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MIL-STD-1629A
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MIL-STD-1629A
24 NOVEMBER 1980
SUPERSEDING
MIL-STD-1629 (SHIPS)
1 NOVEMBER 1974
MII.-STD-2O7O (AS)
12 JUNE 1977
MILITARY STANDARD
..
MI L,-STD-16?9A
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Washington, DC 20301 —1
MIL-STD-1629A
ii
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MT7,-STW 1629A
FOREWORD
I
The~failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) is an essential
function in design,from concept through development. To be effective,
the FMEcA must be iterative to correspond Wit}l ~he nature of the design
process itself. The extent of effort and sophistication of approach
used in the F~CA will be dependent upon the nature and requirements of
the individual program. This makes it necessary to tailor the requirements
for an FMECA to each individual program. Tailoring requires that,
regardless of the degree of sophistication, the FMECA must contribute
meaningfully to program decision. A properly performed F’MECA is invaluable
to those who are responsible for making program decisions regarding the
feasibility and adequacy of a design approach.
The usefulness of the FMECA as a design tool and in the decision making
process is dependent upon the effectiveness with which problem information
is communicated for early design attention. Probably the greatest
criticism of the ~~A has been its limited use in improving designs.
The chief causes for this have been untimeliness and the isolated performance
of the F~CA without adequate inputs tO the design process. Timeliness
is perhaps the most important factor in differentiating between effective
and ineffective implementation of the FITECA. While the objective of an
FMECA is to identify all modes of failul-e ~ithin a system design, its
first purpose is the early identification of all catastrophic and critical
failure possibilities so they can be eliminated or minimized through
design correction at tt~eearliest possible time. Therefore, the FMECA
should be initiated as soon as preliminary design information is available
at the higher system levels and extended to the lower levels as more
information becomes available on the items in question.
a.
iii
— .. .——.
--.—.—-
——--—
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}frT,-sTD-1629A
CONTENTS
paragraph Page
1. SCOPE. . . . . . . . . . ● . ● . ● ● . ● ● ● ● . ● . 1
1.1 Scope. . . . . . . . ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ✘ ● ● e ● ● ● ● ● 1
1.2 Application . . . . . w 9 ● ● 9 ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 1
1.3 Numbering system . . . . ✎ ● . ✎ ✎ 6 ✎ ● . ● ✎ ● ✎ ● 1
1.4 Revisions . . . . . . . . ✎ ✎ . ✎ ✎ . ✎ b . ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ 1
1.4.1 Standard . . . . . . ● ● ● ● ● ● s ● ● 8 ● ✎ ✎ ● ✎ ● 1
1.4.2” Tasks. . . . . . . . ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 1
1.5 Method of reference . ● ● ● b ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ✎ b ● ● ● 1
.
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS . . ✎ . . ✎ . . ✎ . . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎
3. DEFINITIONS . . . . . ● ● ✎ . . ● . ● ✎ . ● ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 3
3.1 Terms. . . . . . . . . ● ✎ . . ✎ . . ● . . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 3
3.1.1 Contractor . . . . . . . ● ● . ● . . ✎ . ● ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 3
3.1.2 Corrective action . . ● . ✎ . . ✎ ● ● ● ● ● ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 3
3. 1.3 Compensating provision . ✎ . . ✎ ● . ✎ , * ✎ . ✎ ● ✎ 3
3.1.4 criticality . . . . . . . ✎ . . ✎ . . ✎ . ● ✎ . ✎ ● ✎ 3
3.1.5 Criticality analysis (CA) ✎ . . ✎ ● ● ✎ . . ✎ . ● ✎ ✎ 3
