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The New Regional Order
in the Middle East
Changes and Challenges

Edited by Sara Bazoobandi

International Political Economy Series

Series Editor
Timothy M. Shaw
Visiting Professor
University of Massachusetts Boston
Boston, MA, USA
Emeritus Professor
University of London
London, UK
The global political economy is in flux as a series of cumulative crises
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the BRICS, rise.

More information about this series at

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 Sara Bazoobandi
Editor

The New Regional

Order in the Middle
East
Changes and Challenges
Editor
Sara Bazoobandi
Middle East Risk Consulting
Hamburg, Germany
Nonresident Senior Fellow
at the Atlantic Council within
the Global Business and Economics
Program and Global Energy Center
Washington, DC, USA
Nonresident Fellow at Arab Gulf State
Institute in Washington
Washington, DC, USA

ISSN 2662-2483 ISSN 2662-2491 (electronic)

International Political Economy Series
ISBN 978-3-030-27884-7 ISBN 978-3-030-27885-4 (eBook)
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 Introduction

In recent decades, millions of people across the Middle East and North
Africa region have shared the same grievances, including: inequality, lack
of social mobility, outdated state—citizen relationships and a general
lack of hope in their political systems (to name only few). These griev-
ances have driven widespread and ongoing change across the region.
A chain of dramatic and historical events has taken place in the region
since 2010–2011. This book is a collective effort to shed light on some
of the key events, the underlying reasons behind these and the future
challenges for the region. The scope of change and the pace of events
are both broad and fast, which makes it virtually impossible to capture all
trends. That is why contributors of this book have picked up on impor-
tant themes that are also closest to their fields of expertise. The idea of
this book was born in 2015 at a Gulf Research Meeting in Cambridge,
where Dr. Neil Quilliam and myself co-authored a paper on the key fac-
tors for strategic changes in the region. The book includes six chapters.
Chapter 1 reviews a number of key socio-economic challenges that
the region faces. Many of the socio-economic challenges that the region
has struggled with in recent decades were highlighted by the chain of
political uprisings across the region. This chapter explores how changes
in a number of social factors—including identities, social and individual
values, the definition of the social roles for different genders and state–
citizen relations—have contributed to the recent political uprisings across
the region. The degree to which such changes have taken root differs
between different countries; nevertheless, the change is widespread

v
vi INTRODUCTION

and visible in every part of the region. The chapter also sets out how
these challenges are compounded by the context of the so-called water–
food-energy nexus—a set of critical environmental challenges facing the
region.
Chapter 2 reviews the changes in and the challenges associated with
oil wealth management in the Gulf Cooperation Council. It sets out how
oil income has fuelled the region’s growth and development and helped
the ruling families to establish and maintain their rule. It then looks into
the role of oil wealth in the social contracts in place across the region,
and how low oil prices have prompted debates between policymakers
and citizens over the sustainability of oil-driven economic growth mod-
els and their impact on social contracts across the region. The chapter
illustrates how mounting pressure to reduce dependency on oil by diver-
sifying the economy and instituting structural reforms has brought about
an increased repurposing of assets that traditionally have been managed
through Sovereign Wealth Funds towards domestic and regional needs.
While Sovereign Wealth Funds remain active in international markets,
they are being readjusted to ensure sustainability in terms of returns,
income and operational capabilities.
Chapter 3 analyses how and why the GCC developed as a regional
organisation and security community in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.
It explores the factors that favoured closer cooperation among the six
ruling families in the Gulf and examines the nature of the cooperative
mechanisms that gradually evolved after 1981. Progress was far from
seamless or linear as tensions complicated, undermined, and in some
cases held back cooperation. The chapter argues that the shock of the
Arab Spring in 2011 and the differing regional responses to the upheaval
not only widened these fissures in Gulf politics, but also altered the com-
mon threat perception that had effectively constituted a consensual base-
line in regional considerations of security up to that point. The chapter
goes on to look into how the recasting of the dynamics of Gulf secu-
rity after the blockade of Qatar heralded the rise of a multipolarity of
participants in regional security structures that for decades had been the
preserve of first the British and then the US as external guarantors of
stability.
Chapter 4 provides a review of the history of Iran’s nuclear ambi-
tions, the nuclear negotiations, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(JCPOA) and its impacts at domestic, regional and international levels.
Iran’s nuclear programme began in the 1960s under the government
 INTRODUCTION vii

of the country’s last monarch and was restarted by the Islamic Republic
after the end of Iran–Iraq War. Although, it was never proven that Iran’s
nuclear programme had an active military dimension, Iran’s regional bal-
ance of power struggle, the experience of eight devastating years of war
with Iraq, sharing borders with a nuclear nation (Pakistan) and having
multiple domestic security challenges led the international community to
conclude that it would have made perfect sense for the Islamic Republic
to aspire nuclear military capability. The nuclear negotiations that con-
cluded with the JCPOA became a milestone in Iran–US relations since
the Islamic Revolution and a significant diplomatic achievement for all
parties involved. The unilateral withdrawal of Trump’s Administration
from the JCPOA, however, has revived uncertainties about the future of
Iran–US relations. This chapter analyses the impact of the Iran nuclear
deal and the US withdrawal from it at the domestic, regional and inter-
national levels.
Chapter 5 addresses the question whether China’s developing eco-
nomic relationship, which is promoted through the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), will lead it to play a more muscular political, diplo-
matic and military role in the near future. The Gulf region is undergo-
ing a series of profound changes at national, regional and international
levels. It is at a pivotal moment in its history when the balance of
power amongst external powers is transitioning from a predominantly
US-dominated order to a multipolar one in which global powers, such
as China, and regional powers, such as Russia, Turkey, India and Brazil
are beginning to shape and influence the region. This chapter argues that
since the Obama presidency (2008–2016), the US has strongly signalled
that it is no longer willing to play the role of sole external security pro-
vider and, in doing so, has left a vacuum. It examines the exact nature of
the US change in policy, its wider implications for the region and, at the
same time, the deepening of relations between China and the Gulf.
Chapter 6 builds on the analysis presented in Chapter 5 by exploring,
in more detail, how Russia, India, Turkey and Brazil are beginning to
shape and influence the political and economic landscape in the Middle
East and North Africa. It begins with an assessment of Russia’s bid to
capitalise on the immediate opportunities afforded to it by Washington’s
pause. The chapter then compares and contrasts Russia’s role in the
region with that of other key external powers influencing and shaping
the region. The chapter provides analysis on India’s strategic move to
strengthen relations with the UAE and Saudi Arabia. It also argues that
viii INTRODUCTION

in response to those strategies, countries such as Turkey and Brazil align

themselves more closely to Qatar, which has been under blockade from
its neighbours since July 2017.
The book has benefitted heavily from the support of various indi-
viduals and institutions, directly and indirectly. I would like to thank
my husband, Rupert Winckler, for his constant support and encour-
agement. I am grateful to all the contributors of this manuscript. I am
particularly thankful for the support provided by Palgrave Macmillan
Political Economy series Christina Brian, Anca Pusca and Katelyn
Zingg and the series editor, Tim Shaw. I would also like to thank my
mother-in-law Marie Winckler and Rhiannon Alexander for patiently
reading and editing my writings. I am indebted to all the individu-
als who generously took the time to answer my questions in meetings
and interviews, amongst those, I would like to extend my special grat-
itude to Ambassador Charlotta Sparre, former Swedish Ambassador
to Jordan and Egypt and Patrick Costello, Head of Division Global3
at the European External Action Service. I am also thankful to the
Economic Research Forum for their generous funding of a research pro-
ject to which I contributed in 2016. The second chapter of this book
hugely benefitted from the findings of that project. Last but not least,
I am grateful to Mani Jad, Deputy Director of Centre for Middle East
Development, University of California, Los Angeles, for providing her
generous advice and assistance.

