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Coalition Governance in Western Europe

OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi

COMPARATIVE POLITICS
Comparative Politics is a series for researchers, teachers, and students of political
science that deals with contemporary government and politics. Global in scope,
books in the series are characterized by a stress on comparative analysis and strong
methodological rigour. The series is published in association with the European
Consortium for Political Research. For more information visit
http://www.ecprnet.eu
The series is edited by Susan Scarrow, John and Rebecca Moores Professor of
Political Science, University of Houston, and Jonathan Slapin, Professor of Political
Institutions and European Politics, University of Zurich.

    

Beyond Turnout
How Compulsory Voting Shapes Citizens and Political Parties
Shane P. Singh
Party System Closure
Party Alliances, Government Alternatives, and Democracy in Europe
Fernando Casal Bértoa Zsolt Enyedi
The New Party Challenge
Changing Cycles of Party Birth and Death in Central Europe and Beyond
Tim Haughton Kevin Deegan-Krause
Multi-Level Democracy
Integration and Independence Among Party Systems, Parties, and
Voters in Seven Federal Systems
Lori Thorlakson
Citizen Support for Democratic and Autocratic Regimes
Marlene Mauk
Democratic Stability in an Age of Crisis
Agnes Cornell Jørgen Møller Svend-Erik Skaaning
Coalition Governance in Central Eastern Europe
Edited by Torbjörn Bergman Gabriella Ilonszki Wolfgang C. Müller
The Reshaping of West European Party Politics
Agenda-Setting and Party Competition in Comparative Perspective
Christoffer Green-Pedersen
Parliaments in Time
The Evolution of Legislative Democracy in Western Europe, 1866–2015
Michael Koß
Inequality After the Transition
Political Parties, Party Systems, and Social Policy in Southern and
Postcommunist Europe
Ekrem Karakoç
Democracy and the Cartelization of Political Parties
Richard S. Katz Peter Mair
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi

Coalition Governance
in Western Europe
Edited by
TORBJÖRN BERGMAN, HANNA BÄCK,
and JOHAN HELLSTRÖM

1
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi

3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
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 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi

Preface and Acknowledgement

This volume presents our joint research on the coalition life cycle in Western
Europe. We place particular emphasis on the under-researched coalition govern-
ance aspect of that cycle. The work emanates from a project for which Johan
Hellström is the principal investigator: PAGED—Party Government in Europe
Database (sponsored by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond, Dnr IN15-0306:1). We also
gratefully acknowledge the support of Wolfgang C. Müller at the University of
Vienna who hosted our first workshop. Hanna Bäck at Lund University hosted a
second one. In both cases, the long and strenuous hours during which we jointly
discussed indicators and definitions were balanced by pleasant company and
gracious hosts.
In this research, we have relied on our structured collaboration approach. We
presented our contributors with a set of suggested variables and indicators but
together we also discussed and scrutinized these variables so that they were
defined in a dialogue between the editors and the contributors. This facilitated a
common understanding and common use of important variables. From that point
of departure, our contributors analysed coalition politics in their country, building
not least on sources in their native language, discussions with informed colleagues,
and interviews. We believe that the combination of systematic data collection and
the skills of authors who know their cases well is a productive one. We include
cabinets formed up to and including January 2019.
At Umeå University, Jonas Lindahl provided skilled research assistance
throughout the project. We are also grateful for the cooperation with the
Comparative Politics series editors and the support of the team at Oxford
University Press.
We believe in transparency and in sharing data. One result of our efforts will be
an open access data set, with codebooks and documentation, published online at
the European Representative Democracy Data Archive (www.erdda.org).
This volume is a product of colleagues working together. It made the work fun!

Torbjörn Bergman—Hanna Bäck—Johan Hellström

OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi

Contents

List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
List of Contributors xv
1. Coalition Governance in Western Europe 1
Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström

2. The Three Stages of the Coalition Life Cycle 15

Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström
3. Austria: Phasing-Out Grand Coalition Government 41
Wolfgang C. Müller
4. Belgium: From Highly Constrained and Complex Bargaining
Settings to Paralysis? 81
Lieven De Winter and Patrick Dumont
5. Denmark: How to Form and Govern Minority Coalitions 124
Flemming J. Christiansen
6. Finland: Forming and Managing Ideologically Heterogeneous
Oversized Coalitions 165
Tapio Raunio
7. France: Electoral Necessity and Presidential Leadership Beyond
Parties 206
Isabelle Guinaudeau and Simon Persico
8. Germany: From Stable Coalition Camps to New Complexity 247
Marc Debus, Holger Döring, and Alejandro Ecker
9. Greece: From Coalitions as a ‘State of Exception’ to the
New Normal? 284
Myrto Tsakatika
10. Iceland: Political Change and Coalition Politics 324
Indridi H. Indridason and Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson
11. Ireland: Coalition Politics in a Fragmenting Party System 357
Paul Mitchell
12. Italy: Continuous Change and Continuity in Change 396
Francesco Zucchini and Andrea Pedrazzani
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viii 

13. The Netherlands: Old Solutions to New Problems 448

Tom Louwerse and Arco Timmermans
14. Norway: Towards a More Permissive Coalitional Order 482
Torill Stavenes and Kaare W. Strøm
15. Portugal: Left-Wing Single-Party Governments and Right-Wing
Coalitions 517
Patrícia Calca
16. Spain: Single-Party Majority and Minority Governments 544
Bonnie N. Field
17. Sweden: The Rise and Fall of Bloc Politics 574
Johan Hellström and Jonas Lindahl
18. The United Kingdom: When a Coalition Meets the
Westminster Model, Who Wins? 611
Nick Barlow and Tim Bale
19. Croatia: Strong Prime Ministers and Weak Coalitions 640
Dario Nikić Čakar
20. Coalition Governance Patterns across Western Europe 680
Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström

Appendix: On Definition and Measurement 727

Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, Johan Hellström, and Jonas Lindahl

Index 749
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List of Figures

1.1 The life cycle of governments 2

1.2 Effective number of parliamentary parties, 1945–2019 5
2.1 Potential impact of party system change on the coalition life cycle 31
20.1 Trend over the government formation process length in Western Europe
1945–2019 693
20.2 Cabinet formation duration for post-election cabinets in Western Europe
1945–2019 694
20.3 The relationship between parties’ seat contributions and their share
of ministerial posts 698
20.4 Power concentration and power dispersion 700
20.5 Size of agreements 706
20.6 Length of coalition agreements in Western Europe 706
20.7 Content of coalition agreements 707
20.8 Share of early terminations in Western Europe, 1945–2019 709
20.9 Trend of cabinet duration Western Europe, 1945–2019 713
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 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi

