἀλλ’ ἐννέα καὶ ὅλως ἕτερόν τι παρὰ
τὴν δεκάδα.
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one thing is a part of a second if and only if the second is a whole for the first.
From this it follows that if x is not a part of y anymore, then y is not a whole for
x anymore, and that the whole y has thereby ceased to exist. But this does not
amount to, or imply, the claim that y has ceased to exist as a whole. The nose
is a part of the Herm: if I knock off the nose, we cease to have a whole Herm.
Yet ‘it remains a Herm, and Herms are wholes – so that, in the metaphysically
fundamental sense, it does not cease to exist as a whole’.33
What about the version of the claim restricted to numbers: is it true that if
you subtract one from ten, ten does not exist anymore? We have seen that at the
beginning of his treatment of subtraction in M IX, Sextus reports a Dogmatic
characterisation of it as a process which affects an item: ‘If there is something
which is affected, then it is affected through addition, or through subtraction,
or through alteration and change’;34 and it is clear that in Sextus’ argument
the affected item is the number – the number from which the subtraction is
made. Thus, Sextus’ arguments assimilate the phenomenon of subtracting an
apple from a basket containing ten apples with the phenomenon of subtract-
ing a unit from number ten. Sextus’ arguments in M IV 21–2 are characterised
by a similar conflation: that of treating the addition of a unit to another unit in
terms of the addition of an apple to an apple already in the basket.
Both moves are false. The statement ‘2 = 1 + 1’, which is the definition of 2,
means that 2 is the term of the integer series which comes next after 1: 2 is the
successor of 1. It does not describe a γένεσις which concerns some items, but
rather a relation which holds between the items denoted by the terms ‘2’ and
‘1’. Similarly, ‘9 = 10 − 1’ does not describe the fact that the item denoted by ‘10’
has been affected at a certain moment in a way which threatens its identity.
That statement rather indicates that a certain relation holds among the three
items denoted by the terms ‘9’, ‘10’, and ‘1’ – which obviously do not cease to
exist. Similarly, when you truly say that a genus splits into its species, you are
not describing an event which is taking place, but rather a relation which holds
between several items: the genus and its species.
It is important to indicate exactly what things are conflated here and what
the consequences of the conflation are. Let us focus on the statement ‘2 = 1 + 1’
and on the addition it refers to. The word ‘addition’ sometimes names a mental
operation – the time-consuming mental act that we perform when we check
a bill, or when we calculate the number of guests attending our party. But it
also sometimes names, in post-Fregean terms, an abstract function which takes
33 Cf. J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., p. 467.

34 M IX 277: … εἰ ἔστι τι τὸ πάσχον, ἤτοι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν πάσχει ἢ κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ κατὰ ἑτεροί-
ωσιν καὶ μεταβολήν….
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158 Chapter 5
two numbers as its arguments and yields a number as its value. This does not
amount to, or depend on, a mental act that you and I may or may not perform
and that lasts a certain amount of time: it is rather a timeless relation that
holds among numbers. Now in ‘2 = 1 + 1’ the sign ‘+’ indicates the plus-function,
and the whole statement indicates that the value of the plus-function () + ()35
for the arguments 1 and 1 is 2.
The distinction between operation and function lies at the heart of Frege’s
criticism of the account of the arithmetical truths provided by Mill in his A
System of Logic. Mill claims that, for instance, the statement ‘3 = 2 + 1’ refers to,
and is grounded on, the empirical fact that the agglomeration of things con-
noted by ‘3’ has some physical property – that is to say, some characteristic
manner in which it is made up of, and may be separated into, parts.36 It is
an empirical fact that the collection of objects arranged thus: ⸪ may be rear-
ranged or separated into two parts thus: ˑˑ ˑ – and it is this empirical fact that
grounds the truth of ‘3 = 2 + 1’.37 In suggesting this, Frege objected,38 Mill con-
founded the meaning of the proposition ‘3 = 2 + 1’ with the applications which
can be made of it – with the operations of addition we may perform on e.g.
bodies thanks to the fact that that proposition is true. It is because of the fact
that ‘3 = 2 + 1’ holds that if you put two apples in a basket which already con-
tains an apple in certain physical circumstances,39 you shall have three apples
in the basket; but this operation does not contribute to the reference of the
arithmetical truth.
Three of the four arguments put forward by Sextus on M IV 24–30 – his
second argument against the possibility of subtracting one from ten (29–30),
and also his two arguments against the possibility of subtracting one from
nine (26 and 27–8) – are characterised by the above-mentioned conflation.
But the conflation is not made in Sextus. In other words, Sextus’ arguments
may be seen as argumenta ad hominem: if you take number as the result of the
subtraction of a unit from a given number, and subtraction as a process which
affects numbers, then absurdities follow.
35 For this account of Frege’s conception of function as something incomplete or ‘unsatu-

rated’ cf. A. Kenny, Frege: An Introduction to the Founder of Modern Analytic Philosophy,
Penguin, London, 1995, p. 103.
36 Cf. J.S. Mill, A System of Logic, III, 24, 5.
37 Cf. J.S. Mill, A System of Logic, II, 6, 2.
38 See Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, ch. 1: cf. A. Kenny, Frege, cit., pp. 60–2.
39 For a few stimulating thoughts on these circumstances see L. Reinhardt, ‘Good and Bad
Arithmetical Manners’, Analysis 75 (1), 2015, pp. 26–8.
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4 M IV 24–5: Number, Whole, and Substance
What about the argument against the possibility of subtracting one from ten
offered by Sextus in M IV 24–5? The argument runs as follows. Let us suppose
that the unit is subtracted from the whole ten. The ten is either different from
the particular units or the collection of the ten units; but it cannot be different,
since it is destroyed if and only if they are destroyed. So ten is the same as the
units; but if so, subtracting one from ten will amount to subtracting one from
each of the units – i.e. subtracting ten units. Therefore you cannot subtract one
from ten.
The loci similes closest to M IV 24–5, M IX 313–15 and PH III 90–1, shed some
light on it. M IX 313 presents a complementary remark in support of the claim
that ten is not different from the particular units. This is so because (i) ten is
destroyed if and only if the ten particular units are destroyed; and (ii) ten exists
if and only if the ten particular units exist.40 Also, the conclusion that the sub-
traction of one unit will be in the end a subtraction of ten units is declared
impossible in M IX 31541 – an obvious remark missing in M IV 25 and 27.
Let us focus on the distinction Sextus’ argument turns on: the ten is either
different from the ten particular units or the collection of them. In order to
grasp the sense of it, we have to remember the mereological framework of
Sextus’ argument – the fact that the number ten is a whole whose parts are the
ten units. In light of this, the question at stake in the argument is whether that
particular whole which is the number ten is different from its parts or amounts
to the collection of them.
This is a numerical instance of a general mereological puzzle much
discussed in Antiquity: is a quantitative whole the same as its parts?42 The
question has Pre-Socratic origins in the celebrated ‘growing argument’ by
Epicharmus, which presents one version of the puzzle (fr. 276 Kassel-Austin).43
40 M IX 313: see n. 30.

41 M IX 315: ἀπὸ πάσης δὲ μονάδος ἀφαιρουμένης καὶ ἀφ’ ἑαυτῆς τῆς μιᾶς μονάδος ἔσται ἡ τῆς
μιᾶς μονάδος ἄρσις ⟨δεκάδος ἄρσις⟩. ἄτοπον δέ ἐστι τὴν τῆς μονάδος ἄρσιν δεκάδος λέγειν ἄρσιν
ὑπάρχειν. ἄτοπον ἄρα καὶ ἀπὸ δεκάδος ἀξιοῦν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι μονάδα.
42 I owe the account which follows to J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., pp. 434, 466.
43 In Epicharmus, the argument is used to show the problem of the identity of items (a
number, a body) through time – throughout the process of growth. If you add some-
thing (a unit) to a number, it is not the same number anymore. Therefore you cannot
say that the number has grown. Similarly, if you add something to a human body, then
it is not the same thing anymore. Therefore you cannot say that the body has grown. For
an analysis of the argument see D. Sedley, ‘The Stoic Criterion of Identity’, Phronesis 27
(3), 1982, pp. 255–75; cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, London and New York,
Routledge, 19822, pp. 106–7; S. Menn, ‘On Socrates’ First Objections to the Physicists
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160 Chapter 5
It was then tackled by Plato, who entertains the idea that ‘a whole is to be
identified with its parts’ in the Parmenides (145C1–2: καὶ μὴν τά γε πάντα μέρη τὰ
αὑτοῦ τὸ ἕν ἐστι, καὶ οὔτε τι πλέον οὔτε ἔλαττον ἢ πάντα), and, even more explic-
itly, in the Theaetetus (204A7: Ὅτι οὗ ἂν ᾖ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη
εἶναι). Here Plato considers the supposition that the whole or τὸ ὅλον is the
same as the all or τὸ πᾶν: Theaetetus tentatively denies the identification at
204B2–3 and is persuaded to accept it at 205A7. The matter was debated in
the Academy: an allusion to the debate may be found in Aristotle’s Topics VI 13,
150a15, where he mentions the arguments used to show that ‘the parts are not
the same as the whole’.44 Born long ago, the argument is still alive: Hegel plays
with it, possibly under the influence of Sextus.45
In Sextus’ corpus, the general mereological puzzle grounds his attack on the
existence of wholes as they are conceived by the Dogmatists (M IX 338–44).
The pattern of the overall attack is presented in 338. If anything is a whole,
then it is either different from its parts, or the collection of its parts. But neither
of the disjuncts survives scrutiny: therefore there is no whole. Consistently
with this strategy, Sextus examines and rejects firstly the claim that the whole
is different from its parts (339–40), and then the claim that the whole is the
collection of them (341–4).
What does the general mereological dilemma put forward by Sextus amount
to? Barnes identifies two possible interpretations of it.46 According to the
first of them, the dilemma is whether a whole is or is not identical to the sum
of its parts.47 A couple of features of Sextus’ discussion of wholes, however,
leave open the possibility of a second and different interpretation, involv-
ing the relation of ontological reducibility. In a text parallel to M IX 343–4,
Sextus illustrates the claim that a whole is the same as its parts by referring
to the fact that ‘a distance is nothing over and above the distant objects and
(Phaedo 95e8–97b8)’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 38, 2010, pp. 37–68, esp. at
pp. 45–6; J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., pp. 474–8.
44 Aristotle, Top. VI 13, 150a15: οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὰ μέρη καὶ τὸ ὅλον.
45 See ‘Das Verhältnis des Ganzen und der Thiele’, Wissenschaft der Logik II ii 3A.
46 See J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., pp. 465–83.
47 Barnes further observes that ‘although Sextus ignores the distinction between partitions
and other sets of parts’ – a partition of an object having been defined as a set of its parts
such that (i) each of the parts in a partition must be disjoint from every other part of the
partition, and (ii) the parts must be conjointly exhaustive (p. 464) – ‘his argument will
wander off into trifling sophisms unless it is conducted in terms of partition’ (p. 466).
Barnes then reformulates and evaluates Sextus’ attack on wholes in M IX 338–44 in these
terms (pp. 466–73).
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timbering is nothing over and above timbers’ (PH III 99).48 Distances are noth-
ing over and above the distanced objects: for there to be a distance between
Paris and Nancy is simply for Paris and Nancy to be such-and-so – some num-
bers of kilometres apart. Furthermore, the preposition παρά that Sextus uses in
order to express the view that distances are nothing apart from the distanced
objects, may be used not only to express identity, but also to express onto-
logical reducibility.49 Thus, the Sextan parallel suggests an interpretation of
the mereological dilemma at play in M IX 338–44 which involves ontological
reducibility rather than identity: on this interpretation, the question would be
whether the existence of a whole can or cannot be reduced to the existence of
its parts – whether for there to be a whole is, or is not, simply for its parts to be
such-and-so; or, in Aristotelian terms, whether a whole is, or is not, an accident
of its parts.
Now which of these two interpretations fits M IV 24–5? Corresponding to
the contrast in this passage between ten (ἡ δεκάς) being different from the par-
ticular units (ἑτέρα τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων) vs. being the collection of units (ὁ
ἀθροισμὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων) – i.e. the same as the units (ἡ αὐτὴ ταῖς μονά-
σιν ἐστὶν), we find in M IX and PH III a contrast between ten being something
different apart from the particular units (ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὰς δέκα μονάδας)
vs. being the collection of individual units – i.e. being in the individual units (ἐν
αὐταῖς ἐστι ταῖς μονάσιν ἡ δεκάς).50
We have seen earlier in chapter 3 that the same contrast appears in the arith-
metical discussion in the Outlines (PH III 157–63). This passage, read along with
some Alexandrian parallels and their Aristotelian background, would suggest
that the distinction in M IX 313–15 and in M IV 24–5 is the one involving onto-
logical reducibility: either (i) ten is an accident of the ten particular units or
48 Sextus, PH III 99: καθάπερ οὐδὲ διάστασίς ἐστί τι παρὰ τὰ διεστῶτα οὐδὲ δόκωσις παρὰ τὰ
δεδοκωμένα.
49 As Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., p. 478, n. 18 emphasises, examples of this double phil-
osophical use of παρά are to be found in Aristotle: thus, when at Met. Η 6, 1045a8–10
Aristotle refers to things ‘which have several parts … and the whole is something παρά the
parts’, he means that wholes are not identical with any sum of their parts, while when,
in Phys. IV 3, 210a16–17, Aristotle observes that ‘in another way, ⟨a thing is said to be in
something⟩ as the whole is in its parts – for the whole is nothing παρά the parts’, he means
that a whole is ontologically reducible to the sum of its parts.
50 M IX 313: ἤτοι ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἡ δεκὰς παρὰ τὰς κατὰ μέρος μονάδας, ἢ ἀθροισμὸς τῶν κατὰ μέρος
μονάδων ἐστὶν ἡ δεκάς. ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν μὲν τῶν κατὰ μέρος μονάδων οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν δεκάδα· εἰ
δὲ ἐν αὐταῖς ἐστι ταῖς μονάσιν ἡ δεκάς. … Cf. PH III 90, where Sextus just affirms that ten
is not something different apart from the ten particular units (nor one of them), but the
collection of them: ἡ δεκὰς οὔτε ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὰς δέκα μονάδας οὔτε τις τῶν μονάδων
ἀλλ’ ἡ συνέλευσις πασῶν τῶν μονάδων …
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162 Chapter 5
(ii) it is not an accident of them – either ten exists insofar as the ten particular
units exist or ten does not exist insofar as they exist. However, the ontological
reduction conveyed by the relation ‘being an accident of’ is asymmetrical: if
the ten exists insofar as the ten particular units exist, then the ten particular
units do not exist insofar as the ten exists. And we have seen that Sextus’ argu-
ments in M IV 24–5 and IX 313–15 presuppose that the ten exists if and only if
the ten units exist. So it appears that the distinction that Sextus has in mind is
rather the one involving identity: the whole ten is either identical with a set of
ten units or is not identical with it; and that Sextus proceeds by relying on the
claim that the ten is identical with a set of ten units.
What can we say of the rest of the argument: how can one infer, from the
fact that the ten is identical with a set of ten units, that if you subtract a unit
from ten, then you subtract it from each of the ten units? Some light may be
shed on the question by the parallel passage in the Outlines:
If the unit is subtracted from the whole ten, since the ten is neither some-
thing other than the ten units nor one of the units, but the aggregate of
the units, the unit ought to be subtracted from each of the units in order
to be subtracted from the whole ten (Sextus, PH III 90).51
In order for the unit to be subtracted from the whole ten (and not from just
a part of it), the unit must be subtracted from every part of the ten – i.e. from
each of the ten units. Now, given a quantitative whole X, if you subtract some-
thing from the whole X, it surely does not follow that you subtract it from each
part of it. To rehearse the example used by Barnes: from the fact that you sub-
tract the nose from the whole herm (and that is to say, from a herm with all its
parts), it does not follow that you subtract the nose from each part of the herm.
However, ἡ δεκὰς in the Sextan passages does not denote a continuous quan-
titative whole like a herm, but rather a discrete quantitative whole, and that is
to say either the number ten or a decad (a group or set of ten items). Now it
is pretty clear that if we take ἡ δεκὰς to refer to the number ten, the argument
does not work; still, it is reasonable to ask whether a version of the distributive
claim applied to numbers of things holds. You might think that there are cases
in which if you take something from a group, then you take something from
each member of the group: for instance, to fine a group of people is to fine each
of them. But of course that’s not always so; and in any event, Sextus needs
51 Sextus, PH III 90: εἰ γὰρ ἡ μονὰς ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς δεκάδος, ἐπεὶ ἡ δεκὰς οὔτε ἕτερόν τί
ἐστι παρὰ τὰς δέκα μονάδας οὔτε τις τῶν μονάδων ἀλλ’ ἡ συνέλευσις πασῶν τῶν μονάδων, ἀπὸ
ἑκάστης μονάδος ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ὀφείλει ἡ μονάς, ἵνα ἀπὸ ὅλης ἀφαιρῆται τῆς δεκάδος.
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something stronger, namely that if you take X from a group, then you take X
from each member of it. Perhaps the absurdity is slightly hidden by the τουτέ-
στιν clause at M IV 25: ‘if the ten is the same as the units, i.e. if the individual
units are the ten’: one might read that as ‘i.e. if each of the particular units is
the same as the ten’. So the inference would run as follows: since the ten is the
same as the units – and that is to say, each unit is the same as ten – then sub-
tracting one from ten will amount to subtracting one from each of the units.
But how could the claim that the ten is the same as the units be taken to be
equivalent to the claim that each of the ten units is the same as the ten; and
how could this latter claim be taken to imply that subtracting one from ten will
amount to subtracting one from each of the units? So far we have understood
the relation of being a part of (holding between the n units and the number
n) and its converse being a whole for (holding between the number n and the
n units) at play in our passage in terms of the relations of being a quantitative
part of and being a quantitative whole for respectively. However, the terms μέρος
and ὅλος (and cognates) may also be used to denote two relationships quite dif-
ferent from those mentioned above: that of being a logical part of and that of
being a logical whole for. Thus Aristotle, in the book Delta of his Metaphysics,
says that ‘are also called parts those things into which a Form, apart from quan-
tity, can be divided: and this is why species are called parts of their genus’.52
Each species of a genus may be called a part of it (and a genus may be called a
whole for its species) not in an extensional, but in an intensional sense: given
the species A, B, C, … of a genus X, A, B, C, … are parts of X insofar as exactly
one of A, B, C, … is true of anything of which X is true.53
Examples of intensional parts and wholes may be found in Sextus too.
At PH II 220–2 Sextus applies the Dilemma of Participation stemming from
Plato’s Parmenides 131 A–C to a genus and its species: each species participates
either in the whole of its genus or in a part of it; but both possibilities are
problematical. One of the reasons why the latter possibility is rejected runs as
follows: if a species (man) shares in just a part of its genus (animal), then the
species cannot be characterised in terms of the whole genus – and that is to
say, by reference to all the elements occurring in the definition of the genus:
so man will not be an animal (i.e. a perceptive animate substance), but just a
part of it (e.g. a substance, but neither animate nor perceptive).54 It is pretty
52 Aristotle, Met. Δ 25, 1023b17–19: ἔτι εἰς ἃ τὸ εἶδος διαιρεθείη ἂν ἄνευ τοῦ ποσοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα μόρια
λέγεται τούτου· διὸ τὰ εἴδη τοῦ γένους φασὶν εἶναι μόρια.
53 On quantitative parts and wholes, logical parts and wholes and their relationships, see
L. Corti, ‘Generi e parti’, Epistemologia 32 (2), 2009, pp. 185–208, with references.
54 Sextus, PH II 220: εἰ δὲ ἓν εἶναι λέγοιτο ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσιν αὐτοῦ γένος, ἤτοι ὅλου αὐτοῦ ἕκα-
στον εἶδος αὐτοῦ μετέχει ἢ μέρους αὐτοῦ. ἀλλ’ ὅλου μὲν οὐδαμῶς·… εἰ δὲ μέρους, πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ
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164 Chapter 5
clear that Sextus, here, is not talking about the extension of the predicates man
and animal respectively (that is to say, of the set of all the items of which it is
true to say of each that it is a man and of the set of all the items of which it
is true to say of each that it is an animal), and of the relation of being a quan-
titative part of holding between them; he is talking about the intension of
those predicates (of what being a man and being an animal – humanity and
animality – amount to), and of the relation of being a logical part as character-
ised above holding between them.
If, in the light of PH II 220, we think about an argument in the spirit of the
one in M IV 25 implying logical parts and wholes, we might put forward some-
thing like the following. Consider a genus X, characterised as ‘such-and-so’, its
species, and the particular Xs. If you take something from the characterisation
of X (say, ‘so’), then you take it also from the characterisation of the species
and of the particular Xs. Take the genus animal, for instance. Suppose that it
has always been characterised as ‘perceptive animate substance’, but then this
characterisation is shown to be false: an animal is to be characterised as an
animate substance, but not perceptive. Since ‘perceptive’ is subtracted from
the genus animal, it is also subtracted from its species and the particular ani-
mals. Animal is not taken to be a perceptive substance anymore: neither are its
species and the particular animals. Or else: take a fudge cake, and cut it into
ten slices; each of them is fudge cake; so if you subtract something from the
characterisation of the fudge cake, you subtract it from the characterisation of
each of its parts.
In the light of these examples, we might read the argument in M IV 25 as fol-
lows. Since each of the ten units is the same in genus or kind as the ten (for they
are both numbers), if you subtract something from the characterisation of the
ten in terms of number, then you subtract it from the characterisation of each
of the units. This argument is sound, and the prima facie absurd inference
perfectly correct. But, thus understood, the argument in M IV 25 amounts to
an instance of the following pattern of argument: if X and Y are the same in
genus, then if you change your account of X, your account of Y will change too:
and this has nothing to do with subtraction understood either as an opera-
tion performed on countable items or as an abstract function which takes two
numbers into a number.
It seems to me that if we want to make better sense of the distributive claim,
we have to change path. We have to take this claim to derive from a wrong, but
ἀκολουθήσει τῷ εἴδει τὸ γένος πᾶν, ὡς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐδὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἔσται ζῷον ἀλλὰ μέρος
ζῴου, οἷον οὐσία, οὔτε δὲ ἔμψυχος οὔτε αἰσθητική.
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interesting move: that of treating number along the same lines as e.g. man, on
the grounds that they are both universal items. The line of reasoning underly-
ing the distributive claim could have been the following. If X happens to F, and
F is a universal, then X happens to all Fs – to each and every F. For instance,
man is a universal item: so if X happens to man, then it happens to all men – to
each and every man. Now let us suppose that any number n is a universal item
too. If so, then if X happens – say – to the number ten, it happens to all the ten
units – to each of the ten units. Does the distributive claim in Sextus’ argument
reflect the efforts of handling the metaphysics of universal quantifiers?
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Chapter 6
M IV 31–4: Sextus’ Attack on Number Conceived

of as the Result of the Addition of a Unit
1 Introduction
The section is composed of three main parts: a statement of the conclusion to

which Sextus’ overall attack on addition in 31–3 is supposed to lead (31); two
arguments against the possibility of adding a unit to a given number, the first
appearing at 31–2, and the second at 33; a sketch of the structure of Sextus’
overall attack on addition (31–4) and subtraction (23–30), and a transition
to the treatise which follows M IV, Against the Astrologers (34).
The sketch of Sextus’ attack on addition and subtraction in 34 is coher-
ent with the one he offers at the beginning of his attack on subtraction
(24) and with the conclusion he announces in 31: number is conceived of as
existing as the result of addition or subtraction; it has been shown that nei-
ther of them exists; it must be concluded that it is impossible to conceive of
number as the result of addition or subtraction, and therefore that number, as
far as the Dogmatic characterisation of its existence goes, does not exist. But
how does Sextus argue for the impossibility of addition? Despite the fact that
Sextus introduces the puzzles against addition as being analogous to those he
addresses against subtraction, the former are characterised by some original
features. It is time to have a close look at them.
2 M IV 31–2: Number, Units, and Conceptual Parts
Sextus’ first argument against addition may be sketched as follows. It is not

possible to conceive of a number as the result of the addition of a unit to a
given number – say, to conceive of the number eleven as the result of the addi-
tion of a unit to the number ten. For the unit is added either to the whole ten or
to the last part of it; and both possibilities are problematical. The unit cannot
be added to the whole ten: for, since the whole ten is conceived together with
all the particular units, adding a unit to the whole ten would amount to adding
a unit to all the ten particular units – and that is absurd. Nor can the unit be
added to the last part of ten: for the increase of one part of the whole ten does
not imply the increase of the whole ten.