2.1.6 Sck-crity . . . . . . . . ✎ . . ✎ ● ● ✎ . ● ✎ . ✎ ● ● 3
3.1.7 Damage effects . . . . . ✎ . . ✎ . . ● . . ✎ . ✎ ● ✎ 3
3.1.7.1 Primary damage effects . ✎ . . ✎ ● ● ✎ ● . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 3
3.1. 7.2 Secondary damage effects ✎ . . ✎ . . ● . . ✎ . ✎ ● ✎ 3
3.1.8 Damage mode . . . . . . . ✎ . . ✎ . . ✎ . . ✎ . ✎ ● ✎ 3
3. 1.9 Damage mode and effects analysis (DMEA) . . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 4
3.1.10 Detection mechanism . . . . . . . ● ✎ ✎ . . ✎ . ✎ ● ✎ 4
3.1.11 Environments . . . . . . . . . . ✎ ✎ ✎ . . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 4
3.1.12 Failure cause . . . . . . . . . . ✎ ✎ ✎ . . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 4
3.1.13 Failure effect . . . . . . . . . ✎✌✎ . . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 4
3.1. 13.1 Local effect . . . . . . . . . . ✎ ✎ ✎ ● . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 4
3.1.13.2 Next higher level effect . . . . ● ☛☛ ● ● ● ● ✎ ● ✎ 4
3.1.13.3 End effect . . . . . . . . . . . ● ☛✎ . . ✎ ● ● ✎ ✎ 4
3.1.14 Failure mode . . . . . . . . . . ✎ ✎ ✎ . . ● ● ✎ ✎ ● 4
3.1.15 Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) ● ● ● ✎ ✎ ● 4
3.1.16 FMECA-Maintainability information . ..0 . ● . ✎ ✎ ✎ 4
3.1.17 Indenture level . . . . . . . . ● . . . . . ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 4
3. 1.17.1 Initial indcllturc lt!vcl . . ● ● ● ..,* ● ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 5
3.1. 17.2 Other indenture levels ● ● ✎ ✎ ● ..0. ● ● ● ✎ ✎ ✎ 5
3.1.18 Interfaces . . . . . . ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ● . . . . ● ✎ . ✎ ✎ ✎ 5
3.1.19 Single failure point . ● ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ..0. . ✎ ● ✎ ✎ ✎ 5
3.1.20 Threat mechanism . . . ● ✎ ✎ ✎ ● . . . . ● ✎ . ✎ ✎ ● 5
3.1.21 ~lnde~e~tal>lefai]llre . ✎ ✎ ✎ ✎ ✌ . . . . . ● . ● ✎ ✎ 5
----
MIL-STD-16Z9A
CONTENTS (Continued)
Paragraph Page
5. DETAIL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1 Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Tasks
101 FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . ● 101-1
102 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS .*..* . . . . . 102-1
103 FMECA-MAINTAINABILITY iN;OiMiT;Oi . . . . . . . . . . 103-1
104 DAMAGE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS 104-1
105 FAILURE MODE, EFFECTS, AND CRITICA~I&”tiA;Y;I; ;&: 105-1
FIGURES
Figure
Task 101
Task 102
v
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MIL-STD-1629A
CONTENTS (Continued)
-
Figure Page
TasLJ03
Task 104
APPENDIX
Paragraph
10. GENERAL . . . . . . . . . . .
● = = - “
● ● ● ● ● ● ‘-1
10.1 Scope .*.** **** **** ● ●
A-1
10.2 Tailoring=r;q;i;~e;t~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
10.3 Duplication of effort . . . . . . . . s ● “ ● ● ● ● A-i
vi
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MI1.-STD-1629A
1. SCOPE
J;4 Revisions,
b, Task nurriber(s).
2. REFERENCED DOCUMENTS
*
2.1 Issues of documents. The following documents of the
issue in effect—on the date cf invitation for bid or request for proposal,
are referenced in this standard for il]form;+tjnrl
and ~uict,ance.
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MXL-STD-1629A
--
SPECIFICATIONS
Military
STANDAR.DS
Militarv .
HANDBOOKS
Militarv
.
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MTL-STD-1 629A
3. DEFINITIONS
✎ ✎✎ ✍✍✍✍✍ ●
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MIL-STD-1629A
3.1.9 Damage mode and effects ana Qsis (DMEA). The analysis of
a system or equipment conducted to dete~ine Me extent of damage sustained
from given levels of hostile weapon damage mechanf~s and tile effects of
such damage modes on the continued controlled operation and mission
completion capabilities of the system or equipment.