List of Tables

1.1 Institutions and their changes over time in Western Europe, 1945–2018/19 7
2.1 Government types in Western Europe, 1945–2018/19 17
3.1 Austrian cabinets since 1945 46
3.2 Government formation period in Austria, 1987–2018 49
3.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Austrian coalitions, 1987–2018 57
3.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Austria, 1945–2018 60
3.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Austria, 1945–2018 61
3.6 Cabinet termination in Austria, 1987–2018 70
4.1a Belgian cabinets, 1946–2018 87
4.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Belgium, 1991–2019 92
4.2 Government formation period in Belgium, 1991–2018 94
4.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Belgian coalitions, 1991–2018 102
4.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Belgium, 1991–2018 105
4.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Belgium, 1946–2018 108
4.6 Cabinet termination in Belgium, 1991–2018 116
5.1a Danish cabinets since 1945 132
5.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Denmark, 1988–2018 135
5.2 Government formation period in Denmark, 1988–2018 137
5.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Danish coalitions, 1988–2018 141
5.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Denmark, 1945–2018 144
5.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Danish coalitions, 1945–2018 146
5.6 Cabinet termination in Denmark, 1988–2018 155
6.1 Finnish cabinets since 1945 170
6.2 Cabinet formation in Finland, 1987–2018 178
6.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Finnish coalitions, 1987–2018 181
6.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Finland, 1945–2018 185
6.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Finnish coalitions, 1945–2018 190
6.6 Cabinet termination in Finland, 1987–2018 199
7.1a French cabinets since 1959 209
7.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in France, 1988–2018 218
7.2 Cabinet formation in France, 1988–2018 221
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xii   

7.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in French coalitions, 1988–2018 224

7.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in France, 1959–2018 228
7.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in French coalitions, 1959–2018 233
7.6 Cabinet termination in France, 1988–2018 238
8.1 German cabinets since 1949 252
8.2 Cabinet formation in Germany, 1987–2018 257
8.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in German coalitions, 1987–2018 262
8.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Germany, 1949–2018 264
8.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in German coalitions, 1949–2018 267
8.6 Cabinet termination in Germany, 1987–2018 273
9.1a Greek cabinets since 1977 287
9.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Greece, 1977–2018 289
9.2 Cabinet formation in Greece, 1977–2018 294
9.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Greek coalitions, 1977–2018 298
9.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Greece, 1977–2018 301
9.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Greek coalitions, 1977–2018 303
9.6 Cabinet termination in Greece, 1977–2018 311
10.1a Icelandic cabinets since 1944 331
10.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Iceland, 1987–2018 333
10.2 Cabinet formation in Iceland, 1987–2018 335
10.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Icelandic coalitions, 1987–2018 339
10.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Iceland, 1944–2018 340
10.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Icelandic coalitions, 1944–2018 344
10.6 Cabinet termination in Iceland, 1987–2018 350
11.1a Irish cabinets since 1944 363
11.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Ireland, 1989–2018 368
11.2 Cabinet formation in Ireland, 1989–2018 369
11.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Irish coalitions, 1989–2018 374
11.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Ireland, 1944–2018 375
11.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Irish coalitions, 1944–2018 380
11.6 Cabinet termination in Ireland, 1989–2018 387
12.1a Italian cabinets, 1946–2018 400
12.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Italy, 1987–2018 405
12.2 Government formation period in Italy, 1987–2018 413
12.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Italian coalitions, 1987–2018 420
12.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Italy, 1946–2018 424
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   xiii

12.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Italy, 1946–2018 427

12.6 Cabinet termination in Italy, 1987–2018 435
13.1a Dutch cabinets since 1946 453
13.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in the Netherlands,
1946–2018 456
13.2 Cabinet formation in the Netherlands, 1989–2018 458
13.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Dutch coalitions, 1989–2018 461
13.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in the Netherlands, 1946–2018 463
13.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Dutch coalitions, 1946–2018 467
13.6 Cabinet termination in the Netherlands, 1989–2018 474
14.1a Norwegian cabinets since 1945 489
14.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Norway, 1989–2019 493
14.2 Government formation period in Norway, 1989–2019 494
14.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Norwegian coalitions, 1989–2019 499
14.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Norway, 1945–2019 501
14.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Norwegian coalitions, 1945–2019 504
14.6 Cabinet termination in Norway, 1989–2019 511
15.1a Portuguese cabinets since 1976 521
15.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Portugal, 1987–2018 522
15.2 Cabinet formation in Portugal, 1987–2018 524
15.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Portuguese coalitions, 1987–2018 527
15.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Portugal, 1976–2018 531
15.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Portuguese coalitions, 1944–2018 535
15.6 Cabinet termination in Portugal, 1987–2018 539
16.1a Spanish cabinets since 1977 550
16.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Spain, 1977–2018 556
16.2 Cabinet formation in Spain, 1977–2018 558
16.3 Cabinet termination in Spain, 1977–2018 567
17.1a Swedish cabinets since 1945 578
17.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Sweden, 1988–2019 584
17.2 Cabinet formation in Sweden, 1988–2019 586
17.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Swedish coalitions, 1991–2019 594
17.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Sweden, 1945–2019 596
17.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Swedish coalition governments,
1945–2018 599
17.6 Cabinet termination in Sweden, 1988–2018 605
18.1a British cabinets since 1945 614
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xiv   

18.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in the United Kingdom,

1945–2018 617
18.2 Cabinet formation in the United Kingdom, 1945–2018 618
18.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in British coalitions, 1945–2018 625
18.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in the United Kingdom,
1945–2018 627
18.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in British coalitions, 1945–2018 629
18.6 Cabinet termination in the United Kingdom, 1945–2018 634
19.1a Croatian cabinets since 1990 646
19.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Croatia, 1990–2018 651
19.2 Cabinet formation in Croatia, 1990–2018 653
19.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Croatian coalitions, 1991–2018 657
19.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Croatia, 1991–2018 659
19.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Croatian coalition governments,
1991–2018 663
19.6 Cabinet termination in Croatia, 1990–2018 671
20.1 Party system indicators in Western Europe and Croatia 682
20.2 Institutional rules and conventions concerning cabinet formation 684
20.3 Prime ministerial powers 689
20.4 Cabinet formation 692
20.5 Parliamentary cabinets 695
20.6 Government participation of parties with median legislator and the largest
parliamentary party in Western Europe and Croatia 697
20.7 Coalition governance 701
20.8 Coalition discipline in legislation and parliamentary behaviour 704
20.9 Policy agreements 708
20.10 Mechanisms of cabinet termination 711
20.11 Cabinet duration 714
20.12 Three models and sixteen coalition governance structures 717
20.13 Coalition governance models, empirical manifestations at the country level 719
A.1a Swedish cabinets since 1988 731
A.1b Electoral alliances and pre-electoral coalitions in Sweden, 1991–2019 734
A.2 Cabinet formation in Sweden, 1988–2019 736
A.3 Distribution of cabinet ministerships in Swedish coalitions, 1991–2019 738
A.4 Size and content of coalition agreements in Sweden, 1991–2019 740
A.5 Coalition governance mechanisms in Swedish coalition governments,
1988–2018 742
A.6 Cabinet termination in Sweden, 1988–2018 744
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi

List of Contributors

Tim Bale is Professor of Politics at Queen Mary University of London, UK.

