978-981-13-6899-8

Asia in Transition 8
Lian Kwen Fee

Naomi Hosoda
Masako Ishii Editors
International
Labour Migration
in the Middle
East and Asia
Issues of Inclusion and Exclusion
Asia in Transition
Volume 8
Editor-in-Chief
Jeremy Jammes, Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Gadong,
Brunei Darussalam
Series Editors
Noor Hasharina Haji Hassan, Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei
Darussalam, Brunei Darussalam, Brunei Darussalam
Zawawi Ibrahim, Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Gadong,
Brunei Darussalam
Victor T. King, Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Gadong,
Brunei Darussalam
Johan Fischer, Department of Social Sciences and Business, Roskilde University,
Roskilde, Roskilde amt, Denmark
This book series is an initiative in conjunction with Springer under the auspices
of the Universiti Brunei Darussalam—Institute of Asian Studies (http://ias.ubd.edu.
bn/). It addresses the interplay of local, national, regional and global influences in
Southeast, South and East Asia and the processes of translation and exchange
across boundaries and borders. The series explores a variety of disciplinary and
interdisciplinary perspectives.
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13611

Lian Kwen Fee Naomi Hosoda
• •
Masako Ishii
Editors
International Labour
Migration in the Middle East
and Asia
Issues of Inclusion and Exclusion
123
Editors
Lian Kwen Fee Naomi Hosoda
Institute of Asian Studies School of Global Humanities
Universiti Brunei Darussalam and Social Sciences
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam Nagasaki University
Nagasaki City, Japan
Masako Ishii
College of Intercultural Communication
Rikkyo University
Tokyo, Japan
ISSN 2364-8252 ISSN 2364-8260 (electronic)

Asia in Transition
ISBN 978-981-13-6898-1 ISBN 978-981-13-6899-8 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6899-8
Library of Congress Control Number: 2019933699
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar
methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721,
Singapore
Preface and Acknowledgements
The proposal for this book was first conceived when researchers in the Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)-funded project titled ‘Neo-Plural
Society: Research on Ethnic Group Relations with a Focus on Expatriate Workers
in the Arab Gulf States’ (JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP26257004) decided to
come to the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, to present and
discuss their findings at a workshop in September 2015 titled ‘Reframing Migration
Discourse in the Middle East and Asia: Issues of Inclusion and Exclusion’. As a
result of the workshop, the participants decided that a publication in English would
expose the work of Japanese researchers, who have been actively conducting
fieldwork in the Arab Gulf states, to an international audience. In the course of the
discussion, it became apparent that the contributions reflected the experiences of
migrants in both positive and negative terms and that it would be instructive to go
beyond the binary discourse of migration—integration versus exclusion—and
regard it as both inclusion and exclusion and empowering as well as disempow-
ering. We also included several contributions on the receiving countries of Asia in
order to widen the coverage.
The editors thank the JSPS for its generous funding of the project and the
Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, for providing adminis-
trative support for the workshop and financial assistance for editing and the
eventual publication of the book. We are grateful to Gareth Richards and Helena
Dodge-Wan for the care they have taken in copy-editing the contributions.
Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam Lian Kwen Fee

Nagasaki City, Japan Naomi Hosoda
Tokyo, Japan Masako Ishii
January 2019
v
Contents
1 Introduction: Migrants in the Middle East and Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Lian Kwen Fee, Naomi Hosoda and Masako Ishii
2 Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States: Oil Rent, Migrants
and Authoritarian Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Masaki Matsuo
3 Empowerment of Migrant Domestic Workers: Muslim Filipinas
in the United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Masako Ishii
4 The Complexities of Social Inclusion and Exclusion Among
Intermarried Filipino Migrant Workers in the United Arab
Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Akiko Watanabe
5 ‘This is our home, but we cannot stay here forever’:
Second-Generation Asian Youths in Kuwait and the United
Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Naomi Hosoda and Kyoko Matsukawa
6 Promoting Diversity, Branding the State: Migrant-Friendly
Discourses in the United Arab Emirates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Koji Horinuki
7 Brunei Darussalam: Female Labour Force Participation
and Foreign Domestic Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Wako Asato
8 A Space of Emancipation or a Space of Insecurity?
Gendered Dimensions in Nepal Town, South Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
Seonyoung Seo
vii
viii Contents
9 International Migration and the Politics of Multiculturalism

in Japan, South Korea and Singapore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Lian Kwen Fee
Glossary of Non-English Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
Editors and Contributors
About the Editors
Lian Kwen Fee is professor of sociology at the Institute of Asian Studies,

Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Brunei. His academic background is in political and
historical sociology, and his research interests focus on race and the state, migration
and multiculturalism. His most recent publications include: Multiculturalism,
migration, and the politics of identity in Singapore (as contributing editor, 2016);
International migration in Southeast Asia (as co-editor, 2016); and Tamil migration
to colonial Malaya 1930s–1950s. South Asian Diaspora 10 (as co-author, 2017).
Naomi Hosoda is associate professor at the School of Global Humanities and

Social Sciences, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki City, Japan. Her main research
interest is in anthropological studies of Filipino migration with a focus on cultural
normality, family relations, transnational community, education and
citizenship. She is editor of Wangan arabu shokoku no Imin rodosha: ‘ta
gaikokujin kokka’ no shutsugen to seikatsu jittai (Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf
states: Growing foreign population and their lives) (2014, in Japanese). Her pub-
lications in English include: Middle class Filipinos and the formation of diasporic
national communities in the United Arab Emirates. In International migration in
Southeast Asia: Continuities and discontinuities, ed. Lian Kwen Fee et al. (2016);
and 2008: ‘Open City’ and a new wave of Filipino migration to the Middle East. In
Asia inside out: Changing times, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo et al. (2015).
Masako Ishii is professor of Philippine area studies and peace studies at the
College of Intercultural Communication, Rikkyo University, Japan. Her main
research interest examines area studies of Muslim society in the Philippines,
focusing on gender, migration, armed conflict and the peace process. Her publi-
cations include: Chuto he dekasegi ni iku firipin no musurimu josei: Kawaru ‘sei’
kihan to idou suru josei (Muslim Filipino women working in the Middle East:
Changing norms of femininity and sexuality and migrant women). In Isuramu no
ix
x Editors and Contributors
sei to bunka (Sexuality and cultures in Islam), ed. Hiroshi Kato (2005, in Japanese);
and Firipinjin kaji rodosha ni taisuru hogo he no torikumi (Possibilities and limi-
tation of protection for Filipina domestic workers in the Arab Gulf states). In
Wangan arabu shokoku no Imin rodosha: ‘ta gaikokujin kokka’ no shutsugen to
seikatsu jittai (Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states: Growing foreign population
and their lives), ed. Naomi Hosoda (2014, in Japanese).
Contributors
Wako Asato Division of Transcultural Studies, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto

University, Kyoto, Japan
Koji Horinuki JIME Centre, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, Tokyo,
Japan
Naomi Hosoda School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki
University, Nagasaki City, Japan
Masako Ishii College of Intercultural Communication, Rikkyo University, Tokyo,
Japan
Lian Kwen Fee Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar
Seri Begawan, Brunei
Kyoko Matsukawa Department of Sociology, Faculty of Letters, Konan
University, Kobe, Japan
Masaki Matsuo School of International Studies, Utsunomiya University,
Utsunomiya, Japan
Seonyoung Seo Department of Sociology, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
Akiko Watanabe Faculty of International Studies, Bunkyo University, Chigasaki,
Japan
Abbreviations and Acronyms
AED United Arab Emirates dirham

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines
AGS Arab Gulf states
CBSE Central Board of Secondary Education
CISCE Council for the Indian School Certificate Examination
EPS employment permit system
FDW foreign domestic worker
FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association (International
Federation of Association Football)
G7 Group of Seven
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP gross domestic product
ILO International Labour Organisation
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JKPE Jabatan Perancangan dan Kemajuan Ekonomi (Department of Economic
Planning and Development)
KHDA Knowledge and Human Development Authority
KWD Kuwaiti dinar
MFDW Muslim Filipina domestic worker
NCERT National Council for Educational Research and Training
NGO non-governmental organisation
NRI nonresident Indian
OFW overseas Filipino worker
PHP Philippine peso
POEA Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
SR Saudi riyal
TOPIK Test of Proficiency in Korean
UAE United Arab Emirates
WAM Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat (Emirates News Agency)
xi
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Share of national workers in the public sector, 1962–2011 . . . . . . 19

Fig. 3.1 Sarangani region, the Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Fig. 4.1 Social strata in the UAE according to nationality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Fig. 6.1 Migrant population of Abu Dhabi and Dubai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Fig. 6.2 National Day decorations and clothing items being
sold at a supermarket in Abu Dhabi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Fig. 7.1 Migrant populations in Asia and the Arab Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
Fig. 7.2 Labour force participation ratio in Brunei, 1990–2017 . . . . . . . . . 127
Fig. 7.3 Literacy rates in Brunei, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
xiii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Number of national and migrant workers in the AGS,

2010–2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 17
Table 2.2 National division of labour in Bahrain in 2010 and Kuwait
in 2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 21
Table 2.3 National division of labour in Qatar in 2010 and Saudi
Arabia in 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 23
Table 2.4 Historical change of the national division of labour
in Kuwait, 1957–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 27
Table 2.5 Changes in the national division of labour in Bahrain,
1959–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 29
Table 2.6 Average wages in Bahrain of nationals and non-nationals
in the production sector between 1983 and 2006 . . . . . . . . . . .. 30
Table 4.1 Marriage contracts and divorce certificates in the UAE,
2007–2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 61
Table 7.1 Citizenship status of Bruneian residents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
Table 7.2 Bruneian labour market composition by occupational
category and citizenship status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Table 7.3 Ratio of Bruneian citizens, permanent residents and temporary
residents of the total workforce in each occupational sector. . . . 124
Table 7.4 Number of domestic workers and employment ratios
in Brunei and the AGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Table 7.5 Labour force participation rates of women in selected
Asian countries and the AGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
Table 7.6 Gender wage gap in Brunei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
xv
Chapter 1
Introduction: Migrants in the Middle
East and Asia
Lian Kwen Fee, Naomi Hosoda and Masako Ishii
Abstract The discourse on migration outcomes in the West has largely been domi-
nated by issues of integration. It is more relevant to view immigration in non-Western
societies in relation to practices of exclusion and inclusion. Exclusion refers to a
situation in which individuals and groups are usually denied access to the goods,
services, activities and resources guaranteed by full citizenship. However, the expe-
rience of exclusion is not cross-culturally uniform. Inclusion and exclusion may be
simultaneous and can be empowering and disempowering. The contributions in this
volume go beyond the binary discourse of exclusion versus inclusion by examining
the experience of migration in the Arab Gulf states and Asia. They broadly sketch
the political and economic context of the receiving societies in the two regions as a
prelude to appreciating how migrants respond to their reception and treatment.
Keywords Asia · Arab Gulf states · Migrants · Foreign labour · Inclusion ·

Exclusion
The understanding of integration outcomes is usually framed within two models

of immigration, namely temporary immigration (Asia and the Middle East) and
settler immigration (Western countries). While the receiving countries of the West
are concerned with settlement and incorporation of migrants, policies in the Middle
East and Asia are driven by a rationale of exclusion and control. In the past, the
discourse on migration outcomes in the West has been largely dominated by issues
of integration, but it is perhaps more relevant now to examine immigration in non-
Western societies in relation to practices of exclusion and inclusion. The contributions
Lian, K. F. (B)
Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei
e-mail: kwenfee.lian@ubd.edu.bn
N. Hosoda
School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki City, Japan
e-mail: hosoda@nagasaki-u.ac.jp
M. Ishii
College of Intercultural Communication, Rikkyo University, Tokyo, Japan
e-mail: masang@rikkyo.ac.jp
© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 1

Lian Kwen Fee et al. (eds.), International Labour Migration in the Middle East and Asia,
Asia in Transition 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6899-8_1
2 Lian, K. F. et al.
in this volume examine the reception policies of host countries of the Middle East and
Asia and how migrant groups have responded to these policies, while highlighting
significant issues for comparative discussions.
The concept of social exclusion has most often been discussed in the context of
social policy and welfare regimes in the West and in relation to poverty. Exclusion
refers to a situation in which individuals and groups are usually denied access to
goods, services, activities and resources associated with citizenship. However, this
approach has been criticised by Jackson (1999) with regard to gender issues as they
are highly relevant to migration in the context of globalisation. In her critique, she
argues that when framed within a North–South discourse, it may be potentially ethno-
centric to assume that the experience of exclusion is cross-culturally uniform. Indeed,
work on migration issues has invariably been conducted within such a discourse.
Moreover, any discussion of exclusion is usually conducted relative to integration.
Setting up a dualistic opposition between inclusion and exclusion raises two prob-
lems: the first is that it assumes that power is a zero-sum game, that the included are
powerful and the excluded are powerless; and second, it overlooks the possibility that
marginality can offer both limitations and opportunities. It is possible to argue that
inclusion and exclusion may be simultaneous and that they can be empowering and
disempowering. In this volume, the contributors examine the situation of migrants in
the Middle East and Asia as one that encompasses both exclusion and inclusion. For
example, why would a migrant leave their home country to look for opportunities
overseas if he or she did not feel excluded in some way in the sending society? The
contributors in this volume attempt to go beyond the common binary discourse of
exclusion versus inclusion that has dominated migration research.
From a policy viewpoint, this volume also addresses how the governments of the
receiving societies manage the diversity created by international migration in the
era of globalisation—the significant and long-term presence of migrant communi-
ties—and the political challenges this diversity poses. Sooner or later both states and
local populations must come to terms with the emergence of a newly conceived mul-
ticultural society in their midst, an issue that has bedevilled many Western countries.
As a prelude, we need to set the background context of the chapters in this volume.
To begin with, the defining features of international migration under conditions
of globalisation were highlighted at the start of the twenty-first century. Hollifield
(2004) states that international migration is rising at an exponential rate and has
become a permanent feature of the global economy. As transnational networks have
become denser and more efficient, sending and receiving societies are increasingly
linked with the greater facilitation of movement of people across borders and over
longer distances. In a prescient discussion, Castles (2002) highlights that international
migration in the form of both highly skilled and low-skilled labour will gravitate
towards and contribute to the rise of global cities. Such cities will see the emergence
of sociocultural diversity and dual economies where a prosperous sector is largely
supported by low-skilled workers. These societies may be referred to as multicultural
societies or in some cases transnational communities, inhabited by transmigrants and
cosmopolitans. Family reunifications, Castles continues, will increase even under
the restrictive migration regimes present in the Gulf oil states and East Asia. As
1 Introduction: Migrants in the Middle East and Asia 3
transnational communities proliferate, states will manage the status of foreigners by

introducing ‘quasi-citizenship’ or ‘denizenship’ to accommodate the divergent rights
of migrants, both relative to citizens and to each other, that is, not all migrants have
equal rights. Castles notes that in all of these systems, little heed has been paid to
human agency by both migration policymakers and analysts.
In the context of migration in a global economy, where do the Arab Gulf states
(AGS) sit? The AGS comprise Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and they share some common characteristics. They
are oil-rich countries whose citizens are ethnically Arab, with monarchical political
regimes located on the Arabian Peninsula, and they formed the Gulf Cooperation
Council in 1981. They have similar policies in relation to accepting migrant workers.
The AGS have been described as petro-modernist and rentier states that utilise the
latest technological advances to develop urban infrastructure suited to a cosmopolitan
population (AlShehabi 2015: 12). This development is underwritten by substantial
revenues derived from external rents based on the exploitation of oil. Political author-
ity is wielded by a number of ruling families in a traditional patriarchal society that
is based on patrimonial lineage and tribal affiliation. Membership of such a society
and exclusive citizenship/nationality are only granted to those who can prove their
descent through familial lineage (Thiollet 2016: 11).
There are two significant periods in the history of immigration into the Gulf
states. The first occurred from 1950 to 1970 and is referred to as the Gulf’s first oil
boom when post-war economic development in the West fuelled oil production on
a commercial scale (AlShehabi 2015: 8). Infrastructural developments in transport,
health, education and administration within the AGS created economic opportunities
that drew a large number of migrants from other countries such as Palestine and
Yemen (Owen 1985: 7; Kapiszewski 2001: 59). Arab labour during those years
constituted 85% of all migrant labour in the AGS (Khalaf 2015: 46–47). The second
oil boom from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s oversaw a rapid increase in migration
from South Asia. This shift was not entirely due to a shortage of Arab labour; Asian
labour was relatively cheaper and easier to expend, and, unlike Arab migrants who
usually brought their families with them, Asian migrants left their families in their
home countries. Moreover, the ruling families in the Gulf feared that Arab migrants
from countries like Egypt and Palestine were likely to spread radical ideologies and
pose a security risk. In 1990, the turning point of migration in the AGS came after
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the deportation of an estimated two million Arabs
as a consequence (AlShehabi 2015: 25). The decline in the Arab migrant population
in the Gulf was matched by the steady increase in Asian migrants, mainly from
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, but a significant number also came from
Indonesia and the Philippines.
More than any other region in the world, in each of the Gulf states the migrant
component of the total population is very significant, comprising between a third to
more than three-quarters of the population (Fargues 2011: 274; Horinuki, Chap. 6).
Unlike in the past when Arab migrants could be integrated into the host societies
through intermarriage and cultural assimilation, the increasing presence of Asian
migrants has gradually led to the emergence of dual societies based on the strict
distinction between nationals and non-nationals (Fargues 2011: 278).
Separation between nationals and non-nationals is enforced through the kafala
practice of requiring every foreigner to be sponsored by a local citizen, policies
aiming to reduce intermarriages, nationalisation policies whereby private companies
are required to hire nationals up to a certain level, and residential segregation. These
forms of discrimination are also highly gendered in what are deeply patriarchal
societies. For example, female citizens lose their citizenship if they marry foreign
men in Kuwait (Longva 1997) and other AGS. An intricate system of inclusion and
exclusion was instituted not only between citizens and migrants, but also within
the migrant population through a highly segmented labour market and a policy of
privileged categories (Khalaf 2015: 49). Thus family reunification is permitted only
in the case of those earning a substantial salary and with secure accommodation
(Hosoda and Matsukawa, Chap. 5).
Despite the comprehensive controls adopted by the AGS on immigration—poli-
cies directed against the long-term settlement of migrants and therefore the adoption
of an anti-integrationist stance since the 1990s—there are clear signs that more or
less permanent migrant communities have been established. Recent statistics from
the Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme show that for the
AGS, for children under the age of 14, 27% of the total population for this age group
were non-nationals; for those aged 65 and above, 20% of the total population for this
age group were non-nationals (Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Pro-
gramme 2018). In certain countries, these percentages are even higher. For example,
as of December 2016, 45% of the population aged 65 years and above and 46% of
the population aged below 14 years old in Kuwait were non-nationals (Gulf Labour
Markets, Migration and Population Programme 2018).
The process of demographic normalisation is so far advanced that a second gen-
eration has emerged through family reunions or births in the receiving countries.
Having lived abroad for the majority of their lives, returning to their country of
origin is not the preferred option for this generation (Fargues 2011: 286).
The term ‘developmental state’ has been used to refer to the industrial power-
houses of East and Southeast Asia such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singa-
pore. The developmental state has been characterised as having an unusually high
degree of autonomy over the national economy and is a positive driving force behind
economic development and export-orientated industrialisation. The developmental
state plays an interventionist role in the development process rather than relying
on market forces in the optimal allocation of resources, possesses competent state
agencies to regulate industrial policies, and is noted for its ability to penetrate and
mobilise society (Beeson 2009: 9–10). The effectiveness of the developmental state
in promoting economic growth has been contrasted with rent-seeking among other
strategies used in many developing countries (Douglass 1994: 545, 548). To ensure
growth, the state reinvests to expand the productive capacities of industry, maintains
wage increments below increases in labour productivity by controlling labour both
directly and indirectly and makes significant investments in infrastructure (including
in human resources). Critical to its development strategy is the regulation of labour
rather than allowing markets to determine the cost of labour (Douglass 1994: 553),
hence the importance of migrant labour. To the extent that they are able to achieve
these goals, state actors of the developmental state believe that they will be able to
maintain the relative legitimacy of their policies.
In contrast to the AGS, where the global demand for oil has been the main driver
of economic growth and the increased recruitment of foreign labour, Japan and South
Korea were heavily focused on developing their human resources sector to support
export-orientated industrialisation. In the immediate post-war period, both countries
were initially exporters of low-wage labour, but as they experienced rapid economic
growth, more foreign workers arrived. In the 1980s, Japanese employers in small- to
medium-sized manufacturing and construction industries came under severe strain
to reduce their costs in order to be internationally and locally competitive, a situation
that was exacerbated by the rising value of the yen (Douglass and Roberts 2000: 6).
Similarly, in the late 1980s, labour shortages caused by the expansion of the industrial
and service sectors forced South Korea to open its borders to migrant workers (Lee
2009: 369). By the mid-1970s, a declining fertility rate and an ageing population had
already begun in Japan, with South Korea not far behind.
Meanwhile, in the AGS migrant workers have been entering receiving countries
since the 1950s. As noted earlier, at first the majority of migrants came from Arab
countries, but an increasing number came from South Asia and later Southeast Asia
from the 1970s onwards. Significant labour migration to East Asia and Singapore
began in the 1980s in a similar pattern. Japan and South Korea encouraged their co-
ethnics to return in order to address labour shortages. It soon became clear though
that the return of these co-ethnics alone could not meet the rising demand from
local employers. In the early 1990s, both South Korea and Japan instituted trainee
internship schemes to bring in unskilled foreign workers under the pretext of provid-
ing training and work experience for several years; however, in practice they were
a backdoor means of bringing in migrant workers without official recognition or
appropriate work visas. Trainees in these programmes were treated as cheap dis-
posable labour and were not granted proper rights; over the years, thousands have
instead become undocumented workers in both South Korea and Japan. It was not
until 2004 that South Korea replaced its existing scheme with an employment permit
system. However, Japan has since expanded on the programme with some protection
for the participants. Previously local industry associations or chambers of commerce
were responsible for checking on labour law violations involving the trainees. This
function has now been taken over by the government.
There are currently 2.2 million foreigners residing in Japan, representing about
1.95% of the country’s total population (Statistics Japan 2018a). In 2017, South
Korea had 1.8 million foreign residents, comprising 3.4% of the total population
(Park 2017). Compared to the Gulf states, the foreign populations in these two East
Asian countries are relatively insignificant and are not perceived as security risks by
their governments. Another notable observation is the phenomenon of international
marriages. AGS governments have been discouraging mixed marriages, for the ruling
families keep a close eye on maintaining their sovereignty and social cohesion in the
region. In stark contrast, international marriages have increased in Japan and South
Korea. These peaked at over 6.1% of all registered marriages in Japan in 2006 though
the figure has fallen steadily since then to 3.5% in 2017 (Statistics Japan 2018b);
similarly, international marriages in South Korea accounted for nearly 14% of all
registered marriages in 2005 though the figure now stands at about half that (Kim
and Oh 2011: 1564). This is a significant trend, particularly in South Korea where it
is estimated that about a third of children in 2020 will be of mixed Korean and Asian
parentage (Lian, Chap. 9).
In this introduction, we have broadly sketched the political and economic context
of the migrant-receiving countries of the AGS and East Asia as a backdrop to the
chapters in this book, and in particular in order to make better sense of the reception
and treatment of foreign immigrants in these two regions.
Masaki Matsuo (Chap. 2) examines how the concept of ‘ethnocracy’ may be
applied to the AGS to explain how resources and rewards are distributed on the basis
of ethnic origins or nationality to legitimise ruling regimes. An ethnocracy generally
refers to a political system in which the majority ethnic group disproportionately
appropriates the physical, institutional and legal instruments of the state to further
its dominance and power. In this regard, Longva (2005) describes Kuwait as a civic
ethnocracy in which citizenship is restricted exclusively to those who share a common
descent and are thus entitled to exceptional privileges that are not afforded to other
residents. In particular, Matsuo focuses on how in the AGS the division of labour
between both the public and private sectors and also within the private sector is used to
ensure that the privileges and benefits of citizens are preserved and protected. Hence,
employment in the public sector and in higher occupations is reserved exclusively for
citizens while middle-level and unskilled work is left for lower-paid foreign migrants.
This ethnocratic practice is most appropriate to economies that are dependent on rent-
seeking as it ensures the long-standing loyalty and support of the dominant ethnic
citizens. Using employment data with nationality and occupational divisions, he
argues that some of the AGS are more effective than others in using ethnocracy to
maintain and control their political legitimacy.
Masako Ishii (Chap. 3) examines the life stories and narratives of Muslim
domestic workers from the Philippines who have worked in various parts of the AGS
for extended periods of time. Coming from the Sarangani region, where the majority
of the population is Christian, the informants described how their experiences of
discrimination in the Philippine labour market occurred because they were Muslim
women. This forced them to look abroad for opportunities in the Middle East where,
as Muslims, they expected to be treated better. Unfortunately, the reality of abuse,
sexual harassment and overwork hit them hard as they moved within the AGS,
constantly seeking better working and living conditions. It was only after learning to
speak Arabic and developing their informal networks over a considerable number of
years that they found jobs as domestic workers that ensured them a regular income
(more than twice what they were previously paid), a safe environment and their
own private spaces. Ishii’s analysis raises two significant and salient facts that are
relevant to migrant agency and autonomy. The first is that the formation of support
networks and safety nets among co-ethnics (especially for those who have been
badly victimised by employers and state agencies) is encouraged in a labour market

where mobility is tightly regulated and segregated by nationality. The second is
that the marginalisation and disempowerment experienced by these women in their
country of origin have resulted in their relative empowerment and inclusion in
the AGS, when they were eventually able to earn enough as domestic workers to
contribute to improving the lives of their families in the Philippines.
In the UAE, where nearly 90% of the population are migrants, the number of
international marriages is not particularly high. An estimated 36% of mixed marriages
of non-Emirati affiliations were recorded in 2015, many involving Filipinas. Akiko
Watanabe (Chap. 4) states that the full benefits of citizenship are only accorded to
Emiratis who can prove their lineage to 1925 or before (that is, jus sanguinis) and
naturalisation only bestows an individual with partial citizenship. The phenomenon
of international marriages in the AGS has implications for how the incorporation
of foreign migrants into Arab societies can be understood in more depth. In her
discussion of the personal accounts of Filipinas who married Arabs while they were
working in the UAE, Watanabe illustrates how inclusion in one social sphere often
entailed exclusion in another; the opening of one door closed another. Marites, who
married an Iraqi architect but did not possess citizenship status herself, could move
freely within the informal setting of the Filipino migrant community and leverage
benefits from this network. On the other hand, Sarina, whose husband is a naturalised
Palestinian employed in the government, also found employment in the public sector
upon giving up her Philippine citizenship. As a consequence, she was more cautious
about how she conducted herself within the Filipino community, as there were those
who viewed her as someone who could potentially do favours for her fellow co-
ethnics because she possessed citizenship status in the UAE.
Voluntary migrants all over the world must pick one of two options: either they
choose to settle and are incorporated in the host societies of the receiving countries
or they are to return to their countries of origin once they are no longer employed.
However, migration in the era of globalisation has invariably led to a long-term
dependence on foreign labour, creating relatively permanent ethnic communities
in the process. In the AGS—the third largest destination for international migrants
after Europe and North America, particularly for migrants from South Asia and the
Philippines—a second generation of Asian youths has grown up in the host countries
where their parents are employed. This is largely the consequence of their parents
who are middle-class professionals and who make use of immigration policies that
favour skilled workers to extend their stay in the AGS.
Naomi Hosoda and Kyoko Matsukawa (Chap. 5) have captured the dilemma of
this second generation of young Filipinos and Indians, who have grown up and been
educated in the AGS for the majority of their lives. Unable to settle and assimilate in
their countries of origin when they return, many of this second generation eventually
return to the Middle East to continue their tertiary education in foreign universities,
hoping to migrate later to Canada, Australia or Britain. Despite receiving a global
education and being exposed to a global community, this second generation finds
itself trapped in a liminal existence where the future of where they will settle remains
uncertain.
In the Gulf, the UAE stands out as a receiving country in that it is almost totally
dependent on the labour of foreigners to drive its economy. Migrants from over 200
nationalities comprise an estimated 90% of the country’s population. This dispropor-
tionate share of migrants as part of the total population of the AGS has been a source
of concern to government agencies—particularly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in 1990—who view the significant presence of foreigners as a possible risk to their
security and sovereignty. Since the beginning of the century, a multitude of criticism
has arisen in the international media and from human rights organisations regarding
the violations of the rights of migrant workers in the Gulf region, notably health and
safety issues, salary retention, physical abuse, inadequate housing conditions as well
abuses of the kafala system to maintain tight control over foreign workers.
Koji Horinuki (Chap. 6) notes that in the late 2000s, the UAE government took
the initiative to promote a more migrant-friendly discourse by encouraging tolerance
and highlighting the contributions of expatriates and migrants in state-building, eco-
nomic development and social diversity. Since 2010, the UAE has also celebrated
International Labour Day, solicited foreign worker participation in its national day
celebrations, liberalised immigration policies and introduced an anti-discrimination
law in 2015. Horinuki identifies two reasons for this remarkable policy shift by
the UAE authorities: first, the negative narratives of the West had to be countered
and highly skilled foreigners in a competitive international labour market had to be
enticed to migrate to the region; and second, by promoting diversity and tolerance,
the UAE hopes to head off the potential for internal social conflict and prevent the
rise of radicalism and religious extremism. More significantly, Horinuki suggests
that the Emiratis recognise that the migrant workforce is there to stay. Whether this
will lead to any form of incorporation of these non-nationals in local society remains
an open question.
The work of Wako Asato (Chap. 7) on the relative contribution of the local female
labour force and foreign domestic workers (FDW) in Brunei Darussalam is revealing,
especially when set in the comparative context of the AGS and the developmental
states of Asia. Both rentier and developmental states are dependent on foreign labour,
but its relative significance is not always fully recognised. Foreigners in Brunei con-
stitute 27.5% of the total population, compared to 70–90% in Qatar and the UAE,
and less than 10% in Japan and South Korea. Asato states that what is most remark-
able about Brunei is the contribution of women to the economy. The local female
participation in the labour force rose from around 20% in 1971 to approximately
45% in 1990 and almost 60% in 2015. What is even more surprising is that women
in Brunei earn on average approximately 17% more than men. Asato also argues that
the absence of gender inequality in the state is due to a large proportion of women
receiving higher education and the low cost of employing foreign domestic labour.
Asato estimates that 36% of Bruneian households employ FWDs, possibly the high-
est rate in Asia. The use of the concept of the rentier state (as understood in the
AGS) to describe Brunei is questioned, as Asato suggests that the higher educational
attainment, labour force participation of women (many of whom are employed in
the professional and managerial sectors) and the reverse gender wage gap are in fact
elements of a developmental state.
Labour migration regimes in countries that practise temporary migration are usu-
ally disciplinary and controlling, aiming to minimise migrant mobility and create
both spatial and social isolation. The appropriation of urban space in the form of
ethnic enclaves enables migrant workers to shape and form their own communities
with communal networks, information sharing and informal associations that pro-
vide much-needed social and emotional support. ‘Nepal Town’ in the Dongdaemun
district of Seoul is the main gathering place of male Nepalese migrants who are prin-
cipally employed in manufacturing industry. Seonyoung Seo (Chap. 8) examines the
lives of female Nepalese workers who arrived in increasing numbers in South Korea
after the employment permit system first came into force in 2004 to regulate labour
immigration. Female Nepalese workers who are employed in the agriculture sector
in remote areas suffer from often intense social isolation as they find it difficult to
access Nepal Town, even on the two days they have off per month. On the occasions
that they do manage to go to Nepal Town to meet female friends, they find themselves
the subject of social surveillance and gossip in the closed world of co-ethnics in this
male-dominated space. The emancipatory potential of Nepal Town is thus mitigated
by its disciplinary practices, of which women bear the brunt.
International migration is integral to the development of a global economy and
has been critical to the economic powerhouses of Asia—Japan, South Korea and
Singapore—since the 1980s. All three countries share the common challenge of
declining fertility rates and ageing populations, resulting in an increasing dependence
on the migrant workforce to meet the need for labour. Out of this has arisen social
and cultural diversity, posing a new challenge for the governments in managing such
diversity. This depends greatly on how multiculturalism is interpreted and to what
extent it is translated into everyday practice and policies that have tangible effects in
communities. At one end of the continuum, multiculturalism is the protection of the
rights of minorities; while at the other end, it is merely the symbolic recognition of
cultural, racial and ethnic differences.
In the final contribution, Lian Kwen Fee (Chap. 9) discusses the efficacy of exoge-
nous and endogenous influences in determining the practice of multiculturalism.
Japan has steadfastly remained a monocultural society with strong domestic support
for maintaining the status quo. The country has taken tokenistic steps in embracing
multiculturalism which have only come about as a result of its international obliga-
tions (Yamamoto 2012). Meanwhile, South Korea’s progress towards multicultural-
ism is tied to the strength of its civil society in the struggle for democratisation with
migrant advocacy and the protection of migrant rights being supported by the labour
movement and the humanitarian lobby. The South Korean government has accepted
that it is no longer a monocultural society due to the increasing number of inter-
national marriages and children of mixed ancestry. However, it has not abandoned
the hope that foreign workers and non-ethnic Koreans will be able to successfully
socially integrate into Korean life (Ahn 2013).
Singapore is the exception in that it has institutionalised the rights of its ethnic
constituents and their respective identities. Lian concludes with the statement that
domestic political considerations override international obligations in how far each
of these countries is willing to go in order to adopt a truly multicultural society. It is
claimed that the theory of liberal constraint is efficacious in the receiving countries of
the West but it has a limited influence in these societies that regard labour immigration
as only temporary.
References
Ahn, Ji-Hyun. 2013. Global migration and the racial project in transition: Institutionalising racial
difference through the discourse of multiculturalism in South Korea. Journal of Multicultural
Discourses 8 (1): 29–47.
AlShehabi, Omar. 2015. Histories of migration to the Gulf. In Transit states: Labour, migration
and citizenship in the Gulf, ed. Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, 3–38.
London: Pluto Press.
Beeson, Mark. 2009. Developmental states in East Asia: A comparison of the Japanese and Chinese
experiences. Asian Perspective 33 (2): 5–39.
Castles, Stephen. 2002. Migration and community formation under conditions of globalization.
International Migration Review 36 (4): 1143–1168.
Douglass, Mike. 1994. The ‘developmental state’ and the newly industrialised economies of Asia.
Environment and Planning A 26: 543–566.
Douglass, Mike, and Glenda S. Roberts. 2000. Japan in a global age of migration. In Japan and
global migration: Foreign workers and the advent of a multicultural society, ed. Mike Douglass
and Glenda S. Roberts, 3–37. London: Routledge.
Fargues, Philippe. 2011. Immigration without inclusion: Non–nationals in nation-building in the
Gulf states. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 20 (3–4): 273–292.
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Population Programme. 2018. National and non-
national populations by aggregated age groups in GCC countries (national statis-
tics, 2005–2016). http://gulfmigration.eu/gcc-national-non-national-populations-aggregated-
age-groups-gcc-countries-national-statistics-2005-2016/. Accessed 9 Sept 2018.
Hollifield, James F. 2004. The emerging migration state. International Migration Review 38 (3):
885–912.
Jackson, Cecile. 1999. Social exclusion and gender: Does one size fit all? The European Journal of
Development Research 11 (1): 125–146.
Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2001. Nationals and expatriates: Population and labour dilemmas of the
Gulf Cooperation Council states. Reading: Ithaca Press.
Khalaf, Abdulhadi. 2015. The politics of migration. In Transit states: Labour, migration and citi-
zenship in the Gulf, ed. Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, 39–56. London:
Pluto Press.
Kim, Hyuk-Rae, and Oh Ingyu. 2011. Migration and multicultural contention in East Asia. Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37 (10): 1563–1581.
Lee, Yoonkyung. 2009. Migration, migrants, and contested ethno-nationalism in Korea. Critical
Asian Studies 41 (3): 363–380.
Longva, Ang Nga. 1997. Walls built on sand: Migration, exclusion, and society in Kuwait. Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press.
Longva, Anh Nga. 2005. Neither autocracy nor democracy but ethnocracy: Citizens, expatriates
and the socio-political system in Kuwait. In Monarchies and nations: Globalisation and identity
in the Arab states of the Gulf, ed. Paul Dresch and James Piscatori, 114–135. London: I.B. Tauris.
Owen, Roger. 1985. Migrant workers in the Gulf. London: Minority Rights Group.
Park, Si-soo. 2017. 1.76 million foreigners live in South Korea; 3.4% of population. Korea Times,
17 November.
Statistics Japan. 2018a. Foreign residents in Japan. https://stats-japan.com/t/kiji/11639. Accessed
14 Sept 2018.
Statistics Japan. 2018b. Trends in percent distribution of marriages by nationality of bride and groom
in Japan, 2017. https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=
00450011&tstat=000001028897&cycle=7&year=20170&month=0&tclass1=000001053058&
tclass2=000001053061&tclass3=000001053069&stat_infid=000031743465&result_back=1&
second2=1. Accessed 18 Sept 2018.
Thiollet, Hélène. 2016. Managing migrant labour in the Gulf: Transnational dynamics of migra-
tion politics since the 1930s. Oxford: International Migration Institute, Oxford Department of
International Development, Working Paper 131.
Yamamoto, Beverly Anne. 2012. From structured invisibility to visibility: Is Japan really going to
accept multiethnic, multicultural identities? Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 19
(4): 428–439.
Lian Kwen Fee is professor of sociology at the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei
Darussalam, Brunei. His academic background is in political and historical sociology, and his
research interests focus on race and the state, migration and multiculturalism. His most recent pub-
lications include the following: Multiculturalism, migration, and the politics of identity in Singa-
pore (as contributing editor, 2016); International migration in Southeast Asia (as co-editor, 2016);
and, Tamil migration to colonial Malaya 1930s–1950s. South Asian Diaspora 10 (as co-author,
2017).
Naomi Hosoda is associate professor at the School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences,
Nagasaki University, Nagasaki City, Japan. Her main research interest is in anthropological studies
of Filipino migration with a focus on cultural normality, family relations, transnational commu-
nity, education and citizenship. She is the editor of Wangan arabu shokoku no Imin rodosha: ‘ta
gaikokujin kokka’ no shutsugen to seikatsu jittai (Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states: Grow-
ing foreign population and their lives) (2014, in Japanese). Her publications in English include
the following: Middle class Filipinos and the formation of diasporic national communities in the
United Arab Emirates. In International migration in Southeast Asia: Continuities and discontinu-
ities, ed. Lian Kwen Fee et al. (2016); and 2008: ‘Open City’ and a new wave of Filipino migration
to the Middle East. In Asia inside out: Changing times, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo et al. (2015).
Masako Ishii is professor of Philippine area studies and peace studies at the College of Intercul-
tural Communication, Rikkyo University, Japan. Her main research interest examines area studies
of Muslim society in the Philippines, focusing on gender, migration, armed conflict and the peace
process. Her publications include the following: Chuto he dekasegi ni iku firipin no musurimu
josei: Kawaru ‘sei’ kihan to idou suru josei (Muslim Filipino women working in the Middle East:
Changing norms of femininity and sexuality and migrant women). In Isuramu no sei to bunka
(Sexuality and cultures in Islam), ed. Hiroshi Kato (2005, in Japanese); and Firipinjin kaji rodosha
ni taisuru hogo he no torikumi (Possibilities and limitation of protection for Filipina domestic
workers in the Arab Gulf states). In Wangan arabu shokoku no Imin rodosha: ‘ta gaikokujin
kokka’ no shutsugen to seikatsu jittai (Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states: Growing foreign
population and their lives), ed. Naomi Hosoda (2014, in Japanese).
Chapter 2
Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States: Oil
Rent, Migrants and Authoritarian
Regimes
Masaki Matsuo
Abstract Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf states (AGS) promotes stability in social and
state governance by creating disparities between citizens and migrants. In general,
migrants are considered to be a source of social unrest despite their significant con-
tributions to the national economies of the AGS. The region, which is the world’s
largest absorber of international migrants, is dominated by authoritarian regimes
that have survived and persisted due to their strong ethnocratic policies despite the
Arab Spring revolutions. Through data comparisons and a time series analysis of
labour markets, this chapter explains the two main features of the AGS that build
this framework of ethnocracy: oil revenues and the national division of labour.
Keywords Arab Gulf states · Rentier states · Authoritarianism · Division of

labour · Ethnocracy · Migrants
2.1 Introduction
Why have migrants not become a major political issue in the Arab Gulf states (AGS)
for the governments of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
1
Arab Emirates (UAE)? Whether or not this is an accurate view, migrants are gener-
ally considered a source of concern to receiving countries, with the large-scale migra-
tion of foreign workers perceived to bring about security issues, cultural conflicts
and a lack of social cohesion, employment issues and financial problems caused by a
growth in the number of welfare recipients and an increased dependence on a coun-
1 In this chapter, the term ‘migrant’ coincides broadly with international migrant workers who do
not possess nationality in the receiving countries. In the AGS, migrants are referred to as expatriates
and live there under a short-term contract that usually lasts two years. These migrant workers are
not considered to be prospective citizens. Additionally, the term migrant does not refer to citizens
who were once foreigners but are now naturalised as there are few such residents in the AGS. For
the naturalisation policies of the AGS, see Gianluca Parolin (2009).
M. Matsuo (B)
School of International Studies, Utsunomiya University, Utsunomiya, Japan
e-mail: matsuom@cc.utsunomiya-u.ac.jp