The two more interesting features of the argument are the following. First,
it is grounded on a disjunction (the unit is added either to the whole ten or
to the last part of it) which is supposed to be exclusive and exhaustive. How
so? Second, the first disjunct is taken not to hold on the ground that since the
whole ten is conceived together with the particular units, adding a unit to
the whole ten will amount to adding a unit to all the ten particular units. Why?
The first question may be answered in the light of the loci similes on sub-
traction, which present the same disjunction and have been analysed in the
previous chapter: the unit is added either to a numerical whole (be it the whole
number ten or one of its numerical parts which is a numerical whole), or to the
last part of the ten – and that is to say, to a part of the number ten which is not
a numerical whole: the unit. This is the exclusive and exhaustive disjunction
each member of which is taken to be problematical.
What about the second question? We have seen that, in the arguments on
subtraction in M IV 27–8, IX 316–17, and PH III 92, the parallel puzzling claim
that the unit is subtracted from each of the ten’s particular units is grounded
on the thesis that the whole ten is the same as the particular units. By contrast,
in the argument on addition in M IV 31–2 the puzzling claim that the unit is
added to all the ten units is grounded on the thesis that the whole ten is con-
ceived together with the ten particular units. So what is the meaning of this
latter thesis, and how is it supposed to ground the problematical claim?
The expression ‘to be conceived together with’ (σύν X νοεῖσθαι) and its vari-
ants ‘to be grasped together with’ (σύν X καταλαμβάνεσθαι) and ‘to be observed
together with’ (σύν X θεωρεῖσθαι) appear in several passages in Sextus’ corpus,
sometimes in contrast with ‘to be different from’ (ἕτερον εἶναι):1 and the pas-
sages provide crucial elucidation both of the syntax and of the meaning of the
expression. First of all, ‘is conceived together with’ is elliptical for ‘is conceived
of as being F together with’: thus, for instance, ‘a man is observed of as (being)
a man together with a head’; ‘a cubit is conceived of as (being) a cubit together
with a palm’ (M IX 348–9).2 Second, the last member of the relationship should
be formulated in terms of a predicate. This is suggested in particular by a pas-
sage from Against the Geometers in which Sextus attacks the possibility of
conceiving of the geometrical point as being an incorporeal and intelligible
item. If we conceive of the point as such, ‘we shall conceive of it together
with being the sign and the limit of the line, and also with being completive
1 See e.g. PH II 184; M IX 314, 348, 349, 350; M I 139, 163; III 24–5, 49, 55–6; IV 14, 31.
2 M IX 348: θεωρεῖται δέ γε ὁ ἄνθρωπος σὺν τῇ κεφαλῇ ἄνθρωπος … 349: σὺν γὰρ τῷ παλαιστῇ καὶ ὁ
πῆχυς νοεῖται πῆχυς.
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168 Chapter 6
of it’ (M III 25).3 Under the hypothesis considered by Sextus, the geometri-
cal point is conceived of as being the point together with being the sign and
the limit of the line; in general, something is conceived of as being F together
with being G.4 Third, quite often in Sextus’ texts, the items among which the
relation of being conceived together with is taken to hold are a whole and its
parts: for instance the ten and the ten units (M IV 31) – or each of the ten units
(M IX 314), the man and his head (M IX 348), the cubit and the palm (M IX 349).
We will come back to this.
What does it mean ‘to be conceived together with’? An answer is suggested
by another passage from Against the Geometers:5
[55] If it is possible, while conceiving of a length together with a cer-

tain breadth, to grasp a breadthless length by negation of the breadth,
it will be possible in the same way, while thinking of flesh together with
its property of vulnerability, to think of flesh which is invulnerable and
impassive … [56] But that is utterly impossible and contrary to the com-
mon conception of men; for what is thought of as invulnerable is no
longer flesh, since flesh is thought of as flesh together with the property
of vulnerability (M III 55–6).6
Since flesh is conceived of as being flesh together with the property of being
vulnerable, to think of flesh as being invulnerable would be contrary to the
conception of flesh common to all men. It is therefore impossible to do so:
and it is a matter of conceptual impossibility. For the same reason, if length is
3 M III 25: σὺν τούτῳ καθεστὼς σημεῖον καὶ πέρας γραμμῆς αὐτὸ νοήσομεν, σὺν τῷ καὶ συμπληρωτι-
κὸν αὐτῆς ὑπάρχειν.
4 Thus, the two instances of this relationship in M IX 348–9 may be formulated as follows: ‘a
man is observed of as being a man together with having a head’; ‘a cubit is conceived of as
being a cubit together with including a palm’. Note that the English translators have some-
times felt the need to render the last member of the relationship in terms of a predicate, even
when this is not so expressed in Sextus’ text: see e.g. M IX 314: σὺν ταύτῃ [scl. μονὰδι] νοεῖσθαι
τὴν δεκάδα (Bury: ‘the decad is conceived as including this monad’; Bett: ‘the ten is conceived
with this [unit] as a component’).
5 The indication, translation, and interpretation of the passage follow J. Barnes, ‘Bits and
Pieces’, in id., Method and Metaphysics: Essays in Ancient Philosophy I, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 2011, pp. 429–83, p. 462.
6 Sextus, M III 55–6: [55] εἴπερ τε δυνατόν ἐστι μῆκός τι νοήσαντας σὺν ποσῷ πλάτει στερήσει τοῦ
πλάτους λαβεῖν μῆκος ἀπλατές, ἐνδέξεταί ποτε κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον καὶ σάρκα σὺν τρωτῷ ἰδιώ-
ματι νοήσαντας στερήσει τοῦ τρωτοῦ ἰδιώματος νοῆσαι ἄτρωτόν τε καὶ ἀπαθῆ σάρκα … [56] ὅπερ
τελέως ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον καὶ παρὰ τὴν κοινὴντῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔννοιαν· τὸ γὰρ ἄτρωτον νοούμενον ἡμῖν
οὐκέτι ἐστὶ σάρξ, ἐπείπερ σὺν τῷ τρωτῷ ἰδιώματι ἡ σὰρξ ἐνοεῖτο ὡς σάρξ.
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conceived of as being length together with the property of possessing breadth,

it is not possible to think of a length as being breadthless. This passage pro-
vides us with a feature of the relation of being conceived together with – a
necessary condition for it to hold, which might be expressed as follows:
If Fs are thought of as being F together with being G, then it is conceptu-

ally impossible for Fs not to be G (e.g. if lengths are thought of as being
lengths together with possessing breadth, then it is conceptually impos-
sible for lengths to be breadthless).
We have seen that in several Sextan passages the items among which the rela-
tion of being conceived together with holds are a whole and its parts: so we
might well wonder why this is so. In the course of his discussion of the notions
of part and whole in Against the Physicists, Sextus deals with a little dispute
that he takes to exist among the Dogmatists (M IX 335–7). The dispute turns
on the relationship between a whole and any one of its parts. Suppose that
X is a part of Y. Then, Sextus argues, the Epicureans hold that X is different
from Y, the Stoics hold that X is neither different from nor the same as Y, and
Aenesidemus thinks that X is both different from and the same as Y.
The origin of the matter of the dispute and the different Dogmatic positions
have been admirably analysed by Barnes.7 It is the Stoic view in particular that
interests us here. Sextus presents it as follows:
7 See J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., pp. 456–63. The matter of the dispute derives from
Parmenides 146b, where Plato implies that a part of something is neither the same as that
thing nor different from it: ‘Everything is related to everything thus: either it is the same, or
it is different, or (if it is neither the same nor different) it will be a part of that to which it is
thus related or it will stand to it as a whole to a part’ (Πᾶν που πρὸς ἅπαν ὧδε ἔχει, ἢ ταὐτόν
ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον· ἢ ἐὰν μὴ ταὐτὸν ᾖ μηδ’ ἕτερον, μέρος ἂν εἴη τούτου πρὸς ὃ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ὡς πρὸς μέρος
ὅλον ἂν εἴη): on this passage cf. Proclus, Elements of Theology, 66. The subject was taken up by
Aristotle as a puzzle applied to quantitative parts and wholes, be they continuous or discrete
(Phys., I 2, 185b11–16): ‘There is a puzzle about parts and wholes, perhaps not in relation to
the argument [scl. the Eleatic monism] but in its own right: are a part and a whole one or
many? In what way are they one or many? If they are many, in what way are they many? And
the same puzzle arises for non-continuous parts’ (ἔχει δ’ ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου,
ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλ’ αὐτὴν καθ’ αὑτήν, πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς
ἓν ἢ πλείω, καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν …). In his commentary
on the Physics, Simplicius offers a short essay on this ἀπορία (In Phys. 83.6–86.18): he cites
the views of Eudemus, Alexander, and Porphyry, and shows that the question was widely
debated in the Aristotelian later tradition. As far as M IX 335–7 is concerned, Barnes’ analysis
ends on a sceptical note. He suggests that Sextus invents the Dogmatic dispute: although
the Epicureans, the Stoics, and Aenesidemus had mereological views (and a couple of texts,
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170 Chapter 6
The Stoics say that a part is neither different from the whole nor the same
as it. For a hand is neither the same as the man (for it is not a man) nor
different from the man (for a man is conceived of as man together with
it) (M IX 336).8
Let us focus on the first conjunct of the Stoic view, and in particular on the
reason and example given in its support. According to the Stoics, any part of
a whole is not different from it insofar as the whole is conceived of as whole
together with any one of its parts: for instance, a hand is not different from
the man insofar as a man is conceived of as man together with a hand. The
passage indicates that the Stoics used the relationship of being conceived of
together with to characterise the relationship of being a whole for: if something
is a whole for some parts, then it is conceived of as being a whole together with
including any of its parts. The question is: for what kinds of wholes may the
Stoics have plausibly held this claim?
Let us suppose that the Stoics held this claim for quantitative wholes, and let
us rephrase it in the light of the characterisation of being conceived along with
provided above. If something is a whole, it is conceptually impossible for it to
lack any of its parts: since man is a whole, it is not possible to conceive of a man
as lacking hands. The claim might be taken to hold for this particular case: for
it is not absurd to think that men necessarily have opposable thumbs – and
therefore possess hands; however, its generalisation to any quantitative whole
is problematical. For, as Barnes points out,
it is absurd to hold that, generally, if X is a part of Y, then Y cannot, by

dint of conceptual necessity, lack X. My appendix is a part of my body.
But I can readily think of my body as lacking that useless organ.9
If we take the Stoic view reported by Sextus in M IX 336 to apply to quanti-

tative parts and wholes, then it is readily falsifiable: in this case, it would be
one from Posidonius and one from Seneca, show that the Stoics contributed to a solution
to the Academic puzzle), they did so in different contexts and for different ends: it is Sextus
who misleadingly presents them as different voices of a Dogmatic conceptual disagreement
about the relationship between a whole and any one of its parts (see J. Barnes ‘Bits and
Pieces’, cit., p. 463).
8 Sextus, M IX 336: οἱ δὲ Στωικοὶ οὔτε ἕτερον τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος οὔτε τὸ αὐτό φασιν ὑπάρχειν· ἡ γὰρ
χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστίν (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος), οὔτε ἑτέρα παρὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον (σὺν
αὐτῇ γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος νοεῖται ἄνθρωπος).
9 J. Barnes ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., p. 462.
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uncharitable to ascribe to the Stoics such a false view. Is there another, more
charitable way of understanding the Stoic position? Barnes provides one.
He suggests that the Stoics mentioned by Sextus were not concerned about
quantitative parts and wholes, but rather conceptual parts and wholes, and he
provides the following characterisation of their view:
Being G is a conceptual part of being F (and conversely, being F is a con-

ceptual whole for being G) just in case our concept of being F is such that
(i) whatever is F is by nature G; and

(ii) whatever is F is by nature H
(where H and G are distinct):
e.g. having hands is a conceptual part of being a human body (and con-
versely, being a human body is a conceptual whole for having hands) just
in case
(i) whatever is a human body by nature has hands; and

(ii) whatever is a human body has by nature another property, distinct
from having hands.10
Now let us go back to the argument in M IV 31–2. Since in this passage the ten is
characterised both as being a whole whose parts are the ten units and as being
conceived together with them, it is tempting to understand the mereological
relation at stake as being conceptual, and not quantitative. We may add that,
in the light of Barnes’ characterisation of the relationship of being conceived
together with, the claim that the ten is conceived together with all the particu-
lar units can be read in the following terms: the number ten is conceived of as
being the number ten together with being ten particular units, i.e. whatever is
the number ten by nature is ten units.
If we keep this in mind, then Sextus’ argument can be taken to run as fol-
lows. The number ten is a conceptual whole for ten particular units – they are
its conceptual parts. Thus, whatever is the number ten by nature is ten units.
10 This characterisation accounts for the fact, suggested by the Stoic example reported by
Sextus, that even when being G is a conceptual part of being F, it should remain logically
possible for something to be F without being G (for a human body remains a body even
when its hands are amputated); see J. Barnes ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., p. 462, n. 83.
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172 Chapter 6
So adding a unit to the number ten will amount to adding a unit to each of the
ten units, i.e. adding ten units; and that leads to absurdities.
The argument is a sophism. In order for it to work, it would be necessary for
two claims to hold: (i) each unit is a conceptual part of the number ten; and
(ii) if X is a conceptual part of Y, then X is the same as Y. But (i) is obviously
false. It is the set of ten units (i.e. the ten units taken together) which is a con-
ceptual part of the number ten – insofar as, I guess, the number ten is a set of
ten units with some further feature: the units, the elements of the set, must be
ordered.11 And (ii) is false too: for the second clause of the definition of being
a conceptual part of grants that if X is a conceptual part of Y, then there is a
property which holds of Y and does not hold of X.
The argument provided by Sextus presupposes that a whole is conceived
together with any one of its parts. Which Dogmatist – which Dogmatic school –
could have made such a claim? M IX 336 suggests a clear answer: the Stoics – or
better, some Stoics. One may object that the answer is hasty: for Sextus, in that
passage, may be inventing or misconstruing a Stoic position for dialectical pur-
poses. But this objection appears to be ungrounded insofar as other passages
indicate that something similar to the mereological view presented in M IX 336
underlies a characteristically Stoic claim: that according to which a good man
is ‘not other than’ his goodness.
Two Sextan loci witness this claim: M XI 24 and PH III 170. The loci share the
same context. Sextus reports the definition or characterisation of what is good
(ἀγαθόν) provided by ‘the Stoics’. The good, then, is benefit or not other than
benefit. The benefit is virtue (which amounts to the ruling part of the soul of
a man being in a certain state) and virtuous action (that is to say, activity in
accordance with virtue), while virtuous men and friends are not other than
benefit (see M XI 22–3; cf. PH III 170). At this point, the two Sextan loci signifi-
cantly diverge:
11 Was the (false) distributive claim grounded on the view that the number ten is a univer-
sal item, conceived this time as a conceptual whole? Cf. the analysis of the argument in
M IV 24–5 in chapter 5.
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M XI 24 PH III 170
‘Parts, say the sons of the Stoics, are ‘Now wholes, they [sc. the Stoics]
neither the same as their wholes nor say, are neither the same as their
other than them: a hand, for instance, parts (a man is not his hand) nor
is neither the same as the whole man something else over and above
(for it is not a whole man) nor other their parts (they do not subsist
than the whole (for the whole man is without the parts). Hence, they
conceived of as a man together with the say, wholes are not other than their
hand). Since virtue, then, is a part both parts. So, since the virtuous [men]
of the good man and of the friend, and are wholes with respect to their
the parts are neither the same as their ruling part (which they called a
wholes nor other than their wholes, the benefit), they say that they are not
good man and the friend are called not other than benefit’.13
other than benefit’.12
Let us focus on M XI 24. The paternity of the doctrine it includes is ascribed to

‘the sons of the Stoics’. The part of the argument which is more pertinent for
our aims, imbedded in its context, may be sketched as follows. The term ‘good’
is applied by the Stoics both to the benefit (i.e. to the virtue, understood as the
ruling part of the soul being in a certain state) and to what is said to be no other
than benefit (that is to say, the virtuous men). To be precise, the virtuous men
are said to be neither benefit nor other than benefit. The reason why this is so is
the following. Parts are not other than their wholes (for wholes are conceived
together with their parts): for instance, a hand is not other than a human body.
Now since the benefit is a part of the virtuous man, and parts are not other
than their wholes, the virtuous man is no other than benefit.
12 Sextus, M XI 24: τὰ γὰρ μέρη, φασὶ Στωικῶν παῖδες, οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν οὔτε ἑτεροῖα
τῶν ὅλων, οἷον ἡ χεὶρ οὔτε ἡ αὐτή ἐστιν τῷ ὅλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ (οὐ γὰρ ὅλος ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἡ χείρ),
οὔτε ἑτέρα τοῦ ὅλου (σὺν γὰρ τῇ [ὅλῃ] χειρὶ ὅλος ὁ ἄνθρωπος νοεῖται ἄνθρωπος). ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ τοῦ
σπουδαίου ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ φίλου μέρος ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, τὰ δὲ μέρη οὔτε ταὐτὰ τοῖς ὅλοις ἐστὶν
οὔτε ἕτερα τῶν ὅλων, εἴρηται ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ φίλος οὐχ ἕτερος ὠφελείας).
13 Sextus, PH III 170: τὰ δὲ ὅλα οὔτε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς μέρεσιν εἶναι λέγουσιν (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
χείρ), οὔτε ἕτερα παρὰ τὰ μέρη (οὐκ ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν μερῶν ὑφέστηκεν). διόπερ οὐχ ἕτερα τῶν
μερῶν τὰ ὅλα λέγουσιν. ὅθεν τὸν σπουδαῖον ὅλον ὄντα ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ὅπερ ἔφα-
σαν ὠφέλειαν, οὐχ ἕτερον ὠφελείας εἶναι λέγουσιν.
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174 Chapter 6
If we compare M XI 24 with M IX 336, we may notice that the former fea-

tures two claims and an example already appearing in the latter, and one new
example. Just as M IX 336, M XI 24 includes (i) the claim that parts are not
other than their wholes (i.e. that any part of a whole is not other than it, as the
example clearly suggests); (ii) an instance of this claim: a hand is not other
than a man; (iii) the claim, on which (ii) is grounded, according to which the
whole man is conceived of as a man together with the hand. We find then
(iv) a new example of the relationship of being a part of: virtue is a part of the
virtuous man.
The Stoic piece of reasoning reported by Sextus in M XI 24 appears to be
fairly coherent apart from one glaring blemish. From the facts that benefit is
a part of the virtuous man and parts are not other than their wholes it follows
that benefit is no other than the virtuous man – and not that the virtuous man
is no other than benefit. How could we explain the conclusion? The simplest
way of doing so amounts to taking the Stoics to assume that the relationship of
‘(not) being other than’ is symmetrical:
If X is (not) other than Y, then Y is (not) other than X.
It is pretty clear that the Stoic doctrine reported in M XI 24 is perfectly coher-