Sara Bazoobandi
 Contents

1 The Middle East North Africa Socio-economic Challenges 1

Sara Bazoobandi

2 GCC Oil Wealth: The Power and the People 27

Sara Bazoobandi and Rhiannon Alexander

3 The Realignment of Regional Politics and the Future

of the Gulf Cooperation Council 49
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

4 Iran Nuclear Programme, a Brief History 69

Sara Bazoobandi

5 The Role of External Powers: Global Actors (Part I) 93

Neil Quilliam

6 The Role of External Powers: Regional Actors (Part II) 119

Neil Quilliam

ix
 Abbreviations

ADIA Abu Dhabi Investment Authority

ASPA Summit of South American-Arab Countries
BRI Belt and Road Initiative
CASF China-Arab States Cooperation Forum
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
EIA Energy Information Administration
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FII Future Investment Initiative
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF International Monetary Fund
IONS Indian Ocean Naval Symposium
IRGC Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JCPOA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
KIA Kuwait Investment Authority
LNG Liquified Natural Gas
MbS Mohammad bin Salman
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA National Security Agency

xi
xii ABBREVIATIONS

OPEC Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PIF Public Investment Fund
PPP Public—Private Partnership
QIA Qatar Investment Authority
SAGIA Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority
SAMA Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle
SWF Sovereign Wealth Fund
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
 List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Arab Youth Survey: How strongly do you agree or disagree
with the statement? (Source Arab Youth Survey [2016],
available at: http://www.arabyouthsurvey.com/
pdf/2016-AYS-Presentation-EN_12042016100316.pdf) 4
Fig. 1.2 University attendance in the Middle East (Source Catriona
Davies, “Mideast Women Beat Men in Education, Lose
Out at Work”, CNN, 6 June 2012. http://www.cnn.
com/2012/06/01/world/meast/middle-east-women-
education/) 17
Fig. 1.3 Global desalination capacities by region (Source CNN 2019) 19

xiii
 CHAPTER 1

The Middle East North Africa

Socio-economic Challenges

Sara Bazoobandi

Introduction
Middle Eastern societies have been facing fundamental social, economic
and political challenges in recent decades. Many of these challenges were
highlighted by the chain of political uprisings across the region that
began in 2011. These challenges have arisen partly from changes in a
number of social factors. Identities, social and individual values, the defi-
nition of the social roles for different genders and state–citizen relations
have all begun to change across the region. The degree to which such
changes have taken root differs between different countries; nevertheless,
the change is widespread and visible in every part of the region. Such
changes have presented societies with new challenges for which neither
policymakers nor the public have solutions to offer. This chapter will

S. Bazoobandi (*)
Middle East Risk Consulting, Hamburg, Germany
Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council within the Global Business
and Economics Program and Global Energy Center, Washington, DC, USA
Nonresident Fellow at Arab Gulf State Institute in Washington,
Washington, DC, USA

© The Author(s) 2020 1

S. Bazoobandi (ed.), The New Regional Order in the Middle East,
International Political Economy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-27885-4_1
2 S. BAZOOBANDI

review a number of key socio-economic challenges that face the region.

It is worth noting that the order in which the list is conducted does
not represent their weight or importance. The chapter will examine the
ongoing shift of identities, the negative impact of the lack of efficient
socio-political dialogue, absence of social mobility, and poor public pol-
icy and planning across the region. It will also review the role of external
powers as well as some of the key internal players such as women, youth
and entrepreneurs. The chapter will then move on to studying the causes
of the governance crisis across the region and identifying the main chal-
lenges that the MENA region is facing in the globalised world. Finally, a
brief review of water–energy–food nexus will be provided.

Shift of Identities
Similar to the rest of the world, multiple aspects of globalisation have
affected the Middle East North Africa region. The way in which citizens
across the region define themselves has been influenced by their experi-
ence of living in a globalised world. The Arab Youth Survey1 is an inter-
esting source to look at empirical evidence to confirm regional trends.
Although the sample size of this survey cannot be said to represent the
entire population of the region (it includes about 200 interviewees per
country), it does tell a clear story about the mindset of the current youth
cohort in the Middle East. According to the survey, over the past years,
a high number of the young believe that globalisation has had a negative
impact on their local cultural heritage. The survey also shows that a high
number of the participants want their leaders to do more to improve
their personal freedoms, human rights and rights of women.2 The Arab
uprisings were to a great extent a result of the people’s desire for such
improvements. Globalisation has affected the ways in which individu-
als define their identities, values and aspiration across the world and the
MENA region has been no exception in this sense. Desire for protection
of human rights and personal freedoms is now an integral part of peo-
ple’s identity, which goes beyond the existing definitions associated with
the region’s national flags, of being Arab or Muslim.
One of the challenges facing Middle Eastern societies currently is
related to the core identities of the region’s citizens in today’s globalised
world. Such identities are often in conflict with one another. This is not
limited to the sectarian identities but also includes existing political and
social identities. For many years, the political apparatus in many Middle
Eastern countries has created identities that have been dictated to the
 1 THE MIDDLE EAST NORTH AFRICA SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 3

citizens by the states. The governments in various countries across the

region had heavy-handed campaigns to create identities that suited their
own overall political agendas. In addition, for centuries, the patriarchal
nature of these societies has also imposed certain identities on citizens.
With the forces of globalisation, the influence of some of these ideologies
on regional identities has weakened over time. As a result, the socio-po-
litical entities that were created to promote those ideologies started to
weaken as well. For example, the regional effort to create Arab solidarity
no longer resonates with the social, political and economic values and
aspirations of most Arab nations across the region.
In 2017, I attended a workshop as a part of a regional peacebuilding
initiative. In one of the closed-door sessions that were held under the
Chatham House Rule, a regional analyst explained the emergence of the
new identities across the region as follows:

Bigger countries in the region have much bigger challenges to deal with and
are no longer focused on the regional issues. Simple socio-economic issues
such as education, employment and building one’s life through the ranks
of the society are the main priorities for their young citizens. The previous
regional sentiment towards the Arab neighbours that was boosted by the
concept of Arab solidarity has begun to fade and new identities started to
emerge across the region. Today, people, particularly the youth, define them-
selves through a rather complex combination of identities. The younger gen-
erations no longer consider themselves only as Arabs or Muslims. They also
describe themselves as Asians, Africans or Mediterranean. Such a shift of iden-
tities has had significant economic consequences as well. Economic relations
have diversified beyond the regional partners. Over the past years, regional
economies have been building p ­ artnerships with Africa, Russia and China.