Nick Barlow is a PhD candidate in Politics at Queen Mary University of London, UK.
Torbjörn Bergman is Professor of Political Science at Umeå University, Sweden.
Hanna Bäck is Professor of Political Science at Lund University, Sweden.

Patrícia Calca is a researcher at Iscte – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, CIES-Iscte, Lisbon,

Portugal and visiting fellow at the Center for Data and Methods, University of Konstanz,
Germany.

Flemming J. Christiansen is Associate Professor of Political Science at Roskilde University,

Denmark.
Marc Debus is Professor of Political Science at the University of Mannheim, Germany.
Lieven De Winter is Professor of Political Science at the University of Louvain, Belgium.
Patrick Dumont is Professor of Political Science at The Australian National University,
Australia.

Holger Döring is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bremen,

Germany.
Alejandro Ecker Junior Professor for Politics and Communication in Ibero-America at
Heidelberg University.
Bonnie N. Field is Professor of Global Studies at Bentley University, USA.
Isabelle Guinaudeau is a CNRS researcher at Centre Emile Durkheim, Sciences Po
Bordeaux, France.

Johan Hellström is Associate Professor of Political Science at Umeå University, Sweden.

Indridi H. Indridason is Professor of Political Science at the University of California,
Riverside, USA.
Gunnar Helgi Kristinsson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Iceland,
Reykjavik.
Jonas Lindahl is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Umeå University, Sweden.

Tom Louwerse is Associate Professor of Political Science at Leiden University, the

Netherlands.

Paul Mitchell is Associate Professor of Political Science at the London School of Economics
and Political Science, UK.
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 29/6/2021, SPi

xvi   

Wolfgang C. Müller is Professor of Democratic Governance at the Department of

Government, University of Vienna, Austria.
Dario Nikić Čakar is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Zagreb University, Croatia.
Andrea Pedrazzani is Assistant Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Milan,
Italy.
Simon Persico is Professor of Political Science at Pacte, Sciences Po Grenoble, France.

Tapio Raunio is Professor of Political Science at Tampere University, Finland.

Torill Stavenes has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Exeter, UK.
Kaare W. Strøm is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of
California, San Diego, USA.

Arco Timmermans is Professor of Public Affairs at Leiden University, the Netherlands.

Myrto Tsakatika is Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Glasgow, UK.
Francesco Zucchini is Full Professor of Political Science at the University of Milan, Italy.
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 28/6/2021, SPi

Chapter 1
Coalition Governance in Western Europe
Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström

In parliamentary democracies, the partisan composition of the legislature is the

basis for the cabinet (Strøm et al. 2003). At times, parliamentary elections produce
a single majority party in parliament and the outcome of the cabinet formation
process is largely a foregone conclusion. The UK used to be one example of this.
Alternating majority parties controlled the cabinet. However, more recently, the
UK has also been governed by a multiparty cabinet and by a government formed
by a party that held only a minority of the seats in parliament. Rare as these events
have been in the UK, coalitions of political parties govern most of Europe.
Across Western Europe, there is considerable empirical variation in the pat-
terns of coalition formation and dissolution. The study of this variation is a
vibrant research field, where the largest subfield focuses on the formation of
governments (e.g. Riker 1962; Martin and Stevenson 2001; Döring and
Hellström 2013). But there is also a substantial literature focusing on the termin-
ation of cabinets (e.g. Warwick 1979; Saalfeld 2008; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones
2009; Bassi 2017). For quite some time, these two facets, the coming together and
the breaking up of coalition governments, remained largely separate research
traditions. In this book, we employ a dynamic coalition politics perspective—
specifically, we build on the idea that what happens at the formation stage shapes
what happens during the government’s tenure, which in turn influences its
durability. This is what Strøm et al. (2008) label the ‘life cycle’ of coalition
governments.
Our ambition with this volume is three-fold. First, we build on the lessons from
earlier studies of governments in both Western and Central Eastern Europe to
deepen our understanding of the coalition life cycle. Second, we seek to capture
how recent changes in the West European party systems influence the various
stages of the coalition life cycle. Third, we are interested in particular in how
coalition partners cooperate and make policy once a government has formed,
aiming to contribute to the growing literature on the topic of coalition governance,
which has, as pointed out by Laver (2012), become an intriguing and challenging
topic in coalition politics research.
Thus, we look at three phases in the life cycle. We begin with the formation
process, for example studying the bargaining rounds, the duration of the forma-
tion period, and the total amount of time it takes to form a government.

Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström, Coalition Governance in Western Europe In: Coalition Governance
in Western Europe. Edited by: Torbjörn Bergman, Hanna Bäck, and Johan Hellström, Oxford University Press.
© Oxford University Press 2021. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198868484.003.0001
OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 28/6/2021, SPi

2 ̈   ,  ̈  ,   ̈ 

Moreover, during the formation phase, the coalition partners typically design
various mechanisms to facilitate cooperation, which are implemented at the
governance phase. In the final phase, coalitions eventually end, and when they
do, we want to know the reason behind their termination. The three phases of the
coalition life cycle applied to cabinets—formation, governance, and termination—
are relevant to all parliamentary systems in democratic Europe.
In this introductory chapter, we briefly outline the different stages in the
coalition life cycle. We then discuss the changing context for government forma-
tion in the West European countries, in particular how the party systems have
changed over the past few decades. We also briefly present the institutional
context in which coalition politics is played out. We conclude by giving a brief
overview of the content of our volume.

The life cycle of governments in parliamentary democracies

Heuristically, the life cycle of cabinets can be conceptualized as having three major
phases. These are illustrated in Figure 1.1.¹ In our illustration, the coalition life
cycle starts with the government formation stage.² Focusing on this stage, scholars

• (Elections)

GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT
TERMINATION FORMATION
• Bargaining duration/delays
• Cabinet duration
• Government composition/size
• Termination types
• Payoff allocation (e.g. ministerial
portfolios)

GOVERNANCE
• Coalition governance models
• Policy-making of ministers
• Control mechanisms
(e.g. coalition agreements)

Figure 1.1 The life cycle of governments

¹ For simplicity, we here speak about the three main stages in the coalition cycle, even though the
coalition life cycle could be further sub-divided into more stages. Strøm et al. (2008) identify eight
different steps in the cycle that all correspond to an identifiable body of literature.
² According to our definition, we count a new government (or cabinet) every time there is (a) a
change in party composition, (b) a change in prime minister, or (c) a general election (Müller and
 OUP CORRECTED AUTOPAGE PROOFS – FINAL, 28/6/2021, SPi

