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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

Leibniz: General Inquiries on the Analysis

of Notions and Truths
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

B SH P N EW T E X T S I N T H E H I ST O RY
OF PHILOSOPHY
The aim of this series is to encourage and facilitate the study of all aspects of the
history of philosophy, including the rediscovery of neglected elements and the
exploration of new approaches to the subject. Texts are selected on the basis of
their philosophical and historical significance and with a view to promoting the
understanding of currently under-­represented authors, philosophical
traditions, and historical periods. They include new editions and translations of
important, yet less well-­known works which are not widely available to an
Anglophone readership. The series is sponsored by the British Society for the
History of Philosophy (BSHP) and is managed by an editorial team elected by
the society. It reflects the society’s main mission and its strong commitment to
broadening the canon.

General editors
Maria Rosa Antognazza
Michael Beaney
Mogens Lærke (managing editor)
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

Leibniz
General Inquiries on the Analysis
of Notions and Truths
Edited with an English translation by
M A S SI M O M U G NA I

1
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

1
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Massimo Mugnai 2021
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
First Edition published in 2021
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

Contents

List of Abbreviations vii

On This Edition ix

Introduction1
Text and Translation 42
Commentary135

Bibliography 147
Index Nominum 151
General Index 153
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 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

List of Abbreviations

A G. W. Leibniz (1923– ). Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe.

Darmstad, Leipzig, and Berlin: Deutsche Akademie der
Wissenschaften zu Berlin.
DAC G. W. Leibniz (2020). Dissertation on Combinatorial Art, ed.
M. Mugnai, H. van Ruler, and M. Wilson. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Discourse G. W. Leibniz (2020). Discourse on Metaphysics, ed. Gonzalo
Rodriguez-­Pereyra. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
GM G. W. Leibniz (1849–63). Mathematische Schriften, ed.
C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. Berlin: A. Asher and Halle:
H. W. Schmidt.
GP G. W. Leibniz (1875–90). Die Philosophischen Schriften, ed.
C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.
Grua G. W. Leibniz (1948). Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits de
la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre, ed. G. Grua. 2 vols.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
L G. W. Leibniz (1969). Philosophical Papers and Letters. A
Selection, tr. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker. 2nd edn. Dordrecht:
D. Reidel.
LH ‘Leibniz-­Handschriften’. Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek,
Hanover.
LP G. W. Leibniz (1966). Logical Papers. A Selection, tr. and ed.
G. H. R. Parkinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
MP G. W. Leibniz (1973). Philosophical Writings, ed. G. H. R.
Parkinson, tr. Mary Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson. London:
J. M. Dent & Sons.
Mugnai (2008) G. W. Leibniz (2008). Ricerche generali sull’analisi delle nozioni
e delle verità e altri scritti di logica, ed. Massimo Mugnai. Pisa:
Edizioni della Normale.
NE G. W. Leibniz (1981). New Essays on Human Understanding,
tr. and ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

viii List of Abbreviations

Opuscules Louis Couturat, ed. (1903). Opuscules et fragments

inédits de Leibniz, extraits des manuscrits de la
Bibliothèque royale de Hanovre. Paris: Alcan, 1903.
Philosophical Essays G. W. Leibniz (1989). Philosophical Essays, ed. and tr.
Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber. Indianapolis, IN,
and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company.
Rauzy (1998) G. W. Leibniz (1998). Recherches ­ générales sur
l’analyse des notions et des vérités. 24 thèses métaphy-
siques et autres textes logiques et métaphysiques, ed.
Jean-­Baptiste Rauzy. Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France.
Schriften zur Syllogistik G. W. Leibniz (2019). Schriften zur Syllogistik, ed. and
tr. Wolfgang Lenzen. Hamburg: Felix Meiner
Verlag.
Schupp (1982) G. W. Leibniz (1982). Generales Inquisitiones
de Analysi Notionum et Veritatum—Allgemeine
Untersuchungen über die Analyse der Begriffe und
Wahrheiten, ed. F. Schupp. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag.
T G. W. Leibniz (1985). Theodicy. Essays on the
Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin
of Evil, ed. Austin Farrer, tr. E. M. Huggard. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

