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THE HANDBOOK
OF GLOBAL SHADOW
BANKING
Volume II
The Future
of Economic
and
Regulatory
Dynamics
Luc Nijs
The Handbook of Global Shadow Banking,
Volume II
Luc Nijs
The Handbook
of Global Shadow
Banking, Volume II
The Future of Economic and Regulatory
Dynamics
Luc Nijs
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
In this second volume on global shadow banking, three main domains will be further
explored. The first domain deals with the macroeconomic fundamentals of the respective
shadow banking segments: why do they exist, what problem(s) do they solve, and why are
some of these embedded risks so persistent? The second domain captures the global analy-
sis of shadow banking markets. Shadow banking markets, regardless of which segment,
are always modeled based on the regulatory environment and economic landscape of a
certain jurisdiction. Therefore, despite the many commonalities, shadow banking mar-
kets differ in their dynamics, roles they play in the local market and the way exposures are
created. A global analysis of those markets comes next. The last domain covered in the
book deals with the many open-ends that the sector still characterizes. It gets philosophi-
cal every now and then, and related topics like regulatory arbitrage, contract imperfection
and governance are brought into the analysis.
In the second domain, which encompasses Chaps. 2–6, I then branch out into a
geographical survey to experience the shadow banking dynamics around the world, make
comparisons, review different policy and regulatory responses, subject them to assess-
ments and shed some light on the first feedback loops we received in recent years from all
those changes. The last chapter (Chap. 7), before I draw some conclusions, reads like an
anthology of unsolved issues. And with its 22 sections, it requires limited brainpower to
understand that there are many issues. Most likely, this is because the regulation enacted
so far carries limited cloud, risk in complex global networks is still less understood, tail
risk is still largely neglected,1 liquidity2 is treated as a deity, and regulators are, besides
being brainwashed by lobbyists on an ongoing basis, still very much confused about
what to tackle. In the myriad and madhouse of macroeconomic and econometric model-
ing, it truly is nearly impossible to divide right from wrong, especially if your target is
1
Also by market participants; see, for example, S. Chernenko et al., (2015), Who Neglects Risk?
Investor Experience and the Credit Boom, Working Paper, mimeo.
2
See for a stylized model of liquidity creation without banks: S. Kucinskas, (2015), Liquidity
Creation Without Banks, VU University/Tinbergen Institute Working Paper, mimeo, August 17.
v
vi Preface
continuously moving. Complexity and opaqueness are killing any attempts to create
effective and consistent regulatory framework in any field. The econometric madhouse,
with its so-called analytical logic and its self-proclaimed truths,3 don’t go well with the
rational nature of verbal logic needed to create proper and effective regulation. The
shadow banking markets is a poster child example of the problematic nature of the rela-
tionship between economic principles and the dogmatic disciplines of regulation, a rela-
tionship the ‘law and economics’ sphere has been digging into for over half a century now
and with very few guiding principles so far.
Even more problematic is the fact that the self-constructed superiority of economists
have led to a situation where economists, in their capacity of supervisors, lobbyists or
otherwise have been driving regulatory content way too much, thereby ignoring the chal-
lenging differences between econometric and verbal logic, often using macroeconomic
models that are one-sided,4 labeled as reflecting reality or the truth without any sort of
critical questions being asked by regulators. The role of the regulator itself was often there
to facilitate the legislative process. Very little else was added by them. If your counterparty
is a well-structured, organized, cash-rich globally integrated financial system, you have
everything to lose. And I realize that public interest might not be the first thing on regula-
tors’ minds these days anymore, although the stability of public financial markets is a
public objective that benefits everybody.
Closing the trust deficit in order to maintain to stabilize the role of finance in society
is not a matter of macroprudential policy and ex ante regulation. If an industry wants to
interact with society, it will have to somehow account for the consequences of that inter-
action, especially in an industry that matters as much as the financial industry. That’s why
the distrust stems so much from the fact that society has extensively observed what hap-
pens when things go wrong. That financial capital crumbles under distress is something
everybody understands and is able to give it its meaningful place in a capitalist society.
But the wearing down of social capital following distressed events is something that is not
easily repaired nor forgotten (as the losses here are the most enduring). And although
banks and the financial industry have recovered some of their luster and poise, there is
still a large bill that needs to be settled. Besides the trust element, there is still the element
of ‘purpose’ in banking that needs to be redefined and that seems harder than it sounds.5
That problematic field includes the question of the nature of the economic discipline.
