RESEARCH PROPOSAL

India’s Inadvertent Missile Launch

A critical analysis of Indian nuclear command and control

Submitted by: Syed Alyaan Kazmi

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In August 1999, India published its draft nuclear doctrine in which it declared they India shall
take extraordinary precautions for the safety and security of the nuclear weapons1.Since then,
India has been involved in several nuclear accidents and safety breaches of nuclear material.
Similarly, on 9 march 2022, India “accidently” fired a cruise missile into Pakistan. Official
Indian statement on the incident acknowledged that “during a routine maintenance, a technical
malfunction led to the accidental firing of a missile”.

Based on such facts, the research will focus on the gaps and loophole s in the Indian nuclear
command and control, its safety procedures, and protocols to authorize nuclear weapons use. The
study will give an insight to the pessimist debate on the emerging nuclear weapon states like,
India which argues that the military organizations will focus on developing offensive weapons
rather than focusing on developing safety systems2.

Theoretical Framework:

This study focuses to analyze the risks of nuclear accident emanating from the very structure of
Indian nuclear command and control through the lens of organizational theory. Nuclear historian
and political scientist Scott D. Sagan in his organizational theory of international relations
explain that theory sees the creation of any vital policy issue as being determined by no single
group: Government leaders can significantly disturb, but rarely control, the behavior of an
organization, which is determined mainly by routine operating procedures, with rarely more than
measured, incremental deviations3.

The theory also explains the contradiction in complex organizations which arise from the
pursuing of multi-goals in an organization. As a result, the leaders in the organization seeks
control over the other groups to achieve their personal goals. Consequently, Sagan predicts that
overtime, the military will intensify its lobby to gain control and independent authority to use
nuclear weapon4.
1
India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine." Arms Control Association | T. Accessed May 21, 2022.
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-07/indias-draft-nuclear-doctrine.
2
Scott D. Sagan, “the Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear
Weapons, “International security 18, no.4 (spring 1994): 83, accessed May 20, 2022,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539178
3
Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1995), 286
4
Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, James J. Wirtz, Planning the unthinkable (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press,2000), 37.
For example, according to the official nuclear draft of India, the authority to launch the nuclear
weapons strictly lies with the Prime minister5. In Indian nuclear command and control the prime
minister maintains the assertive control of nuclear weapons by controlling the military.
Therefore, there remains a basic always/Never dilemma as explained by peter fever regarding
positive and negative control of nuclear weapons that creates contradiction in the military and
political leadership goals6.

LITERATURE REVIEW:

The key readings for the research include:

Book: Nuclear command and control norms: A comparative study by Dr. Salma Shaheen. The
book provides an extensive comparative analysis of the evolution of Nuclear C2 of India and
other nuclear weapon states under a specific analytical framework7.

Research article:

“Command and control challenges in South Asia” by Clayton P. Bowen and Daniel Wolvén
provide an extensive debate on the general dilemmas, the operational requirement and the
academic debate initially revolving around the command and control in South Asia. The authors
discuss the development of nuclear command and control in south Asia from the perspectives of
optimist/pessimist nuclear proliferation debate8.

Book: “Confronting the bomb: Pakistani and Indian Scientists Speak Out edited by Pervez
Hoodbhoy”. This book critically views the issues ranging from the political to technical ones in
the nuclear command and control structure and taboos attached with the nuclear issues. A
chapter by Zia Mian elaborates the commanding and controlling of the nuclear weapons to
ensure safety protocols in South Asia to avoid inadvertent nuclear escalation between India and
Pakistan.9

5
India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine." Arms Control Association | T. Accessed May 21, 2022.
6
Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of nuclear weapons in the United States (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1992),
7
Salma Shaheen, Nuclear command and control norms: A comparative study (United Kingdom: Routledge, 2019),
80.
8
Clayton P. Bowen, Daniel Wolvén, “Command and control challenges in south Asia”, The non-proliferation Review
(spring/summer 1999) :25.
9
Pervaiz Hoodbhoy, Confronting the bomb: Pakistani and Indian Scientists Speak Out (Oxford: oxford university
press, 2012): 204.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS:

The research would attempt to answer following key questions:

1. What are the perils linked with fragile Indian Nuclear command and control system having the
potential to initiate accidental nuclear war?