On This Edition

The original manuscript of the GI was composed employing different

inks and pen nibs, clear evidence, together with the marginal notes
and the many erasures, that Leibniz revised it several times. Some para-
graphs, for instance, are crossed out and completely rewritten on the
margin of the sheet. This shows that Leibniz pondered at length on the
content of the GI, which is his most complete work entirely devoted to
the project of building a new logic.
The text of the GI was published for the first time in 1903 by Louis
Couturat in his collection of Leibniz’s essays (Opuscules: 356–99).
A German translation based on Couturat’s edition appeared in 1960 in a
collection of Leibniz’s texts on logic published by Franz Schmidt:
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Fragmente zur Logik, Berlin: Akademie
Verlag. Translations into English were made by George H. R. Parkinson:
Leibniz, Logical Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966; and Walter
H. O’Briant, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s General Investigations Concerning
the Analysis of Concepts and Truths. A Translation and an Evaluation,
Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1968.
For a first critical edition we had to wait until 1982, when Franz
Schupp published the Latin text revised from the original manuscript,
together with a German translation of it. The definitive critical text was
established by the Berlin Academy in 1999 (G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche
Schriften und Briefe, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, VI Reihe, IV, pp. 739–88).
Compared with Couturat’s pioneering work, Schupp’s text was a con-
siderable improvement (it supplied passages that were omitted in the
Couturat edition and corrected several mistakes due to a wrong tran-
scription). The Academy edition, in its turn, improved on Schupp’s edi-
tion, establishing the correct reading of some words and sentences that
were misread by Schupp. In general, however, Schupp’s edition ­continues
to be quite reliable and, in some respects, there are even reasons to pre-
fer it to the Academy edition. Leibniz, for instance, is aware of the
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

x On This Edition

distinction between use and mention applied to a word or a sentence,

and, aiming to stress this difference, he usually underlines the items that
are mentioned and not used. Unfortunately, however, he does not sys-
tematically employ this device, and uses it even with the aim of empha-
sizing some expressions. In the manuscript, for instance, we find phrases
like ‘terms coincide if they can be substituted . . .’, where Leibniz under-
lines the word ‘coincide’ for emphasis, not aiming to stress that it has
been mentioned and not used.1
The editors of the Academy edition have adopted the policy of ren-
dering in a different font words underlined by Leibniz and italicize all
words that they think are mentioned. The problem is, however, that they
make very extensive use of italics and, in some cases, they blur the dif-
ference between words used and words mentioned.
Another problem with the Academy edition is that all Leibniz’s mar-
ginal notes in the manuscript become footnotes in the printed text. Now,
some of these notes are clearly remarks that Leibniz wrote when doing a
second reading of the text and have, as it were, a ‘personal’ character,
something like ‘here I have to add this and this’, or ‘NB’, or ‘this para-
graph needs to be revised’, etc. But there are other remarks which inte-
grate into the text and are written as parts of it proper. The Academy
edition, however, does not attempt to discriminate between these two
kinds of marginal notes.
The present translation has been conducted on the basis of the ori­
gin­al manuscript of the GI and of the text established by the Academy of
the Sciences of Berlin, taking obvious advantage of the pre-­existing
translations by Parkinson and O’Briant. In translating the text into
English, an attempt has been made to employ the distinction use–mention
economically and to distinguish the marginal notes that are supposed to
integrate into the text from those that seem to be of a different nature.

1 Cf. LP: lxiii–lxiv: “One difficulty which faces the translator of Leibniz concerns the use of
quotation marks. These, now commonly employed to indicate that a word or group of words is
being mentioned as opposed to being used, are not used at all by Leibniz, who has no standard
way of indicating the mention as opposed to the use of a word or words. Sometimes he uses a
­capital letter. . . . Sometimes he underlines a word or phrase. . . . Sometimes he uses parentheses. . . .
Sometimes he uses the Greek definite article, followed by the word or words mentioned.”
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

On This Edition xi

The Latin text does not include the transcription of passages or words
that Leibniz first wrote and then deleted: these are included in the
Academy edition.
Key to the symbols:

(1) Words or phrases in square brackets, [ . . . ], have been corrected

(2) Words or phrases in angle brackets, 〈 . . . 〉, have been written in

or integrated by the editor.

the margin of the manuscript or added to the text by Leibniz.

[〈 . . . 〉], correspond to corrections or conjectures proposed by the

(3) Words or phrases in both square brackets and angle brackets,

Academy edition of the GI.