In recent years, much has been said about the neoclassical monoculture taught at univer-
sities and that has a much wider range of implications than just the content of courses,
3
See, for example, M. Fourcade et al., (2015), The Superiority of Economists, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 29, Nr. 1, Winter, pp. 89–114.
4
Many welfare models, for example, are built on the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
(DSGE model). This has created a very one-dimensional view of welfare optimizing policies, despite
the fact that many questions can be asked about the intellectual integrity of the model and the
recalibrations needed that didn’t happen (yet); see: A.M. Shordone et al., (2010), Policy Analysis
Using DSGE Models: An Introduction, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, October, pp. 23–43;
M. Kolosa and M. Rubaszek, (2015), How Frequently Should We Re-estimate DSGE Models,
International Journal of Central Banking, Vol. 11, Nr. 4, December, pp. 279–305.
5
A. G. Haldane, (2016), The Great Divide, Speech by Andrew G Haldane, Executive Director and
Chief Economist of the Bank of England, at the New City Agenda annual dinner, London, May 18.
Preface vii
but also the normative nature of peer review and influence.6 One of the questions on
which the jury is still out is, to what degree the regulatory framework is appropriate from
a risk perspective given the overall risk sensitivity of an interconnected global marketplace?7
The group of 30 concluded before that the overall risk to stability is as great as ever.8 In a
day and age when the nexus between banks and capital markets has come to full maturity
and has truly gone global, the discussion about financial stability is one about financial
markets and equally so about the real economy. The relevance and public interest dimen-
sion as such is never far gone.9 Caruana’s approach10 seems balanced and convincing when
he claims that regulation is only part of the problem in a context where banking seems to
still qualify as a contaminated industry.11
And as regulation is not the only element in the solution mix, three critical elements
play and will play a role for a long to come. There is not a single space in the regulatory
sphere where the amount, layers and interaction between regulation, policies of all sorts
and natures, as well as technical standards- and that on a global basis- are as intense as in
the financial sphere. So three words deserve utmost attention: coherence, calibration and
complexity12; and that against the backdrop of a well-functioning financial sector is cru-
cial for generating dynamics related to growth and robustness13 while reducing or manag-
ing systemic risk. From the perspective of systemic risk, shadow banking can be defined
6
See in detail: G. Racko et al., (2017), Economics Education and Value Change: The Role of
Program-Normative Homogeneity and Peer Influence, Academy of Management Learning &
Education, Vol. 16, Nr. 3, July 6, https://doi.org/10.5465/amle.2014.0280; Haldane focuses on
the kaleidoscopic nature of the economic discipline and the ‘more questions than answers’—back-
ground economics is emerged with as a grandchild of philosophy. See A. Haldane, (2016), The
Dappled World, Speech given by Andrew G. Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of England, GLS
Shackle Biennial Memorial Lecture, November 10.
7
A. Dombret, (2016), The New Normal in Banking – Perspectives for Regulators, Speech by Dr.
Andreas Dombret, Member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the Bundesbank
reception as part of Eurofinance Week 2016, Frankfurt am Main, November 15 (bis.org).
8
G30, (2016), Shadow Banking and Capital Markets. Risks and Opportunities, G30 Working
Paper, Washington, DC, November.
9
See regarding the nexus bans/capital markets: H. S. Shin, (2016), The Bank/Capital Markets
Nexus Goes Global, Speech at the London School of Economics and Political Science, November
15, bis.org
10
J. Caruana, (2016) What Are Capital Markets Telling Us About the Banking Sector?, Speech at
IESE Business School conference on ‘Challenges for the Future of Banking: Regulation, Governance
and Stability’, November 17.
11
C. Borio, (2016), The Banking Industry: Struggling to Move On, Keynote Speech at the
‘Competition in Banking: Implications for Financial Regulation and Supervision’, Fifth EBA
Research, Workshop, November 28–29.