14 M. Matsuo
try’s infrastructure. These factors are generally regarded as sources of grave political
contention. However, the AGS do not suffer from them despite being the world’s
most significant migrant-receiving region. Even during the Arab Spring revolutions,
all of the AGS, with the exception of Bahrain, succeeded in preventing widespread
demonstrations and uprisings. This particular phenomenon can be explained by two
elements that serve political, economic and social functions in the AGS: oil revenue
allocation policies and international migration. These two factors combine to estab-
lish a system that is unique to the AGS, where ethnocracy has stabilised authoritarian
regimes by creating great disparities between citizens and migrants.
Various studies of citizens and migrants in labour markets in the AGS have been
conducted, though most focus on describing the current circumstances of migrant
workers and their economic effects (Looney 1994; Kapiszewski 2001; Kamrava and
Babar 2012; Hertog 2013; Khalaf et al. 2015; Winckler 2017). While these studies
are highly informative, they omit the political effects of foreign migrants on the
power and focus of authoritarian regimes. Research on authoritarianism in the AGS
is mainly limited in scope to certain indigenous or ethnic elements, such as tribal
kinship, the support of ruling family members (Herb 1999) and the ruling elites’
cooptation of ordinary citizens through rent allocations (Yom and Gause 2014). This
narrow research focus forms a kind of methodological nationalism that does not
include the impact of migrants in shaping political rule, though these non-nationals
comprise more than half of the total population in the AGS. In other words, it is
possible that by excluding the role of foreign migrants from the current discourse, a
potentially significant portion of the current political issues is not thoroughly exam-
ined. Migration studies are therefore key to studying the political phenomena of
the Gulf region, and an analysis of the labour market where citizens and migrants
compete is well suited to this purpose.
2.2 Authoritarianism, Migrants and the Oil Economy
The AGS have several distinct commonalities, such as authoritarian governments,

large migrant populations and oil-dependent economies. In this section, I refer briefly
to these points and illustrate how ethnocracy has been established through the com-
bination of the oil economy and international migration.
2.2.1 Authoritarianism and the Oil Economy
The AGS are among the longest surviving authoritarian countries in the world. Since
their foundation (Saudi Arabia in 1932) or independence (Kuwait in 1961, Oman
in 1970 and Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE in 1971), the AGS have maintained their
hereditary monarchies in power. In both Kuwait and Bahrain, the ruling monarch as
head of state appoints the prime minister from ruling families (the Al-Sabah family in
2 Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States: Oil Rent, Migrants and … 15
Kuwait and the Al Khalifa family in Bahrain) and not from publicly elected members
of parliament. However, Kuwait does have a greater degree of freedom than many
other AGS in that its national assembly is based on universal elections, while Bahrain
only held its second general election in 2002 though there have been three subsequent
elections. Meanwhile, in Oman the ruling monarch, Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said,
is not only the head of state and head of government but also the current prime
minister and is responsible for appointing the cabinet. Both Saudi Arabia and Qatar
are monarchies where the head of state and head of the government is the king (Saudi
Arabia) or the emir (Qatar). In Saudi Arabia, elections by members of the public to
the national consultative assembly are not permitted, whereas in Qatar, a general
election for its consultative assembly has been postponed from 2013 to 2019. In
the UAE, the Federal National Council is partly elected by citizens; however, it is a
consultative council and not a legislative council. On the whole, then, citizens of the
AGS are denied participation in democratic processes and do not have the right to
voice their political decisions through parliamentary representation.
The most influential framework that explains the considerable prevalence of
authoritarianism in the Middle East is rentier state theory (Beblawi 1987; Luciani
1987). Because of the exogenous quality of oil wealth (derived from foreign coun-
tries as the cost of oil exports) and the capital-intensive nature of oil production, oil
revenue is considered to be unearned income. Hence, a state that depends greatly on
oil wealth is considered a rentier state. This oil wealth provides authoritarian rulers
with resources they can allocate to citizens in order to buy their allegiance without
having to collect tax from the domestic economy. When citizens receive allocations
of (oil) rent revenues through services such as free health care, education, hous-
ing and fuel and food subsidies, they are enjoying not a reallocation of what they
themselves once paid as tax but an allocation of unearned income. In a rentier state,
leaders can implement two popular policies at the same time: decreasing taxes and
increasing beneficial expenditure. This enforces the continued support of citizens
even for authoritarian rulers for as long as the rulers keep such favourable policies
in place.
The rentier effect has been confirmed through regression analysis (Ross 2013),
but the details of the process still remain obscure. For example, it has not been
confirmed yet whether rent allocation is carried out equally for all citizens. If rent is
in fact allocated unevenly, discontent and dissatisfaction will grow among neglected
citizens with poor allocations. In addition, when oil wealth decreases what kinds of
crises will arise and how will the government respond to them? How will the ruling
elites attempt to maintain the stability of their regimes?
2.2.2 Ethnocracy and Authoritarianism
The concept of ethnocracy was first employed in studies on the relationship between
citizens and migrants by Longva (2005). She studies the structure of Kuwait society
and demonstrates that social institutions establish a boundary between the ruler and
16 M. Matsuo
the ruled, along with an ethnic boundary. Longva refers to Mazrui (1975) who coined
the concept of ethnocracy, defining it as ‘a political system based on kinship, real or
presumed’. Reviewing usages of this concept modified over the years—that is, ‘the
tendency for an elite to posit their own physical characteristics and cultural norms as
the essence of the nation over which they rule, [thereby] narrowing its definition and
excluding all those within the polity who do not exhibit the same characteristics or
embrace the same norms’ (Longva 2005: 119)—she shows that the variety of physical
characteristics and cultural norms employed by ruling elites leads to a plethora of
ethnocratic regimes, such as ‘racial ethnocracy’ in Bolivia and Guatemala, where
white and mestizo citizens dominate Indian citizens, and ‘religious ethnocracy’ in
Israel, where Judaism defines of the ruling ethnic group. In the AGS, Longva argues,
it is a ‘civic ethnocracy’ that is present because citizenship conceived in terms of
shared descent is the defining feature (Longva 2005: 119). According to her, the
current inequalities between citizens and migrants allow social stratification that
existed before the oil boom to persist by concealing disparities between citizens.
This manifests itself, for example, between descendants of the Al-Sabah lineage
and ordinary Kuwaitis in terms of political power, and between traditional merchant
groups and relative newcomers in terms of economic power. Since Kuwaiti citizens
are a minority, they consider themselves to be besieged by migrants. Citizens do not
consider migrants to be victims of ethnocracy. Rather, they understand ethnocracy
to be a measure to protect themselves and the country’s stability from migrants,
who are the demographic majority. This system also strengthens the bond between
citizens as a privileged and empowered group (Longva 2005: 126–127). As a result,
the authoritarian regimes in place in Kuwait and elsewhere in the AGS are more
likely to survive.
Unlike democracy, there are no clear or distinct indicators of ethnocracy. Politi-
cal disparity is not an appropriate indicator as most governments do not grant suf-
frage to temporary migrant workers; therefore, it cannot explain ethnocratic features
present in society. Instead, the division of labour—along with the citizen/migrant
boundary—is a more suitable indicator since this divide captures the salient dispar-
ity between citizens and migrants.
2.2.3 Migrants and the Oil Economy
The number of migrants has increased with the growth of the domestic economy of
the AGS, and this increase is considered to be a direct result of the oil economy. The
original native population of the AGS was too small to adequately supply the domestic
labour force when oil wealth first flowed, which led to an influx of international
migrant workers, beginning in the 1970s at the outset of the oil boom (Birks and
Sinclair 1980).
Today migrants comprise the majority of the workforce in the AGS, playing a
major role in the labour market. Table 2.1 shows the proportion of migrant workers
versus total workers in each of the AGS. Of the total workforce, migrant workers
Table 2.1 Number of national and migrant workers in the AGS, 2010–2016
Country Year Workers Percentage share of migrants of
Nationals Migrants all workers (%)
Bahrain 2010 185,055 526,175 73.98

Kuwait 2011 350,220 1,449,813 80.54
Oman 2015 429,806 1,825,603 80.94
Qatar 2015 99,204 1,857,423 94.93
Saudi 2016 3,038,945 10,850,192 78.12
Arabia
Sources Information & eGovernment Authority, Bahrain (2015), Central Statistical Bureau, Kuwait
(2015), National Centre for Statistics and Information, Oman (2017), Ministry of Development
Planning and Statistics, Qatar (2015a, b), General Authority for Statistics, Saudi Arabia (2017)
Note The figure of national workers for Saudi Arabia is represented as that of employed Saudi
workers because the difference between the total labour force (13,568,423) and employed nationals
(3,038,945) is too large to grasp the full extent of the contribution of migrant workers. The UAE is
not included in this table as it does not disclose information relating to the proportion of national
and migrant workers
constitute almost 74% in Bahrain and close to 95% in Qatar. Without migrants, the
economies of the AGS simply would not exist. Nevertheless, the status and rights of
migrants are generally weak to non-existent in the region. They are controlled under
the kafala system, which requires migrants to be sponsored by individual citizens
(kafeel) who then hold the right to hire and cancel the sponsored migrant’s work
contracts as well as permit or forbid renting property, purchasing vehicles, opening
bank accounts and even travel within and outside of the country. When contracts are
cancelled, migrants must leave the country. This system creates and preserves the
asymmetrical power balance that citizens hold over migrants in which citizens are
like slave masters and migrants are like slaves. Citizens may treat migrants unsym-
pathetically without fear of any repercussion, for example, by decreasing their wages
illegally under the threat of cancellation of the contract or, ultimately, deportation.
In contrast, migrants have few or no measures to resort to or even to report these
abuses. They are absolutely subordinate (Khalaf and Alkobaisi 1999). The kafala
system tethers migrants to citizens and hinders the development of sound labour
markets (Weinstein 2002).
In addition, naturalisation is strictly limited. First, the length of time one must
live in the host country in order to obtain citizenship in the AGS is extremely long,
which works to deter naturalisation: 20 years for Kuwait and Oman, 25 years for
Bahrain and Qatar, and 30 years for the UAE. Second, possession of dual citizenship
is prohibited in the AGS, which decreases the incentive for naturalisation among
many migrants.
18 M. Matsuo
2.2.4 Division of Labour: The Heart of Ethnocracy
Such non-inclusive immigration policies and oil wealth have created a very specific
division of labour. As many scholars emphasise, the AGS have attempted to absorb
national workers into the public sector (Kapiszewski 2001; Hertog 2012). The public
sector is desirable for citizens because it is stable and they receive better salaries
and more benefits than they do in the private sector. Wages in the public sector
come from the government budget which basically consists of oil revenues. In this
respect, the policy of absorbing citizens into the public sector is a form of rent
allocation. However, there is a theoretical limit on the capacity to do so which is
dependent on the price of oil and demographics. If the national population increases
at a rate that exceeds the growth of oil income, the budget reaches a limit on what
it can pay as salaries to public employees. When this limit is reached how is the
labour market affected? In the AGS, migrant workers are competitive in terms of
salary because of the vast economic disparities that exist between the AGS and the
poorer countries that send migrants. Further, migrants cannot negotiate higher wages
or better working conditions because of the restrictive kafala system. Under such
circumstances, enterprises prioritise the hiring of migrants over citizens. Citizens then
working in the private sector will be exposed to severe competition from migrants,
potentially eroding the stability of authoritarian regimes.
By introducing a division of labour into the private sector as well, citizens can still
be protected from competition and the ruling elites can avoid opposition movements
that arise from labour issues. If the governments of the AGS impose certain quotas for
private enterprises hiring citizens, these enterprises will compensate for the increased
costs by decreasing the wages of migrant workers. In turn, these migrants (who cannot
protest against such treatment given the control of the kafala system) may decide
to leave when their wages become insufficient to cover the cost of migrating there.
This national division of labour along the lines of the citizen/migrant boundary in the
private sector is thus established at the expense of migrants. This leads to migrants
being defined not just as a cheap source of labour but also a valuable resource
to sustain authoritarian regimes. If this divisive system continues to work and the
countries of the AGS maintain a significant amount of oil wealth, breakdowns of
authoritarian politics can be staved off.
2.3 Analysing Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States
2.3.1 National Divisions of Labour: Occupations for Citizens

and Occupations for Migrants
As described above, there are two types of division of labour in the AGS: a division
between public/private sectors (which coincides with citizens/migrants) and a wage
division within the private sector. Theoretically, the division between the public and
Fig. 2.1 Share of national workers in the public sector, 1962–2011

Sources The figure is compiled by the author based on the following sources: Statistical Bureau,
Bahrain (1972), Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain (1982), Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain
(1993, 2001), Central Informatics Organisation, General Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain (2001,
2010), Central Statistical Office, Kuwait (1980, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2008), Central Statistical Bureau,
Kuwait (2013), Ministry of National Economy, Oman (2001, 2007, 2012), Central Statistical Organ-
isation, Qatar (1991), Qatar Statistics Authority (2007), Ministry of Development Planning and
Statistics, Qatar (2011), Central Department of Statistics, Saudi Arabia (1965, 1970, 1980), Saudi
Arabian Monetary Authority (2000, 2003, 2018), Ministry of Labour, Saudi Arabia (2008)
Note The values indicate the percentage of national workers who are absorbed in the public sector;
for example, in 2010, the value of Qatar is slightly above 90%, which means that almost 90% of
total Qatari workers are absorbed in the public sector, not that nearly 90% of jobs in the public
sector are occupied by Qatari workers. The UAE is not included in this table as it does not disclose
information relating to the proportion of national and migrant workers
private sectors comes first because as long as rulers rely on and ensure this policy
they do not require support from private businesses and therefore maintain their
autonomy. When the government’s budgetary limit is reached, rulers must impose a
quota system on enterprises. Figure 2.1 illustrates the share of national workers in
the public sector. Kuwait and Qatar remain in the first stage of a national division
of labour while the other Gulf countries have already advanced to the second stage.
This mirrors approximately the degree of public resistance and hostility displayed
during the Arab Spring in each of the AGS. There were no protests on the streets
of Qatar. As Kristian Coates Ulrichsen (2014: 104) notes, there was a ‘near-total
absence of any sort of political demands, whether organised or informal, emanating
from Qatari nationals’. Meanwhile, opposition rallies and demonstrations in Kuwait
were soon brought under control. In contrast, antigovernment uprisings in Bahrain
led to destruction and violence that were eventually suppressed by the armed forces
of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
20 M. Matsuo
There are few studies of the second stage of the division of labour. Some schol-
ars have acknowledged the wage disparities between citizens and migrants and the
implementation of a quota system, but they do not describe the trend in detail. Do
such policies protect a wide range of citizens or just some of them? If the division of
labour in the private sector cannot provide citizens with comprehensive protection,
it is undeniable that a sense of discontent will grow among citizens.
To analyse this point, it is necessary to look at the private sector labour market and
determine the degree of the national division of labour. For this purpose, we scruti-
nised occupational statistics of the AGS and standardised occupational categories that
vary slightly from country to country. Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are the results of these anal-
yses. The tables consist of various occupational sectors, the number of employed
workers by nationality in each occupation, the percentage of the total workforce
of either nationals or migrants employed in a particular sector and the percentage
of the occupational sector occupied by either nationals or migrants. For example,
in Table 2.2 for nationals in the occupational sector of directors and managers in
Bahrain, the percentage of the total workforce of Bahraini nationals employed in
this occupation is 25.11%, thus indicating that just over a quarter of nationals in the
country are employed in this sector. The tables cover Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia, as Oman and the UAE do not disclose such detailed statistical informa-
tion, and thus these two countries are omitted. The figures for national workers that
exceed 20% of the national workforce are highlighted in grey (except for subtotals).
A column for concentration for each sector is also included in the tables. The
figures for the concentrations were obtained by dividing the figures for percentage of
the occupational sector occupied by either nationals or migrants for each occupation
by the corresponding figure for the proportion of that nationality of the total workforce
(the bottom two rows of the tables) in order to determine whether a national division
of labour exists. This means that if no national division of labour exists, the percentage
of the occupational sector occupied by either nationals or migrants would be equal
to the proportion of that nationality of the total workforce, and thus the figure for
concentration would be equal to 1.
If a job in an occupation is allocated preferentially to national or migrant work-
ers, then the percentage of the occupational sector occupied by either nationals or
migrants becomes greater or lesser than the proportion of that nationality in the total
workforce, causing the figure for concentration to be greater or lesser than 1. The
greater the distance from 1 that the value of concentration is the more established
the division of labour is in that occupation. For example, in Table 2.3, the figure for
concentration for nationals in the occupational sector of directors and managers for
Saudi Arabia is 3.78. This figure was derived by dividing 68.21 (the figure for the
percentage of that occupational sector occupied by nationals) by 18.04 (the figure
for the percentage of Saudi Arabian nationals of the country’s total workforce). This
indicates that the proportion of Saudi nationals as directors and managers is almost
four times greater than the actual proportion of Saudi nationals in the total work-
force, illustrating that the labour market prefers to hire nationals to migrant workers
for this occupational sector. This can be seen as an effect of the national division
of labour. A similar trend is observed for the same occupational sector for Bahrain,
Table 2.2 National division of labour in Bahrain in 2010 and Kuwait in 2011
Bahrain (2010) Kuwait (2011)
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of

the total the the total the
Occupational occupational
sector/ Nationality Number workforce of occupational Number workforce of sector
industry of nationals or sector occupied Concentration of nationals or occupied by Concentration
workers migrants by either workers migrants either
employed in the nationals or employed in nationals or
sector migrants the sector migrants
Directors National 23298 25.11 46.61 3.05 10223 26.09 15.82 4.33
and
managers Migrant 26686 5.19 53.39 0.63 54393 5.27 84.18 0.87
Specialists National 13237 14.27 43.00 2.81 17088 43.62 8.73 2.39
and
Occupations technicians Migrant 17546 3.41 57.00 0.67 178674 17.30 91.27 0.95
for citizens National 18513 19.96 72.65 4.75 5733 14.63 21.21 5.80
Clerical work
Migrant 6971 1.36 27.35 0.32 21302 2.06 78.79 0.82
National 55048 59.34 35.67 2.33 33044 84.35 11.50 3.15
Subtotal
Migrant 99280 19.30 64.33 0.76 254371 24.63 88.50 0.92
Retail, National 13832 14.91 8.06 0.53 1712 4.37 1.62 0.44
wholesale
and service Migrant 157745 30.67 91.94 1.09 104217 10.09 98.38 1.02
Agriculture, National 224 0.24 2.78 0.18 592 1.51 4.14 1.13
husbandry
and fishing Migrant 7825 1.52 97.22 1.15 13709 1.33 95.86 0.99
2 Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States: Oil Rent, Migrants and …
Occupations
for migrants National 22116 23.84 8.17 0.53 3829 9.77 0.58 0.16
Production
Migrant 248554 48.32 91.83 1.08 660392 63.95 99.42 1.03
National 36172 38.99 8.03 0.53 6133 15.65 0.78 0.21
Subtotal
Migrant 414124 80.51 91.97 1.09 778318 75.37 99.22 1.03
(continued)
21
Table 2.2 (continued)
22
Other National 1549 1.67 62.21 4.07 – – – –

occupational Migrant 941 0.18 37.79 0.45 – – – –
sectors
Nat iona l 9 27 69 15.28 3 91 77 3 .66
Total
Migra nt 5 14 34 5 84.72 1 03 26 89 96.34
Source Computed by the author from data of Central Informatic Organization (Bahrain) (2010) and Central Statistical Bureau (Kuwait) (n.d.)
Note Occupational categories differ from statistics of each of AGS. Occupational categories of this table are standardized through the following procedure. As to
Bahrain, original occupational categories consist of ‘Legislators, administration directors and managers, working proprietors’, ‘Scientific, technical and human
matters specialists’, ‘Scientific, technical and human subjects technicians’, ‘Clerical occupations’, ‘Sales occupations’, ‘Agriculture, stock-breeding, Agriculture
and hunting occupations’, ‘Industrial, chemical and food industries occupations’, ‘Principal and auxiliary engineering occupation’ and ‘Unknown’. Original
second and third occupational categories are merged into ‘Specialists and Technicians’ on this table, seventh and eighth categories are merged into ‘Production’.
Ninth category is represented ‘Other occupations’ in this table. The other original categories are represented as related categories on this table. As to Kuwait,
occupational categories consist of ‘Legislators, senior officials and managers’, ‘Professionals’, ‘Technicians and associate professionals’, ‘Clerks’, ‘Service
workers, shop and market sales workers’, ‘Skilled agricultural and fisher workers’, ‘Craft and related workers’, ‘Plant and machine operators and assemblers’,
‘Elementary occupations’, ‘Not Classified’. Original second and third categories are merged into ‘Specialists and Technicians’ on this table, seventh, eighth and
ninth categories are merged into ‘Production’ on this table. Tenth category is represented as ‘Other occupations’ on this table. The other original categories are
represented as related categories on this table
M. Matsuo
Table 2.3 National division of labour in Qatar in 2010 and Saudi Arabia in 2016
Qatar (2010) Saudi Arabia (2016)
Percentage Percentage Percentage of Percentage of

Occupational of the total of the the total the
sector/ Nationality Number workforce of occupational Number workforce of occupational
industry of nationals or sector Concentration of nationals or sector occupied Concentration
workers migrants occupied by workers migrants by either
employed in either employed in nationals or
the sector nationals or the sector migrants
migrants
Directors National 2563 21.96 8.17 10.59 146792 7.89 68.21 3.78
and
managers Migrant 28798 1.92 91.83 0.93 68401 0.81 31.79 0.39
Specialists National 5384 46.13 3.58 4.64 346952 18.65 29.16 1.62
and
Occupations technicians Migrant 144935 9.66 96.42 0.97 842768 9.97 70.84 0.86
for citizens National 1476 12.65 2.83 3.66 506611 27.24 85.70 4.75
Clerical work
Migrant 50723 3.38 97.17 0.98 84561 1.00 14.30 0.17
National 9423 80.74 4.03 5.22 1000355 53.78 50.12 2.78
Subtotal
Migrant 224456 14.96 95.97 0.97 995730 11.78 49.88 0.61
Retail, National 1166 9.99 0.85 1.11 577627 31.06 11.76 0.65
wholesale
and service Migrant 135230 9.01 99.15 1.00 4335231 51.31 88.24 1.08
Agriculture, National – – – – 4298 0.23 4.10 0.23
husbandry
Occupations and fishing Migrant 20266 1.35 100.00 1.01 100471 1.19 95.90 1.17
for migrants National 1082 9.27 0.10 0.12 246423 13.25 8.07 0.45
Production
Migrant 1120454 74.68 99.90 1.01 2808747 33.24 91.93 1.12
National 2248 19.26 0.18 0.23 828348 44.53 10.26 0.57
Subtotal
Migrant 1275950 85.04 99.82 1.01 7244449 85.74 89.74 1.09
(continued)
23
Table 2.3 (continued)
24
Other National – – – – 31306 1.68 13.02 0.72

occupational
sectors Migrant – – – – 209151 2.48 86.98 1.06
National 11671 0.77 1860009 18.04
Total
Migrant 1500406 99.23 8449330 81.96
Sources Computed by the author from data of Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar) (n.d. b) and General Authority for Statistics (Saudi
Arabia) (n.d.)
Note Occupational categories differs from statistics of each of AGS. Occupational categories of this table are standardized through the following procedure. As
to Qatar, original occupational categories consist of almost same categories of Kuwait as indicated in Table 2.2 except that ‘Not Classified’ does not exist in a
statistic of Qatar. The standardization procedure is same as Kuwait. As to Saudi Arabia, original occupational categories consist of ‘Directors and Managers’,
‘Specialists in professional, technical and humanitarian fields’, ‘Technicians in professional, technical and humanitarian fields’, ‘Clerical works’, ‘Careers
sale’, ‘Service occupations’, ‘Careers agriculture, animal husbandry, fishing and bird’, ‘Occupations industrial and chemical processes and food industries’,
‘Occupations of supporting basic engineering’, ‘Other occupations’. Original second and third categories are merged into ‘Specialists and Technicians’ on this
table, fifth and sixth occupations are merged into ‘Retail, Wholesale and Service’ on this table, seventh and eighth categories are merged into ‘Production’ on
this table. The other original categories are represented as related categories on this table
M. Matsuo
Kuwait and Qatar. The reverse trend can be seen for the agriculture, husbandry and
fishing sectors of Saudi Arabia where the concentration value for national workers
is 0.23, signifying that Saudi Arabian nationals rarely choose to be in these sectors
with migrant workers filling them instead.
A national division of labour by occupational sector is easily observed using
these tables. For example, in Kuwait (Table 2.2), while the concentration values
for national workers are 4.33 for directors and managers, 2.39 for specialists and
technicians, and 5.80 for clerical work, the values for migrants are 0.87, 0.95 and
0.82, respectively. These three occupational groups are obviously occupations largely
reserved for citizens only. On the other hand, while the values of concentration
for national workers for retail, wholesale and service, and production are 0.44 and
0.16, respectively, the respective values for migrants are 1.02 and 1.04. These two
occupational sectors could be considered to be occupations for migrants.
The national division of labour is shown as a common characteristic of the AGS.
In all four countries, the concentration values for the subtotals of nationals in occu-
pations for citizens are greater than 1, whereas the corresponding values for nationals
in occupations for migrants are less than 1. However, Bahrain differs from the other
countries in that in this country only, the occupational category of production (which
is considered to be an occupational sector for migrants) can be viewed as one of
the main occupations for national workers (23.84%). In Saudi Arabia, the occupa-
tional category of retail, wholesale and service (which is also considered to be an
occupational sector for migrants) is also one of the main occupations for nationals
(31.06%). The distinction between these two examples in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia
lies in the fact that there is a stark difference between these two industries.
Production workers are likely to be exposed to the economic phenomenon of
‘Dutch disease’. Dutch disease occurs in countries that receive large amounts of
exogenous capital inflow (usually from the discovery of a natural resource) that
hinders the growth of industries that produce tradable goods. When large amounts
of capital (such as oil wealth) flow into a country at a relatively rapid rate, the
country’s consumption of both of tradable and non-tradable goods is stimulated.
In turn this brings about price increases in non-tradable goods only as the supply
of non-tradable goods is less elastic than that of tradable goods and the country’s
currency appreciates swiftly. As a result, when a country receives a sizeable amount
of capital from other countries, investments are concentrated in industries related
to resources and non-tradable goods while tradable goods industries decline with a
growth in imports (Richards and Waterbury 2007). In order to respond to this decline
and to maintain their price competitiveness in the global market, the production and
manufacturing sectors tend to resort to lowering wages in an attempt to reduce costs.
In an oil-exporting country, production sector workers are more likely to suffer from
wage reductions, and this has the potential to become a source of intense social
unrest. If the government does not address this issue quickly and effectively, the
possibility of increased antigovernment sentiment may escalate. In comparison, the
service sector is largely different. In the presence of Dutch disease, non-tradable
sectors (including both the retail and service industries) attract more investments
26 M. Matsuo
and become the principal growth sector of the domestic economy with the inflow of
foreign capital.
From the labour market data available and an analysis of uprisings in the AGS
that took place at the time of the Arab Spring, the relationship between the level of
ethnocracy in place and the stability of the ruling regime of a particular country can
be inferred. In Kuwait and Qatar, an almost complete division of labour between
the public and private sectors is maintained, with the vast majority of citizens being
employed in the public sector—this allows these two countries to remain at the first
stage of labour division. The figures of concentration for occupations for citizens
are 3.15 in Kuwait and 5.22 in Qatar, while it is 2.78 for Saudi Arabia and 2.33
for Bahrain. In addition, Bahrain seems to have a significant proportion of citizens
employed in an occupational sector that is susceptible to the negative economic
effects of Dutch disease.
To confirm the validity of this inference, we introduce a time series analysis to
further understand the relationships between the intensity of national divisions of
labour and the resilience of authoritarian regimes. Because only Kuwait and Bahrain
disclose such statistical information, we compare these two countries. Though they
are selected due to the availability of statistical data, they are good comparative cases
as both have similarities in legislative structures, election systems and population
size. But there is one important difference: political stability. Kuwait is considered
to be politically stable while Bahrain is not. These similarities and differences are
helpful in determining the effect of ethnocracy on authoritarian stability.
2.3.2 Time Series Analysis
2.3.2.1 Kuwait
Table 2.4 shows the historical change in the proportion of national and migrant work-
ers for various occupational sectors in Kuwait. The figures for national workers that
exceed 20% of the national workforce are highlighted in grey (except for subtotals).
In 1957, it can be observed that most Kuwaiti nationals were employed in the retail,
wholesale and service sector (27.77%) and the production sector (39.41%). Together,
these two industries provided employment for more than 60% of all Kuwaiti nation-
als. Almost a decade later in 1965, employment of nationals in retail, wholesale and
service had risen to 44.18% while that for production had dropped to 23.77%, indi-
cating a shift from the employment of Kuwaitis in production. Until the mid-1970s,
occupational sectors in Kuwait were not seen as being specifically for either citizens
or migrants, as over 60% of Kuwaiti workers had been employed in occupations that
are now seen as being largely for migrants. This categorisation became clear in the
1980s.
In 1975, it can be observed that an upward climb on the occupational ladder had
already begun as national employment in production had decreased to 17.65% while
clerical work began to emerge as one of the main occupations for Kuwaiti nationals
Table 2.4 Historical change of the national division of labour in Kuwait, 1957–2010
Year
Occupational sector/ industry Nationality
1957 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2010
National 1.86 3.47 1.20 4.41 23.93 9.43 26.38
Directors and managers
Migrant 1.33 1.77 0.86 1.22 3.64 1.71 7.72
National 1.71 3.61 11.20 27.97 34.45 33.87 43.94
Specialists and technicians
Occupations Migrant 5.77 8.58 15.18 14.85 15.62 12.75 25.38
for citizens National 11.40 18.19 20.53 34.91 30.98 49.53 14.78
Clerical work
Migrant 7.73 8.89 9.54 9.40 5.01 6.36 3.03
National 14.96 41.04 32.93 67.30 89.36 92.83 85.10
Subtotal
Migrant 14.84 15.75 25.57 25.47 24.26 20.82 36.13
National 27.77 44.18 44.94 24.67 4.53 4.25 4.23
Retail, wholesale and service
Migrant 13.34 29.29 29.94 35.52 46.83 51.51 14.83
Agriculture, husbandry and National 2.18 1.78 4.48 0.28 0.19 0.04 1.40
fishing Migrant 1.18 2.05 1.80 2.20 2.25 2.78 1.93
Occupations
for migrants National 39.41 23.77 17.65 7.75 3.33 1.84 9.27
Production
Migrant 67.22 48.53 42.69 36.81 25.72 24.26 52.90
National 69.36 69.73 67.07 32.70 8.05 6.13 14.90

Subtotal
Migrant 81.73 79.87 74.43 74.53 74.80 78.55 69.66
National 15.68 5.00 0.00 – 2.60 1.04 –
Other occupational sectors
Migrant 3.43 0.89 0.00 – 0.95 0.63 –
National 33.16 23.08 29.14 14.27 19.10 18.46 5.17
Total Migrant 66.84 76.92 70.86 85.73 80.90 81.54 94.83
Sources Computed by author using data from Central Statistical Office (Kuwait) (1979, 1996, 2007) and Central Statistical Bureau (Kuwait) (n.d)
Note Occupational categories are compiled from original statistical data. The method of compilation is explained in the note of Table 2.2. Data for occupations
represented as ‘Other occupations’ as to 1985 and 2010 do not exist in the original statistics
27
28 M. Matsuo
(20.53% in 1975 and 34.91% in 1985) along with specialists and technicians (from
11.20% in 1975 to 27.97% in 1985, and 34.45% in 1995). By 1995, a sharp drop
had occurred with employment of Kuwaiti nationals in the retail, wholesale and
service sector dropping to under 5% and continuing at this level until the present.
Similarly, the rate of Kuwait nationals in the production sector also decreased during
this period. By 1995, it can be seen that this change in occupations for Kuwaiti
nationals had accelerated. The main occupations for Kuwaitis were now directors
and managers (23.93%), specialists and technicians (34.45%) and clerical workers
(30.98%), while only 4.53 and 3.33% were in the retail, wholesale and service and
production sectors, respectively. This upward transition still continued up to 2010
and is visible in Table 2.4 as an upward path to the right, highlighted by the grey
cells of the table.
It is important to note that this upward occupational transition of Kuwaitis was not
achieved by downscaling the production sector. Although not specified in the table,
the number of workers employed in production has increased steadily from 1,056,000
in 1975, 2,164,000 in 1985, 2,264,000 in 2005, to 3,731,000 in 2010. This signifies
that the upward transition was achieved by replacing national workers employed in
lower-level occupations with cheaper migrant workers, in addition to creating jobs in
higher-level occupations that were filled primarily by national workers only. Some
attentive readers may notice the growth of the national workers in the production
sector in 2010. It increased 7.43% points comparing to 2005. At this time, one cannot
conclude whether this indicates a new trend in the division of labour in Kuwait. The
analysis of this chapter is based on the newest statistical data so that continuous
observation of this issue is required. However, it seems not to have seriously affected
Kuwaiti politics, because almost 90% of Kuwaiti workers were absorbed in the public
sector (see Fig. 2.1) and the figure for Kuwaiti workers working in production in the
private sector (9.27%) is less than 1% of total Kuwaiti workers.
2.3.2.2 Bahrain
Table 2.5 shows the changes in the national division of labour of nationals and
migrants in Bahrain from 1959 to 2010. It experienced a similar trajectory as Kuwait’s
labour market up to the 1970s. In 1959 and 1971, Bahraini workers were employed
mainly in both the retail, wholesale and service and production sectors. In 1981, the
proportion of Bahraini workers employed in clerical work reached 21.59%, while
in 1991, the proportion of nationals employed as specialists and technicians had
increased to 21.39%. However, the proportion of Bahrain nationals in the production
sector did not decrease as it did in Kuwait but instead remained at around 22% from
1991 to 2010. Considering that the actual number of workers in the production sector
increased slightly from 192,000 in 1991 to 221,000 in 2010, it can be assumed that a
portion of the workers who had been employed in production remained in the sector
with new entrants also arriving.
This is in contrast to the gradual decline in the proportion of nationals in retail,
wholesale and service where wages are generally considered to better than those in the
Table 2.5 Changes in the national division of labour in Bahrain, 1959–2010
Year
Occupation Nationality
1959 1971 1981 1991 2001 2010
National – 1.47 1.47 11.77 12.88 25.11
Directors and managers
Migrant – 2.19 1.61 2.69 2.77 5.19
National 4.20 7.72 14.35 21.39 24.40 14.27
Specialists and technicians
Occupations for Migrant 7.63 8.73 10.00 11.62 8.37 3.41
citizens National 9.50 10.53 21.59 19.07 20.36 19.96
Clerical work
Migrant 12.75 5.72 6.69 4.03 3.41 1.36
National 13.70 19.72 37.40 52.23 57.64 59.34
Subtotal
Migrant 20.38 16.64 18.30 18.33 14.55 19.30
National 25.50 23.16 23.03 21.56 19.66 14.91
Retail, wholesale and service
Migrant 23.77 29.31 28.71 34.52 26.76 30.67
Agriculture, husbandry and National 12.07 8.33 4.88 1.60 0.81 0.24
fishing Migrant 3.26 4.98 2.76 3.13 25.57 1.52
Occupations for
migrants National 23.42 45.93 33.79 23.74 21.51 23.84
Production
Migrant 11.35 48.76 50.21 43.80 31.34 48.32
National 61.00 77.41 61.69 46.90 41.98 38.99
Subtotal
Migrant 38.39 83.05 81.68 81.46 83.67 80.51

National 25.30 2.87 0.91 0.87 0.38 1.67
Other occupations Migrant 41.23 0.32 0.01 0.21 1.78 0.18
National 65.65 62.72 41.47 37.44 32.08 15.28
Total Migrant 34.35 37.28 58.53 62.56 67.92 84.72
Sources Statistical Bureau, Bahrain (1969, 1972), Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain (1982), Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain (1993, 2001), Central
Informatics Organisation, General Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain (2001, 2010)
Note Occupational categories in this table were compiled from the original statistical data used. The method of compilation is outlined in the note for Table 2.2.
The data for 1959 only include male workers. In 1959, the statistics included the occupational category ‘administrative and clerical’ that was not in the original
29
statistics for other years. It is represented in this table as ‘clerical work’