(4) ‘L’ in the footnotes refers to the original word (or words)
employed by Leibniz.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

Introduction

1 Genesis and Structure of the ‘General Inquiries’

Leibniz composed the General Inquiries on the Analysis of Notions and

Truths [Generales inquisitiones de analysi notionum et veritatum] (‘GI’
henceforth) during the year 1686, the same year in which he began to
correspond with Arnauld and wrote the Discourse on Metaphysics.1 The
correspondence with the philosopher and theologian Antoine Arnauld
(1612–94) constitutes one of the main sources for the study of Leibniz’s
philosophy, and the same holds for the Discourse, which offers a first sys-
tematic account of notions like those of complete concept of an individual,
pre-established harmony between soul and body, and substantial form
(something very similar to the ‘monad’ of Leibniz’s mature philosophy).2
The GI is a necessary supplement to the correspondence with Arnauld
and the Discourse in so far as it develops a central topic of Leibniz’s
metaphysics and shows the intimate connection that links Leibniz’s
phil­oso­phy with the attempt to create a new kind of logic. It is in the GI,
indeed, that Leibniz articulates for the first time his favourite solution to
the problem of contingency, and it is in the GI that he displays the main
features of his logical calculus.
At first glance, the GI gives the impression of a ‘compact’ and coherent
work: it begins with a fairly long introduction where several topics are
discussed (philosophy of logic, metaphysics, and grammar), and then a
list of paragraphs of various lengths follows, marked with numbers from
1 to 200. To the sequence of paragraphs, however, there is no correspond-
ing systematic and coherent development of a logical calculus. It is only
towards the end of the essay that Leibniz proposes a set of principles
from which the theorems previously proved can be derived; and he

1 Cf. Antognazza (2009: 239–41). 2 Cf. Discourse and A VI, 4B: 1529–88.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

2 Introduction

attains this result without explicitly discussing the relationship of his

final outcome with the other principles previously proposed: these simply
survive in the body of the text as evidence of the steps that have evolved
to produce the final outcome.3
On at least two occasions he revives his old project of employing
numbers to express propositions but then, after a while, he abandons this
issue and abruptly begins to develop a different topic.4 As George
Parkinson remarked, the GI is a difficult work ‘in which Leibniz often
seems to be groping his way’.5 This, however, does not undermine the
extraordinary value of the GI, which is very rewarding for everyone inter-
ested in logic, philosophy of logic, and metaphysics (besides Leibniz’s
thought). As Marko Malink and Anubav Vasudevan point out, the GI:

does not take the form of a methodical presentation of an antecedently

worked-out system of logic, but rather comprises a meandering series
of investigations covering a wide range of topics. As a result, it can be
difficult to discern the underlying currents of thought that shape the
treatise amidst the varying terminology and conceptual frameworks
adopted by Leibniz at different stages of its development.6

Given this composite structure of the GI, in what follows I devote two
sections to introduce each of the two main topics of this work: logic and
metaphysics.
Section 2 (‘Logic’) begins with a preparatory account of Leibniz’s
project for a universal characteristic and focuses on the relationships
between rational grammar and logic. Then, I will discuss the general
structure and the main ingredients of Leibniz’s logical calculus as pre-
sented in the GI.
Section 3 (‘Metaphysics’) is centred on the problem of contingency,
which caused a lot of trouble for Leibniz from the beginning of his cor-
respondence with Arnauld until the end of his life. I attempt to explain,

3 Malink andVasudevan (2016: 685–6).

4 Leibniz’s idea of employing numbers to designate concepts (and propositions) traces back
to the DAC (1666): 4–5; 161. An extensive discussion of Leibniz’s use of numbers in his logical
essays can be found in chapter 3 of Schriften zur Syllogistik.
5 LP: xxvi–xxvii. 6 Malink and Vasudevan (2016: 686).
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

Introduction 3

first, the nature of this problem and then to show how Leibniz reckoned
he had solved it: in the GI, indeed, we find, even though it is expressed
in a tentative way, the core of his solution based on infinite analysis.