A. A
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!’11
L-!;
’J’l)-
1629A
4. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
M17,-STW1629A
(i
.
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MT1.-ST~-l629A
.
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MIL-S’I’D-1629A
—
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MTT,-sTn-1629A
9
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MIL-STD-1629A
4.5 FMECA Report. The results of the FMEA and other related
analyses shall be documented in a report that identifies the level of
analysis, summarizes the results, documents the data sources and techniques
used in performing the analysis, and includes the system definition
narrative, resultant analysis data, and worksheets. The worksheets
shall be organized to first display the highest indenture level of
analysis and then proceed down through decreasing indenture levels of
the system. The ground rules, analysis assumptions, and block diagrams
shall be included, as applicable, for each indenture level analyzed.
Interim reports shall be available at each design review to provide
comparisons of alternative designs and to highlight the Category I and
Category II failure modes, the potential single failure points, and the
proposed design corrections. The final report shall reflect the final
design and provide identification of the Category I and Category II
failure modes and the single failure points which could not be eliminated
from che design.
—
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?f?l.-STD-l629A
<
d . DETAIL REQUIRE~.NTS
5.1 Tasks. The detail tasks for performing an FMEA and other
—-.
related analyses follow. The tasks for the related analyses supplement
and are dependent upon performing an FMEA in accordance with Task 101.
Review Activities:
Navy - SH, 0S
Army - EA, AR
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MTl,-STl)-lii?(l
A
TASK 101
SPECIFI CATIONS
Militarv
STANDARDS
Military
‘-)1*
,,<.”4
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MT1,-STD-1629A
TASK 101
24 November 1980
101-2
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MIL-STD-1629A
TASK 10I
2~1 Yevcm!>l?r!9(90
101-3
—————
——- -E _x==- -.-.. .. .-.—e.
S=-.-——=.-G.=.-—_.—-
=—--—.—-.
T—-. ——— ——————
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MI J,-STD-16?9A
functional block diagram will provide a functional flow sequence for the
system and each indenture level of analysis and present hardware indenture .-
●
and can be used for both hardware and functional method FMEA’s. MIL-M-
24100 procedures and techniques for dcvcl.opins major functiol~ dia~rnms
may be used for guidance in developing functional block diagrams.
.—-——
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NTl,-STD-162!lA
a. Premature operation.
c* Intermittent operation.
5.6.1 Local
—— -— effects. Local effects concentrate specifically on
the impact an assumed failure mode has on the operation and function of
the item in the indenture level under consideration. The consequences
of each postulated failure affecting the item shall be described alnn~
with any second-order effects which result. T!ICIpurpose of definin}-,
lc)CaI effects is to provide a basis for evaluating compensatin~ prn’risi~)ns
and for recommending corrective action:;. It is j)ossible for ~l]e “lf)cal”
effect to be the failure mode its~’lf.
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MI L-STD-1629A
5.6.3 End effects. End effects evaluate and define the total
effect an assumed failure has on the operation, function, or status of
the uppermost system. The end effect described may be the result of a
double failure. For example, failure of a safety device may result in a
catastrophic end effect only in the event that both the prime function
goes beyond limit for which the safety device is set and the safety
device falls. Those end effects resultil~g from a double failure shall
be indicated on the FMRA worksheets.
... , —— . .
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MIL-STD-1629A
TASK !01
24 November 1980
101-7
Ml 1,-STD-1079A
TASK 101
24 November 191?0
1, .1.-,:
. ,.,
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MIL-S’I’1)-1629A
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24 November 1980
101-10
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?IIL-STD-1629A
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101-11
24 Nov(’mh(’r1980
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MI L-STD- 1629A
TASK 102
CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
llANDBOOKS
Militarv
-. -———....= ——
—-— ———=-.—.-—.=-_>_—_-—_—_—— —.