     3

have asked why specific types of government form. Where early coalition theories
predicted that minimal winning coalitions would form (e.g. Riker 1962), later
work has aimed to explain why minority or oversized governments form (e.g.
Strøm 1990; Volden and Carrubba 2004; Mitchell and Nyblade 2008; Eppner and
Ganghof 2017; Thürk et al. 2020).³
One aspect of government formation which has received considerable interest
among scholars is the question of why negotiations over government formation
takes a long time in some countries, whereas they are very brief in others (e.g. De
Winter and Dumont 2008; Golder 2010; Laver and Benoit 2015; Ecker and Meyer
2017).
Other questions focusing on this particular phase relate to the payoffs that
political parties negotiate over. Here, a large body of work has focused on the
question of why some parties receive more portfolios than others do (e.g. Browne
and Franklin 1973; Warwick and Druckman 2005; Cutler et al. 2016). Still others
have been interested in parties’ portfolio preferences and in predicting ‘who gets
what’ in terms of portfolios (e.g. Bäck et al. 2011; Ecker et al. 2015).
The second phase of the coalition life cycle is the period when parties govern
and make policy, the coalition governance stage. This phase has received less
attention than the first and third phases, but the literature on this topic is growing.
An overarching question that is asked is, ‘how do coalitions govern?’ In order to
understand this, it is important to know how the coalition contracts negotiated
during the formation phase are set up. This means that the distinction between the
end of the formation phase and the beginning of the coalition governance phase is
analytically useful, but also that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the
stages. Theoretically, this is in line with research that incorporates actor expect-
ations about the future stages already at the formation stage (Laver and Shepsle
1996; Diermeier 2006; Lupia and Strøm 2008).
In the emerging governance literature, several different types of coalition
governance model exist to describe and understand government decision-making.
One, the ministerial government model, suggests that ministers have complete
autonomy to direct policy in their department as they prefer (Laver and Shepsle
1996). Another, the so-called prime minister model, places government authority
largely in the hands of the prime minister (PM). A third model emphasizes that
coalition governance should be characterized as individual parties negotiating and
monitoring each other. An extreme variant of this model is the veto players model