Lack of Efficient Channels for Dialogue

The next challenge facing societies across the region is the lack of social
and political dialogue at various levels. Traditionally, the region has been
missing efficient channels for dialogue at both national and regional
level. At the national level, the democratic institutions through which
the citizens are allowed to communicate with the political elite have been
corrupt or completely manipulated by the security apparatus or the polit-
ical elite. Moreover, the political leadership has structurally targeted free-
dom of expression and it has been always controlled and restricted due
to national security concerns. Needless to say, the definition of national
security has remained broad and intentionally vague across the region
4 S. BAZOOBANDI

(for example, through lack of clarity in the legal description of political

crime across the region). Bloggers, journalists, cartoonists, students, civil
right activists, women’s rights activists, academics, former politicians and
community leaders have all been targeted by the states’ security systems
across the region and portrayed as national security threats.
Throughout more than two years of research for this book, I have
travelled fairly frequently to various parts of the region and had numer-
ous conversations with people across the board (e.g. journalists, activists,
academics) about the future of the region. The point most frequently
raised in these discussions was that the only solution to address social,
political and economic challenges that the region is facing is to imple-
ment various drastic reforms. When asked about the prospect of such
reforms, though, most people were relatively cynical and believed that
the reforms will take a very long time. Not surprisingly, I came across
similar results in the Arab Youth Survey (see the graph below). The
Arab Youth Survey results show that the majority of survey participants
were more optimistic about the prospect of reform and the future of the
region at the beginning of the Arab uprising. As the time passed, how-
ever, a strong sense of cynicism has grown across the region.
Overall, events across the region confirm that the change, particu-
larly since the Arab uprisings, is going in a completely opposite direction
from what is required. The MENA region is losing the global compe-
tition where innovation, accountability, critical thinking, transparency

͞&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĂď ^ƉƌŝŶŐ͕ / ĨĞĞů ƚŚĞ ƌĂď ǁŽƌůĚ ŝƐ ďĞƩĞƌ Žī͟
ůů ŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐΎ ;^ŚŽǁŝŶŐ й ŐƌĞĞͿ
ϴϬ ϳϮ ϳϬ
ϱϰ
ϲϬ
ϯϴ ϯϲ
ϰϬ
ϮϬ
Ϭ
ϮϬϭϮ ϮϬϭϯ ϮϬϭϰ ϮϬϭϱ ϮϬϭϲ

Fig. 1.1 Arab Youth Survey: How strongly do you agree or disagree with
the statement? (Source Arab Youth Survey [2016], available at: http://www.
arabyouthsurvey.com/pdf/2016-AYS-Presentation-EN_12042016100316.pdf)

*Arab Youth Survey includes sample data from 16 Arab countries: GCC, Jordan,
Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia
 1 THE MIDDLE EAST NORTH AFRICA SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 5

and access to (at least some) information are the key factors for success.
Moreover, serious security concerns throughout the region, open con-
flicts in many countries that often, directly or indirectly, affected other
nations have influenced the direction of change in the region. As a result,
at the regional level, there is a vacuum of trust and communication at
highest political level. Whilst political leaders have been alienating their
counterparts by pushing for their own agendas, restrictions to the right
to travel, widespread state-sponsored media, regional security and ideo-
logical conflicts have also divided people at the grassroots level (Fig. 1.1).

Absence of Social Mobility

The lack of social mobility is both another pressing challenge and a sig-
nificant driver of social discontent across the region. This stems from a
lack of values to define social transformation across the region. Values
that define social transformation and the tools and mechanisms for
social transformation have been neglected in Middle Eastern societies.
Institutions, bureaucratic structure, cultural values and human capital
development required for the social transformation in the region have
not developed in ways conducive to social mobility. As a result, whilst
most of the societies within the global community have moved on to a
level of technological, economic and political structures which allow eas-
ier social transformation, Middle Eastern societies have been struggling
to implement simple changes to allow individuals to improve their social
status. In most societies across the region, having stronger links with the
political elite has been perceived as the best, and indeed the shortest, way
to access resources and opportunities. Individual merit, determination
and creativity have all been outdone by personal connections with influ-
ential political figures.
There are however, some agents for change across the region with
great potential to change the existing dynamics. Women, youth and
entrepreneurs are perhaps, in the current socio-political climate, the
most influential agents for change. In many countries women are effect-
ing change, at varying paces and making their voices heard. For example,
more than half of the graduates in many countries in the MENA region
are female. Given the demographic structure of the region, the majority
of the citizens in MENA are young and hold great potential for creating
innovative solutions and fighting the current obstacles to social transfor-
mation. In practice, however, the youth potential is restricted by both:
6 S. BAZOOBANDI

by a lack of opportunities and by the restrictiveness of the socio-politi-

cal space. Finally, entrepreneurs have demonstrated impressive potential
for change in the region. There are numerous examples of successful
entrepreneurial solutions across the region. Regional entrepreneurs have
introduced creative solutions in a broad range of social, environmental
and economic areas such as waste management, traffic, food and energy.
Whilst such solutions have hopeful prospects for creating jobs, their
operating environment is a real obstacle to development and success.

Exclusionary Public Policy

The exclusionary public policies of governments across the region also
present another set of challenges. The Middle Eastern political elites
have had carefully defined criteria based on which the ‘inner circles’ are
created. Ideological orientation and personal or family links have been
considered as key factors to create an inner circle to which the politi-
cal elite has given varying degrees of access to power. Often those who
comply with the dominant ideology of the elite (political or religious or
both) or have certain personal or family links with the ruling elite are
provided with better access to resources and political power. This has led
to widespread social dissatisfaction and various forms of radicalisation
that have emerged across the region over the past decades. In most of
the developed globalised societies, governments have introduced welfare
systems that aim to empower the middle classes and boost social mobil-
ity. However, in the Middle East, such welfare systems either do not exist
or do not function efficiently.
Looking at global political history, there are very few cases in which
political power has been given up easily. Transformation of power is
indeed a long struggle involving frequent forward steps and setbacks. The
Middle East is no exception to such a trend. As a result, for many dec-
ades, the same political powerhouses have dominated the social, political
and economic structure in most of the MENA countries. The main rea-
sons for the limited push for changing the monopoly of political power in
the region is to be found in the basics of the Arab Human Development
Reports: the deficits in freedom, education and women’s participation.
Another key element has been the state ‘buying’ loyalty from the citizens;
and, the role of the external factors such as historical ones related to the
colonial pasts, as well as more modern ones stemming from the West’s
long support—now renewed—for the traditional powerhouses.
 1 THE MIDDLE EAST NORTH AFRICA SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 7

The recent wave of citizens’ demand for change in the regional

power structure has certainly not led to any desirable outcomes yet. The
demand for change has so far only been the very beginning of a very
long, and probably painful, journey for change. Having said that, it is
clear that the overall regional dynamics have begun to change. The open
public debates over various aspects of social and political structure, a
greater interest and engagement from the citizens in political and civic
participation, more access to information from different sources (even
though often very uneven and mixed with misinformation), the break-
ing of political, social and economic taboos and last but not least a mas-
sive generational shift with large young populations are all solid evidence
of such changes. These are perhaps the beginning of a rather lengthy
process of transformation in the structure of political power across the
region. Such changes will in the long-run play crucial roles in reforming
the exclusionary policies in the region.