30 M. Matsuo
Table 2.6 Average wages in Bahrain of nationals and non-nationals in the production sector
between 1983 and 2006
Occupational sector Nationality 1983–1984 1994–1995 2005–2006
Specialists and technicians National 7213.20 11,237.30 10,373.30
Migrant 11,412.10 15,352.00 6838.30
Production National 4362.80 6524.80 7318.40
Migrant 5639.50 9455.90 6361.80
Source Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain (1984, 1999, 2001), Central Informatics Organisa-
tion, General Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain (2009)
Note Figures are represented in the local currency. Figures of average wages are substituted by
average income of wages and salaries of head of the household. In the original data, those in the
‘specialists and technicians’ category in this table were originally represented as ‘professional,
technical and related workers’ and those in the ‘production’ sector in this table were originally
represented as ‘production and related workers’
production sector. These historical changes in the Bahraini labour market indicate that
in around 1990 the country experienced a divergence of the occupational movement
into two paths. The first path was an upward progression of Bahrainis into higher-
level occupations (such as clerical work or specialists and technicians) and fellow
citizens entering the labour market who then joined them. The second path concerned
Bahrainis who remained in the production sector and the other new national entrants
that joined them. This divergence represents a striking contrast to Kuwait where
the majority of citizens experienced an upward transition in occupations with most
citizens withdrawing from lower-level occupations that were then filled by foreign
migrants. The history of the labour market in Bahrain illustrates the negative effects
of the oil economy, which increased disparity among citizens.
However, even if there were a divergence, the disparity among citizens could
be prevented if a split labour market was established. Because a split labour mar-
ket institutionalises different wages within the same level of occupation, citizens
employed in lower-level sectors (considered occupations for migrants) can be allo-
cated the same wage as citizens employed in higher-level sectors (occupations for
citizens) to compensate for any disparity. This requires an examination of occupa-
tional wage statistics for Bahrain. Unfortunately, they do not exist. Instead, we looked
at household surveys from 1983 to 2005 and used income data concerning the heads
of households of those employed in the occupations in question as a proxy for data
on wages. Table 2.6 shows the change in incomes of those who were employed in
the production sector and specialists and technicians, which were the main occupa-
tions for Bahraini nationals from 1983 to 2005. It indicates that wages of Bahrainis
employed in the production sector were 1.4–1.7 times less than Bahrainis employed
as specialists and technicians. Thus, a split labour market did not exist. Furthermore,
Bahraini workers earned smaller wages on average than migrants until 2005–2006.
These figures suggest that Bahraini workers in the production sector not only suffered
from the inequality between citizens but were also at a disadvantage with migrant
workers as well.
2.4 Discussion
The analyses above disclose that a national division of labour in Kuwait was estab-
lished in both the public and private sectors. In the private sector, citizens experienced
an upward transition in occupations from the 1970s until the early 1990s. In con-
trast, in Bahrain, the public sector could absorb around 40% of national workers at
most, while in the private sector some nationals experienced similar transitions into
higher-level jobs, whereas others were left behind in occupations where they were
more likely to be exposed to Dutch disease than their fellow citizens. The results of
this analysis strongly suggest that Kuwait remains at the first stage of the division
of labour. The division between public and private sectors seems to have worked
comprehensively. Thus, the number of national workers in the private sector is small
enough that private companies can bear the higher cost of employing Kuwaiti nation-
als at the cost of decreasing the salaries for migrants. Bahrain, on the other hand,
advanced past this private/public division of labour. As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, around
60% of national workers in Bahrain were working in the private sector as of 2010,
incurring a cost that is too large for corporations and businesses to bear, even with
reducing migrants’ wages.
The differences between Kuwait and Bahrain are also reflected in the political
histories of the two countries. From the 1950s to 1960s, antigovernment movements
were active in both Kuwait and Bahrain, as was common in all the AGS. Chalcraft
(2011) explains that antigovernment movements were based on Arab nationalism
as, during this period, the AGS depended heavily on workers from Egypt, Syria
and Palestine, countries which were the sources of such ideologies. As a result of
the oil boom of the 1970s, AGS governments were able to introduce rent allocation
policies to pacify antigovernment movements, in addition to the de-Arabisation of
migrants due to the influx of workers from Asian countries in the 1980s. Although
such an explanation may be feasible, it cannot account for why dissident movements
in Bahrain were reactivated in the 1990s and continued into the 2000s when the
de-Arabisation of migrants had been completed.
In this respect, the analyses in this chapter offer another explanation. First, from the
1970s to the 1990s, some Bahraini citizens moved into upper-level professions and
subsequently their lives improved. Such improvements urged potential dissidents
to be co-opted into pro-governmental groups, or at the very least to refrain from
criticising the government given the prospect that allocation policies would continue
with the benefits of these policies reaching all Bahrainis. However, what followed
was a polarisation between one group of Bahrainis that completed the transition
into more desirable jobs and another that remained in low-level occupations; thus,
the disparity among citizens was enlarged, causing a resurgence of antigovernment
movements in the 1990s and later.
Apart from the significant presence of migrants, there are indications that sectar-
ianism between Shi‘as and Sunnis contributed to political turmoil in Bahrain at the
time of the Arab Spring. It is recognised (even without official demographic data)
that while Shi‘a Muslims comprise 65–70% of the indigenous population in Bahrain
32 M. Matsuo
(Winckler 2017), the ruling families and their supporters are Sunnis. Such sectari-
anism causes serious conflict. Many political conflicts in this region are explained
by sectarianism, but it is not likely to have been the main cause of the political tur-
moil in Bahrain after 2011. Based on a large sample survey, it can be confirmed that
the Bahrain government implemented policies to strengthen sectarianism in order to
prevent the establishment of cross-sect coalitions against the regime (Gengler 2015).
This coincides with the argument that anti-regime movements in the AGS initially
included both sects, but the intervention of ruling regimes altered these conflicts
which became increasingly sectarian (Matthiesen 2013). Recent studies argue that
sectarianism is not the main cause of conflicts, but once a conflict happens it is
then sectarianised (Hashemi and Postel 2017; Matthiesen 2017). This suggests that
despite the appearance of sectarian opposition, the cause is not sectarianism itself
as the real trigger is accumulated discontent with the government. In Kuwait, most
citizens had already completed an upward occupational transition by the 1990s and
enjoyed a privileged status at the expense of lower-paid foreign migrants, so any
antigovernment sentiments were easily contained. It is probable that the difference
between Kuwait and Bahrain and the degree of ethnocracy enforced through a divi-
sion of labour lies simply in their oil revenues. As Kuwait has sizeable oil revenues
and can afford to hire citizens in the public sector, the number of citizens working in
the private sector is relatively small and private enterprises can bear the higher cost
of hiring nationals over migrants.
2.5 Conclusion
In a nationally segmented labour market, rent allocation policies allow for ethnocratic
privileges to be bestowed on citizens, fostering a greater sense of dependency on the
ruling government. Migrant workers play a role in sustaining authoritarian regimes
given that as long as economic conditions allow for it, citizens remain in the public
sector in higher-level jobs while migrants are employed in lower-paid occupations.
The system that is in place in Kuwait—the transfer of national workers to more
stable higher-paid occupations and the filling of less favourable lower-paid jobs with
migrant workers—establishes a national division of labour which becomes the core
of ethnocracy.
The collapse of ethnocracy in Bahrain indicates that it is not a perpetual institution.
When the inflow of foreign capital is insufficient to continue supporting the public
sector, some citizens are forced to enter the private sector. Because the higher cost of
hiring citizens in the private sector is borne by companies themselves, the upper limit
of hiring nationals at higher wages is dependent on the profits of the private sector.
This means that if the domestic economy grows at a faster rate than the national
workforce, private enterprises can earn enough profits to afford to hire nationals,
even after oil revenues decrease. However, if this is not the case, citizens cannot
enjoy ethnocratic premiums that they once did. From the labour market analysis
presented here, the case of Bahrain implies that a sudden revenue shortage (such as
a fall in oil prices) will not bring about an authoritarian breakdown and the rise of
antigovernment movements. Rather, it is understood that this requires the gradual
build-up of discontent due to disparities between citizens over a span of several
decades.
The process of establishing ethnocracy was one that came about in the Gulf
region as the AGS became heavily reliant on oil revenues. Only rentier states that
can establish this system are capable of then resolving the problems that come with
the oil economy and stabilise their authoritarian regimes. The comparison between
Kuwait and Bahrain serves as a good example.
References
Beblawi, Hazem. 1987. The rentier state in the Arab world. In The rentier state, ed. Hazem Beblawi
and Giacomo Luciani, 49–62. London: Croom Helm.
Birks, J.S., and C.A. Sinclair. 1980. International migration and development in the Arab region.
Geneva: International Labour Office.
Central Department of Statistics, Saudi Arabia. 1965. Statistical yearbook, first issue. Riyadh:
Central Department of Statistics, Saudi Arabia.
Central Department of Statistics, Saudi Arabia. 1970. Statistical yearbook, sixth issue. Riyadh:
Central Department of Statistics, Saudi Arabia. 1980. Statistical yearbook, sixteenth issue. Riyadh:
Central Informatics Organisation, General Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain. 2001. Census 2001.
Manama: Central Informatics Organisation, General Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain.
Central Informatics Organisation, General Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain. 2009. Household
expenditure and income survey 2005/06. Bahrain: Central Informatics Organisation, General
Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain.
Central Informatics Organisation, General Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain. 2010. Census 2010.
Manama: Central Informatics Organisation, General Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain.
Central Statistical Bureau, Kuwait. 2013. Annual statistical abstract 2012. Kuwait City: Central
Statistical Bureau, Kuwait.
Central Statistical Bureau, Kuwait. 2015. Annual statistical abstract 2014. Kuwait City: Central
Statistical Bureau, Kuwait.
Central Statistical Office, Kuwait. 1980. Annual statistical abstract 1979. Kuwait City: Central
Statistical Office, Kuwait.
Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain. 1984. Household expenditure and income survey 1983/84.
Manama: Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain.
Central Statistical Organisation, Qatar. 1991. Annual abstract 11th issue. Doha: Central Statistical
Organisation, Qatar.
Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain. 1993. Population, housing, buildings and establishments
census 1991. Manama: Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain.
34 M. Matsuo
Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain. 1999. Household expenditure and income survey 1994/95.
Bahrain: Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain.
Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain. 2001. Population, housing, buildings and establishments
census 2001. Manama: Central Statistics Organisation, Bahrain.
Chalcraft, John. 2011. Migration and popular protest in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf in the
1950s and 1960s. International Labour and Working-Class History 79: 28–47.
Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain. 1982. Bahrain census of population and housing 1981. Manama:
Directorate of Statistics, Bahrain.
General Authority for Statistics, Saudi Arabia. 2017. Labour market 2017 first quarter report.
Riyadh: General Authority for Statistics, Saudi Arabia.
Gengler, Justin. 2015. Group conflict and political mobilisation in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf:
Rethinking the rentier state. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hashemi, Nader, and Danny Postel (eds.). 2017. Sectarianization: Mapping the new politics of the
Middle East. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Herb, Michael. 1999. All in the family: Absolutism, revolution, and democracy in Middle Eastern
monarchies. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Hertog, Steffen. 2012. A comparative assessment of labor market nationalization policies in the
GCC. In National employment, migration and education in the GCC, ed. Steffen Hertog, 75–115.
Berlin: Gerlach Press.
Hertog, Steffen (ed.). 2013. National employment, migration and education in the GCC. Berlin:
Gerlach Press.
Information & eGovernment Authority, Bahrain. 2015. Economic characteristics, result of cen-
sus, census 2010. Information & eGovernment Authority, Bahrain. http://www.data.gov.bh/en/
ResourceCenter. Accessed 1 October 2018.
Kamrava, Mehran, and Zahra Babar (eds.). 2012. Migrant labour in the Persian Gulf. London:
Hurst & Company.
Khalaf, Abdulhadi, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh. 2015. Transit states: Labour, migration
and citizenship in the Gulf. London: Pluto Press.
Khalaf, Sulayman, and Saad Alkobaisi. 1999. Migrants’ strategies of coping and patterns of accom-
modation in the oil-rich Gulf societies: Evidence from the UAE. British Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 26 (2): 271–298.
Longva, Anh Nga. 2005. Neither autocracy nor democracy but ethnocracy: Citizens, expatriates
and the socio-political system in Kuwait. In Monarchies and nations: Globalisation and identity
in the Arab states of the Gulf, ed. Paul Dresch and James Piscatori, 114–135. London: I.B. Tauris.
Looney, Robert E. 1994. Manpower policies and development in the Persian Gulf region. Westport:
Praeger.
Luciani, Giacomo. 1987. Allocation vs. production states: A theoretical framework. In The rentier
state, ed. Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, 63–82. London: Croom Helm.
Matthiesen, Toby. 2013. Sectarian Gulf: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Spring that wasn’t.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Matthiesen, Toby. 2017. Sectarianization as securitisation: Identity politics and counter-revolution
in Bahrain. In Sectarianization: Mapping the new politics of the Middle East, ed. Nader Hashemi
and Danny Postel, 199–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mazrui, Ali A. 1975. Soldiers and kinsmen in Uganda: The making of a military ethnocracy. Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage.
Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar. 2011. Annual statistical abstract 2011.
Doha: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar.
Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar. 2015a. Bulletin—Labour force statistics,
2015. Doha: Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar.
Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar. 2015b. Labour force statistics bulletin
2015. Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics, Qatar.
Ministry of Labour, Saudi Arabia. 2008. Al-Kitāb al-ih.sāı̄ al-sanawı̄ li-l-‘āmm al-mālı̄ 1427–1428
h [Annual statistical book for the fiscal year of 1427/1428 h]. Riyadh: Ministry of Labour, Saudi
Arabia.
Ministry of National Economy, Oman. 2001. Statistical yearbook 2000. Muscat: Ministry of
National Economy, Oman.
National Centre for Statistics and Information, Oman. 2017. Statistical yearbook 2017. Muscat:
National Centre for Statistics and Information, Oman.
Parolin, Gianluca P. 2009. Citizenship in the Arab world: Kin, religion and nation-state. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press.
Qatar Statistics Authority. 2007. Annual abstract. Doha: Qatar Statistics Authority.
Richards, Alan, and John Waterbury. 2007. A political economy of the Middle East, 3rd ed. Boulder:
Westview Press.
Ross, Michael L. 2013. The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority. 2000. Thirty sixth annual report. Riyadh: Saudi Arabian Mon-
etary Authority.
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority. 2003. Thirty ninth annual report. Riyadh: Saudi Arabian Mon-
etary Authority.
Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority. 2018. Annual statistics 2017. http://www.sama.gov.sa/en-US/
EconomicReports/Pages/YearlyStatistics.aspx. Accessed 1 Oct 2018.
Statistical Bureau, Bahrain. 1969. The fourth population census of Bahrain: A brief analytical and
comparative study. Manama: Statistical Bureau, Bahrain.
Statistical Bureau, Bahrain. 1972. Statistics of the population census 1971. Manama: Statistical
Bureau, Bahrain.
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. 2014. Qatar and the Arab spring: Policy drivers and regional implica-
tions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weinstein, Eric. 2002. Migration for the benefit of all: Towards a new paradigm for economic
immigration. International Labour Review 141 (3): 225–252.
Winckler, Onn. 2017. Arab political demography: Population growth, labour migration and natalist
politics. Rev. 3rd ed. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
Yom, Sean L., and F. Gregory Gause III. 2014. Resilient royals: How Arab monarchies hang on.
In Democratization and authoritarianism in the Arab world, ed. Larry Diamond, and Marc F.
Plattner, 112–126. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Masaki Matsuo is an associate professor at the School of International Studies, Utsunomiya

University, Japan. He has researched the political economy of the Middle East, focusing on the
relationship between the redistribution of oil wealth and authoritarian regimes. He uses both qual-
itative field research and quantitative statistical analysis. His publications include the following:
Authoritarianism and labour market: preference of labour policies in the Arab Gulf countries. IDE
Discussion Paper 514 (2015); and Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf states: Preliminary analysis of
recent labour market. Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 4 (2011).
Chapter 3
Empowerment of Migrant Domestic
Workers: Muslim Filipinas in the United
Arab Emirates
Masako Ishii
Abstract This chapter examines the empowerment of Muslim Filipina domestic

workers (MFDWs) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with reference to the analyt-
ical framework of Naila Kabeer. Her definition of empowerment highlights ‘choice’
as its central concept—the processes by which ‘those who have been denied the
capacity for choice gain this capacity’. I refer to three of Kabeer’s distinctions relat-
ing to the consequences of choices: (1) trivial choices we make on a mundane basis,
every day of our lives; (2) significant or more strategic life choices that have pro-
found consequences for both the overall quality and direction of the lives; and (3)
choices to negotiate with the broader structure of inequality. Based on interviews and
dialogue with the MFDWs, the discussion examines their empowerment in the social
context of inclusion in the UAE labour market as a result of exclusion from the local
labour market in the Philippines, as well as both inclusion and exclusion in the UAE
host society and opportunities that arise from being excluded from both Philippine
society and the host society. MFDWs are at the lowest layer of the UAE’s labour
market given the hierarchical structure that divides its society by nationality, gender
and class. On the other hand, social safety nets exist among low-skilled labourers
on this bottom layer, as well as among loosely formed Filipino communities. By
accumulating a wealth of experience living and working in the UAE for prolonged
periods, these MFDWs acquire survival strategies in how to access these safety nets.
However, their increased scope of choice is yet to negotiate the broader structure of
inequality.
Keywords United Arab Emirates · Domestic workers · Women’s empowerment ·

Philippines · Migration · Muslims
M. Ishii (B)
College of Intercultural Communication, Rikkyo University, Tokyo, Japan
e-mail: masang@rikkyo.ac.jp

38 M. Ishii
3.1 Introduction
In March 2016, I met Radjina, a 33-year-old Sangil woman, who was divorced
without children.1 She described being contented with her current labour conditions
as a domestic worker in Dubai. Radjina is a Muslim Filipina who had repeatedly
worked as a domestic worker for over 15 years with seven different employers in
various Arab Gulf states (AGS) and had never been fully satisfied with her previous
labour conditions.2 ‘Alhamdulillah, I finally found a decent job,’ she told me. She
was working for the family of a Greek man married to an Persian woman3 who were
living in an apartment in Palm Jumeirah, an affluent neighbourhood and one of the
richest residential areas in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The family had one child
and the apartment only had a few rooms; Radjina remarked that her workload was
fairly manageable. Her salary was AED2000 (approximately US$540) per month.
She was regularly paid, allowed to have her own mobile phone and was given one
day off per week. Radjina’s devotion to Islam had increased while she was living and
working in the AGS, and her employers respected her religion and did not attempt
to interfere in this regard—she said that her employers were very kind.
In 1995, I began research on Muslim Filipinas from the Sarangani region of the
Philippines (Fig. 3.1) who became domestic workers in the Middle East (including
in the AGS).4 And in 2015, I first encountered some Muslim Filipina domestic
workers (MFDWs) such as Radjina.5 Prior to 2015, most of the MFDWs I had met
were not well paid (usually only receiving around US$200 per month), had no days
off, endured long hours of work and had their movements and communications
restricted. The minimum initial processing fee for a domestic worker in the Middle
1 Radjina is a pseudonym as are all names that appear in this chapter. Muslim Filipinos comprise
more than ten ethnolinguistic groups that are collectively called Moros. Sangil is one of the Muslim
ethnolinguistic groups of the Philippines, and they mainly reside in General Santos City, Sarangani
province and Davao del Sur province.
2 In this chapter, the AGS refers to the six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC):
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
3 Radjina mentioned that the wife is Persian, and I assumed that she was originally from Iran.
4 In this chapter, the Sarangani region refers to both General Santos City and Sarangani province.
The combined population in 2015 was approximately 1,138,000 (General Santos City: 594,000;
Sarangani province: 544,000) (Philippine Statistics Authority 2016a).
5 This chapter is based on field research that I conducted from March 1995 to March 1996 when
staying in the Muslim-populated area of Sarangani region on Mindanao island in the southern
Philippines. Here I interviewed several Muslim women who had returned home from the Middle
East (Ishii 2002). I also conducted a survey of Muslim Filipina overseas workers by revisiting
the Sarangani region for short periods from 2001 to 2004 and from 2008 to 2009 (Ishii 2005,
2011). During 4–17 February 2009, I visited the UAE and interviewed 26 MFDWs and a member
organisation of a Philippine non-governmental organisation (NGO) (Ishii 2011). In 2015, 2016
and 2017, I visited the UAE for several days to interview more Muslim Filipina overseas workers
who were employed there. These interviews were conducted in a mixture of English, Tagalog and
Cebuano. Radjina eventually returned home to the Philippines after I interviewed her in 2016.
3 Empowerment of Migrant Domestic Workers: Muslim Filipinas in … 39
Fig. 3.1 Sarangani region, the Philippines
East ranged from PHP5000 to PHP10,000 (US$100–200) in 2009.6 In total, most

domestic workers were charged around two to three months’ salary as their processing
fee, which they were supposed repay once they began working in the host country
(Ishii 2005, 2011). In this chapter, I refer to this type of MFDW as a type A MFDW.
On the other hand, what Radjina managed to obtain was: (1) a regular and reason-
able income for a decent living standard back home in the Philippines; (2) a private
space outside of the ‘workplace/home’ where she could enjoy building upon social
relationships, meet new acquaintances and also gain different experiences; and (3)
a safe and secure working environment. According to Naila Kabeer, these are some
6 As provided by POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 6, Series of 2006, overseas domestic work-
ers are not supposed to pay any placement fee (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) 2013). However, the charging of the processing fee to the applicants of overseas domestic
workers has been commonly practised in the Philippines. What is included in the processing fee
varies. For example, some include airfare, processing fee for the passport, accommodation expenses
in Manila before departure and so on. According to the spokesperson of a non-governmental organ-
isation, Migrante International, quoted in the online journal Rappler: ‘One of the most common
violations of RA 8042 is the placement fee. The policy is clear but many recruitment agencies still
charge (high rates). Actually, they just change the name’ (Santos and Tomacruz 2017).
40 M. Ishii
of the most vital elements that contribute to women’s empowerment (Kabeer 2016:
395). I refer to the MFDWs who have succeeded in securing these three conditions
as type B MFDWs.7
This chapter examines the empowerment of MFDWs in the UAE by referring to
the analytical framework of Kabeer’s work (Kabeer 1999, 2001, 2011, 2012, 2016,
2017). Her definition of empowerment ‘takes choice as its central concept’ (Kabeer
2012: 2). According to Kabeer, empowerment ‘refers to the processes by which those
who have been denied the capacity for choice gain this capacity’ (Kabeer 2012: 2,
2017: 650). In order to examine the empowerment of MFDWs, I refer to the three
distinctions made by Kabeer that relate to the consequences of choices: (1) trivial
choices we make on a mundane basis every day of our lives; (2) significant or more
strategic life choices that have profound consequences for the overall quality and
direction of our lives; and (3) choices that negotiate with the broader structures of
inequality (Kabeer 2012: 3).
To assess women’s empowerment as participants in the labour market, Kabeer
argues that it is important to situate women’s agency in the forces of labour market
inclusion and exclusion (Kabeer 2001). In other words, she frames the analysis of
women’s empowerment by assessing whether their ability to make choices is either
increased or diminished by participating in the labour market. This chapter refers
to Kabeer’s methodology to examine the empowerment of MFDWs in the social
context of inclusion in the UAE labour market that has arisen as a result of exclusion
from the local labour market of the Philippines, as well as inclusion and exclusion
in the UAE and the various opportunities that have arisen out of exclusion in their
home and host country.
7 The salary level of migrant workers varies according to nationality even though these workers are
engaged in the same kind of work, as their pay is determined by the wage levels of their country of
origin. Among Filipina domestic workers, the salary of Christian Filipinas is usually US$400 and
above per month, as they are considered to have a higher education level and a more modern lifestyle.
Most Muslim Filipinas were hired with a salary of US$200 per month as they were believed to be
less educated (Ishii 2005, 2011). In 2015, I began to encounter Muslim Filipinas who had worked in
the AGS for long periods and were on the same wage level as Christian Filipinas (as was the case of
Radjina). On 16 December 2006, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) set
in place the implementation of a protection and welfare enhancement reform package for Filipino
household workers and set the minimum wage for these workers at above US$400 per month. This
reform was launched because the Philippine government considered it a significant problem that
many of the country’s domestic workers in the AGS were hired at low wages of around US$200 per
month. In 2009, the MFDWs I began interviewing in the UAE were not aware of the reform package
guidelines. The Philippine government has been engaged in a continuous bilateral negotiation with
the AGS and improved wages of MFDWs may be partly due to these negotiations. In June 2014,
the UAE’s Ministry of Interior introduced new standard contracts for domestic workers that led to
a significant reduction in the Philippine government’s role in verifying and ensuring fair contracts;
the Philippine government responded by halting the hiring of Filipino domestic workers by the UAE
(Libo-on 2014). As a result, there has been a shortage of Filipino domestic workers in the UAE,
which may also have caused an increase in the salaries of domestic workers who were already in
the country.
The majority of Muslim Filipinas in the Sarangani region are excluded in the
local labour market due to their lower educational level and discrimination against
Muslims that is prevalent in Philippine society. Therefore, becoming a domestic
worker is one of the very limited options that these women have in order to obtain
a decent income to have a satisfactory standard of living in their original society.
In the UAE, where Islam and Muslim identity are widely appreciated in national
and public spaces, Muslim Filipinas are not discriminated against because of their
religion. Nevertheless, their religious affiliation does not necessarily entail inclusion
in the host society as well as the labour market. Rather, nationality and class delineate
the boundary of social inclusion and exclusion to a much greater degree than religion.
It has been argued that the existence of strong NGO activism would contribute to
the empowerment of migrant domestic workers by encouraging them to engage in
protests to uphold and protect their rights (Constable 2009). In the AGS, however,
displays of overt activism are absent because this kind of engagement is strictly
prohibited (Gamburd 2010). Instead, informal support activities have been developed
among Filipino workers and low-skilled and vulnerable migrants by NGOs (Ishii
2014; Kathiravelu 2016). The development of such unofficial safety nets reflects
the reality that the official protection policies and schemes of both the sending and
receiving countries are far from sufficient to resolve the widespread mistreatment of
migrant workers in the region. In order to understand the empowerment of migrant
domestic workers in the AGS, it is important to consider the aid networks which
function as safety nets for vulnerable workers, especially in emergency situations.
Compared with type A MFDWs, type B MFDWs have a greater ability to familiarise
themselves with these sources of aid and survival strategies which, in turn, enhance
their ability to make greater economic and social choices.
The existence of unofficial support systems has been highlighted by the growing
ethnographic and qualitative research on migrant domestic workers in the AGS.
Mark Johnson conducted an empirical study on Muslim Filipinos in Saudi Arabia
and writes about how the ‘presence of compatriots, co-ethnic and kin significantly
enhances migrant domestic workers’ option and opportunities’ (Johnson 2011: 460).
Compared with other overseas destinations of Filipino migrant workers, the AGS is
distinct in that these workers engage in a wider range of occupations, from domestic
workers to professionals, than in other foreign countries (Johnson 2010; Hosoda
2013). Because the labour market is hierarchically segregated by nationality, safety
nets to help compatriots (kababayan) develop (Hosoda 2013). I have previously
demonstrated how vulnerable MFDWs resort to the safety net of informal support
activities (Ishii 2014).
This informal space in the AGS is important for migrant domestic workers; it is
from here that they gain new knowledge and survival strategies to be empowered
and to enhance their ‘power to choose’ (Kabeer 2001). MFDWs like Radjina, who
had spent an extensive period in the AGS as a type A MFDW and experienced much
mistreatment at the hands of her employers, learn survival strategies including how
to gain access to informal support networks. With valuable knowledge gleaned from
many years of living and working in the Gulf, they have transitioned into type B
MFDWs—a position where they have more freedom and control over the employers
42 M. Ishii
they choose to work for as well as greater economic power, privacy, autonomy and
opportunities to gain even more experience. Despite their improved choices, they
are yet to negotiate with the broader structure of inequality, which continues to
deprive them of alternative career and life choices other than being overseas domestic
workers.
In the AGS, migrant workers largely remain silent on the everyday injustices
caused by the asymmetrical and unequal power relations that exist between local
employers and foreign employees. International human rights organisations have
widely criticised the long-standing abuse and exploitation that the hierarchical soci-
eties of the Gulf have exerted on migrants. Thus, the role of the human rights organ-
isations is important for giving a voice to the voiceless and advocating change to
structures of inequality which continually marginalise migrant workers.
It is also essential to examine how the empowerment of migrant women’s agency
can be constrained or advanced by their experiences of ‘powerlessness’ and inequal-
ity. At the same time, it is also crucial to understand why these feelings of inequality
are difficult to translate into feelings of injustice, which contributes to the continued
perpetuation of an unequal society (cf. Longva 1997: 181).
3.2 Inclusion in the Foreign Labour Market of the AGS

as a Result of Exclusion in the Local Labour Market
of the Philippines
The Philippines is a predominantly Christian country with a Muslim population

that is mainly concentrated in Mindanao island, Palawan and the Sulu archipelago,
in southern Philippines. Muslims in the Philippines constitute the largest minority
group, comprising 5–6% of the total population of around 101 million (Philippine
Statistics Authority 2015). The Muslim-populated areas in the Philippines are among
the most impoverished regions in the country. This is due to the armed insurgency
that has been fought between the (largely Muslim) Moro separatist groups and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).8 Politically marginalised and economically
deprived in their own ancestral land, discontented Moros formed the first separatist
group around 1970 and have since waged rebellion against the government to attain
the right to self-determination, representation and a greater sense of autonomy in the
Christian-dominated state, a struggle that continues to this day.
Due to repeated evacuations caused by the prolonged conflict, many children in
the region have stopped attending school, resulting in low educational attainment
among Muslims in comparison to Christians. This is a further hindrance to satis-
factory employment in the local labour market, where strong discrimination against
Muslims has persisted for decades, especially in the Sarangani region as the majority
8 The violent clash that has been waged between the Maute group, which has sworn allegiance to
the Islamic State militant group, and the AFP from 23 May to 23 October 2017 has added to the
religious tension and conflict in southern Philippines.
of the population there is Christian. Moreover, increased Islamophobia, due to the

11 September 2001 attacks on the United States, terrorist violence and the spread of
violent extremism from the Middle East have made it even harder for Muslim men
and women to be hired locally in southern Philippines.
Radjina’s statement below details the reasoning behind her decision to become a
MFDW. She graduated from a high school in the Sarangani region in 1999 and then
engaged in tinda-tinda (selling goods informally in public markets) of vegetables
and helped her father to grow vegetables.
In the Philippines, you cannot find job. Even though you graduate from college you cannot
find a good job and you are made to stand by. Even if you apply, you are not hired if
you are a Muslim. In the Philippines, it is difficult to apply for a job if you are a Muslim.
Your applications are all rejected. Therefore, if you are a Muslim, you feel more like going
abroad. They say that Muslims are problematic. Once, I applied [a job vacancy] at Gaisano
[a shopping mall in General Santos City]. However, you needed to wear a sexy uniform,
and there were other requirements. I did not take the job. Then I engaged in tinda-tinda at
the public market with my cousin. I grew vegetables in the mountain following my father.
If you have no connection, you are not hired. Even though you prepare all the necessary
documents, you are not hired for being a Muslim.
In the Sarangani region, where I have been conducting field research since 1995,
low-skilled occupations such as contractual work at tuna-canning factories or banana
plantations are available but wages for these kinds of jobs are very low. The minimum
daily wage in Sarangani region in 2016 was PHP275 (US$5.50) for the nonagricul-
tural sector and PHP257 (US$5.10) for the agricultural sector. However, the actual
wages paid were as low as PHP100–150 (US$2–3 in 2009) per day, according to my
interviews with former workers at tuna-canning factories in March 2009.
It is in this situation, where few decent employment opportunities are available in
the local labour market, that many Muslim Filipinas opt to become domestic workers
in the Middle East.9 Some recruitment agencies offer ‘fly now, pay later’ schemes
exclusively for domestic workers bound for the Middle East. Most Filipinas can
thus easily apply to become domestic workers without having to pay a significant
amount of cash up front as the fees are paid back in instalments deducted from their
monthly salary once they begin working overseas. Factors such as cheaper processing
fees compared to other destinations and instalment schemes play a major role in
the decision-making of Muslim Filipinas from low socio-economic households to
become domestic workers in the Middle East, primarily in the AGS.
Previously, social norms of sexuality and femininity to control female sexual-
ity—for example, virginity before marriage was highly valued and therefore the
movements of young girls were restricted—had been present that served to con-
strain Muslim Filipinas’ freedom of movement. However, the armed conflict forcibly
expanded their range of movement because in the Sarangani region in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, many inhabitants needed to evacuate their original villages to seek
safety and refuge (Ishii 2002). In addition, the armed conflict impoverished Muslim
9 In2014 and 2015, the main destinations for Filipino overseas workers in the Middle East were
the AGS, as well as Israel, Lebanon and Jordan (Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) 2015; Philippine Statistics Authority 2016b).
44 M. Ishii
households and the necessity of earning an income caused women to negotiate social
norms of sexuality and femininity in a more flexible way, allowing them to engage
in cash-earning activities away from home. Society thus also came to accept the fact
that these women chose to work overseas.
In exchange for this expansion of their freedom of movement, they are obliged
to support their families back home. In poor Muslim households where many men
have difficulty finding employment locally and abroad, the remittances of overseas
workers are vital to sustaining household economies.
The salary for the majority of MFDWs in the AGS was around US$200 per
month when I conducted a survey from 2001 to 2004 as well as from 2008 to 2009
(see Footnote 4), which was a little better than the minimum monthly wage in the
Sarangani region. However, Muslim women could only obtain jobs in the local labour
market at a significantly lower pay grade due to the discrimination mentioned earlier;
additionally, most of these positions were irregular forms of contract employment,
involved hard monotonous tasks and usually paid less than was promised. There
was only a marginal difference in the pay of local and overseas employment but as
these women have a better chance of saving and remitting money home as live-in
domestic workers overseas, they go abroad in the hope that choice will make a greater
difference towards improving their lives and the lives of their families.
3.3 Inclusion and Exclusion in the Segregated Labour

Market and Hierarchical Society of the UAE
Muslim Filipinas who move to the UAE to work enter a new society where being
a Muslim is appreciated more than being a non-Muslim, in stark contrast to their
home society. However, the UAE’s labour market is also hierarchically segregated
according to nationality, ethnicity (Arab or non-Arab), gender (Longva 1997: 144;
Kapiszewski 2001) and class. Being a Muslim does not always work favourably for
them to overcome segregation (cf. Watanabe 2014).
A characteristic of the UAE labour market is that there is a clear division of labour
between nationals and migrants. According to Masaki Matsuo, 80% of the public
sector was dominated by Emirati nationals in 2008 (Matsuo 2014: 70–71). With
nationals at the top of the labour market hierarchy and migrant domestic workers at
the bottom, there is less competition between nationals and migrants in the UAE.
Consequently, nationals do not contest the participation of migrant domestic workers
in the labour market. What matters more for Emirati nationals is the impact that the
domestic worker makes on the family unit. Some Muslim employers prefer to hire
Muslim Filipinas as they may get along with the household better, but others prefer
to hire Christian Filipinas because they are seen as better educated and thus could
be more helpful for their children’s education.
Distinct class divisions prevent migrant domestic workers from social interaction
with others, especially Emirati nationals. On the other hand, informal safety nets
have developed among low-skilled migrant workers to help those in need who are
unable to access official assistance (Ishii 2014: 139). Because the labour market
is segregated by nationality, there exists a loosely formed Filipino community that
provides support and companionship for compatriots working in the UAE (Hosoda
2013).10 By becoming more familiar with the living and working conditions in the
AGS, migrant workers gradually come to understand the existence and function of
such avenues for help, thus acquiring new survival strategies. The following story of
Miranda, a type B MFDW, illustrates how an experienced and relatively empowered
domestic worker could extend help to other Filipinos employed in the service sector.
3.4 Type B MFDWs Assisting Fellow Filipino Workers

in the Service Sector
When I met her in March 2017, Miranda (a married Sangil woman) was 43 years
old and had worked for a Jordanian couple in Dubai for almost five years. Her
employers had two daughters, aged eight and five. Miranda was hired when the
younger daughter was only two months old. The couple were working as medical
doctors and, according to Miranda, were very open-minded. They were living in an
apartment with only two rooms, one of which Miranda and the younger daughter
occupied. Miranda said her workload was light as her main task was to take care of
the younger daughter, who loved her very much and was attached to her as Miranda
had been taking care of her since she was a baby. After dinner, Miranda would often
watch Filipino soap operas on her mobile phone, while her ‘madam’ would watch
Arabic soap operas separately but with both of them lying on the floor in the same
room. The husband would then joke that they were both ‘addicts’. In this way, the
domestic labour that Miranda engaged in was set against a background of intimate
personal connections with the family—creating a significantly less stressful and less
confrontational work environment.
Her employers had also brought Miranda with them to Jordan several times on
family trips. The last visit was for the wedding of the wife’s younger brother, and the
wife had prepared a beautiful white dress for Miranda. Miranda noted that she was
incredibly grateful for their treatment, even though she was just a domestic worker.
Though Miranda had previously worked in Saudi Arabia for three years and in the
UAE for two years as a domestic worker, this was the first time the she felt she
was treated kindly as a fellow Muslim by her employers. Her monthly salary was
AED2000 (around US$540) with a day off per week. Nevertheless, though she was
treated well and had a good relationship with her employers, especially given past
experiences (see Sect. 3.5.2), she still had difficulties finding a proper ‘home’ with
her employers.
10 ‘Loosely formed Filipino community’ means it lacks ‘any real means of ensuring the account-
ability of their members’ (cf. Kathiravelu 2016: 185).
46 M. Ishii
Miranda was introduced to a Pakistani man by a Filipina friend. At first, she occa-
sionally conversed with him using her mobile phone and then met him by coincidence
during one of her days off; eventually they got married in 2013. It was on her days
off that she enjoyed meeting and spending time with her husband and several other
Sangil women who came from the same village in the Sarangani region. She became
very close with a Christian Filipina as they had both suffered tough labour condi-
tions at a cleaning company before her friend went on to marry a Nepalese man. This
couple lived in an apartment with a large living room; sometimes, Miranda and the
other Sangil women would gather there to spend a night together watching the news
of the Philippines, laughing over Filipino soap operas and following up progress of
their houses they are building back home. When I met her in August 2017, Miranda
explained that she and the group of Sangil women were planning to rent an apartment
together: ‘I need to have a place where I can relax like home.’
Having gained a significant amount of experience working in the AGS, Miranda
thus managed to secure a space for her personal freedom, was able to freely to
communicate when she chose to using a mobile phone and had the support of her
employers in forming friendships outside their control on her days off. She was now
in a position to extend informal support to other workers in trouble. One example
of this involved another Sangil woman named Aida who was working with other
Filipina workers for a cleaning company catering to schools in Sharjah. Their initial
monthly salary was AED900 (around US$250) which was increased by AED100
(around US$27) every year. They worked for 10 hours a day and were paid for any
overtime.
In 2014, the management of the cleaning company worsened and the payment of
workers’ salaries was often delayed, so that they did not have enough money to buy
food. When this happened, Miranda’s employers gave her rice and food supplies so
she could help feed Aida and her co-workers at the cleaning company. Sometimes,
Miranda would ask her Pakistani husband to deliver food to them as well. In this
way, Miranda extend assistance to her other Filipinos working in the service sector
to help them overcome challenges.
In another instance, Aida’s younger sister ran away from her employer and sought
shelter and aid at the Philippine embassy where she then phoned Miranda for help.
Upon receiving the call, Miranda was allowed to go to the embassy by her employers
where she found Aida’s sister to be very thin. She wanted to go back to the Philippines
but her employer would not return her passport. Aida made a phone call to the
employer pretending to be a staff member of the employment agency responsible for
Aida’s sister and threatened to blacklist the family and call the police to the family’s
house.
The employer was scared and immediately returned the passport. As the employer
could not understand English, Aida spoke to the employer in Arabic (which she had
learned while working in the AGS). Aida said that initially she could not speak
Arabic and did not have much knowledge about living and working in the region so
she was very afraid to make any decisions. What made a difference for her were the
experiences she gained and her understanding of Arabic; together these helped her
to protect her rights and become stronger as a result.
3.5 Type B MFDWs and Their Empowerment
Both Radjina and Miranda were victims of mistreatment and abusive working con-
ditions as type A MFDWs with different employers throughout the AGS for long
periods of time. Through these harrowing and unpleasant episodes, they came to learn
new coping techniques and how to access aid and support from their compatriots.
They mentioned that their experiences had made them stronger and more resilient,
taught them how to overcome risks they face and enabled them to become type B
MFDWs. This empowerment of both Radjina and Miranda should be understood in
the context of their experiences in the AGS.
3.5.1 Radjina’s Experiences
Before she worked for her most recent employers who lived in Palm Jumeirah,
Radjina worked for six employers for a total of more than 70 months as a type A
MFDW. It was in 2001 that Radjina first went abroad to work in Dubai, but she
returned home after only five months; she was overworked and could not manage
to care for two-year-old twins. Radjina had requested her employer to hire another
Filipina domestic worker to help her but her employer declined. Her salary in this
position was AED500 (around US$135) per month.
Around 2004 (she was not sure of the exact year), she worked in Kuwait for a
local Kuwaiti employer. This time, she finished her two-year contract with them for a
monthly salary of approximately KWD45 (around US$160). After she was released
by this employer at the end of her contract, she remained in Kuwait and began working
for a couple consisting of a Syrian husband and Kuwaiti wife. Radjina mentioned
that the wife was very kind towards her but the husband was cruel and made repeated
sexual advances towards her. She insisted that what he had attempted to do was haram
(forbidden acts) according to Islamic teachings but he did not listen and continued
to harass her in this manner. His abusive behaviour forced Radjina to run away to the
Philippine embassy where she stayed for three months. Her employers did not agree
to give back her passport and instead threatened to report her to the authorities for
absconding. Radjina insisted that it was not her fault as her employers were solely
to blame and said that she was not afraid of the police; eventually her employers
surrendered her passport. The Philippine embassy covered the cost of her airfare
back home, and Radjina mentioned that the welfare officer at the embassy was very
sympathetic and caring.
She then began working in Qatar for a group of families originally from Yemen.11
Three families were living together in one house and they hired three domestic
workers, one of whom was Radjina. The wife of one of the families was very kind
but the wife’s mother was very ‘maldita’ (mean). Radjina’s primary role was to take
care of the children but she was also made to care for the wife’s mother. One of
11 According to Radjina’s accounts, the husband’s father was Yemeni while the mother was Indian.
48 M. Ishii
her co-workers (also Filipina) always seemed to be jealous of Radjina for unknown
reasons, and the wife’s mother became increasingly mean to Radjina. Eventually,
Radjina quarrelled with the old woman every day and decided to quit the job. The
wife was kind enough to release Radjina from her contract and covered her travel
expenses back to the Philippines after Radjina had stayed in their house for 11 months.
Radjina next went to work in Saudi Arabia. She was assigned to a large house
for a family with three children but she was their only domestic worker. They did
not provide Radjina with enough food and she subsequently became very thin and
malnourished. Her salary was SR850 (around US$227) per month. After staying in
the house for eight months, she could not bear the situation any longer; Radjina left
for her recruiting agency and stayed there instead. Every month, she was assigned to
a different household as a part-time domestic worker but she needed to pay SR300
(around US$80) to the recruiting agency every month for accommodation expenses,
etc. In this way, she finished her two-year work contract in Saudi Arabia.
After Saudi Arabia, Radjina moved to Dubai where worked for an Emirati couple.
She finished her two-year contract with them with a monthly salary of AED1500
(around US$400). Radjina then began searching for her next job through the internet
and applied for a position as a domestic worker for the family of the Greek husband
and Persian wife. There, she finally found satisfactory labour conditions as a domestic
worker.
3.5.2 Miranda’s Experiences
Miranda said that she had survived many unsatisfactory and abusive labour conditions
as a domestic worker before she finally found a job working for the Jordanian family
in an environment that she found was positive.
Miranda worked in Saudi Arabia for three years with a monthly salary of SR700
in the 1990s. After that, she returned to the Philippines and then applied to be a
domestic worker in the UAE. She worked for an Emirati couple living in Abu Dhabi
who had another domestic worker (a Christian Filipina) already working for them in
the house. The wife was very kind but the husband was problematic. He constantly
complained to Miranda, and they would often quarrel. One day during the month of
Ramadan, Miranda found herself lying in a hospital bed due to overwork. Towards
the end of the two-year contract, Miranda asked the wife if she could find another
job once her contract was completed. The wife agreed but pleaded with Miranda
not to run away because she was afraid the situation would impact negatively on
the family’s reputation. Miranda did manage to finish her two-year contract and was
released by her employers.
Next, Miranda found a job through the internet at a company owned by Palestinians
that provided household cleaning services. Her initial monthly salary was AED900
(around US$250) which had increased to AED1300 (around US$350) by the time she
quit that job. She regularly worked ten hours per day. When she began working for the
company, there were four Christian Filipinas and one Nepalese worker. They were all
made to live with the family of the company’s owner in an apartment in Ajman and
made to clean the owner’s room as well as to take care of their three small children
after returning from work. In summer, when the outside temperatures rose as high
as 40 °C, they were made to walk to clients’ houses. They were overworked and,
according to Miranda, became as thin as ‘skeletons’ so the workers decided to leave
the apartment.
The company had assigned Miranda to clean the house of a Jordanian couple and
after one year of commuting to the house for cleaning the couple offered Miranda a
job as a live-in domestic worker. She accepted the offer and quit her former cleaning
company.
Both Radjina and Miranda had repeatedly been type A MFDWs in the AGS with
different employers over long periods of time. The everyday struggles they faced
arose from their employers’ attitudes (including sexual harassment from a male
employer in Radjina’s case), mistreatment such as overworking and underfeeding,
the withholding of salaries and passports, jealousy from co-workers and exploitation
by unscrupulous agencies. However, by becoming type B MFDWs, their economic
options improved. By earning a monthly salary of US$400 (more than double than
what they could earn in the Philippines), they could support and contribute to improv-
ing the lives of their family members back home. Miranda has bought a piece of land
in General Santos City and is gradually building a house where she hopes start a
small business once she returns to the Philippines. Radjina had been able to support
the education of her siblings back home.
In terms of social choices, they can gain and expand on new social connections
by utilising their days off. Like Miranda, who became the best friend of a Christian
Filipina who married a Nepalese man, close interactions with Christian Filipinos are
more frequent in the UAE than in the Philippines, where anti-Muslim discrimination
is strong. The social stigma surrounding Muslim Filipinas and their treatment as
second-class citizens abroad is mitigated in part by belonging to a Muslim majority,
as well as being only temporary residents of the receiving country’s society.
The treatment of Radjina and Miranda as second-class Muslims provides with
them with an ‘observer status’ to evaluate the host society as well as their own
home society (cf. Kabeer 2012: 10). For MFDWs, working in the Gulf means living
in predominantly Islamic countries abroad. Their experiences of living in Muslim-
majority societies, but with a lower socio-economic class, offer them a context in
which to consider their own home society from a wider perspective. Coming from a
country where they have been looked down upon and marginalised for their religious
beliefs, they enjoy inhabiting a space where being Muslim is appreciated and they
are motivated to develop a critical stance towards Christian-dominated Philippines.
In contrast, the abuse and unfair treatment they suffered at the hands of their
employers have disillusioned them about their expectations of Muslims in the Middle
East, the centre of the Islamic world. Despite practising the same religion, these
employers do not respect their domestic workers and fail to fulfil their practical
obligations as Muslims. For example, harsh treatment suffered during the month of
Ramadan makes these MDFWs critical of Muslims in the Middle East, while their
50 M. Ishii
observations of Arab gender relations make them critical of the patriarchal societies
and more appreciative of their own home society.
Anh Nga Longva, who conducted a study of expatriate and migrant life in Kuwait,
argues that it is important to take into consideration migrants’ time, by which she
means ‘not just the temporal flow but also the sum of experiences that fills this
flow’ in ‘the study of migration, in particular sustained migration’ (Longva 1997:
172). Longva highlights ‘the double contradiction of time and space’ of migrants
in Kuwait—for migrants, host countries of the AGS ‘might be a spatial reality but
… remained a temporal “unreality”’. It is important to understand why the sense
of inequality between migrant workers and employers is difficult to translate into a
greater and more vocal sense of injustice. As most domestic workers feel that their
subordinate position is a temporal unreality, their sense of belonging is offshored.
They tend to accept the power asymmetry between themselves and their employers,
opting for submissiveness as a strategy rather than translating the feeling of inequality
into a feeling of injustice (Longva 1997: 181). Furthermore, there are few appropriate
mediators and channels to report injustices committed against vulnerable migrants
because social activism is restricted in the Gulf.
The widespread suffering of type A MFDWs could be avoided if formal protection
schemes were in place to ensure decent working conditions as their working condi-
tions deprive them of opportunities to become empowered. The role of the human
rights organisations is thus important in advocating the implementation of policies
to ensure that all migrant workers receive: (1) a regular income; (2) the opportunity
for their own private space and social interactions; and (3) safe and healthy work-
ing conditions. Human rights organisations are also important for documenting and
reporting on the situations of the often-voiceless migrant community and advocating
for change to structures of inequality which continuously marginalise vulnerable
migrant workers.
3.6 Conclusion: Understanding Empowerment of MFDWs