2. What are the basic dilemmas associated with Indian Command and control?

3. How the civil-military relations contribute in the exacerbating the risks associated with Indian
Command and control?

4. What is the suitable theoretical framework to study the behavior of command and control in
the emerging nuclear weapon states?

PROBLEM STATEMENT:

The study recognizes the underlying problem that the incidents of inadvertent missile launch by
India depicts the fragility of its nuclear command and control. The counterforce temptations in
the Indian nuclear command and control can lead to India reviewing its operational nuclear
doctrine which will increase the likelihood of accidental nuclear war in South Asia.

OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH:

 To analyze the risks associated with the safety and security of Indian nuclear weapons
through a critical assessment of Indian Nuclear command and control.
 To underly key dilemmas that could lead India shifting to counter-force nuclear strategy.
 To fill the gaps in existing literature on the likelihood of accidental or inadvertent nuclear
war between India and Pakistan.
 To provide a theoretical framework for the study of nuclear command and control
systems in the emerging nuclear weapon states.

HYPOTHESIS:
The study hypothesizes that the technical and policy gaps in the Indian command and control
system compromise the safety and security of its nuclear weapons which can lead to accidental
nuclear escalation in South Asia.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY:

The research would employ the qualitative approach at the different levels of the study. The data
collection for the research involves both primary and secondary sources. Given the sensitivities
regarding the nuclear command and control systems, the primary data would not be accessible.
Therefore, the published data of the nuclear Command and controls of other nuclear weapon
states will be used to draw possible comparisons, if any.

RESEARCH OUTLINE:

The research will be conducted in seven chapters:

The chapter 1 “Introduction” will provide an overview of the research concisely.

Chapter 2 covers the “Theoretical framework” for the study of nuclear command and control
systems in the emerging nuclear weapon states. It will provide an insight into the organizational
theory used by the nuclear historian and political scientist Scott Sagan to explain the nature of
evolving control of nuclear weapons in the emerging nuclear weapon states.

Chapter 3 “Conceptualizing nuclear command and control” discusses the conceptual elements
and dynamics of the command-and-control system in nuclear weapon states. It would give an
insight into why and how states develop such complex structure for the regulation of the nuclear
weapons.

Chapter 4 “Nuclear command and control in India” would provide a detailed analysis of
Indian nuclear command and control structure and its evolutionary history. It will also highlight
the distinguishing elements and dynamics of Indian Nuclear command and control.

Chapter 5 “The Always/Never dilemma and civil-military relationship” will elaborate the
basics dilemma of the nuclear command and control systems and will be explained parallel to the
theoretical framework identified for the research. It will also debate on the issue of
assertive/delegative control of nuclear weapons in India in peacetime and crisis.
Chapter 6 “Dangers of accidental nuclear escalation in South Asia” would offer a
comprehensive on the prospects of accidental nuclear war between Pakistan and India, given the
historical mistrust, uncertainty, and ambiguity in their respective nuclear arsenals and policies.

Chapter 7 “Conclusion” will conclude the study and give some recommendations on the
adopting more comprehensive risk reduction measure to avoid nuclear accidents which can cause
crisis instability between the two nuclear weapon states.

Bibliography
Bowen, Clayton P., and Daniel Wolvén. "Command and control challenges in South Asia." The
Nonproliferation Review 6, no. 3 (1999), 25-35. doi:10.1080/10736709908436762.

Feaver, Peter. Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1992.

Hoodbhoy, Pervez. Confronting the Bomb: Pakistani and Indian Scientists Speak Out. Oxford: Oxford
university press, 2012.

India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine." Arms Control Association | . Accessed May 21, 2022.
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999-07/indias-draft-nuclear-doctrine.

Lavoy, Peter R., Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz. Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000

Sagan, Scott D. "The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of
Nuclear Weapons." International Security 18, no. 4 (1994), 66-107. Accessed May/June 20, 2022.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539178.
Sagan, Scott D. The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1995.

Shaheen, Salma. Nuclear Command and Control Norms: A Comparative Study. United Kingdom:
Routledge, 2020.