Delegitimised Democratic Institutions

Another key challenge facing the MENA societies is the structural and
organised effort for delegitimisation of democratic institutions by the
political elite. Rigged votes and sham elections have completely under-
mined the legitimacy of the democratisation of the societies. As a result,
people’s trust in such processes has declined across the region. General
public opinion in the region is fairly cynical about the integrity of the
existing election processes. For decades, various countries of the region
have experienced undemocratic political events such as military coups,
and the governments’ manipulation of the election processes and/or
change of legislations in favour of the ruling elite (e.g. expansion of pres-
idential power and limitation of the power of assemblies).
Such events have further delegitimised the democratic process across
the region. Paradoxically, though, in recent decades the participation
rate in various elections across the region has significantly increased.
In Iran, Egypt and Turkey, people’s involvement in various local and
national elections has shown that whilst the general sense of cynicism
over the integrity of the elections has remained unchanged, citizens still
view these processes as an important communication channel with the
ruling elite. Often the citizens use elections as unique occasions to pro-
test against ongoing suppression, corruption and monopolised political
power. Some recent elections, therefore, confirm that whilst structural
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
assessment in all cases being the knight’s fee, in its secondary
sense of a parcel of land worth twenty pounds a year. Whatever the
laity might think of this arrangement, the indignation of the clergy
was bitter and deep. The wrong inflicted on them by the scutage of
1156 was as nothing compared with this, which set at naught all
ancient precedents of ecclesiastical immunity, and actually wrung
from the Church lands even more than from the lay fiefs.[1467] Their
wrath however was not directed solely or even chiefly against the
king. A large share of the blame was laid at the chancellor’s door; for
the scheme had his active support, if it was not actually of his
contriving. Its effects on English constitutional developement were
for later generations to trace; the men of the time saw, or thought
they saw, its disastrous consequences in the after-lives of its
originators. In the hour of Thomas’s agony Gilbert Foliot raked up as
one of the heaviest charges against him the story of the “sword
which his hand had plunged into the bosom of his mother the
Church, when he spoiled her of so many thousand marks for the
army of Toulouse”;[1468] and his own best and wisest friend, John of
Salisbury, who had excused the scutage of 1156, sorrowfully avowed
his belief that the scutage of 1159 was the beginning of all Henry’s
misdoings against the Church, and that the chancellor’s share in it
was the fatal sin which the primate had to expiate so bitterly.[1469]

[1466] “Secundum ejus scutagium assisum pro eodem exercitu

Walliæ” [this writer assigns a like object to the scutage of 1156,
but in both cases he is contradicted by chronology and
contemporary evidence] “reperies in rotulo anni quinti regis
ejusdem inferius. Fuitque assisum ad duas marcas pro quolibet
feodo, non solum super prælatos, verum tam super ipsos quam
super milites suos, secundum numerum feodorum, qui tenuerunt
de rege in capite; necnon et super residuos milites singulorum
comitatuum in communi.” [Cf. Rob. Torigni as quoted above, p.
459, note 2.] “Intitulaturque illud scutagium, De Dono. Eâ
quidem, ut credo, ratione, quod non solum prælati qui tenentur
ad servicia militaria sed etiam alii, abbates utpote de Bello et de
Salopesbirie et alii, tunc temporis dederunt auxilium.” Alex.
Swereford (Liber Ruber Scacc.) quoted in Madox, Hist.
Exchequer, vol. i. p. 626. Gerv. Cant. (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 167, calls
 it a scutage: “Scotagium sive scuagium de Angliâ accepit.” The
references to it are in almost every page of the Pipe Roll 5 Hen.
II. (Pipe Roll Soc.); the most important are collected by Madox,
Hist. Exch., vol. i. pp. 626, 627. There are also a few notices in
the next year; Pipe Roll 6 Hen. II. (Pipe Roll Soc.), pp. 3, 6, 24,
29, 30, 32, 51. There are a few entries of “scutage” by that name
—from the abbot of Westminster (Pipe Roll 5 Hen. II., pp. 6, 24,
27; 6 Hen. II., pp. 11, 24, 28), the bishop of Worcester (5 Hen. II.,
p. 24), William of Cardiff (ibid.), the abbot of Evesham (ib. p. 25),
and the earl of Warwick (ib. p. 26). Some of these pay “donum”
as well. In reference to this matter some of the Northumbrian
tenants-in-chivalry are designated by a title which is somewhat
startling in the middle of the twelfth century: the sheriff of
Northumberland renders an account “de dono militum et
tainorum” (Pipe Roll 5 Hen. II., p. 14). What was the distinction
between them?

The sum charged on the knight’s fee in Normandy was sixty

shillings Angevin;[1470] in England it seems to have been two marks.
[1471] The proceeds, with those of a similar tax levied upon Henry’s

other dominions,[1472] amounted to some hundred and eighty

thousand pounds,[1473] with which he hired an immense force of
mercenaries.[1474] But his host did not consist of these alone. The
great barons of Normandy and England, no less than those of Anjou,
Aquitaine and Gascony, were eager to display their prowess under
the leadership of such a mighty king. The muster at Poitiers was a
brilliant gathering of Henry’s court, headed by the chancellor with a
picked band of seven hundred knights of his own personal following,
[1475] and by the first vassal of the English Crown, King Malcolm of

Scotland,[1476] who came, it seems, to win the spurs which his

cousin had refused to grant him twelve months ago, when they met
at Carlisle just before Henry left England in June 1158.[1477] The
other vassal state was represented by an unnamed Welsh prince;
[1478] and the host was further reinforced by several important allies.
One of these was Raymond Trencavel, viscount of Béziers and
Carcassonne, a baron whom the count of Toulouse had despoiled,
and who gladly seized the opportunity of vengeance.[1479] Another
was William of Montpellier.[1480] The most valuable of all was the
count of Barcelona, a potentate who ranked on an equality with
kings.[1481] His county of Barcelona was simply the province which
in Karolingian times had been known as the Spanish March—a strip
of land with the Pyrenees for its backbone, which lay between
Toulouse, Aragon, Gascony and the Mediterranean sea. It was a fief
of the West-Frankish realm; but the facilities which every marchland
in some degree possesses for attaching itself to whichever
neighbour it may prefer, and so holding the balance between them
as to keep itself virtually independent of them all, were specially
great in the case of the Spanish March, whose rulers, as masters of
the eastern passes of the Pyrenees, held the keys of both Gaul and
Spain. During the last half-century they had, like the lords of another
marchland, enormously strengthened their position by three politic
marriages. Dulcia of Gévaudan, the wife of Raymond-Berengar III. of
Barcelona, was heiress not only to her father’s county of Gévaudan,
but also, through her mother, to the southern half of Provence,
whose northern half fell to the share of Raymond of St.-Gilles. Her
dower-lands were settled upon her younger son. He, in his turn,
married an heiress, Beatrice of Melgueil, whose county lay between
Gévaudan and the sea; and the dominions of the house of St.-Gilles
were thus completely cut in twain, and their eastern half surrounded
on two sides, by the territories of his son, the present count of
Provence, Gévaudan and Melgueil.[1482] The elder son of Dulcia,
having succeeded his father as Count Raymond-Berengar IV. of
Barcelona, was chosen by the nobles of Aragon to wed their youthful
queen Petronilla, the only child of King Ramirez the Monk. He had
thus all the power of Aragon at his command, although, clinging with
a generous pride to the old title which had come down to him from
his fathers, he refused to share his wife’s crown, declaring that the
count of Barcelona had no equal in his own degree, and that he
would rather be first among counts than last among kings.[1483] A
man with such a spirit, added to such territorial advantages, was an
ally to be eagerly sought after and carefully secured. Henry therefore
invited him to a meeting at Blaye in Gascony, and secured his co-
operation against Toulouse on the understanding that the infant
daughter of Raymond and Petronilla should in due time be married
to Henry’s son Richard, and that the duchy of Aquitaine should then
be ceded to the young couple.[1484]

[1467] Joh. Salisb. Ep. cxlv. (Giles, vol. i. p. 223; Robertson,

Becket, vol. v. Ep. cxciv., p. 378).

[1468] Gilb. Foliot, Ep. cxciv. (Giles, vol. i. p. 269; Robertson,

Becket, vol. v. Ep. ccxxv., p. 525).

[1469] Joh. Salisb. Ep. cxlv. (Giles, vol. i. pp. 223, 224).

[1470] See above, p. 459, note 2{1465}.

[1471] So says Alex. Swereford. See above, p. 460 note{1466}.