ent with the one reported in M IX 336. In particular, the fact that the whole,
in M XI 24, is characterised as being conceived together with any one of its
parts suggests that the mereological concepts at stake in this passage are those
characterising M IX 336: the relationship of being a conceptual whole for and
its converse, that of being a conceptual part of. Indeed, the new example we
find in M XI (virtue is a part of the virtuous man) satisfies the two conditions
characterising the relationship of being a conceptual part of as it appears in
M IX 336: since being a virtue is a part of being a virtuous human being, then
(i) whatever is a virtuous human being by nature is a virtue (that is to say, a soul
in such-and-such a condition); and (ii) whatever is a virtuous human being by
nature has a second property, distinct from that of being a virtue (for a virtuous
man is not just a soul).
Now let us have a look at PH III 170. If we compare it with M XI 24, we may
notice three differences. First: the doctrine is not ascribed to ‘the sons of the
Stoics’, but to ‘the Stoics’ (PH III 169). We will come back to this point later.
Second: in lieu of the claim that a part is not other than its whole, we find the
claim that a whole is not other than any of its parts. But this is not shocking, if
we take the Stoics to assume that the relationship of ‘(not) being other than’ is
symmetrical. Third: the claim that a whole is not other than any of its parts
is not grounded as its converse is grounded in M XI 24, and that is to say on
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the thesis that a whole is conceived together with its parts; it is rather inferred
(ὅθεν) from the claim that a whole is not something else over and above its
parts – it does not subsist without parts.
How are we to understand this latter claim? A couple of passages from the
letter CXIII from Seneca to Lucilius may shed some light:
It is agreed that the mind is an animal, since the mind itself makes us
animals, and since they have derived the term ‘animal’ from it; virtue,
however, is nothing but the mind in a certain disposition; therefore it
is an animal … One thing must be separate from another if they are to
be two … My mind is an animal and so am I, but we are not two. Why?
Because my mind is a part of me. Something will be counted by itself only
when it stands by itself. But when it is a component of something else, it
cannot seem to be other than it. Why is that? I will tell you: because what
is other ought to be distinctly its own, entire and complete within itself.
(Seneca, ep. CXIII 2, 4–5)14
The question debated in letter CXIII is whether virtues are animals – liv-
ing items. Seneca reports first the views and the arguments for an orthodox,
affirmative answer, and then the arguments for a negative answer, which he
favours. The mereological view reported in our passage appears in the course
of an argument in favour of the affirmative answer which Seneca ascribes to
‘the Olds’ (antiqui: CXIII 1). Seneca justifies his attack on the Stoic orthodoxy
by referring to the fact that even Cleanthes and Chrysippus indulged in that
modus operandi (23); and he draws from Posidonius to back up his own posi-
tion. We may suppose, then, that Seneca’s antiqui are what we call today the
Old Stoics.15
Let us skip through the main argument in the passage by means of an exam-
ple. Socrates’ mind is an animal. Socrates is an animal. Still, there are not two
animals. Why? Because Socrates’ mind is a part of Socrates, and therefore it
does not stand by itself – it is not other than Socrates.
14 Seneca, Ep. CXIII 2,4–5: [2] Animum constat animal esse, cum ipse efficiat ut simus ani-
malia, cum ab illo animalia nomen hoc traxerint; virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus
quodam modo se habens; ergo animal est … [4] alter ab altero debet esse diductus ut duo
sint … [5] et animus meus animal est et ego animal sum : duo tamen non sumus. quare ?
quia animus mei pars est. tunc aliquid per se numerabitur cum per se stabit: ubi vero alterius
membrum erit non poterit videri aliud. quare? dicam: quia quod alium est suum oportet esse
et proprium et totum et intra se absolutum. Translation by Inwood, slightly modified.
15 Cf. J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., p. 460, n. 81.
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176 Chapter 6
It is important to stress that the mereological relationship, here, is quantita-

tive. Socrates is a quantitative item; Socrates’ mind is a quantitative item too,
insofar as it is material πνεῦμα: this is clearly shown by a passage from Stobaeus
(Eclogae II, 64.18–65.6) which is the only text cited by the SVF as evidence for
the orthodox thesis that virtues are animals (apart from Seneca’s letter CXIII):
‘They say that every virtue is and is called a body: for the intellect and soul are
bodies’.16 So the argument in Seneca is about quantitative parts and wholes.
Since Socrates’ mind is a quantitative part of Socrates, the former does not
stand by itself – it is not other than the latter. In other words, Socrates’ mind
is not wholly distinct from Socrates17 – in general, any quantitative part of a
whole is not wholly distinct from it; and, if this relation is symmetrical, then
a whole is not wholly distinct from any of its quantitative parts.
Now it seems to me that the absence of the reference to the relationship of
being conceived along with in PH III 170 strongly suggests that the mereologi-
cal relationship characterising that passage is not conceptual, but quantitative.
Thus, the Stoic view presented in that passage would be the following: since
virtue, which identifies with the ruling part of the soul in such-and-such a con-
dition, is a quantitative part of the virtuous man – being a part of his soul, the
former is not wholly distinct from the latter; and conversely, the virtuous man
is not wholly distinct from virtue – nor from any other of its quantitative parts.
If this is so, then M XI 24 and PH III 170 radically differ: for the former reports
a Stoic view on conceptual parts and wholes on the same wavelength as that
reported in M IX 336, while the latter reports a Stoic view on quantitative parts
and wholes analogous to the one described by Seneca. Does Sextus ascribe the
two doctrines to the same thinkers? He ascribes the one he offers in PH III 170
to the Stoics (and a wholly similar doctrine is ascribed by Seneca to the Old
Stoics). As for M XI 24, Sextus, having introduced the whole passage about the
good (21–4) as reporting a Stoic position (21), presents the doctrine in 24 as
belonging to ‘the sons of the Stoics’. How are we to understand this reference?
Long and Sedley suggest that the phrase probably denotes ‘later Stoics,
since the doctrine in question is attributed only to them’;18 Spinelli agrees,
and wonders whether the reference may be to Mnesarchus, the pupil of
Posidonius.19 Bett, however, is not convinced:
16 Cf. B. Inwood, Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2007,
pp. 272–3.
17 For a brilliant interpretation of this claim see J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., p. 461.
18 A.A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1987, vol. II, pp. 368. They also address the reader to Stobaeus Eclogae I, 177.21–179.17
(including Posidonius fr. 96 Edelstein-Kidd): the text will be examined later.
19 E. Spinelli, Sesto Empirico. Contro gli Etici, Naples, Bibliopolis, 1995, p. 173, n. 14.
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‘The sons of the Stoics’ … may refer … to later Stoics. But elsewhere
(M IX 336, PH III 170) Sextus attributes the same point about parts and
wholes without restriction. And in the present passage, the point is used
to explain or justify a definition which is itself attributed generically to
the Stoics. I therefore prefer to read this as simply periphrasis for ‘the
Stoics’ (cf. e.g. M VI 19, 30).20
I hope to have shown that Bett is wrong to take the mereological view ascribed
by Sextus to the Stoics in M XI 24, M IX 336, and PH III 170 to be the same.
If Long and Sedley are right, then we may conclude that the crucial concep-
tual tools at stake in Sextus’ argument in M IV 31–2 belong to later Stoics – or,
to be more precise, that the argument used by Sextus against the Pythagorising
Platonists of his time originally attacked a later Stoic position.
3 M IV 33: Number, Addition, and Generation
Sextus’ second argument for the impossibility of addition in M IV 33 may be

sketched as follows. Suppose the number eleven to be conceived of as exist-
ing as the result of the addition of a unit to the number ten. Either the unit is
added to the ten while this remains, or the unit is added to the ten while this
does not remain. But the unit cannot be added to the ten while it remains,
since the ten will not remain ten. And the unit cannot be added to the ten
which does not remain, since the addition cannot absolutely be made to the
ten, if this does not remain. Therefore the unit cannot be added to the ten.
The argument is grounded on a disjunction which is taken to be exclusive
and exhaustive (the unit is added either to the ten while it remains or to the
ten which does not remain) followed by the rejection of the disjuncts; and
both steps of the argument are rather obscure. The other loci in which Sextus
attacks addition (M IX 321–7, PH III 94–6, and M I 166–8) do not provide any
direct contribution for the understanding of it, insofar as they are character-
ised by a different, trilemmatic structure: we will come back to them later.
Crucial elucidation of the argument in M IV 33, however, is provided by Sextus’
arguments against subtraction in M IV 29–30 and M IX 318–19. Let us display
the passages side by side:
20 R. Bett, Against the Ethicists, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 65–6.
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178 Chapter 6
M IX 318–19 M IV 29–30
[318] … If a unit is removed from [29] … If the unit is removed from the
the ten, the unit is removed either ten, either the ten which it is removed
while the ten still remains or while it from exists, or it does not exist. But
does not remain; but a unit is never the removal cannot be made from
removed from it either while it does the existing ten (for, as long as the ten
not remain or while it does remain; remains, it is not possible to subtract
and there is nothing in addition to anything from it qua ten – otherwise it
existing and not existing; therefore would not be ten anymore), nor from
a unit is not subtracted from the the non-existing ten: [30] for, nothing
ten. [319] It is right away appar- can be subtracted from what does not
ent that the unit is not subtracted exist. But there is nothing to conceive
from the ten while it remains; for in beyond existing and not-existing;
so far as the ten remains, nothing therefore, nothing is removed from
is subtracted from it. But that it is the ten.22
subtracted from it while it does not
remain is again absurd; for nor can
anything be subtracted from what
does not exist. Therefore nothing is
subtracted from anything.21
Let us start from M IX 318–19. In this passage, the exclusive and exhaustive dis-
junction which in M IV 33 is applied to addition is applied to subtraction: either
the unit is subtracted from the ten while it remains (μενούσης), or the unit is
subtracted from the ten while it does not remain (μὴ μενούσης). The argument
proceeds by suggesting that there is no other possibility beyond existing (εἶναι)
and not-existing (μὴ εἶναι), and showing that the unit cannot be subtracted
21 Sextus, M IX 318–19: [318] πρὸς τούτοις· εἰ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος αἴρεται ⟨ἡ⟩ μονάς, ἤτοι ἀπὸ μενού-
σης ἔτι τῆς δεκάδος αἴρεται ἡ μονὰς ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ μενούσης· οὔτε δὲ ⟨ἀπὸ⟩ μὴ μενούσης αἴρεταί ποτε
μονὰς οὔτε ἀπὸ μενούσης· παρὰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπὸ τῆς
δεκάδος μονάς. [319] ἀπὸ μὲν οὖν μενούσης τῆς δεκάδος αὐτόθεν φαίνεται μὴ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἡ
μονάς· ἐφ’ ὅσον γὰρ μένει δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀφαιρεῖται ἀπ’ αὐτῆς. ἀπὸ δὲ μὴ μενούσης πάλιν ἀφαιρεῖ-
σθαι ἄτοπον· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀφαιρεθῆναί τι δύναται. οὐκ ἄρα ἀφαιρεῖταί τι τινός.
22 Sextus, M IV 29–30: [29] καὶ ἄλλως, εἴπερ ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος γίνεται ἡ τῆς μονάδος ἆρσις, ἤτοι
ἀπὸ οὔσης γίνεται τῆς δεκάδος ἆρσις ἢ ἀπὸ μὴ οὔσης· οὔτε δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς οὔσης γένοιτ’ ἄν (ἐφ’ ὅσον
γὰρ μένει χρόνον δεκάς, οὐδὲν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς ἀφαιρεθῆναι δύναται ὡς δεκάδος, [30] ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι ἔσται
δεκάς) οὔτε ἀπὸ μὴ οὔσης· ἀπὸ γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲ ἀρθῆναί τι πέφυκεν. καὶ ⟨μὴν⟩ παρὰ τὸ
εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν ἔστι νοῆσαι· οὐκ ἄρα αἴρεταί τι ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος.
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from the ten either if it remains (since as long as this is so, it is not possible
to subtract anything from it), or if it does not remain – since nothing can be
subtracted from a non-existing item (μὴ ὄντος).
In some parts of the argument, εἶναι is used where the structure of the argu-
ment would require μένειν to be used. The simplest explanation of this fact is
to think that μένειν implies existing, and that this is so because μένειν means
‘to persist’, ‘to keep existing’. This is confirmed by M IV 29–30, where the cru-
cial disjunction is expressed by means of εἶναι (the unit is added either to the
existing ten or to the non-existing ten), and the fact that the removal cannot
be made from the ten while it exits (οὔσης τῆς δεκάδος) is grounded on the fact
that as long as the ten remains (μένει), i.e. persists, nothing can be subtracted
from it.
We may add that the ground on which, in M IX 318–19 and IV 29–30, the sub-
traction of a unit from the persisting/non-persisting ten is rejected seems to be
entirely parallel to the elliptical ground on which, in M IV 33, the addition of a
unit to the persisting/non-persisting ten is rejected – so that the former can be
used to complete the latter.
In the light of these remarks, we can understand the argument in M IV 33
as follows. Either the unit is added to the number ten while it keeps existing, is
still there, or the unit is added to the number ten which does not keep existing.
But the unit cannot be added to the number ten if it keeps existing: for, as long
as the ten exists, it is not possible to add anything to it qua ten – otherwise,
it will not be ten anymore. And the unit cannot be added to the number ten
if it does not exist (anymore): for nothing can be added to a non-existing item.
It is pretty clear that the second disjunct is correct – that nothing can be
added to a non-existing item. What about the first disjunct? An argument with
a similar structure appears in M X 338, in the course of Sextus’ attack on gen-
eration and destruction. Sextus focuses on the objects of thoughts, and puts
forward an argument concluding that none of them can come into being out
of multiple things (ἐκ πλειόνων):
For when two things come together a third cannot come into being while
the two remain, and again, if there are three, a fourth cannot come into
being while the three remain. There was a more precise discussion of this
when we were investigating the subsistence of man and establishing that
man is neither body nor soul nor the composite (Sextus, M X 338).23
23 Sextus, M X 338: δυεῖν γὰρ συνελθόντων τρίτον οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μενόντων τῶν δυεῖν, καὶ πάλιν
τριῶν ὄντων τέταρτον οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, μενόντων τῶν τριῶν. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀκριβέστερον,
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180 Chapter 6
The reference in the last sentence is not clear.24 No Sextan extant passage
exactly fits the description; the one which comes closest to that is M VII 276–8.
Here Sextus considers the position of some ‘clever seeming Dogmatists’ (τινὲς
τῶν συνετῶν εἶναι δοκούντων κατὰ τὴν δογματικὴν αἵρεσιν) who defend the pos-
sibility of defining man as a rational mortal animal – and later, Sextus refers
to the section this passage belongs to as concerning the ‘subsistence of man’
(370: ἡ τἀνθρώπου ὑπόστασις). The Dogmatists, then, argue that it is only when
they are put together that animal, rational, and mortal define man, ‘like what
we observe in the case of parts and whole’ (276: οἷόν τι καὶ ἐπὶ μερῶν καὶ ὅλου
θεωροῦμεν γινόμενον). For just as a hand, on its own, is not a man, nor a head,
nor a foot, but the composite of them is conceived of as a whole, so too man
is not just animal, not rational on its own, nor mortal taken by itself, but the
aggregate of all these. To this view Sextus objects:
If each of these things on its own is not man, how can they make man
when collected together, without either exceeding what man is or falling
short of his real extent or diverging in any other way? (M VII 278)25
I take the three questions to presuppose that man, rational, and mortal keep
existing once they are put together, and the trifling sophism they hint at to be
grounded on confusion about the intension and extension of these predicates
along the following lines. Defining man as a rational mortal animal implies
taking the group of men to amount to that constituted by the rational items,
the mortal items, and the living items: but it is scarcely possible that the exten-
sion of the former matches that of the latter.
What is the relationship between M IV 33, M X 338, and M VII 278? It seems
to me that M X 338 includes a general puzzling claim (‘When two things come
together, a third thing cannot come into being while the two things remain’),
of which we find a quantitative instance in M IV 33 (‘When you add a unit to
the number ten, the number eleven cannot come into being while the number
ten remains’) and a logical instance in M VII 278 (‘When animal, rational and
mortal are put together, man cannot come into being while the former three
remain’). And given the mereological reference at M VII 276, we might take
ὅτε περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὑποστάσεως ἐζητοῦμεν παριστάντες, ὅτι οὔτε σῶμά ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος
οὔτε ψυχὴ οὔτε τὸ σύνθετον.
24 Cf. R. Bett, Sextus Empiricus. Against the Physicists, Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2012, p. 143, n. 165.
25 Sextus, M VII 278: πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ πῶς, εἰ κατ’ ἰδίαν ἕκαστον οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἄνθρωπος, δύναται
εἰς ταὐτὸ συναχθέντα ἄνθρωπον ποιεῖν, μήτε πλεονάσαντα παρὸ ἔστι, μήτε ἐλλιπόντα παρὸ ὑπό-
κειται, μήτε ἄλλως πως τραπέντα.
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Sextus to allude to a general difficulty about the generation of a whole from its
parts, be they quantitative (M IV 33) or logical (M VII 278). In any case, M X 338
provides no reason in favour of the puzzling claim, and the reason given in
M VII 278 appears to be different from the one provided in M IV 33, so that the
former passages do not help our understanding of the latter.
So let us go back to the first disjunct in M IV 33. In order to get clearer on
the difficulty raised by Sextus, let us start by applying it to number of things –
groups of items. There were ten apples in the basket five minutes ago; then you
added an apple, and now there are eleven apples in the basket. Suppose that
the addition was made to the ten apples – that there are now eleven apples
where there were only ten five minutes ago because you added an apple to the
apples already in the basket.26 The question is: when did you add the apple? Let
us consider the sequence of instants {t1, t2, …, tn} elapsed between five minutes
ago and now. If at t5 there were ten apples in the basket, then the addition
cannot have been made at t5 (because if so, then at t5 there would not be ten
apples in the basket, but eleven). And the same holds for any instant tx elapsed
between five minutes ago and now.27 Therefore there is no instant in which the
addition was made – and, in general, there is no instant in which any addition
to groups of items can be made.
Now Sextus’ argument aims at showing that no addition of a unit to a given
number can be made – so that no number can be conceived of as the result
of such an addition. It presupposes that as long as number ten exists, num-
ber eleven cannot come into being. This seems to be part of a view about the
generation of numbers which Sextus puts forward in his attack on generation
and destruction, both in his Against the Physicists (M X 323) and in the Outlines
(PH III 109): numbers are assimilated to numbers of things existing in time,
coming to be and being destroyed as the result of the addition/subtraction of a
unit, and addition and subtraction are conceived of as acts performed on such
groups of items.28 In chapters 4 and 5 we have shown what is wrong, from a
26 It is worth noting that Sextus’ objection against addition here is different from the one
he raises in his attack on the number two conceived of as the conjunction of units in
M IV 21–2 (and loci similes): for the latter is grounded on the claim that the addition is
made to the two units – that is to say, to the units which were already two: see chapter 4.
27 Suppose we accept that at t5 there are eleven apples in the basket and at t4 there are ten
apples, and suggest that the addition was made between t4 and t5. The question is: what
is there between t4 and t5? And the answer is: instants – an infinite amount of instants, if
time is infinitely divisible. So the original question might be asked again: at which of these
infinite instants has the addition been made?
28 The arguments against the possibility of addition in the Sextan loci similes share these
presuppositions. At M IX 326–7, Sextus puts forward a trilemmatic argument in order
to argue for the impossibility of numerical addition. Suppose we add a unit to a given
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182 Chapter 6
conceptual point of view, with this claim (and in particular with understand-
ing addition and subtraction of numbers as time-consuming acts performed
on groups of items), and we have suggested that Sextus’ arguments may be
understood as emphasising and stigmatising some absurd consequences of
this claim; in this chapter we will focus on its origin.
Let us start with the first passage:
If anything comes into being or is destroyed, something must be added