Strøm 2000). A new government may occur after an election, or as a ‘replacement’. A replacement
cabinet forms when the previous cabinet ended without there being a new general election held (i.e.
changes in the governing parties or of the PM).
³ A minimal winning coalition is one that cannot lose a member and still be winning, that is hold the
majority of seats in parliament. A surplus coalition is one that can actually lose a member (the smallest)
and still be winning. A minority cabinet is one that include parties that together control less than half
(or exactly half) of all the members of parliament (Riker 1962).
Another random document with
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University course. At eighteen the candidate to the priesthood might
be ordained Subdeacon; at twenty he could take the diaconate, and
at twenty-five be ordained Priest. It will be noticed that these ages in
some way generally correspond to the academic degrees. Going to
the University at fourteen, a clerical student might have, and no
doubt frequently had, received the various steps of minor Orders.
Four years of the liberal arts enabled him at eighteen to take his
degree of Bachelor of Arts. It was at this age that he could be
ordained Subdeacon. Then seven years of theological study enabled
him to become a Bachelor of Divinity at twenty-five, at which time he
was of the right age to receive the priesthood. This was the regular
course; but without doubt the greater number of candidates for the
ministry did not pass through all the schools. Some, no doubt, after
entering sacred Orders, became attached to cathedrals, colleges of
priests, and even parochial churches, where, in the midst of a more
or less active life, they prepared themselves for further ecclesiastical
advancement. Wherever they were, however, they would have to
prove themselves to be sufficiently lettered and of good life before
they would be accepted for Ordination, and their examination and
proof was put as a conscientious duty upon the bishop before he
determined upon accepting and ordaining them. For a candidate to
become a cleric there was not much difficulty, if he showed sufficient
diligence and good-will, and the various minor Orders were also
bestowed without any serious question as to the likelihood of failure,
etc., in the ecclesiastical career. With the subdiaconate, however,
this was in no sense the case, and no one was allowed to be
ordained without what was called a “title,” that is, he was required to
show that he had been nominated to a benefice sufficient for his
proper maintenance, or had been given a responsible guarantee of
adequate support for one in sacred Orders. In the case of sons of
well-to-do parents the bishop might accept the possession of
sufficient property as guarantee under the title of “patrimony.”
Moreover, the Episcopal Registers show for what large numbers of
clergy the religious houses became surety for a fitting maintenance
in the event of failure of health or withdrawal of ecclesiastical
resources. A certificate of Orders received was to be furnished by
the bishop’s official, the fee for each of which was settled in the
English Church by Archbishop Stratford at 6d.
 SACRAMENT OF ORDINATION
The entry into the clerical state, with its duties and privileges, was
outwardly manifested by the tonsure and corona. The former, as the
gloss upon the Constitution of Cardinal Otho declares, was the
shaving of a circle on the crown of the cleric as a sign of the laying
aside all desire for temporal advantages and avaricious thoughts.
“And,” says the author, “in the proper tonsure of clerics, I believe, is
included the shaving of beards, which, contrary to the law, many
modern clerks grow with great care.” The corona, although
apparently in time it became synonymous with the “tonsure,” in its
original English meaning certainly signified the close crop of the hair,
on the upper part of the head, as “a sign that clerics sought only the
Kingdom of God.” One curious instance of a bishop giving the
tonsure in a parish church may be mentioned. In 1336, Bishop
Grandisson, of Exeter, went to St. Buryan to terminate a serious
quarrel between the inhabitants and himself, in which they had
practically rejected his jurisdiction. He was attended by many of the
gentry and the clergy, one of whom translated the bishop’s address
into Cornish, for those who only understood that language. The
parish then renewed their obedience “in English, French, and
Cornish,” and the bishop absolved them from the penalties of their
disobedience. After which, says the record, “he gave the first
tonsure, or sign of the clerical character, to many who were natives
of that parish.”
The dress of clerics was legislated for by the Constitutions of
Cardinal Ottoboni, to which subsequent reference was constantly
made by the English bishops. Thus the same Bishop Grandisson, in
1342, issued a monition to his clergy on the subject, in which he
speaks of the sensible legislation of the cardinal. All clerics were
directed to follow this law as to their dress; it was not to be so long or
so short as to be an object of ridicule or remark. The cassock or
clerical coat in length was to be well above the ankles (ultra tibiarum
medium attingentes), and the hair was to be cut so that it could not
be parted and showed the ears plainly. In this way, by their corona
and tonsure, and by the exterior form of their dress, they might be
clearly known and distinguished from laymen. Cardinal Otho likewise
enforced the regulation about clerical dress, and declared that some
of the English clergy looked rather like soldiers than priests, an
opinion which the author of the gloss endorsed with the saying that it
is not only in their dress that some offend, but in their open-mouthed
laugh (risus dentium) and their general gait. The cardinal directs that
all clerics shall use their outer dress closed, and not open like a
cloak, and this in particular in churches, in meetings of the clergy,
and by all parish priests, always and everywhere in their parishes.
The status of the English clergy, generally from a legal standpoint, is
thus described in Pollock and Maitland’s History of English Law—
“Taken individually, every ordained clerk has as such a
peculiar legal status; he is subject to special rules of
ecclesiastical law and to special rules of temporal law....
Every layman, unless he were a Jew, was subject to
ecclesiastical law; it regulated many affairs of his life,
marriages, divorces, testaments, intestate succession; it
would try him and punish him for various offences, for
adultery, fornication, defamation; it would constrain him to
pay tithes and other similar dues; in the last resort it could
excommunicate him, and then the State would come to its
aid.... The ordained clerk was within many rules of
ecclesiastical law which did not affect the layman, and it
had a tighter hold over him, since it could suspend him
from office, deprive him of benefice, and degrade him from
his Orders.”
So much about the clergy generally and about the way in which they
entered the clerical state and mounted the various steps of the minor
and sacred Orders, until their reception of the sacred priesthood
brought them into the close relations which existed between the
clergyman and his flock. It is now time to turn to the consideration of
the various kinds of parochial clergy. And first (1) The Rector or
Parson was appointed to his benefice by the patron of the living, with
the approval of the bishop, by whose order he was also inducted or
instituted. Among the Harleian Charters in the British Museum is an
original deed of induction to a living, which sets out the ceremony
and prescribes the feast to follow. The benefice after his induction
became the rector’s freehold. In the language of Bracton, the
position of a rector differed legally from that of a vicar, inasmuch as
he could sue and be sued for the property or benefice he held, which
he did in the name of the Church. And to this “only rectors of
parochial churches are entitled, who have been instituted as parsons
by bishops and by ordinaries.” It was the duty of the archdeacon,
either personally or by his official, on the certificate of the bishop, to
put the rector into possession of his benefice. The fee to be paid,
according to the Constitution of Archbishop Stratford, was not to
exceed 40d. when the archdeacon came in person, “which sum is
sufficient for the expenses of four persons and their horses;” or two
shillings when the official came with two or three horses.
Previously to this, however, and before issuing his letters of
induction, the bishop was bound to satisfy himself that the priest
presented to fill the rectory had the necessary qualities of a good
pastor of souls. In the Constitution of Cardinal Otho on this point,
after recalling the saying of St. Gregory that “the guidance of souls is
the art of arts,” the cardinal goes on to say that “our Catholic art”
requires that there “should be one priest in one church,” and that he
should be a fitting teacher, “by his holy life, his learning, and his
teaching,” and upon this last quality Lyndwood notes that he should
be able to adapt his instructions to his audience. “Whilst to the wise
and learned he may speak of high and profound things, to the simple
and those of lesser mental capacity he should preach plainly about