12
Or put differently: (1) how is this all going to work together as one large well-functioning
machine, (2) are these policies and regulation tuned-in to each other given the often different objec-
tives the supporting institutions have, and (3) are we sure the lobbying-induced complexity will not
make the instruments idle at a point in time that it really matters? See also: S. Ingves, (2016),
Finalising Basel III: Coherence, Calibration and Complexity, Keynote speech at the second
Conference on Banking Development, Stability and Sustainability, December 2, bis.org
13
T. Adrian et al., (2016), Vulnerable Growth, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, Nr.
794, September.
viii Preface
14
H. Nabilou and A.M. Pacces, (2017), The Law and Economics of Shadow Banking, in Iris
H. Chiu & Iain MacNeil (eds.), Research Handbook on Shadow Banking: Legal and Regulatory
Aspects, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, pp. 7–46.
15
See the interesting and recent report on the matter: G. Prasanna et al., (2019), Regulatory
Complexity and the Quest for Robust Regulation, Advisory Scientific Committee (ASC) ESRB
Report Nr. 8, June 4, via esrb.europe.eu
16
R. K. Quarles, (2019), The Financial Stability Board: Moving to the Next Phase, G20 Research
Center, University of Toronto, June, pp. 140–141. I guess the true value is in his closing statements:
‘[m]uch progress has been made since the financial crisis. Yet the recent build-up of vulnerabilities
in several areas reminds us that we cannot be complacent.’
17
See for a very good and recent literature review on the issue: BCBS, (2019), The Costs and
Benefits of Bank Capital – a Review of the Literature, Working Paper Nr. 37, June 24, via bis.org.
But the BCBS also makes the conclusion subject to a number of important considerations.
18
FSB 2019 numbers.
Preface ix
leaves the idea that there is control. I see that slightly differently. Paper is patient, frame-
works are bureaucratic in nature, nobody is really accountable and interventions are ex
ante or ex post intrinsically insufficient. The central question then is, are we willing to
accept everything the free market produces? But in this case, that is a confronting ques-
tion because many shadow banking activities are triggered by regulation. The regulator
therefore is part of the problem. And the central bank has admittedly become the lender
of last resort and willing to underwrite private assets without limits. With such friends
you don’t need enemies.
The manuscript is updated up till and including 30 June 2019. Non-published articles
or papers can be accessed through ssrn.com and/or the web page of the relevant university
or institution. Between the different editions of this volume, updates will be provided,
most likely in an E-book format. Check the website for further information.
xi
xii Contents
3.12 The Dynamics of the Shadow Banking Sector and the EU Financial
Stability231
3.13 Central Clearing: Also Systemic Risk in the Making in Europe? 236
3.14 The Capital Markets Union and the Securitization Sector 238
3.14.1 Introduction and Context 238
3.14.2 The Structure and Content of the Securitization Regulation 246
3.14.3 Lower Capital Requirements for Securitization Products 250
3.14.4 Will the CMU Project, and in Particular the Securitization
Initiative, Make a Real Difference? 252
3.14.5 EU Capital Markets and the CMU Project 257
3.15 Shadow Banking Is Now a Structural Aspect of the European
Financial Infrastructure 265
3.15.1 Introduction 265
3.15.2 Country Specifics in the EU Banking Sector 267
3.15.3 Shadow Banking in Switzerland 274
3.15.4 The Shadow Banking Market in the Netherlands 275
3.15.4.1 Introduction 275
3.15.4.2 Special Financial Institutions 277
3.15.5 The Shadow Banking System in Switzerland 279
3.16 European Shadow Banking in Recent Times 281
3.16.1 Introduction 281
3.16.2 The Growth of the EU Shadow Banking Sector and
Financial Stability Risk 282
3.17 Safe Asset Creation (in the EU) 285
3.17.1 Introduction: Manufacturing Safe Assets 285
3.17.2 Safe Assets as a Distinct Asset Segment 292
3.17.3 Are Safe Assets a Problem? 300
3.17.4 The Sovereign Bond-Backed Securities Proposal 308
3.17.5 Alternatives to the SBBS Model 314
3.17.6 Are There Downsides to (Private) Safe Asset Creation? 317
7 Future Directions433
7.1 Introduction 433
7.2 The Effect of Bank Capital Requirement on Growth 433
7.3 The Holistic Financial Industry and Its Function 435
7.4 Is More Market-Based Funding the Solution? 437
7.5 What Role Should Finance Have in Society and What Benefits
Should Be Expected? 440
7.6 The Future of Securitization 442
7.7 Asset Management: A Blind Spot in Terms of Shadow Banking 453
7.7.1 Introduction 453
7.7.2 Incentives and Benchmarking 453
7.7.3 Asset Management and Systemic Risk 467
7.7.4 Vulnerabilities Deriving from Asset Management Activities 469
7.7.5 The Involvement of Pension Funds, Sovereign Wealth
Funds and ETFs 479
7.7.6 Regional- and Country-Specific Reporting Regarding Asset