in the UAE
For some MFDWs, becoming a domestic worker in the Middle East is often a choice
borne out of a limited number of alternatives. As Mahdavi (2014: 78) points out,
Muslim Filipinas are ‘forced to choose from a series of limited options structured by
many different facets of their lives’. Being excluded from the local labour market,
they travel overseas to become domestic workers in the Middle East, hoping to
escape anti-Muslim discrimination, to save money and improve their lives and the
lives of their families back home. As they expect, they are not discriminated for
being Muslim in the UAE labour market. The discrimination that they face instead
is that of nationality, gender and class, where they are placed at the lowest layer of
the hierarchical AGS societies.
Without any sufficient and official protection policies in force, they gradually learn
that there are instead informal aid networks created by migrants themselves to which
they can resort to for help, as well as in the loosely formed Filipino community.
Sheer necessity compels them to explore the new ways of forming connected lives
which provide them with the feelings of intimate friendship and also protection.
Radjina’s and Miranda’s experiences gave them the confidence to look for better
jobs through the internet, and they no longer relied on personal connections alone.
They are now familiar with both the formal institutions and informal support activities
in the UAE and have acquired the knowledge to look for better-paying jobs. After
working in the AGS for a substantial amount of time, they were eventually able to
find satisfactory employers, with whom they could secure the conditions of: (1) a
regular income; (2) private space outside the workplace where they can enjoy new
social interactions on their days off; and (3) safe and secure labour conditions.
Having acquired these three components, they could then assist fellow Filipino
workers in the UAE when needed as well as improving their lives back home by earn-
ing a regular income which they then use to purchase property, remit money to their
families and even provide for family members’ educational expenses. Additionally,
these MFDWs are more autonomous in deciding what they want to buy, gaining new
social relationships during their days off and experiencing less discrimination than in
their original society. For type B MFDWs, their trivial and strategic life choices are
expanded upon by becoming domestic workers in the UAE in comparison with the
choices that were available in their home society. However, for type A MFDWs, they
may not always be able to gain the capacity to improve their choices. Nevertheless,
the empowerment of type B MFDWs cannot be understood without considering their
acceptance of systemic inequality and their asymmetrical power relationship with
their employers.
Radjina was proud that her youngest brother would graduate from college. How-
ever, after she finished looking back at her experiences in the AGS, Radjina sighed
and said:
If you are a domestic worker, you are assigned many tasks but sometimes you are not
provided enough food. This situation applies everywhere as far as you are a domestic worker.
Especially, you get very tired during the Ramadan with so much work, but your employers
do not care.
Miranda was happy that she had bought a piece of land in the Philippines and con-
structed a house. She noted that she was only able to do so by ‘kuskos kubeta’
(scrubbing toilets) overseas.
Both understood their subordinate position in the UAE in terms of citizenship,
class and gender. Though they belong to the dominant religion of the UAE, they
were sometimes treated as second-class Muslims. It is ironic that Radjina became
more devoted to Islam during her time in the AGS, but not because the public space
inspired her to gain more knowledge about Islam—it was because of her suffering
as a domestic worker that she sought relief and solace in religion (cf. Hosoda and
Watanabe 2014). Their sense of distress at unsatisfactory working conditions is miti-
gated by the thought that their subordinate position in the Gulf is temporary and will
52 M. Ishii
not continue when they return to the Philippines. On the other hand, although they
are individually and economically empowered by becoming domestic workers in the
UAE, Radjina’s and Miranda’s empowerment must be viewed in the light of their
extensive suffering for a prolonged period of time. In addition, this empowerment
lacks the power to negotiate greater change in the socio-economic structures which
continuously exclude their contributions to the local labour market in the Philippines.
Acknowledgements This research was supported by the Japan Society for Promotion of Science
(JSPS) Kakenhi Grant number 2026257004B1 (2014–2017). I am grateful to my Filipino friends
who kindly shared their experiences of living in the UAE with me.
References
Constable, Nicole. 2009. Migrant workers and the many states of protest in Hong Kong. Critical
Gamburd, Michele R. 2010. Advocating for Sri Lankan migrant workers: Obstacles and challenges.
In Migrant workers in Asia: Distant divides, intimate connections, ed. Nicole Constable, 67–86.
New York: Routledge.
Hosoda, Naomi. 2013. Kababayan solidarity? Filipino communities and class relations in United
Arab Emirates cities. Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 1 (3): 18–35.
Hosoda, Naomi, and Akiko Watanabe. 2014. Creating a ‘new home’ away from home: Religious
conversions of Filipina domestic workers in Dubai and Doha. In Migrant domestic workers in the
Middle East: The home and the world, ed. Bina Fernandez and Marina de Regt, 117–139. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ishii, Masako. 2002. Josei ga kataru Filipin no musurimu shakai: Funsou, kaihatsu, shakai henyou
[Stories of Muslim women in the Philippines: Armed conflict, development and social change].
Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.
Ishii, Masako. 2005. Chuto he dekasegi ni iku firipin no musurimu josei: Kawaru ‘sei’ kihan to
idou suru josei [Muslim Filipinas working in the Middle East: Changing norm of femininity and
sexuality, and migrant women]. In Isuramu no sei to bunka [Sexuality and cultures in Islam], ed.
Hiroshi Kato, 185–210. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press.
Ishii, Masako. 2011. Fukugo kakusa wo idou suru: Wangan sanyukoku de kajiroudousha toshite
hataraku firipin no musurimu josei [Moving through layers of complex disparities: Muslim Filip-
ina domestic workers in the Gulf States]. In Sekai de mottomo mazushiku aruto iukoto [Being the
poorest in the world], ed. Peace Studies Association of Japan, 25–46. Tokyo: Waseda University
Press.
Ishii, Masako. 2014. Firipinjin Kajirodosha ni taisuru hogo heno torikumi [Possibilities and limi-
tation of protection for Filipina domestic workers]. In Wangan arabu shokoku no imin rodosha:
‘ta-gaikokujin kokka’ no shutsugen to seikatsu jittai [Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states:
Growing foreign population and their lives], ed. Naomi Hosoda, 122–146. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.
Johnson, Mark. 2010. Diasporic dreams, middle-class moralities and migrant domestic workers
among Muslim Filipinos in Saudi Arabia. Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology 11 (3–4): 428–448.
Johnson, Mark. 2011. Freelancing in the kingdom: Filipino migrant domestic workers crafting
agency in Saudi Arabia. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 20 (3/4): 459–478.
Kabeer, Naila. 1999. Resources, agency, achievement: Reflections on the measurement of women’s
empowerment. Development and Change 30 (3): 435–464.
Kabeer, Naila. 2001. The power to choose: Bangladeshi women and labour market decisions in
London and Dhaka. London: Verso.
Kabeer, Naila. 2011. Between affiliation and autonomy: Navigating pathways of women’s empow-
erment and gender justice in rural Bangladesh. Development and Change 42 (2): 499–528.
Kabeer, Naila. 2012. Empowerment, citizenship and gender justice: A contribution to locally
grounded theories of change in women’s lives. Ethics and Social Welfare 6 (3): 216–232.
Kabeer, Naila. 2016. Josei no enpawamento ni kansuru chousa kenkyu no kaisouroku: Tabiji,
chizu, soshite douhyou [Reflections on researching women’s empowerment: Journeys, maps and
signposts]. In Sentaku no chikara [The power to choose], 381–399, trans. Tamaki Endo, Waka
Aoyama, and Jaehyang Han. Tokyo: Harvest-sha.
Kabeer, Naila. 2017. Economic pathways to women’s empowerment and active citizenship: What
does the evidence from Bangladesh tell us? Journal of Development Studies 53 (5): 649–663.
Kathiravelu, Laavanya. 2016. Migrant Dubai: Low wage workers and the construction of a global
city. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Libo-on, Lily B. 2014. Deployment of Filipina maids in UAE on hold. Khaleej Times. 25 June.
Longva, Anh Nga. 1997. Walls built on sand: Migration, exclusion, and society in Kuwait. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
Mahdavi, Pardis. 2014. Immobilised migrancy: Inflexible citizenship and flexible practices among
migrants in the Gulf. In Migrant domestic workers in the Middle East: The home and the world,
ed. Bina Fernandez and Marina de Regt, 75–93. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Matsuo, Masaki. 2014. Fuetsuzukeru Iminrodosha ni wangan arabu shokoku seifu ha ikani taiou
subekika [How do the governments of the Arab Gulf states cope up with the increasing number
of migrant labourers?]. In Wangan arabu shokoku no imin rodosha: ‘ta-gaikokujin kokka’ no
shutsugen to seikatsu jittai [Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states: Growing population and
their lives], ed. Naomi Hosoda, 64–88. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA]. 2013. POEA goes after recruiters col-
lecting placement fees from household service workers. News Release, June 14. http://www.poea.
gov.ph/news/2013/06-3.pdf. Accessed 2 Oct 2018.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration [POEA]. 2015. Overseas employment statistics:
Deployed overseas Filipino workers 2014–2015. http://www.poea.gov.ph/ofwstat/compendium/
2015.pdf. Accessed 16 Sept 2018.
Philippine Statistics Authority. 2015. Census of population. 2015-061. 31 July. https://psa.gov.ph/
statistics/census/2015-census-of-population. Accessed 1 Oct 2018.
Philippine Statistics Authority. 2016a. Population of Region XII: SOCCSKSARGEN (based on the
2015 census of population). http://psa.gov.ph/content/population-region-xii-soccsksargen-based-
2015-census-population. Accessed 16 Sept 2018.
Philippine Statistics Authority. 2016b. 2015 survey on overseas Filipinos. https://psa.gov.ph/content/
2015-survey-overseas-filipinos-0. Accessed 16 Sept 2018.
Santos, Ana P., and Sofia Tomacruz. 2017. Migrant life in Qatar: Are zero placement fees for OFWs
scam or solution? Rappler, 10 September. https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/178956-ofw-
placement-fees-scam-solution. Accessed 3 Oct 2018.
Watanabe, Akiko. 2014. UAE to Qatar ni okeru Firipinjin no isuramu kaishuu to shakaikankei no
henyou [Filipino conversions to Islam and transformation of their social relations in the UAE
and Qatar]. In Wangan arabu shokoku no imin rodosha: ‘ta-gaikokujin kokka’ no shutsugen to
seikatsu jittai [Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states: Growing population and their lives], ed.
Naomi Hosoda, 206–228. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.
Masako Ishii is professor of Philippine area studies and peace studies at the College of Intercul-
tural Communication, Rikkyo University, Japan. Her main research interest examines area studies
of Muslim society in the Philippines, focusing on gender, migration, armed conflict and the peace
process. Her publications include the following: Chuto he dekasegi ni iku firipin no musurimu
54 M. Ishii
josei: Kawaru ‘sei’ kihan to idou suru josei (Muslim Filipinas working in the Middle East: Chang-
ing norms of femininity and sexuality and migrant women). In Isuramu no sei to bunka [Sexual-
ity and cultures in Islam], ed. Hiroshi Kato (2005); and Firipinjin kaji rodosha ni taisuru hogo he
no torikumi [Possibilities and limitation of protection for Filipina domestic workers]. In Wangan
arabu shokoku no Imin rodosha: ‘ta gaikokujin kokka’ no shutsugen to seikatsu jittai [Migrant
workers in the Arab Gulf states: Growing foreign population and their lives], ed. Naomi Hosoda
(2014).
Chapter 4
The Complexities of Social Inclusion
and Exclusion Among Intermarried
Filipino Migrant Workers in the United
Arab Emirates
Akiko Watanabe
Abstract This chapter illustrates the complexities of social inclusion and exclusion
of migrant workers who had intermarried and were living in the United Arab Emirates
(UAE). The research focuses on intermarriages between Filipinos and non-Emirati
nationals and examines the utilisation of the social capital gained in the UAE as
these migrant workers employ different survival strategies during their periods of
long-term residence overseas. The analysis demonstrates that nationality is the main
cause behind the displacement of intermarried migrant workers to other countries as
they choose paths where the future of their livelihoods and families can be secured.
The discussion also illustrates the various consequences of intermarriages between
the different nationalities, which can result in inclusion and exclusion in both informal
senses but also in formal and public contexts.
Keywords United Arab Emirates · Intermarriage · Filipino · Citizenship ·

Inclusion · Exclusion
4.1 Introduction
A cultural melting pot, a rich social tapestry, the expatriate motley crew—whatever you
want to call it—if ever there was a platform for people from different nationalities, cultures,
religions and backgrounds to meet, mingle and marry, the UAE would be it. (Wilkins 2016)
The migrant population of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) comprises workers from
200 countries and makes up almost 90% of the country’s total population (United
Nations 2017). During their time working in the country, some may develop intimate
relationships with others and begin to form families. This is one of the aspects that has
led to the UAE being a culturally diverse and cosmopolitan society. However, unlike
the assumption advanced in the quote by Louisa Wilkins above, when both parties in
the relationship are temporary migrant workers and are not of the same nationality
the issues they face are far more complicated with regard to citizenship and access to
A. Watanabe (B)
Faculty of International Studies, Bunkyo University, Chigasaki, Japan
e-mail: watanabe@shonan.bunkyo.ac.jp
56 A. Watanabe
state resources, a situation that is unique to the Arab Gulf states (AGS).1 Against this
backdrop, this chapter endeavours to illustrate the inclusion and exclusion of migrant
workers who have intermarried and are living in the AGS, particularly in the UAE,
and to examine how citizenship shapes their strategies to survive extended residency
periods overseas. A special focus is paid to Filipino and non-Emirati couples, as
Filipino migrant workers are engaged in various occupations and belong to different
social classes in the UAE (compared to other nationalities)—a factor that is discussed
below.
Inclusion and exclusion are two of the most critical factors that must be understood
in order to determine whether migrants are ‘grounded’ in their destinations. Inclu-
sion and exclusion encompass varying degrees of legal, political, social, cultural,
economic and psychological aspects of the citizenships that these foreign workers
attain. Ruth Levitas et al. (2007: 25) define social exclusion as a multifaceted and
highly complicated process that
involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability to
participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in a
society, whether in economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects both the quality
of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a whole.
The receiving or host countries’ states and civil societies have been providing ‘care’ to
these migrants in the form of national security, economic prosperity and prospective
citizenship. Such care is more comprehensive in immigrant countries such as the
United States and Britain.2 However, with regard to the AGS, where the state’s legal
and moral obligations of care are only ensured through formal citizenship, there
are questions about who the majority of society really is and what inclusion and
exclusion mean for migrants.
The primary difference between migrant workers in the AGS and those in immi-
grant countries is that migrant workers in the AGS cannot obtain formal citizenship
in their destination country, regardless of the duration of their stay. With the excep-
tion of Bahrain, foreign workers are permitted to stay in these states and acquire
residential visas under the kafala (sponsorship) system.3 There are no options for
permanent residency and very few paths to naturalisation. Settling in the AGS after
retirement is prohibited for foreigners and workers must quickly leave the AGS once
their contracts have expired or if they lose their jobs. Foreign migrant workers there-
fore become long-time sojourners, entrenched in a condition where they strive for
non-permanent residential status during their time working in the AGS. To sustain
the dominance of nationals, despite being a demographic minority, a highly stratified
society is maintained where nationals are at the top of the hierarchy and non-nationals
1 The Arab Gulf states are referred to here as countries belonging to Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
2 In this chapter, ‘immigrant countries’ refer to host countries where migrants are fully able to acquire
the nationality of the host country, regardless of their racial, ethnic and religious background, while
still retaining their original cultures and languages.
3 Bahrain has claimed to have done away with the kafala system; however, proper enforcement to
ensure the rights of foreign workers is lacking.

4 The Complexities of Social Inclusion and Exclusion Among … 57
are then divided according to occupational sectors, socio-economic class and coun-
tries of origin (Bristol-Rhys 2012). In such an environment, social solidarities and
informal support networks have developed among the respective segregated classes,
nationalities and religious groups, playing an integral role in the lives of migrant
workers in the Gulf region (Kathiravelu 2012; Hosoda 2014; Hosoda and Watanabe
2014; Ishii, Chap. 3).
Intense global migration has increased the possibilities of marital unions of people
from a variety of settings. Intermarriages—that is, partnerships of two people from
different backgrounds whose nationalities, ethnicities and religions may vary—are
individual choices that are situated within the realities of the contexts and perceptions
that these couples experience.4 This internationalisation of intimacy has been viewed
as barrier-breaking in that it can cross racial, national, cultural, religious and class
boundaries (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2014). Concurrently, the growing number
of intermarriages is regarded as a challenge for social cohesion, national security
and identity (Alzaabi 2012). Scholarship on the intermarriage of Asian migrants has
addressed the phenomena in relation to the feminisation of migration (Yang and Lu
2010), upward social mobility and its pitfalls (Constable 2004), the agency of foreign
wives, including the utilisation of the ‘eroticisation of “Asian-ness”’ (Nagy 2003),
segmented assimilation (Song 2010) and the dynamics of pluralism (Le Gall and
Meintel 2015), among other facets. Most of this research discusses the integration of
mixed families into mainstream host societies and is focused on families of interna-
tional marriages between citizens and noncitizens in an immigrant country such as
the United States, Britain or Canada. Few studies have focused on marriages between
noncitizens with nonpermanent residential status in the AGS.
Thus, in dealing with the intermarriage of non-nationals in the AGS, it is important
to review the societal structure and to delineate the social boundaries that exist in the
host country. This is done by focusing on the citizenship of the foreign workers which
may indicate the ‘persistence of ethnic and cultural divides that hinder inclusion and
social cohesion’ (Rodríguez-García 2015: 26). By focusing on intermarried Filipino
couples and their mixed families in the UAE (where migrant workers comprise the
majority of the population), this research addresses the complexities of inclusion
and exclusion of intermarried couples the UAE. The data used in this chapter were
collected in the UAE over a total period of two months from 2010 to 2016 in addition
to information from newspaper articles and statistical data from the websites of
government offices. All names have been changed to protect the privacy of those
involved.
4 Common alternative terms to ‘intermarriages’ are mixed marriages, international marriages,

transnational marriages, cross-cultural marriages and interracial marriages, depending on the con-
text and the individual author’s focus. In this chapter, the term intermarriage means ‘marriages
engaged in by two consenting adults from two different nation-states’ (Lumayag 2016: 73), with
the aim of emphasising fundamental issues that couples face with regard to citizenship, settlement,
social welfare and children’s access to education.
58 A. Watanabe
4.2 Citizenship in the United Arab Emirates
The UAE is an ambiguous ‘tiered system’ where political, economic and social
rights vary with the different hierarchical levels of its population (Jamal 2015). From
the 1970s until the present day, the UAE has observed drastic economic and social
changes, largely owing to the profitability of the oil industry. One of these changes
was a massive influx of foreign workers from neighbouring countries in the Middle
East and South Asia that had colonial connections, which has resulted in a situation
where nationals comprise only around 10% of the total population. Given this huge
demographic imbalance, the government decided to absorb those workers with Arab
and Muslim origins as citizens in order to enhance the country’s population growth.
As such, the UAE was relatively generous in granting citizenship until the 1990s,
but has since shifted to an ‘Emiratisation’ standpoint, introducing a number of poli-
cies to severely restrict citizenship, residency and the migration of foreigners. In
2003, the Emirati government officially introduced a ‘cultural diversity policy’ to
reduce the number of Asian workers coming into the country by more closely exam-
ining the issuance of work visas to these migrants, and since then the UAE has made
it increasingly difficult for migrants to naturalise (Jamal 2015: 605). In the same
year, the government implemented the Emirates identification card system which is
only issued to individuals who possess a khulasat al-qaid (family book, issued to
Emirati nationals who can trace their Emirati ethnic lineage in the UAE to at least
1925). Only those who possess it are regarded as UAE citizens and entitled to full
citizenship and state services (Jamal 2015: 602).5 These services include free educa-
tion in public institutions through to university, free health care, pensions, land and
subsidised loans for homes, free water and subsidised electricity, as well as highly
discounted rates on food items and groceries. If one works for a national entity, an
additional allowance is given, which is an extra stipend on top of a basic salary (Jamal
2015: 206). Those without a khulasat al-qaid may hold UAE passports (as do many
naturalised Palestinians and Yemenis, for example) and are entitled to partial state
benefits but do not enjoy the benefits of full citizenship as noted above (Vora 2013).
In other countries, political instability could be a potential outcome of a rising
proportion of migrant workers; however, the system practised in AGS (especially in
the UAE) does not follow this trend. Political stability is instead strengthened and
maintained by the vast migrant workforce that supplies the labour for lower-paid
occupations, while citizens continue to enjoy generous rights and material benefits
of the ‘welfare state’ (Longva 2006; Matsuo, Chap. 2). Moreover, there is a distinct
social boundary between UAE nationals (who are considered to belong to the upper
strata) and non-nationals, which the latter cannot cross (see Fig. 4.1).
It is under such structured hierarchical conditions that migrant workers relish
flexible citizenship, as described by Ong (1999). Foreign workers are drawn in by the
trappings of a tax-free lifestyle, well-maintained infrastructure, social advancement
and greater opportunities for economic gains in the UAE; in exchange, they receive
5 Thisimplementation of the Emirates identification card system has stripped full citizenship from
thousands of local people and Bidoon who do not have a khulasat al-qaid.
Fig. 4.1 Social strata in the Upper strata

UAE according to nationality
UAE
naƟonals
Non-naƟonals
Lower strata
few political rights and no promise of eventual legal citizenship in the host country.
Still, I concur with Ali’s (2011: 560) argument that ‘(w)hile there certainly are many
dimensions to citizenship beyond the legal, such as cultural, economic, consumer
and psychological dimensions of citizenship, these are largely meaningless without
formal legal standing’. Although migrants may enjoy being denizens, without legal
citizenship, they are fundamentally not able to have a sense of belonging or a more
grounded life.
Today, there are only a few ways for migrant workers to settle and enjoy partial
welfare benefits in the UAE. Globally, this is done by acquiring naturalisation or a
permanent residence visa. Although the process of naturalisation is formalised in the
UAE (but with some exceptions as described below), the first requirement needed for
citizenship is often considered to be a 30-year period of legal residence in the country;
for Arab citizens or those of Omani, Qatari or Bahraini descent, this period is reduced.
Additional requirements include but are not limited to possessing fluency in Arabic,
a clean police record, ‘proper’ academic qualifications and a ‘healthy’ bank balance,
with wasta (connections) playing an important role in expediting the screening and
citizenship application processes (Ali 2011: 559). Even with citizenship, naturalised
citizens are not able to enjoy the full benefits that nationals receive and they have their
naturalisation revoked if or when they violate some standards such as acting and/or
speaking against the state. This means that it is practically impossible for migrant
workers of non-Arab origin to attain full naturalisation. Additionally, permanent
visas do not exist.6 In the case of a resident investor visa, which is valid for three
years, someone may purchase and own property in the UAE or start up a free trade
zone company. By doing so, investors may enjoy economic citizenship in the country
but at a significant financial cost. Other foreigners may apply and register for a two-
year visa through their employing company under the kafala system or become
self-employed and risk deportation. Therefore, migrant workers may resort to other
long-term coping strategies while living and working in the UAE for extended periods
of time.
6 The implementation of a so-called genius visa, a visa with longer term of validity of up to 10 years
and granted only to highly skilled specialist workers and investors, is currently being developed
(Khaleej Times 2018).
60 A. Watanabe
4.3 Marriage Trends in the UAE
The stringent policies towards citizenship and nationality are associated with shifting
marriage trends in the UAE. A surge in the country’s economic growth and devel-
opment has increased the cost of UAE marriages as weddings have become more
elaborate, leading to more Emirati men marrying foreigners, more divorces taking
place between Emirati couples and more Emirati women marrying later in life or
choosing not to marry at all. These trends resulted in what the government perceived
as a threat to Emirati national identity. To encourage more marriages between Emirati
men and women, a marriage fund was established in 1992 that provides newlyweds
with financial assistance of around AED70,000 (approximately US$19,000) (Dun-
can 2018). The programme aims to build and maintain ‘a stable and consolidated
Emirati family and to fortify the Emirati social and demographic structure’ (UAE
Government 2018) in order for Emirati men and women to continue forming the
ethnic foundations of the state.
The proportion of intermarriages with other nationals has been growing slightly
more than that of endogamy between Emiratis. Table 4.1 shows the marriage contracts
and divorce certificates issued in the UAE in 2007–2015. While the marriage growth
rate from 2007 to 2015 between national husbands and national wives is 1.16, it is
1.21 for national husbands and non-national wives, 1.27 for non-national husbands
and national wives and 1.29 for non-national husbands and non-national wives. This
indicates that to some extent more intermarriages are seen with nationals marrying
non-nationals as well as more marriages are taking place among migrant workers.
However, the data do not include the nationalities of non-nationals. Looking at mar-
riages in the UAE from 2007 to 2015 between Emirati nationals and non-nationals,
the total percentage of marriages is 17.37%. This figure is similar to that of Kuwait
but is the lower than that of Bahrain (28.9%) and Qatar (23.1%) (Alharahsheh et al.
2015).
Although countries in the Gulf traditionally favoured arranged clan endogamy
and consanguineous marriage, it is clear that a high rate of intermarriages is indeed
becoming a contemporary and unavoidable phenomenon, changing the social land-
scape of the UAE from a tribal community to a more urban cosmopolitan population.
There are several factors behind this trend. First, with the younger generation being
exposed to a wider range cultures than previous generations, they have begun to avoid
arranged marriages and sought more personal liberty by marrying foreigners. Second,
the cost of marrying local women has risen as their families often request luxurious
wedding ceremonies along with mahr (bride wealth) that grooms are obliged to pay
to the bride’s family. Third, as more local women have now attained higher educa-
tion, it has become difficult for them to find suitable matches—they then choose to
marry foreign men rather than remaining unmarried. Finally, many local men now
perceive that foreign wives, especially non-Arabs, are more tolerant and obedient
than local women.
In a society where polygyny is both customarily practised and legally permitted,
Emirati men may take second wives from other countries of origin. These wives
Table 4.1 Marriage contracts and divorce certificates in the UAE, 2007–2015
Nationalities Year Total % Growth rate
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Marriage contracts National husband and 6190 7441 7510 7553 7239 6962 7411 7401 7202 64,909 47.00 1.16
national wife
National husband and 1662 1844 1883 1798 2009 1791 2019 2159 2013 17,178 12.44 1.21
non-national wife
Non-national husband 658 716 642 737 652 824 898 838 838 6803 4.93 1.27
and national wife
Non-national husband 4811 5040 5120 5016 5205 5297 6023 6519 6195 49,226 35.64 1.29
and non-national wife
Divorce certificates National husband and 1580 1737 1767 1795 1849 1704 1749 1992 1891 16,064 42.40 1.20
national wife
National husband and 672 676 682 693 686 647 694 786 759 6295 16.62 1.13
non-national wife
4 The Complexities of Social Inclusion and Exclusion Among …
Non-national husband 129 115 157 145 132 133 162 191 215 1379 3.64 1.67
and national wife
Non-national husband 1380 1327 1470 1561 1478 1417 1628 1840 2048 14,149 37.35 1.48
and non-national wife
Note The table is compiled by the author from the annual statistical data on marriage contracts and divorce certificates in the UAE published by the Federal
Competitiveness and Statistics Authority, United Arab Emirates from (2007) to (2015)
61
62 A. Watanabe
are entitled to become UAE citizens after a period of three years of marriage—they
receive partial citizenship as dependants of nationals.7 Since Emirati citizenship
follows the jus sanguinis principle, citizenship is only passed from fathers to their
children, and thus issues about nationality are less likely to occur in these cases as
children are born as Emiratis and foreign wives may then be naturalised. Conversely,
interfamilial divisions regarding nationality would occur if a female Emirati citizen
marries a foreign man, as not only would her husband not be able to apply for Emirati
citizenship but her children would likewise have no rights to Emirati citizenship.8
However, a decree was passed in 2011 entitling children of Emirati women married
to foreigners to apply for full citizenship once they turn 18 years old (Salem 2011).
They would then have the same rights as any other Emirati regarding education,
health benefits and employment. This could be considered a radical move for the
country as it indicates the government prioritising ethnic links of its citizens over
patrimonial links.
With respect to foreign workers, nearly 36% of marriages that took place in the
UAE in 2007–2015 were between non-Emirati parties (see Table 4.1). A predominant
number of migrant workers come from countries such as India, Pakistan, Egypt,
Yemen, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Nepal (Horinuki 2009).
Male migrant workers (even if they are married) are not always allowed family
reunification; that is, they are not allowed to bring their wives and children with them
unless their monthly salaries are at least AED3000 (US$820), with accommodation
provided by the employer.9 According to Françoise De Bel-Air (2018: 18), ‘this law
de facto excludes more than half of Dubai’s workers from bringing their family over
to the emirate: 50.2 per cent of all labourers there earned less than Dh2500 per month
in 2016’.
Nonetheless, data from the Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) pro-
gramme reveal that non-Emiratis had been staying in the UAE for extended periods
of time (GLMM 2005). Nearly half (46.78%) of the foreign population aged 35 and
above had been residing in the country for more than 10 years (GLMM 2005). Dur-
ing their prolonged stays when they have few citizens’ rights, foreign workers often
associate with other migrants in both social and religious activities as well as in their
workplaces (Hosoda 2014). It is therefore not too difficult to befriend other workers
and develop intimate friendships and relationships.
7 According to the United Arab Emirates Federal Law No. 17 of 1972, if the husband dies the wife
may keep her UAE citizenship. However, if they divorce after three years without children, she
is to be stripped of her UAE citizenship. The citizenship awarded to the wife does not include
voting rights, the right to run as a candidate in general elections or the right to be appointed to any
parliamentary or ministerial position.
8 There has been a strong debate on the gendered nature of the regulation of mixed marriages. With
a greater number of female citizens being highly educated, their claim for legal citizenship for
children of Emirati mothers has become more vocal. In the light of this, 1117 children of Emirati
mothers were naturalised (Salem 2011). An additional 500 children of Emirati mothers were granted
citizenship in 2013 (The National 2013).
9 This is according to Article 31(D) of Ministerial Decision No. 360/1997. If accommodation is not
provided, the wage minimum is set at AED4000 (approximately US$1090) a month.