2 Logic

2.1 The Characteristic Art and the Rational Grammar

The GI is an essential part of the project for the constitution of what

Leibniz calls characteristic art (ars characteristica). In Latin the word
character means ‘sign’ or ‘mark’, and the characteristic art was conceived
as a system of signs provided with rules for performing three different
tasks: encoding concepts, forming propositions, and inferring prop­os­
itions from propositions.
The first embryonic idea of the characteristic art can be traced back to
the Dissertation on Combinatorial Art, which Leibniz wrote when he
was 19 years old (1665–6).7 The Dissertation contains many seeds from
which Leibniz’s philosophy will take its mature form. In particular, in
the Dissertation Leibniz elaborates a project that can be summarized as
follows:

(1) By means of analysis, each concept should be decomposed into

its component parts until the first concepts are reached.
(2) Once the first concepts are reached, combine them and produce
all kinds of complex concepts.
(3) At the same time choose a system of simple signs to designate the
first concepts, so that any complex of signs can be univocally
associated with each complex concept.8

Leibniz believes that the best signs to employ are numbers. If the chosen
signs are letters or marks different from numbers, we will have a kind of
universal language: a language, that is, of pure concepts, accessible to
everyone. If numbers (in particular prime numbers) are employed to

7 See DAC: 1–4. 8 Cf. DAC: 4.

OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

4 Introduction

designate the first concepts, then we will have the possibility of trans-
forming each logical argument into a calculus.
After his stay in Paris (1676–9), Leibniz enriches his project for the
constitution of the characteristic art by the following tasks:

(1) Define a method for developing an analysis of each concept.

(2) Define a method for recombining the first concepts and thus
producing all complex concepts.
(3) Define a set of rules for developing a very general calculus based
on either the relations of coincidence or of containment holding
for terms and propositions.

Leibniz assigns the task of realizing points 1 and 2 to a discipline that he

calls general science (scientia generalis) and that he divides into two
parts: analysis and synthesis.9
Since the concepts that Leibniz had in mind were those employed in
everyday life and in the sciences of his time, if they were to be analysed
as required by the constitution of the characteristic art, a kind of general
repository was needed to store them (in some order). Leibniz believed
that an encyclopedia of all knowledge acquired by mankind during the
centuries could play the role of such a ‘repository’. Thus, the task of con-
structing an encyclopedia is integrated into the project for the charac-
teristic art.10
Leibniz, however, was uncertain about the structure of the encyclope-
dia, whether it should be systematic, beginning with principles and
ax­ioms and then including all truths that can be derived from the prin­
ciples, or whether it should contain all items in alphabetical order. Several
manuscripts with sketches and projects of the two possible structures
clearly show Leibniz’s irresolution on this point.11

9 On scientia generalis, see A VI, 4A: LII–LXXXVII, 352–74, 544; L: 233. On analysis and
synthesis, see L: 173–6, 184–8, 229–34 and Schneider (1970). On the relationships between sci-
entia generalis and Leibniz’s projects for an encyclopedia of the sciences, see Pelletier (2018).
10 Cf. Philosophical Essays: 8; A VI, 4A: 84, 138, 257, 338–60.
11 Cf. A VI, 4A: 257, 338–49, 430.
 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

Introduction 5

A series of essays written around the same time as the GI shows that
in this period Leibniz intended to build the universal language on the
basis of a very austere grammar that he called rational grammar (gram-
matica rationalis).12 In these essays, Leibniz investigated the grammar of
a fragment of Latin (the Latin written and spoken mainly by scientists
and philosophers of his time) aiming to reduce it to a limited number of
elements. To realize this task, in a long essay entitled Analysis of Particles
(Analysis particularum) Leibniz investigates the behaviour and meaning
of several Latin particles.13 In a text explicitly devoted to philosophical
language he splits the terms (vocabula) of the natural language into
words (voces) and particles (particulae). Words are nouns, verbs, and
adverbs; particles are prepositions, conjunctions, pronouns, and even
inflexions and cases. As Leibniz remarks, ‘Words constitute the matter,
particles the form of the discourse (oratio).’14
Leibniz’s distinction is analogous to that of medieval logicians between
categorematic and syncategorematic terms and roughly cor­res­ponds to a
more general distinction between fundamental (radicalis) and auxiliary
(servilis) expressions that Leibniz wants to introduce into characteristic.15
‘Fundamental’ or basic expressions are substantives and adjectives; ‘auxil-
iary’ expressions are particles. Leibniz characterizes his project as follows:

Everything in discourse can be analysed into the noun substantive

‘being’ or ‘thing’, the copula, i.e. the substantive verb ‘is’, adjectives, and
formal particles.16

An important task that Leibniz assigns to rational grammar is that of

finding a treatment of relational arguments that would permit them to
be handled by the methods of what he regards as logic.17 Statements,
and consequently arguments containing relations, indeed, were quite
troublesome to people who accepted traditional logic based on
Aristotle’s syllogistic.

