scholar warrior

Book Reviews

Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons Conflict Redux

Edited by Gurmeet Kanwal & Monika Chansoria
KW Publishers Pvt Ltd, 2013, 232 pages, Rs. 740

Pakistan’s nuclear programme is India-centric with a view to marginalise India’s

conventional edge. With a first use nuclear weapon policy, Pakistan would
seek to lower the threshold for usage of these munitions to coerce India not
to respond militarily when subjected to an asymmetric jihadi strike. Pakistan
has undertaken dastardly terrorist attacks with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
trained militants against civilian targets in India and has not been confronted
with a military response from India. This has led to a strategic brinkmanship.
Pakistan keeps playing the nuclear card with dexterity, compelling India to
constantly find an answer to the nuclear dilemma. The development of the
60-km Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW) Nasr has added a new dimension. This
book, edited by Gurmeet Kanwal and Monika Chansoria has many renowned
contributors, who address many issues regarding this weapon. Apart from the
editors, there are contributions by Bharat Karnad, Vijay Shankar Shankar, Kapil
Kak, Arun Sahgal, Sasikumar, Nagappa, Shalini Chawla, Rajesh Rajagopalan and
Manpreet Sethi.
The introductory chapter clearly states that the nuclear weapons of Pakistan
are for deterrence, and providing parity with India in the politico-strategic realm.
The actual possibility of use of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is zero.
The book quotes senior Pakistani officers who have categorically stated that the
Indian response to Pakistan’s first use would be a total holocaust. The chapter

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points out that in late 2010, with 90 TNWs, it was difficult for Pakistan to stop an
Indian Armoured Division moving dispersed on a 30 km frontage. There would
be a minimum inescapable requirement of 436 TNWs to stop an armoured
division. The reported accelerated production of plutonium from three military
dedicated reactors in Khushab and a fourth under construction, would result
in an inventory of 200 warheads by 2020. To further compound the existing
problem, the issue of miniaturising the warhead to fit into the Nasr missile with
a 30 cm diameter is a complex engineering problem. The chapter also speaks of
grabbing a city close to the border which would present nuclear targets to the
Pakistan Strategic Plans Division to employ nuclear weapons.
The book lucidly brings out the help provided by China in developing nuclear
weapons and delivery systems for Pakistan. This was done despite China signing
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1982. China supplied inputs
regarding enriched uranium and a 25 kiloton bomb in 1983, and the production
facility for the M-11 missiles. Further, China sold 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan
to be used in high speed centrifuges. With regard to TNW, the book correctly
establishes that circumstantial evidence points to covert assistance given by
China to Pakistan.
The paper on Pakistani doctrinal thinking with regard to nuclear weapons,
interestingly states that if the need arises, Pakistan could be irrational in using
nuclear weapons, even involving the destruction of its own people if pushed
beyond a limit. Further, the paper describes the implications of thresholds
pertaining to preemptive response, early response, delayed response and
accumulated response. Pakistan is likely to resort to the use of TNWs as
perceived low cost strategic weapons under conditions where it perceives a
major operational defeat such as unacceptable loss of territory threatening high
value targets, serious degradation of military potential and attacks on critical
infrastructure important for its war-waging effort. The control of TNWs remains
unstated but given their limited range, they would have to be placed under the
theatre commanders for effective employment. The response by India as given in
the paper is a graduated retaliation likely to cause extensive damage to Pakistan.
Further, in the Pakistani attempts to convey threshold ambiguity, the nuclear trip
wires are not seen as uniform. These appear to be much shorter and tighter in
the Punjabi heartland, relatively more stretched in Sindh and loose in Pakistan
Occupied Kashmir (POK). Thus, the Pakistani response would be different,
depending on the sector addressed. TNWs are part of the Pakistani nuclear
doctrine and India has to, therefore, calibrate its response to this aspect.

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The paper on command and control in the context of TNWs highlights the
set-up needed to handle this threat from Pakistan. The draft Indian Nuclear
Doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) of the National
Security Council has stated that the authority to release nuclear weapons for
use rests with the Prime Minister of India. On January 04, 2003, the Cabinet
Committee on Security (CCS) adopted and made public key elements of India’s
nuclear doctrine as also the command and control structure. The Prime Minister
and the CCS now comprise India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). In the
NCA, the Political Council headed by the Prime Minister is the sole authority for
ordering a nuclear strike. The Political Council is advised by an Executive Council
headed by the National Security Adviser (NSA). The Executive Council executes
decisions through the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the
Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) Strategic Forces Command. As regards Pakistan,
the Pakistan Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) exercises control over the nuclear
weapons. They have a Strategic Plans Division (SPD) and each of the Services has
a Strategic Forces Command (SFC). Though the nuclear weapons are stored by
the SPD, in the case of TNWs, these would have to be with the SFC of the Army,
thereby, leading to fully mated nuclear weapons being stored with the theatre
commanders, causing decentralised deployment of this critical asset. This could
lead to unauthorised or accidental launches for which India must be prepared.
The details of the imageries obtained indicate that Nasr is a 300 mm missile
mounted on a Chinese A 100 Transport Erector Launcher (TEL).The Pakistani
TNWs have been developed to pour cold water on India’s cold start doctrine and
as, per the book, India should respond with its second strike capability. The book
could have brought out counter-measures like the Iron Dome to the Nasr which
degrades its capability, if successfully intercepted.
The book is extremely well researched and compiled. It is a must read for
officials in the Ministries of Defence and External Affairs, strategic analysts and
all serving and retired officers of the armed forces.