These relationships may vary from cohabitation to legal marriage. Accommoda-

tion sharing is illegal as sharia law in the AGS prohibits unmarried men and women
living together or sharing a closed space—the penalty is a jail term of a minimum of
one year followed by deportation under Article 356 of the UAE Penal Code (Asger
2011). Many migrant workers in Dubai still do this to save money while some migrant
couples have cohabited in secrecy (Asger 2011).10 To formalise their relationships
legitimately and start families of their own, they may decide to be legally married.11
However, there is still a relatively high divorce rate among non-Emirati couples (see
Table 4.1). This may be due to relationships ending at the termination of their work
contract period while others may face the challenges of entering a marriage without
proper consideration, communication issues or a lack of deeper understanding of
their partner’s culture, language or religion in the case of intermarriages.
4.4 Filipino Migrant Workers in the AGS
Filipinos make up the fourth largest group among migrant workers in the AGS
(Horinuki 2009). Their migration to the AGS (including the UAE) began in the
mid-1970s in response to high unemployment rates in the Philippines; the number of
Filipinos working overseas has soared ever since. Today, Filipino contract workers
in West Asia (predominantly the AGS) comprise 57.1% of the total of 2,379,000
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) whose departure occurred between 2012 and
2017 (Philippine Statistics Authority 2017a). They engage in various occupations
ranging from higher-level professions such as doctors and architects to low-skilled
workers like domestic and construction workers. In 2017 alone OFWs in West Asia
sent PHP72.73 billion (about US$145 million) as remittances (Philippine Statistics
Authority 2017b). This figure comprises almost half of the total cash remittances of
OFWs in 2017 (Philippine Statistics Authority 2017b).
Considering that the AGS does not provide the option for permanent residency,
equal salaries among migrant workers of different nationalities or access to free
10 Some single foreigners may share studio apartments with others of the same sex and become
‘bed spacers’, while others may rent rooms from families living in condominiums together (Damir-
Geilsdorf 2016).
11 The legal procedure for marriage in the UAE is complex. First, non-Emiratis can only get married
if they possess residence visas. They must then undergo a medical examination before the marriage,
and provide their birth certificate, original passport, copies of their visas and marital status certifi-
cates, among several other documents. The process becomes even more complicated if the bride
and groom are from different religions or nationalities. Expatriates and migrant workers can marry
in a church if they are both Christians; if they belong to different religions, though, they may be
not able to marry in the UAE. Muslim couples can marry at sharia courts. Embassies also conduct
civil weddings—some countries will solemnise marriages for couples where either the bride or
the groom has citizenship of that country (such as Norway, Poland, France, the Czech Republic,
Belgium, Britain and India) while others will only solemnise marriages where both the bride and
groom possess that country’s citizenship (such as the United States, the Netherlands, Germany,
Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Mexico and the Philippines) (Hilotin 2013).
64 A. Watanabe
higher education for children of migrant workers, most Filipino workers assume that
the period spent working in the AGS is merely temporary. They may return home or
migrate to more immigrant-friendly countries, bringing their family members with
them for brighter futures, a more grounded and stable life, and better opportuni-
ties for their children. Nevertheless, some workers may not have any other suitable
occupational opportunities and they must choose to remain in the AGS as long as
they can. Filipino migrants often spend most of their time at work and spend any
time off with their kin (if any) or members of associations and faith-related groups,
who may provide social, material and psychological assistance to those in need.
This assistance includes solicitations for runaway maids to return home, while social
activities include regular visits to shelters by nurses and other cultural events. Other
nationalities are not excluded from participating in these activities. During my time
in the UAE, I learned of an American woman who joined a Catholic gathering with a
Filipina every Friday, and a Syrian consultant married to a Filipina domestic worker
who seemed to enjoy socialising regularly with other Filipinos in a local park.
If they are young and marriageable, some Filipino workers do choose to start new
families during their time in the AGS as migrants. From my research conducted in
2010, 464 Filipinos who married other Filipinos submitted marriage contracts to the
Philippine consulate in Abu Dhabi in the same year. Meanwhile, 84 others acquired
a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage; these are Filipinos who were
planning on marrying foreigners and this certificate was one of the necessary papers
that needed to be submitted to the respective judicial departments. This means that
just over 15% of the total 548 marriages were Filipinos choosing intermarriage with
other nationalities. However, there is no gender ratio provided for these figures.12
Considering the fact that the number of single female OFWs was 1.8 times more
than male OFWs in 2009, there is a greater possibility of Filipinas marrying people
from other nationalities than Filipino men marrying foreign women (Gresham et al.
2016). This may be due to the relative scarcity of other female migrant workers in
the AGS and their distribution in particular job sectors. Although there were more
than 1.4 million female migrants of working age (20–59 years old) in the UAE as of
December 2017 (De Bel-Air 2018), these foreign female workers (with the exception
of Filipinas) are believed to be mostly Indians, Sri Lankans and Indonesians. The
majority of Indian women marry relatively young and rarely marry other nationalities
as many follow the custom of marrying Indian men of their own caste. Meanwhile,
Indonesians and Sri Lankans are predominantly domestic workers and they seldom
have days off to socialise with other migrant workers. In contrast, there are abundant
‘bachelor’ migrant workers in the AGS, though many of them may have wives back
home or working in other countries. Filipinas, whether single, single mothers or
married, often shoulder the duty of being breadwinners for their families back home
and therefore carry out these responsibilities to the best of their abilities. At the same
time, however, many also dream of marrying Westerners so as to avoid these burdens
and have more prosperous futures with greater opportunities and a higher standard
12 Interview with Jose V. Jacob, consul general at the Philippine embassy in Abu Dhabi, March
2010.
of living. Thus, they may prefer ‘puti’ (white) men who may be better off financially
(Watanabe 2014).
Nevertheless, a number of Filipina workers have settled down with men from other
countries, including those from less-developed countries such as India, Pakistan,
Egypt and Syria. Many of these men are Muslims. In the UAE, Christian Filipinas
do not have to embrace Islam when marrying Muslims, whereas non-Muslim males
who marry Muslim females must convert to Islam. Some Filipinas do choose to
become Muslims anyway.13 This may be because of either a change in personal
faith or for the sake of understanding their husband’s culture and developing deeper
relationships with it as well as with their husband’s family (Hosoda and Watanabe
2014).
4.5 Case Studies
By introducing some social background and life histories of Filipinas married to the
other nationalities, I underscore the complexities of inclusion and exclusion that are
present in the AGS, the social capital created by language and familial choices made
based on nationality.
4.5.1 Case 1: A Work-centric Lifestyle that Limits Social

Network Expansion
Marites, who I interviewed in March 2010, was 38 years old at the time and had
worked in marketing in Dubai since 2002. In 2007, she married an Iraqi architect who
is two years older than her. Marites met her husband in the same interior decorating
company where she works. She found him more Westernised than she expected and
he noted her devotion towards him. Gradually their friendship became intimate and
they decided to get married in order legitimatise the relationship. Altogether, it took
more than six months to prepare the documents for the marriage; as Marites recalled,
it was ‘as if the government don’t want us [migrant workers] getting married’. After
a great deal of effort, they were finally able to marry at the Dubai courts. Though her
husband was a Muslim, he was relatively more secular and Marites did not embrace
Islam as marriages between Muslim men and non-Muslim women are permitted in
Dubai without the conversion of either party. The following year Marites’s husband
was laid off due to the 2008 financial crisis. His dismissal was largely due to his
relatively high salary as he is Arab. Shortly afterwards, he found a job in Abu Dhabi
where he stayed during the week and commuted back to Dubai on weekends.
13 Some of these conversions have been covered in newspaper articles. For example, see Ruiz (2015,
2016) and Gokulan (2018).

66 A. Watanabe
The couple spoke English to each other and Marites did not know Arabic except
for a few common words and phrases. Living in Dubai, though, Marites did not have
to speak or understand much Arabic as a large proportion of the population is fluent
in English. On some occasions, her husband’s male compatriots and friends visited
their house but she did not socialise with them very much. Instead, Marites preferred
to mingle with a few close Filipina friends and occasionally participated in Filipino
community events, which her husband rarely accompanied her to. Marites has never
met her husband’s family except for his older brother who was the witness of their
marriage contract as he was also working in Dubai at the time. Most of her husband’s
family were living in Iraq and were professionals such as pilots and engineers. Her
mother-in-law was a widow and housekeeper.
Marites and her husband did not intend to have children as they were more focused
on earning a decent living and supporting their families back home. She noted: ‘Our
priority in Dubai is to work and earn, not to start a family.’ It is not atypical that
many middle-aged couples focus on making money rather than having children. As
long as Marites and her husband had jobs in the UAE, they could send remittances
home and build up their savings though they began to consider migrating to Britain
before their retirement. Political insecurity and bleak wage prospects made life in
Iraq and the Philippines unattractive options; they agreed that neither country was a
viable choice for their future.
Marites had more or less surrendered her hope of acquiring access to resources,
rights, goods and services provided by the UAE government, and instead the cou-
ple’s long-term but temporary stay in the UAE was therefore more likely to remain
economic in nature, as they decided on a future elsewhere where they could obtain
comprehensive citizenship. Though Marites continued to develop her personal ties
with compatriots, to date marrying an Iraqi did not seem to intersect the distinct
boundaries between the Filipino and Iraqi communities in the UAE. This may be due
to both the work-orientated lifestyles of many migrants and cultural and language-use
differences.
4.5.2 Case 2: Assimilation in the Arab Community
Jasmin, who was 35 years old in 2017, is a Filipina mother of two. Up to the age
of 15 she had spent nearly 10 years in Saudi Arabia together with her parents who
had been working in the medical field. Her parents placed her in a public school and
Jasmin learned Arabic there—her father mentioned that it would be helpful for her
long-term survival in the Gulf, which she later found to be true. After pursuing her
tertiary education in a college in the Philippines, Jasmin came to Dubai in 2004. She
met her Lebanese husband (who is seven years older than her) through a Filipino
friend who had also married someone from Lebanon. Her husband was a pastry chef
of a boulangerie firm that had its headquarters in France. Within six months, they
got engaged and married in Dubai in 2007. Both the bride’s and groom’s parents
came to Dubai as Jasmin’s parents were still working in Saudi Arabia at that time
and Lebanon is not too far away.
At the time of my interview in 2017, Jasmin had been working as a teacher in
a special needs school four times a week where she dealt with the different parent-
ing styles of local mothers. Besides her work as a teacher, Jasmin also ran her own
homemade cupcake catering service. Her customers were multinational, including
Emiratis, many Lebanese nationals who were contacts through her husband’s net-
work, and Filipinos who were mostly from her own personal social circle. She gained
this diverse group of customers by posting about her products on social media with
Arabic captions and occasionally inviting the couple’s friends who ran big companies
for free tasting sessions as ‘local people here believe word of mouth’.
The couple spoke both English and Arabic at home. Though their way of life
seemingly fitted quite well in Dubai, the couple strongly considered moving to the
Philippines in a few years for several reasons, mainly for her husband’s early retire-
ment and also for the sake of their children’s education. Jasmin’s husband had been
working in Dubai for 25 years and wanted more relaxation time for both himself
and his family. Life in Dubai was both costly and work-orientated, and he did not
possess permanent residency in the UAE. Though Jasmin’s husband might qualify
for naturalisation after living in Dubai for another five years, he had no interest in
living in the UAE for an even longer period. Returning to Lebanon was not an option
for him either due to instability and political turmoil in the region. Moreover, the
couple was determined to have their children go to high school in the Philippines
as they found it reasonable in terms of quality and value for money. Yet the couple
deemed it necessary that the family stay together. As Jasmin’s husband has been to
the Philippines on family vacations and liked the homely environment, Jasmin had
no objection to returning to the country as it would allow her to be closer to her
parents who had already returned home from working in the Gulf.
In Jasmin’s case, her early life experiences living in the Gulf, her proficiency in
Arabic and marrying a Lebanese man all played key roles in her acceptance into the
Arab community. In the UAE’s hierarchical society, Arabs are considered to be of
a higher status than Asians; Jasmin’s Arabic fluency connected her to the dominant
social class and allowed her to assimilate as one of them. Nevertheless, as migrant
workers, the couple decided to leave the country with their children as the family did
not have the option of permanent residency or full citizenship in the UAE.
4.5.3 Case 3: Attaining UAE Citizenship While Being

Connected to the Migrant Community
Sarina, who was 49 years old in 2012 and a mother of two, had been based in the
UAE for 31 years. She arrived in the UAE in 1986 and started working as a secretary
for a car company, intending for the job to be a stepping stone before she moved to
68 A. Watanabe
Italy where her aunt worked. However, before long Sarina had embraced Islam and
married a Palestinian man whom she met while learning Arabic in Dubai.
Sarina entered the public service in 1996 when she began working as an admin-
istrative assistant. She was promoted to a senior counsellor three years later. In her
department, she dealt with many migrant workers, allowing her to brush up on her
French, Arabic and English language skills. She had a generous connectedness and
deep affection towards her compatriots that was especially apparent in the fact that
Sarina was very active in the Filipino community in Dubai, took the initiative to host a
Filipino basketball league, organised a parade celebrating Philippines Independence
Day and provided skills training and livelihood opportunities to other Filipinos in the
UAE. More importantly, she also helped distressed Filipinos living in the UAE as an
ate (older sister), but unfortunately encountered many cases of Filipinos who tried to
take advantage of her because of her position and connections. Sarina believed that
Filipinos could not dispel the long-standing prejudice against them in the Gulf unless
they were highly observant of both the laws and social codes of the AGS, lived in a
moral and disciplined manner, and were creative in the ways that they endured their
working conditions away from home.
Sarina’s husband had acquired UAE citizenship in the late 1990s as he was Pales-
tinian, a Muslim, fluent in Arabic and had lived in the country for many years.14 He
was also working for the UAE government. At the time of our interview in 2012,
their eldest child had benefited from having a naturalised citizen as a father, and had
graduated from a college in the UAE and was subsequently hired in a government
office. Sarina and her husband’s other child was still a student. As her husband was
a UAE citizen, Sarina was entitled to apply for citizenship as well but in order to
do so she had to renounce her Philippine citizenship as the UAE does not recognise
dual citizenship.15
In comparison with the first two cases, Sarina’s intermarriage with a naturalised
man along with her status as public officer resulted in a more stable life. In addition,
her children also benefited from the extensive welfare and assistance that the UAE
offers its citizens. In this regard, as a government employee she was controlling her-
self so as not to speak or behave against the UAE’s governance. Yet she maintained
firm ties with the Filipino community in the UAE and was engaged in serving her
compatriots as best she could. This context resembles middle-class Filipino immi-
grants in the United States and Canada who also regularly extend assistance and aid
to their countrymen (Seki 2009).
14 Up until 1997, nearly 5000 Arabs became naturalised Emiratis, including many Yemeni and
Palestinian nationals (Jamal 2017).

15 However, the Philippine government enacted the Republic Act 9225 in 2003, admitting natural-
born Filipinos who lost their citizenship when they naturalised as citizens in other countries to
reclaim their Philippine nationality. Therefore, it is possible that Sarina might have followed the
new law and acquired dual citizenship.
4.6 Conclusion: Complexities and Changes in Inclusion

and Exclusion
The stringent nationality policies of the UAE that arose as a consequence of more
Emiratis intermarrying with non-Emiratis has played a partial role in shaping today’s
citizenship in the state, ranging from full citizenship to the holders of family books
to partial citizenship and naturalisation. These policies also limit migrant workers
and their families and children to economic, cultural and psychological citizenship.
This stratification has resulted in the differentiation of material and welfare benefits
provided by the state and also hierarchical exclusion among the various levels of
society. Knowing that they could never fully secure their lives in the UAE and would
never be on an equal footing with nationals, some migrant workers have utilised their
language skills in order to survive better. By acquiring Arabic-language proficiency,
non-Arab migrant workers were able to enter into new social networks and access a
greater number of resources. This is a form of social capital that cannot be gained
by simply going out with peers and colleagues of the same nationality.
Intermarriages may help migrants to better integrate into the host country’s society
by enabling an expansion of social networks through partners. In the UAE, Emiratis
and Arabs are generally deemed to comprise the ‘majority’ of society as they have
significantly larger political and economic power and greater rights than the rest
of the population. However, when examining intermarriages between Filipinos and
non-national Arabs as introduced in the case studies, their inclusion and exclusion
appear to be complex.
First, we need to consider the concept of timeframes when examining choices
regarding citizenship. This is because the gravity and importance of nationality alter
with a person’s stage in life, and the ways inclusion and exclusion also change accord-
ingly. Though all three Filipinas in the case studies had married Muslim men from
Arabic backgrounds, these women’s choices regarding citizenship and integration
into local society varied not only with their background but also with their current
stage in life and plans for the future. In the long term, Jasmin’s family would also be
a focal point in her decision-making process since her children also faced exclusion
in the UAE. As migrant workers, both Jasmin and Marites were holders of resident
visas, which were provided to them by their employers. Since nationality is also a
key factor at the forefront of the minds of most migrant workers, especially when it
comes to the end of contracts or resignation from jobs overseas as well as postretire-
ment life, it is vital to examine inclusion and exclusion in the AGS in relation to the
passage of time.
Second, this forces us to consider the agency and autonomy of the people them-
selves in making decisions regarding married life. Jasmin and her husband had the
chance of obtaining partial citizenship through her husband’s naturalisation as was
the case with Sarina. However, Jasmin and her husband did not want to obtain natural-
isation since life in Dubai was too work-orientated and it did not match the lifestyles
they wanted for their future and their children’s futures. Thus, we can say that not all
foreign workers dream of obtaining citizenship in the ‘welfare states’ of the Gulf and
the resulting material benefits from the state—even those who would have the right
70 A. Watanabe
to in the near future may choose otherwise, such as Jasmin’s husband who could
apply for naturalisation in five years.
Third, there is a paradoxical aspect to inclusion and exclusion in that if workers
are included in one social group, they may be excluded from another. Sarina’s case
demonstrates the question of antinomy in inclusion and exclusion as she was forced
to choose between being a UAE citizen or a Philippine citizen. In the UAE, a person
must choose one of their nationalities as the government forbids dual citizenship.
It is ironic that because of Sarina’s status as a government employee and wife of a
naturalised husband, the other Filipinos had begun to see her as different and took
advantage of her more privileged position in Emirati society. Moreover, since Sarina
was a UAE government employee, she experienced immobility in that she has much
less freedom to act and speak out against the government and the authorities. This
alienation in turn pressured Sarina to maintain close ties with the Philippines.
Lastly, though they may be excluded in one sense, they may have other oppor-
tunities for inclusion in other ways. This is true in the case of Marites who was not
as successful as the other two women in expanding her social capital through her
marriage with an Iraqi. However, she chose to integrate herself fully among her own
network of Filipinos to gain more access to resources and instead fostered a greater
sense of belonging among her compatriots. As noted, the segregation of nationali-
ties in the UAE strengthens migrant workers’ predisposition to stay in their comfort
zones and socialise mainly with their fellow citizens.
There is a debate over social networks and intermarriage and whether migrant
workers’ integration into new social networks comes first and then leads to intermar-
riage or if intermarriage comes first and results in more connections being opened
up to them (Rodríguez-García 2015). The three cases in this chapter illustrate to
some degree that either the expansion of social networks resulted in intermarriages
or that these two possibilities took place concurrently with the foreigners involved
displaying personal characteristics of openness and giving. In addition, it is likely that
international marriages are both a catalyst that allows individuals to cross national
boundaries of culture, religion and language among others and are also an outcome
of having crossed these boundaries.
Viewed in the long term, these forms of social capital may not be a panacea to
overcoming national and non-national boundaries demarcated by official citizenship.
Some studies have illustrated the effects of intermarriage and economic integration
that are achieved through the acquisition of native language skills in Australia (Meng
and Gregory 2005). Still, legal citizenship plays a more influential role in deciding
a family’s future in the cases outlined in this chapter. In the case of labour migration
from home countries to immigrant countries (such as Britain, the United States,
Canada and Australia), many foreigners choose to settle permanently by attaining
permanent residence and eventually gaining full citizenship. Some choose to return
to their home country instead where they can exercise their citizenship and options
of geographical mobility. These choices arise from the forced displacement from
the AGS after the termination of contracts as there are stringent policies regarding
migrant workers. Lastly, for the case of intermarried families where both husband
and wife are non-nationals who are not eligible for naturalisation in the AGS, they are
forced to move to either the husband’s country, the wife’s country or third countries
that are have more immigrant-friendly naturalisation policies. If one party is either a
national or naturalised citizen, the family may choose to stay in the AGS. What lies
behind these choices is whether they were entitled to a grounded and stable life in
the UAE as this would effect all aspects of married and family life, no matter what
social stratum or hierarchy the husband and wife are situated in.
The analysis has attempted to illustrate the complexities of the inclusion and
exclusion of migrant workers who had intermarried and are living in the UAE, and to
examine how legal citizenship determines their strategies of surviving long-term stays
in a foreign country. People meet and marry in the hypermobile, super-diverse, tiered
system of the ever ‘Emiratising’ UAE society. Given the preference for endogamy in
the historical background of the AGS, it could be argued that intermarriage is one of
the most important factors in ‘barrier-breaking’. Nevertheless, the strict naturalisation
and citizenship laws of the UAE mean that migrants of other nationalities may face
eventual displacement from the country if they do not secure naturalisation through
their partner or find long-term jobs. The inclusion and exclusion of migrant workers
differ according to individual experiences, nationalities and socio-economic levels,
and transform as time passes, especially if new regulations regarding citizenship are
put in place. In such circumstances, these couples and families are forced to make
serious decisions with long-lasting effects regarding where to settle and continue
their lives. As a result, they maximise what social capital they have and utilise the
very nature of their existence as sojourners.
References
Ali, Syed. 2011. Going and coming and going again: Second-generation migrants in Dubai. Mobil-
ities 6 (4): 553–568.
Alzaabi, Ahmed. 2012. The risks that foreign labour poses to UAE national security. MA thesis,
United States Army Command and General Staff College.
Alharahsheh, Sanaa Taha, Mohamad Mahmoud Mohieddin, and Faras Khalid Almeer. 2015. Marry-
ing out: Trends and patterns of mixed marriage amongst Qataris. International Journal of Social
Science Studies 3 (6): 213–225.
Asger, Muby. 2011. Living together in the UAE? Think twice. Gulf News, 9 June.
Beck, Ulrich, and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim. 2014. Distant love: Personal life in the global age.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bristol-Rhys, Jane. 2012. Socio-spatial boundaries in Abu Dhabi. In Migrant labour in the Persian
Gulf, ed. Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 59–84. London: Hurst.
Constable, Nicole (ed.). 2004. Cross-border marriages: Gender and mobility in transnational Asia.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Damir-Geilsdorf, Sabine. 2016. Contract labour and debt bondage in the Arab Gulf states: Policies
and practices within the kafala system. In Bonded labour: Global and comparative perspectives
(18th–21st century), ed. Sabine Damir-Geilsdorf, Ulrike Lindner, Gesine Müller, Oliver Tappe,
and Michael Zeuske, 163–190. Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag.
De Bel-Air, Françoise. 2018. Demography, migration, and the labour market in the UAE. Flo-
rence: European University Institute and Jeddah: Gulf Research Centre, Gulf Labour Markets
and Migration and Population Programme. GLMM–EN–No. 1/2018. http://gulfmigration.org/
media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2018_01.pdf. Accessed 18 Nov 2018.
Duncan, Gillian. 2018. Hundreds of Emirati couples share marriage grants worth more than Dh60
million. The National, 5 July.
72 A. Watanabe
Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority, United Arab Emirates. 2007–2015. Statistics
by Subject. Population and Demographic. Marriage and divorce. http://fcsa.gov.ae/en-us/Pages/
Statistics/Statistics-by-Subject.aspx#/%3Fsubject=Population%20and%20Demographic&
folder=Population%20and%20Demographic/Population/Marriage%20and%20Divorce.
Accessed 16 Nov 2018.
Gokulan, Dhanusha. 2018. My first Ramadan was the best. 31 May.
Gresham, Phillip, Marieke Smit, and Lothar Smith. 2016. Gender dimensions of the ‘national script’
on migration and remittances in the Philippines. In Women, gender, remittances and development
in the Global South, ed. Ton van Naerssen, Lothar Smith, Tine Davids, and Marianne H. Marchand,
99–118. New York: Routledge.
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration [GLMM] Programme. 2005. UAE: non-Emirati
population by sex, age group and duration of stay in the UAE (five-year peri-
ods, 2005). http://gulfmigration.eu/uae-non-emirati-population-by-sex-age-group-and-duration-
of-stay-in-the-uae-five-year-periods-2005/. Accessed 28 July 2018.
Hilotin, Jay B. 2013. Why getting married in the UAE is a knotty affair. Gulf News, 13 February.
Hosoda, Naomi. 2014. Kababayan solidarity? Filipino communities and class relations in United
Arab Emirates cities. Journal of Arabian Studies: Arabia, the Gulf, and the Red Sea 1 (3): 18–35.
Hosoda, Naomi, and Akiko Watanabe. 2014. Creating a ‘new home’ away from home: Religious
conversions of Filipina domestic workers in Dubai and Doha. In Migrant domestic workers in the
Middle East: The home and the world, ed. Bina Fernandez and Marina de Regt, 117–139. New
Horinuki, Koji. 2009. Wangan Arabu san’yukoku ni okeru gaikokujin rodosha mondai to kokunai
seiji no hen’you: Arabu shuchokoku renpou wo jirei ni [Expatriate problems and the transforma-
tion of domestic politics in the GCC countries: The case of the United Arab Emirates]. In Kokusai
idou no hikaku seijigaku [Comparative politics of international migration], ed. Japan Association
for Comparative Politics, 69–91. Kyoto: Minerva.
Jamal, Manal A. 2015. The ‘tiering’ of citizenship and residency and the ‘hierarchisation’ of migrant
communities: The United Arab Emirates in historical context. International Migration Review
49 (3): 601–632.
Jamal, Manal A. 2017. The ‘other Arab’ and Gulf citizens: Mutual accommodation of Palestinians
in the UAE in historical context. In Arab migrant communities in the GCC, ed. Zahra Babar,
111–132. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kathiravelu, Laavanya. 2012. Social networks in Dubai: Informal solidarities in an uncaring state.
Journal of Intercultural Studies 33 (1): 103–119.
Khaleej Times. 2018. UAE launches 10-year residency visas for investors, specialists. 21 May.
Le Gall, J., and Deirdre Meintel. 2015. Cultural and identity transmission in mixed couples in
Quebec, Canada: Normalising plural identities as a path to social integration. Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 662 (1): 112–128.
Levitas, Ruth, Christina Pantazis, Eldin Fahmy, David Gordon, Eva Lloyd, and Demi Patsios. 2007.
The multi-dimensional analysis of social exclusion. Bristol: Department of Sociology and School
for Social Policy, Townsend Centre for the International Study of Poverty and Bristol Institute
for Public Affairs, University of Bristol.
Longva, Anh Nga. 2006. Nationalism in pre-modern guise: The discourse on hadhar and badu in
Kuwait. International Journal of Middle East Studies 38 (2): 171–187.
Lumayag, Linda A. 2016. Marriage ‘during’ work migration: Lived experiences of Filipino marriage
migrants in Malaysia. In Marriage migrations in Asia: Emerging minorities at the frontiers of
nation-states, ed. Sari K. Ishii, 73–101. Singapore: NUS Press.
Meng, Xin, and Robert G. Gregory. 2005. Intermarriage and the economic assimilation of immi-
grants. Journal of Labour Economics 23 (1): 135–175.
Nagy, Sharon. 2003. Attitudes toward mixed marriages in Bahrain: The eroticisation of class. Al-
Raida 10 (101/102): 79–83.
National, The. 2013. Sheikh Khalifa grants UAE citizenship to 500 children of Emirati mothers. 28
November.
Ong, Aihwa. 1999. Flexible citizenship: The cultural logics of transnationality. Durham, NC: Duke
University Press.
Philippine Statistics Authority. 2017a. Table 1.3 Distribution of overseas Filipino workers by place
of work and sex: 2017. Statistical tables on overseas contract workers (OCW): 2017. https://psa.
gov.ph/sites/default/files/attachments/hsd/article/TABLE%201.3%20%20Distribution%20of%
20Overseas%20Filipino%20Workers%20by%20Place%20of%20Work%20and%20Sex%20%
202017.xls. Accessed 16 Nov 2018.
Philippine Statistics Authority. 2017b. Table 1.8 Total and average cash remittances of male and
female overseas Filipino workers during six months prior to survey by place of work 2017. Sta-
tistical tables on overseas contract workers (OCW): 2017. https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/
attachments/hsd/article/TABLE%201.8%20%20Total%20and%20Average%20%20Cash%
20Remittance%20of%20Male%20and%20Female%20Overseas%20Filipino%20Workers%
20During%20Six%20Months%20Prior%20to%20Survey%20by%20Place%20of%20Work%
202017.xls. Accessed 16 Nov 2018.
Rodríguez-García, Dan. 2015. Intermarriage and integration revisited: International experiences and
cross-disciplinary approaches. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
662 (1): 8–36.
Ruiz, Ramona. 2015. Filipina Muslim convert blessed by first Ramadan in UAE. The National, 15
July.
Ruiz, Ramona. 2016. Ahead of Ramadan, Filipina convert finds religion of peace and tranquillity.
The National, 2 June.
Salem, Ola. 2011. 1,117 children of Emirati women to get citizenship. The National, 1 February.
Seki, Koki. 2009. Differences and alliances in a transnational social space: An analysis of Filipino
middle-class identity. Japanese Journal of Cultural Anthropology 74 (3): 390–413.
Song, Miri. 2010. What happens after segmented assimilation? An exploration of intermarriage and
‘mixed race’ young people in Britain. Ethnic and Racial Studies 33 (7): 1194–1213.
UAE Government, Official Portal. 2018. Marriage. https://government.ae/en/information-and-
services/social-affairs/marriage. Accessed 10 Oct 2018.
United Nations. 2017. International migration report 2017. New York: United Nations.
Vora, Neha. 2013. Impossible citizens: Dubai’s Indian diaspora. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press.
Watanabe, Akiko. 2014. Intimacy and estrangement: Narratives of Filipino women worker mar-
ried to foreign Muslims abroad. In Dynamics of marriage migration in Asia, ed. Kayoko Ishii,
63–83. Tokyo: Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ICLAA), Tokyo
University of Foreign Studies.
Wilkins, Louisa. 2012. Can cross-cultural relationships work? Gulf News, 12 August.
Yang, Wen-Shan, and Lu Melody Chia-Wen. 2010. Asian cross-border marriage migration: Demo-
graphic patterns and social issues. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Akiko Watanabe is associate professor of anthropology and area studies at the Faculty of Inter-
national Studies, Bunkyo University, Japan. She has conducted fieldwork in Manila and the Arab
Gulf states, mainly in the United Arab Emirates and Qatar over a period of 10 years. Her research
looks into normativity and connectedness of both Muslim converts and people born as Muslims in
the Philippines, in relation to overseas labour migration, the place of belonging of Asian women
who have intermarried, and the representativeness of interethnic and interfaith relations. Her pub-
lications include the following: Intimacy and estrangement: narratives of Filipino women workers
married to foreign Muslims abroad. In Dynamics of marriage migration in Asia, ed. Kayoko Ishii
(2014).
Chapter 5
‘This is our home, but we cannot stay
here forever’: Second-Generation Asian
Youths in Kuwait and the United Arab
Emirates
Naomi Hosoda and Kyoko Matsukawa
Abstract This chapter investigates future prospects and a sense of belonging among
second-generation Asians based on case studies of Filipino and Indian youths in the
Arab Gulf states (AGS), in particular Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Due to
the strict migration and exclusive citizenship policies of the AGS, second-generation
Asians in the region mainly grow up within their respective ethnic groups where they
are segregated from the host society as well as from other ethnic communities. Many
of them are simultaneously unaccustomed to the physical and social environment of
the countries that their parents come from. Their sense of belonging thus appears
to be multifaceted in that their ‘home’ is an ethnically segregated community in a
Gulf country, but where they are permitted to stay only as temporary residents. As
a result, these second-generation Asians are forced to search for places where they
can cultivate a real sense of belonging.
Keywords Arab Gulf states · Second-generation migrants · Belonging · Global

education · Citizenship · Youths
5.1 Introduction
Kyla is a 17-year-old Filipina high school student and the daughter of a Filipino
couple working in Kuwait. She takes a school bus every day to a private Philippine
school in Kuwait City with her 15-year-old sister and 10-year-old brother. They
spend all day in school from 7.00 a.m. to 4.00 p.m., where they study along with
800 other second-generation migrant children whose parents work in Kuwait as
nurses, engineers, office clerks and sales managers, among other jobs. Kyla has been
living in the Middle East since she was brought there at the age of three. Given
N. Hosoda (B)
School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki University, Nagasaki City, Japan
e-mail: hosoda@nagasaki-u.ac.jp
K. Matsukawa
Department of Sociology, Faculty of Letters, Konan University, Kobe, Japan
e-mail: kyoko@konan-u.ac.jp
76 N. Hosoda and K. Matsukawa
that 80% of the students and staff are Filipinos, she is surrounded by many other
Filipinos on a daily basis. Kyla is fluent in both Tagalog and English with a modest
understanding of Arabic as the school curriculum includes Arabic-language lessons.
Nevertheless, every time she joins her family on trips to the Philippines, she finds
herself quite different from other Filipino high school students who are growing up
in the Philippines. Kyla in fact feels more comfortable living in Kuwait City.1
In the past few decades, the number of foreign migrants in the Arab Gulf states
(AGS) has continued to grow. The AGS—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Ara-
bia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—have thus been increasingly scrutinised
and studied in both the international media and by scholars with regard to labour and
migration patterns, citizenship laws and the character of societies where migrants
make up a significant portion of the total population. Migrants in the region work
in various sectors of the economy such as construction, health care and household
services. What is less well studied is the presence of family members of middle-class
migrant workers, especially children and teenagers, and the environment that they
experience living in the AGS. This chapter examines future prospects and a sense of
belonging among second-generation Asians in the AGS, especially in Kuwait and
the UAE, based on case studies of Filipino and Indian youth.
The lives of second-generation foreigners in the region demonstrate an inter-
esting and important case in the study of transnationalism and migrants’ sense of
belonging. Scholarship on transnationalism has pointed out that, along with techno-
logical advances in the fields of air transportation, communication, and financial and
commodity transactions, migrants increasingly maintain ties with their country (or
countries) of origin while integrating in the receiving country. They thus live in a
‘transnational social field’ (Schiller et al. 1992) or ‘transnational social space’ (Faist
1998) where they build social relations and identities across international borders.
However, children of migrants living in the AGS grow up in a social context in which
the host country views the migrant population as ‘temporary workers’ and rejects the
idea of assimilation and social integration. As a result, they are confined to a social
space that is segregated not only from the host society but also from the majority of
other nationalities. Simultaneously, these children grow up being accustomed to a
so-called Gulf lifestyle where they are surrounded by modern infrastructure and are
exposed to global brands and a cosmopolitan environment on a daily basis, which
is a far cry from the living conditions in many urban cities in Asia. Indeed, many
consider the Gulf country (or city) they reside in as their ‘home’.2
Despite the large volume of international migrants from the Philippines and
India in various parts of the world, most research on second-generation migrants
focuses on children living in Western countries and some selected Asian countries
(Rangaswamy 2000; Das 2012; Chen and Jeung 2012; Singh and Cabraal 2013;
1 Interview with Kyla at the New Kuwait Philippines International School, Kuwait City, 22 February
2017.
2 As with Al-Ali and Koser’s (2002) work on transnationalism and a sense of home, in this chapter,
we define ‘home’ as a place where fear, danger, alien places and traditions, and unfamiliar faces
are absent; in other words, ‘home’ is where these students and their families enjoy a safe, familiar
and comfortable living space.
5 ‘This is our home, but we cannot stay here forever’ … 77
Aguilar 2014; Nagasaka and Fresnoza-Flot 2015) or those who have been left behind
to be raised in their homelands (Parreñas 2005; Aguilar 2009; Zachariah and Rajan
2014). Even though the six countries of the AGS are the third largest destination for
international migrants after North America and Europe (World Bank 2016), studies
on second-generation migrants in the region remain limited, with the exception of
works by Ali (2010) on second-generation migrants in Dubai and by Vora (2013)
on middle-class Indian children also in Dubai.
We intend to fill this gap in current knowledge by focusing on the children of
migrant workers from the Philippines and India who are growing up in the AGS.
We address the following questions. First, under what kind of social environment do
second-generation Filipino and Indian migrants grow up and how are they educated?
What schooling options are available to them and how do they and their parents
choose educational opportunities? How do second-generation Asian youths view
Gulf countries, the countries of their citizenship as well as other countries? Where
do they plan to live in future and why? How do they view themselves and where do
they think they belong? Do the future prospects of Filipino and Indian youths differ?
The main reason for the focus on youths from the Philippines and India is that
these two nationalities make up a large portion of foreign workers residing in the
AGS. As discussed in the next section, Indians are the most dominant foreign popu-
lation in the AGS (World Bank 2018), and there is a historical connection between
the Indian subcontinent and the Arabian Peninsula that dates back to before the dis-
covery of oil in the Gulf. On the other hand, the migration of Filipinos to the Gulf is
relatively recent and occurred only after the oil boom that began in the early 1970s.
Filipinos thus possess far fewer historical ties with the region compared to their
Indian counterparts.3
We have conducted fieldwork on Filipino and Indian migrants since 2009, but the
ethnographic data on Filipino and Indian youths, their parents, school administrators
and teachers used in this chapter were mostly collected in March 2016 and February
2017 in the UAE (in particular Dubai, Fujairah and Sharjah) and Kuwait. We were
able to conduct an in-depth study on the lives of second-generation Filipino and
Indian youths in their late teens to twenties. All names used in this chapter are
pseudonyms to protect the privacy of the students and their parents.
Given the fact that both the Philippines and India are multiethnic nations, the
population of Filipinos and Indians living in the AGS also comprises various ethnic
groups. Indian communities in the AGS have further ethnic subdivisions (Matsukawa
2014), partly due to their large population size in the Gulf. Among various Indian
ethnic groups, cases of second-generation Goans are closely examined here, though
not exclusively, as one of the authors (Kyoko Matsukawa) has been conducting
research in Goa for over 15 years. Goa is a southwest Indian state on the Arabian
Sea, and despite its small population size of approximately 1.45 million according
to the 2011 census (Government of India 2017) a number of its residents began to
migrate to the Arab Gulf even before oil was discovered in the region (Gracias 2000).
3 Historical
records show several waves of Arab migration to precolonial Philippines, which con-
tinued even during the colonial period (Rosario 2016).
5.2 South Asians and Southeast Asians in the Arab Gulf