Management Activities Within the Shadow Banking Sphere 482
7.8 The Globalization of Banking and the Impact of the Financial Crisis 487
7.9 Shadow Banking and Contemporary Unconventional Monetary
Policy490
7.9.1 Introduction 490
7.9.2 Macroprudential Instruments and Shadow Banking 491
7.10 Shadow Banking and Basel III: Do the Costs-Benefits of Financial
Regulation Still Matter? 508
7.11 Deepening and Growing the Financial Sector: But How Deep and
Big Exactly? 518
7.11.1 Introduction 518
7.11.2 Project Finance and the Role of Leveraged Finance 520
7.11.3 As Long as Societies Change, so Do (Shadow) Banking
Institutions521
7.11.4 A Decision-Tree for the Regulator and Oversight Bodies 523
7.11.5 Avoiding Ambiguity and Bringing Down the Last Public
Puts525
7.11.6 Financialization and Its Long-Term Implications 526
7.12 The Neglected Risk Syndrome 528
7.13 The Limits of Shadow Banking Supervision 532
7.13.1 Introduction 532
7.13.2 The Liquidity Fetishism 532
7.13.3 A Total Reset of the System Is More than Likely Required 534
7.14 A Capital Markets Union for the EU: Meaningless Acronym or Game
Changer?536
7.14.1 Introduction 536
7.14.2 Bank-Biased or Market-Biased Financial System? 540
Contents xvii
Index721
List of Tables
xix
List of Boxes
xxi
1
The Macroeconomic Dimensions
of Shadow Banking
1.1 Introduction
It is well understood by now that the shadow banking (SB) industry, its players, activities
and evolution do not occur in isolation. In fact they are a direct function of all elements
including the nexus that shadow banking has with the many policy domains including
microeconomic, macroeconomic and monetary and fiscal policies as well as financial
regulation and supervision. Also the evolution and innovation in the financial sector
impact its outlook, design and content. A look back in recent history provides ‘fuel’ for
that line of thinking. Starting in the 1990s and pretty much all the way into the start of
the 2008 financial crisis, the financial system (in the US but also elsewhere) did go
through a period of rapid change, growth and innovation. Banking as an industry did
transform away from the traditional intermediary functions as loan origination and
deposit-taking and engaged into a ‘securitized’ banking model through which loans were
ultimately distributed to entities in the shadow banking sphere.1 The implication of that
happening is that shadow banking entities came to replicate or at least engage in tradi-
tional banking activities including credit and maturity transformation. The consequence
was that these shadow banking activities took the same risks as banks but with a (very)
limited capital base. That combined with overleverage of the financial system overall cre-
ated the by now well-known consequences which included financial stability and reces-
sionary conditions.
What happened in the period 1990–2008 has however been in the making for decades
though. Also in the period before 1990 shadow bank credit expanded each time banks went
through traditional cyclical contractions. Even more, while consumer credit and mortgages
held by traditional banks were positively correlated with gross domestic product (GDP),
those holdings, outside the banking sector, were negatively correlated. The two aggregates
1
G. Gorton and A. Metrick, (2012), Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, Journal of Financial
Economics, Vol. 104, pp. 425–451.
move in different directions following a monetary tightening.2 It was Meeks et al.3 who
demonstrated (through a general equilibrium model4) that the ability of traditional banks
to securitize can stabilize the overall supply of credit in the system by offloading it in the
shadow banking system, but that it (‘the risk taking by those shadow banking entities’) is
also at the root cause of increased macroeconomic volatility.5 Their model doesn’t however
capture all complexities of shadow banking activities,6 financial innovation (and its flaws7)
and regulatory change (prudential regulation and financial system regulation) as well as the
imperfect or suboptimal working of some asset markets (e.g. pricing in the collateralized
debt obligation, or CDO, markets8). Also the dynamics of special purpose vehicles and their
use to reduce the amount of capital required are left out of scope.9 Their model is built on
the understanding that there are ‘two types of financial intermediary, each facing endoge-
nous balance sheet constraints which depend on their net worth’.10 The commercial banks
2
W.J. den Haan, and V. Sterk, (2010), The Myth of Financial Innovation and the Great Moderation,
Economic Journal, Vol. 121, pp. 707–739; Y. Altunbas, et al., (2009), Securitization and the Bank
Lending Channel, European Economic Review, Vol. 53, pp. 996–1009; E. Loutskina, and Philip
E. Strahan, (2009), Securitization and the Declining Impact of Bank Finance on Loan Supply:
Evidence from Mortgage Originations, Journal of Finance, Vol. 60, pp. 861–889.