to something and something be subtracted from something or some-
thing must change from something. For coming into being and being
destroyed must come about in one of these three ways. For instance: in
the case of the ten, as the result of the subtraction of a unit, the nine
comes into being but the ten is destroyed; and again in the case of the
nine, as the result of the addition of a unit, the ten comes into being but
the nine is destroyed. And the same account holds of the items which
are destroyed or come into being through conversion: for in this way the
wine is destroyed and the vinegar comes into being (M X 323).29
Sextus ends his point by indicating that since coming into being and being
destroyed imply that either addition or subtraction or change has taken place,
number – say four, so as to obtain five. The unit is added either to itself or to the four or to
the five that is produced from them both; the three disjuncts are to be rejected; therefore
addition is impossible. In this argument, numbers are taken to exist in time and have the
other features mentioned above: cf. M IX 327: ‘the five was not there before the addition
[of a unit to the four]’, ‘what is added always has to be added to something that was there
before [the addition has been made]’. In the other Sextan passages on addition, the same
trilemmatic argument is applied to things measuring a certain number of units of quan-
tity (a body of four cubit at M IX 321–5, an amount measuring four cups at PH III 94–5, and
half a verse in M I 166–8); and note that Sextus introduces his argument for the impos-
sibility of adding a unit to a given number in 326–7 as being the same as those for the
impossibility of adding a palm-sized to a cubit-sized body (σῶμα) in 321–5: see M IX 326,
321. Again, in an argument put forward in his attack on subtraction (M IX 298–9), the
crucial disjunction at stake in M IV 33 is applied to a quantified item, a body measuring
one cubit: ‘We will make the subtraction from the cubit either when it remains or when it
does not remain’ (299: καὶ ἔτι ἤτοι ἀπὸ μένοντος τοῦ πήχεως ποιησόμεθα τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν ἢ ἀπὸ
μὴ μένοντος). (The reason why the first disjunct is rejected is different from the one we find
in M IV 33 and offers no contribution for the understanding of the latter).
29 Sextus, M X 323: καὶ μὴν εἰ γίνεταί τι καὶ φθείρεται, ὀφείλει τί τινι προστίθεσθαι καί τί τινος
ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἤ τι ἔκ τινος μεταβάλλειν· γένεσις γὰρ καὶ φθορὰ κατά τινα τῶν τριῶν τούτων τρό-
πων ὀφείλει συνίστασθαι, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς δεκάδος κατ’ ἀφαίρεσιν τῆς μονάδος γίνεται μὲν ἡ ἐννεάς,
φθείρεται δὲ ἡ δεκάς, καὶ πάλιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἐννεάδος κατὰ πρόσθεσιν μονάδος γίνεται μὲν ἡ δεκάς,
φθείρεται δὲ ἡ ἐννεάς. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τροπὴν φθειρομένων ἢ γεννωμένων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος· οὕτω
γὰρ φθείρεται μὲν ὁ οἶνος, γίνεται δὲ ⟨ὁ⟩ ὄξος.
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and he has shown that none of these processes actually exists, he has virtually
established that generation and destruction do not exist.
In M X, Sextus introduces the view in the context of ‘an inquiry on genera-
tion and destruction’, i.e. an attack on these philosophical notions, ‘undertaken
by the sceptics against the Physicists’ (Sextus, M X 310)30 and in the locus similis
PH III 109, at the beginning of his attack on generation and destruction, Sextus
explicitly ascribes it to some undetermined Dogmatic philosophers:
Generation and destruction are turned about together with addition and
subtraction and natural change: for without these nothing could come
into being or be destroyed. For instance, it is when ten is destroyed, they
say, that nine is generated, by the subtraction of a one; and ten is gen-
erated when nine is destroyed, by the addition of a one; and rust when
bronze is destroyed, by natural change (PH III 109).31
According to this view, numbers are in time, and they are not eternal: they
come into being and are destroyed – cease to exist. A number m comes into
being as the result of the addition/subtraction of a unit to/from a given num-
ber n. Once the addition/subtraction is made, m comes into being and n ceases
to exist: m does not exist before the addition/subtraction is made; n does not
exist anymore after the addition/subtraction. And in Sextus’ attack on subtrac-
tion in the context of his attack on generation and destruction (PH III 86–93),
numbers are used as paradigmatic examples of quantities.
Sextus’ attack on subtraction (280–320) and addition (321–7) in M IX is
coherent with this view about generation, destruction, and number. The attack
is grounded on a threefold division of the ways in which an item is affected,
a division which is similar to the one which opens Sextus’ attack on genera-
tion and destruction in M X and PH III. If something is affected, it is affected
either by way of addition (in the case of things which increase), or by way of
subtraction (in the case of things which decrease), or by way of alteration and
change (in the case of e.g. things that pass over from health to sickness); but
there is no addition or subtraction or alteration and change; therefore nothing
30 Sextus, M X 310: Ἡ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς ζήτησις συνίσταται τοῖς σκεπτικοῖς πρὸς τοὺς
φυσικοὺς.
31 Sextus, PH III 109: Συμπεριτρέπεται μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ φθορὰ τῇ προσθέσει καὶ τῇ
ἀφαιρέσει καὶ τῇ φυσικῇ μεταβολῇ· χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων οὔτε γένοιτο ἄν τι οὔτε φθαρείη, οἷον γοῦν
ἀπὸ τῆς δεκάδος φθειρομένης, ὡς φασίν, ἐννεάδα γίνεσθαι συμβαίνει κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν μονάδος,
καὶ τὴν δεκάδα ἀπὸ τῆς ἐννεάδος φθειρομένης κατὰ πρόσθεσιν τῆς μονάδος, καὶ τὸν ἰὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ
χαλκοῦ φθειρομένου κατὰ μεταβολήν. The italics are mine.
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184 Chapter 6
is affected (277–9; cf. 329).32 Within this context, numbers are used as paradig-
matic examples of items which are affected by addition and subtraction.
To this picture we may add a couple of details. First: in the course of his
attack on subtraction in M IX, Sextus mentions some examples provided by
‘the Aporetics’, a group of Pyrrhonian philosophers he does not seem to iden-
tify himself with, who take numbers to be paradigmatic examples of quantities
and quantitative wholes. At M IX 303–6 Sextus wants to argue that a lesser
quantity cannot be subtracted from a greater quantity, insofar as the former
is not included in the latter. In order to show this, he mentions the examples
‘put forward by the bringers of impasse’, and these are numerical: ‘if five
is included in six, as a case of less in more, then necessarily four also would be
included in five, as a case of less in more, and three in four, and two in three,
and one in two’ (303), so that fifteen should be included in six – and that is
absurd.33 At 311, wanting to show that a part cannot be subtracted from a whole
nor a part from a part, Sextus invites us to ‘look at the claim, as in the sceptics’
habit, as it applies to number’:34 he then rejects the two possibilities grounding
on numerical examples (312–19). So there seems to be an established sceptic
custom amounting to the use of numbers as paradigms of quantities to which
Sextus adheres here.
Second: the section on addition and subtraction from the Outlines clearly
suggests that at least some of Sextus’ arguments against these Dogmatic
notions are not his own inventions. For Sextus, introducing the first of the argu-
ments against subtraction he puts forward in PH III 85–8, explicitly ascribes it
to someone:
That there is no such thing as subtraction they deduce from the following
considerations. If one thing is subtracted from another, either the equal is
subtracted from the equal or the greater from the less or the less from the
32 Having put forward arguments for the impossibility of addition and subtraction only
(M IX 280–327), Sextus assumes that he has argued eo ipso for the impossibility of change,
since the latter is to be understood in terms of the former (cf. M IX 329: ‘change is the
removal of one thing and the addition of another’: ἦν γὰρ ἡ μετάθεσις τοῦ μὲν ἄρσις, τοῦ δὲ
πρόσθεσις).
33 Sextus, M IX 303: εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἓξ ἐμπεριέχεται τὰ πέντε ὡς ἐν πλείονι ἐλάττονα, ἀνάγκη κἀν
τοῖς πέντε περιέχεσθαι τὰ τέσσαρα ὡς ἐν πλείονι ἐλάττονα, κἀν τοῖς τέσσαρσι τὰ τρία, κἀν τοῖς
τρισὶ τὰ δύο, κἀν τοῖς δυσὶ τὸ ἕν … To see what is wrong with this move, cf. the remarks by
J. Barnes, ‘Bits and Pieces’, cit., pp. 463–5, about the locus similis PH II 216–17; cf. PH III 87.
34 Sextus, M IX 311: σκοπῶμεν δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὡς ἔθος τοῖς ἀπὸ τῆς σκέψεως, ἐπὶ ἀριθμοῦ.
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greater. But subtraction comes about in none of these ways, as we shall

establish. Therefore subtraction is impossible (PH III 85).35
In the rest of the passage Sextus does not say whom he is talking about. But,
as we have just seen, in the parallel passage M IX 303–6, introducing numeri-
cal counterexamples of the claim that the less is included in the greater, he
indicates that they come from the ‘Aporetics’ – and that is to say (cf. PH I 7)
the sceptic philosophers:
That the rules of logical consistency are observed we may see from the
examples given by the Aporetics (M IX 303).36
In the subsequent passage (89–93), parallel to M IV 23–30 and M IX 312–19,

where he argues that a part (one) cannot be subtracted from its whole (ten)
nor from another part of the same whole (nine), Sextus does not mention
anyone he has drawn the argument from. But later, in offering the argument
against addition (PH III 94–6), he does refer to someone:
Addition too has been supposed by them to be something impossible.

What is added, they say, is added either to itself or to what was there
beforehand or to the compound of both. But none of these options is
sound. So nothing is added to anything (PH III 94).37
Who argued that addition is impossible? Did Sextus draw the mereological
argument against subtraction contained in PH III 89–93 from some philoso-
phers too? The loci paralleli M IV 23–30 and M IX 312–19 do not provide an
answer: Sextus does not ascribe his mereological arguments against subtrac-
tion (M IV 23–30; M IX 307–19) and addition (M IV 30–3; M IX 321–7) to anyone.
Still, it is difficult not to suppose that the same people made these two entirely
parallel claims. And we should also remember that, in his attack on number in
35 Sextus, PH III 85: Ὅτι δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀφαίρεσις, ἐντεῦθεν ἐπιλογίζονται. εἰ ἀφαιρεῖταί τι ἀπό
τινος, ἤτοι τὸ ἴσον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ἀφαιρεῖται ἢ τὸ μεῖζον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐλάσσονος ἢ τὸ ἔλασσον ἀπὸ τοῦ
μείζονος. κατὰ οὐδένα δὲ τῶν τρόπων τούτων ἀφαίρεσις γίνεται, ὡς παραστήσομεν· ἀδύνατος
ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀφαίρεσις.
36 Sextus, M IX 303: καὶ ὅτι τῷ ὄντι σῴζεται τὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας, σκοπῶμεν ἐπὶ τῶν τιθεμένων τοῖς
ἀπορητικοῖς ὑποδειγμάτων.
37 Sextus, PH III 94: Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρόσθεσις τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι παρ’ αὐτοῖς ὑπείληπται. τὸ γὰρ
προστιθέμενον, φασίν, ἤτοι ἑαυτῷ προστίθεται ἢ τῷ προϋποκειμένῳ ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συνεστῶτι·
τούτων δὲ οὐδέν ἐστιν ὑγιές· οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ προστίθεταί τι τινί.
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186 Chapter 6
the Outlines (PH III 157–67), Sextus introduces his main puzzle as a difficulty
which has been raised in the past:
Once they had concluded in this way that numbered objects are not
numbers, the puzzle against number entered the scene (PH III 157).38
Thus, the following picture emerges. Sextus seems to draw the arguments that
in M IV he directs toward the art of arithmetic and the conception of number
on which it is grounded (and that is to say, number conceived of as the result
of the addition/subtraction of a unit to/from a given number) from some
Pyrrhonian predecessors who used these arguments (in a different context) to
attack the Dogmatic conceptions not of number, but of addition and subtrac-
tion themselves, possibly in the context of an attack on increase and decrease,
or generation and destruction.
In order to see the picture a bit clearer, let us have a look at the Dogmatic
side of the matter. The view that number is an item coming to be as a result of
the operations of addition and subtraction which destroy the addenda and the
minuend plays a prominent role in a celebrated argument:
The argument about growth is an old one, for, as Chrysippus says, it is

propounded by Epicharmus. Yet when the Academics hold that the puz-
zle is not altogether easy or straightforward, these people [scl. the Stoics]
have laid many charges against them … The argument is a simple one and
these people [scl. the Stoics] grant its premises: all particular substances
are in flux and motion, releasing some things from themselves and receiv-
ing others which reach them from elsewhere; the numbers or quantities
which these are added to or subtracted from do not remain the same but
become different as the aforementioned arrivals and departures cause
the substance to be transformed; the prevailing convention is wrong to
call these processes of growth and decay: rather they should be called
generation and destruction, since they transform the thing from what it
is into something else, whereas growing and diminishing are affections
of a body which serves as substrate and persists (Plutarch, Comm. not.
1083A–B).39
38 Sextus, PH III 157: Οὕτως οὖν ἐκείνων συναγαγόντων, ὅτι ἀριθμὸς οὔκ ἐστι τὰ ἀριθμητά, παρει-
σῆλθεν ἡ κατὰ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἀπορία.
39 Plutarch, Comm. not. 1083A–B: ὁ τοίνυν περὶ αὐξήσεως λόγος ἐστὶ μὲν ἀρχαῖος· ἠρώτηται γάρ,
ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος, ὑπ’Ἐπιχάρμου· τῶν δ’ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ οἰομένων μὴ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον μηδ’ αὐτόθεν
ἕτοιμον εἶναι τὴν ἀπορίαν, πολλὰ κατῃτιᾶσθαι ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἁπλοῦς ἐστι καὶ τὰ λήμματα
συγχωροῦσιν οὗτοι· τὰς ἐν μέρει πάσας οὐσίας ῥεῖν καὶ φέρεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἐξ αὑτῶν μεθιείσας
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The early fifth-century comic poet Epicharmus was quoted as arguing that just
as a number or measure when added to or subtracted from becomes a different
number or measure, so a person who grows or diminishes becomes a differ-
ent person (fr. 276 Kassel-Austin). The Academics made great play of this
argument – most of the time in cases which involve growth and diminution, as
the passage from Plutarch witnesses. The general problem was this: how can a
thing retain its identity and be said to grow or diminish between times t1 and
t2 if what it consists of at t2 is different from what it consisted of at t1? And the
official upshot was a rejection of the Stoic concepts of growth and diminution,
on the ground that ‘x grows’ is intelligible only if x exists at the beginning and
at the end of the process, and the denial of identity over time seems to exclude
this. You cannot say that a quantitative item grows, be it a discrete quantity (a
number or group of things) or a continuous quantity: the concept of growth is
to be rejected, and Stoic cosmology, which is grounded on it, ‘is built on sand’.40
Chrysippus reacted to the argument by introducing the distinction between
substance and the peculiarly qualified which is derided by the Academics in
the continuation of the passage from Plutarch quoted above. A clearer idea of
Chrysippus’ move may be gained from a later exposition of it by Posidonius
and Mnesarchus (early first century BC) in Stobaeus, Eclogae I, 177.21–179.17.
Let us quote the beginning of this text:
Posidonius says that there are four kinds of destruction and generation
from the existent to the existent. For they recognised that there was no
such thing as generation from, or destruction into, the non-existent, as
we said before. But of change into the existent he says that one kind is by
division, one by alteration, one by fusion, and one an out-and-out change
τὰ δέ ποθεν ἐπιόντα προσδεχομένας· οἷς δὲ πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν ἀριθμοῖς ἢ πλήθεσι, ταὐτὰ μὴ
διαμένειν ἀλλ’ ἕτερα γίνεσθαι, ταῖς εἰρημέναις προσόδοις ⟨καὶ ἀφόδοις⟩ ἐξαλλαγὴν τῆς οὐσίας
λαμβανούσης· αὐξήσεις δὲ καὶ φθίσεις οὐ κατὰ δίκην ὑπὸ συνηθείας ἐκνενικῆσθαι τὰς μεταβολὰς
ταύτας λέγεσθαι, γενέσεις [δὲ] καὶ φθορὰς μᾶλλον αὐτὰς ὀνομάζεσθαι προσῆκον, ὅτι τοῦ καθε-
στῶτος εἰς ἕτερον ἐκβιβάζουσι· τὸ δ’ αὔξεσθαι καὶ τὸ μειοῦσθαι πάθη σώματός ἐστιν ὑποκειμένου
καὶ διαμένοντος. Translation by Long and Sedley; the italics are mine.
40 D. Sedley, ‘The Stoic Criterion of Identity’, Phronesis 27 (3), 1982, pp. 255–75, p. 258. As
Sedley argues, this strong Academic conclusion, which is to be found in the passage from
Plutarch quoted above, should be taken to represent the Academy in its Carneadean
phase – mid- or late second century BC. Chrysippus is the chief target. At An. In Plat.
Theat. 70.8–22 the Academics are presented as having a weaker position, namely that the
existence of growth is self-evident, so that the Stoics are silly in trying to prove what is
self-evident. This sounds like the Academy’s later mitigated scepticism of Philo of Larissa
(first half of the second century BC): cf. D. Sedley, ‘The Stoic Criterion of Identity’, cit.,
p. 272, n. 12.
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188 Chapter 6
which they call ‘by resolution’. Of these, that by alteration belongs to the
substance, while the other three belong to the so-called ‘qualified indi-
viduals’, which come to occupy the substance. And it is along these lines
that processes of generation come about. The substance neither grows
nor diminishes through addition or subtraction, but simply alters, just
as in the case of numbers and measures. And it follows that it is in the
case of peculiarly qualified individuals, such as Dion and Theon, that pro-
cesses of both growth and diminution arise.41
Posidonius distinguishes four kinds of change by which the identity of some-

thing can be lost or gained. One of them (the change by alteration) concerns
its substance – that is to say, its material substrate; the other three concern its
qualified individuality. As for its substance, any alteration constitutes a change
of identity: hence a substance cannot be said to grow, since it cannot retain
its identity through the process. So far, Posidonius accepts Epicharmus’ anal-
ogy with number and measures. In Posidonius’ view, however, something does
endure and constitute a proper subject of growth: and that is the peculiarly
qualified individual – e.g. Theon, whose uniquely indentifying characteristics
must be lifelong, despite the constant flux of its material substrate. Crucial
to this move is the idea that Theon, although constituted by his matter, is not
identical with it.
Let us skip through the evidence we have collected so far. In M IV 23–33,
Sextus attacks number conceived of as the result of the subtraction/addition
of a unit from/to a given number by showing that these are impossible.
The arguments used by Sextus against numerical subtraction and addition
were part of the arsenal used by some Pyrrhonian predecessors of his to show
that subtraction/addition in general are impossible (possibly in the context
of an attack on the notions of increase and decrease, or generation and sub-
traction). In these general arguments, numbers were used as paradigmatic
41 Stobaeus, Eclogae I, 177.21–178.14: Ποσειδώνιος δὲ φθορὰς καὶ γενέσεις τέτταρας εἶναί φησιν
ἐκ τῶν ὄντων εἰς τὰ ὄντα γιγνομένας. τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων καὶ τὴν εἰς ⟨τὰ⟩ οὐκ ὄντα,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν πρόσθεν, ἀπέγνωσαν ἀνύπαρκτον οὖσαν. τῶν δ’ εἰς ⟨τὰ⟩ ὄντα γινομένων μετα-
βολῶν τὴν μὲν εἶναι κατὰ διαίρεσιν, τὴν δὲ κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ κατὰ σύγχυσιν, τὴν δ’ ἐξ ὅλων,
λεγομένην δὲ κατ’ ἀνάλυσιν. τούτων δὲ τὴν κατ’ ἀλλοίωσιν περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν γίγνεσθαι, τὰς δὲ
ἄλλας τρεῖς περὶ τοὺς ποιοὺς λεγομένους τοὺς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐσίας γιγνομένους. ἀκολούθως δὲ τούτοις
καὶ τὰς γενέσεις συμβαίνειν. τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ
ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπ’ ἀριθμῶν καὶ μέτρων. καὶ συμβαίνειν ἐπὶ ⟨δὲ⟩
τῶν ἰδίως ποιῶν οἶον Δίωνος καὶ Θέωνος καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις γίνεσθαι. I accept the emen-
dations introduced by Long and Sedley to the text edited by Wachsmuth (The Hellenistic
Philosophers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, vol. 2, pp. 171–2); the transla-
tion is by Long and Sedley.
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examples of quantities. These arguments against addition and subtraction

are grounded on the claim that the subtraction or addition of a unit from/to
a given number n cause the destruction of n and the coming into being of a
new number.
In the second century BC, the Academics use a version of Epicharmus’
growing argument to show that increase and decrease, as characterised by
the Stoics, are not intelligible. This argument takes number as a paradigmatic
example of quantity, is grounded on the claim that the subtraction or addition
of a unit from/to a given number n causes the destruction of n and the coming
into being of a new number, and assumes the claim to hold for any quantity
whatsoever.
The Stoics (Chrysippus, and then Posidonius and Mnesarchus) react by
accepting that quantities, by virtue of addition and subtraction, do not change
but are destroyed and generated. However, they take to have found what
changes and grows: the peculiarly qualified individual. (So that Dion’s body
does not grow, but Dion does grow.)
Might it be the case that the Sextan arguments against addition and subtrac-
tion, which share with the Academic arguments against increase and decrease
the use of numbers as paradigms of quantities and the claim that addition
and subtraction cause the destruction and generation of numbers, have their
origin in the Academy? Let me be clearer. In Sextus we find arguments against
the concepts of generation and destruction (and ultimately against increase
and decrease and generation and destruction) which are grounded on the
claim that numbers do not grow, but are generated and destroyed by addition
and subtraction. In the Academics, we find arguments against the concepts of
growth and diminution based on the claim that numbers do not grow, but are
generated and destroyed by addition and destruction. The subject requires fur-
ther scrutiny; but, at this stage of the inquiry, a reasonable conjecture seems to
be that the ultimate origin of Sextus’ argument might lie in the Academy. That
is to say, Sextus might be drawing from Pyrrhonists who draw from Academics
who (take number as paradigmatic examples of quantities and) claim that
increase and decrease are impossible. And it is worth noting that Sextus, at
PH III 82–4, does use a version of Epicharmus’ puzzle applied to quantities.
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Conclusion
As a conclusion, let us step back from the close analysis of individual sections
of Against the Arithmeticians that we have been offering: let us consider the
Sextan text as a whole as well as in the context of the set of treatises to which
it belongs, Against the Professors, and reflect on the coherence of the project it
appears to stem from.
In his Against the Arithmeticians Sextus wants to attack an alleged discipline
or science: arithmetic. As in all the other treatises composing his Against the
Professors, Sextus does not aim at attacking a specific author or a specific book –
a specific version or specimen of the discipline; he rather attacks its general
presuppositions or features. Sextus wants to show that the art of arithmetic
does not exist – that what is called ἀριθμητικὴ τέχνη is not an art or a science at
all; and he wants to do that by showing that its alleged subject matter, that is to
say number, does not exist, insofar as the features which are ascribed to num-
ber are true of no object at all. These conclusions are to be understood as one
part of the equipollent structure in virtue of which Sextus purports to provoke
Pyrrhonian ἐποχή over the existence of arithmetic. Sextus undermines that art
by offering counterarguments to its principles – the definitions of unit and
number: for these counterarguments would lead one to suspend one’s judge-
ment as to whether numbers are real or not. In doing so, Sextus interacts with
Dogmatic philosophers of mathematics, who provided arguments in favour of
the standard definitions of unit and number, rather than with practising math-
ematicians, who could not and did not do so.
In his attack on the art of arithmetic, just as in his attack on all the other
disciplines targeted in Against the Professors, Sextus draws his arguments
from different sources, and his arguments appear – at least sometimes – to
be grounded on different presuppositions. This raises two interrelated ques-
tions. The first one, which we have in part dealt with in the course of our
analysis of the single sections of Against the Arithmeticians, is historical: which
sources did Sextus draw his arguments from, and which were the doctrines
and the authors targeted by these sources? The second question has to do with
the appropriateness of Sextus’ attack with regard to his target: was really num-
ber characterised by the different features presupposed by the arguments put
forward by Sextus? In order to get clearer on the matter, let us start by revising
the characteristics of the elements of arithmetic as they result both from the
description of them that Sextus offers in M IV 2–10 and from the presupposi-
tions of the argument attacking them that Sextus puts forward in 11–34.