12 Cf. AVI, 4A: 102–5, 112–17, 267, 338–9, 344–5, 528. 13 A VI, 4A: 646–67.
14 A VI, 4A: 882. 15 A VI, 4A: 643.
16 LP: 16 (translation slightly modified); A VI, 4A: 886. 17 LP: xx.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

6 Introduction

A well-known argument in syllogistic form is the following:

(A)
(1) All men are mortals.
(2) All Greeks are men.
(3) Therefore, all Greeks are mortals.

A typical argument involving relations, instead, is this:

(B)
(1) Socrates is Sophroniscus’ son.
(2) Therefore, Sophroniscus is Socrates’ father.

According to the mnemonic verses employed by the schoolmen, (A) is a

syllogism traditionally classified as an instance of the mode Barbara. During
the seventeenth century (B) became known as a case of inversion of rela-
tion.18 In each sentence of syllogism (A) a predicate is attributed to a subject,
whereas the premise and conclusion of the argument based on the inversion
of relation state that a relation (son, father) holds between two individuals
(Socrates, Sophroniscus). The traditional syllogism employs three terms (in
the example above: ‘man’, ‘Greek’, and ‘mortal’) and concludes thanks to the
role played by the so-called middle term (in the example above: ‘man’); the
inversion of relation does not have a middle term and was considered, at
least by some seventeenth-century logicians, as a direct (or immediate) infer-
ence. The two arguments are quite different, and it is impossible to express
the inversion of relation as a syllogism, maintaining at the same time all the
constraints that characterize a syllogism in its traditional form.
Aristotle believed that arithmetic, geometry, optics, and ‘in general those
sciences which make enquiry about the cause’ carry out their demonstra-
tions through the first syllogistic figure.19 As Jonathan Barnes remarks:

In his Elements Euclid first sets down certain primary truths or axioms
and then deduces from them a number of secondary truths or the­orems.
Before ever Euclid wrote, Aristotle had described and commended that

18 Cf. Jungius (1957): 89–93. 19 Aristotle, An. post. 79a17–24.

 OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 29/04/21, SPi

Introduction 7

rigorous conception of science for which the Elements was to provide a

perennial paradigm. All sciences, in Aristotle’s view, ought to be pre-
sented as axiomatic deductive systems—that is a main message of the
Posterior Analytics. And the deductions which derive the theorems of
any science from its axioms must be syllogisms—that is the main mes-
sage of the Prior Analytics.20

Aristotle’s view was accepted by the great majority of his followers and
by those who shared the logical theory developed in Prior Analytics. The
ancient philosopher and physician Galen of Pergamon (third century ad)
was probably the first to claim that the Aristotelian syllogism was
unsuitable for handling relations and relational arguments. Galen,
indeed, introduced a new class of inferences that he called relational
­syllogisms to handle relations.21 These syllogisms differed, according to
him, from categorical and hypothetical syllogisms:

There is also another, third, species of syllogism useful for proofs, which
I say come about in virtue of something relational, while the Aristotelians
are obliged to number them among the predicative syllogisms.22

