1. PEOPLE v. PERFECTO, PHIL.

887
G. R. NO. L-18463, October 4, 1922 MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS: Fernando M. Guerrero, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, discovered

that documents which consists of records of testimony given by witnesses in the
investigation of oil companies had disappeared from his office.The day after he
had informed the Senate body of the loss of documents in the session called by the
Governor-General, an article against the Senate, which was edited by the herein
defendant, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, was publishedin the newspaper La Nacion.Mr.
Perfecto was accused to have violated the Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code
(SPC) which punishes “any person who, by *** writing, shall defame, abuse, or
insult, any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority”.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still
in effect despite the change of soveriegnty from Spanish to United State.

RULING: No, the Article 256 of the SPC is not in effect and cannot be applied in
this case. First, the article was enacted to protect the Spanish officials who were
representatives of the King. However, there are no longer Kings nor
representatives of the Kings to protect at present and “Minister of the Crown” does
not exist in the current government.Second, the Philippine Libel Law (Act No.
227) had repealed so much in the provision that relates to written defamation,
abuse and insult in the SPC and based on the facts, the defendant violatedneither
of the two laws. Lastly, the change from Spanish to American sovereignty of the
Philippines.As stated as a general principle of public law, the laws that regulates
the relations of the inhabitants of the acquired territory to the previous sovereign
are abrogated. Therefore, the judgment was reversed, and the defendant-appellant
was acquitted.

2. Macariola vs. Asuncion, A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77
Bernardita Macariola vs. Judge Elias Asuncion of CFI Leyte

A.M. No. 133-J, May 31 1982, 114 SCRA 77

FACTS:

In 1963, Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving
parcels of land located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the
legibility of the parties to inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of
the parties submitted a project partition reflecting the preference of the parties. The project
partition was, however, unsigned by Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly
authorized by Macariola as counsel. The judge then approved the project partition. The decision
became final in 1963 as well.

Reyes et al sold some of their shares to Arcadio Galapon, who later sold the property to judge
Asuncion in 1965.

On 6 Aug 1968, Macariola filed a complaint against Judge Asuncion with “acts unbecoming a
judge” on the ground that he bought a property (formerly owned by Macariola) which was
involved in a civil case decided by him; this act by Asuncion is averred by Macariola to be against
Art. 1491, par 5 of the Civil Code which provides:

"Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
xxx xxx xxx

"(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in
litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they
exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment
and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession".

Also, Macariola said that Asuncion’s act tainted his earlier judgment. Macariola said that the
project partition was unsigned by her and that what was given to her in the partition were
insignificant portions of the parcels of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision.

HELD:

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property
in 1965 – 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property
directly from any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold
the property to Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a “dummy” of Asuncion.

Also, Macariola did not show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what
she got were insignificant portions of the land.

The Supreme Court however admonished Judge Asuncion to be more discreet in his personal
transactions.

3. Javellana vs Executive Secretary Case

Facts

Petitioner filed a case to the Supreme Court to restrain respondents from

implementing any of the provisions of the Proposed Constitution not found in the
present Constitution referring to that of 1935.
Javellana alleged that the President is without authority and jurisdiction in
implementing the said proposed Constitution and that the election held was not a free
election, hence, null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been
ratified validly.

RULING:

Yes.

Justices Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Concepcion, or six

(6) members of the Court also held that :

… the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly
ratified in accordance with Article XV, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution which
provides only one way for ratification, i.e., “in an election or plebiscite held in
accordance with law and participated in only by qualified and duly registered voters”.

However, it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions that a
new Constitution once accepted acquired by the people must be accorded recognition
by the Court.

All the cases are dismissed.

4. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317)

FACTS:

President Aquino issued EO No. 284, which allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in
addition to their primary positions. It was assailed for it violates the Constitution.

Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of EO No. 284 on the principal submission that
it adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution.
According to petitioners, by virtue of the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution," the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in
Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely:

(1) The VicePresident may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3,
par. (2), Article VII thereof; and
(2) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by
virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an executive order allowing members of the Cabinet, their

undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices in addition to
their primary positions is valid.