[1472] “De aliis vero terris sibi subjectis inauditam similiter

censûs fecit exactionem.” Gerv. Cant. (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 167. Cf.
above, p. 459, note 2{1465}.

[1473] Gerv. Cant. (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 167. He makes this to be

the proceeds of the scutage in England alone, but see Bishop
Stubbs’s explanation, Constit. Hist., vol. i. p. 457, note 4, and his
remarks in the preface to Gesta Hen. Reg. (“Benedict of
Peterborough”), vol. ii. pp. xciv–xcvi.

[1474] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

[1475] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 33.

[1476] Gerv. Cant. as above. Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

[1477] Chron. Mailros, a. 1158.

[1478] “Quidam rex Gualiæ.” Gerv. Cant. as above.

[1479] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 10 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 125). He

miscalls him William Trencavel.

[1480] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

[1481] “Vir magnus et potens, nec infra reges consistens.” Will.

Newb. as above (p. 123).
 [1482] On these marriages, etc., see Vic and Vaissète, Hist. du
Languedoc, vol. iii.

[1483] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 10 (Howlett, vol. i. pp. 123–125).

Raymond’s speech, and the whole story of Raymond, Ramirez
and Petronilla, as given in this chapter, form a charming
romance, whose main facts are fully borne out by the more
prosaic version of Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

[1484] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

A last attempt to avert the coming struggle was made early in

June; the two kings met near the Norman border, but again without
any result.[1485] Immediately after midsummer, therefore, Henry and
his host set out from Poitiers and marched down to Périgueux.
There, in “the Bishop’s Meadow,” Henry knighted his Scottish cousin,
and Malcolm in his turn bestowed the same honour upon thirty noble
youths of his suite.[1486] The expedition then advanced straight into
the enemy’s country. The first place taken was Cahors; its dependent
territory was speedily overrun;[1487] and while in the south Raymond
Trencavel was winning back the castles of which the other Raymond
had despoiled him, Henry led his main force towards the city of
Toulouse itself.[1488] Count and people saw the net closing round
them; they had seen it drawing near for months past, and one and all
—bishop, nobles and citizens—had been writing passionate appeals
to the king of France, imploring him, if not for the love of his sister, at
least for the honour of his crown, to come and save one of its fairest
jewels from the greedy grasp of the Angevin.[1489] Louis wavered till
it was all but too late; he was evidently, and naturally, most unwilling
to quarrel with the king of England. He began to move southward,
but apparently without any definite aim; and it was not till after
another fruitless conference with Henry in the beginning of July[1490]
that he at last, for very shame, answered his brother-in-law’s appeal
by throwing himself into Toulouse almost alone, as if to encourage its
defenders by his presence, but without giving them any substantial
aid.[1491] Perhaps he foresaw the result. Henry, on the point of laying
siege to the city, paused when he heard that his overlord was within
it. Dread of Louis’s military capacity he could have none; personal
reverence for him he could have just as little. But he reverenced in a
fellow-king the dignity of kingship; he reverenced in his own overlord
the right to that feudal obedience which he exacted from his own
vassals. He took counsel with his barons; they agreed with him that
the siege should be postponed till Louis was out of the city—a
decision which was equivalent to giving it up altogether.[1492] The
soldiers grumbled loudly, and the chancellor loudest of all. Thomas
had now completely “put off the deacon,” and flung himself with all
his might into the pursuit of arms. His knights were the flower of the
host, foremost in every fight, the bravest of the brave; and the life
and soul of all their valour was the chancellor himself.[1493] The
prospect of retreat filled him with dismay. He protested that Louis
had forfeited his claim to Henry’s obedience by breaking his compact
with him and joining his enemies, and he entreated his master to
seize the opportunity of capturing Toulouse, city, count, king and all,
before reinforcements could arrive.[1494] Henry however turned a
deaf ear to his impetuous friend. Accompanied by the king of Scots
and all his host, he retreated towards his own dominions just as a
body of French troops were entering Toulouse.[1495]

[1485] Contin. Becc. a. 1159 (Delisle, Rob. Torigni, vol. ii. p.

172).

[1486] Geoff. Vigeois, l. i. c. 58 (Labbe, Nova Biblioth., vol. ii. p.

310). The Chron. Mailros, a. 1159, says Malcolm was knighted at
Tours on the way back from Toulouse; Geoff. Vigeois implies that
it was on the way out.

[1487] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 34.

Rob. Torigni, a. 1159. Cf. Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 10 (Howlett, vol. i. p.
126), who however has got the sequence of events wrong.

[1488] Will. Newb. as above.

[1489] Letters of Peter archbishop of Narbonne:—Hermengard

viscountess of Narbonne:—“commune consilium urbis Tolosæ et
suburbii”— Epp. xxxiii., xxxiv., ccccxiv., Duchesne, Hist. Franc.
Scriptt., vol. iv. pp. 574, 575, 713. The archbishop curiously
 describes the threatening invader as “Dux Normanniæ.” The
citizens make a pitiful appeal; the viscountess makes a spirited
one, and wishes the king “Karoli regis magnanimitatem.”

[1490] Contin. Becc. a. 1159 (Delisle, Rob. Torigni, vol. ii. pp.
173, 174).

[1491] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 33. Will.

Newb., l. ii. c. 10 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 125).

[1492] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 33,

Geoff. Vigeois, l. i. c. 58 (Labbe, Nova Biblioth., vol. ii. p. 310),
Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 10 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 125), the Draco Norm., l.
i. c. 12, vv. 437–464 (ib. vol. ii. pp. 608, 609), and R. Diceto
(Stubbs), vol. i. p. 303, attribute the retreat to Henry’s reverence
for his overlord; Gerv. Cant. (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 167, seems to
look upon it as a measure of necessity; but considering that
Louis had brought almost nothing but himself to Raymond’s aid,
one does not see what necessity there could be in the case. The
Draco alone mentions Henry’s consultation with the barons—
unless there is some allusion to it in the words of Will. Fitz-
Steph., who describes Henry as “vanâ superstitione et reverentiâ
tentus consilio aliorum.”

[1493] The English archdeacon’s unclerical doings in this war

were however quite eclipsed by those of the archbishop of
Bordeaux. See a letter from the citizens of Toulouse to King
Louis; Ep. ccccxxv., Duchesne, Hist. Franc. Scriptt., vol. iv. p.
718.

[1494] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 34.

[1495] Ibid.

He had, however, conquered the greater part of the county,[1496]