States
The AGS are well known for hosting a massive number of foreign nationals from all
over the world, mostly as migrant workers. Recent estimates on the foreign population
in the AGS indicate that there are about 29 million migrant workers present in these
six countries, which constitutes 56% of the total population in the AGS (World Bank
2016). In some states, the proportion of the foreign population far exceeds that of
the national population, such as in Qatar, the UAE and Kuwait where the percentage
of migrants of the total population in 2013 was 90.8, 88.5 and 72.1%, respectively.
The majority of migrant workers in the region initially came from neighbouring
Arab countries and Palestine, but after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, they
increasingly came from South and Southeast Asia.4 There are no comprehensive
statistics on the composition of expatriate communities in the AGS as this informa-
tion is considered to be sensitive for security reasons. Nevertheless, migrant popu-
lation estimates by the World Bank show that Indians, who make up 30.9% of the
total number of foreign nationals residing in the AGS, are the largest group, followed
by Bangladeshis (10.4%) and Pakistanis (10.3%) (World Bank 2018). Other major
countries of origin of migrants in the AGS include Indonesia (7.3%) and the Philip-
pines (5.5%) in Southeast Asia, Egypt (8.6%) and Yemen (3.6%) in the Middle East,
and Nepal (3.1%) and Sri Lanka (2.5%) in South Asia.
The notable presence of Indians and other South Asian people in the Persian Gulf
region dates back to the pre-oil era. The earliest account of an Indian community
of Hindu merchants in Siraf, Iran, can be found in a book written in 916 ce by an
Arab historian. During the Safavid dynasty (1501–1722), Khatris, Hindu merchants
from Multan in southwestern Punjab, were the largest single group of Indians in the
Gulf. Gujarati Jain merchants were active in the ports of the Gulf between the tenth
and sixteenth centuries. Hindu merchants from Sindh, Kutch and western Gujarat
replaced Jain merchants from the seventeenth century onwards. The presence of
Khojas, Muslim merchants from Gujarat and Bombay, can also be traced back to
the sixteenth century (Onley 2014). British protection over Gulf sheikhdoms in the
nineteenth century led to an increase in Indian workers in the region, particularly as
bankers, pearl merchants and government officials (Jain and Oommen 2015).
In the twentieth century, the number of foreign workers in the Gulf significantly
increased from the 1970s onwards due to the oil boom with many Indians being
recruited as workers in the oil industry (Potter 2014). A majority of these new
migrants were male due to a lack of job opportunities available for women (such
as in the health care, manufacturing, teaching and entertainment sectors and domes-
tic work). Kerala used to be the main Indian state that sent migrants to the AGS with
4 Andrzej Kapiszewski gives several additional reasons for the increased presence of Asian workers
in the Gulf. Asian migrants, he states, did not represent any ideological threat to the host states,
and appeared to be ‘less expensive to employ, easier to lay off, and believed to be more efficient,
obedient, and manageable’. Further, they tended to migrate without their families and so were less
likely to settle down permanently (Kapiszewski 2006: 7).
not only unskilled workers but also semi-skilled and professional workers leaving
the state. Recently, more Indian migrants (mostly unskilled workers) have been com-
ing to the Gulf from the northern state of Uttar Pradesh (Jain and Oommen 2015).
However, migrant workers from Goa hold a distinctive position, even though there
are fewer of them compared to Indian migrants from other regions. Many Goans who
work overseas are Catholics and have a good command of English, which has greatly
helped them to secure white-collar jobs in the AGS. (The presence of Catholics in Goa
is due to Portuguese colonial rule from 1510 to 1961.) Throughout history, migrants
from Goa have pursued socio-economic opportunities overseas including in British
India and East Africa. Goans were already migrating to the Arabian Peninsula in
the 1950s and 1960s, including to Oman where they worked as labourers (Gracias
2000), before other Indians began migrating there after the oil boom of the 1970s
and 1980s.
The influx of Southeast Asians to the Gulf began during the early 1970s when
construction and other related industries needed a large migrant workforce to build
and run the infrastructure that was required. These migrants were mostly recruited
as contract workers through commercial recruitment agencies (Owen 1985: 8). The
Philippine government in particular seized this opportunity to create more employ-
ment for its citizens. Since then, it has vigorously promoted overseas employment by
establishing government agencies focusing on marketing, regulating contracts and
taking care of the welfare of Filipinos working abroad (Hosoda 2015: 285). Although
the bulk of Filipino workers in the 1970s were male, an increasing number of Fil-
ipinas also began migrating to the region shortly after. This was partly due to the
diversification of development strategies that some Gulf countries pursued. Filipinas
are now employed not only as nurses, teachers and domestic workers but also as shop
attendants, hospitality staff in the tourism industry and office workers.
A significant number of migrants from Asia are now professionals or skilled
workers. In the business sector in the AGS, there is a difference between migrants
from South Asia and Southeast Asia, with South Asian merchants constituting one
of the dominant groups in the business sector, along with Arab and Western groups
(Gardner 2010: 71–95; Vora 2013: 1–35). The presence of Southeast Asian merchants
remains minimal, with the majority of Southeast Asians being contract workers.
5.3 Growing Up in Countries with Strict Migration Policies

and Exclusive Citizenship
The lives of migrant workers in the AGS are described as fragmented and atomised
because of the rules and regulations governing their movements, though the actual
circumstances of individuals may vary according to each country’s policy and social
conditions as well as the individual’s job sector, nationality and income. In all six
countries of the AGS foreigners are not granted permanent residence, and regardless
of their occupation they are only allowed to stay for a contractual period of up to two
to three years (with the possibility of renewal). However, several countries have begun
to consider offering permanent residency to expatriates who can fulfil a strict set of
criteria. A sponsorship system, known as kafala, affects all aspects of foreigners’
immigration and residence in the region. Since their employers are their sponsors,
foreigners are placed in a position in which the employer is able to wield significant
power over them (Gardner 2010; Kathiravelu 2016).
Furthermore, in the labour market, both Kuwait and the UAE have preferential
policies that favour the hiring of nationals over foreigners in higher occupations,
constituting a form of ‘Kuwaitisation’ or ‘Emiratisation’ (Kapiszewski 2001). Addi-
tionally, the salaries of foreign workers are determined by salary standards in their
countries of origin. As a result, wages for the same job in the same workplace
vary according to each employee’s nationality. These economic disparities between
migrants from countries with higher and lower salaries give rise to marked differ-
ences in living conditions and lifestyles. Disparities also exist among people of the
same nationality. With some migrants employed as professionals or managers while
many others are employed in lower-level sectors or relatively unskilled positions,
income levels vary greatly according to different occupations, which in turn engender
divisions among fellow nationals (Ali 2010; Bristol-Rhys 2012). This social frag-
mentation is reflected in the private lives of migrants which are highly segmented into
small groups composed of close relatives and/or friends of similar social, cultural
and religious backgrounds (Longva 1997; Kathiravelu 2016).5 During their days off
and free time after work, migrants tend to socialise within these small groups and
communities.
Children of Asian migrants are also greatly affected by the rules and regulations
governing their migrant worker parents, as well as the current social and environ-
mental conditions they must endure. First, as dependants of temporary residents,
these children have no prospect of acquiring nationality or citizenship of a Gulf
country, regardless of their birthplace or length of stay in the country. Second, they
are primarily children of middle-class foreigners as only professionals and higher-
income workers are allowed to bring their family members to the AGS to stay with
them; it can also be expensive to support non-working family members in the AGS
due to the high cost of living in the region.6 Third, as shown below, the children of
5 Omar AlShehabi calls this situation ‘hyper-alienation’, in which a person feels a ‘lack of control and
involvement in the production of their surrounding environment, whether economically, politically,

socially or culturally, to the point where they feel the surrounding environment and its production
process does not represent them, and indeed is a source of oppression’ (AlShehabi 2015: 28). He
also emphasises that hyper-alienation has been occurring not only with the migrants but also with
citizens of the host country.
6 The governments of the AGS permit certain categories of foreign workers and/or workers with
valid residency permits and salaries higher than a specified minimum to sponsor their family mem-
bers. For example, in the UAE, the government permits migrant workers with a monthly salary over
AED4000 (approximately US$1100) to sponsor their family members, whereas the Omani govern-
ment stipulates that workers are only permitted to sponsor family members if they are employed
in specific occupational sectors (Hosoda 2016: 42–43). In Kuwait, the minimum income required
for migrants to sponsor their wives and children is KWD250 (approximately US$820) per month
(Mahdavi 2016: 78). Although no official statistics are available, the authors were informed by
Asian migrants attend expensive private schools as public schools (which are free of
charge) are exclusively for children of local citizens. Fourth, many Asian children
are isolated in their homes and have a limited circle of friends because their mobility
is restricted to relying on either school buses or their parents’ private vehicles. Not
only do most cities in the AGS lack public transportation systems that are easily
accessible to youths, these students’ parents also tend to spend many hours at work
and are unable to drive or chaperone their children after school. In apartment build-
ings and residential areas of the Gulf, it is rare to see groups of children playing with
each other outdoors as neighbourhood gatherings are unlikely to take place; this is
partly due to the high temperatures in the daytime, especially during summer when
temperatures can climb above 40 °C.
Finally, the majority of Asian children spend their after-school hours inside their
homes on weekdays while on weekends they tend to go out to eat in restaurants, shop
and play in malls, or visit their parents’ friends. In contrast to many Asian cities where
the latest technologies and high-end products are available amid an environment of
crowded streets and poor urban housing, almost all cities of the Gulf are clean, orderly
and remarkably modern, with huge shopping complexes that house outlets of global
brands and various entertainment attractions. For many children growing up in Gulf
cities, weekly visits to malls and regular meals at various restaurants are a part of
everyday life.
As such, children of Asian migrants in the AGS are not integrated in the host coun-
try’s society and they mostly live in small ethnic enclaves where they are segregated
from other ethnic groups and nationalities, while still being exposed to hypermodern
urban lifestyles.
5.4 Educational Opportunities and Family Decisions
There is little statistical information or analytical literature on children of Asian

migrants living in the AGS, and our interviews revealed that the backgrounds of
Asian children vary greatly according to each individual. Based on information from
these interviews, we may say that a typical Filipino child living in the AGS is born
in the Philippines to two Filipino parents. He or she was brought to a Gulf country
between the ages of four and seven years, around the age for kindergarten or primary
school enrolment. In the case of Indians, it is more difficult to describe a typical
second-generation child due to the greater diversity and size of the Indian foreign
population. It can also be said that a certain proportion of Indian children were
born in the AGS, including a small number of third-generation migrants of whose
grandparents moved to the Gulf for work in 1950s.7 Filipino and Indian parents are
the principal of an Indian school in February 2016 that a monthly income of at least KWD1000
(approximately US$3300) is needed to stay comfortably with their family in Kuwait.
7 For example, when we visited the Salmiya Indian Model School in Kuwait on 24 February 2017,
we had a chance to talk to ninth grade students. We asked them whether they were born in Kuwait.
most likely working, and hiring a nanny is not very common among these families
largely due to the cost involved. Thus, the educational institutions that are available
play a vital role in shaping the lives of second-generation migrants.
In the AGS, public education includes both primary and secondary education,
and generally covers a period of 12 years and is free of charge for those possessing
citizenship. However, enrolment in the public education system is limited to children
of citizens. Foreign workers mostly choose to send their children to international
or foreign schools as local public schools do not admit foreign students and the
curriculum of local schools places a much greater emphasis on the Arabic language
and Islamic subjects. Migrants are transitory residents who view their stays in the
AGS as temporary though they may span a period of several years; most intend to
return to their home countries eventually. Thus, if their children attend schools that
use the same curriculum as that of their home country, these children can more easily
integrate into society and schools when their families decide to return.
In the UAE and Kuwait, where foreigners make up the majority of the popula-
tion, a wide range of curricular options is available. Time Out magazine published
an education directory for 2016/2017 as a special issue of Time Out Dubai Kids,
which states that the main curricula taught in private schools in Dubai follow Amer-
ican, Australian, British and Indian systems and the International Baccalaureate
programme (Time Out Dubai Kids 2016). The booklet contains information on 180
schools (from kindergarten to the twelfth grade), such as fee structures and the rat-
ings given by the Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA), which
is responsible for the growth and quality of private education in Dubai.8 According
to Dubai Private Education Landscape 2013/14, there were 158 private schools in
Dubai and among the total of 243,715 students attending these private schools some
30,994 were Emiratis (KHDA 2014). In Kuwait, figures from the country’s central
statistical bureau show that during the 2016/2015 academic year, a total of 258,248
children in Kuwait attended private schools not including those in special needs
schools (Central Statistical Bureau, Kuwait 2016). Part of this total included private
schools that used an Arabic curriculum: 17 kindergarten schools with 4106 students,
41 primary schools with 40,936 students, 49 intermediate or middle schools with
34,174 students and 45 secondary schools with 23,054 students. Private schools with
non-Arab curricula in the same academic year comprised 95 kindergarten schools
with 34,989 students, 98 primary schools with 72,239 students, 92 intermediate or
middle schools with 32,860 students and 70 secondary schools with 15,890 students.9
Out of 19 students, nine were born in Kuwait. Among them, parents of six students came from
India. For three students, their parents were Sri Lankan, Pakistani, Indian and Jordanian.
8 The KHDA was established in 2006 in order ‘to develop all knowledge and human resource
sectors in the Emirate of Dubai and bring them on par with international standards and prevalent
best practices’ (Dubai Government Portal 2011).
9 In Kuwait, the public educational system consists of nursery (two years), primary (five years),
intermediate (four years) and secondary (three years) schools. Private schools with foreign curricula
do not follow in the same system. For instance, in the Indian educational system, years are divided
into lower primary (five years), upper primary (three years), lower secondary (two years) and
higher/senior secondary (two years).
Schools using Western curricula (British, American and French schools) are popular
and are generally more expensive. Some Kuwaiti parents even prefer to send their
children to English-medium private schools (Oxford Business Group 2015: 155).
For their preschool, primary and secondary education, the majority of both Filipino
and Indian children in the AGS go to Philippine and Indian schools, respectively.
The first Philippine overseas school was the International Philippine School which
established in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 1981 (Salud 2005); its founding by the Philip-
pine Department of Foreign Affairs was in response to the increasing demand from
Filipino parents for a school that taught the curriculum endorsed by the Philippine
Department of Education. These parents hoped that this would enable their children
to reintegrate into society and the local school system better upon their return to the
Philippines. Philippine schools now exist in other Gulf countries, with 19 schools in
Saudi Arabia, six in the UAE (two each in Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Sharjah), two in
Kuwait, two in Qatar, one in Bahrain and one in Oman (Philippine Schools Overseas
2014). They are privately operated but are compelled to comply with the require-
ments and regulations of the governments of the Philippines and of the host countries.
These schools are also tasked with providing a venue for the teaching and propaga-
tion of Philippine culture and heritage among Filipino youths overseas, though they
may admit a small number of non-Filipino students.
In the case of Indian schools, most are affiliated with the Central Board of Sec-
ondary Education (CBSE) in New Delhi.10 A number of schools in the UAE follow
another curriculum, which is conducted by the Council for the Indian School Cer-
tificate Examination (CISCE).11 According to the CBSE website, among the 227
CBSE-affiliated overseas schools, 80% are located in the AGS. The largest num-
ber of Indian schools is in the UAE with 86, followed by 42 in Saudi Arabia, 19 in
Kuwait, 15 in Oman, 13 in Qatar and eight in Bahrain. Some schools have students of
different nationalities other than Indians, while others admit only Indian students.12
The main criteria for parents for choosing a suitable school are its reputation and the
cost of tuition fees. It is said that Indian Christians send their children to schools run
by missionaries.
Some parents from the Philippines and India choose to send their children to
schools that follow Western curricula, which have higher fees than Philippine or
10 At the national level, the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT)
develops education policies and guidelines in India while there are several curriculum bodies and
boards of education that govern different school education systems. The CBSE is one of these
bodies and its establishment can be traced back to 1921, though its present name only dates to
1952. Currently, the CBSE has pan-Indian jurisdiction and the board’s affiliation is internationally
accepted. Affiliated schools follow a curriculum set by the board (British Council, India 2014:
16–17; Ghosh and Mohan 2015: 75).
11 In the Indian educational system, students must take national exams at the end of grade 10 and
at the end of grade 12; both the CBSE and the CISCE administer their own versions of these
examinations. Indian states also have their own boards as alternatives to national examinations
(Dundar et al. 2014: 78).
12 The principal of an Indian school in Kuwait told us that Indian schools are popular among
other nationalities as well because they are English-medium schools and tuition fees are generally
reasonable compared to American and British schools.
Indian schools. One main reason for this decision is the lack of availability of Philip-
pine or Indian schools near their homes. For instance, children of Filipino families
in Fujairah, UAE, study at either private British or Indian schools because there is
no Philippine school in the area. Another reason is that many parents believe that a
Western education enables their children to earn higher salaries in the future. These
parents believe that a more Western-orientated education will be advantageous for
their children pursuing higher education in Western countries and for seeking job
opportunities both within and outside the AGS.
Both Filipino and Indian students must make important decisions regarding where
to go to pursue their tertiary education after completing secondary school. There are
three main options; they can: (1) return to the Philippines or India; (2) emigrate to
other countries, mainly the United States, Canada, Australia or Britain; or (3) remain
in the AGS. The first choice is the most inexpensive and generally preferable for
most Filipino and Indian families. Take, for example, the Taghoy family from the
Visayas region of the Philippines. Both parents are civil engineers and migrated to
Dubai in the late 1990s. After several years of living and working there, they brought
over their daughter and son, Arlene and Jun, and enrolled them in a Philippine school
in Dubai. After graduating from high school, Arlene returned to the Philippines by
herself in 2007 to study civil engineering at a public university. Although the first
year was hard on her because of the intense adjustment period to a different lifestyle,
she completed five years at the university. After passing her board examinations in
2013, she returned to Dubai ‘because [she] missed [her] family too much’ and her
father found her a job with a contracting company. Arlene has since transferred to
another company in Dubai that offered her a better salary and has been saving money
as she and her Filipino boyfriend living in Abu Dhabi have plans to start their own
business in the Philippines. Out of 14 of Arlene’s female classmates from her school
in Dubai, 10 went back to the Philippines to pursue higher education; all of them
are now back in Dubai. Jun went back to the Philippines in 2015 after spending
10 years in Dubai ‘because universities in Dubai are too expensive’ and plans to
study aerospace engineering at a university in Manila. He is currently struggling to
adjust to life back in his parents’ home province in the Philippines.13
As with Arlene and her classmates, most Filipino high school graduates go back
to the Philippines for further studies and tertiary education; this is partly due to the
expensive tuition fees in other countries and partly because Filipino children in the
AGS dream of becoming students at top universities in the Philippines. Nonetheless,
the majority of students come back to Dubai soon after graduating university, primar-
ily to earn higher salaries and to live with their families if they can. A manager of a
Philippine school in Dubai stated that, according to the school’s survey in 2014, 95%
of 103 graduates from her school planned to study at universities in the Philippines
but also return to Dubai or other countries for work. She commented on this survey
13 Interview with Arlene and her family in Dubai, 5 March 2016.

finding as a ‘vicious cycle of migration’, because children of migrant workers also

become migrant workers.14
If these children were brought up in the AGS for many years, adjustment problems
can occur if they are too accustomed to a life of convenience and comfort. For
instance, crowds can be unbearable in both the Philippines and India. If one stays
in cities like Manila and Mumbai, heavy traffic congestion makes travel and living
tough and unpleasant. If their parents are wealthy enough, these second-generation
migrants may have the option instead of going to European or American universities
or remaining in the AGS to attend a local branch of a foreign university. Currently,
many Western universities have branch campuses in the Gulf with the option available
for students to transfer to their campuses in the United States, Europe, Canada or
Australia.15
The experiences of the children of the Fernandes family are a case in point. Their
parents were born in Goa, India, and their father came to work in Dubai in 1986. He
has been working for a local English newspaper. Their mother was employed by a
transnational company in India and she joined a local branch of the same company
in Dubai after she got married. However, she left her job some years ago. They
have a daughter, Maria, and a son, Kevin. They sent their children to a local Indian
school near their home in Sharjah and intended to move back to India before Maria
entered college. In 2011, after the death of the children’s paternal grandfather, the
family returned to Goa for his funeral and decided to stay for some time when
they considered settling down in India. They tried to transfer Maria to a school in
Goa but she could not adjust to the environment there and stopped going to school.
Meanwhile, Kevin could also not bear the school’s lack of cleanliness, especially
the dirty toilets. Their parents gave up on the idea of sending Maria to an Indian
college and moving back to India altogether. The family all moved back to Dubai
where Maria returned to her original school in Sharjah and completed the twelfth
grade. After her graduation, she went to study architecture at the Canadian University
Dubai, and after spending two years there Maria decided to move to Britain; she is
14 Interview with Jenny Gonzales (manager for development and community relations) at the United
International Private School, Dubai, 10 March 2016.

15 At the turn of the twenty-first century, the AGS began to place an emphasis on reforming educa-
tional programmes and transforming themselves into a knowledge-based society in order to diversify
their economies and move away from dependence on oil. At the present, the public sectors of the AGS
employ mostly nationals, while the private sectors offer higher-paying positions to skilled migrants
due to a shortage of national workers with sufficient knowledge and the required education level. As
noted by Alexander Wiseman et al. (2014: 6), the ‘nationalisation of the private sector… is a key to
the development of a highly knowledgeable and highly skilled national workforce’. This shift has
led to the proliferation of international partnerships in the higher education industry of the AGS.
As Davidson and Smith (2008: 1) emphasise, ‘most Gulf universities and colleges interact with the
partner institutions in Europe, North America and Australia or are branches of them’, while Vora
(2013: 159) points out that the proliferation of the branches of Western universities in the AGS is
the moves from oil to diversified economies ‘which include the promotion of knowledge as a com-
modity and investment in high-quality education to produce citizens as managerial transnational
subjects’.
now at the University of Portsmouth. Kevin was sent to a different high school with
a British curriculum.16
Although going back to India is often the easiest way for children of Indian
migrants to attend university, this path also has its own issues. Admission to medical,
dental or engineering colleges in India is highly competitive and to be exempt from
entrance exams students must apply for non-resident Indians (NRI) quota seats.
However, these quota seats often entail higher fees. Some are critical of obtaining
admission through the quota system and believe that it is easier for wealthy NRIs to
‘purchase’ a seat and not to bother taking the entrance examinations (Chakoo 2001).
The question of where to continue studying after high school is a problem for boys
as their fathers can only sponsor them under their residency visa until they reach the
age of 18 years (Vora 2013: 78). If they want to continue living in the AGS, they must
either find employment and an employee willing to sponsor their residency visa or
obtain a student visa through their college or university. Girls can be sponsored by
their fathers until they get married.
Filipino and Indian children in the AGS, as well as their parents, are faced
with many choices for primary, secondary and tertiary education and make choices
depending on their financial capacities, personal preferences and family networks.
For primary and secondary education, most children go to private schools close by
that use the curricula of either the Philippines or India or those with Western curric-
ula. For tertiary education, these students then either study at a local university in the
Philippines or India or obtain student visas to study at universities in Gulf countries
or in Western countries such as Britain, the United States, Australia or New Zealand.
After graduating from university, they are again faced with the decision of where to
begin their working lives. Do they settle in their home country, try to find a job in
the AGS or emigrate to another (most likely Western) country?
5.5 ‘Where to settle down in the future?’
How do second-generation Asian youths view their home countries and the countries
of the Gulf? How do they make important decisions regarding their future? During our
fieldwork in Dubai, we met Jay, who is the son of a Filipino couple we have known
for some years.17 He is a first-year student majoring in marketing and computer
science at the Dubai branch campus of Murdoch University. He lives in an apartment
with his parents, who both work as academic researchers in the UAE, and his older
brother who is now a market researcher at a private company that operates in Dubai.
Jay was brought to Dubai by his parents at the age of eight; he grew up in the
country and finished both his primary and secondary education at a Philippine school
in Dubai. After finishing his secondary education, Jay returned to spend one year in
16 Interview
with the mother of Maria Fernandes in Sharjah, 7 March 2016.
17 Interviews
and focus group discussions with Jay, Zara, Annie, Alex, Jason and Jay’s parents in
Dubai, 8 March 2016.
Manila as a university student. However, he experienced difficulties living in Manila,

including traffic congestion, typhoons and floods; after a year, he could not bear it
any more and he moved back to Dubai to live with his parents. He then enrolled in
Murdoch University in Dubai. In the long run, Jay dreams of starting his own business
related to marketing. Currently, he is contemplating transferring to the university’s
main campus in Australia and finishing the third and fourth years of his degree
there, hoping that the move will provide him with more international experiences
and enable him to decide better where to set up his business and settle.
Through Jay, we met four of his Filipino classmates—two female students (Zara
and Annie) and two male students (Alex and Jason)—with whom he spends most
of his free time, either at home or at shopping malls. We had the chance to ask the
five students, including Jay, about their views on living in Dubai and their plans for
the future. Three (Jay, Zara and Annie) plan to migrate elsewhere. Jay finds neither
Dubai nor Manila ideal and mentioned that Dubai is a ‘convenient but only tempo-
rary place for us’ with discrimination based on nationality, which he just ‘accept[s]
as the reality here’. Another difficulty with living in Dubai is that ‘there is no neigh-
bourhood’—there is a lack of a general community in the AGS that is found in other
countries as foreigners socialise with either their own nationalities or those of similar
socio-economic conditions and very rarely do locals socialise on a deeper level with
foreigners. Manila, on the other hand, also has its drawbacks such as heavy traffic
congestion and job-hunting practices that are largely based on personal connections.
He is thinking of migrating either to Canada which ‘seems nice’ to him or to Australia
where his aunt resides. His parents are also encouraging Jay to migrate to Canada or
Australia for better job and citizenship opportunities, though his parents themselves
plan to retire in the Philippines. Zara and Annie also intend to go to Western countries
to study or to complete internships first and then eventually permanently emigrate to
these countries.
Alex and Jason hope to return to the Philippines after working in Dubai for several
years. Alex plans to start a restaurant business with his father in their hometown in
the southern part of Luzon because, as he describes it, ‘that has been my father’s
dream, and I want to help my father’. Jason wants to stay with his grandmother in
Manila with whom he was closest to until he moved to Dubai as he still misses her.
None of the students considers Dubai to be a place they want to stay for a long period.
For them, it is rather a transit place to study, to work, to gain experiences and to save
money for the future. Zara told us why she became a working student in Dubai but
wishes to live in Canada, Australia or New Zealand one day:
I was surprised to see how hard my parents are working here [in Dubai]. Naturally I came to
feel that I want to help my parents.… My father [was fired and] had to go to Africa to find
work at the time of the [Dubai financial] crisis and he is still there.… So I want to migrate
to a country where my family can stay all together safely, because I don’t want my children
to experience what [family disintegration] I experienced. I heard that in Canada, Australia
or New Zealand, immigrants can lead family-oriented lives and that education is free.18
18 There was a massive layoff of Filipino workers among other foreign nationals during the Dubai
financial crisis which began in 2008 and continued to 2009. The Philippine government sent a
special taskforce team from the Philippines to aid those who were suddenly laid off and were asked
Zara and Annie believe that the Philippines is not the ideal place to start a family
because of the unstable economic situation and crime rate.
The five students find that the education at Murdoch University in Dubai is gen-
erally better than university education available in the Philippines. According to
Jay’s father, one characteristic of Filipino students in Dubai is that they are very
conscious of the salary standards of the career paths they plan on pursuing after
graduation as the high university tuition fees are paid for by their parents. In the case
of Murdoch University in Dubai, the annual fees for an undergraduate degree are
AED86,000–94,000 (US$23,000–26,000) depending on the major students choose
(Murdoch University, Dubai 2018).
The five students’ views on their relationships with Dubai, the Philippines and
other countries reveal their uncertain sense of belonging. They consider themselves
Filipinos despite the fact that the lifestyle and the socio-economic environments they
were exposed to when they visited the Philippines were unfamiliar to them and a
stark contrast to the life they lead in Dubai. However, they also regard themselves
‘more focused and determined’ than Filipino university students in the Philippines
whom they have met during their vacation trips and found to be quite ‘relaxed and
fun-seeking’. Although their views on returning to the Philippines may be similar to
that of second-generation Filipino youths living in Western countries, in the case of
second-generation Filipino youths in Dubai another factor appears to influence their
sense of belonging, which is the temporary nature of their stay in Dubai. Regardless of
the length of one’s stay, familiarity and bond with the AGS, these foreign workers and
their families must always have a backup plan, whether returning to the Philippines or
emigrating to another country. This feeling of uncertainty seems to constantly cloud
their future and causes the greatest ambivalence about their sense of belonging. This,
in turn, may strengthen the close bonds among their immediate family and friends
in Dubai, while also pressuring them to focus on establishing strong economic and
legal statuses at an earlier age.
Though many first-generation Filipinos in Dubai also endure a feeling of uncer-
tainty about their future, second-generation youths experience it in different ways.
Most of those we interviewed regard the ethnically segregated but close-knit com-
munity of their own in Dubai as their ‘home’. This is because their childhood and
school years were all spent in Dubai, they feel more comfortable with the lifestyle
in the Gulf, their closest friends are all in Dubai and they are treated as ‘visitors’
when they return to the Philippines.19 Yet the fact that they are never guaranteed
citizenship in the Gulf countries leaves them with a great deal of uncertainty for
to leave the UAE immediately. Foreign workers and their families were required to leave the UAE
within a month after the cancellation of their work permits. See Hosoda (2015) for a more detailed
analysis.
19 In addition, the arrival age and the length of stay may influence their sense of belonging. If they
are brought to Dubai at a young age, they tend to regard themselves as ‘different from Filipinos in
Manila’, whereas if they arrive during their adolescent years and stay only several years, they may
consider the Philippines as their true home, in the same way that first-generation migrants do. The
former communicate only with their relatives whom they meet during their trips to the Philippines,
whereas the latter may still stay in touch with friends and maintain their social networks, even after
the future and keeps them searching for ways to acquire citizenship and settle down
in another country. On the other hand, the first-generation Filipinos we interviewed
stated that they are still familiar enough with the Filipino way of life to readjust to
life back home if they had to leave the AGS.
Second-generation Indians seem to have the similar issues of uncertainty as Fil-
ipinos in terms of where to settle for their future. Hasna Fathima, a graduate student
of a Canadian university, dreams of inheriting her father’s restaurant business in
Kuwait. Her father is from Kerala but she was born and brought up in Kuwait. While
in Kuwait, she went to a local Indian school until the ninth grade and then she
shifted to a British curriculum school. After she finished her secondary education,
she entered a university in Britain but then decided to study at a branch campus of
a university in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. After obtaining a bachelor’s degree there,
she moved to Canada where she is currently pursuing a master’s degree in interna-
tional business. Although she is willing to join her father in running his business in
Kuwait, she stated: ‘This [Kuwait] is our home, but we cannot stay here forever.’
As her feelings of dissatisfaction lie with discriminatory policies against foreigners,
including the issue of visas, she wonders what citizenship she will be able obtain
in future. She thinks that obtaining Malaysian citizenship will be more suitable as
she felt free and relaxed in the multiethnic environment of Malaysia during her time
there as an undergraduate student.20
This question of where to settle down in future is also shared by second-generation
Goans. Antonio, who was brought up in Kuwait with two sisters and a younger brother
in the 1980s, left the country after Iraq’s invasion in 1990. After the political situation
improved, his father went back to Kuwait while Antonio remained in Goa with his
mother and siblings, where they completed their education and went to college. He
and his brother decided to return to Kuwait to work. Antonio is now working for
a Kuwaiti bank, and his brother found a position as an accountant at a hospital.
He has started to wonder where he should settle down in future. The main reason
for contemplating leaving Kuwait is the future of his two-year-old son, especially
with respect to his education. Antonio thinks that Australia or London would be
good places to settle in as his elder sister lives in London while he applied for an
Australian permanent resident visa and obtained it easily.21 Like a number of Goans,
Antonio and his family all have Portuguese passports. The colonisation of Goa by
Portugal up to 1961 resulted in Portuguese immigration law allowing Goans to obtain
a Portuguese passport if their parents or grandparents were born in Portuguese-held
Goa (Sonwalkar 2018); this has eased the immigration process for many Goans who
now can live and work in the European Union. They reside in large numbers in
Britain, which is still a member of the European Union at the time of the research.
This has given them another option in terms of global mobility.
moving to Dubai. Despite the multinational environment in the Gulf, both groups spend the majority
of their free time only with other Filipinos.
20 Interview with Hasna Fathima in Kuwait City, 23 February 2017.
21 Interview with Antonio in Kuwait City, 20 March 2015.
Antonio’s attitude is in contrast to that of his father, who is certain that he would
return to Goa when he decides to retire. Many other first-generation Goan migrants
share this firm belief in returning to Goa eventually. When Antonio told us about his
future, he did not mention the possibility of going to India, despite spending some
years there. He also noted that Kuwait’s infrastructure is better, especially hospitals.
First-generation Goan expatriates frequently travel between Kuwait and Goa as they
are relatively close to each other. According to one Goan, though Kuwait became
a ‘second home’ during their extended stay in the country, Goa has always been in
their hearts and minds. They have always maintained their family and kinship ties
and social networks with Goa while in the AGS. Second-generation Goan migrants
accompany their parents to spend school holidays there. However, many do not regard
Goa as their home, including Maria who was mentioned earlier and who now lives in
Britain. ‘My daughter probably will come back to Dubai to find her employment,’ her
mother answered, when the authors asked what plans Maria had for her future after
graduation. Maria considers home to be Dubai, much like the ‘Dubai-born confused
Desis’ noted by Vora (2013) in her work.22
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined future prospects and the sense of belonging among second-
generation Asians in the AGS based on our case studies of Filipino and Indian youths.
Children of migrants living in the AGS grow up in a social context in which the host
country views the migrant population and their dependents as ‘temporary’ and rejects
the idea of their assimilation and integration into the host society. They are therefore
confined in a social space where they are segregated not only from the host society
but also along nationality and socio-economic lines. In the meantime, they also grow
accustomed to a so-called Gulf lifestyle in which they are surrounded by modern
infrastructure and exposed to global brands, in stark contrast to the lifestyles they
might experience in their home countries. Feeling comfortable in such an environ-
ment, many children of foreign workers think of the Gulf countries as their home.
A close look at the educational options of Filipino and Indian youths in the AGS
reveals that they and their parents make their choices from the opportunities available
22 ‘Dubai-born confused Desi’ is a colloquial term for a South Asian person born in Dubai, which
Vora (2013: 148–154) describes in her book. ‘Desi’ is a colloquial word referring to a South Asian
person. Dubai-born confused Desis can also be associated with ‘American-born confused Desis’.
According to Padma Rangaswamy, an American-born confused Desi ‘encapsulates the dilemma of
the Indian teenager growing up in the United States’. Rangaswamy states that ‘most of the second
generation feel that their parents have no true understanding of American culture, and that they resort
to stereotyping of the unknown American mainly in order to influence and control their children.
Parents see challenges to their authority as “typically Americanised” behaviour and demand that
their children be “Indianised” and respectful and unquestioningly obedient’ (Rangaswamy 2000:
169). The main difference between Dubai-born confused Desis and American-born confused Desis
is that the former must find a place to settle in the future, while the latter is more rooted in the host
society.
to them in different locations—the AGS, their respective home country and other
countries—based on their financial capabilities, personal preferences and family
networks. Asian children are not permitted to attend local public schools; thus, for
primary and secondary education, they attend international or foreign private schools
operating in the AGS that use Indian, Philippine or Western curricula. For tertiary
education, they return to their parents’ country, study overseas in Western countries,
such as Britain, or remain in the AGS to study at branches of international universities.
After graduation, as in the cases of Arlene and her classmates in Dubai as well as
Antonio in Kuwait, many return to work in the Gulf region where it is easy for them
to find jobs even if it is on a contractual basis.
Despite the greater socio-economic opportunities they may be exposed to and
their higher standard of living in the AGS, these second-generation Asian migrants
must cope with an uncertain future. They know that the chances of becoming a citizen
of the Gulf country they reside in are slim or non-existent; therefore, they live with
a sense of insecurity regarding their future as they or their family may not have
their visas or work permits renewed. As such, their sense of belonging appears to be
complex given that their ‘home’ is in fact an ethnically segregated community in a
Gulf country. As these countries only allow them to stay as temporary residents, they
are continuously considering places where they can cultivate a much greater sense
of belonging.
It is nonetheless interesting that most do not have concrete plans to leave the
Gulf despite the fact that they are excluded from the host societies of the region.
The AGS have numerous ethnic communities of foreign workers that are familiar
to most second-generation Asian migrants. Therefore, it seems that many second-
generation Asians make use of their ‘home’ ethnic community as a stepping stone
when starting their careers. As the cases of Arlene and Maria show, Gulf countries
can be a useful temporary ‘home’ where they may rely on their family and friends
to find employment and work until they find another country that is more immigrant
friendly and where they feel they can settle permanently.
Although the number of cases is still limited and further research is required,
if Indian and Filipino youths in this chapter are compared, then Indian second-
generation migrants, with their historically rooted social capital in the AGS and
beyond, seem to have more options overseas both within the AGS and/or oppor-
tunities elsewhere. In the case of Hasna Fathima, her father owned restaurants in
Kuwait which enabled her to seek higher education outside the AGS. Additionally,
she has a chance of inheriting her father’s business and expanding it, which is a
significant opportunity that does not seem to be available to most Filipino migrants
at present. However, Hasna expressed insecurity about staying in Kuwait due to the
discriminatory treatment of foreigners.
This research elucidated that acquiring citizenship and long-term residency over-
seas is a central concern for a considerable number of second-generation Asian
migrants in the AGS. They are denied chances not only of being naturalised but also
of being ‘denizens’ in the host country, that is, immigrants who are not naturalised
citizens but are long-term residents in their destination countries and enjoy a sub-
stantial set of rights (Hammer 1990). Despite their familiarity and affective ties with
communities and places in the Gulf, their right to stay there remains unclear. While
some scholars have proposed different ideas of citizenship based on a more universal
notion of personhood rather than on the membership of a specific nation-state, such
as ‘post-national citizenship’ and ‘global citizenship’ (Soysal 1994; Carter 2001;
Cabrera 2010), these new citizenship notions are generally considered difficult to
realise and contextualise in the present global political situation (Isin and Turner
2008). The life choices and voices of second-generation Asian youths described
here reflect the complicated and challenging realities of those who today experience
discrepancies between the notion of citizenship based on a specific nation-state and
growing temporary migration across international borders.
Acknowledgements The study was supported by the Japan Society for Promotion of Science
(JSPS) grant-in-aid for scientific research number 2026257004B1 (2014–2017). An earlier version
of this chapter was presented at the Twentieth Asian Studies Conference Japan at the International
Christian University, 2–3 July 2016. We thank the participants for their insightful comments. We
are deeply grateful to Filipino and Indian expatriate families, community leaders, schoolteachers,
administrators and embassy officials in Kuwait and the UAE for having shared their everyday lives
and views with us.
References
Aguilar, Jr, Filomeno V. 2009. Maalwang buhay: Family, overseas migration, and cultures of relat-
edness in Barangay Paraiso. Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
Aguilar, Jr, Filomeno V. 2014. Migration revolution: Philippine nationhood and class relations in
a globalised age. Singapore: NUS Press.
Al-Ali, Nadje, and Khalid Koser. 2002. Transnationalism, international migration and home. In
New migration approach? Transnational communities and the transformation of home, ed. Nadje
Al-Ali and Khalid Koser, 1–14. London: Routledge.
Ali, Syed. 2010. Dubai: Gilded cage. New Haven: Yale University Press.
AlShehabi, Omar. 2015. Histories of migration to the Gulf. In Transit states: Labour, migration
and citizenship in the Gulf, ed. Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, 3–38.
London: Pluto Press.
Bristol-Rhys, Jane. 2012. Socio-spatial boundaries in Abu Dhabi. In Migrant labour in the Persian
Gulf, ed. Mehran Kamrava and Zahra Babar, 59–84. London: Hurst.
British Council, India. 2014. Indian school education system: Overview. New Delhi: British Council,
India.
Cabrera, Luis. 2010. The practice of global citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Carter, April. 2001. The political theory of global citizenship. London: Routledge.
Central Statistical Bureau, Kuwait. 2016. Educational statistics 2015/2016—Chapter 1: Incubation
and schools. Kuwait City: Central Statistical Bureau, Kuwait.
Chakoo, B.L. 2001. Drama of admissions through NRI quota. The Tribune, 26 July. http://www.
tribuneindia.com/2001/20010726/mailbag.htm. Accessed 22 Oct 2018.
Chen, Carolyn, and Russell Jeung (eds.). 2012. Sustaining faith traditions: Race, ethnicity, and reli-
gion among the Latino and Asian American second generation. New York: New York University
Press.
Das, Ashidhara. 2012. Desi dreams: Indian immigrant women build lives across two worlds. Delhi:
Primus Books.
Davidson, Christopher, and Peter Mackenzie Smith (eds.). 2008. Higher education in the Gulf
states: Shaping economies, politics and culture. London: Saqi Books.
Dubai Government Portal. 2011. http://www.dubai.ae/en/Lists/GovernmentDepartments/
DispForm.aspx?ID=29. Accessed 24 Oct 2018.
Dundar, Halil, Tara Béteille, Michelle Riboud, and Anil Deolalikar. 2014. Student learning in South
Asia: Challenges, opportunities, and policy priorities. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Faist, Thomas. 1998. Transnational social spaces out of international migration: Evolution, signif-
icance, and future prospects. European Journal of Sociology 39 (2): 213–247.
Gardner, Andrew M. 2010. City of strangers: Gulf migration and the Indian community in Bahrain.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Ghosh, Sunanda, and Radha Mohan. 2015. Education in emerging Indian society: The challenges
and issues, 2nd ed. New Delhi: PHI Learning.
Government of India. 2017. Area and population: Statistical year book India 2017. Delhi: Ministry
of Statistics and Programme Implementation. http://www.mospi.gov.in/statistical-year-book-
india/2017/171. Accessed 3 Dec 2018.
Gracias, Fatima da Silva. 2000. Goans away from Goa: Migration to the Middle East. Lusotopie
7:423–432. http://www.mospi.gov.in/statistical-year-book-india/2017/171.
Hammar, Tomas. 1990. Democracy and the nation state: Aliens, denizens and citizens in a world
of international migration. Aldershot: Avebury.
Hosoda, Naomi. 2015. 2008: ‘Open City’ and a new wave of Filipino migration to the Middle East.
In Asia inside out: Changing times, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo, Helen F. Siu, and Peter C. Perdue,
281–303. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Hosoda, Naomi. 2016. Middle class Filipinos and the formation of diasporic national communities
in the United Arab Emirates. In International migration in Southeast Asia: Continuities and
discontinuities, ed. Lian Kwen Fee, Md Mizanur Rahman, and Yabit bin Alas, 39–56. Singapore:
Springer.
Isin, Engin F., and Bryan S. Turner. 2008. Investigating citizenship: An agenda for citizenship
studies. In Citizenship between past and future, ed. Engin F. Isin, Peter Nyers, and Bryan S.
Turner, 5–17. London: Routledge.
Jain, Prakash C., and Ginu Zacharia Oommen (eds.). 2015. South Asian migration to Gulf countries:
History, policies, development. New York: Routledge.
Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2006. Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. UN Expert
Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region, Population
Division Department of Economic and Social Affairs, United Nations Secretariat. Beirut, 15–17
May.
Kathiravelu, Laavanya. 2016. Migrant Dubai: Low wage workers and the construction of a global
city. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Knowledge and Human Development Authority [KHDA], Dubai, UAE. 2014. Dubai private edu-
cation landscape 2013/14. Dubai: KHDA.
Longva, Anh Nga. 1997. Walls built on sand: Migration, exclusion, and society in Kuwait. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press.
Mahdavi, Pardis. 2016. Crossing the Gulf: Love and family in migrant lives. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Matsukawa, Kyoko. 2014. Indo Goa shusshin-sha no komyuniti nettowaku [Community networks
among Goans of India]. In Wangan arabu shokoku no gaikokujin rodosha: Ta gaikokujin kokka no
shutsugen to seikatsu jittai [Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states: Growing foreign population
and their lives], ed. Naomi Hosoda, 185–205. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten.
Murdoch University, Dubai. 2018. Fees. https://www.murdochuniversitydubai.com/fees. Accessed
13 Oct 2018.
Nagasaka, Itaru, and Asuncion Fresnoza-Flot (eds.). 2015. Mobile childhoods in Filipino transna-
tional families: Migrant children with similar roots in different routes. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Onley, James. 2014. Indian communities in the Persian Gulf, c. 1500–1947. In The Persian Gulf in
modern times: People, ports, and history, ed. Lawrence G. Potter, 231–266. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Owen, Roger. 1985. Migrant workers in the Gulf. London: Minority Rights Group, Report No. 68.
Oxford Business Group. 2015. The report: Kuwait 2015. London: Oxford Business Group.
Parreñas, Rhacel Salazar. 2005. Children of global migration: Transnational families and gendered
woes. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Philippine Schools Overseas. 2014. List of Philippine schools overseas by country (as of December
2014). http://www.cfo-pso.org.ph/schools.html. Accessed 20 Oct 2018.
Potter, Lawrence G. (ed.). 2014. The Persian Gulf in modern times: People, ports, and history. New
Rangaswamy, Padma. 2000. Namasté America: Indian immigrants in an American metropolis.
Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Rosario, Teresita Cruz-del. 2016. Interrupted histories: Arab migrations to pre-colonial Philippines.
In International migration in Southeast Asia: Continuities and discontinuities, ed. Lian Kwen
Fee, Md Mizanur Rahman, and Yabit bin Alas, 149–165. Singapore: Springer.
Salud, Francis R. 2005. Arab News, 17 March. http://www.arabnews.com/node/263863. Accessed
20 Oct 2018.
Schiller, Nina Glick, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton. 1992. Transnationalism: A new ana-
lytic framework for understanding migration. In Towards a transnational perspective on migra-
tion: Race, class, ethnicity, and nationalism reconsidered, vol. 645, ed. Nina Glick Schiller,
Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, 1–24. New York: Annals of the New York Academy
of Sciences.
Singh, Supriya, and Anuja Cabraal. 2013. ‘Boomerang remittances’ and the circulation of care: A
study of Indian transnational families in Australia. In Transnational families, migration and the
circulation of care: Understanding mobility and absence in family life, ed. Loretta Baldassar and
Laura Merla, 220–234. New York: Routledge.
Sonwalkar, Prasun. 2018. Goans with Portuguese passports to benefit from UK plan for EU
citizens post Brexit. Hindustan Times, 22 June. https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/
goans-with-portuguese-passports-to-benefit-from-uk-plan-for-eu-citizens-post-brexit/story-
iQZON4x2p7qPiCqM2nLB6M.html. Accessed 27 Oct 2018.
Soysal, Yasemin Nuhoglu. 1994. Limits of citizenship: Migrants and postnational membership in
Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Time Out Dubai Kids. 2016. Time Out Dubai Kids education directly for 180 schools in the City
2016/17. Dubai: ITP Executive Publishing.
Vora, Neha. 2013. Impossible citizens: Dubai’s Indian diaspora. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press.
Wiseman, Alexander, Naif H. Alromi, and Saleh Alshumrani (eds.). 2014. Education for a knowl-
edge society in Arabian Gulf countries. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
World Bank. 2016. Migration and remittances factbook 2016, 3rd ed. Washington, DC: International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank.
World Bank. 2018. Bilateral estimates of migrant stocks in 2017. http://www.worldbank.org/
en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-data. Accessed 15 Nov
2018.
Zachariah, K.C., and S. Irudaya Rajan. 2014. Researching international migration: Lessons from
the Kerala experience. New Delhi: Routledge.
Naomi Hosoda is associate professor at the School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences,
Nagasaki University, Nagasaki City, Japan. Her main research interest is in anthropological studies
of Filipino migration with a focus on cultural normality, family relations, transnational commu-
nity, education and citizenship. She is the editor of Wangan arabu shokoku no Imin rodosha: ‘ta
gaikokujin kokka’ no shutsugen to seikatsu jittai (Migrant workers in the Arab Gulf states: Grow-
ing foreign population and their lives) (2014, in Japanese). Her publications in English include
the following: Middle class Filipinos and the formation of diasporic national communities in the
United Arab Emirates. In International migration in Southeast Asia: Continuities and discontinu-
ities, ed. Lian Kwen Fee et al. (2016); and 2008: ‘Open City’ and a new wave of Filipino migration
to the Middle East. In Asia inside out: Changing times, ed. Eric Tagliacozzo et al. (2015).
Kyoko Matsukawa is professor at the Faculty of Letters, Konan University, Kobe, Japan.
She majored in cultural anthropology and did her doctoral research on the multilingual situation
in Goan society, India. Her publications include the following: Xitkoddi (rice and fish curry),
comunidades and ramponkars: Goan foodways in transition. In Rethinking Asian food heritage,
ed. Sidney Cheung (2014); and The formation of local public spheres in a multilingual society:
The case of Goa, India. Journal of the Japanese Association for South Asian Studies 17 (2005).
Her current research examines the globalisation of Indian performing arts, as well as transnational
community and citizenship of Indian expatriates in the Middle East.
Chapter 6
Promoting Diversity, Branding the State:
Migrant-Friendly Discourses
in the United Arab Emirates
Koji Horinuki
Abstract This chapter examines the recent emergence of ‘migrant-friendly dis-

courses’ in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although the UAE plays host to a
large number of foreign workers, there have been relatively few social integration
policies aimed at aiding migrants to assimilate into its close-knit society. The UAE’s
migration policies were thus seen as highly exclusive and unfriendly to the migrant
community. However, in the late 2000s, stylised expressions that promoted a greater
sense of tolerance, peace and harmony began to emerge and focused on the cultural
diversity of the UAE in a favourable manner. The chapter examines the reasons why
the UAE has prioritised employing such kinds of discourse. The analysis suggests
that migrant-friendly branding is used for framing the state in a positive light, which
is very important in attracting more foreign workers into the country.
Keywords United Arab Emirates · Migrant-friendly discourses · Branding ·