Review by Maj Gen PK Chakravorty. The reviewer was an adviser to BrahMos Aerospace.

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Warring Navies-India and Pakistan

Commodore Ranjit B Rai (Retd) and Joseph P Chacko
India Publications Company, 2014, 264 pages, Rs 399

God and a Soldier people adore

In time of War, not before;
And when war is over and all things are righted
God is neglected and an old Soldier slighted.

Crippling of the NRP Afonso de Albuquerque on December 18, 1961, by the INS
Betwa and Beas, the raid on Dwarka (site of the Somnath temple) on September
07, 1965, by the Pakistani task force, the reasons for the Navy’s ‘Sweet Fanny
Adams’ in 1962 and 1965, the mystery around the sinking of the PNS Ghazi in
December 1971, the immense unrecognised contribution of the Mukti Bahini at
sea, the missile boat attacks on Karachi, the exploits of the INS Vikrant in the Bay
of Bengal, the loss of the INS Khukri on December 09, 1971, the story of forgotten
and unsung heroes Roy Chou and Aku Roy, and many such other indelible
watermarks left by brave sailors on the operational history of the Indian Navy
have found their way in the book titled Warring Navies – India and Pakistan. The
book not only attempts to speak for the naval fraternity of India and Pakistan
but goes beyond to include fascinating and comprehensive details of Operation
Lal Dora in Mauritius (1983), Operation Flowers are Blooming in Seychelles
(1987), Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka, Operation Cactus in Maldives (1988)and
Operation Talwar during Kargil.
The Warring Navies is indeed a welcome addition to the limited body of
literature which exists on operations of the Indian Navy. This book is the second
one on the subject by Commodore Ranjit Rai and is co-authored with Joseph P
Chacko. The Warring Navies provides a ringside view of operations conducted by
the Indian Navy post-independence. The authors provide a lucid commentary of
all major military operations, juxtaposed with contemporary geo-politics, which
makes a very interesting and absorbing read. The authors have also made an
endeavour to present the Pakistani view of many important incidents that have
shaped the history of naval operations in the subcontinent. The book includes
an introduction by General Ved Malik, a maritime perspective by Admiral Vishnu
Bhagwat and a regional perspective by Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar.

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Commodore Ranjit Bhawani Rai has commanded four naval warships, and
the Naval Academy, served twice as the Director of Operations and later as
Director Intelligence, and has enriched the book with his vast personal experience
and comprehensive research to provide an all-inclusive account of the naval
operations. Commodore Ranjit has also travelled extensively and interacted with
veterans to include Petty Officer Chaman Singh, MVC, in Rewari, Lt Cdr J K Roy
Choudhury, VrC, settled in Lebong, Darjeeling, Commander V P Kapil, VrC in
Delhi, Major Chandrakant, VrC, 1 Guards (4 Rajput) in Delhi and Sajid Zahir from
Dacca, as well as Lieutenant General JFR Jacob. He has also travelled to Pakistan
in 2010 to meet Pakistani naval officers and historians and even met the wives
of some officers who took part in the 1965 and 1971 Wars and has referred to the
books by the Pakistan Book Club. Joseph is a defence journalist, entrepreneur
and the publisher of Frontier India, a portal publishing news and current affairs.
Apart from the details of naval operations and their geo-political context, one
continuous thread that runs along most of the chapters is regarding the dire need
of having a Chief of Defence Staff. It emerges unambiguously that operations in
the past, right from Operation Vijay in 1961, have had a tri-Service participation,
and, hence, involved contentious issues during the planning to include resource
allocation, prioritisation of operational tasks and, ultimately, their execution.
The Prime Minister and the Raksha Mantri, therefore, need to have a single point
of advice and this is possible only if there is a Chief of Defence Staff. The authors
cite many an occasion from the past, purely from the operational perspective, to
emphasise the necessity of the institution.
The book makes an interesting read, particularly in the light of the fact that it
comes from the pen of a man who has seen most of it himself. It is recommended
to be part of all libraries in premier military establishments of the country and
needs to be read by the coming generations, lest they forget the glorious acts, the
valour and the sacrifices of the brave men in whites.

Review by Col Sanjay Sethi. The reviewer is a Senior Fellow, CLAWS.