few things, and those that are useful.” As to these qualifications the
bishop had to satisfy himself within two months after the
presentation, in order that the parish should not be kept vacant
longer than was necessary. Besides the above-named qualities, by
ordinary law of the English Church, any one presented as a rector
was bound to be a cleric; to be at least five and twenty years old; to
be commendable in his life and knowledge; and if not a priest, he
was at least to be fit to receive the priesthood within a year. As a rule
each rectory, or benefice for a rector, had but a single rector; but
there are instances where in one place, at Leverton, for example,
there were two parsons appointed to one church, with two houses,
with the tithes divided, and, of course, with the obligations distinct. In
a few cases, as at Darley Dale, Derbyshire, there were three or even
more rectors for the one parish.
In the first chapter it has been pointed out what were the tithes
payable to the rector of a parish, and that they frequently brought in
a considerable sum of money. On the other hand, there were many
and constant claims made upon the revenues of the parochial
church, and this not accidentally or casually, but by custom and
almost by law. The repair of the chancel and the upkeep of choir-
books and other things necessary for the services, which were not
found by the people, had to be met out of the “fourth part” of the
tithe, which was supposed to be devoted to such purposes. Another
constant claim was the relief of the poor, strangers, and wayfarers,
called “hospitality.” This, according to Lyndwood, was well
understood and practised in England, where the churches, to meet
those calls, were better endowed than they were abroad.
This claim, there can be no doubt, was fully accepted and carried
out. If a rector was for some reason or other non-resident, by law his
charity or “hospitality” had to be administered either by the curate
who served the church, or by a resident proctor appointed for the
purpose. In acknowledgment of this obligation, in the wills of the
period we find the clergy directing money to be paid by their
executors to the poor of the parishes which they had served. Thus
William Sheffield, Dean of York, who died in 1496, after arranging
that this distribution should be made in proportion to the time during
which he had held each benefice, adds: “For the goods of the
Church are the property of the poor and therefore the conscience is
heavily burdened in the spending of the goods of the Church. For
badly spending them Jesus have mercy.”
In the record of the visitation of churches in the diocese of Exeter, in
1440, there are many references to the “hospitality” kept by the
clergy. In one instance the rector is praised for having rebuilt his
chancel and added two good rooms to the rectory, one for himself
and one for the purposes of hospitality. In another there is a note
“that, from time immemorial to the day of the present rector, great
hospitality had been maintained, and the goods of the church had
been made the property of the sick and the poor,” but that this had
ceased. It seems to us, indeed, almost strange in these days to see
what was the teaching of the mediæval Church about the claims of
the poor, and to remember that this was not the doctrine of some
rhetorical and irresponsible preacher, but of such a man of law and
order as was the great Canonist Lyndwood. There can be no doubt
that the proceeds of ecclesiastical benefices were recognised in the
Constitutions of legates and archbishops as being in fact, as well as
in theory, the eleemosynæ, the spes pauperum—the alms and the
hope of the poor. Those ecclesiastics who consumed the revenues
of their cures on other than necessary and fitting purposes were
declared to be “defrauders of the rights of God’s poor,” and “thieves
of Christian alms intended for them;” whilst the English canonists
and legal professors, who glossed these provisions of the Church
law, gravely discussed the ways in which the poor of a parish could
vindicate their right—right, they call it—to a share in the
ecclesiastical revenues of their Church.
This “jus pauperum,” which is set forth in such a textbook of English
law as Lyndwood’s Provinciale, is naturally put forth more clearly and
forcibly in a work intended for popular instruction, such as Dives et
Pauper. “To them that have the benefices and goods of Holy
Church,” writes the author, “it belonged principally to give alms and
to have the cure of poor people.” To him who squanders the alms of
the altar on luxury and useless show the poor man may justly point
and say, “It is ours that you so spend in pomp and vanity!... That
thou keepest for thyself of the altar passing the honest needful living,
it is raveny, it is theft, it is sacrilege.” From the earliest days of
English Christianity the care of the helpless poor was regarded as an
obligation incumbent on all; and in 1342 Archbishop Stratford,
dealing with appropriations, or the assignment of ecclesiastical
revenue to the support of some religious house or college, ordered
that a portion of the tithe should always be set apart for the relief of
the poor, because, as Bishop Stubbs has pointed out, in England,
from the days of King Ethelred, “a third part of the tithe” which
belonged to the Church was the acknowledged birthright of the
poorer members of Christ’s flock. All the old diocesan registers of
English sees afford like instances of specific injunctions as to
bestowing part of the income of the benefice on the poor when
appropriations were granted.
Besides the regular revenues from parochial tithes, the rector had
other sources of income. Such, for instance, were the offerings made
for various services rendered to individuals, as baptisms, marriages,
churching of women, and funerals. An offering, also, for a special
Mass said or sung for a particular person or intention, was made to
the rector if he officiated, which by the Constitution of Lambeth he
could only do when the special service did not interfere with the
regular duties of his cure. In 1259-60 Bishop Bronescombe settled
the Mass fee at “one penny;” and in the churchwardens’ accounts of
Dover there is an entry, in 1536, of a payment “for ten Masses with
their offeryng pens, which was for Grace’s obit,” 4s. 4d. In law these
offerings were known as “memorial pence” (denarii memoriales), or
“earnest pence” (denarii perquisiti), because, on account of this
“retaining fee,” the priest engaged to offer Mass on a special day.
Various “oblations,” moreover, were apparently made to the parson
regularly. At Folkestone, for example, according to the Valor
Ecclesiasticus, an oblation of 5d. was made to the priest each
Sunday. Lyndwood lays down, as the law regarding regular oblations
“made on Sundays and Festivals, etc.,” that they belong to the priest
who had the cure of souls, “whose duty it was to pray for the sins of
the people.” Other priests, who might be attached to the church, had
no claims upon them except by agreement, as those who make the
offering are not their parishioners. Oblations of this kind were not
always voluntary, and they could be recovered for the clergyman by
the bishop, as, for instance, when they were made according to a
previous agreement, or promise, or in any special need of the
Church, as when the minister had not sufficient to support himself
properly; or when such offering was made according to established
custom.
Bishop Quevil, in the Synod of Exeter, states what were the long-
established customs in the English Church as to regular oblations.
Every adult parishioner above the age of fourteen years had to make
an offering four times a year, at Christmas and Easter, on the
patronal feast, and on the dedication feast of his parish church, or,
according to custom, on All Saints’ day. The bishop also desired that
the people of his diocese should be persuaded to bring Pentecost
offerings also to their parish churches, or at least to send them to
their parsons. To induce them so to do, special indulgences granted
to all benefactors of churches were to be published on each of the
three Sundays before the feast, and all such offerings were to be
taken to the place where the Whit-Sunday processions assemble.
Bishop Rigaud de Asserio, of Winchester, in 1321, makes the same
claim as to the regular four payments, but puts the age at eighteen,
and even then only claims the oblation as a right in the case of those
possessing some movables of their own. In some instances,
apparently, a portion of the offerings made for any special object was
by custom given to the priest for his own use, as a well-understood
tax. This, for example, was the case at St. Augustine’s church at
Hedon, in the East Riding of Yorkshire, where in the fifteenth century
“a third of the oblations to the Holy Cross was given to the Vicar.”
The rectory house, which was situated near to the church, would no
doubt in these days be considered very poor. A living-room and a
bedroom, with perhaps a room in which to exercise “hospitality,” with
some necessary offices and a kitchen, were all that, as far as can be
ascertained, constituted the dwelling-place of the parochial priest.
“Religious feelings,” says Dr. Rock, “sweetened the homeliness of
everyday life.” Over the parlour chimneypiece in the vicarage house
at Besthorpe, Norfolk, built by Sir Thomas Downyng, priest, are
these lines—