3
R. Meeks et al., (2014), Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability, Bank of England Working
Paper Nr. 487 (later on published Shadow Banks and Macroeconomic Instability, Journal of
Money, Credit and banking, Vol. 49, Issue 7, October 2017, pp. 1483–1516).
4
Their model (p. 8) is built on four key assumptions: (1) Financial intermediation is key to channel
supply of credit as deposit holders cannot enforce contracts; (2) ‘financial institutions are unable to
completely pledge the assets they hold on their balance sheets as collateral to raise funds from out-
side investors.’ This causes creditors to limit their funding to banks and consequently to drive a
wedge between the ‘returns earned by savers and the costs incurred by borrowers’; (3) the shadow
banking system is a valuable system as it allows ‘collateral to be used more efficiently by transform-
ing illiquid loans into tradable assets, thereby enhancing net aggregate liquidity’. See also:
B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole, [2011], Inside and Outside Liquidity, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
and Z. Pozsar et al., [2013], Shadow Banking, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, Issue December,
pp. 1–16, who see value in ‘gains from specialization and comparative cost advantages’ but little in
activities driven by regulatory arbitrage; and (4) ‘commercial banks transfer aggregate risk to the
shadow banking system (such transfers may be complete or partial), but risk is not transferred to
unlevered investors outside of the intermediary sector.’
5
Through a shock that came from within the system; see in detail: M. Gertler, (2010),
Macroeconomics in the Wake of the Financial Crisis, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol.
42, pp. 217–219.
6
Their focus is on shadow banks engaged in the bank-like activities of credit transformation (issuing
fixed obligations against risky assets) and maturity transformation (issuing short maturity obliga-
tions against long maturity assets).
7
For securitized assets, these flaws include poor underwriting incentives, flawed modeling assump-
tions and opaque security design; see in detail: A. S. Blinder, (2013), After the Music Stopped,
Penguin Press, NY.
8
J. Coval, et al., (2009), The Economics of Structured Finance, Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Vol. 23, pp. 3–25.
9
See for that in detail: M.K. Brunnermeier, (2009), Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch
2007–2008, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, pp. 77–100, and Z. Pozsar, et al., (2010),
Shadow Banking, July, FRB New York Staff Report Nr. 458.
10
Meeks et al., (2014), ibid., p. 4.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
CHAPTER XI.
THE KIDNAPING.
“A grandson,” replied Mr. Pyle. “Such a cute little feller, too! Only five,
but as big as most boys of seven or eight. He’s all we’ve got, you see, and
some day all this will be his. Would you like to see him, Mrs. White?”
“Don’t be foolish, Enoch!” protested his wife. “A lady like Mrs. White
ain’t interested in children.”
“Indeed, I am!” declared Elaine. “I should dearly love to see the little
man. Where is he?”
“In the nursery,” said Mr. Pyle. “I’ll bring him down.”
The proprietor of Pyle’s Pink Pellets left the room, and presently
returned, leading Tommy by the hand—a curly-headed little chap wearing
his first sailor’s suit.
The boy was naturally shy at first, but he soon succumbed to Elaine’s
charming manners, and allowed her to take him on her knee.
How Mr. and Mrs. Pyle beamed! Here was their grandson sitting on the
lap of a real social leader! Without a doubt, it was the proudest moment of
their lives.
Presently Elaine announced that she must go.
“This has been a most delightful visit,” she said, “but I’m afraid it must
come to an end, as all good things do. You’ll come and see me soon, though,
won’t you, and bring Tommy with you? I’ve quite set my heart on it.”
She rose to her feet and held out her hand to the boy.
“Will you escort me to my car, Tommy?” she asked, with a dazzling
smile.