International reputation · Migration
6.1 Introduction
The Arab Gulf states (AGS), here comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), are among the most diversified societies
in the contemporary world, where nationals are a minority and massive numbers of
migrants make up the majority of the total population (Horinuki 2011). The influx of
migrants continues to increase despite falling oil prices and an economic slowdown
in the Gulf that began in mid-2014, indicating the economic potential of the region
to keep receiving additional workers. The AGS remain a major global labour market.
While the AGS maintain their position as major destinations for migrants to live
and work, they must do so in the light of their extremely poor working conditions and
continuous human rights violations. For example, gas- and oil-rich Qatar has been
branded a twenty-first-century ‘slave state’ because of its poor working conditions
K. Horinuki (B)
JIME Centre, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, Tokyo, Japan
e-mail: horinuki@gmail.com

98 K. Horinuki
for low-waged migrant workers who are involved in construction projects related
to the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup 2022
(Arabian Business 2013). International media and human rights groups, such as
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have criticised Qatar as well as
FIFA with regard to their responsibility for promoting labour law reform in 2016.
In general, then, the international image and evaluation of the AGS on human rights
conditions are low. According to the Walk Free Foundation’s Global Slavery Index
2018, which evaluates 167 countries based on the size of the problem, vulnerability
and government response, Qatar ranked 153th in the Prevalence Index, with Kuwait
(155), UAE (148), Bahrain (139), Saudi Arabia (138) and Oman (128) also located
among the worst offenders (Walk Free Foundation 2018).
Nonetheless, the AGS have begun to value their international reputations and
thus seek to represent themselves with more positive images through branding on
an international level. It has become a political priority for them to address issues
pertaining to the treatment of foreign workers in order to ensure a steady supply of
labour from overseas. The AGS began tackling problems regarding migrant labour
and human rights conditions from the mid-2000s in cooperation with agencies such as
the International Labour Organisation, the International Organisation for Migration
and the United Nations Human Rights Council, and have invited both domestic and
international media to cover these reform processes and improved labour conditions.1
Despite these efforts, the AGS remain seen as unfriendly countries for some migrants,
especially low-skilled and low-paid migrant workers.
There is considerable academic research on the work life and communities of
expatriates in the AGS that discusses how they have struggled with exclusion and
adaptation to the host society, including studies on labour issues, discrimination,
human rights, class and economic disparities (Kapiszewski 2001; Horinuki 2010;
Khalaf 2015). From the 2000s, the lack of protection policies, rules and basic respect
for human rights of migrant workers in the AGS, and especially in Dubai and Saudi
Arabia, has been the focus of the international media and human rights groups.
Many studies have also criticised the kafala system of sponsorship, which forms the
basis of a highly inequitable power relationship between employer and employee,
as one of the main institutional reasons behind migrants’ complaints (Dito 2015).
Vora and Koch (2015), however, criticise previous research on migrants in the AGS,
as they argue that this research has been largely on the politics of exclusion based
on ethnocracy and the kafala system, while not fully taking into account the active
contributions of foreign workers to state- and nation-building projects. Rather, Vora
and Koch advocate an alternative approach that focuses on inclusion of expatriates
when considering the societies of the Arab Gulf. This is a unique and innovative
approach which helps our focus on the use of migrant-friendly discourses.
Although they have contributed immensely to state building in the AGS, the size
of migrant communities has been regarded negatively by some in the host societies
in view of demographic imbalances, state security concerns and issues of national
1 Some Arab Gulf countries have hired international consultants, public relations firms, consultants
and lobbying firms for media campaigns targeted at Western media outlets (Walker 2014).
6 Promoting Diversity, Branding the State: Migrant-Friendly … 99
identity that have arisen (Partrick 2009; Horinuki 2011; Arab Gulf States Institute
in Washington 2016). The various migrant communities bring with them their own
values, traditions, cultures and ways of life, all of which may clash with local values,
traditions and culture. Social conditions and hierarchies also create a sense of exclu-
siveness in the host society that the migrant community cannot integrate themselves
into. And yet, as I discuss below, foreign migrants in the AGS contribute to creating
a much broader diversity in the host society and this diversity is seen as attractive to
foreign investors and skilled migrants.
We now witness a new social phenomenon of both official and unofficial ‘migrant-
friendly discourses’ that began to emerge in the late 2000s, especially in the UAE. A
migrant-friendly discourse can be defined as a means of expression that highlights
the role of migrants in contributing to state building, economic development, social
diversity and promoting a sense of tolerance. Much of this discourse in the UAE
is delivered and broadcast via its official news agency Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat
(WAM, Emirates News Agency). For example, Sheikh Nahyan bin Mubarak Al
Nahyan, the then head of the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Social Development,
expressed ‘his satisfaction at being among the UAE workers who had come from
different countries’, and added ‘we are proud of their contribution to the nation
building and progress’ on the occasion of the ministry’s celebration of International
Workers’ Day (WAM 2016a). Another example is the phrase often used by officials:
the UAE ‘is a global society of many cultures—a country where people from nearly
200 nations work and live in peace and harmony’ (WAM 2015a). Migrant-friendly
discourses can be seen in the context of national events, such as International Labour
Day on 1 May, Flag Day on 3 November and National Day on 2 December, as well
as in official speeches at international conferences.
Whether the working and living conditions of migrants have improved or not,
some AGS such as the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain have recently turned to greater
social diversity based on large migrant communities as the new ‘brand image’ for
the country. As a country’s brand is closely connected to its international standing,
every country attempts to promote a good image, to maintain its global reputation
and to hide potentially negative or harmful issues. According to Peterson’s (2006)
argument, the smaller states of the AGS use branding strategies for the survival of
their ruling regimes and to retain legitimacy within the state. For example, branding
involving natural resources, international aviation companies or international sports
events is used to increase the prestige of a country as well as raise its international
reputation. However, as Chad Haines (2011: 178) points out, the state brand may
hide domestic issues with migrant labour issues in Dubai forgotten and ‘all masked
by the claim to being global’. How can we understand and interpret migrant-friendly
discourses? Do they reflect a new trend in policies concerning migrants in the UAE?
100 K. Horinuki
6.2 Migrant Issues and Trends in the UAE in the 2010s
In the 2000s, serious problems concerning the treatment of migrant workers and for-
eign communities in the UAE came to light. Labour-sending countries, international
human rights organisations and the international media each focused on these issues
and questioned the governments and parties involved. Global pressures in the name
of human rights damaged the UAE’s reputation on an international scale and acted
as a catalyst for triggering changes in labour and migrant policies.
6.2.1 Migrant Issues and Social Conflicts in the UAE
The UAE is well known for its unique demographic composition where a staggering
88.4% of its total population of over 9 million are international migrants (United
Nations 2017). The number of migrants in the UAE, particularly in Abu Dhabi and
Dubai, has continued to increase, even after the global financial crisis of 2008 and
the drop in oil prices that began in late 2014 (Fig. 6.1). Both migrants themselves and
the media often refer to the UAE as a popular destination for work, with Abu Dhabi
and Dubai dubbed as ‘open cities’ or ‘business cities’ (Malit and Al Youha 2013;
Hosoda 2013: 25); this is considered to be a big comparative advantage for the UAE
in the AGS labour markets and in attracting global talent. Therefore, maintaining
openness in UAE society is a key to its economic growth and stability.
Fig. 6.1 Migrant population of Abu Dhabi and Dubai

Sources Abu Dhabi Statistics Centre (2011–2018) and Dubai Statistics Centre (2015, 2017)
Although the UAE retains its position as a major destination for migrant workers,
this does not mean that there are no longer any issues related to them. Migrants in
the middle- to upper-income classes may enjoy working and living conditions in
the UAE, while low-income workers, such as domestic workers and those in the
construction industry, still suffer from poor working conditions and a lack of legal
protection. To this day, local English-language newspapers report labour issues, such
as low wages, passports and wages being withheld by employers, and strikes. There
are still many criticisms made by international organisations of the UAE concerning
human rights conditions, although conditions have gradually improved (European
Parliament 2012; Harroff-Tavel and Nasri 2013).2
At the same time, the rapid growth of the migrant population has been understood
to cause trouble within the UAE host society owing to the fact that migrants bring
with them their own cultures, norms and lifestyle practices, all of which can conflict
with local traditions and Arabic and Islamic values. An example is dress codes. Many
local people have voiced complaints over the way female expatriates choose to dress
in the city, which is seen as immodest, indecent and a violation of local cultural
norms. In May 2012, two Emirati women started a Twitter campaign (@UAEDress-
Code) that called on expatriates and foreign tourists to follow a more ‘decent’ dress
code; the public subsequently called on members of the Federal National Council to
discuss legislation to introduce a dress code (Almazroui 2012; The National 2012).
According to survey results of the Ministry of Interior’s official magazine, 999, it was
pointed out that ‘72% of expats admit that they know little about their host country’
and their lack of cultural awareness may cause trouble (Remo-Listana and Procter
2012: 14–18). These cultural concerns can be said to be a ‘dilemma of openness’ of
sorts as the UAE government seeks to find a balance between protecting local values
but still remaining accepting of foreign workers and their different lifestyles. If the
UAE wishes to further economic development, it needs to maintain an open policy
to attract more migrants; however, it will also face more social conflicts between
nationals and migrants.
2 The major pillar in the UAE’s labour policies is labour protection, and the government has imple-
mented new policies in order to solve labour issues since the mid-2000s. The Ministry of Labour,
for example, introduced a midday break rule in 2005 to protect workers from the sun and heat in
the summer season; it has now become one of the labour protection standards in the AGS. The
wage protection system, officially announced in 2007 by the UAE cabinet, is another effort through
which employers are obliged to pay employees’ salaries via bank accounts so that the ministry
can trace payment conditions. With regard to international cooperation on labour issues, the UAE
government works with international organisations and other countries in the Abu Dhabi Dialogue
launched in 2008, which is a landmark scheme to discuss relevant issues with both labour-sending
and receiving countries.
102 K. Horinuki
6.2.2 Policy Trends on Migrant Labour and Communities
The UAE government and especially the Ministry of Human Resources and Emirati-
sation (former Ministry of Labour) have tackled labour issues since the mid-2000s
due to the mounting pressure from international society (Horinuki 2010).3 The inter-
national media and human rights organisations have condemned the UAE as a ‘coun-
try of modern slavery’; such criticisms have greatly harmed its reputation. In the late
2000s, the UAE began to implement labour reforms and introduced new polices,
such as the wage protection system, which spread to other AGS. It can be said that
migrant labour policy trends in the UAE show how governments have recognised
the issues and identified them as a part of changing policy agendas.
In the 2010s, policy trends on migrant issues have become more migrant and labour
friendly in both policy and legal terms. The UAE government has called for tolerance
as a new policy concept to address racial and religious discrimination.4 To maintain
peaceful coexistence in society, the government introduced the Anti-Discrimination
Law in July 2015, which forbids ‘any form of discrimination on the basis of religion,
caste, creed, doctrine, race, colour, or ethnic origin’ (WAM 2015d). Following the
enactment of the law, the UAE appointed a new minister of state for tolerance, Sheikha
Lubna bint Khalid al-Qasimi, in February 2016 to promote tolerance as a core value.
These two political decisions were designed to tackle religious extremism, such as
the rise of ISIS and other political Islamic movements in the UAE and Middle East;
moreover, these decisions were also expected to promote social peace and stability
in the UAE.
As well as migrant protection, labour market reform is a policy priority. The labour
law was reformed and the so-called six-month ban rule for migrant workers was lifted
in 2016 to increase the liquidity of the labour market.5 Another protection announced
in 2016 was free accommodation for low-wage workers through which employers
have an obligation to provide adequate accommodation for their employees. The
Ministry of Labour is striving to enhance its ability to communicate with stakehold-
ers, including employers and employees, through publications such as the quarterly
magazine Al-Amal (meaning ‘work’ in Arabic) to explain new policies, institutional
changes and the ministry’s work. In 2016, it published the first annual report on
3 There are many international criticisms of the expatriates’ labour conditions in the UAE not only
from human rights organisations but also foreign governments and the international media. For
example, Human Rights Watch published two reports in 2006 and 2009 that discuss construction
workers and describe the UAE’s backwardness on labour protection instead of its forward-facing
images of Dubai and Abu Dhabi that include modernity and luxuriousness (Human Rights Watch
2006, 2009).
4 Since the Arab Spring in 2011, the UAE government has recognised the emergence of the extremist
Islamic group ISIS, and an increase in hate crimes and xenophobia in Western countries as a negative
influence on its society.
5 Foreign employees who wish to move to a new company will be granted new work permits
immediately without a six-month ban if the previous contract between employer and employee is
terminated by mutual agreement (Arabian Business 2015).
workers’ welfare, which is described as ‘part of our drive to increase transparency

around labour issues’ (Gulf News 2016).
In short, the number of migrant-related issues and international pressures on the
UAE in the 2000s triggered policy changes and institutional reform for more migrant-
friendly policies, although there are still outstanding issues such as the kafala system
and granting full citizenship to long-term migrants. In addition, regional instability
and the expansion of religious extremism have highlighted the need to promote
diversity and tolerance as the key to a stable society.
6.3 Branding the State as a Symbol of Diversity
This section reviews when and how a migrant-friendly discourse has been used in
the UAE, and who uses it. The analysis mainly uses official documents and texts
of speeches published through government authorities and the national media such
as WAM because the authorities censor most official texts and obviously highlight
what they want to reveal (and hide what they do not want to disclose).
6.3.1 Emergence of Migrant-Friendly Discourses in the UAE
UAE officials have come to use fixed expressions such as ‘the UAE is a country where
people from nearly 200 nations work and live in peace and harmony’ in their official
speeches. It is not clear when this style of expression was first used or by whom. Abdul
Rahman Mohammed Al Owais, the then minister of culture, youth and community
development, may have been the first government official to use the term in public
in 2008 when WAM reported that he said that ‘people of 200 different nationalities
and followers of various faiths live peacefully in the United Arab Emirates’ (WAM
2008a). In the same period, Anwar Gargash, who was a long-serving minister of state
for foreign affairs, in an official speech at UN Human Rights Council’s Universal
Periodic Review in 2008 to explain human rights condition of the UAE, said: ‘A
large part of the UAE’s population is made up of culturally diverse foreign workers
attracted by the positive employment opportunities and tolerant social environment
in the country. The UAE is proud to have developed into an open, modern Arab
and Islamic model for the region with over 200 nationalities among its workforce’
(WAM 2008b). As noted already, the UAE’s working environment and the human
rights conditions of migrant workers were criticised throughout the 2000s such that
the government initially used this discourse to counter international criticism.
This assertion of diversity and plurality then became a popular expression in
the context of the UAE’s policies, especially concerning migrants, labour issues,
economic development and investment. Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan,
the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, stresses the importance of coexistence in the UAE
communities: ‘At home, the UAE has a well-established track record of coexistence,
104 K. Horinuki
as well as religious and cultural tolerance among its residents. Currently, more than
200 nationalities are registered as living in the country’ (Crown Prince Court 2018).
Similar expressions are confirmed at the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MOFA 2018). Today, we can see this discourse everywhere—from official speeches
and national events to international meetings and conferences.
6.3.2 Migrant-Friendly Discourses in Development Policies

and Official Documents
Since independence, the AGS have introduced five-year development plans designed
as blueprints for the industrial sectors, infrastructure and social development. In the
2000s, the AGS renewed five-year development plans concerning so-called national
visions or strategic plans that exemplify basic ideas for their future development,
including governance, the economy, welfare services and the processes of social
development. There are migrant-friendly discourses in these official documents that
describe migrants as an essential workforce for economic growth and their role in
building a diversified society. The Dubai Strategic Plan (2015), launched in 2007,
expresses the increase in the migrant population as the reason for economic growth:
The growth in population and the presence of a large number of different nationalities has
resulted from the significant influx of foreign workforce that have been attracted to participate
in and benefit from the unprecedented rapid economic growth. This has created a unique
multicultural environment with rich opportunities for cultural interaction and cooperation.
(Government of Dubai 2007: 26)
The Abu Dhabi government’s Policy Agenda 2007–2008 as well as the Abu Dhabi
Economic Vision 2030 also stress the role of migrants in future growth: ‘Expatriates
have brought additional diversity and dynamism to the economy and to society’ and
set a goal to attract more skilled migrant workers for future economic growth and
diversification of the economy (Executive Council of Abu Dhabi 2007; Government
of Abu Dhabi 2008: 38–39). Both Dubai and Abu Dhabi have benefited from migrant
workers not only economically but also culturally and socially, and this diversification
has contributed to the strength and attractiveness of the UAE. The federal government
launched UAE Vision 2021 in 2010, which aims to make the UAE the ‘best country in
the world’ by emphasising its unique society characterised by openness, coexistence
and understanding of the concept of a future community:
We want the nation to draw strength from its traditions of openness, peaceful coexistence,
and understanding. In this way Emiratis will always resist the value-flattening effects of
globalisation, and will always be enriched rather than threatened by their nation’s openness
to the world. (Government of UAE 2011: 17)
It is important to emphasise that official statements hailing the role of migrant

workers in state building and economic growth were very rare in the UAE until the
2010s even though it was a major migrant-receiving country. Even in the other AGS,
a migrant-friendly discourse is still very rare. However, the current development
plans of the UAE have officially recognised migrants, both skilled expatriates and
unskilled labourers, as a major source of future development. Thus, continuing to
attract migrants is one of the strategic pillars of its development plans.
6.3.3 Official Speeches for Branding the UAE
Migrant-friendly discourses occasionally appear in official speeches to explain how

UAE society is peaceful, diverse and multicultural, and to indicate that the country
symbolises coexistence and tolerance. The UAE uses this discourse strategically
through branding to enhance its international reputation. For example, in a speech at
the United Nations Security Council, which was held to discuss the rights of ethnic
and religious groups in the Middle East, the UAE’s representative, Zaki Nusseibeh,
mentioned that the country is a good model for coexistence in which ‘more than
200 different nationalities live and work and worship their own faiths freely’ (WAM
2015b). Ali Majed Al Mansoori, chairman of the Abu Dhabi Department of Economic
Development, made a speech at the opening plenary of the World Economic Forum’s
Summit on the Global Agenda in 2015, and said: ‘Among the singular attributes of
the UAE is its diverse population. We have more than 200 nationalities who call
the UAE home’ (Dubai PR Network 2015). As migrants in the UAE are not given
citizenship and permanent residency, Al Mansoori’s speech was remarkable because
it implied that UAE is not a temporary place for migrants to live and work anymore,
but had become a long-term place of residence—their ‘home’.
In the context of social stability and security, we also find migrant-friendly dis-
courses that symbolise UAE society as a model of coexistence and peace. A police
officer, Khamis Al Mazeina, explains the reason why Dubai is safe and has no organ-
ised crime: ‘Dubai is a multicultural city with more than 200 nationalities, living in
peace and harmony’ (SCNC 2016). Further, a similar discourse was used in the con-
text of ‘combating terrorism’ and against religious extremism such as that promoted
by ISIS. Ebtisam al-Ketbi, director of the Emirates Policy Center, said in a speech on
the occasion of the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate that discussed combating terrorism:
‘The UAE hosts more than 200 nationalities that all live in an environment of toler-
ance and coexistence.’ She added: ‘The UAE model has offered a microcosmic world
that proves the possibility of coexistence according to the rule of mutual benefits and
everyone’s right to be different’ (WAM 2014a). It is interesting that the UAE’s social
diversity, based on its massive migrant population, is mobilised to counter religious
radicalism, a critical issue in Middle Eastern politics.
‘Tolerance’ recently became a new keyword to explain the UAE’s diversity as
well as its migrant-friendly discourses. Abu Dhabi’s crown prince Sheikh Mohamed
made a historic visit to Vatican City and met Pope Francis in September 2016.
He explained that the UAE is working ‘to build the foundations of dialogue and
coexistence among different civilisations, cultures, religions, and peoples, based on
the values of tolerance and openness’, and added that ‘the UAE has been able to
create a model for coexistence among the more than 200 nationalities who live on its
106 K. Horinuki
land in a spirit of love, harmony, and understanding, despite differences of culture,

race, and religion’ (WAM 2016b). This was a very symbolic speech in religious terms
because the most powerful ruler of the UAE used a migrant-friendly discourse on the
occasion of a historical meeting with the highest authority of the Catholic Church.
The UAE clearly aimed to spread its tolerant image beyond the Islamic world in
order to promote its reputation in international society.
It can been demonstrated, then, that the government emphasises that migrant
communities are a positive dimension of UAE society—representing the diversity
of the society and acting as a symbol of coexistence—and that this is promoted
through global platforms. An example is the World Expo, which will be held in
Dubai in 2020. Dubai’s bidding committee for the World Expo made its appeal to
the UAE with a migrant-friendly discourse in its promotion campaign via official
presentations, public relations videos and social network services. For instance, a
film titled Ali’s Film (2012) was used during the bidding campaign. In the film, a
10-year-old Emirati boy, Ali, explains why Dubai is eligible for the World Expo.
Here Ali explains that one of the reasons is because Dubai is a place where ‘people
from 200 nationalities live’. It is clear from this and other examples that the UAE
realises its social diversity is composed of a migrant population that acts as a selling
point, one that can be used in making appeals through branding. In the context of the
UAE’s history, this is a remarkable development because migrants are now officially
regarded as important actors in creating its society.
6.4 Migrant-Friendly Discourses and UAE Society
As discussed above, there are many kinds of migrant-friendly discourses in the UAE
today and they are used for strategic reasons in branding the state. This section
discusses how the UAE describes and reproduces itself as a ‘diverse society’ through
national events and media campaigns aimed at both Emiratis and migrants.
6.4.1 Involving Migrants in National Events
Historically, there have been few social integration policies for the migrant commu-
nity in the UAE and it is commonly believed that Emiratis and migrants do not interact
socially. However, migrants are not always excluded from everyday life and from
interacting with the local Emirati community. Migrants have been actively involved
in national events as community members and the government is now using these
national events to send a message to both Emiratis and migrants.
The first example is May Day or International Labour Day. Migrant labour issues
have been important for a long time in the UAE. Since 2010, the Ministry of Labour,
local government and private companies have officially held May Day events to
praise migrants’ role in national development and to show their appreciation. On the
occasion of May Day events, ministers and officials express their congratulations to
workers—mainly migrant labourers—and it can be said that this is a new trend in
the UAE’s labour policy. For example, an official of the Ministry of Labour said on
the occasion of Labour Day in 2015:
Under the slogan ‘Labourers are the lifeblood of our works,’ the Labour Ministry will host
Labour Day events to reaffirm our pride and appreciation for all those who contributed to
the country’s development and economic progress under the vision of the wise leadership,
which has long emphasised the value of work and respect for all labourers. (WAM 2015c)
It is important to point out that labourers are officially recognised for their role in
contributing to national development in the official discourse, and this is a milestone
for the migrant community. During the event, some private companies provided
special gifts to labourers, such as calling cards, gift boxes, food and sweets. In 2016,
du, the major private telecom company, distributed small gift packs, including AED15
($4.08) calling cards to 500 blue-collar workers.
The second example is Flag Day, which is a new national event held since 2013
to celebrate the anniversary of the accession of Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan
as the UAE president. Both Emiratis and residents have been asked to display the
UAE flag in their homes, offices, schools and public buildings to show their loyalty
to the nation. Thus, Flag Day is primarily attempting to foster patriotism among the
Emiratis, but it also involves migrants living in the country. On this day, there are
many related events held both publicly and privately, and there are many video clips
that are produced and uploaded to social media sites. The flag’s colours of red, green,
white and black are frequently used as a unifying symbol in national events and to
visually develop and stimulate people’s sense of belonging to the UAE as home. It
is not difficult to understand that the government is mobilising migrant residents to
Flag Day events to promote their sense of belonging to the host country.
The third example is National Day, which celebrates the UAE’s independence in
1971 and its progress as a nation. Related events and programmes are held around
mid-November until the end of first week of December across the country, and it has
become an important occasion not only for Emiratis but also for migrants who take
an active part in the various events (Koch 2015; see Fig. 6.2). Many musicians and
private companies have produced unofficial National Day songs and music video clips
that are then uploaded to social media platforms. Migrant musicians have produced
some National Day songs. For example, Iqbal Madakkara, an Indian migrant from
Kerala working in Dubai, has produced the UAE National Day song since 2013 and
the 2015 version has been watched more than 225,000 times. These songs carry a
sense of love and feeling of belonging to the UAE.6 In general, National Day is a
special occasion for Emiratis, which celebrates the history of state building and the
ruling families, but it has also become an important event for migrants to demonstrate
that they too belong to the UAE.
6 In
his lyrics to the National Day Song in 2015, Madakkara explains his sense of belonging to the
UAE: ‘By birth I may be a foreigner here/But by living I am an Emirati.’ https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=8JUTEdh6qDQ.
108 K. Horinuki
Fig. 6.2 National Day decorations and clothing items being sold at a supermarket in Abu Dhabi
(Photograph: Koji Horinuki 2014)
Note Migrants are looking the National Day items which are usually in the UAE’s national flag
colours (red, green, white and black) and use the ruler’s picture. They wear these items while
enjoying National Day’s events. This also adds to the festive mood and sense of belongingness in
the host society
Even in National Day events, we can see migrant-friendly discourses used in

official speeches and media reports. For example, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al
Nahyan, the minister of foreign affairs, stated on the occasion of the 43rd National
Day:
The UAE has become a destination for all with its tolerance and openness to the world’s
cultures and peoples, exchanging respect with respect and enjoying security and safety under
the laws which respect freedom of difference and treat everyone fairly before the law, which
is represented by the presence of 200 nationalities from different parts of the world enjoying
stability and a decent life. (WAM 2014b)
The local media has also reported migrants’ voices on National Day and their love of
the country, in addition to praising those who worked on National Day. The National,
a local English-language newspaper, described cleaning staff who took part in clean-
up work after the celebrations as ‘unsung heroes’ (Ahmad 2015).
A migrant-friendly discourse in national events is a very new political and social
phenomenon in the UAE. Although many migrants still face labour-related and social
issues under the kafala system and are not eligible for citizenship, the government
attempts to send a message to migrants that they are an integral part of society.
6.4.2 Media Campaigns
The UAE government uses migrant-friendly discourses strategically to promote

social stability and tolerance through national and social media campaigns. In 2014,
for example, the Abu Dhabi Executive Council Communication Committee of the
Abu Dhabi government launched a television commercial campaign called ‘#al-
youm_anā_Imārātı̄’ (Today I Am an Emirati). This is a series of television campaigns
to evoke testimonies of regard for the UAE: the series features migrant residents (not
only Arabs but also other nationalities) who describe the reasons for living in the
UAE and how they love the country. There are several versions of the commercial.
But the final scene is a shared one: it concludes with the words ‘I consider myself
a part of this country. Today I am an Emirati.’ This is a groundbreaking message
from the government to the society because there is a general understanding that an
Emirati must be a person who holds a UAE passport.
Another media campaign called ‘Express Your Love for the UAE’ was made for
the 45th anniversary of National Day by the Aqdar Initiative (Mubādalat Aqdar)
of the Khalifa Student Empowerment Program. Its goal is to enable all members
of the community (local and resident) to express their love for the UAE and its
leadership in their own unique way, and to document and publish these expressions.
The Aqdar Initiative released a similar television commercial, ‘Express Your Love
for the UAE’, in which four migrant residents who had lived in the UAE for a long
time talked about how they love the country. The Aqdar Initiative also uses social
media platforms such as Facebook to promote the ‘Express Your Love for the UAE’
campaign, and their group page was set up on 12 June 2016; it had received 67,129
‘likes’ by mid-November 2016. Official posts on the page often describe the UAE
society as ‘peaceful and diverse’. One post describes the UAE as ‘a meeting point
for cultures and civilisations. It hosts literary, cultural and global events that enhance
communications between people of all backgrounds #LoveForUAE’ (Love for UAE
29 July 2016, 0:07). In addition, a stylised expression of the UAE’s diversity is used
in their post: ‘the #UAE is a country where equality thrives, and where everyone’s
rights are guaranteed by the justice system, which perceives no difference between
the 200 nationalities living on its territory #LoveForUAE’ (Love for UAE 27 July
2016, 2:43).
One feature of these media campaigns is picking migrant residents for key roles to
speak about their sense of belonging to the UAE although it is not their original home
country. It can be assumed that these television commercials are mainly targeted at
Emirati society because they are broadcast through local Arabic channels. It also can
be said that this kind of awareness campaign stimulates Emiratis to think that social
diversity is a part of the UAE’s national identity and that migrants are part of society.
110 K. Horinuki
6.4.3 Why Does the UAE Promote Itself as a Diverse Society?
As already noted, the UAE government has often used its migrant-friendly discourses
in various ways through official speeches and media campaigns. Why does the UAE
emphasise its social and cultural diversity both inside and outside of the country?
Two reasons can be inferred. The first is that this is the UAE’s branding strategy
for maintaining a good reputation in international society. The UAE emphasises
words such as ‘diversity’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘coexistence’, which are shaped by demo-
graphically imbalanced conditions, as features to promote although many migrant
and labour issues still exist. As this is a new policy and trend, it is still difficult to
evaluate whether it will succeed or fail. However, international criticism concerning
migrant issues in the UAE in the 2000s did undermine its international image and
reputation. So the government has generated a counter-discourse to deflect human
rights criticisms, build a positive image as a modern country and hide structural issues
that are created by the kafala system. In addition, branding the state is an important
strategy for the future development plans because it will require further expatriates
and skilled migrants for economic growth. Since more than 90% of the workforce
are migrants, the UAE will continue to rely on them as its main workforce for the
foreseeable future. In this regard, the country also has to maintain the attractiveness
of employment for migrants, and especially high-skilled workers who are able to
transform an oil-dependent economy to a knowledge-based economy. Competition
for talent in global and regional labour markets has intensified, and so the UAE has
promoted social diversity as a unique selling point.
The second reason is the government’s message of awareness is meant for both
Emiratis and migrants. Migrant-receiving countries like France, Germany and Aus-
tralia have been facing many social conflicts between nationals and migrants, includ-
ing xenophobia, hate crimes and anti-immigrant movements. By contrast, there have
been few serious and visible conflicts between Emiratis and migrants. But this does
not mean that there will be no social conflicts in the future. By raising concerns about
extremism in the Middle East, the UAE government may be aware that an intolerant
society will engender societal risks as well as be a cause of regime instability. In the
context of recent policy discussions, the government emphasises both coexistence
and tolerance as core values in a demand that society respects Emirati culture and
identity as well as other communities’ identities. In addition, such policies send a
strong message to migrants that the UAE recognises them as an important part of
society.
Nonetheless, the migrant-friendly discourses include the social hierarchy present
in the UAE. In general, the discourse covers all foreign residents, but they can be
separated into two strata. The first includes mid- to high-class expatriates who are
attracted from the global professional labour market. The second stratum comprises
migrants who belong to a lower socio-economic class. For example, the migrant-
friendly discourses in the development policy target the former to enhance strong
human capital, while the official Labour Day messages target the latter group by
celebrating workers’ roles in state building. Whether the discourses are used for
branding the state or raising social awareness the message is not always the same.
6.5 Conclusion
I have argued that the recent policy trend of using migrant-friendly discourses shows
that UAE society is in the midst of a social transition. Previously, while the UAE
and the AGS in general relied heavily on migrant workers, their working conditions
had been criticised over labour issues. In addition, migrants were often identified as
a negative factor in local society because they were the main cause of demographic
imbalance and national identity issues. Although international human rights pres-
sures have helped the AGS to improve migrants’ situation and working conditions,
there are still unresolved issues such as the kafala system, permanent residency and
citizenship.
The UAE has attempted to convert this negative image of migrants to a new
and more positive image—the UAE as a symbol of coexistence and diversity—in
both international and domestic society. We can see many expressions of a migrant-
friendly discourse in the official documents and speeches during the present decade.
The UAE government uses a stylised form of expression, which stresses how diverse
UAE society is, such as ‘the UAE is a country where people from nearly 200 nations
work and live in peace and harmony’ on various occasions including international
conferences and National Day events. This discourse is used to counter the negative
images related to migrants and to promote the UAE as a diverse society because it still
needs to attract both high- and low-skilled migrant workers for future development.
The discourse is still a unique political and social phenomenon among the AGS.
Qatar, the 2022 World Cup host country, has been criticised for migrant labour and
human rights issues in relation to construction work on its stadiums, and it has
recently implemented labour reforms and strategic media campaigns. Like the UAE,
Qatar and other AGS are also vulnerable to international pressures, and so they will
apply similar policies to improve their image and reputation.
In addition, the migrant-friendly discourses in the UAE are part of a social aware-
ness policy aimed at both Emiratis and the migrant community. Today, migrants
are officially recognised as members of society and are often mentioned in official
discourses. This is remarkable given the UAE’s history. Of course, this policy trend
does not mean that migrant-related and structural issues such as the kafala system
will be resolved in the near future. It is still also not clear whether this new policy
trend enables the Emirati community to integrate migrants or to overcome social
barriers between Emiratis and migrants. However, as the UAE cannot stop the inflow
of migrants and thereby change the demographic imbalance in its society, migrant-
friendly discourses are assumed to be a realistic means of reflecting a changing
policy.
112 K. Horinuki
References
Abu Dhabi Executive Council. 2007. Policy agenda 2007–2008: The Emirate of Abu Dhabi.
Abu Dhabi, Government of. 2007. Highlights Dubai strategic plan (2015). http://www.
arabruleoflaw.org/compendium/Files/UAE/94.pdf. Accessed 9 Dec 2009.
Abu Dhabi, Government of. 2008. The Abu Dhabi economic vision 2030. https://www.ecouncil.ae/
PublicationsEn/economic-vision-2030-full-versionEn.pdf. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Abu Dhabi Statistics Centre. 2011. Statistical yearbook of Abu Dhabi 2011. Abu Dhabi: SCAD.
Ahmad, Anwar. 2015. National Day’s ‘unsung heroes’ take to the streets to clean rubbish left behind
after celebrations. The National, 3 December. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/national-day-s-
unsung-heroes-take-to-the-streets-to-clean-rubbish-left-behind-after-celebrations-1.107583.
Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Ali’s Film. 2012. EXPO 2020 Dubai Candidate City Bid Film. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
5d0M5kumljY. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Almazroui, Ayesha. 2012. Emirati women and workforce in a clash of culture. The National,
19 May. https://www.thenational.ae/uae/emirati-women-and-workforce-in-a-clash-of-culture-1.
401527. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. 2016. Gulf Societies in transition: National identity and
national projects in the Arab Gulf states. Workshop Report. 10 June.
Arabian Business. 2013. Qatar a ‘21st century slave state’—Trade union boss. 11 Febru-
ary. https://www.arabianbusiness.com/qatar–21st-century-slave-state-trade-union-boss-488994.
html. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Arabian Business. 2015. UAE cancels 6 months work ban. 27 December. http://www.emirates247.
com/news/emirates/uae-cancels-6-months-work-ban-2015-12-27-1.615147. Accessed 9 Dec
2018.
Crown Prince Court. 2018. UAE public policy. Webpage of the Crown Prince Court of Abu Dhabi.
https://www.cpc.gov.ae/en-us/theuae/Pages/government.aspx. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Dito, Mohammed. 2015. Kafala: Foundations of migrant exclusion in GCC labour markets. In Tran-
sit states: Labour, migration and citizenship in the Gulf, ed. Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi,
and Adam Hanieh, 79–100. London: Pluto Press.
Dubai PR Network. 2015. Opening address: His excellency Ali Majed Al Mansoori during the
opening plenary of the world economic forum’s summit on the global agenda 2015. 27 October.
http://mobile.dubaiprnetwork.com/pr.asp?pr=103824. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Dubai Statistics Centre. 2015. Number of population estimated by nationality—Emirate of Dubai
(2013–2015).
Dubai Statistics Centre. 2017. Number of population estimated by nationality—Emirate of Dubai
(2015–2017). https://www.dsc.gov.ae/Report/DSC_SYB_2017_01%20_%2003.pdf. Accessed
15 Dec 2018.
European Parliament. 2012. Human rights situation in the United Arab Emirates. P7_TA-
PROV(2012)0400. 26 October. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201211/
20121119ATT55902/20121119ATT55902EN.pdf. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Gulf News. 2016. UAE publishes first annual worker welfare report. 7 May. https://gulfnews.com/
uae/government/uae-publishes-first-annual-worker-welfare-report-1.1820746. Accessed 9 Dec
2018.
Haines, Chad. 2011. Cracks in the façade: Landscapes of hope and desire in Dubai. In Worlding
cities: Asian experiments and the art of being global, ed. Ananya Roy and Aihwa Ong, 160–181.
Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
Harroff-Tavel, Hélène, and Alix Nasri. 2013. Tricked and trapped: Human trafficking in the Middle
East. Geneva: International Labour Organisation.
Horinuki, Koji. 2010. The dynamics of human flow, control, and problems in the United Arab Emi-
rates: The relationship between labour-sending and receiving countries in 2000s. Paper presented
at the 2010 Exeter Gulf Studies Conference, Exeter, 30 June–3 July.
Horinuki, Koji. 2011. Arabu Shuchoukoku renpou ni okeru Kokka Un’ei to Shakai Henyou: ‘koku-
min mainoriti kokka’ no keisei to hatten [State administration and social transformation in the
United Arab Emirates: Formation of a ‘national-minority state’ and its development]. PhD dis-
sertation, Kyoto University.
Hosoda, Naomi. 2013. Kabayan solidarity? Filipino communities and class relations in United Arab
Emirates cities. Journal of Arabian Studies 3 (1): 18–35.
Human Rights Watch. 2006. Building towers, cheating workers: Exploitation of migrant construc-
tion workers in the United Arab Emirates. New York: Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.
org/report/2006/11/11/building-towers-cheating-workers/exploitation-migrant-construction-
workers-united. Accessed 22 Dec 2018.
Human Rights Watch. 2009. “The Island of Happiness”: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on
Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi. New York: Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/
05/19/island-happiness/exploitation-migrant-workers-saadiyat-island-abu-dhabi. Accessed 22
Dec 2018.
Kapiszewski, Andrzej. 2001. National and expatriates: Population and labour dilemmas of the
GCC states. Reading: Ithaca Press.
Khalaf, Abdulhadi. 2015. The politics of migration. In Transit states: Labour, migration and citi-
zenship in the Gulf, ed. Abdulhadi Khalaf, Omar AlShehabi, and Adam Hanieh, 39–56. London:
Pluto Press.
Koch, Natalie. 2015. Is nationalism just for nationals? Civic nationalism for noncitizens and cele-
brating National Day in Qatar and the UAE. Political Geography 54 (1): 43–53.
Malit Jr, Froilan T., and Ali Al Youha. 2013. Labor migration in the United Arab Emirates: Chal-
lenges and responses. Migration Policy Institute, 18 September. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/labor-migration-united-arab-emirates-challenges-and-responses. Accessed 20 Dec 2018.
National, The. 2012. Tailoring a dress code to the UAE would be a struggle. 14 June. https://www.
thenational.ae/uae/tailoring-a-dress-code-to-the-uae-would-be-a-struggle-1.442698. Accessed 9
Dec 2018.
Partrick, Neil. 2009. Nationalism in the Gulf States. Research Paper No. 5, Kuwait Programme on
Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States, London School of Economics
and Political Science, October.
Peterson, J.E. 2006. Qatar and the world: Branding for a micro-state. Middle East Journal 60 (4):
732–748.
Remo-Listana, Karen, and Emma Procter. 2012. Missing out? Majority of expats confess to lack of
UAE knowledge of local customs and traditions. 999: Security and Safety for All 14–18 Feb.
United Arab Emirates, Government of. 2011. UAE vision 2021: United in ambition and deter-
mination. http://fgccc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/UAE_Vision_2021.pdf. Accessed 9 Dec
2018.
United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation [MOFA]. 2018.
The UAE and human rights. https://www.mofa.gov.ae/EN/TheUAE/Pages/UAE-and-Human-
Rights.aspx. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
114 K. Horinuki
United Arab Emirates, Supreme Council for National Security [SCNC]. 2016. Major General
Khamis Al Mazeina to Taware’e wa Azamat: There is no organized crime in the UAE Dubai
is a multicultural city with more than 200 nationalities, living in peace and harmony. 10 April.
https://www.ncema.gov.ae/en/media-center/news/10/4/2016/major-general-khamis-al-mazeina-
to-tawaree-wa-azamat-there-is-no-organized-crime-in-the-uae-dubai-is-a-multicultural-city-
with-more-than-200-nationalities-living-in-peace-and-harmony.aspx#page=1. Accessed 9 Dec
2018.
United Nations. 2017. International migration report 2017. New York: United Nations.
Vora, Neha, and Natalie Koch. 2015. Everyday inclusions: Rethinking ethnocracy, kafala, and
belonging in the Arabian Peninsula. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 15 (3): 540–552.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2008a. Al Oweis [sic] addresses First Alliance of Civilisations.
16 January. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395228023835. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2008b. UAE is keen on tracking human rights issues head on:
Gargash. 4 December. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395228246997. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2014a. UAE researcher: International campaign must have
a common vision to combat terrorism. 19 October. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395271090362.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2014b. Abdullah bin Zayed statement on the occasion of
the 43rd anniversary of UAE National Day, 1st Add. 1 December. http://wam.ae/en/details/
1395273298225. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2015a. Nahyan bin Mubarak: UAE is keen to consolidate
values of tolerance, moderation and respect for religions. 4 February. http://wam.ae/en/details/
1395276054987. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2015b. UAE reaffirms commitment to upholding rights of ethnic
and religious groups in the Middle East at UN Security Council debate. 29 March. http://wam.
ae/en/details/1395278618857. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2015c. MoL marks Labour Day with 10-day celebrations organ-
ised for workers. 29 April. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395279896403. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2015d. UAE issues law against hate crimes and discrimination.
20 July. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395283489477. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2016a. 10,000 workers observe International Workers’ Day in
7 locations in Abu Dhabi. 29 April. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395294891167. Accessed 9 Dec
2018.
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat [WAM]. 2016b. Mohamed bin Zayed: Islamic world is one of the biggest
victims of terrorism and extremism. 15 September. http://wam.ae/en/details/1395299982479.
Walk Free Foundation. 2018. Global slavery index 2018. https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/
download/. Accessed 9 Dec 2018.
Walker, Lesley. 2014. Qatar, UAE under fire for PR tactics over 2022 and Islamist backing. Doha
News, 28 September.
Koji Horinuki is a senior researcher at the JIME Center, Institute of Energy Economics, Japan.
His main research interests are contemporary Gulf politics, security and social affairs. His publi-
cations in English include: Japan in the Gulf: Between intra-bureaucratic politics and inter-Asian
rivalry. In The emerging Middle East–East Asia nexus, ed. Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Yukiko
Miyagi (2015); Controversies over labour naturalisation policy and its dilemmas: 40 years of
Emiratisation in the United Arab Emirates. Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 4 (2011); and
Administrative reform and the globalisation strategy in Dubai: A study of double-edged develop-
ment from 1990 to 2009. Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies 26 (2011).
Chapter 7
Brunei Darussalam: Female Labour
Force Participation and Foreign
Domestic Workers
Wako Asato
Abstract This chapter analyses the characteristics of citizenship composition and