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MT T,-STD-I(I?9A
TASK 102
24 November 1980
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MII.-ST1)-
162(]A
a. Identification number
b. Item/Functional identification
c. Function
f. Severity classification
3.2.1.3 Failure mode ratio (n). The fraction of the part failure
rate (~ ) related to the particular failure mode under consideration
shall b: evaluated by the analyst and recorded. The failure mode ratio
is the probability expressed as a decimal fraction that the part or item
will fail in the identified mode. If all poten:ial failure modes of a
particular part or item are listed, th~-”SIITII~Jf !’IEI
{Jv’111.I(Js
for t-l::)t
part or item will equal une. Individual f;lilurc m~~de m~]ltipliers mav bc
derived from fai]urc rate source data or from test and operational data.
If failure mode data are not available, the m v~lues shall represent the
anal~~st’s judgernent based upon all analvsis of tl~e item’s functions.
l-ASK 1(.)2
9,’
. ‘,:( ‘ 1“ b
“.”(:’;
:;:)C’ 1f]
,.n
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MTl,-STD-lf)2(l
A
3.2.1.4 Part failure rate (an). The part failure rate (~p) from -
the appropriate reliability prediction or as (calculated using the procedure
described in MIL-HDBK-217, shall be listed. Where appropriate, application
factors (n ), environmental factors (TE), and other n-factors as may be -
required st all be applied to the base failure rates (~b) obtained from ,,
handbooks or other reference material to adjust for differences in
operating stresses. Values of n-factors utilized in computing ~p shall
be listed.
where:
J
Cr = ];(f?dpt)n n = 1,2, ’3,...j
n–l
—
TASK J02
24 November 1980
— — — .
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MIL-STD-1629A
where:
MI
L-STD-162!IA
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MI I.-sTI)-I629A
INCREASING
CRITICALITY
HIGH) -
.
d
> t-
/’
/
/
/
/
/
a
v
.
*- —
(LOW)
—
III II I
SEVERITY CLASSIFICATION
(hJcREAs ING LEVEL OF SEVERITY ~)
TASK 102
24 November 1980
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MIL-STD-1629A
TASK 103
FMECA-MAKNTH??IIBILITY INFORMATION
STANDARDS
Military
a. Identification number
b. Item/functional identification
c. Function
f. Severity classificaLioIl
TASK 103
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MIL-STD-1629A
—
TASK 103
24 November 1980
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MI L-STD-1629A
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24 November 1980’
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TASK 104
~,: I’lani’i’in&.
I’larming Llie WIIL4 i~lcludeb the contLacLoK”is
procedures for assuring the timeliness of the analysis and its utilization
in the vulnerability assessments of the weapon system.
2.2 Developed
—— weapon s~stems. When specified, a DMEA is
conducted to identify all subsystems and components in a developed
(existing) weapon system to the 1.CVC1 defined by the procuring agency.
The DMEA is used to provide data related LO L]leimpact of Engineering
Change Proposais (ECPs) and retrofit propr~ms on rota] w[’apon ~ystc>m
survivab~lity. Threats should be periodi~:ll~~;●
ssessed to duterninfi j[”
the weapon system is still capable of operaLing effectively in a hostile
environment,
MIL-STD-1629A
a. Identification number
b. Item/functional identification
c. Function
f, Severity classification
—
TASK 104
24 November 1980
1(?4-?
.
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MTL-STD- 1629A
a. Penetration
b. Severed
c. Shattered, cracked
d. Jammed
e. Deformed
.
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M1l,-STi)-
1629A
4.2.3 End effects. End effects evaluate and define the total
effect an assumed damage m~de has on the operation, function, or status
of the uppermost system. The effect of each damage mode upon the essential
function(s) affecting weapon system operating capability and mission
completion capability shall be determined. The end effect described may
be the result of a double failure. For example, failure of a safety
device may result in a catastrophic end effect only in the event that
both the prime function goes beyond limit for which the safety device iS
set and the safety device falls. Those end effects resulting from a
double failure shall be indicated on the DMEA worksheets.
a. EQW Those
features of the design that relate to
the identified
damage mode that minimize the vulnerability
with respect to the specified threat mechanisms;
i.e., redundancy, separation of components, lines,
and structure, elimination of fire paths, integral
armor, etc.
c. History.