Since Galen, only a very small number of logicians and philosophers

have dared to oppose the received view inspired by Aristotle.23 Among
these dissenting voices, that of Joachim Jungius (1587–1657) was one of
the most interesting. A professor of natural sciences in Hamburg, the
author of a logic handbook, the Logica Hamburgensis (1638), and highly
regarded by Leibniz, Jungius believed that traditional logic needed to be
expanded with additional inferences involving relations that he assumed
to be primitive and not reducible to syllogisms.24
20 Barnes (2007: 360). 21 Barnes (2007: 419–24, 431–3).
22 Galen (1974: xvi, 1).
23 During the period from around 900 to 1200, some authors belonging to the Arabic
­tradition were well aware of the difficulties implied by attempting to express relational inferences
in the form of an Aristotelian syllogism. From the thirteenth century onwards, Arabic thinkers
continued to discuss the problem of relational inferences, still maintaining a logical framework
largely inspired by traditional syllogistic doctrines (cf. Khaled El-Rouayheb (2010)), but they
seem to have exerted no significant influence on authors belonging to the cultural milieu
­originating in the Latin tradition.
24 One of these inferences was the inversion of relation just mentioned above; another was
the so-called inference from the right to the oblique (a recto ad obliquum), of which the follow-
ing is an example:
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naisystävän — ja ken viimeiseksi tässä jäisi, maksaisi vedon.

MATTI

Siksihän meillä oli niin kiire kihloihin päästä, kun aika loppuu
tänään.

ANNI

Kyllä ne merimiehet ovat aika veitikoita.

PUOSU

Ja tytöt vielä suurempia veitikoita — mutta mi nä en vielä tunnusta

hävinneeni, vaan teen morsiamen vaikka puusta.

EMMA

Tuolla menee Jaakopsonska laiturilla. Hän varmaan hyväksyisi

puosun tarjouksen.
 TYTÖT (Nauravat.)

Ihan varmaan.

PUOSU

Matami hoi. Tulkaa vähän tänne. Olkaa niin hyvä.

(Jaakopsonska, iso, joko hyvin laiha tai hyvin lihava nainen,

tulee. Tytöt tervehtivät häntä nauraen.)

JAAKOPSONSKA

No mitä lystiä täällä pidetään?

PUOSU

Päivää, matami. Oletteko niinkuin avioliittoon vapaa?

JAAKOPSONSKA

Miehestä erossa nykyään, mutta eipä tuohon eri kiirettä ole, miten
niin?

PUOSU

Minun kun pitäisi päästä kihloihin, mutta ei ole morsianta.

JAAKOPSONSKA

No siitä pulasta kyllä voin sinut päästää. Tuossa on käsi.

(Naurua.)
PUOSU

Tuota — tuota (katsoo Jaakopsonskaa.) Jos sentään mietitään

vähän aikaa — tuota — ota sinä, Kinnari.

KINNARI (Menee topakasti Jaakopsonskan luo, katsoo tätä, mutta

polvet rupeavat tutisemaan ja hän sanoo arasti.)

Ei — en minä uskalla.

JAAKOPSONNI (Tulee päissään laulaa rallattaen.)

Rati rati rallaa, ja taivahalla, rati riti j.n.e.

JAAKOPSONSKA

Sehän on Jaakopsonni!

JAAKOPSONNI

Lohikäärme!

(Juoksee kauhistuneena pakoon.)

JAAKOPSONSKA

Älä mene — älä mene, — kyllä minä sinut kiinni otan!

(Juoksee Jaakopsonin jälkeen huutaen tätä.)

TOISET (Nauravat; puosu on kauhistunut.)

KINNARI (Katsoo portaalta; toiset laidalta.)

 Jaakopsonni juoksee kuin hengen edestä, mutta ämmä tavoittaa,
ämmä tavoittaa — ei vielä — ei vielä.

MIKKONEN

Jaakopsonni juoksee hevoseen — — — jo ennätti hevosmiehen

luo.

KINNARI

Nyt ne lyövät hevosta selkään — mamma jää, mamma jää!

(Yleinen huuto ja nauru.)

PUOSU

Pääsi pakoon. Kyllä nyt Jaakopsonni on pian Ruotsin puolella.

KINNARI

Hän ei varmaankaan tiennyt, että hänen entinen armaansa oli

tullut tähän kaupunkiin.

PUOSU

Nyt taitaa minunkin olla parasta uskoa hävinneeni.

SOINI (On puhellut Kertun ja Arvin kanssa.)

Täällä on vielä eräs neiti, joka ei ole sanonut mitään näihin

asioihin.

KERTTU (Nauraa.)
 Mitä minulla olisi sanomista, kun ei ole mitään kysyttykään.

PUOSU

Kysytty! Kauneimmalle neitosista on siis rakkauden tunnustus

tekemättä.
(Polvistuu.) Tässä teidän jalkojenne juuressa vannon.

KAIKKI MIEHET

Ja minä, ja minä, j.n.e.