“All you that sitt by thys fire warmyng

Pray for the sowle of Sir Jhon Downyng.”

Probably, in some place attached to the rectory there would have

been some kind of enclosure, or priest’s garden. Occasionally,
mention is made of the existence of one, as, for instance, in the
visitation of churches of the archdeaconry of Norwich, in 1363,
where in one case the rector is said to have in his use a house and
garden “next to the rectory on the north side.” But this seems to have
been really parish property, as it is recorded that it “was sufficient to
find all the candles in the church.” Sometimes, no doubt, the priests’
houses would have been larger than they usually appear to have
been from the examples that survive or the records which are
available. Thus in the early fifteenth century the Bishop of Lincoln
granted a priest in his diocese permission to have a private oratory in
his rectory house, on condition that the oratory was fittingly adorned,
and that no other rite but Mass was celebrated in it. The Holy
Sacrifice might be offered there either by him or any other priest in
his presence.

RECTORY, WEST DEAN, SUSSEX

A curious example of a poor rector being received as a boarder into
a religious house is recorded in the register of Bishop Stapledon.
The parish of Charles, in Devonshire, was, in 1317, found to be
burdened with great debt, and its state evidently almost bankrupt.
With the consent of the bishop, the rector, Walter de Wolfe, called
upon the Prior of Pilton to help him out of his difficulties. It was
consequently agreed that the best way was for the rector to come
and live in the priory, and for the prior to farm the revenues of the
parish for five years, during which time he should serve it, and with
the savings pay off the debts of the rector.
The Vicar in many ways had the same work and responsibility as a
rector in regard to all parochial duties. He was legally, however, as
the word implies, one who took the place, or was the deputy of the
rector. Although a rector, actually in possession of a parish and
engaged in working it, could with permission and for adequate
reasons appoint a vicar as locum tenens, in England almost
universally by a “vicar” was meant the priest appointed to work a
parish in the case of an impropriated living. The nature of these
benefices has already been explained, and it is unnecessary here to
do more than recall the fact, that although the greater tithes went to
the monastery, college, or dignity to which the living had been
impropriated, the appointed vicar had his portion of tithe, the
oblations made to the church he served, and a pension settled by
the episcopal authority. These, at any rate, with the rest of the
income, afforded adequate support, with, in addition, sufficient to
enable him to do the repairs of the chancel, which, in the case of the
rectorial benefice, were incumbent on the parson.
This position of vicars only requires to be illustrated here very briefly.
In 1322, Bishop Rigaud de Asserio, of Winchester, settled the means
of support and the duties of the Vicar of Romsey, as between him
and the abbess and convent. Every day the vicar was to have from
the abbey two corrodies equal to what two nuns had. He was to take
the tithes on flax, on hemp, and on fifteen other products of the soil;
he was to have all funeral dues, and all legacies of dead people,
except those specifically left for the repair, etc., of chancel; he was
also to have certain lands to work for his own purposes, and to take
all oblations made in the church. On the other hand, besides his
ordinary duties, he was to pay all ecclesiastical dues and taxes; to
find all books and ornaments of the church, and to repair and
maintain them, as well also as to keep up and repair the entire
chancel of the church. To take another case: the monks of
Glastonbury, the impropriators of the parish of Doulting, in Somerset,
received £18 a year in the sixteenth century from their portion of the
impropriated tithe. Their vicar at the same time, with the duty of
looking after the annexed chapels, took £43.
The mode of institution for a vicar was very much that of a rector. He
was appointed by the impropriator of the living, acting as patron, and
he had to receive the assent of the bishop of the diocese. By a
statute of Cardinal Otho, confirming the practice of the English
Church, “no one could be appointed to a vicarage unless he were a
priest, or a deacon ready to be ordained a priest at the next Quatuor
temporum ordination.” On his appointment, he had to surrender
every other ecclesiastical benefice, and to take an oath that he
would reside continually in his vicarage, so that any absence beyond
the space of three weeks was unlawful.
The above legislation, of course, regarded only what were known as
perpetual vicars—those, namely, that were appointed to impropriated
livings with a tenure of office similar to that of rectors. The author of
the gloss on the Constitution of Otho notes that in England there
were really four kinds of vicars, or four classes of priests who were
accounted or known as vicars: (1) those who for a stipend took the
cures of rectors, or of perpetual vicars, temporarily, and at the will of
those who engaged them—these did not require the licence of the
bishop, unless under special diocesan law; (2) those sent by the
Pope, etc., to certain parts of the world were called vicars; (3) vicars
appointed by the bishops, and known as vicars-general; and (4) the
perpetual vicars of churches, instituted to the cure of souls by the
bishop, and by his licence installed—these were most properly called
vicars.
It is evident, from what is set out in the Valor Ecclesiasticus, that the
vicar proper, if he found it necessary, had to provide help in the way
of a curate. In this there was no distinction between a rector and a
vicar; and it is obvious that, where this was required, provision for it
had been made in the arrangement which had been come to in the
first instance between the impropriators and the bishop; or that
arrangement had subsequently been modified to enable the vicar to
meet the expense of extra help.
Curates.—Next in importance among the parochial clergy come the
assistant priests, known as Curates (curati), or those entrusted with
the cure of souls. They are called in canon law vice curati, or
capellani, who “administer the sacraments, not in their own name,
but in the name of another”—that is, in the name of the rector or
perpetual vicar. They were also, as previously pointed out, in
England occasionally called vicars, in the sense of taking the place
of the rector, etc.
Every curate by law was to receive from the rector or vicar who
employed him a fixed and sufficient salary, and all manner of
bargains as to payment or contracting out of obligations were
prohibited. Thus in the acts of the Synod of Ely, in 1364, Bishop
Simon Langham says, “We strictly prohibit any rector from making a
bargain with his (assistant) priest of this kind: that besides his fixed
stipend he may take offerings for anniversary Masses, etc., since
such a bargain is a clear indication that the fixed stipend is too
small”—and to make it up, these fees are looked for, and the parish
Masses may be neglected. In fact, by the Constitution of Archbishop
Courtney, in 1391, the curates were to receive none of the oblations,
fees, or offerings made in a parish, for services for which they
received a sufficient payment from those who employed them.
According to the same Constitution, the curate was admitted to his
office by the rector or vicar on any Sunday or Feast-day before the
parishioners at the parochial mass. After the Gospel of the Mass the
curate took an oath to respect the above conditions as to fees, etc.,
in the parish church or any chapel of ease in which he celebrated
Mass, and declared that he would neither stir up nor take part in any
quarrel or misunderstanding between the rector and his people; but
that, on the contrary, he would ever strive to preserve both peace
and love between them.
A curate thus instituted could only hear the confessions of
parishioners in the church or chapel where he said Mass according
to the leave and permission he had received; he was bound to be
present in the choir of the parish church, vested in a surplice, at
Matins, High Mass, Vespers, and other Divine service at the
appointed hours on Sundays and festivals, together with the other
ministers of the church, who were legally bound to assist at and
increase the numbers of those present at these services, and not to
remain in the nave or walk about in the cemetery, etc. On Sundays
and Feast-days, when a funeral Mass had to be said, the curate,
unless with leave of his rector, was not allowed to begin this Mass
until after the Gospel of the High Mass. In their private lives curates
were warned always to act as priests, and not to frequent taverns,
plays, or illicit spectacles. In dress and carriage they were ever to
uphold the credit of the ecclesiastical state, and not to bring scandal
upon their rectors or upon themselves.
Sometimes the need of extra assistance in the parish was felt by the
people, and very frequently they contributed the sum necessary for a
curate’s sufficient stipend. At times the people even appealed to the
bishop to force the parson to seek additional help. Thus in the
diocese of London, in the fourteenth century, there is recorded the
complaints of the inhabitants of a parish that their vicar would not
allow the services of a priest for whom they had paid, and that thus
“they were deprived of daily Mass, and other divine service, with the
sacraments and sacramentals.”
At times, indeed, the need of an assistant in a parish was so obvious
that the bishop felt bound to interfere in order to secure the
appointment. Thus Bishop Rigaud de Asserio, of Winchester, in
1323, appointed a curate to the Vicar of Twyford, “who was suffering
from an incurable disease” and unable to do the work of his parish.
In the same way, in 1313-14, Bishop Stapledon, of Exeter, appointed
a curate coadjutor to the Vicar of St. Neots, who was found to be
suffering from leprosy. The vicar was to have a certain stipend; was
to keep the best room in the parsonage, with the adjoining parts of
the house, except the hall. The door between this room and the
vicar’s chamber was to be built up, and the newly appointed curate
was to have the whole administration of the vicarage.
The Chantry Priest.—Next in order of importance among the priests
of a mediæval parish come the clergymen serving any chantry
attached to the church. These chantry chapels were, as is well
known, very numerous in pre-Reformation days, particularly in
towns; but it has hitherto not been sufficiently recognised that the