—.——.— - Identification of previous testing and
analysis rela~lng to this particular case which will
be used to support the validity.
TASK 104
24 I?ovvmber 198fl
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MIbST&1629A
TASK 105
STANDARDS
Military
HANDBOOKS
Military
105-1
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MI I,-ST1)-
1629A
TASK 105
24 November 1980
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MI1,-SI1)-1629A
3*7 Failure rate data sources. The failure rate data source
shall be the same as that used for the other reliability and maintainability
analyses required by the contract. NIL-HDEK-217 shall be tl~e primary
source of failure rate data for electronic parts. Failure rate data for
parts not covered by MIL-HDBK-217 shall be selected from alternative
data sources. The failure rate data sources shall be identifi~d in the
FMECA plan and shall be approved by the procuring activity prior- to USe.
4. .-.,
Ordering data, The followin g details s}lall -
in the appropriate contractual documents:
i(’~i w}~(~t~
ion with this
.
—.
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MIL-STD-1629A
APPENDIX A
10. GENERAL
40 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
A-1
.-A 1
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M?L-sT~-1629A
MIL-STD-1629A
44-‘3
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M1l.-STD-l629A
50.5 DMEA (task 104). The DMEA provides essential inputs for
the vulnerability assessment of a weapon system to aid in the identification
of deficiencies and the evaluation of designs for enhancing survivability.
Since the DMEA utilizes the failure mode information from the FMEA, it
should not be imposed without imposition of the FMEA. The DMEA, like
the initial FMEA, should be done early in the conceptual phase to provide
data related to the capability of the conceptual weapon system design LO
survive the effects of the specified hostile Lllreats. Development of
this data before weapon system design configuration is finalized will
provide significant survivability benefits with minimal impact on cost
and schedule.
(1)
j
cr=~ (Cm)n or
n=]
j
6
cr=z- fl~lpt X i(l )n R = 1,2,3, ...j (2)
.-
n= 1
. .
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MIL-STD-1629A
Where:
For example, the calculations for C,nand ~r for a given mission ph<ase
under severity classification Ca~e~Ory 11 is as follows:
Solve for 1P using typical part failure rate model from MIL-HDBK-217.
MII,-STD-16:?9A
(X3 = 0.5 for failure mode under severity classification Category IV.
Let /3= 0.5 and t = 1.0 hour for the mission phase.
For a2: Cm = 6(+ x 106) = (0.5 X 0.2) (7.2 X 10-6) (1) x 106 A
cm = 0.72
Then:
j 2
or Cr = Z (Balpt x 106) = E (Lu’jt x 106)
n
n=l n=l
‘,..t,
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INSIRUCII ONS: In ● continuing effort to nmke w c~*~tion d-umente &t*r, *e DoD p~ri~ this form for u in
submitting comxnsnu end suggestioru Allu~n ofmjlitary
improwementw for etandardizetioa
documenwsre&titadto-e
~~0~. ~ formUMY ~ de~ched.
fo~ed-g *@ ~- in~i-~t ~~ ~Ong tie~~ -e f~ NOT =flL@. -d
nasikd. In b~k f4 be + Ss=ific - ~ble •~~t -icu~ probl- -u su* m wor~q whti rwJuhd interpre~tion, wes
@o rigid, mstrictiw, JOOM, embiguow or -c
inco=ptiible, ~d gi- Propoeed wording
changeswtdchwould elleviate the
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11111
Commanding Officer NO POSTAGE
Naval Air Engineering Center N6cEs64nv
IF MAILED
Systems Engineering Standardization Department
IN THE
(SESD) , Code 93 Ufu ITEO STATES
Lakehurst . NJ 08733 h 4
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I BUSINESS Rf=-”” MAIL [
I FIRST CLASS PERMIT NO 12503 wASHINGTON O C f
Commanding Officer
Naval Air Engineering Center
Systems Engineering Standardization Department
(SESD) . Code 93
Lakehurst, NJ 08733
ATTN : TJ?14(9322)
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