The lad shyly took her hand, and they walked out of the room, Mr. and
Mrs. Pyle following close behind them.
“This is a much nicer car than any of ours,” Tommy announced, as Elaine
took her seat, and the chauffeur solicitously tucked her in. “I wish we had a
car like this, granddad.”
“I’m sure you have much nicer ones as it is,” the girl said, patting him on
the head. “You just think this is better, because it is new to you. However, if
you like it, would you care to ride with me as far as the gate?”
“Yes,” Tommy said eagerly. “Can I go, granddad?”
Elaine turned to Mr. Pyle.
“Do you think you can trust me with him as far as the road?” she asked,
throwing him a mischievous glance.
The glance struck home, and Mr. Pyle looked at her reproachfully.
“What a question!” he ejaculated. “Of course, I’d trust him with you
anywhere. You—you can have anything we’ve got, Mrs. White.”
“That’s perfectly dear of you!” she said, holding out her hand to assist
Tommy to climb into the car; then turned to the driver. “Go slowly down the
drive,” she said, “so that Tommy’s ride won’t come to an end too soon, and
stop at the gates.”
The chauffeur—who was none other than the Count in disguise—touched
his cap, and the car began to move slowly down the drive.
Mr. and Mrs. Pyle walked beside it, responding to Elaine’s lively sallies
in their slow, embarrassed way, and feeling several inches taller than they
had felt an hour ago.
At last the car reached the gates and turned into the road. Wilhelm
glanced ahead and saw that the way was clear, after which he looked back
over his shoulder at Elaine, who replied, with an almost imperceptible nod.
Then suddenly the car leaped forward like a thing alive, and the next
instant it was thundering along the road with the speed of an express train.
Mr. Pyle let out a cry of alarm, but no thought of treachery crossed his
mind.
He merely thought the chauffeur had made a mistake, and had increased
the speed of the machine instead of shutting off the power.
“Stop! stop!” he shouted, running after the car. “Shut off your engine and
put on your brakes!”
Mrs. Pyle meanwhile stood still and wrung her hands. She was certain
that the big car was running wild and that a terrible accident was imminent.
Then an extraordinary thing occurred.
The dignified Mrs. Brook-White—or, rather, the lady who Mr. and Mrs.
Pyle believed to be Mrs. Brook-White—turned around in her seat with a
mocking laugh, and daintily blew them a farewell kiss.
Mr. Pyle could hardly believe his eyes.
To use his own words, he was “completely flabbergasted.” He pulled up
with a gasp of incredulous bewilderment, and even as he did so, the car
swung around a turn in the road and vanished from sight.
It was evident that Tommy Pyle was to have a much longer ride than
either he or his grandparents anticipated, but where that ride would end, no
one could say—except “Mrs. Brook-White,” her eminently respectable-
looking chauffeur, and certain of the leading members of The Order of the
Philosopher’s Stone.
CHAPTER XIII.
It was quite true, as Mr. Pyle had heard, that Francis Massey had sent for
Nick Carter.
He had first left the case in the hands of the local police, but when at the
end of a week they had frankly confessed that they were baffled, he had
wired for Nick Carter.
The detective promptly responded to the summons, and arrived at
Meadowview in one of his private cars, accompanied by Chick and Captain,
their police dog.
Massey received them in the study, his right hand swathed in bandages,
and his left arm in a sling.
“If I had followed my own inclination,” he said, “I should have sent for
you at first. I was persuaded to place the matter in the hands of the police,
but although they have been searching and investigating and inquiring and
cross-examining for just a week, they’re as far as ever from discovering any
clew to the identity of the scoundrels. I sincerely trust you will be more
successful.”
The detective looked a little dubious.
“You haven’t improved my chances by waiting a week before sending for
me. However, I’ll do my best, of course. Needless to say, I’ve read the
newspaper accounts of the case, but I should be glad to hear your version of
the affair.”
“If you’ve read the newspapers,” replied Massey, “I don’t suppose I can
tell you anything that will be very new. We’d been to the opera—my wife
and daughters and myself—and, in the ordinary course of events, we should
have returned about half past twelve. Owing to engine troubles and a blow-
out, however, it was just after two when we got here.
“We were all rather tired,” he continued, “and we decided to go straight
to bed. Before my wife and daughters retired, however, they handed me their
jewels. I placed the latter in their proper cases, brought them to this room,
and locked them in that safe.”