(Puosu nousee.)

PUOSU

Kylläpä nyt kelpaa, vaikka ei äsken Jaakopsonska kelvannut.

Mitä neiti sanoo?

KERTTU (Iloisesti.)

Kyllähän minä merimiehistä paljon pidän ja sitäpaitsi olen

orpotyttö, ettei suinkaan turva olisi haitaksi.

PUOSU

Sillä lailla, maailma valkenee — —

KERTTU

Mutta kai minä saan valita.

PUOSU
 Annan teille sydämeni.

TOISET

Ja minä, ja minä, ja minä, j.n.e.

PUOSU

Silkit.

TOISET

Ja minä, ja minä, j.n.e.

PUOSU

Kullat.

TOISET

Ja minä, ja minä, j.n.e.

KERTTU

Minä rupean sen kumppaniksi, kenellä on kihlat heti minulle antaa.

PUOSU

Minulla. (Hyppää ottamaan piilottamaansa arkkusta.) Tyhjä!

(Sieppaa äkkiä hirmuisen suuren kellon liivinsä taskusta; Kertulle.)
Tässä!

KERTTU (Nauraa.)
 Onko tämä kihlakello?

TOISET (Nauravat; puosu panee kellonsa taskuun.)

ARVI

Minulla on.

(Ottaa arkkusen ja antaa Kertulle, joka avaa sen toisten

tyttöjen auttaessa.)

KINNARI

No, mutta minun päiviäni.

MIKKONEN

Siellähän ne varustukset ovat.

PUOSU

Katso peeveliä!

TYTÖT

Niin kauniita.

KERTTU (Ujosti.)

Mikä minun tässä auttaa.

PUOSU
 Minä panen vastaan, neiti on nuori. Teillä on joku naittaja tai
holhooja. Veto ei ole voitettu, kihlaus ei ole laillinen.

KERTTU

Minulla ei ole holhoojaa eikä omaisia muuta kuin nuori veli.

PUOSU

Vaikkapa velikin, asia ei ole valmis.

NAPPULA (Tulee.)

Nyt ne perunat on kuorittu.

KERTTU

Eerikki!

(Rientää syleilemään veljeään.)

NAPPULA

Kerttu!

KERTTU

Sinäkö se oletkin se Nappula, ja noin kasvanut.

MIKKONEN

Siinähän nyt on veli! Annatko sinä sisaresi naimisiin?

NAPPULA

Kelle?

MIKKONEN

Puosulle —

NAPPULA

En!

MIKKONEN

No entä Arville?

NAPPULA

Arville kyllä. Sinä saat.

ARVI

Kiitoksia.

(Arvi ja Kerttu syleilevät. Toiset huutavat eläköön.)

NAPPULA

Mutta sinun pitää antaa sen keittää minullekin sitten kuin tulet
laivaani kapteeniksi.

ARVI
 Tottahan toki Kerttu keittää molemmille.

KERTTU

Kyllä minä keitän.

PUOSU

Malttakaahan. Tuliko neiti täältä laivasta minua vastaan äskettäin.

KERTTU

Kyllä, kävin tiedustelemassa veljeäni.

PUOSU

Ahaa. Tässähän onkin pelattu oikein teatteria. Nyt minä

ymmärrän, miksi neiti oli niin taipuvainen kihloihin menemään. Asia
oli Arvin kanssa valmis. Katsos peevelin poikaa, kun voitti. Onnea,
onnea! Siinä on kelloni sinulle vielä päällisiksi. Kelvanneehan tuo
noin miehiselle miehelle.

ARVI

Kiitoksia, puosu, te olette hyvä mies…

PUOSU

Pidä vain omasi, sillä kyllä niitä tyttöjä on minunkin varalle.

Taitavatkin ulkomaalaiset minusta enemmän tykätä kuin kotipuolen
tytöt… niillä on erilainen kauneusihanne.
ANNI

Pulska mieshän puosu on, mutta eihän sitä niin äkkiä pidä toivoa.

EMMA

Pitää antaa vähän ajatusaikaa.

VIISU

Tietysti vähän miettimisaikaa.

PUOSU

Kyllä te osaatte, ai-jai-jai-jai — mutta nyt lauletaan ja maistetaan.

Onnea kihlatuille!