HELD:

Invalid. In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to
Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated
July 23, 1987 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that
Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their
primary position to not more than two (2) positions in the government and government
corporations, Executive Order No. 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the
1987 Constitution itself.

6. Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552 GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER

[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]

Facts: In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to
pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the
amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon
would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

Issue: Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?

Held: Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges
are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount
circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first
applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers
when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United
States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when the Philippine
Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges'
compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs
them.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon
buying gasoline, or cars or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real
property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are
levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to
diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the
fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block
encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of
judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a
basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs.
Gore).

7. Pastor Endencia et al vs Saturnino David

G.R. No. L-6355-56 – 93 – Phil. 699 – Political Law – The Judiciary – The Legislature –
Separation of Powers

Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue (CIR), ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary
pursuant to Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that

No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall
be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared
not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are exempt
from taxation – this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of powers, i.e., the
executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from the judiciary; that
under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries of judges may not
be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing their salaries is already
a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII, Constitution).

The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto
vs Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD: No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts
have the power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In
Sec. 13, R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the courts
when it inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”

Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution of
their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of
the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in
Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This
act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of
the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or
act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not
conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be
usurping a judicial function in defining a term.

The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law,
the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it
may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their
task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case
by the highest court of the land.

8.Judge David Nitafan vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue

G.R. No. 78780 – 152 SCRA 284 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – The
Judicial Department – Judicial Autonomy – Income Tax Payment By The
Judiciary

Judge David Nitafan and several other judges of the Manila Regional Trial Court
seek to prohibit the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries or compensation for such
would tantamount to a diminution of their salary, which is unconstitutional. Earlier
however, or on June 7, 1987, the Supreme Court en banc had already reaffirmed
the directive of the Chief Justice which directs the continued withholding of taxes
of the justices and the judges of the judiciary – but the SC decided to rule on this
case nonetheless to settle the issue once and for all.

ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are exempt from the
payment of income tax.
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution, based on their
deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and judges from general taxation.
Members of the judiciary, just like members of the other branches of the
government, are subject to income taxation. What is provided for by the
constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fixed salary which may not be subject to the
whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to
the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

But may the salaries of the members of the judiciary be increased?

Yes. The Congress may pass a law increasing the salary of the members of the
judiciary and such increase will immediately take effect thus the incumbent
members of the judiciary (at the time of the passing of the law increasing their
salary) shall benefit immediately.

Congress can also pass a law decreasing the salary of the members of the
judiciary but such will only be applicable to members of the judiciary which are
appointed AFTER the effectivity of such law.

Note: This case abandoned the ruling in Perfecto vs Meer and in Endencia vs
David.

9. Francisco vs House of Representatives

Facts –

On June 2, 2003, an impeachment complaint was filed against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide and seven (7) Associate Justices. However, it was dismissed by The House
Committee on Justice on October 22, 2003, for being insufficient in substance.

Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new impeachment

complaint against Chief Justice Davide on October 23, 2003.

Petitions arose against the House of Representatives et al, who contend that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional, violating the provision of
Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution.

“no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
one within the period of one year.” – Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution.
Senator Pimentel Jr. Filed a Motion to Intervene, stating that the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court. and that the sole power,
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.

RULING:
The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole, the said provision should function to

the full extent of its substance and form and its terms, in conjunction with all other
provisions of the Constitution.

Pursuant to Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, “the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court.” Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and
enforceable. Also, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on part of any branch of the
government.

10. IBP vs. Zamora

G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless
violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only,
until such time when the situation shall have improved. The IBP filed a petition
seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over
the military and the civilian character of the PNP

Held:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power
solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress
may revoke such proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the
revocation or review of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The
distinction places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have simply lumped
together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and review without any
qualification.

The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the
intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using
the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign
power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which involve the curtailment
and suppression of certain basic civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus
necessitating safeguards by Congress and review by the Court.

In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to
determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis.
The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden, as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out
the armed forces.

The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the
civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the
Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use
of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces are the
ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to
the PNP

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the
civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the operations is lodged
with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since
none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there
can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of
the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of
the PNP.