and had no intention of abandoning his conquests; but the task of
protecting them against Raymond and Louis together, without the
support of Henry’s own presence, was a responsibility which all his
great barons declined. Two faithful ministers accepted the duty:
Thomas the chancellor and Henry of Essex the constable.[1497]
Thomas fixed his head-quarters at Cahors;[1498] thence, with the
constable’s aid, he undertook to hold the country by means of his
own personal followers,[1499] backed by Raymond of Barcelona,
Trencavel, and William of Montpellier.[1500] He ruled with a high
hand, putting down by proscription and even with the sword every
attempt at a rising against Henry’s authority storming towns and
burning manors without mercy in his master’s service;[1501] in helm
and hauberk he rode forth at the head of his troops to the capture of
three castles which had hitherto been considered impregnable.[1502]
Henry’s “superstition” (as it was called by a follower of Thomas)[1503]
about bearing arms against his overlord applied only to a personal
encounter in circumstances of special delicacy; he had no scruples
in making war upon Louis indirectly, as he had done more than once
before, and was now doing not only through Thomas but also at the
opposite end of France. The English and Scottish kings had retired
from Toulouse to Limoges, where they arrived about Michaelmas.
[1504] Meanwhile Count Theobald of Blois, now an ally of Henry, was
despatched by him “to disquiet the realm of France”—that is,
doubtless, to make a diversion which should draw off the attention of
the French from Toulouse and leave a clear field to the operations of
Thomas. The French king’s brothers, Henry, bishop of Beauvais, and
Robert, count of Dreux, retaliated by attacking the Norman frontier
with fire and sword.[1505] Thomas, having chased away the enemies
across the Garonne and secured the obedience of the conquered
territory, hurried northward to join his sovereign, whom he apparently
followed into Normandy. There he undertook the defence of the
frontier. Besides his seven hundred picked knights, he maintained at
his own cost for the space of forty days twelve hundred paid
horsemen and four thousand foot in his master’s service against the
king of France on the marches between Gisors, Trie and Courcelles;
he not only headed his troops in person, but also met in single
combat a valiant French knight of Trie, Engelram by name; and the
layman went down before the lance of the warlike archdeacon, who
carried off his opponent’s destrier as the trophy of his victory.[1506]
The king himself marched into the Beauvaisis, stormed Gerberoi,
and harried the surrounding country till he gained a valuable
assistant in Count Simon of Montfort, who surrendered to him all his
French possessions, including the castles of Montfort, Rochefort and
Epernon. As these places lay directly in the way from Paris to
Etampes and Orléans, Louis found himself completely cut off from
the southern part of his domain, and was compelled to ask for a
truce. It was made in December, to last till the octave of Pentecost.
[1507] Henry’s wife had now joined him; they kept Christmas together

at Falaise,[1508] and Henry used the interval of tranquillity to make

some reforms in the Norman judicature.[1509] When the truce expired
the two kings made a treaty of peace,[1510] negotiated as usual by
the indefatigable chancellor;[1511] the betrothal of little Henry and
Margaret was confirmed, and the Vexin was settled upon the infant
couple. As for the Aquitanian quarrel, Louis formally restored to
Henry all the rights and holdings of the count of Poitou, except
Toulouse itself; Henry and Raymond making a truce for a year,
during which both were to keep their present possessions, and
complete freedom of action was left to their respective allies.[1512]

[1496] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 34.

Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

[1497] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 34.

[1498] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

[1499] Will. Fitz-Steph. as above.

[1500] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

[1501] E. Grim (Robertson, Becket, vol. ii.), p. 365. Herb. Bosh.

(ib. vol. iii.), pp. 175, 176.

[1502] Will. Fitz-Steph. (ibid.), p. 34.

[1503] Ib. p. 33. See above, p. 465, note 1{1485}.

[1504] Geoff. Vigeois, l. i. c. 58 (Labbe, Nova Biblioth., vol. ii. p.

310).

[1505] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

 [1506] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), pp. 34, 35.

[1507] Rob. Torigni, a. 1159.

[1508] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.

[1509] Contin. Becc. a. 1160 (Delisle, Rob. Torigni, vol. ii. p.

180).

[1510] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.

[1511] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 24 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 159).

[1512] The treaty is printed in Lyttelton’s Hen. II., vol. iv. pp.
173, 174. It has no date; we have to get that from Rob. Torigni—
May 1160. The terms of the treaty are summarized by Rog.
Howden (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 218, who places it a year too late. He
also introduces a second betrothal, between Richard and Adela,
the second daughter of Louis and Constance. But the treaty
printed by Lyttelton says nothing of this; and if it be the treaty
mentioned by Rob. Torigni the clause is impossible, for Adela
was not born till the autumn of 1160.

This imperfect settlement, as far as Toulouse was concerned,

advanced no further towards completion during the next thirteen
years. Henry’s expedition could hardly be called a success; and
whatever advantage he had gained over Raymond was dearly
purchased at the cost of a quarrel with Louis. There can be little
doubt that Henry had fallen into a trap; Louis had misled him into
lighting the torch of war, and then turned against him in such a way
as to cast upon him the blame of the subsequent conflagration. The
elements of strife between the two kings could hardly have failed to
burst sooner or later into a blaze; the question was whose hand
should kindle it. In spite of Henry’s Angevin wariness, Louis had
contrived to shift upon him the fatal responsibility; and for the rest of
his life the fire went smouldering on, breaking out at intervals in
various directions, smothered now and then for a moment, but never
thoroughly quenched; consuming the plans and hopes of its
involuntary originator, while the real incendiary sheltered himself to
the last behind his mask of injured innocence.
 For six months all was quiet. In October the two kings held another
meeting; the treaty was ratified, and little Henry, who had lately come
over from England with his mother, was made to do homage to Louis
for the duchy of Normandy.[1513] About the same time the queen of
France died, leaving to her husband another infant daughter.[1514]
Disappointed for the fourth time in his hopes of a son, Louis in his
impatience set decency at defiance; before Constance had been a
fortnight in her grave he married a third wife, Adela of Blois, daughter
of Theobald the Great, and sister of the two young counts who were
betrothed to the king’s own elder daughters.[1515] His subjects,
sharing his anxiety for an heir, easily forgave his unseemly haste and
welcomed the new queen, who in birth, mind and person was all that
could be desired.[1516] It would, however, have been scarcely
possible to find a choice more irritating to Henry of Anjou. On either
side of the sea, the house of Blois seemed to be always in some way
or other crossing his path; in their lives or in their deaths, they were
perpetually giving him trouble. At that very time the death of
Stephen’s last surviving son, Earl William of Warren,[1517] had led to
a quarrel between the king and his dearest friend. William was
childless, and the sole heir to his county of Boulogne was his sister
Mary, abbess of Romsey. This lady was now brought out of her
convent to be married by Papal dispensation to Matthew, second son
of the count of Flanders.[1518] The scheme, devised by King Henry,
[1519] was strongly opposed by the bridegroom’s father,[1520] and
also by Henry’s own chancellor. Thomas, somewhat unexpectedly
perhaps, started up as a vindicator of monastic discipline,
remonstrated vehemently against the marriage of a nun, and used all
his influence at Rome to hinder the dispensation; he gained,
however, nothing save the enmity of Matthew, and a foretaste of that
kingly wrath[1521] which was to burst upon him with all its fury three
years later. Even without allowing for Henry’s probable frame of mind
in consequence of this affair, the French king’s triple alliance with the
hereditary rivals of the Angevin house would naturally appear to him
in the light of a provocation and a menace. The chancellor seems to
have made his peace by suggesting an answer to it.
 [1513] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.

[1514] Ibid. R. Diceto (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 303. Hist. Ludov.

(Duchesne, Hist. Franc. Scriptt., vol. iv.), p. 415. Constance died
on October 4; Lamb. Waterloo, Rer. Gall. Scriptt., vol. xiii. p. 517.

[1515] R. Diceto (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 303. Cf. Gerv. Cant.

(Stubbs), vol. i. p. 167, and Rob. Torigni, a. 1160. Adela was
crowned at Paris with her husband on S. Brice’s day (November
13); Hist. Ludov. (Duchesne, Hist. Franc. Scriptt., vol. iv.), p. 416.

[1516] Hist. Ludov. as above.

[1517] He died in October 1159, on the way home from

Toulouse; Rob. Torigni, ad ann.

[1518] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160. Lamb. Waterloo (Rer. Gall.

Scriptt., vol. xiii.), p. 517. According to Matthew Paris, Hist. Angl.
(Madden), vol. i. p. 314, the marriage took place in 1161.

[1519] Herb. Bosh. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 328.

[1520] Lamb. Waterloo as above.