Conclusion 191
In M IV 2–10, then, Sextus offers a sample of what he introduces as a

‘Pythagorean’ philosophy of number: the so-called ‘Derivation System’, in
which all beings in the universe are allegedly shown to derive from numbers,
and ultimately from two principles, the one and the two. Despite the fact that
Sextus and other later sources label the system as ‘Pythagorean’, the crucial
features of this doctrine appear to find their origin in Plato and in the Old
Academy. Of the four Sextan accounts of the system, the one provided in M
IV 2–10 as well as its couplet in M VII 92–109 probably derive as historical
doxography from Posidonius, while the presentation in M X 248–63 (and its
counterpart in PH III 151–6) draw from an older source which several scholars
identify as Xenocrates, with the intermediation of a neo-Pythagorean scholar
of the Hellenistic or Imperial era. In the account of the Derivation System
provided in M IV, the one is the principle (producing the structure) of all the
other numbers. By contrast, according to the other later accounts of the sys-
tem to be found in Sextus (M X and PH III) and elsewhere (the Pythagorean
Commentaries recorded or composed by Alexander Polyhistor and trans-
mitted by Diogenes Laertius in his Life of Pythagoras, the Life of Pythagoras
excerpted by Photius and the reports of the doxographer Aëtius), as well as
according to the Aristotelian description of the Platonic doctrine, the princi-
ples of numbers are two: the one and the indefinite two.
In M IV 11–20 Sextus offers a definition of one which he ascribes to Plato but
which does not appear in Plato’s extant writings, and then he attacks it. The
principle of all number, the one or unit, is characterised as a Platonic Form,
the Form of one, by sharing in which each thing is one thing and each uni-
versal item – things like man or animal – is both one thing and many things.
Furthermore, the Form of one identifies with none of the countable items and
exists independently from them. Sextus’ attack on one targets the principle
of number so conceived. In M IV 18, à propos the first cluster of arguments
addressed against the Form of one in 14–18, Sextus says that ‘the same should
be said for the two, the three and in general for all numbers’.1 So Sextus, here,
appears to treat all numbers in the same way as one – presupposing that in
the discipline he is attacking every number is characterised as a Platonic Form
or as a universal item existing independently from the countable particulars
sharing in it. That the argument addressed against the one understood as a
Form in M IV 14–8 may be applied to any number is also implied by the locus
similis in the Outlines (PH III 163: ‘Similarly, none of the other numbers will
1 Sextus, M IV 18: τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ λεκτέον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ δύο ἢ καὶ τρία καὶ καθόλου ἐπὶ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ, ἵνα
μὴ μηκύνωμεν.
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192 Conclusion
exist in its own right; for we can apply to each of the numbers the argument
here propounded by way of example in the case of the one’;2 cf. 156–7). Is
Sextus wrongly or captiously thinking that he can extend his attack on one
to all numbers, or is he justified in doing so, insofar as the doctrine he targets
takes or implies every number to be a Platonic Form?
In M IV 21–2 Sextus’ target is the number two, characterised as being gen-
erated or coming into being by the conjunction of two units. More precisely,
Sextus’ attack presupposes the number two to come into being as a result of
the juxtaposition/addition of units, just as a pair of things (say two apples
in the basket) comes to be as a result of their juxtaposition/addition. At the
end of this passage, Sextus indicates that the difficulty raised against the num-
ber two may be raised for any number, so that, because of this, no number
exists; and indeed, the general version of the argument in M IV 21–2, arguing
for the impossibility of conceiving any number, not just the number two, as a
conjunction of units, appears at M X 308–9.
This conception of number is at stake in Sextus’ attack on subtraction
(23–30) and addition (31–34). Sextus’ arguments, here, target number con-
ceived of as existing in virtue of the subtraction/addition of a unit from/to
a given number. They rely on several assumptions. Any natural number n is a
quantitative whole; units – i.e. a unit, and any aggregate of units (any number)
smaller than n – are n’s quantitative parts; the subtraction of a unit from a
given number (say, ten) or from a part of it (say, nine) are respectively a case
of subtracting a part (one) from its whole (ten) or from another part of the
same whole (nine). More precisely, Sextus’ arguments target numbers assimi-
lated to numbers of things, aggregates of units (μονάδων ἀθροισμός) existing in
time, coming to be and being destroyed as the result of the addition/subtrac-
tion of a unit, and addition and subtraction conceived of as acts performed
on such groups of items. At least a couple of arguments (those in 24–5 and
31–2) presuppose that number is conceived of as a Platonic Form or as a uni-
versal item like man or animal: for a puzzling distributive claim featured by
both arguments (if a unit is subtracted/added from/to a number n, then it
is subtracted/added from/to each of the n units) appears to be grounded on
this conception of number (if something happens to man, then it happens to
each and every man). Furthermore, the argument against addition in 31–2 is
grounded on the application to numbers of a Stoic mereological claim in vogue
in the Hellenistic era and ascribable to Posidonius or Mnesarchus: a concep-
tual whole is conceived together with any of its parts. So it seems as if Sextus’
2 Sextus, PH III 163: ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν ἕκαστος καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἔσται· χρῆσθαι γὰρ
ἔνεστιν ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῷ λόγῳ παραδειγματικῶς νῦν ἐπὶ τῆς μονάδος ἠρωτημένῳ.
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Conclusion 193
target, here, is number conceived of as a universal and characterised with ref-

erence to Stoic views. To this picture, we may add a remark about the origin of
the Sextan arsenal. Sextus appears to draw his arguments against numerical
subtraction and addition from some Pyrrhonian predecessors who used num-
bers as paradigmatic examples of quantities and employed these arguments in
a different context, and that is to say to attack the Dogmatic conceptions not of
number, but of addition and subtraction themselves, possibly in the context
of an attack on the Dogmatic notions of increase and decrease, or generation
and destruction. The ultimate origin of the Pyrrhonian arguments appears to
lie in the Academy: that is to say in the use, made by the Academics in the
second century BC, of a version of Epicharmus’ Growing Argument to show
that increase and decrease, as characterised by the Stoics, are not intelligible.
Let us suppose, as a working hypothesis, that Sextus’ attack is respect-
ful of and appropriate to its target – that he is attacking a doctrine in which
the principles of numbers, numbers, addition, and subtraction are actually
characterised by the features mentioned above, or by features which imply
them. Is this hypothesis verifiable or falsifiable – are there extant testimonies
of such a doctrine? Let us start from the more striking (and hard to swallow,
from a post-Fregean perspective) of these features: did some representatives of
Platonism claim that numbers are generated or come into being? Well, yes: and
the first among them was the founder of this tradition himself. For Plato was
tempted into the use of temporal and biological language in his account of the
relation of numbers to their principles, one and indefinite two. Aristotle often
reports that Plato refers to the generation of numbers: and if in some places the
reference is vague (Aristotle, Metaphysics Μ 6, 1080a14–16; 9, 1085b7), there are
many explicit uses of the verb γίγνεσθαι in the sense of coming into being (Α 6,
987b22–35; Μ 7, 1082b30; Ν 1, 1087b7; 3, 1091a4–5), and Aristotle relies on them
to make a joke about the parenthood of numbers implied by Plato’s way of
talking about numbers (988a1 ff.). More seriously, and more interestingly from
a philosophical point of view, Aristotle argues that Plato, or the Platonists, are
committed by their language to the view that the generation of numbers is a
temporal process (1091a23–8)3 – and therefore that numbers are in time.
3 Aristotle, Met. Ν 4, 1091a23–28: ‘They [scl. the Platonists] say that there is no generation of
odd numbers, which clearly implies that there is generation of even ones: and some hold that
the even is constructed first out of unequals – the Great and Small – when they are equalised.
Therefore the inequality must apply to them before they are equalised. If they had always
been equalised they would not have been unequal before; for there is nothing prior to that
which has always been. Hence evidently it is not for theoretical reasons that they introduce
the generation of numbers’ (Τοῦ μὲν οὖν περιττοῦ γένεσιν οὔ φασιν, ὡς δηλονότι τοῦ ἀρτίου οὔσης
γενέσεως· τὸν δ’ ἄρτιον πρῶτον ἐξ ἀνίσων τινὲς κατασκευάζουσι τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ ἰσασθέντων.
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194 Conclusion
Was Plato’s view that numbers are generated or come into being adopted in
the Platonist tradition? It was: and a couple of Platonist accounts of the way in
which numbers are generated may be found in Sextus’ reports of and attacks
on the ‘Pythagorean’ doctrine in PH III and in M X. According to the first
account, ‘the indefinite two comes from the one by addition [κατὰ ἐπισύνθεσιν]’
(153), and from the one and the indefinite two all the other numbers are gen-
erated (154). Some details of this second process are provided a little later: all
the other numbers, the so-called ‘composite’ numbers, are compounded and
generated from the one and the indefinite two, the so-called ‘superordinate’
numbers, by combination: and since the derivation of the indefinite two from
the one and that of the composite numbers from the superordinate numbers
are both cases of generation or coming into being of items, Sextus feels free to
apply the argument he has addressed to the former against the latter (166). M
X 276–7 offers a second and (at least prima facie) different Platonist account
of the relation of numbers to their principles. According to this, from the first
unit and the indefinite two the one in numbers and the two in numbers come
into being – the one from the first unit and the two from the unit and the
indefinite two. And the other numbers were also produced from the first one
and the indefinite two – the latter always generating twos, the former always
limiting. Whatever the differences between the two accounts, however, they
are not relevant for Sextus. For Sextus’ attack on the two in 302–9 is grounded
on a point which the second account indisputably shares with the first: the fact
that the number two, as any other number, comes into being or is generated.
But let us go back to Against the Arithmeticians. Are there extant traces or
testimonies of Platonist doctrines analogous to the one witnessed by Sextus in
this treatise? And can we get a bit clearer on the nature and identity of Sextus’
target? Here are some remarks which (a) the analysis provided in chapters 1–6
above does not depend on, and (b) are conjectures which certainly do not pro-
vide an exhaustive answer to the questions asked, but hint at three research
paths which may deserve further scrutiny.
ἀνάγκη οὖν πρότερον ὑπάρχειν τὴν ἀνισότητα αὐτοῖς τοῦ ἰσασθῆναι· εἰ δ’ ἀεὶ ἦσαν ἰσασμένα, οὐκ ἂν
ἦσαν ἄνισα πρότερον (τοῦ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὐκ ἔστι πρότερον οὐθέν), ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι ἕνε-
κεν ποιοῦσι τὴν γένεσιν τῶν ἀριθμῶν). According to Pseudo-Alexander (819.37–820.6), Aristotle
would be stigmatising, here, Xenocrates’ effort to understand Plato’s talking of the ‘genera-
tion of numbers’ as referring not to a chronological process, but to logical facts – an effort
analogous to the one dispensed by Speusippus and Xenocrates to interpret Plato’s talking
of the generation of the universe in the Timaeus (cf. Aristotle, De caelo I 9, 279b32–280a2).
For a discussion of this topic and these passages by Aristotle and Pseudo-Alexander see
now T. Bénatouïl, ‘Speusippe et Xénocrate ont-ils systématisé la cosmologie du Timée?’, in
M.-A. Gavray and A. Michalewski (eds.), Les principes cosmologiques du platonisme. Origines,
influences et systématisation, Turnhout, Brepols, 2017, pp. 19–38, at pp. 30 ff.
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Conclusion 195
First: as we have already emphasised, in the account of the Derivation

System provided in M IV the one or unit is the principle of all the other num-
bers – a feature which differentiates it from all the other accounts, where the
numbers are produced by the one and the indefinite two. Now this feature,
along with other features characterising the arithmetical doctrine attacked by
Sextus in M IV, may be found in the work of a Platonist philosopher, Sextus’
roughly contemporary Theo of Smyrna (first half of the second century AD).
At the beginning of the arithmetical section of his Mathematics Useful for
Understanding Plato, Theo offers some introductory remarks on a few funda-
mental arithmetical notions. These include a disjunctive definition of number
and a characterisation of unit (18.3–8), several arguments in favour of the
indivisibility of the unit (18.9–19.13), some thoughts on the status of unit and
numbers as opposed to that of one and numerables (19.13–20.5), as well as a
rich, albeit at times confused, doxographical section on the notions of unit and
one (20.5–21.19).
In the first three parts of his arithmetical introduction, Theo reports views
that he appears to endorse (some of which he will rehearse later, in the section
of his work devoted to music),4 while in the fourth part he puts forward several
scholarly tenets alternative to his own; in both cases, he largely draws from
material belonging to a pre-existent Platonist arithmetical tradition. The more
interesting views for our aims are the characterisations of number and unit
endorsed by Theo, as well as a couple of tenets he reports in his doxographical
section. Theo adopts the view that the unit ‘is the limiting case of quantity –
principle and element of numbers, that which is left behind when multiplicity
is diminished by the subtraction of each number in turn, and which thus takes
on the characteristics of fixity and stability’.5 Within this system, the two plays
no ontologically foundational role – it is clearly not on the same level as the
unit.6 The essential character of the unit, on which depends the fact that it is
4 Theo of Smyrna, Expositio 93.17–106.11: see especially 100.1–15.

5 Theo of Smyrna, Expositio 18.5–8: μονὰς δέ ἐστι περαίνουσα ποσότης ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον τῶν ἀριθ-
μῶν, ἥτις μειουμένου τοῦ πλήθους κατὰ τὴν ὑφαίρεσιν τοῦ παντὸς ἀριθμοῦ στερηθεῖσα μονήν τε καὶ
στάσιν λαμβάνει. The italics are mine. Petrucci (Teone di Smirne. Expositio rerum mathemati-
carum ad legendum Platonem utilium, Sankt Augustin, Akademia Verlag, 2012, p. 70) is right
in observing that Hiller’s unjustified expunction of ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον τῶν ἀριθμῶν is hardly
acceptable: for the unit is repeatedly characterised as the principle of numbers later in the
text, both in the part including the views adopted by Theo (19.21) and in the doxographi-
cal section (20.12 and 24.23). Delattre also translates the gloss, without mentioning Hiller’s
emendation. For the translation that I have provided cf. J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists: A
Study of Platonism 80 BC to AD 220, London, Duckworth, 19922, p. 350.
6 Thus later, in the arithmetical passage to be found in the section devoted to music, Theo
will put forward a sharp contrast between the unit, characterised as ‘principle of everything’
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196 Conclusion
a principle, is its indivisibility, which is argued for by means of several proofs;

by contrast, any number is composed by and reducible to units – for it is an
aggregate of units.7 Numbers are generated or come into being: the doubling
of the unit that brings about the two is called ‘first change and growth’;8 and
‘the two, joining the unit, generates the three’.9 To numbers and their principle,
unit, which are objects of thought (νοητά), correspond respectively numerable
items and their principle, one, which are objects of perception (αἰσθητά) and
bodies. Whereas number ‘itself’ (say the five itself) is quantity in the objects
of thought, the corresponding numerable items (say five horses) is quantity
in the perceptible; and unit is characterised as the partless, intelligible Idea or
Form of one.10
Theo’s doxographical section includes several scholarly views on the prin-
ciple or principles of numbers alternatives to the one he adopts. He starts by
distinguishing some ‘modern’ thinkers, who take the principles of numbers in
perceptible items to be just the unit and the two, from ‘Pythagoras’ followers’,
who take them to be all the numerical terms set out in the series (that is to say,
the number three as the principle of each three in the perceptible items, and so
on for any number). According to a third view, the principle of the numbers in
the perceptible items is the unit, and that is to say the one in itself and by itself:
and ‘cause of every intelligible and ingenerated item, the nature of Ideas, God, the intel-
lect, beauty, virtue, and each of the intelligible substances’, and the two, characterised as
deriving from the unit and as being ‘cause of the matter and of every perceptible item’:
cf. Expositio 99.24–100.8: ἡ μὲν γὰρ μονὰς ἀρχὴ πάντων καὶ κυριωτάτη πασῶν … καὶ ἐξ ἧς
πάντα, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐξ οὐδενός, ἀδιαίρετος καὶ δυνάμει πάντα, ἀμετάβλητος, μηδεπώποτε τῆς αὐτῆς
ἐξισταμένη φύσεως κατὰ τὸν πολλαπλασιασμόν· καθ’ ἣν πᾶν τὸ νοητὸν καὶ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἡ τῶν
ἰδεῶν φύσις καὶ ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν νοητῶν οὐσιῶν,
οἷον αὐτὸ καλόν, αὐτὸ δίκαιον, αὐτὸ [τὸ] ἴσον· ἕκαστον γὰρ τούτων ὡς ἓν καὶ καθ’ ἑαυτὸ νοεῖται
… with 100.9–12: πρώτη δὲ αὔξη καὶ μεταβολὴ ἐκ μονάδος εἰς δυάδα κατὰ διπλασιασμὸν τῆς
μονάδος, καθ’ ἣν ὕλη καὶ πᾶν τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ αὔξησιςτὸ αἰσθητὸν
καὶ ἡ γένεσις καὶ ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ αὔξησις καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ κοινωνία καὶ τὸ πρός τι.
7 Theo of Smyrna, Expositio 18.3–5: ἀριθμός ἐστι σύστημα μονάδων, ἢ προποδισμὸς πλήθους
ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχόμενος καὶ ἀναποδισμὸς εἰς μονάδα καταλήγων.
8 Theo of Smyrna, Expositio 100.9–10: πρώτη δὲ αὔξη καὶ μεταβολὴ ἐκ μονάδος εἰς δυάδα κατὰ
διπλασιασμὸν τῆς μονάδος …: for the full passage see n. 6.
9 Theo of Smyrna, Expositio 100.13: ἡ δὲ δυὰς συνελθοῦσα τῇ μονάδι γίνεται τριάς.
10 Theo of Smyrna, Expositio 19.14–20.5: ᾗ δὲ διενήνοχεν ἀριθμὸς καὶ ἀριθμητόν, ταύτῃ καὶ μονὰς
καὶ ἕν. ἀριθμὸς μὲν γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐν νοητοῖς ποσόν, οἷον αὐτὰ εʹ καὶ αὐτὰ ιʹ, οὐ σώματά τινα οὐδὲ
αἰσθητά, ἀλλὰ νοητά· ἀριθμητὸν δὲ τὸ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς ποσόν, ὡς ἵπποι εʹ, βόες εʹ, ἄνθρωποι εʹ. καὶ
μονὰς τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέα ἡ νοητή, ἥ ἐστιν ἄτομος· ἓν δὲ τὸ ἐν αἰσθητοῖς καθ’ ἑαυτὸ λεγό-
μενον, οἷον εἷς ἵππος, εἷς ἄνθρωπος. ὥστ’ εἴη ἂν ἀρχὴ τῶν μὲν ἀριθμῶν ἡ μονάς, τῶν δὲ ἀριθμητῶν
τὸ ἕν· καὶ τὸ ἓν ὡς ἐν αἰσθητοῖς τέμνεσθαί φασιν εἰς ἄπειρον, οὐχ ὡς ἀριθμὸν οὐδὲ ὡς ἀρχὴν ἀριθ-
μοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὡς αἰσθητόν. ὥστε ἡ μὲν μονὰς νοητὴ οὖσα ἀδιαίρετος, τὸ δὲ ἓν ὡς αἰσθητὸν εἰς ἄπειρον
τμητόν. καὶ τὰ ἀριθμητὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν εἴη ἂν διαφέροντα τῷ τὰ μὲν σώματα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα.
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Conclusion 197
this is further qualified as the first essence and Idea of the one, by sharing in
which each of the items which exists is said to be one thing.11 A little later, Theo
reports a fourth view, shared by ‘most of the people’. These posit as principle
what they call ‘the unit itself’ and, interchangeably, ‘the one’, meaning by that
the first and intelligible essence of the one, which makes of each thing one
thing: for everything is one thing by share in it.12
It is pretty clear that both the view adopted by Theo and the alternative
scholarly tenets he reports13 present similarities with the doctrine described
and attacked by Sextus in M IV. Thus, the characterisation of unit both as
principle of all number and as Idea of one, its essential character of being indi-
visible, and the characterisation of number both as an aggregate of units and
as a transcendent intelligible item adopted by Theo are to be found in Sextus
too. However, in Sextus’ M IV there is no trace of the sharp distinction between
unit as the principle of number and one as the principle of numerables which
is found in Theo’s view; on the contrary, Sextus uses interchangeably ‘one’ and
‘unit’ to indicate the Idea of one. In this respect, the doctrine attacked by Sextus
rather resembles the one described in the two scholarly positions reported by
Theo: for they both call the principle of number ‘one’ and ‘unit’, and they both
identify it in the Idea or Form of one – as Sextus does in his attack.
Where do the arithmetical view adopted by Theo and the couple of alter-
native tenets he mentions come from? In chapter 1, along the lines of the
11 Theo of Smyrna, Expositio 20.6–18: ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀρχὰς ἀριθμῶν οἱ μὲν ὕστερόν φασι τήν τε μονάδα
καὶ τὴν δυάδα, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου πάσας κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς τὰς τῶν ὅρων ἐκθέσεις, δι’ ὧν ἄρτιοί τε
καὶ περιττοὶ νοοῦνται, οἷον τῶν ἐν αἰσθητοῖς τριῶν ἀρχὴν τὴν τριάδα καὶ τῶν ἐν αἰσθητοῖς τεσσά-
ρων πάντων ἀρχὴν τὴν τετράδα καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμῶν κατὰ ταὐτά. οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων
ἀρχὴν τὴν μονάδα φασὶ καὶ τὸ ἓν πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένον διαφορᾶς ὡς ἐν ἀριθμοῖς, μόνον αὐτὸ ἕν,
οὐ τὸ ἕν, τουτέστιν οὐ τόδε τὸ ποιὸν καὶ διαφοράν τινα πρὸς ἕτερον ἓν προσειληφός, ἀλλ’αὐτὸ
καθ’αὑτὸ ἕν. οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἀρχή τε καὶ μέτρον εἴη τῶν ὑφ’ ἑαυτὸ ὄντων, καθὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων
ἓν λέγεται, μετασχὸν τῆς πρώτης τοῦ ἑνὸς οὐσίας τε καὶ ἰδέας. Petrucci (Teone di Smirna, cit.,
p. 320) takes the second view mentioned in this passage to imply that the numbers of the
numerical series have no principle. I wonder whether this is right – I do not know of any
Platonist account of number implying that there is no principle of numbers, and I cannot
see what this position would have to do with the examples provided in the passage. I take
the second view rather to suggest that the principles of numbers in the countable items are
the members of the numerical series – as opposed to the first view, according to which
they are the unit and the two, and to the third view, according to which the numbers in
the countable items have just one principle, the unit.
12 Theo of Smyrna, Expositio 20.20–21.3: οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι προστιθέασι τῷ μονάδα αὐτὴν τὴν πρώτην
μονάδα, ὡς οὔσης τινὸς οὐ πρώτης μονάδος, ἥ ἐστι κοινότερον καὶ αὐτὴ μονὰς καὶ ἕν—λέγουσι
δὴ καὶ τὸ ἕν—, τουτέστιν ἡ πρώτη καὶ νοητὴ οὐσία τοῦ ἑνός, ἑκάστου τῶν πραγμάτων παρέ-
χουσα ἕν· μετοχῇ γὰρ αὐτῆς ἕκαστον ἓν καλεῖται.
13 It is in particular to the third and to the fourth of the above-mentioned scholarly tenets
which I refer here and in the rest of the conclusion.
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198 Conclusion
seminal contributions by Burkert, we have argued that the ultimate source of