KAIKKI (Kilistävät ja huutavat eläköön.)

Kuoro n:o 10.

KAIKKI

Lempi on valtias merellä ja maalla. Ei sitä kenkään

vastustella saata. Vastahan vaan ottaa saan, rakkaus kun
ovelleni kolkuttaa.

Toivomme hartaasti nuorille teille onnea lykkyä elämänne

teille. Poikia pulskia paksuja, tyttöjäkin sieviä ja somia.

MIEHET
 Nyt Suomen neitosille, täss’ läsnä oleville, me täydet maljat
nostamme ja hartahasti toivomme, että myöskin meille
maailman kulkureille sama onni koittaisi, ja armas vihdoin
löytyisi.

TYTÖT

No kyllä vain joskus saa kaikki kylkiluunsa, se vaikka oisi

puusta. Siis oottakaa ja toivokaa, te kaikki saatte varmaan
pienen oman armaan.

KAIKKI

Lempi on valtias merellä ja maalla, ei sitä kenkään

vastustella saata. Vastahan vaan ottaa saan, rakkaus kun
ovelleni kolkuttaa

PUOSU

Tämähän on juhlallista. Viettäkäämme Arvin kihlajaisia oikein

hupaisesti. Meidän on kaikkien mentävä iltapäivällä tansseihin, jotka
ovat täällä likellä tavarasuojassa.

ANNI

Siitähän tulee hauskaa.

MIEHET

Tietysti kaikki tansseihin.

VIISU
 Se on tietty! Sinnehän mekin olimme lopullisesti menossa.
(Kumartaa puosulle.) Saanko pyytää puosua ensimmäiseen naisten
valssiin.

TOISET TYTÖT

Ja minä, ja minä…

PUOSU

No nyt on onni kerrassaan muuttunut. — Tuhansia kiitoksia,

neitoset.
Tanssi onkin minun parhaimpia puoliani.

ANNI

Senhän näkee jo puosun vartalostakin.

PUOSU

He he, vai huomaa sen jo päältäpäin.

TOISET TYTÖT (Nauravat.)

Tietysti.

PUOSU

Mehän voisimmekin laulaa sen merimieslaulun, jossa minulla on

soolo-tanssi, että naiset näkevät.

MIEHET
 Lauletaan vain.

NAISET

Sehän olisi hauskaa nähdä.

PUOSU

Sadehatut päähän! Ja siitä säkeistöstä aloitetaan että »Kun nämä

lasit on maisteltu» ja tietysti maistetaan nyt, että olisi syytä niin
laulaa.

(Kaikki maistavat.)

Kuoro n:o 11.

Kun nämä lasit on maistettu, se toimi tulee uusi.

Kova oli seelein komento, kun laivaan tuli luusi.
Mutta hurratkaamme vain, sillä se on tapamme ain’,
vaivoja me nähdä saamm’, jotka seilaamme ulkomailla.

Blow boys, blow, to California,

there is plenty of gold,
so I’ve been told,
in the banks of Sacramento.

Kun maihin on päästy reilusti ja tultu kotirantaan,

siellä ne oottavat heilatkin, he sydämensä antaa.
Siis hurratkaamme vain, sillä se on tapamme ain’,
vaivoja me nähdä saamm’, jotka seilaamme ulkomailla.

Blow boys, blow, to California,

there is plenty of gold,
 so I’ve been told,
in the banks of Sacramento.

Reiluista pojista tykkäävät nuo Suomen tytöt armaat.

He nahjukset luotansa lykkäävät, sen tiedämme me varmaan.
Siis hurratkaamme vain, sillä se on tapamme ain’,
vaivoja me nähdä saamm’, jotka seilaamme ulkomailla.

Blow boys, blow, to California,

there is plenty of gold,
so I’ve been told,
in the banks of Sacramento.

PUOSU (Huutaa.)

Taploo, taploo! Kuvaelma pian, pian!

(Loppusoiton aikana asettuvat kaikki äkkiä kuvaelmaan,

mitä koomillisempaan, sitä parempi. Nuori pari keskessä, tytöt
kahden puolen. Puosu seisoo takana pöydällä haaralla jaloin
ja merimiehet mikä missäkin muka jossakin »asennossa».).

KAIKKI

Eläköön!

Esirippu.
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