He pointed to the mutilated safe in the corner. It was empty now, but was
otherwise in the same condition as when the burglars had left it.
“After I’d locked up the jewels,” Massey resumed, “I switched off the
lights and went to bed. For some reason or other I could not get to sleep at
once, and when I’d been in bed about half an hour I thought I heard
somebody moving in the study. I got up quietly, put on a dressing gown and
slippers, armed myself with a revolver, and stole downstairs.
“When I’d crept up to the door here,” he went on, “I distinctly heard men
at work in the room. I waited for a few seconds, and then I suddenly flung
the door open and sprang in, switching on the lights as I did so. One glance
showed me that the safe had been forced and the jewels removed. Two men
were about to stow the cases in a leather bag, and two others were packing
up the apparatus with which they had opened the safe.”
“All the four men wore masks, I understand,” Nick put in.
“That’s true.”
“So you never saw their faces?”
“Unfortunately I did not. From the cut of their clothes, however, and the
appearance of their hands, I judged them to be men of a much superior type
to the common housebreaker. Their hands were as white as my own, and
their clothes were as good as those I’m wearing at this moment.”
“That’s interesting. Now, tell me what you did.”
Massey described how he had covered the men with his revolver, and had
ordered them to raise their hands and stand with their backs to the wall.
“They obeyed without a word,” he said. “I thought I’d cowed them, and
that I only had to ring for help in order to make my capture complete. But
evidently they had posted a fifth man outside the window, to keep watch,
and just as I was about to ring the bell—this bell on the desk—the scoundrel
fired at me through the window and broke my wrist.”
“Did you ever see the fifth man?”
“No, I should never have known of his existence had he not fired. It was
very clever on their part to leave him out there.”
“I see. What happened next?”
“Then for a moment the four masked men seemed almost as startled as
myself—at least, so it appeared to me, although I had troubles of my own
just then, and was hardly in a position to study them at my leisure. At any
rate, panic seized them, I suppose, owing to the fear that the shot would be
heard all over the house. The pain of my shattered wrist made it impossible
for me to do anything more. I was helpless, and the jewels were at their
mercy, but, to my amazement, they seemed to forget all about them.”
“They bolted at once?”
Massey nodded.
“Yes,” he answered. “They rushed to the window, tore down the curtain
in their haste, and took to their heels through the grounds.
“The report of the revolver had aroused the household,” he continued,
“and, in a remarkably short time, the servants were scouring the grounds in
all directions. Two of them saw a man in the act of mounting a motor cycle
in the little lane at the back here. They tried to capture him, but he got away,
and from that day to this nothing more has been seen or heard of any of the
five of them.”
“The man whom your servants saw in the lane—was he one of those in
the study?”
“Apparently not. My people describe him as a young man of rather
foreign appearance, wearing a dark-blue suit. There was no such man in this
room. It seems clear to me that he was the one who was posted outside the
window, and who fired at me.”
“He escaped, you say, on a motor cycle? How did the others get away?”
“The police have a theory that they came here in a motor car, in which
they afterward made their escape. If is only a theory, however. At least, there
doesn’t seem to be any proof. There was a heavy thunder shower an hour or
two later, and that may have obliterated the marks of the car.”
“They left the jewels behind, I understand.”
“Yes, and they also left their apparatus and the leather bag in which they
were about to pack the jewels when I disturbed them. Would you like to see
the things?”
SNAPSHOT ARTILLERY.
By BERTRAM LEBHAR.
A BOMB OUTRAGE.
Chief of Police Hodgins had been to the city hall to tell the mayor the
good news that the Camera Chap had been captured, and was on his way
back to police headquarters when the explosion in the Chronicle Building
occurred.
As he passed the office of Gale’s newspaper, the chief thought that he
might as well drop in and tell his old friend the glad tidings, too. He knew
that the proprietor of the Chronicle and his son would be delighted to hear
that Hawley’s wings had been clipped at last, and that Mayor Henkle had
agreed that the “young desperado” must be sent to jail, public sentiment to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Hodgins was just about to enter the building when there came a violent
report, followed instantly by a crash and loud cries of alarm.
“Great grief!” he gasped. “What has happened? Sounds as if a bomb had
gone off. And it came from inside the building, too!”