priests serving them in any way helped in parochial work. This is
simply because the purpose, for which those adjuncts to parish
churches existed, has not been understood. We have been taught to
believe that a “chantry” only meant a place (chapel or other locality)
where Masses were offered for the repose of the soul of the donor,
and other specified benefactors. No doubt there were such chantries
existing, but to imagine that they were even the rule is wholly to
mistake the purpose of such foundations. Speaking broadly, the
chantry priest was an assistant priest of the parish, or, as we should
nowadays say, curate of the parish, who was supported by the
foundation fund of the benefactors for that purpose, and indeed not
unfrequently even by the contributions of the inhabitants. For the
most part their raison d’être was to look after the poor of the parish,
to visit the sick, and to assist in the functions of the parish church.
Moreover, connected with these chantries were very commonly what
were called “obits.” These were not, as we have been asked to
believe, mere money payments to the priest for some anniversary
services; but they were for the most part money left quite as much
for annual alms to the poor, as for the celebration of any anniversary
offices. Let us take a few examples. In the city of Nottingham there
were two chantries connected with the parish church of St. Mary’s,
that of Our Lady, and that called Amyas Chantry. The former, we are
told, was founded “to maintain the services and to be an aid to the
vicar, and partly to succour the poor;” the latter for the priest to assist
in “God’s service,” and to pray for William Amyas, the founder. When
the commissioners in the first year of Edward VI. came to inquire into
the possessions of these chantries, they were asked by the people
of the place to note that in this parish there were “1400 houseling
people, and that the vicar there had no other priest to help but the
above two chantry priests.” It is not necessary to say that these
foundations were not spared on this account; for within two years the
property, upon which these two priests were supported, had been
sold to two speculators in suchlike parcels of land—John Howe and
John Broxholme.
Then, again, in the parish of St. Nicholas, at Nottingham, we find
from the returns of the Commissioners that the members of the
“Guild of the Virgin” contributed to the support of an extra priest. In
the parish there were “more than 200 houseling people,” and as the
parish living was very poor, there was no other priest to look after
them but this one, John Chester, who was paid by the Guild. The
King’s officials, however, did not hesitate on this account to
confiscate the property. It is useless to multiply instances of this kind,
some hundreds of which might be given in the county of Nottingham
alone. It may be interesting, however, to take one or two examples of
“obits” in this part of England. In the parish of South Wheatley there
were parish lands let out to farm, which produced 18d. a year; say
from £1 to £1 4s. of our money. Of this sum, 1s. was for the poor and
6d. for church lights; that is, two-thirds, or, say, 16s. of our money,
was for the relief of the distressed. So in the parish of Tuxford the
church “obit” lands produced £1 5s. 4d., or more than £16 a year; of
this 16s. 4d. was intended for the poor, and 9s. for the church
expenses. It is almost unnecessary to add that the Crown took the
whole sum; that intended for the poor, as well as that used for the
support of the ecclesiastical services. Neither can it be held, I fear,
that the robbery of the poor was accidental and unpremeditated. It
has been frequently asserted, of course, that although grave injury
was undoubtedly done to the poor and needy in this way, it was
altogether inevitable, since the money thus intended for them was so
inextricably bound up with property to which religious obligations
(now declared to be superstitious and illegal) were attached, that the
whole passed together into the royal exchequer. It would be well if it
could be shown that this spoliation of the sick and needy by the
Crown of England was accidental and unpremeditated; but there are
the hard facts which cannot be got over. The documents prove
unmistakably that the attention of the officials was drawn to the
claims of the poor, and that in every such case these claims were
disregarded, and a plain intimation was given that the Crown
deliberately intended to take even the pittance of the poor.
The Stipendiary priest differed in little from the curate, except that he
was engaged and paid for some special service and not for the
general purposes of a parish like a curate. They (i.e. the
stipendiaries) live, says Lyndwood, upon the stipend paid them for
their service, and have no fixed title or claim upon the church where
they offer up their Mass, except that they are paid for doing so for a
year or other fixed time. They had no claim whatever to fees or
oblations, and indeed, they were prohibited from receiving them.
Like all other priests dwelling within the bounds of a parish,
Stipendiaries were bound to attend in the choir of the parochial
church in surplice at Matins, High Mass, Vespers, and at all other
public Divine service. They were to be ready to read the lessons,
sing in the psalms and other chants, or take any other part,
according to the disposition of the rector or vicar. Some entries in the
Chantry certificates show that this duty was understood and fulfilled
to the end. At Costessy, in Norfolk, to take but one example, a
stipendiary priest was paid £6 by King’s College, Cambridge, to offer
Mass in a Free chapel, for the convenience of the people at a
distance, and the certificate adds, “and the said priest hath always
used to help the curate sing divine service upon holy day in the
parish church.”
Chaplain was a name given apparently to two sets of priests. The
priest employed, by a nobleman or other person of distinction, to say
Mass in a private chapel, and the priest who served a chapel of
ease, established for the convenience of the people in a much
extended parish, were both designated chaplains. Of the first, it is
only necessary to say, that so far at the parish was concerned, it
could claim the presence and help of even all private chaplains at
the ordinary services of the church.
The public chaplains, or those who served in chapels of ease, were
of greater importance in parochial work. The necessity for these
chapelries appears clearly in the “Chantry certificates,” under colour
of the act for suppressing which most of the chapels were destroyed.
Thus to take a few examples: The “Free chapel” of Tylne, in the
parish of Hayton, in Cumberland, had been founded by a priest
named Robert Poore. It had “always been accustomed to have all
manner of Sacraments ministered by the chaplain there to the
inhabitants of North and South Tylne. By reason that many times in
the year such influence of waters and snow doth abound so much
within the said hamlets, the inhabitants thereof can by no means
resort unto their parish church of Hayton, being two miles distant
from the said chapel, neither for christening, burying, or other rites.”
And again at South Leverton, in Nottinghamshire, there was a
“chapel of Cottam, a mile distant from the parish church,” at which
eighty people received the Sacraments. And, adds the “certificate,”
“many times the waters being up the people cannot come to their
parish church.”
Such chapels were built at the cost of the people of the parish, and
under careful restrictions and conditions laid down by the bishop of
the diocese. An excellent instance of this is to be found in the
register of Bishop Brantyngham, of Exeter, where it is recorded that
in 1372 he dedicated a chapel of ease at Dartmouth. Up to this time
Dartmouth was in the parish of Townstall, which was a vicarage, the
benefice being appropriated to the Premonstratensian Abbey of
Torre. The people living at Dartmouth, failing to obtain permission to
have a chapel, proceeded to build one without leave of the abbey or
of their vicar. After considerable difficulty, and upon the intervention
of the bishop, it was allowed that the people on the seashore, many
of them old and infirm and women, frequently were unable to get to
their parish church, especially in stormy winter weather. For this
reason the erection of the chapel with a baptistery and cemetery was
finally allowed, and they were permitted to find a chaplain to serve it,
who was to be licensed from year to year, and admitted by the Vicar
of Townstall. In the same way Bishop Stafford allowed the
establishment of a chapel at Kingsbridge, in Devon, in 1414. The
people who used the chapel had to maintain it, and even the
chancel, as well as all the necessary books and ornaments. They
were not charged, however, with the payment of their own chaplain,
or with the provision of bread and wine for the Blessed Eucharist,
which fell upon the rector of the parish of Churston. Burials of the
dead had up to this time taken place at the mother church; but this,
in view of circumstances adduced, the bishop thought unreasonable.
On the Feast of the Dedication of the parish church, however, every
adult was bound to attend there at the service and to make an
offering. Certain other dues also were ordered to be paid in
acknowledgment of the ties of the chapel to the mother church.
At one place, a chaplain was employed by the rector to say Mass for
the convenience of the people in a chapel attached to a house some
distance from the parish church. In another chapel of ease, a
parishioner left money for a foundation of three Masses weekly for
the people; and at Tatton, near Bristol, the churchwardens, in 1506,
were paying “Sir Richard York, chapel priest,” 27s. 4d. a quarter for
his services.
Besides the above-named priests, all more or less connected with
the working of a mediæval parish, it was ordered that, wherever the
means of the place would allow it, there should be always a deacon
and subdeacon to assist in the due celebration of the Divine service.
Chance references in accounts and other documents seem to show
that they were often so employed. In one set of churchwardens’
accounts there is a curious entry of receipt from a deacon, who pays
for damage done to certain vestments at the time of his ordination. In
another, a collection was made from the parishioners for the support
of the deacon; and in a book of directions for clerics, it is laid down
as part of the deacon’s office to bring the pyx containing the Blessed
Sacrament from behind the altar, where it had been hanging, and to
place it on the table of the altar for the priest to communicate the
faithful.