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Fighting to The End:

Pakistan Army’s Way of War
C Christine Fair
Oxford University Press, 2014, 347 pages, Rs 750

Fighting to the End – The Pakistan Army’s Way of War, Dr. C Christine Fair’s
book divided over eleven chapters, is an informative and exhaustive account,
based on painstaking research pursued by her since the early 1990s. The work
draws its data and inferences from the Pakistani military professional writings
spanning almost six (plus) decades. The author admits that the military writing
she has used as base material does not constitute military doctrine. The Pakistani
military (unlike modern Western militaries or, for that matter, India’s) does not
publish its official doctrine. What these writings do show up, believes Fair, is
the Pakistan military’s “strategic culture”. The book primarily delves deep into
“ideological” and “philosophical” dimensions of the Pakistan Army. The reason
for the basis of her Army-centric research, is primarily owing to its all important
role in nationhood. As argued by author; unlike a conventional scenario wherein,
a country has an Army, in Pakistan the Army has a country.
As per the author, the Pakistan Army’s basic discourse has been India-centric,
wherein India is seen as an aggressor, out to destroy Pakistan. Fair argues that
Pakistan is persistently “revisionist” vis-a-vis India, with which it has been
locked in enduring rivalry since 1947-48, ostensibly over Kashmir. As argued by
the author, Pakistan initiated and lost four wars with India, to include loss of
half of its territory in 1971. The philosophy of “asymmetrical war” as practised
by Pakistan has its roots in 1947, rather than in the late 1980s (as is generally
believed) and the same has backfired since 2002. Pakistan’s power differential
with India has been continuously widening and in spite of setbacks, the author
finds a stubborn Pakistan ever more committed to revisionism, with increased
vigour to resist the rise of India.
Conventional wisdom projecting Pakistan as a “security seeking state”
located in a rough neighbourhood, is refuted by the author. She challenges the
notion of reducing the Indo-Pak puzzle to “Kashmir”, and argues that resolution
of the same shall not make Pakistan discard Islamist proxies and its obsession
with the British inherited notion of “strategic depth”. She refutes Pakistan claims
over Kashmir, which is more than being merely a security seeking demand. There

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are deep ideological and philosophical differences that Pakistan nurtures against
India, which are unlikely to fade away by simply resolving border disputes,
territorial in nature.
The author has justified the US’ assistance and aid to Pakistan over the
years which were based on the belief that the same would build up Pakistan
conventionally, making it jettison its insecurity and aggressiveness towards
India. She opines that Pakistan is purely an ideological and “greedy state”,
fundamentally dissatisfied with status quo – following revisionism of all kinds, to
enhance its prestige and as a competitive tool to achieve non-security goals. Any
appeasement of the Pakistan Army would only reinforce its revisionist pursuits.
The author has stressed that Pakistan’s sense of insecurity and ideological
differences vis-à-vis India have loomed from partition, based on the two-nation
theory. As perceived by Pakistan, partition has been an unfair and unfinished
agenda thrust upon its people delivering an insecure Pakistan, wherein India
acquired the heartland with all the goodies and positives of the Raj while Pakistan
was made to do with troubled frontiers and an ethnically diverse portion, widely
separated. Fair notes that from the 1950s, Pakistan under Ayub Khan has used
the religious plank to rally the nation and indoctrinate its people against India.
A conscious attempt was made to disseminate the Army’s ideological revisionist
narrative through Pakistani textbooks and to coopt religious-political forces.
As a result, in her words, “both military regimes and civilian governments alike
pursue the army’s revisionist agenda”
The key findings that emerge from the book could be summarised as, firstly,
the Army is the custodian of Pakistan’s ideology and geography. Secondly, India
is civilisationally ‘Hindu’ opposed to Pakistan’s ideological foundations based on
the two-nation theory. Thirdly, the Pakistan Army must resist India’s rise and for
that, the primary tool would be “jihad under the expanding nuclear umbrella”.
The author highlights that Pakistan’s stubbornness to pursue the hard line, in
spite of setbacks, is mainly due to its unique concept of ‘victory’ and ‘defeat’. As
per the prevalent thought in Pakistan, in confrontations of various hues with
India, as long as the Pakistanis survive and preserve the ability to strike back,
they are not considered defeated. And that is how, even the 1971 War is taken as
a victory in Pakistan.
In her attempt to draw out a prognosis for the future, the author remarks that
in its revisionist quest, the Pakistan Army will continue to take significant risks,
rather than do nothing. She has flagged a few aspects that could stand out as
game changers, namely, the transition to democracy, the role of civil society to

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give impetus to change, and the economic drivers. All the stated factors presently
are rife with grave challenges. Professor Fair correctly notes that the extrinsic
factors are also unlikely to induce a fundamental change in the strategic culture
of the Pakistan Army.
Many Armies have run their countries, but most of them eventually had to
yield to democratic change and civilian control. The Pakistan Army has been an
exception in this regard and has exercised extraordinary powers, even during
a civilian government. An appreciation of what makes the Pakistan Army tick
should be a high priority for India’s policy-makers and interested agencies and
towards this, Dr. Fair’s solid work has done complete justice.

Review by Col S Ranjan. The reviewer is a Senior Fellow at CLAWS.

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