[1521] Herb. Bosh. as above. Mat. Paris, Hist. Angl. (Madden),

vol. i. pp. 314, 315.

One of Henry’s great desires was to recover the Vexin, which at

his father’s suggestion he had ceded to Louis in 1151 as the price of
the investiture of Normandy. By the last treaty between the two kings
it had been settled that this territory should form the dowry of little
Margaret; her father was to retain possession of it, and to place its
chief fortresses in the custody of the Knights Templars, for the next
three years, until she should be wedded to young Henry with the
consent of Holy Church; whenever that should take place, Henry’s
father was to receive back the Vexin. In other words, the dowry was
not to be paid till the bride was married; and there was evidently a
tacit understanding, at any rate on the French side, that this was not
to be for three years at least.[1522] Later in the summer two cardinal-
legates visited France and Normandy on business connected with a
recent Papal election.[1523] Henry, apparently at the instigation of
Thomas,[1524] persuaded them to solemnize the marriage of the two
children on November 2 at Neubourg.[1525] The written conditions of
the treaty were fulfilled to the letter—the babes were wedded with
the consent of Holy Church, represented by the Pope’s own legates;
and the castles of the Vexin were at once made over to Henry by the
Templars,[1526] three of whom were present at the wedding.[1527]
Louis found himself thoroughly outwitted. His first step was to banish
the three Templars, who were cordially received by Henry;[1528] his
next was to concert with the brothers of his new queen a plan of
retaliation in Anjou. The house of Blois naturally resented a
curtailment of the possessions of the crown which they now hoped
one day to see worn by a prince of their own blood. Louis and
Theobald accordingly set to work to fortify Chaumont, a castle which
Gelduin of Saumur had long ago planted on the bank of the Loire as
a special thorn in the side of the Angevin counts. Henry flew to the
spot, put king and count to flight, besieged and took the castle of
Chaumont together with thirty-five picked knights and eighty men-at-
arms whom Theobald had sent to reinforce its garrison; he then
fortified Fréteval and Amboise, and, secure from all further
molestation, went to keep Christmas with Eleanor in his native city of
Le Mans.[1529]

[1522] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 24 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 159), distinctly

states that the children were not to be married till they were of a
fit age; and such was no doubt the intention of Louis; but it was
by no means expressed in the treaty:—“Totum remanens
Wilcassini” [i.e. all except three of its fiefs which were specially
reserved to Henry] “regi Francie; hoc modo, quod ipse illud
remanens dedit et concessit maritagium cum filiâ suâ filio regis
Anglie habendum. Et eum unde seisiendum ab Assumptione B.
Marie proximâ post pacem factam in tres annos, et si infra hunc
terminum filia regis Francie filio regis Anglie desponsata fuerit,
assensu et consensu Sancte Ecclesie, tunc erit rex Anglie
seysitus de toto Wilcassino, et de castellis Wilcassini, ad opus filii
sui.” Treaty in Lyttelton, Hen. II., vol. iv. p. 173. The question
turned on the construing of “tunc.” Louis intended it to mean
“then, when the three years are expired, if the children shall be
wedded”; Henry and his friends the Templars made it mean
 “then, when the children are wedded, whether the three years
are expired or not.”

[1523] Gilb. Foliot, Ep. cxlviii. (Giles, vol. i. p. 197). Of their

business we shall see more later.

[1524] This must surely be the meaning of Herb. Bosh.

(Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 175: “Quam industrie munitiones
quinque munitissimas, in Franciæ et Normanniæ sitas confinio,
domino suo regi, ad cujus tamen jus ab antiquo spectare
dignoscebantur, a rege Francorum per matrimonium, sine ferro,
sine gladio, absque lanceâ, absque pugnâ, in omni regum
dilectione et pace revocaverit, Gizortium scilicet, castrum
munitissimum, et alia quatuor.” Cf. Thomas Saga (Magnusson),
vol. i. p. 57, which seems however to refer rather to the drawing-
up of the treaty.

[1525] R. Diceto (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 304. Cf. Gerv. Cant.

(Stubbs), vol. i. p. 168, Rog. Howden (Stubbs), vol. i. p. 218, and
Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.

[1526] Rog. Howden and Rob. Torigni, as above. Will. Newb., l.

ii. c. 24 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 159).

[1527] Roger of Pirou, Tostig of S. Omer and Richard of

Hastings; Rog. Howden as above.

[1528] Ibid.

[1529] Rob. Torigni, a. 1160.

A year of peace followed: Henry spent the greater part of it in

Normandy, garrisoning the castles of the duchy, strengthening its
newly-recovered border-fortresses, providing for the restoration of
the old royal strongholds and the erection of new ones in all parts of
his dominions, and superintending the repair of his palace at Rouen,
the making of a park at Quévilly, and the foundation of an hospital for
lepers at Caen.[1530] The chancellor was still at his side, and had
lately, as a crowning mark of his confidence, been intrusted with the
entire charge of his eldest son. Thomas received the child into his
own household, to educate him with the other boys of noble birth
who came to learn courtly manners and knightly prowess in that
excellent school; he playfully called him his adoptive son, and
treated him as such in every respect.[1531] Little Henry was now in
his seventh year, and his father was already anxious to secure his
succession to the throne. The conditional homage which he had
received as an infant was, as Henry knew by personal experience, a
very insufficient security. Indeed, the results of every attempt to
regulate the descent of the crown since the Norman conquest
tended to prove that the succession of the heir could be really
secured by nothing short of his actual recognition and coronation as
king during his father’s life-time. This was now becoming an
established practice in France and Germany. In England, where the
older constitutional theory of national election to the throne had
never died out, such a step had never been attempted but once; and
that attempt, made by Stephen in behalf of his son Eustace, had
ended in signal failure. Discouraging as the precedent was, however,
Henry had made up his mind to follow it; and in the spring of 1162 he
sent his boy over sea and called upon the barons of England to do
him homage and fealty, as a preliminary to his coronation as king.
[1532]

[1530] Rob. Torigni, a. 1161.

[1531] Will. Fitz-Steph. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iii.), p. 22.

Herb. Bosh. (ibid.), pp. 176, 177.

[1532] E. Grim (ib. vol. ii.), p. 366. Anon. I. (ib. vol. iv.), p. 13.

A matter so important and so delicate could be intrusted to no one

but the chancellor. He managed it, like everything else that he took in
hand, with a calm facility which astonished every one. He brought
the child to England, presented him to the bishops and barons of the
realm in a great council summoned for the purpose,[1533] knelt at his
feet and swore to be his faithful subject in all things, reserving only
the fealty due to the elder king so long as he lived and reigned;[1534]
the whole assembly followed his example, and thus a measure
which it was believed that Henry’s personal presence would hardly
have availed to carry through without disturbance was accomplished
at once and without a word of protest,[1535] save from the little king
himself, who with childish imperiousness, it is said, refused to admit
any reservation in the oath of his adoptive father.[1536] Henry
probably intended that the boy’s recognition as heir to the crown
should be speedily followed by his coronation.[1537] This, however,
was a rite which could only be performed by the primate of all
England; and the chair of S. Augustine was vacant. Once again it
was to Thomas that Henry looked for aid; but this time he looked in
vain. Thomas had done his last act in the service of his royal friend.
The year which had passed away since Archbishop Theobald’s
death had been, on both sides of the sea, a year of almost ominous
tranquillity. It was in truth the forerunner of a storm which was to
shatter Henry’s peace and to cost Thomas his life.

[1533] Anon. I. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iv.), p. 13. R. Diceto

(Stubbs), vol. i. p. 306.