Rushing up the stairs, which were strewn with pieces of plaster that the
explosion had torn from the walls, the chief entered the private office of
Delancey Gale—or, to be more exact, all that was left of the private office.
The room was a total wreck. Its door had been torn from its hinges; the
panes of the two windows were completely blown out; the ceiling had come
down; great holes had been torn in the plastering of the walls; the office
furniture was smashed.
And, stretched on the floor, lying so still that Hodgins thought at first that
he surely must be dead, was old Delancey Gale, so badly banged up by the
explosion that his face was scarcely recognizable.
In the hope that there might still be some life left in that inert form, the
chief of police grabbed the telephone which stood on the ruin of what had
been a fine mahogany desk. Fortunately the instrument was still in working
order, and in a few minutes he had the hospital on the wire, and was
imploring them to send an ambulance to the Chronicle office with as little
delay as possible.
When the ambulance surgeon arrived, he announced that there was still a
spark of life left in the proprietor of the Chronicle, but that it was
exceedingly doubtful whether he would survive his injuries.
“Anybody else hurt, chief?” the surgeon inquired, as he and his driver
placed the wounded man on a stretcher and prepared to take him to the
hospital.
“It seems not,” Hodgins replied. “A couple of chaps in the reporters’
room got a few scratches, I’m told; but nobody except poor Gale is injured
seriously. The whole building was jarred by the explosion, but most of its
force seems to have been confined to this room.”
“How did it happen?” the surgeon inquired, as he lifted one end of the
stretcher and started to carry the unconscious man to the ambulance.
“Looks to me like a bomb outrage,” the police official replied, with a
scowl. “See that clockwork affair over there on the floor? I reckon it was
that contraption which caused the damage. But I ain’t had time to make an
investigation. I’ve got my suspicions, though, as to who is responsible for
this atrocity.”
Just as they were lifting the stretcher into the ambulance, young Gale
pushed his way through the crowd which had gathered on the sidewalk. He
had gone out on an errand for his father about an hour before the explosion,
and the sight of the ambulance and the crowd gathered in front of the
Chronicle office was the first intimation he had that anything was wrong.
His face was white as he approached Chief Hodgins.
“Is the governor dead?” he inquired hoarsely.
“Not quite,” was the gruff reply. “But the doc says he don’t stand much
show. What do you know about this explosion, my boy?”
“Nothing at all,” Gale replied nervously. “I can’t understand how it
happened.”
“I reckon I’ve got a pretty clear idea how it happened, all right,” growled
Hodgins. “Somebody sent the old gent an infernal machine. The pieces of it
are lying on the floor of the office now. And it ain’t hard to guess who that
somebody was, eh?”
“No, indeed,” young Gale replied. “My father has only one enemy—at
least, only one who would be capable of such a cowardly attack. That cad,
Carroll, is responsible for this, as sure as you’re standing here, chief! I
demand that you place him under arrest at once!”
“You won’t have to ask that of me twice,” Hodgins replied grimly. “My
fingers are just itching to get hold of that big stiff’s coat collar. But first let
us go in and look the ground over, and see if we can’t find a little more
evidence against him. Suspicion ain’t evidence, you know.”
A more affectionate son might have preferred to accompany the
ambulance to the hospital, in order to be present, or near at hand, while the
surgeons made a thorough examination of his father’s injuries; but this
course did not seem to suggest itself to Gale.
Eagerly he followed the chief of police up the plaster-strewn stairway to
the wrecked private office of the proprietor of the Chronicle.
They examined the fragments of the exploded infernal machine, and
found there some clews which caused Gale to turn excitedly to Hodgins.
“It’s Carroll, sure enough!” he cried triumphantly. “We’ve got enough
evidence here to send him to the chair, if the governor dies, and to prison for
life if he doesn’t. Come on, chief; let’s march to the Bulletin office and place
him under arrest.”
The chief of police took the precaution of providing himself with an
escort of four stalwart members of his force before he went to arrest the
proprietor of the Bulletin.
Not possessing the sunny, placid disposition of his friend Hawley,
Carroll’s indignation took the form of physical resistance when he learned
the intentions of his visitors concerning himself. Hodgins and his posse had
to send for reënforcements before they could get him out of the building.
That was why the proprietor of the Bulletin presented such a battered
appearance when he joined the Camera Chap in the cell at police
headquarters.
CHAPTER XXXIV.
DUBIOUS PROSPECTS.