the doctrinal core of these views lies in the Old Academy. What about their
intermediate source: can we identify or date the doctrinal phase between the
Old Academy (fourth century BC) and Theo (second century AD) which they
stem from? Let us start by asking the question à propos the view adopted by
Theo. The discussion on one and unit including this view has been taken to
come from antecedent sources. Dillon suggested that Theo draws from the
middle Platonist Thrasyllus (early first century AD), astronomer of the emperor
Tiberius.14 More recently, and alternatively, Petrucci has argued that Theo’s
source for this section is the neo-Pythagorean philosopher Moderatus of Gades
(first century AD).15 In his Anthology, the doxographer Stobaeus (fifth century
AD) ascribes to Moderatus a characterisation of number and unit wholly simi-
lar to the one put forward and adopted by Theo, with one crucial difference:
the former lacks the characterisation of unit in terms of ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον τῶν
ἀριθμῶν to be found in the latter.16 The passage quoted by Stobaeus appears
to be hardly compatible with the doctrine of Moderatus as we know it from
other sources;17 furthermore, Moderatus is reported to have written a volumi-
nous doxographical work on the opinions of the Pythagoreans.18 Thus, one way
to explain (i) the similarity of the passages in Theo’s Expositio and Stobaeus’
Anthologium, (ii) the presence of the gloss mentioned above in Theo and its
absence in Stobaeus, and (iii) the incompatibility of the passage in Stobaeus
with the doctrine of Moderatus is to think that Stobaeus is not quoting from
Moderatus’ own doctrine, but from his massive doxographical work; that Theo
is quoting from that work too; and that Theo adds the gloss ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον
τῶν ἀριθμῶν as his own doctrinal contribution to the variant of the arithmetical
doctrine reported by Moderatus. This gloss, then, would be an elaboration, on
Theo’s part, of material of an Academic origin that he inherited indirectly –
and that is to say, via the systematisation of Moderatus.
The view adopted by Theo is doubtless a monistic one, so one may won-
der whether it can be assimilated into or taken to show any link with other
14 See J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists, cit., p. 398.

15 See F. Petrucci, Teone di Smirna, cit., at pp. 41, 313–14.
16 Moderatus ap. Stobaeus, Eclogae I, 21.8–14: Ἔστι δ’ ἀριθμός, ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν, σύστημα μονά-
δων, ἢ προποδισμὸς πλήθους ἀπὸ μονάδος ἀρχόμενος, καὶ ἀναποδισμὸς εἰς μονάδα καταλήγων·
μονάδας δὲ περαίνουσα ποσότης, ἥτις μειουμένου τοῦ πλήθους κατὰ τὴν ὑφαίρεσιν παντὸς ἀριθ-
μοῦ στερηθεῖσα μονήν τε καὶ στάσιν λαμβάνει. Περαιτέρω γὰρ ἡ μονὰς τῆς ποσότητος οὐκ ἰσχύει
ἀναποδίζειν …
17 See F. Petrucci, Teone di Smirna, cit., p. 314.
18 In his Life of Pythagoras, 48, Porphyry mentions a work by Moderatus in ten books, where
the author included the ἀρέσκοντα of the Pythagoreans.
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Conclusion 199
monistic systems we know.19 We have already mentioned that the view put
forward by Theo is hardly compatible with one monistic system – and that
is to say, the one ascribed to Moderatus. It may be tempting to read, in the
couple ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον, a reflection of the monistic systems put forward by
Eudorus (first century BC) and Plutarch (first century AD). However, Eudorus
distinguishes between an ἀρχή (the one) and two στοιχεῖα (the unit and the
two),20 and Plutarch characterises first the one and the indefinite two as ἀνώ-
ταται ἀρχαί, and then the two as στοιχεῖον – and both perspectives appear to
be radically different from the one adopted by Theo. For neither Eudorus nor
Plutarch understand the unit as the minimal quantitative part of reality, and
the reason why they take the one to be the principle is not that it possesses this
feature, but that it can be predicated of any existing item whatsoever. By con-
trast, in Theo’s system what is principle (the unit) is so not insofar as it is more
general of what it is principle of, but insofar as it is the minimal quantitative
part of what it is principle of. And the closest remote antecedent of this view
appears to be Xenocrates, who takes the part to be prior to the whole (Fr. 42) –
a claim that justifies the view that the στοιχεῖον – the part – is an ἀρχή.21 Thus,
Theo appears to ground his view on some well-established traditional notions
and theories he has inherited from the Old Academy via Moderatus.
What about the two Pythagorean tenets reported by Theo and mentioned
above? As far as the first of them is concerned, the emphasis on the καθ’αὑτὸ
character of the one might be taken to point in the direction of Eudorus’
monistic system. However, one and unit are not sharply distinguished, and
only if they were so would it be possible to associate this tenet with the system
typical of Eudorus. The view that the one is the cause of the unity of every
existing thing, which shares in it, is widespread and can be traced back to such
a well-known source as Euclid: as a consequence, it provides no contribution
to the identification of the authorship of the view. Thus, it appears that it is
impossible to identify the specific ancestor for the tenet at stake, and that one
19 The question is duly tackled by Petrucci (Teone di Smirna, cit., pp. 311–13, 320–2): the
remarks that follow are indebted to his reflection.
20 On Eudorus’ principles cf. chapter 2, n. 17 above.
21 Cf. Xenocrates, Fr. 42 Isnardi Parente2 (English translation by S. Pines, ‘A New Fragment
of Xenocrates and Its Implications’, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 51
(2), 1961, pp. 3–34, at pp. 4–5): ‘Alexander says: Xenocrates says: If the relation between a
species and a genus is like the relation between a part and a whole, and if a part is anterior
and prior to the whole in virtue of a natural priority (for if a part is sublated, the whole is
sublated, this in view of the fact that no whole will remain if one of its parts is lacking),
whereas a part will not be ⟨necessarily⟩ sublated if ⟨its⟩ whole is sublated (being possible
that certain parts of the whole be annulled whereas others remain), a species is likewise
indubitably prior to the genus’.
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200 Conclusion
has to confine oneself to observing that the general spirit of the view is monis-
tic. Theo probably refers to a lost scholastic view of which we have no further
trace.
As for the second Pythagorean tenet mentioned above, the features it
ascribes to the principle (that of being a ‘first’ unit, as opposed to a ‘second’
unit which corresponds to the numerical one, and that of making of every
existing item one thing) are also to be found in Sextus, M X 261 and 276. For
Sextus talks about a first unit and clearly distinguishes it from the one in num-
ber – as does Photius. Again, the features of the doctrine we find in Sextus and
in Theo may have been typical of a lost moment of a fragmentary monistic
tradition – an important moment, if, as Theo indicates, the doctrinal position
at stake was shared by ‘most’ of the scholars.
The research path we have followed so far has led us to the conclusion
that the features of the doctrine discussed by Sextus in M IV belong to now
lost monistic variants of it presumably datable to either the first century BC or
the first century AD. Some sections of Sextus’ text further encourage the first
of these two options. We have seen that Sextus’ arguments against number
conceived of as the result of the addition/subtraction of a unit to/from a given
number presuppose that, when a unit is added to/subtracted from a number
n, n ceases to exist and a new number (n +1 or n −1) comes into being. We
have argued that this conception of number is characteristic of the Growing
Argument ascribed to Epicharmus and used by the Academics against the
Stoics in the second century BC. For this argument presupposes that when we
add/subtract a unit to/from a number n, n does not persist and grow (or dimin-
ish), but ceases to exist and is replaced by another number, n +1 or n -1, which
comes into being – and that the same holds for material objects like men. As
Sedley well puts it to illustrate the argument,
Take a man who is composed of n particles. On a given day his body

consumes 20,000 particles of food and expels 19,900 particles. He now
consists of n + 100 particles. Is he still the same man? Like Epicharmus,
the Academic sceptics hope to persuade us that he is not, and like
Epicharmus they invoke the parallel of numbers and measures. Take a
number, n, add 20,000 and subtract 19,900, leaving n + 100. What has
happened to your original number? You cannot intelligibly say ‘It’s still
there, but it’s grown.’ You can only say that it has been replaced by a dif-
ferent number. So too, if the analogy is valid, the man has been replaced
by a different man … The whole question is whether material objects and
numbers do behave alike in this respect.22
22 D.N. Sedley, ‘The Stoic Criterion of Identity’, Phronesis 27 (1982), pp. 255–75, at pp. 256–7.
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Conclusion 201
Furthermore, and more importantly for our aims, this conception of number
appears to be characteristic also of the Stoic reply to this argument – and that
is to say, of the view reported by Stobaeus and ascribed to Posidonius that Long
and Sedley read as providing a reply to this argument:
The substance neither grows nor diminishes through addition or sub-

traction, but simply alters, just as in the case of numbers and measures.
(Posidonius ap. Stobaeus, Eclogae I, 178.10–13)23
According to this account, Posidonius accepts the Academic analogy between

numbers and material objects: that is to say, he accepts that numbers neither
grow nor diminish in virtue of addition or subtraction, but alter – that they
are destroyed and replaced by other numbers; and he further accepts that
if you make any addition to or subtraction from an undefined lump of mat-
ter, it thereby, strictly speaking, ceases to be the same lump of matter. If this
interpretation of the Stoic reply to the Academics is correct, then we have
extra-Sextan evidence that the conception of numbers presupposed by Sextus’
attack on addition and subtraction was held by Posidonius: that it was adopted
not only in a (middle) Platonist context, as the passages from Theo examined
above suggest, but also in some Stoic context around the first century BC. With
respect to this issue, it is convenient to recall that other sections of Sextus’ text
betray traces of Stoic handling: for, as we have argued earlier, Sextus’ presenta-
tion of the mathematical disciplines in M IV 1 at least appear to have a Stoic
colour, his account of the Pythagorean doctrine in M IV 2–10 and M VII 92–109
is probably dependent on Posidonius, and his attack on number in M IV 31–2
appears to be based on a mereological claim in vogue in Hellenistic Stoicism.
What did Posidonius’ position on the generation and destruction of num-
bers amount to, exactly? The question is hard to answer, given the scarcity of
the extant evidence on the Stoic theory of generation. The only Stoic classifica-
tion which survives (other than the one we find in Stobaeus) is a tripartition
in διαίρεσις, σύγχυσις and ἀναίρεσις ascribed to Boethus and recorded by Philo,
De Aeternititate Mundi 79 ff. (SVF III Boeth. 7). There is also an implicit divi-
sion of διαίρεσις and σύγχυσις attributed to Zeno and Chrysippus in Stobaeus,
Eclogae I xi 5a (I, 132.26–133.11).24 None of these texts, however, provides
23 Posidonius ap. Stobaeus, Eclogae I, 178.10–13: τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν οὔτ’ αὔξεσθαι οὔτε μειοῦσθαι
κατὰ πρόσθεσιν ἢ ἀφαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καθάπερ ἐπ’ ἀριθμῶν καὶ μέτρων. For
Long and Sedley’s interpretation of Posidonius’ view see The Hellenistic Philosophers,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1, 1987, pp. 172–3.
24 Cf. I.G. Kidd, Posidonius, vol. II.I: The Commentary: Testimonia and Fragments 1–149,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 386.
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202 Conclusion
additional details to any Stoic account of the generation and destruction

of numbers.
Finally, a third research path appears to encourage the conclusion that the
arguments used by Sextus in M IV were originally directed against a Dogmatic
position datable to no later than the first century BC. As we know, the basic
structure of Sextus’ overall attack on the art of arithmetic in M IV amounts to
denying the existence of such a discipline on the ground of the inexistence
of its alleged subject matter: there is no art of arithmetic (M IV 1), since what
this discipline is supposed to deal with, number, does not exist (M IV 1; cf.
M IV 10, 20, 23, 26, 34). In commenting on M IV 23–34, we have argued that
there are textual reasons to believe that Sextus draws some of his arguments
from some Pyrrhonian predecessors. Furthermore, as noticed by Blank,25
in a couple of passages of his Against the Professors, M I 1–7 and M VI 4–6,
Sextus distinguishes between two kinds of arguments which he uses against
the τέχναι: a first one, of a Dogmatic (in many cases Epicurean) origin, attacks
their usefulness for achieving wisdom; a second one, of a Pyrrhonian origin,
attacks their fundamental tenets – definitions, theorems, hypotheses – and
shows that they are incoherent, or that the objects they deal with (for instance,
in the case of musical theory, tunes and rhythms) do not exist. Thus, we may
ask who, among Sextus’ Pyrrhonian predecessors, may have argued that num-
ber does not exist – or, more generally, who may have held claims of the form
‘X does not exist’ (where ‘X’ denotes a non-evident object).
Now conclusions of this form are also typical of some portions of the account
of scepticism offered by Diogenes Laertius in the ninth book of his Lives.26
Throughout DL IX 90–101 – the section devoted to the Pyrrhonian objec-
tions to the Dogmatic tenets, as far as proofs (90–1), criteria of truth (94–5),
sign-inferences (96–7), causes (97–9), motion (99), learning and teaching
(100), coming into being (100), and naturalistic ethics (101) are concerned –
Diogenes presents the Pyrrhonists as rejecting certain theses – as maintaining
that certain items the Dogmatists hold views about simply do not exist. Having
25 D. Blank, Sextus Empiricus, Against the Grammarians, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998,
pp. xl–xliv, xlix–l; cf. J. Barnes, ‘Scepticism and the Arts’, in id., Proof, Knowledge, and
Scepticism. Essays in Ancient Philosophy III, ed. by M. Bonelli, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 2014 (first published in R.J. Hankinson (ed.), Method, Medicine and Metaphysics,
Edmonton (Alberta), Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988), pp. 512–35, at pp. 515–18,
525–7, 530–1; see the Introduction, section 2.
26 As noticed by J. Barnes: see ‘Diogenes Laertius on Pyrrhonism’ in his Mantissa. Essays in
Ancient Philosophy IV, ed. by M. Bonelli, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2015 (first published in
ANRW II 36.6), pp. 510–83, at pp. 522–4; on DL IX see K.M. Vogt (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism
in Diogenes Laertius, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2015.
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Conclusion 203
introduced the whole section by indicating that the sceptics did away with the
items mentioned above (90), Diogenes goes on mentioning that the sceptics
‘did away with the criterion’ (94), ‘do away with causes’ (97), ‘did away with
learning’ (100)27 and ascribing to them conclusions such as ‘signs do not exist’
(96), ‘there is no cause’ (98, 99), ‘there is no such thing as motion’ (99), ‘there
is no generation’ (100), ‘there is nothing that is good or bad by nature’ (101).28
Since Sextus does not depict the Pyrrhonists as negative Dogmatists of this
sort, but rather as suspenders of judgement, it is possible that Diogenes simply
misrepresents Pyrrhonism. It is also possible, however, that he describes a vari-
ant of scepticism different from the one reported by Sextus. In favour of this
possibility there is evidence in other texts – most notably in Photius’ summary
of Aenesidemus’ Pyrrhonian Arguments – that some Pyrrhonists did reject and
deny certain Dogmatic statements. At Bibl. 212 170b3–36, Photius presents the
arguments put forward by Aenesidemus against the doctrines of rival schools
in the three areas of logic, physics, and ethics in books 2–8 of his work. Photius
only mentions the conclusions Aenesidemus arrives at: and these are that
each of the philosophical items under discussion is either unknowable or, in
certain cases, does not exist. In particular, in the fourth book Aenesidemus
‘says that signs, as we call evident items when they reveal non-evident ones,
do not exist at all, and that those who believe that they exist are carried away
by ungrounded rashness’; ‘the fifth book presents wrestling holds for raising
puzzles against causes, letting nothing be the cause of nothing, and asserting
that those who give causal explanations are deceived’; and in the eighth and
last book Aenesidemus ‘opposes the goal, not allowing either happiness or
pleasure or wisdom or any other goal that any of the philosophical sects would
posit, but saying that the goal whose praise all of them sing does not exist’
(Bibl. 212 170b12–14, 17–20, 30–5).29
27 Ἀνῄρουν δ’ οὗτοι καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ κριτήριον καὶ σημεῖον καὶ αἴτιον καὶ κίνησιν καὶ μάθη-
σιν καὶ γένεσιν καὶ τὸ φύσει τι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν (DL IX 90); Ἀνῄρουν δὲ καὶ τὸ κριτήριον
(94); Ἀναιροῦσι δὲ τὸ αἴτιον (97); Ἀνῄρουν δὲ καὶ μάθησιν (100).
28 Σημεῖόν τε οὐκ εἶναι (DL IX 96); οὐκ ἄρα ἔστι αἴτιον (98, 99); Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστι (99);
Οὐδὲ μὴν γένεσίς ἐστι (100); οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν (101).
29 Photius, Bibliotheca 212 170b12–14 : Ἐν δὲ τῷ δʹσημεῖα μὲν ὥσπερ τὰ φανερά φαμεν τῶν ἀφανῶν,
οὐδ’ ὅλως εἶναί φησιν, ἠπατῆσθαι δὲ κενῇ προσπαθείᾳ τοὺς οἰομένους … 17–20: Προβάλλεται
αὐτῷ καὶ ὁ εʹ λόγος τὰς κατὰ τῶν αἰτίων ἀπορητικὰς λαβάς, μηδὲν μὲν μηδενὸς αἴτιον ἐνδιδοὺς
εἶναι, ἠπατῆσθαι δὲ τοὺς αἰτιολογοῦντας φάσκων … 30–5: Ὁ δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι καὶ ηʹ κατὰ τοῦ τέλους
ἐνίσταται, μήτε τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν μήτε τὴν ἡδονὴν μήτε τὴν φρόνησιν μήτ’ ἄλλο τι τέλος ἐπιχωρῶν
εἶναι, ὅπερ ἄν τις τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν αἱρέσεων δοξάσειεν, ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς οὐκ εἶναι τέλος τὸ πᾶσιν
ὑμνούμενον. Translation by R. Polito (Aenesidemus of Cnossos. Testimonia, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 167), modified; for some useful commentatory notes
on these lines (to which the account that follows is partly indebted) see pp. 168–72.
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204 Conclusion
Woodruff, isolating this set of plainly negative statements, suggests that