[1534] R. Diceto as above.

[1535] Anon. I. (Robertson, Becket, vol. iv.), p. 13.

[1536] Mat. Paris, Hist. Angl. (Madden), vol. i. p. 316.

[1537] Such an intention is distinctly stated by E. Grim

(Robertson, Becket, vol. ii.), p. 366: . . . “filio suo, jam tunc
coronando in regem.”
 CHAPTER XI.
THE LAST YEARS OF ARCHBISHOP THEOBALD.

1156–1161.

All Henry’s endeavours for the material and political revival of his
kingdom had been regulated thus far by one simple, definite
principle:—the restoration of the state of things which had existed
under his grandfather. In his own eyes and in those of his subjects
the duty which lay before him at his accession, and which he had
faithfully and successfully fulfilled, was to take up the work of
government and administration not at the point where he found it, but
at the point where it had been left by Henry I. and Roger of
Salisbury: to pull down and sweep away all the innovations and
irregularities with which their work had been overlaid during the last
nineteen years, and bring the old foundations to light once more, that
they might receive a legitimate superstructure planned upon their
own lines and built upon their own principles. In law, in finance, in
general administration, there was one universal standard of
reference:—“the time of my grandfather King Henry.”
But there was one side of the national revival, and that the most
important of all, to which this standard could not apply. The religious
and intellectual movement which had begun under Henry I., far from
coming to a standstill at his death, had gone on gathering energy
and strength during the years of anarchy till it had become the one
truly living power in the land, the power which in the end placed
Henry II. on his throne. It looked to find in him a friend, a fellow-
worker, a protector perhaps; but it had no need to go back to a stage
which it had long since overpassed and make a new departure
thence under the guidance of a king who was almost its own
creation. At the very moment of Henry’s accession, the hopes of the
English Church were raised to their highest pitch by the elevation of
an Englishman to the Papal chair. Nicolas Breakspear was the only
man of English birth who ever attained that lofty seat; and the
adventures which brought him thither, so far as they can be made
out from two somewhat contradictory accounts, form a romantic
chapter in the clerical history of the time. Nicolas was the son of a
poor English clerk[1538] at Langley, a little township belonging to the
abbey of S. Alban’s.[1539] The father retired into the abbey,[1540]
leaving his boy, according to one version of the story, too poor to go
to school and too young and ignorant to earn his bread; he therefore
came every day to get a dole at the abbey-gate, till his father grew
ashamed and bade him come no more; whereupon the lad, “blushing
either to dig or to beg in his own country,” made his way across the
sea.[1541] Another version asserts that Nicolas, being “a youth of
graceful appearance, but somewhat lacking in clerkly acquirements,”
sued to the abbot of S. Alban’s for admission as a monk; the abbot
examined him, found him insufficiently instructed, and dismissed him
with a gentle admonition: “Wait awhile, my son, and go to school that
you may become better fitted for the cloister.”[1542] Whether stung by
the abbot’s hint or by his father’s reproofs, young Nicolas found his
way to Paris and into its schools, where he worked so hard that he
out-did all his fellow-students.[1543] But the life there wearied him as
it had wearied Thomas Becket; he rambled on across Gaul into
Provence, and there found hospitality in the Austin priory of S.
Rufus. His graceful figure, pleasant face, sensible talk and obliging
temper so charmed the brotherhood that they grew eager to keep
him in their midst,[1544] and on their persuasion he joined the order.
[1545] It seems that he was even made superior of the house, but the
canons afterwards regretted having set a stranger to rule over them,
and after persecuting him in various ways appealed to the Pope to
get rid of him. The Pope—Eugene III.—at first refused to hear them;
but on second consideration he decided to give them over to their
own evil devices and offer their rejected superior a more agreeable
post in his own court.[1546] Nicolas, who had already twice visited
Rome, proceeded thither a third time and was made cardinal[1547]
and bishop of Albano.[1548] Shortly afterwards he was appointed
legate to Norway and Denmark, an office which he filled with
prudence and energy during some years.[1549] Returning to Rome
about 1150, he apparently acted as secretary to Eugene III. until the
latter’s death in July 1153.[1550] The next Pope, Anastasius III.,
reigned only sixteen months, and dying on December 2, 1154, was
succeeded by the bishop of Albano, who took the name of Adrian IV.
[1551]

[1538] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 6 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 109).

[1539] Gesta Abbat. S. Albani (Riley), vol. i. p. 112.

[1540] Will. Newb. as above. Probably he separated from his

wife in consequence of some of the decrees against clerical
marriage passed under Henry I.; that she was not dead is plain
from John of Salisbury’s mention of her as still living in the days
of his friendship with Nicolas. Joh. Salisb., Metalog., l. iv. c. 42
(Giles, vol. v. p. 205).

[1541] Will. Newb. as above (pp. 109, 110).

[1542] Gesta Abbat. as above. The abbot’s name is there

given as Robert, but this must be wrong, as Robert did not
become abbot till 1151, and by 1150, as we shall see, Nicolas
was at Rome.

[1543] Gesta Abbat. (as above), pp. 112, 113.

[1544] Will. Newb., l. ii. c. 6 (Howlett, vol. i. p. 110).

[1545] Ibid. Gesta Abbat. (Riley), vol. i. p. 113.

[1546] Will. Newb. as above (pp. 110, 111). The church of S.

Rufus (diocese Valence) had between 1145 and 1151 an abbot
named N. . . . The editors of Gall. Christ. (vol. xvi. cols. 359,
360) will not allow that this N. was Nicolas Breakspear, and of
course the date will not agree with the version of his history in the
Gesta Abbat.; but it agrees perfectly with that of Will. Newb.;
while the Gesta’s dates are confuted by Nicolas’s undoubted
signatures at Rome.
 [1547] Gesta Abbat. as above.

[1548] Will. Newb. as above (p. 111). Rob. Torigni, a. 1154.

[1549] Will. Newb. as above.

[1550] “A partir de l’année 1150, on trouve la souscription de

Nicolaus episcopus Albanensis au bas des bulles d’Eugène III.”
Delisle, Rob. Torigni, vol. i. p. 288, note 2.

[1551] Will. Newb. as above (p. 111). Date from Cod. Vatic.,
Baronius, Annales (Pagi), vol. xix. p. 77.

The English Church naturally hailed with delight the accession of a

pontiff who was at once one of her own sons and a disciple of
Eugene, whom the leaders of the intellectual and spiritual revival in
England had come to regard almost as their patron saint.[1552]
Adrian indeed shared all their highest and most cherished
aspirations far more deeply and intimately than Eugene himself
could have done. It was in the cloisters of Canterbury that these
aspirations were gradually taking definite shape under the guidance
of Archbishop Theobald. There, beneath the shadow of the cathedral
begun by Lanfranc and completed by S. Anselm, their worthy
successor had been throughout the last ten or twelve years of the
anarchy watching over a little sanctuary where all that was noblest,
highest, most full of hope and promise in the dawning intellectual life
of the day found a peaceful shelter and a congenial home. The Curia
Theobaldi, the household of Archbishop Theobald, was a sort of little
school of the prophets, a seminary into which the vigilant primate
drew the choicest spirits among the rising generation, to be trained
up under his own eyes in his own modes of thought and views of life,
till they were fitted to become first the sharers and then the
continuators of his work for the English Church and the English
nation. Through his scholars had come the revival of legal and
ecclesiastical learning in England; through them had come the
renewal of intercourse and sympathy with the sister-Churches of the
west; through them had been conducted the negotiations with Rome
which had led to the restoration of order and peace; and in them, as