Aenesidemus’ arguments did not propose to counterbalance the Dogmatists’
own and bring about suspension of judgement, but rather to establish negative
conclusions of the form ‘X does not exist’ and show that the Dogmatists were
wrong.30 According to Woodruff, Anesidemus’ scepticism is refutational, and
admits the drawing of certain negative conclusions, paradigmatically of the
form ‘X is not by nature F’, construed as the denial of a general claim about X’s
invariant nature. Bett understands Aenesidemus along similar lines and sees
extant traces of this scepticism in some parts of Sextus’ corpus.31 Schofield,
however, has more recently defended the traditional view that Aenesidemus’
attitude is essentially the same as Sextus’ as far as suspension of judgement is
concerned, by suggesting that the assertions of non-existence that Woodruff
takes as instances of Aenesidemus’ negative conclusions are meant to show
that ‘however strong the arguments for positive answers on philosophical
questions, there are powerful arguments also for negative conclusions’, thereby
producing helplessness to decide one way or another.32 Similarly, Hankinson
takes Aenesidemus to anticipate Sextan Pyrrhonism in arguing on both sides
of an issue to establish an equipollent disagreement as a means of provok-
ing ἐποχή, and Photius to misunderstand (and misrepresent) the structure of
Aenesidemus’ scepticism.33
If conclusions of the form ‘X does not exist’, in the Pyrrhonian tradition
preceding Sextus, are typical of Aenesidemus (whatever role they play in his
modus philosophandi), then it is tempting to think that the source of Sextus’
Pyrrhonian arguments in M IV, which are characterised by conclusions of this
form, is either Aenesidemus or some post-Aenesidemean Pyrrhonist(s). In the
first case, we may further conclude that the arguments used by Sextus origi-
nally attacked Aenesidemus’ contemporary or antecedent adversaries – so
that their original target cannot be dated later than the first century BC. With
respect to this possibility, it is convenient to recall that we have extra-Sextan
30 See P. Woodruff, ‘Aporetic Pyrrhonism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6, 1988,

pp. 139–68, at p. 144: ‘We must admit that Aenesidemus drew unqualified negative con-
clusions’ in his Pyrrhonian Arguments.
31 R. Bett, Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000,
p. 198; Against the Logicians, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. xxi. For a
sketch of Bett’s position see the Introduction, n. 12.
32 M. Schofield, ‘Aenesidemus: Pyrrhonist and “Heraclitean”’, in A.M. Ioppolo and D.N. Sedley
(eds.), Pyrrhonists, Patricians, Patronizers: Hellenistic Philosophy in the Period 155–86 BC,
Naples, Bibliopolis, 2007, pp. 269–338, at pp. 295–6.
33 See R.J. Hankinson, ‘Aenesidemus and the Rebirth of Pyrrhonism’, in R. Bett (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2010, pp. 105–19, at pp. 111–12.
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Conclusion 205
evidence for Pyrrhonian attacks on sciences, both of a global and of an indi-

vidual nature, datable to the first century BC. In his Flight and Discovery 209–11,
Philo of Alexandria, commenting on Genesis 16.12 (‘his hands shall be against
all men, and all men’s hands against him’), mentions the attitude of the ‘rustic
sage’ (ἀγροικόσοφος), typical of the sophist who ‘puts on an excessive scepti-
cism and delights in eristic debates’ and ‘shoots at all the representatives of
the sciences, opposing each of them in public and private’.34 The expression οἱ
ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων, which is used by Sextus at the beginning of his Against the
Professors (M I 1) to denote the representatives of the liberal studies, or more
precisely of the cycle of liberal studies or ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα (M I 7) he is going
to attack, is used by Philo in the same context, that of the ‘cycle of the propae-
deutic studies’ (ἐγκύκλια προπαιδεύματα);35 and by ‘rustic sage’ and ‘sophist’
Philo refers to some of his contemporaries, that is to say ‘those who are now
called Academics and Sceptics, who place no foundation under their opinions
and doctrines and do not prefer one thing to another’.36
34 Philo of Alexandria, Flight and Discovery 209–10: σοφιστοῦ γὰρ βούλημα τοῦτο τὸ λίαν σκε-
πτικὸν ἐπιμορφάζοντος καὶ λόγοις χαίροντος ἐριστικοῖς. οὗτος καὶ πάντας βάλλει τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν
μαθημάτων. On this passage see the Introduction, n. 33.
35 Philo of Alexandria, Flight and Discovery 213; cf. 2, where Philo alludes to his treatise On
Mating with Preliminary Studies, devoted to the subject. The liberal studies are taken to
be propaedeutic to the study of philosophy: on προπαιδεύματα and ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα
in Philo see E. Starobinski-Safran (ed.), Philon d’Alexandrie. De fuga et inventione, Paris,
Éditions du Cerf, 1970, pp. 290–1.
36 Philo of Alexandria, Questions and Answers on Genesis III, 33; translation from the ancient
Armenian version of the original Greek by R. Marcus in Philo. Supplement I, Cambridge
(Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1953. The italics are mine.
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Classical Review 47, 1997, pp. 291–2.
Vitrac, B., Euclide. Les Éléments, vol. 1–4, Paris, PUF, 1990–2001.
Vitrac, B., ‘Les classifications des sciences mathématiques en Grèce ancienne’, Archives
de Philosophie, 68 (2), 2005, pp. 269–301.
Vogt, K.M. (ed.), Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck,
2015.
Westerink, L.G., The Greek Commentaries on Plato’s Phaedo, Vol. II: Damascius,
Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1977.
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Woodruff, P., ‘Aporetic Pyrrhonism’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 6, 1988,
pp. 139–68.
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Index of Citations
Achilles De anima
Isagoge I 2, 404b8–26 80n76
14 78n66 I 2, 404b9–11 81n76
I 2, 404b27–8 81n78
Aëtius De caelo
1.3.8 60 I 9, 279b32–280a2 194n3
4.8.1 76n59 IV 4, 311b33 56
Fragments (ed. Rose3)
Alexander of Aphrodisias 28 64n23, n25
An. Metaphysics
90.6–8 105n45 Α 6, 987b22–35 193
In Met. Α 6, 988a1 ff. 193
52.13–16 105n45 Α 9, 990b15–17 98
56.8 ff. 64n23 and 25 Α 9, 992a10 ff. 66n32
84.2–7 98 Α 9, 992a20 66n30
84.27–85.1 98 Α 9, 992b13 ff. 66n31
121.12–13 106 Β 1, 996a4–8 98–9
180.4–6 99 Β 2, 998a6–19 107
180.11–13 99 Δ 13, 1020a7–32 35
200.35–201.37 107 Δ 13, 1020a8–9 38
In Top. Δ 25–6 130
60.29–61.1 106 Δ 25, 1023b17–19 163n52
342.1–2 108n52 Ζ 1, 1028a19 36n22
355.12–14 99n36 Ζ 2, 1028b24–7 65n29
On mixture Ζ 11, 1036b12 ff. 66
223.27–30 34n14 Η 6, 1045a8–10 161n49
Ι 1, 1052b20 37
[Alexander of Aphrodisias] Ι 1, 1053a30 41
In Met. Μ 1, 1076a11 99n37
819.37–820.6 194n3 Μ 1, 1076a34 99n37
Μ 1, 1076b13 99n37
Anatolius Μ 6, 1080a23 65n28
De decade Μ 6, 1080a14–16 193
30–1 69n39 Μ 6, 1080a24 65n26
32 55, 69n39 Μ 6, 1080a33 65n26
Μ 6, 1080b23 ff. 66n31
An. in Plat. Theat. Μ 7, 1081a21 65n26
70.8–22 187n40 Μ 7, 1081a23 64n25
Μ 7, 1081b30 65n26
Aristotle Μ 7, 1081b35 65n28
Categories Μ 7, 1082b30 193
4, 1b25–29 35 Μ 8, 1083a6 41
6, 4b20–6a35 35 Μ 8, 1083b23 64n25
6, 4b20–5b10 41 Μ 9, 1085a7 ff. 66n31, 66n32
6, 4b20–5a14 22, 34, 38 Μ 9, 1085a31–33 66n30
7, 7b38–39 108n52 Μ 9, 1085b7 193
8, 8b25 36 Μ 9, 1085b27 66n30
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216 Index of Citations
Metaphysics (cont.) Book 1, Def. 8 50

Ν 1, 1087b7 64n23, 193 Book 1, Def. 15 50
Ν 1, 1088b4 ff. 66n32 Book 1, Prop. 10 50
Ν 2, 1089b11 ff. 66n32 Book 7, Def. 1 44
Ν 3, 1090b20 ff. 66 Book 7, Def. 2 44
Ν 3, 1091a4–5 193 Book 7, Def. 12 44
Ν 3, 1091a10 65n27 Book 7, Prop. 1 44
Ν 4, 1091a23–28 193n3 Book 10, Dem. 9.100 15n49
Ν 4, 1091a24 64n25
Περὶ φιλοσοφίας (ed. Ross) Epicharmus
78.20 ff. 66n32 Fragmenta (ed. Kassel-Austin)
Physics 276 139, 159, 187
I 2, 185b11–16 169n7
I 9, 192a7 64n24 Galen
IV 2, 209b15 64n20 Inst. Log.
IV 3, 210a16–17 161n49 III 2 96n27
V 3, 226b34–227a6 39 Meth. Med.
V 3, 226b21–23 39 X 155 96n27
V 3, 227a10–13 39 On pulses
VI 1, 231a21–b18 39 III 751 2
VI 1, 231a21-b1 22 Praen.
VI 1, 231a21–26 40 XIV 628 11n33
VI 1, 231b16–17 39
Topics [Galen]
II 7, 113a24–32 108n52 Diff. Puls.
IV 4, 125a33 108n52 VIII 711 11n33
VI 13, 150a15 160 Introduction
XIV 683 2
Chalcidius
In Plat. Tim. Comm. Genesis
295 62n17 16.12 11n33, 205
Clement of Alexandria Heron of Alexandria

Strom. Definitions (ed. Heiberg)
5.9.59 56n6 135, 4 (p. 98.8–11) 33
Dexippus Hyppolitus
In Cat. Refutatio
69.6–25 100n38 6.3.1 62n17
Diogenes Laertius Iamblichus

VII 135 50 Comm. Math.
VIII 25–33 58 76.16–78.5 56n6
VIII 25 60 VP
IX 90–101 202–3 81, 87–8 56n6
IX 116 2, 3n5
IX 61–108 5n12 [Iamblichus]
Theologumena Arithmeticae
Euclid 20.9 69n39
Book 1, Def. 2 50 23.11ff. 69n39
Book 1, Def. 4 50 84.10–11 65n29
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Lucian 131b 127

Vitarum Auctio 4, 4–5 55 131e 127
131d 128
Nicomachus of Gerasa 132c-d 127–8
Introduction to Arithmetic 137c-141d 61n17
I.2.4–3.1 45 145c1–2 160
I.8.1 47 146b 169n7
I.8.2 47 Phaedo
II.6.1 50 74c-d 84n2
II.17.1 47 95b-96e 135–6
II.17.2 47 96a 87
II.18.1 47 96e-97b 22, 136–40
II.18.4 47 96e-97a 146
II.19.1 47 97a2–5 133
II.20.2 47 97a5-b3 134
101b-c 88, 91, 137, 139–40
Philo of Alexandria 103e-104c 89, 91
De aeternitate mundi 105b-c 90
79 ff. 201 105c 91n16
De vita Mosis Philebus
II 115 69n39 12e-13a 86n8
II 116 55 14b-17a 86–7, 91
Flight and discovery 17a-18e 87n11
209–11 11n33, 205 Politicus
213 205n35 263b 129
2 205n35 Theaetetus
Op. 204a7 160
47–52 55 204b2–3 160
47 69n39 205a7 160
48 69n39 Timaeus
49 69n39 37a-c 79
98 69n39 45b-c 79
Questions and Answers on Genesis 67a-c 79
III.33 205n36
Plotinus
Photius Enneads
Bibl. IV iii 2 155
212 170b12–14 203 VI iii 6.25–6 108n52
212 170b17–20 203
212 170b30–5 203 Plutarch
Comm. not.
Plato 1081F 96n27
Parmenides 1083A-B 186
129a-130a 86n9, 111, 125 Con. praec.
129d 127 142F 78n66
130b-c 108n54 De an. procr.
130b 125n71 1023B 81
130e-131c 125–6 Def. or.
131a-c 20, 163 426A 78n66
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Porphyry I 1–4 8n23

In Cat. I1 8, 10n33, 57, 205
138.30–2 108n52 I2 8n23
In Harm. I 5–7 8
66.18 57 I5 8n23, 13
In Phys. I 6–7 13
120 108 I7 205
Introduction I8 7
I.12 107 I 9–40 7, 10
Sent. I9 10n33
5 108n52 I 10–30 10n33
V. Pyth. I 26 4n7
36–7 56n6 I 28 12
48 198n18 I 29 4n7
49–51 61n17 I 31–4 10n33
I 35–8 10n33
Posidonius I 35 4n7, 57
Fragments (ed. Kidd) I 38 10n33
28 80n75 I 40 57
31 80n75 I 41 7n19
49 80n75 I 49 57
141 80n75, 81 I 53 8n23
149 80n75 I 98 10n30
205 80n75 I 106 7n20
291 80n75 I 121–41 11n34
I 130 96–7
Proclus I 137 96–7
Elements of Theology I 139 167n1
66 169n7 I 140 102n39
In Eucl. (ed. Friedlein) I 156–8 11n34
38–42 46n47 I 157 12
97.17 ff. 69n39 I 163 167n1
99.1 56 I 166–8 22, 177, 182n28
114.25–115.1 69n39 I 179 10n28
I 181 10n28
Seneca I 187 10n31
Letters I 219 10n28
lxv 4–7 108n54 I 221 10n31
cxiii 2 175 I 254 10n28, 10n31
cxiii 1 175 I 260 2
cxiii 4–5 175 I 278 8n23
cxiii 23 175 I 281 8n23
I 305 8n23
Sextus Empiricus I 306 8n23
Adversus Mathematicos (M) I 320 7n19
I 1–40 13 II 1 7n19
I 1–38 10n33 II 10–47 10n31
I 1–8 7 II 10 10n29
I 1–7 202 II 12 10n28
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Adversus Mathematicos (M) (cont.) IV 2 14, 57

II 15 10n28 IV 3 53–4, 70
II 16 10n28 IV 4–5 59, 69n39, 71
II 18 10n28 IV 4 7n20
II 20–47 10n30 IV 5 53–5
II 20 9n27 IV 6–9 69n39, 72–3
II 24 10n28 IV 7 56
II 26 10n28 IV 8 81
II 43 10n28 IV 9 53–5
II 48–59 11n34 IV 10–34 14–5
II 48 7n20, 10n28 IV 10 11n34, 74n45
II 49 10n28, 10n29 IV 11–34 58
II 50 10n28 IV 11–20 14, 16, 22, 48, 74, 191
II 59 7n20 IV 11–13 15n48, 22, 32, 93–4,
II 60 10n28 101, 103
II 85 10n29 IV 11 22, 84–5, 88,
II 99 12 102n39, 112n57, 119
II 106 4n7 IV 12 85, 93n20–1
II 113 7n19 IV 13 84–5, 87–8, 92,
III 1 49n53 112n57, 119
III 2 57 IV 14–8 22, 191
III 4 49 IV 14–6 108
III 7–17 49 IV 14–5 104–5, 111
III 17 57 IV 14 84, 93n20–21, 106,
III 18–93 51 109, 110, 167n1
III 19–93 49 IV 15 93n20, 106
III 21 10n28, 11n34 IV 16 104, 106, 111–112n57
III 24–5 167n1, 168 IV 17 104–5, 109
III 28 17, 50 IV 18–20 22, 112n57, 114, 118,
III 29 11n3450 123, 127, 129
III 34 32n7 IV 18 84, 191
III 36 11n34 IV 19 84, 112, 115–7,
III 49 167n1 IV 21–2 14, 22, 48, 74, 135,
III 55–6 167n1, 168 141, 157, 181n26, 192
III 59 57 IV 21 132, 146n26
III 66–70 32n7 IV 22 11n34, 132, 146n25
III 90–1 11n34 IV 23–34 14, 48, 202
III 94–107 49, 51 IV 23–33 188
III 94 50 IV 23–30 16, 22, 74, 147–8,
III 100 50 185, 192
III 107 11n34, 50 IV 23 11n34
III 109 50 IV 24–5 159, 161–2, 192
III 116 4n7, 7n20 IV 24 154, 166
IV 1 7n19, 11n34, 14–5, IV 25 163–4
17, 21, 31, 33–4, 42, IV 26 155, 158
45n45, 49, 73, 201 IV 27–8 158, 167
IV 2–10 14–5, 21–2, 34, 48, IV 27 159
58, 68–9n39, 73, IV 28 155
74n46, 191, 201 IV 29–30 155, 158, 177–9
IV 2–3 69–70 IV 30–4 22
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Adversus Mathematicos (M) (cont.) VII 119 78–80

IV 30–3 185 VII 202 2
IV 31–4 192 VII 276–8 180–1
IV 31–3 74, 166 VII 370 180
IV 31–2 166–67, 171, 177, VII 373 76n58
192, 201 VIII 161 96–7
IV 31 166, 167n1, 168 IX 78 78
IV 33 177–81, 182n28 IX 216 60n15
IV 34 7n19, 11n34, 105n44, IX 218–40 10n33
166 IX 237 60n15
V1 7n20 IX 252 60n15
V 54 10n32 IX 277–9 184
V 95 10n32 IX 277 149, 157n34
VI 4–6 8, 202 IX 280–320 22, 183
VI 4–5 13 IX 298–9 182n28
VI 4 7n20 IX 303–6 184–5
VI 5 10n33 IX 303 184–5
VI 7–37 8 IX 304 102n39
VI 19–20 10n31 IX 307–19 185
VI 28 7n20 IX 308–10 149–50
VI 30 7n20 IX 311–20 150–1
VI 38–68 8, 11n34 IX 311–12 150, 154
VI 52 4n7 IX 311 184
VI 56 7n20 IX 312–9 184
VI 68 7n21 IX 312 153, 155
VII 92–109 15, 22, 58, 59n13, IX 313–5 159, 161–2
68, 73–6, 82–3, 191, IX 313 92, 159
201 IX 314 167n1, 168
VII 92 76n55, 81n76 IX 315 156, 159
VII 93–109 80 IX 316–7 166
VII 93–95 69–70 IX 317 156n27–28
VII 93 68, 74–7, 79–80, IX 318–9 177–9
82n79 IX 319 154n22, 155
VII 94–100 63n18, 69n39, IX 321–7 177, 183, 185
74n46 IX 321–5 182n28
VII 94–8 72–3 IX 326–8 22
VII 94 55, 69n39 IX 326–7 181–2n28
VII 95–8 69n39 IX 327 182n28
VII 95 70 IX 328 149n3
VII 99–100 63n18, 69n39 IX 329 184, 149
VII 99 78–80 IX 335–7 169
VII 100 55, 71 IX 336 170, 172, 174, 176–7
VII 101–104 32, 77 IX 338–44 160–1
VII 101 76n55 IX 338 97
VII 102–4 78 IX 339 156
VII 102 77 IX 343–44 160
VII 104 77–80 IX 346 96–7
VII 107–8 78 IX 348–9 167
VII 109 76 IX 348 167n1, 168
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Adversus Mathematicos (M) (cont.) XI 81 102n39

IX 349 167n1, 168 XI 118 5n12
IX 350 167n1 XI 130 5n12
X 39 145n23 XI 140 5n12
X 200 149 XI 182 76n58
X 218 77 XI 183 76n58
X 248–309 15, 18, 22, 67, 68n36 Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH)
X 248–84 15, 58 I 1–4 1
X 248–63 67n35, 191 I7 8n23
X 249–62 104 I8 1
X 258 32, 86, 87n12, 87n12 I 84 2
X 261 59, 200 I 222 2
X 262–75 67n34 I 234 8n23
X 276–7 194 I 236–41 3
X 276 59n13, 200 II 98 2
X 277 59, 60n15 II 184 167n1
X 278–80 62–3 II 215 156
X 281–2 63n18 II 219 96, 97
X 284–309 58 II 220–2 163–4
X 285–7 22, 93, 103 II 220 163n53, 164
X 285–6 94n23, 119 III 41 96, 97, 108n52
X 285 95n24 III 82–84 189
X 286 86 III 84 151
X 287 92n19, 94n23, 106 III 85–93 22, 152–3
X 288–98 22 III 85 152n14, 185
X 288–90 109–110 III 86–93 183
X 290 102n39 III 88–9 154
X 291–2 110 III 89–93 185
X 291 96–7 III 89 152
X 292 120 III 90–1 159
X 293–8 114 III 90 161n50, 162
X 293 115 III 92 156–7
X 294–5 118–20 III 93 153, 154n22
X 295 92 III 94–6 177
X 299–307 133–4 III 94–5 22, 182n29
X 302–9 22, 194 III 94 152n14, 185
X 308–9 134–5, 141, 192 III 98 156
X 308 146n25–26 III 99 96, 97, 161
X 309 120, 132n1 III 107 176
X 310 183 III 109 144, 181, 183
X 321–5 22 III 151–67 15, 22, 67, 68n36,
X 323 144, 181–2, 141
X 328–30 144–5, 145n24 III 151–6 15, 58, 103, 191
X 331–8 145n24 III 151 14
X 338 179–80 III 153–4 59n13
XI 22–23 172 III 153 32, 87n12, 194
XI 24 172–4, 176–7 III 154 63n18, 194
XI 68–95 5n12 III 156–67 15, 58
XI 79 102n39 III 156–63 96
XI 80 102n39
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Outlines of Pyrrhonism (PH) (cont.) I, 177.21–179.17 176n18

III 156–7 22, 93, 94, 95, 103, I, 177.21–178.14 187–8
108 I, 178.10–13 201
III 156 15n48, 85n3, I, 363.26–364.5 81n78
102n39 II, 64.18–65.6 176
III 157–63 22, 96,161
III 157 95, 186 Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (SVF)
III 158–63 114 II 139–41 79
III 158 115, 120–2 II 366 78n66
III 159 122 II 367 78n66
III 163 95n26, 121, 191–2 II 368 78n66
III 164–6 22 II 850 76n59
III 164–5 141–2, 144 III Boeth. 7 201
III 164 96, 102n39
III 165 146n25 Themistius
III 166 194, 146n26 In libros Aristotelis ‘De anima’ paraphrasis
III 167 96n26 11.27–12.1
III 169 174
III 170 172–4, 176–7 Theo of Smyrna
III 183 101, 102n39 Expositio
III 188 76n58 18.3–21.19 195
III 221 2 18.3–5 196n7
III 241 76n58 18.5–8 195n5
III 251 76n58 19.14–20.5 196n10
III 252–6 10n33 19.21 195n5
20.5–11 61n17
Simplicius 20.6–18 197n11
In Cat. 20.12 195n5
84.27–8 108n52 20.20–21.3 197n12
115.12–13 108n52 24.23 195n5
214.26–30 78 87.5–6 69n39
371.11–12 108n52 93.17–94.9 69n39
In Phys. 93.21 ff. 69n39
83.6–86.18 169n7 96.1–5 69n39
181.10–15 61n17 97.17–20 69n39
230.35–231.2 62n17 99.24–100.8 196n6
247.30–248.18 67n34 100.1–15 195n4
453.33 ff. 64n23 100.9–12 196n6
524.23 64n20 100.9–10 196n8
100.13 196n9
Speusippus 100.20 69n39
Fragments (ed. Isnardi Parente) 101.11 69n39
96 81n78
122 42, 65n29 Xenocrates
Fragments (ed. Isnardi Parente2)
Stobaeus 23 65n29
Eclogae 42 199n21
I, 21.8–14 198n16 85 81n78
I, 132.26–133.11 201 178 65n29
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General Index
For ancient authors see also the Index of Citations.
Academic, Academy existence of, attacked by the

debate on whole and parts 160 sceptics 10–14, 19, 32, 202
Old see also: Speusippus, Xenocrates 14, liberal arts 7
22, 32, 48, 49n52, 58–67, 82–3, 198–9 moderate vs. radical (ʻmore aporeticʼ)
use of the Growing Argument 187, 189, attack on 8, 10–14, 32n3
193 usefulness of, attacked by the
Ackrill, J.L. 35n17, 36n22, 40, 41n34 Epicureans 8–10, 202
ad hominem argument 158 Asclepiades of Bythinia 67
addition 21, 132–8, 141–7, 156, 166–89, 192–4, Ast, F. 43
200 astrology 3, 7, 10
operation and function 157–8, 181–2, attributive 114
186
Aenesidemus 5n12, 20, 145n23, 169, 203–4 Barnes, J. 3n5, 6, 7n18, 9n25, 12n35, 13, 14,
Aëtius 15, 58 17, 18n53, 20, 21n62, 35n19, 36n21, 37,
affected 41n34, 44n45, 49n54, 85, 92n17, 96n27,
through addition, subtraction, 97n28, 105n45, 106n48, 108n52, 117n63,
change 149, 157, 183–4 130, 154–5, 159–61, 168n5, 169–71,
Agrippa 20 175n15, 176n17, 184n33, 202n25
Alexander of Aphrodisias 169n7 Bekker, I. 53–5, 84, 109n55, 114–5
Alexander Polyhistor 15, 58 Bénatouïl, T. 194n3
Algra, K. 4–6, 18 Bergrren, J.L. 33n10–11
Allen, R.E. 127n73 Betegh, G. 6
Anatolius of Alexandria 43n41 Bett, R. 4, 5n12, 6, 12n36, 13, 14, 17n52, 18, 19,
Annas, J. 85 31, 54–6, 57n8, 79n71, 94n23, 106n46,
Apollodorus of Seleucia 51 109n55, 111n56, 117n62, 168n4, 176–7,
Apollonius 17, 50 180n24, 204
Aporetics see also: Pyrrhonians, sceptics Blank, D. 3n4, 7n22, 8n23, 9n25, 10–11n33, 12,
184–5 13n42, 14, 97n29, 202
Archimedes 17, 50 Blomqvist, T. 3n5
Aristides 9n25 Bobzien, S. 6n13
Aristotle Bodeüs, R. 41
account of quantity 22, 34–42 body (σῶμα)
and Plato’s oral teachings 64–6 arithmetic and geometry 33
vs. Plato on the status of number 19–20, geometrical vs. non-geometrical 32
99–100, 108–9 and incorporeal grasped by number
arithmetic see also: discrete, number 7, 11 77–8
in classifications of mathematical soul and the Tetraktys 57–8, 68–71
sciences 31–4, 42, 45–6 Stoic tripartition of 34, 77–8
principle(s) of 16, 44, 47–8, 51–2 Bonazzi, M. 61n17
Sextus’ attack on 14, 16–18, 42, 51–2, 66, Bonelli, M. 107n50
73, 190–3 Bostock, D. 39n30, 139
truths 158 Brennan, T. 18, 19, 56, 67n35, 87n12, 133n3,
art (τέχνη) 3, 7 134n4
definition of 10, 76 Brisson, L. 18, 31–2, 48n52, 56–7, 105n45
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224 General Index
Brochard, V. 3n6 discrete see: continuous

Bronowski, A. 60n15 division 134, 136–8
Brunschwig, J. 4n8 Dooley, W .D. 107n51
Burkert, W. 14, 19, 56–67, 74–6, 81n76 Dye, G. 8n23, 9n25, 17, 18, 31, 50–1
Bury, R.G. 18n59, 31, 53, 55–6, 84, 102n39,
109n55, 112n57, 115, 132, 168n4 Ellis, B. 36n23, 37n27
Empedocles 68
Cambiano, G. 17, 50 Epicharmus 20, 139, 145, 159, 186–7, 200
Cattenei, E. 41–2 Epicurean(s), Epicureanism
Caveing, M. 47n50 attack on sciences 7–10
Cherniss, H. 64n20, 75n50 and Sextus’ attack on geometry 50–1
chiasmus 147 on whole and parts 169
Cleanthes 175 Epicurus 67
Chrysippus 175, 186–7, 189, 201 Eratosthenes 17, 50
coming into being (γένεσις) Euclid 15, 17
and perishing (φθορά) 179–80 definition of number 41, 44
and addition, subtraction, change definition of unit 44–5
138–9, 143–6, 157, 182–4, 186–9 number theory 16, 43–4
conceived together with 166–76, 192 target of Sextus? 50–1
continuous items Eudemus 169n7
συνεχῆ vs. discrete (διεστῶτα) 21, 32–4 Eudorus 67n35, 199
συνεχῆ vs. discrete (διωρισμένα) 33–4, Eutocius 17, 50
37–42 Evans, J. 33n10–11
ἀλληλουχούμενα vs. discrete extension
(διῃρημένα) 45–6 and intension 164, 180
Cornford, F.M. 125n71
Corti, L. 18n56, 107n50, 163n53 Finamore, J.F. 81n78
countable items (ἀριθμητά) see: one Flinterman, J.J. 9n25
Crantor 61n17 focal meaning 130–1
cycle see also: sciences Forms see also: participation 84, 87–91,
of mathematical studies 17, 50 125, 137
of liberal studies (ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα) being both one and many 86, 91–2, 125
205 genus, species and particulars 86–7, 92,
of propedeutic studies (ἐγκύκλια 163–4
προπαιδεύματα) 205 not the principles of existing things 104
parts and wholes 91–2, 111–112, 114–31
Damascius 139 Frege, G. 113, 157–8
De Vogel, C.J. 58n12, 64n20 Fronterotta, F. 64n20
Decleva Caizzi, F. 4n8, 8n23
definition 101–2, 110–111, 157, 180 Gaiser, K. 67n35, 68n36
Delattre, D. and J. 18, 31, 54–7, 84, 86n5, Gallop, D. 88n13, 137n10, 138n12, 139–40, 146
109n55, 116n61 Geminus of Rhodes 33
Derivation System 14–15, 19, 22, 58, 71, 191 geometry see also: continuous, magnitude
Academic or Pythagorean 14–15, 19, 3, 7, 18
57–66, 191 in classifications of mathematical
principles of 14–15, 32, 58 sciences 31–4, 45–6
Dillon, J. 198 Sextus’ attack on 16–17, 49–51
Diophantus of Alexandria 43, 48n51 Gerson, L.P. 34n14
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General Index 225
Giardina, G. 33n8 logic

Giusta, M. 117n62 not discussed in M I–VI 7
Glidden, D. 4n8 Long, A. 139n16
grammar 3, 7, 10, 11 Long, A.A. 33n12, 58n10, 60n15, 75, 78n64,
Granieri, R. 67n34 176–7
Greaves, D.D. 9n25
Growing Argument 20, 23, 139, 159, 186–9, Machuca, D. 5n12, 17n52
193, 200 Madigan, A.M. 107n50
growth 139, 145, 159n43, 186–9 magnitude (μέγεθος)
belonging to continuous items 21, 38
Hackworth, R. 91n16 kind of quantity (vs. number) 21
Hankinson, R.J. 5n12, 204 subject of geometry 21, 32, 34
harmony 70, 72–3 vs. plurality or aggregate 37–8, 42, 45–6
Harte, V. 124n70 man in general (ὁ γενικὸς ἄνθρωπος) 97n29,
Heath, T.L. 17, 43n41, 47, 50 105, 109–10
Hegel, G.W.F. 160 Mansfeld, J. 3n5, 58n11, 68n36 and 38, 74, 76,
Heiberg, J.L. 17, 33n10, 50 77n62, 81n78, 83
Heintz, W. 84, 106, 114–5, 116n61, 117 mathematicals
Hermodorus 67 intermediates 107
Herodotus 2 ways of existing of 105n45, 106–7
Heron of Alexandria 17, 33, 50 Mau, J. 18, 21, 53–6, 84, 112n57, 114–5, 116n61,
homeomeries 119n65 117, 132
Horky, P.S 57n6 measurable 38
Hulsch, F. 33n10 Menn, S. 139, 145, 159n43
Hyppolitus 2 Menodotus 2
Merlan, P. 81n78
Iamblichus of Chalcis 16, 43, 50 metaphysics 108
Ideas see: Forms in Euclid? 44
Ierodiakonou, K. 4–6, 18 in Nicomachus 44
in virtue of the account proper to (κατὰ τὸν in Sextus’ discussion of number 16, 20
ἴδιον λόγον) 93, 101–2, 142–3 science of beings qua beings 100
induction on kinds 103 Mette, H.J. 53–4
Inwood, B. 34n14, 175n15, 176n16 Mill, J.S. 158
Isnardi Parente, M. 67n35, 87n12 Mnesarchus 23, 176, 187, 189, 192
Moderatus 60, 61–2n17, 198–9
Jaeger, W. 75n50 monistic systems 198–200
Janáček, K. 3–4, 11n33, 12 Morison, B. 5n12, 52n66
Mueller, I. 17, 49n55, 50
Karadimas, D. 9n25 music 3, 7–8, 10, 11
Kenny, A. 158n35
Kidd, I. 74–6, 79n73, 80n75, 81n77, 82n79, Nicomachus of Gerasa 16, 32, 43, 45–8,
201n24 51–2, 66
Kirwan, C. 38n28 non-evident object 1, 202
Kramer, H.J. 67n35 not other than 172–6
number(s) (ἀριθμός)
Lernould, A. 56n5, 109n55 ancient approaches to 15–16, 43–8, 51–2
likeness principle 68, 75–7, 79–80 and aggregates 41n34, 40–2, 158, 162–3,
181–4, 192
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226 General Index
number(s) (ἀριθμός) (cont.) and unit 195–200

and sets 138, 140, 146, 172 being a substance vs. being an
and unit(s) 16, 132–46, 190, 196 accident 20, 98–101, 103, 108–10
same as vs. different from 147–8, existing
159–65, 167 by itself 191
(not) an accident of 161–2 by itself vs. along with the count.
conceived together with 166–8, 171 items 105–6
belonging to discrete items 21, 38 by itself vs. in the count. items 106–8
cardinal 146 not by itself 109–111, 121, 124
composite 194 not in the count. items 111
counting and measuring 37 first principle of existing things 59–60,
criterion of truth 68, 74 104
destruction of 181–3, 188–9, 192, 200–1 highest principle above unit and
elements of things 94–5, 103–4 two 61n17, 199
existing on their own 96–100, 103, 191 Idea (or Form) of 64, 106, 108–9, 112,
figured 42 114–29, 191
four 53–5 (not) unique 114–24
generation of 14, 140–6, 193–4 vs. Form of many 112n57, 124
by subtraction and addition 14, 22, wholes and parts 114–31
59n13, 74, 147–65, 166–89, 192, 200–1 indivisible 119
from the one and the indefinite mereological characterization of 90–1,
two 59–60 114–31
ideal 19, 67 ʻPlatonicʼ characterization of 22,
kind of quantity 21 85–92
‘not comparable’ (οὐ συμβλητοί) 65 principle of all number 58–9, 71, 74, 191,
one, two, three, four 195, 197
and point, line, surface, solid 15, Sextus’ attack on 22, 104–31
54–5, 58, 62–3, 65–6, 71n42 shared by countable items 85–124, 191,
and the Tetraktys 70–3 197
paradigmatic causes of perceptible
items 31–2 Pappenheim, E. 12
Platonic Forms 16, 20, 191–2, 197 Pappus 17, 50
principle(s) of 14, 47, 59–61, 195–7 participation 67, 84–5, 87–8, 91, 93, 111,
subject of arithmetic 21, 31–2, 34, 42, 73 114–31
substances vs. accidents of countable dilemma of 20, 22, 111, 114, 124–31,
items 16, 20, 44–5n45, 99–100, 103, 163
108–9 problems raised by 112n57, 114–31
successor 157 parts see also: whole(s) 149–50, 152, 155–7,
superordinate 194 199
ten 53–6 and species 86, 129–30, 163–4
wholes and parts 40–42, 147–8, 150, conceptual 170–2, 174, 176, 192
152–67, 171–2, 184, 192 continuous vs. non-continuous 38–42,
169n7
O’Connor, J.J. 43n42 intensional vs. extensional 163–4
one (ἕν) of Forms 91–2, 111–2, 114–31
active cause 59–60 of numbers: see number(s)
and many 85–7, 91–2, 124–5 quantitative vs. logical 129–31, 163–4,
and two, principles of number 59–62, 180–1
191, 194 Pellegrin, P. 109n55
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General Index 227
Petrucci, F.M. 62n17, 195n5, 197n11, 198, later account of 15, 59–66
199n19 mathematical vs. acousmatic faction
Philo of Larissa 187n40 56–7
Philolaus 68, 76n55
philosophy Quality (ποιόν, ποιότης)
three parts of 3, 6 in Aristotle 35–6
philosophy of mathematics Quantity (ποσόν), see also: Continuous,
in Sextus 20–21 Magnitude, Number
vs. mathematics 17, 51–2, 190 in Aristotle 35–42
Photius 15, 58 two kinds of 21, 31
evidence for Aenesidemus 5n11
Plato 19, 191, 193 Raven, J.E. 68n36
doctrine of principles 67 reductio ad absurdum 119, 121, 128
lecture On the Good 64, 67 Reinhardt, K. 68n38, 75, 76n53, 78n65
oral teachings 64–6, 67n34 Reinhardt, L. 158n39
Parmenides 19 Rhetoric 3, 7, 9, 10, 11
Phaedo 19 Riedweg, C. 57n6
Philebus 19 Robbins, F.E. 43n39 and 41,46n47, 68n38,
Timaeus 15, 19, 48, 51, 58 82, 83n81
and Posidonius 68, 75–6, 79–82 Roberston, E. 43n42
unwritten doctrines 15, 58, 64 Ross, D. 64n20 and 23, 65n28, 106n48
Plotinus 155 Russell, B. 41n34, 113
Plurality (τὸ πλῆθος) 92, 106 Russo, A. 12n39, 31, 55–6
Plutarch 199 rustic (ἀγροῖκος)
Polito, R. 203n29 Pyrrhonist (ἀγροικοπυρρώνειος) 11n33
Porphyry 169n7 sage (ἀγροικόσοφος) 11n33, 205
Posidonius
and Geminus of Rhodes 33 Saturninus 2
and the Growing Argument 187–9, sceptic(s), sceptical, scepticism see also:
201 Pyrrhonian, suspension of judgment
and M IV 2–10 22, 34, 191 Academic vs. Pyrrhonian 1
and M VII 93–109 68, 74–83, 191 Aenesidemean 5n12, 202–4
and the Old Academy on soul 79–83 and Academics 205
on parts 23, 170n7, 175, 192 and the medical schools 2–3
proper (ἴδιον) 101–2, 110–111, 155 attack on the Arts 10–14, 19, 32, 202
puzzle against number 95, 186 defining characteristic of 1
Pyrrho 8n23 vs. Dogmatic philosophers 3
followers of 8n23, 10n33 vs. Dogmatists vs. Academics 1
Pyrrhonian, Pyrrhonism, Pyrrhonist see also: vs. negative dogmatism 5n12, 12–14, 203
sceptic sciences (μαθήματα) see also: Art, cycle 7,
attack on addition and subtraction 205
184–6, 188–9, 193 general vs. special argument against 7,
attack on the sciences 8–14 10
Diogenes’ account of 5n12 Pyrrhonian vs. Dogmatic attack on
Pythagoras 58n9 7–14
Pythagorean, Pythagoreanism representatives of (οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων)
and the Old Academy 14, 58–66 11n33, 57, 205
criterion of truth 15, 68 Sextus’ attack on 7
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228 General Index
Schmekel, A. 74–6 the number four, and the number ten

Schofield, M. 5n12, 204 53–7
school of medicine Theiler, W. 53, 67n35, 75n50
Empirical vs. Methodical 2–3 Theo of Smyrna 16, 43, 48n52, 66
Sedley, D. 33n12, 74, 78n64 and 65, 79n72, Thiel, D. 67n35
139n16, 159n43, 176–7, 187n40, 200 Third man argument 98
Seneca 176 Thrasyllus 198
separated, separately, separation 44n45, 67, Timon 8n23
99–100, 107–9, 125–7 Trapp, M.B. 9n25
Sextus two (δυάς)
excerptor and compiler 8–9, 19, 190 passive matter 59–60
life 1–3 produced by the one 74, 103, 141, 194
sources (Dogmatic and Pyrrhonian) Sextus’ attack on 22, 132–46, 192
5–14, 19–21, 50–1, 66, 68, 82–3, 188–9,
190, 193, 202 unit (μονάς) see also: one
works 3 defined by Euclid 44
abbreviated titles of 1n1 indivisible, partless 62, 71n42, 111, 118–9,
M I–VI 6–14 148, 195–6
M IV 14–23, 32, 42–52, 66, 186, principle in Nicomachus 47
188–205 Theo’s different accounts of 195–7
order of composition 3–6 universal
Slezák, T. 67n35 items 32, 96, 110
Speusippus 15, 19, 59, 65–6 and numbers 164–5, 192–3
Spinelli, E. 3n6, 7n18, 9n25 and wholes 91–2
Stoic(s), stoicism being both one and many 86, 191
and Epicharmus’ Growing Argument 23, ways of existing of 99, 105n45, 106–8
186–7, 200–1 quantifier 85, 165
and M IV 1 33–34
and Sextus’ attack on geometry 17, 50–1 Vitrac, B. 8n23, 9n25, 17, 18, 31, 32n4, 43n40,
definition of art 10, 76 46n47 and 48, 48n50, 50–1
in M VII 93–109 76–82 Vogt, K. 202n26
old 175–6
on parts and wholes 23, 169–77, 192 White, M.J. 40
on qualified individuality 187–9 Whole see also: part(s), number(s)
sons of 173–4, 176–7 conceptual 170–2, 174, 176, 192
theory of generation 201–2 continuous vs. discrete 162, 169n7
subtraction 16, 20, 132–5, 143–5, 147–66, and any of its part 169–70
192–3, 200 and the sum of its parts 16, 159–60
operation and function 21, 157–8, 164, Woodruff, P. 204
181–2, 186 Wyttenbach, D. 137n10
suspension of judgment (ἐποχή) 1, 5n12, 7,
8, 11–14, 52, 190, 204 Xenocrates 15, 19, 59, 61n17, 65–6, 67n35, 191,
194n3, 199
Tannery, P. 33
Tetraktys (τετρακτύς) Zeno of Citium 10, 201
source possessing the roots of nature Zeller, E. 12n40, 58n12
68–70, 72–3, 76n53 Zhmud, L. 56–7n6
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Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Lorenzo Corti - Sextus Empiricus Against the Arithmeticians

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Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Names: Sextus, Empiricus, author. | Corti, Lorenzo, translator.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

1 M IV 1: Quantities, Number, and Arithmetic 31

2 M IV 2–10: The Derivation System, the Old Academy, and Posidonius 53

3 M IV 11–20: Sextus’ Attack on the One 84

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4 M IV 21–2: Sextus’ Attack on the Two 132

5 M IV 23–30: Sextus’ Attack on Number Conceived of as the Result

6 M IV 31–4: Sextus’ Attack on Number Conceived of as the Result

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This book is one of the outcomes of my research project on ‘Scepticism,

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

1 Sextus’ Life and Works1

Ancient scepticism had two main varieties: the Pyrrhonian, inaugurated by

© Lorenzo Corti, 2024 | doi:10.1163/9789004679504_002 Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

it is very conceivable that Sextus … had an even larger store of arguments

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2 Against the Professors: a Glance at Sextus’ Targets, Method,

Against the Professors is often characterised as Sextus’ more mature work. In

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recommends suspension of judgement over every object of inquiry. In M I–VI,

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grounds that they do not contribute to the achievement of wisdom (M I 1).

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a detailed analysis of M I–VI tends to confirm that Sextus is essentially

So Sextus’ attack on the τέχναι includes arguments of a Pyrrhonian origin and

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

to be on the same wavelength. Thus in M I we find, among other things, argu-

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

M I 1–40, which includes the proclamation of sceptical intentions (6–7), is taken

we do not need to accuse Sextus of negative dogmatism in M I–VI … [T]he

41 Cf. Barnes, ‘Scepticism and the Arts’, cit., pp. 534–5.

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3 Against the Arithmeticians: an Introductory Overview

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account of numbers contained in texts by neo-Pythagorean or Platonist

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the general strategy he adopts in M IV I, Sextus wants to show that geometry

4 Originality and Interest of the Present Work

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

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Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

arithmetical discussion the seminal questions Barnes asked about Sextus’

Furthermore, far from being solely of historical importance, M IV has a

Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

raised by the Platonic notion of participation, or the puzzling consequences of

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Lorenzo Corti - 978-90-04-67950-4

M I 166–8) and their background, constituted by a Stoic mereological position