migration policies of Brunei Darussalam, paying particular attention to foreign
domestic workers (FDWs) and examining how migrants function in the local labour
market. Research on FDWs in East and Southeast Asia is not uncommon, though
little attention has been paid to Brunei. This does not mean that the presence of
FDWs there is negligible. Indeed, the proportion of migrants employed in the work-
force and the proportion of FDWs per capita in the country may be the highest in
the region. However, this level of dependence on foreign workers, which is com-
mon in rentier and developmental states, has become controversial as governments
seek to nationalise their workforces to avoid local unemployment. Though Brunei is
often portrayed as a typical rentier state, it is unique in several aspects: it has rela-
tively high female labour force participation; a high number of female professionals
and managers; and there is no gender pay gap among local people. All these are
characteristics of a developmental state. It could be argued that the higher wages
enjoyed by local women and their participation in the workforce are made possible
partly by the employment of FDWs who take on domestic duties with low economic
value, while their employers develop their own career paths that produce much higher
value. Labour reforms have not necessarily changed these conditions due to the often
ambiguous and indefinite coverage of migrant workers under Brunei’s Employment
Order 2009 and the unilateral implementation of a minimum wage.
Keywords Brunei Darussalam · Foreign domestic workers · Rentier state ·

Developmental state · Migration
W. Asato (B)
Division of Transcultural Studies, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
e-mail: asato.wako.4c@kyoto-u.ac.jp

116 W. Asato
7.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the characteristics of citizenship composition and migra-

tion policies of Brunei Darussalam, paying particular attention to foreign domestic
workers (FDWs) and examining how migrants function in the local labour market.
Research on FDWs in East and Southeast Asia is not uncommon, though little atten-
tion has been paid to Brunei. This does not mean that the presence of FDWs there
is negligible. Indeed, the proportion of migrants employed in the workforce and the
proportion of FDWs per capita in the country may be the highest in the region. How-
ever, this level of dependence on foreign workers, which is common in rentier and
developmental states, has become controversial as governments seek to nationalise
their workforces to avoid local unemployment.
States with a high proportion of migrants are usually classified as either rentier
states or developmental states. Much of the focus of migration in Asia has been on
countries like Singapore or Hong Kong, which are considered to be developmental
states, but not Brunei which is usually regarded as a rentier state. Some basic com-
monalities of rentier states include low tax regimes and generous welfare provisions
to nationals. These are supported through the income generated from the extraction
and export of natural resources, and, in the case of Brunei, its vast income from oil
and natural gas provides its basis as a rentier state. However, the country shares some
similarities with developmental states: a relatively high labour force participation of
women; a high ratio of female professionals; and the relative lack of a gender pay
gap. These distinctive characteristics of the Bruneian workforce cannot properly be
explained without also considering the role of FDWs, who are employed in between
a third and nearly a half of all households in the country.1
Rentier states are characterised by generating a substantial portion of their national
revenues from the rent of indigenous resources, such as natural resources, to external
clients, rather than states that generate the greater part of their income through tax-
ation. To put it another way, a rentier state is itself supported by a rentier economy,
which often contributes to a poorly functioning legal system and limited democratic
politics (Beblawi and Luciani 1987; Vlieger 2012). This is because an authoritar-
ian political elite typically controls the welfare provided to citizens from abundant
national revenues derived from natural resources and/or other external forms of rent.
External rent here includes oil production, as identified by Hossein Mahdavy (1970),
and not the surplus produced by the domestic population (Anderson 1990). More-
over, huge rents are produced by the relatively small number of citizens who are
actually directly involved in the extraction of natural resources (Beblawi 1987).
1 According to Trafficking in persons report 2009 (United States Department of State 2009), the
number of foreign domestic workers was 25,000. In 2014, the number was estimated at 22,000
(Quratul-Ain 2014). The largest estimate is 33,943, based on work permits issued in 2011 (Ubaidillah
2012). According to government statistics in 2011, the number of households in Brunei was 68,208
(JKPE 2011). The household employment ratio of foreign domestic workers would therefore be at
least 32%.
7 Brunei Darussalam: Female Labour Force Participation … 117
To support the rentier system, the state’s distribution of resources must guarantee
the welfare of its citizens. For example, the level of medical cover received by
nationals in the Arab Gulf states (AGS) and Brunei is almost equivalent to that in
Japan. In other words, welfare in rentier states is similar to that of advanced welfare
states. According to the World Health Organisation database (2018), the ratio of out-
of-pocket health expenditure of total health expenditure in Brunei scored 6.0%. This
figure is almost same as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) at 6.5%, and lower than
Kuwait at 12.7% and Japan with universal health insurance at 13.9% and Singapore
at 54.8%.2
However, as income is generated outside the labour market, the cycle of work,
taxation, social insurance and welfare redistribution effects is not salient in rentier
states. Rentier states distribute resources and welfare in return for recognition of the
ruling regime’s legitimacy, though many rentier state regimes are not democratic.
This is in contrast to conventional welfare states that provide welfare to citizens
through a system of taxation or social insurance that is based on principles of equality.
Welfare distribution without redistribution through taxes and/or social insurance is
a key characteristic of a rentier state.
According to modernisation theory, authoritarian regimes that govern rentier states
may not maintain their political legitimacy once an affluent middle class emerges and
demands greater social and political rights. During the Arab Spring uprisings that
began in December 2010, these forces were on display in the Middle East, including in
the AGS when citizen-led groups protested against authoritarian regimes for greater
rights. However, at present it is not easily discernible whether modernisation theory
will hold true in the long term.
In East and Southeast Asia, affluent countries are often referred to as developmen-
tal states. These states are characterised by strong state-led economic policies, as illus-
trated by the French policy of dirigisme. Developmental states can constrain market-
driven capitalism as they are highly state-centric systems (Hundt and Uttam 2017).
In Asia, developmental states include Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand and
Malaysia. Kwon (2005: 6) makes the distinction between two types of welfare devel-
opmentalism in such states. One is inclusive, characterised by productivism, universal
social investment and democratic governance. The other is selective welfare develop-
mentalism, which is also based on productivism but with selective social investment
and authoritarian governance. Some of Asia’s economic development follows the
latter experience, including that of Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea
as these countries used to have (and some still have) limited democracy with selec-
tive social investment. However, authoritarian rule and limited democracy are often
justified on the grounds of economic development so that citizens can enjoy the fruits
of the country’s growth. On this issue, there exists some similarity between rentier
states and developmental states as, to a certain degree, authoritarianism and the lack
of democracy are legitimatised by gains from economic development (Koch 2015).
2 Out-of-pockethealth expenditure in total health expenditure in rentier states ranges from 5 to

20%, which is lower or similar to that of Japan which has medical insurance, according to the
World Health Organisation (2018) database.
118 W. Asato
A further similarity between Asian rentier states and developmental states is that
their economies are dependent on large pools of migrant workers, particularly tem-
porary migrants. Both rentier states (such as the AGS and Brunei) and developmental
states (such as Singapore and Hong Kong) have made significant use of an interna-
tional migrant workforce. For developmental states, as welfare from natural resources
is not guaranteed, industrialisation and human resource development have been pri-
oritised as core economic strategies. However, developmental states that have limited
human resources must resort to bringing in migrants to solve labour shortages. Tai-
wan, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia are increasingly relying on temporary
migrants from developing countries.
7.2 Migration in Rentier and Developmental States
The proportion of migrant populations in Asia and the Middle East broadly fall
into three distinct patterns. The first are those countries where non-citizens make up
the vast majority of the population, comprising 70–90% of the total. Several of the
countries of the AGS fall into this category (Fig. 7.1). For example, the UAE and
Qatar are both rentier states where large numbers of foreign workers were recruited to
help develop the national economies from the 1970s and 1980s onwards. The second
category includes countries where the number of foreign residents is between 25 and
50% of the total population. For example, Bahrain, Oman and Brunei are rentier states
with abundant natural resources (such as hydrocarbon reserves). Singapore and Hong
Kong also fall into this category but are developmental states that have experienced
gradual increases in the number of foreign workers in their economic development.
The third category comprises countries with a low proportion of migrants at around
or below 10% of the total population, such as Japan, South Korea or Thailand. One
possible explanation for the lower ratio of migrants in these countries is because
there are pools of potential workers in rural areas that the states can draw from.
Even though both rentier and developmental states have a higher proportion of
migrants, the differences in resource distribution affect control over citizenship.
There are three status levels in both rentier and developmental states. First, even
though full citizens of rentier states are often not allowed to participate in politi-
cal activities, they may enjoy generous welfare benefits from the income generated
through the export of natural resources, but not through any system of redistribu-
tion. In these states, the division between citizens and non-citizens is strong and
distinct. This is not only due to ethnic, cultural or religious differences but also
because of the immense privileges and benefits citizens receive in return for their
loyalty and support to the ruling regime. In these states, the pathways to citizenship
are extremely limited and they do not grant full citizenship rights, even for marriage
migrants (see Watanabe, Chap. 4). Citizenship rights in rentier states are thus highly
exclusive. The second type of citizens are those who are permanent residents or long-
term residents, sometimes referred to as expatriates. They are typically professionals
and highly skilled persons, who benefit from low taxation and often enjoy access
Fig. 7.1 Migrant populations in Asia and the Arab Gulf

Source United Nations Population Division (2008)
to certain social services and entitlements such as family visas. The third and final
category are short-term contract workers or work-permit holders, and they include
blue-collar workers and FDWs who hold extendable visas that are dependent on their
employment contracts.
In contrast to rentier states, developmental states emphasise industrialisation
to compensate for scarce natural resources. To maintain the international competi-
tiveness of such economies, an interventionist government is coupled with limited
welfare provisions paid for by taxation or social insurance. Because of this, develop-
mental states may seek to attract highly skilled expatriates for long-term stays due
to their potential economic contribution to society.
In Asia, unlike many European countries, patterns of migration are usually char-
acterised by their temporariness, where the predominant proportion of migrants are
short-term visa holders. Compared to situations where migrants have clear pathways
to citizenship, the rights and entitlements of short-term migrants are generally limited
and employers thus benefit from greater labour flexibility and lower wages which can
create labour market segmentation. As temporary migrants are not regarded as targets
of social integration, states can also save money from the transitory nature of these
arrangements. The employment of FDWs on a succession of short-term contracts is
a good example of this situation as they are generally not entitled to family reunions
through the granting of family and spouse visas. The externalisation of FDWs’ house-
hold and family maintenance reduces costs on the host government while facilitating
the participation of local women in the labour market by releasing them from the
burden of domestic work. This situation raises serious questions around the use of
temporary migrants as a tool for the appropriation of surplus from foreign workers
who endure low wages, long work hours and short-term contracts. Many previous
120 W. Asato
studies have highlighted the negative consequences of such arrangements. These

include the disposability of vulnerable workers, low productivity (Chang 2000),
the commercialisation of reproductive work without the application of labour laws
(Romero 2000), the feminisation of domestic work and poor working conditions for
domestic workers (Constable 2007), and subcontracting filial piety (Lan 2006).3
Nonetheless, reduced welfare costs and greater female participation in the national
labour force through the employment of FDWs are compatible with the economic
diversification and nationalisation policies that have been adopted by the Brunei
government since 2002. These policies may facilitate gender equality in the wider
labour market, but reliance on FDWs in Bruneian households comes at the expense of
the vulnerability of these workers. Vulnerability is inherent in this type of migration
and includes exorbitant recruitment fees, extremely unequal power relationships that
exist between employers and employees, and working conditions where labour laws
do not generally apply.
7.3 Citizenship and the Labour Market
Let us now examine the proportion of citizens, permanent residents and temporary
residents in Brunei. According to a 2014 census by the Department of Economic
Planning and Development (Jabatan Perancangan dan Kemajuan Ekonomi, JKPE),
Bruneian citizens comprised approximately 72% of the total population (Table 7.1).
The ratio of Bruneian citizens to permanent and temporary residents has risen slightly;
this is believed to be due to the fact that the rate of natural births exceeds the rate
of foreigners acquiring citizenship by descent in accordance with the principles of
jus sanguinis. In Brunei, birth within the country does not automatically lead to
citizenship rights. Marriage and adoption are often the only ways for foreigners to
attain citizenship. Naturalisation of long-term foreign residents is only permitted
when the applicant has resided in Brunei for over 20 years, is proficient in Malay
and has shown an intent to live in the country permanently (Government of Brunei
Darussalam 2002), while citizenship laws allow for foreign female spouses to register
for citizenship after 12 years of residency. Additionally, acquisition of permanent
residency is limited, with only several hundred people per year being approved.
The proportion of permanent residents has remained consistently around 6.6–7% of
the total population; meanwhile, temporary residents and those deemed as ‘other’
comprised 20.8% of the population in 2015. It would thus seem that Brunei’s labour
demand and supply gap has not changed drastically in the past few years.
According to the distribution of labour by occupational category, it is clear that
in Brunei (as with other rentier states in the AGS) migrant workers are usually
employed in low-skilled occupations (Tables 7.2 and 7.3). The three occupations
with the highest proportion of temporary residents (that is, foreign migrants) are craft
3 However,
the IMF (2013) points out that low productivity is due to the limited human resource
development provided in destination countries due to the temporariness of migrants’ stays.
Table 7.1 Citizenship status of Bruneian residents
Citizenship status Number Ratio
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Brunei citizens 281,660 286,500 291,800 296,500 301,300 0.716 0.717 0.718 0.720 0.722
Permanent residents 25,792 27,200 28,100 28,900 29,100 0.066 0.068 0.069 0.070 0.070
Temporary residents and others 85,920 86,100 86,300 86,500 86,800 0.218 0.215 0.212 0.210 0.208
Total 393,372 399,800 406,200 411,900 417,200
7 Brunei Darussalam: Female Labour Force Participation …
Source Department of Statistics, JKPE (2016)

121
122 W. Asato
and related trades (61.4%), elementary occupations (56%) and plant and machine
operators and assemblers (33.1%).4 This indicates a labour market structure that
requires migrants to shoulder the bulk of low-paid manual work.
It is notable that 38% of elementary occupations are undertaken by women with
temporary residential status; in reality, the majority of this category of work are
domestic workers. Using data from an International Labour Organisation (ILO)
report, which gives the number of non-local workers in Brunei in 2014 as 52,200 and
that 20.7% of the total foreign workers are employed in domestic work (the largest
share of foreign workers in any one industry group), the estimated number of domes-
tic workers is 10,805 (JKPE and ILO 2014: 3). This figure is slightly larger than the
10,135 non-resident women working in elementary occupations (Table 7.2). Second,
looking at the category of professionals, almost half (46.4%) of the total workforce
consists of local female citizens, greater than the number of local male citizens. This
is probably due to the higher levels of educational attainment for women than for men
(see below). The gender gap between local men and women employed as managers
and senior officials is not large either (12%). These points indicate that the presence
of FDWs is instrumental in supporting the local female workforce of managers and
professionals. Finally, labour market competition between local people and migrants
does not appear to be high, except among the category of craft and related trades
workers where 52.5% of the workforce consist of male temporary residents. Even
for the category of plant and machine operators and assemblers, the majority of the
workforce (55.2%) are Bruneian men.
Brunei has achieved a relatively low unemployment rate of 5–6% over the past
two decades up to 2013 (ILO 2018a), meaning that the local labour market has
remained relatively stable. However, like in other rentier states, the issue of workforce
nationalisation has been a sensitive topic in recent times and migrant workers are
frequently regarded as obstacles to achieving even lower rates of unemployment. In
2008, there were 7000 jobseekers in the private sector of which 45% had only an O-
level equivalent education (Izam Said and Syazwan 2008).5 To reduce unemployment
among this group, Brunei shifted towards increasing vocational training for skills
acquisition to enable the employment of O-level graduates who would otherwise
have ‘nowhere to go’ (Brunei Times 2009). The government also subsidised on-
the-job training for local people while providing potential employers with a cost
subsidy for personnel. Despite these initiatives, the situation among these jobseekers
has largely remained the same. As of 2012, 5000 local jobseekers were unable to
find work with 85% them being school leavers whose qualifications were O level
or lower (Thien 2012). However, to prevent any potential conflicts, the government
took a critical view of migrant workers and revoked any unused quotas of foreign
4 Based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations skill levels, elementary occupa-
tions include street workers and vendors (excluding food), building caretakers, rubbish collectors,
porters and luggage handlers, food preparation assistants, refuse workers, building cleaners and
domestic workers (International Labour Office 2012).
5 O-level exams are qualifications in the British educational system and are upper secondary exams
for students between 15 and 17 years.

Table 7.2 Bruneian labour market composition by occupational category and citizenship status
Occupational sector Total Brunei citizens Permanent residents Temporary residents and
others
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Managers and senior officials 14,390 9,549 4,841 8,631 5,175 3,455 2,391 1379 1012 3369 2994 374
Professionals 32,219 14,490 17,729 26,292 11,327 14,965 1414 482 932 4512 2681 1831
Technicians and associate 30,640 19,959 10,681 23,550 14,711 8840 1541 1103 438 5549 4145 1403
professionals
Clerical support workers 21,555 6710 14,845 19,025 5563 13,462 1413 480 934 1117 667 450
Service and sales workers 37,005 24,490 12,515 25,352 17,117 8235 2406 1006 1400 9247 6367 2881
Skilled agricultural, forestry and 2583 2004 578 1651 1385 266 473 183 289 459 436 22
fishery workers
Craft and related trades workers 17,383 14,124 3259 5852 4254 1598 861 750 111 10,670 9121 1549
Plant and machine operators and 7342 7131 210 4192 4054 138 723 706 17 2427 2371 55
assemblers
Elementary occupations 26,456 10,074 16,382 10,470 4920 5551 1175 477 697 14,811 4677 10,135
Total 122,988 67,913 67,947 85,189 36,852 40,722 7859 3524 3333 25,175 7470 14,565
123
124
Table 7.3 Ratio of Bruneian citizens, permanent residents and temporary residents of the total workforce in each occupational sector
Occupational sector Brunei citizens Permanent residents Temporary residents and others
Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female
Managers and senior officials 0.600 0.3596 0.240 0.166 0.096 0.070 0.234 0.208 0.026
Professionals 0.816 0.3516 0.464 0.044 0.015 0.029 0.140 0.083 0.057
Technicians and associate professionals 0.769 0.4801 0.289 0.050 0.036 0.014 0.181 0.135 0.046
Clerical support workers 0.883 0.2581 0.625 0.066 0.022 0.043 0.052 0.031 0.021
Service and sales workers 0.685 0.4626 0.223 0.065 0.027 0.038 0.250 0.172 0.078
Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers 0.639 0.5362 0.103 0.183 0.071 0.112 0.178 0.169 0.009
Craft and related trades workers 0.337 0.2447 0.092 0.050 0.043 0.006 0.614 0.525 0.089
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 0.571 0.5522 0.019 0.098 0.096 0.002 0.331 0.323 0.007
Elementary occupations 0.396 0.1860 0.210 0.044 0.018 0.026 0.560 0.177 0.383
W. Asato
workers (Thien 2015a). In 2017, youth unemployment (15–24 years) was over 5%
for men and over 6% for women while total unemployment was at 2.1% (ILO 2017).
Though there is a disparity between skill level, occupational sectors and job pref-
erence of the unemployed and foreign workers, migrants typically end up being
blamed for the unemployment rates of the local population. Migration has therefore
been a sensitive issue even at times of low unemployment. As is so often the case in
rentier states, Bruneians prefer to work in the public sector: 94% of these jobs are
occupied by Bruneians while the figure is 53% in the private sector in 2014 (Hertog
2012, 2014; JKPE and ILO 2014).
The government of Brunei continues to justify the need for a large pool of migrant
workers on the country’s small size and limited population, which is ‘not enough to
support cost-effective [investments]’ in the global market according to the minister
of home affairs (Ubaidillah 2012), in effect conceding that a dependency on migrant
labour is inevitable. This discourse is somewhat similar to those in developmental
states such as Singapore.
7.4 Domestic Workers in Brunei
Large pools of FDWs are a common feature of many rentier and developmental
states (Table 7.4). In Qatar, 150,000–170,000 FDWs are employed in 80–90% of
households; in Kuwait, 565,000–678,000 FDWs are employed in 72–86% of house-
holds; and in Singapore, 250,000 FDWs are employed in 1.29 million households,
comprising 19.4% of all households (MOM 2018; Singapore, Department of Statis-
tics 2018a). Brunei has brought in an estimated 22,000–34,000 FDWs in 68,000
households, which means that 32–50% of all households employ FDWs.
As noted earlier, domestic workers comprise the largest number of foreign work-
ers by industrial group at 20.7% of the total foreign labour force in Brunei (JKPE
and ILO 2014: 4). This is because the externalisation of household work enables
female participation in the workforce and is necessary to support the large families
that are common in many rentier states. It has been pointed out that the employment
of an FDW in a household is linked to the birth of a child in the family, particularly
where the mother was previously employed outside the home. However, no statistics
are available as to how many FDW employers are working mothers. We may make
inferences though from other examples. In the case of Hong Kong, 78% of married
women aged 25–54 years with children employed an FDW in 2013 (Hong Kong,
Census and Statistics Department 2015). Strikingly, about two thirds (67%) of adult
members in FDW-employing households did not engage in any housework in 2013
(Research Office Legislative Council Secretariat 2017). In Taiwan, 54.5% of house-
holds with FDWs in 2015 reported that they could work outside the home because of
the employment of an FDW (Taiwan, Ministry of Labour 2016). The promotion of
the domestic female workforce is thus partly achieved by the employment of large
numbers of FDWs.
126 W. Asato
Table 7.4 Number of domestic workers and employment ratios in Brunei and the AGS
Country GLMM (2014a, Tayah and Assaf Total number of Estimates of
b, c, 2018) (2018) households households
employing
FDWs (%)
Bahrain 107,711 111,000 151,580 71–73
Kuwait 564,802 678,000 785,289 72–86
Oman 240,180 195,000 399,274 49–60
Qatar 154,057 174,000 201,432 76–86
Saudi Arabia 2,421,103 2,303,000 2,999,218 77–81
UAE – 306,000 1,599,700 19
Brunei 22,000 33,943 68,208 32–50
Singapore 250,000 1,290,000 19
Sources For Bahrain: GLMM (2014a), Bahrain (2010); for Kuwait: GLMM (2014b), PACI (2018);
for Oman: Oman (2010), NCSI (2018); for Qatar: GLMM (2014c), Qatar, Ministry of Development
Planning and Statistics (2015); for Saudi Arabia: Abdul Salam et al. (2014), GLMM (2018); Tayah
and Assaf (2018); for the UAE: Euromonitor International (2016); for Brunei: JKPE (2011); for
Singapore: MOM (2018), Department of Statistics, Singapore (2018a)
Note The number of domestic workers in the AGS in the GLMM data set is from 2014, except for
Saudi Arabia which is from 2018. The data on domestic workers in Tayah and Assaf (2018) are
from 2016
The family-based provision of household work (including childcare and elderly

care) characterises both developmental and rentier states, partly due to their famil-
ialistic welfare regimes. The notion of familialism is one where the family unit
serves as the most important source of welfare (Leitner 2003; cf. Esping-Andersen
1999). However, this is not sustainable in the near future due to demographic changes
(Ochiai 2011), including a reduction in household members, the nuclearisation of
the family, a decline in three-generation households, ageing and low fertility ratios.
In developmental states, the internalisation of family welfare through the employ-
ment of FDWs is preferred to tax-based welfare provision as developmental states
are more orientated towards small government.
Since little research has been published focusing specifically on Brunei, I rely
on secondary data for my analysis from a variety of publicly available information
sources. These include non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports such as those
produced by the Brunei Council on Social Welfare and foreign organisations such
as the Jakarta-based Solidaritas Perempuan, the United States Department of State’s
Trafficking in persons report and the Brunei Times.6
Brunei began recruiting FDWs as early as the 1960s when the government started
to facilitate the move of women into higher education and full-time work. At that
time, the country’s large infrastructural projects attracted foreign skilled workers. The
6 Aftercriticising Saudi Arabia in 2016, the Brunei Times halted all publication after 10 years of
operating (Walker 2016).
Fig. 7.2 Labour force

participation ratio in Brunei,
1990–2017
Source ILO (2018b)
process of industrialisation resulted in a higher demand for FDWs (Brunei Council

on Social Welfare et al. 2014: 7) though official figures on FDWs in Brunei are not
disclosed by the government. Statistics from the media provide a crucial but limited
source of information in this regard. As mentioned elsewhere, the number of FDWs
was around 25,000 in 2009 (Ubaidillah 2009). In 2014, the number of FDWs was
over 22,000 (Quratul-Ain 2014). As of 2012, the Brunei Council on Social Welfare
et al. (2014) estimated that there were 17,000 Indonesian domestic workers, the same
figure as in 2005 (Quratul-Ain 2015). The number of Filipino FDWs is much smaller
at around 4884 in 2012. However, since human smuggling into Brunei via the borders
with Malaysia occurs, these numbers may be an underestimation of the real figures
(Brunei Council on Social Welfare et al. 2014: 7). On the assumption that there were
22,000 FDWs in 2014, this figure shows that approximately 36% of all Bruneian
households employ an FDW; if correct, this would be the highest ratio among South-
east Asian countries. Aside from Filipino and Indonesian domestic workers, hiring
Vietnamese domestic workers has become more popular, particularly when a min-
imum monthly wage was set for Filipino FDWs by the Philippine government and
when recruitment of Vietnamese workers in Taiwan was banned (Sobrina 2007).
The increased employment of FDWs in Brunei has coincided with the advance-
ment of gender equality among the local population. It is interesting to note that the
female labour force participation ratio has been increasing while the male labour
force participation has been on the decline (Fig. 7.2). The rate of female labour force
participation was only 20% in 1971 and has kept on rising, reaching 45% in 1990 and
nearly 60% in 2015, which is one of the highest rates in any Asian rentier state. Even
though the advancement of female participation is striking, the male labour force
participation ratio is one of the lowest in Southeast Asia after Myanmar (OECD
2013).
The high participation rate of women is due to their higher educational attainment,
which has its foundations in economic diversification and workforce nationalisation
policies, such as Brunei’s seventh national development plan for 1996–2000 followed
by Wawasan Brunei 2035 in 2004 (Minnis 1998; Government of Brunei Darussalam
2017). The country’s core plan has focused on education and human capital as key
priorities (OECD 2013). The literacy rate between men and women also achieved
parity among the younger generation in the 1990s (Fig. 7.3). As noted, women have
achieved much in terms of higher education. In 2016 vocational technical training and
128 W. Asato
Fig. 7.3 Literacy rates in

Brunei, 1991
Source JKPE (2003)
higher education, total female enrolment was 56.3% while master’s degree graduates
were 74.3% female and doctor of philosophy graduates were 64.8% female (Brunei,
Department of Planning, Development and Research, Ministry of Education 2017).
Perhaps this is a reason why women now outnumber men in professional positions.
Some research points out that gender equality in Brunei is backed up by equal oppor-
tunity in education, health care, employment and citizenship (Low and Sulaiman
2013). Considering English is the main medium of instruction in the higher educa-
tion system, educational attainment has had a big impact on the labour market as
there are relatively few linguistic barriers. This is a significant difference with the
AGS where the main language of instruction in the local education systems is Arabic
and where there is a large language divide in the labour market (Table 7.5).
The larger average household size in Brunei is another aspect that may account
for the high number of FDWs. In comparison with Singapore which had 3.3 persons
per household in 2017 (Singapore, Department of Statistics 2018b), Brunei averaged
6.5 in 1991 (United Nations Statistics Division 1995) and 5 persons per household
in 2016 (AITI 2016: 6). My estimation (based on household surveys by the Brunei
government) would actually put this figure higher and closer to 6.7 persons (AITI
2016). One of the characteristics of the Brunei household is that even though fertility
is on the decline, many households maintain a large number of family members.
Households with eight or more persons account for 25% of all households (AITI
2010). The high number of household members creates a dilemma for educated
women who must choose between paid work outside the home and unpaid domestic
work. More often than not, women opt for the more profitable option of advancing
their careers and working outside the home and employing an FDW to help with
domestic chores.
As noted earlier, familialistic states often adopt liberal policies to augment family
care as much as possible (Leitner 2003). Though not always explicit, governments
of familialistic states provide incentives or services towards family care; I have
previously termed this a ‘familialisation policy’ (Asato 2014). Some examples of
these policies are tax reductions for three-generation households, civil laws for the
maintenance and care of elderly parents, and provisions for childcare. Such policies
have arguably brought about a form of ‘quasi-gender equality’ without fundamentally
changing the existing gender roles in receiving countries as domestic and care work
is outsourced to women from developing countries as families can in effect purchase
Table 7.5 Labour force participation rates of women in selected Asian countries and the AGS
Qatar UAE Kuwait Bahrain Oman Saudi Hong Japan South Malaysia Singapore Thailand Brunei
Arabia Kong Korea
1990 41.6 25.0 34.7 27.9 17.3 14.4 47.2 50.1 47.1 43.1 50.7 76.0 45.2
2000 38.0 33.8 44.2 34.9 22.7 16.1 49.1 49.3 48.9 44.6 52.6 65.4 55.5
2005 44.7 37.0 44.4 36.3 25.5 17.6 51.7 48.4 50.0 44.3 53.5 66.1 55.1
2010 46.2 46.2 42.8 39.3 27.8 17.7 51.8 49.4 49.3 44.1 57.3 64.4 53.5
2011 46.4 46.4 43.1 39.4 28.2 18.0 51.7 48.1 49.5 44.2 58.1 64.4 53.2
2012 46.6 46.6 43.4 39.4 28.6 18.2 51.6 48.1 49.9 44.3 59.0 64.4 52.9
2013 46.5 46.5 43.6 39.2 29.0 20.2 51.3 48.8 50.1 44.4 58.8 64.3 52.6
2014 46.4 46.4 43.8 39.1 29.3 20.4 51.1 48.7 50.1 44.5 58.6 64.2 52.2
Change, 4.8 21.4 9.1 11.2 12.0 6.0 3.9 −1.4 3.0 1.4 7.9 −11.8 7.0
1990–2014
Source ILO (2018c)
129
130 W. Asato
Table 7.6 Gender wage gap Average monthly wages Male Female Total
in Brunei
Source JKPE and ILO (2014) Overall average B$1950 B$1930 B$1940
Local B$1940 B$2270 B$2090
Non-local B$1980 B$870 B$1570
an ‘extra family member’. This outsourcing allows for ‘traditional values’ to be

maintained and avoids a gender-based backlash (cf. Ito 2014). However, as discussed
below, it is not necessarily a matter of ‘values’ but the underlying exploitation that
realises ‘equality’ of the host country through the recruitment of FDWs from other
countries.
7.5 The Gender Wage Gap and Local and Non-local Wage
Gap
Globally, higher educational attainment has narrowed the wage gap between the
sexes. According to The global gender gap report 2017, in terms of wage equality
for similar work, Brunei ranked eleventh out of 144 countries with a score of 78.2%
based on an executive opinion survey conducted in 2016–2017. Brunei also ranked
first in the world for both enrolment in secondary education and enrolment in tertiary
education for women (World Economic Forum 2017). An ILO survey in 2014 in
collaboration with the Brunei government shows the different perspectives on the
gender pay gap from both the viewpoint of gender and citizenship status.
Table 7.6 shows that the average monthly wages for both local and non-local men
and women is B$1940 (US$1412) with males at an average of B$1950 (US$1420)
and females at an average of B$1930 (US$1405), with the overall gender wage gap
being relatively small (100:99).7 The total average monthly wages of locals and non-
locals are B$2090 (US$1521) and B$1570 (US$1143), respectively. The wage gap
ratio is 100:75. The average monthly wages of local males and local females are
B$1940 (US$1412) and B$2270 (US$1652), respectively. Surprisingly, the gender
gap ratio is 100:85 in favour of females. The average monthly wages of local males
and non-local males are B$1940 (US$1412) and B$1980 (US$1441), respectively.
The gap is 100:98, indicating non-local males earn only slightly more than their local
counterparts. Most stark is the comparison between the average monthly wages of
local females and non-local females, with local females earning B$2270 (US$1652)
and non-local females earning B$870 (US$633). The wage gap is 100:38. This huge
gap is caused by the large number of FDWs employed in low-paying jobs.
These figures are quite surprising in that the gender pay gap between local males
and local females is actually reversed, and the largest gap is that between local
females and non-local females. This shows that FDWs are paid exceptionally poorly.
7 B$1 is approximately equal to US$0.73.

The reverse gender pay gap might be caused in part by the feminisation of work and
the greater proportion of women in higher education. Many local men may therefore
lack the necessary skills and language competence compared to local women, and
this could be a cause of male vulnerability in the labour market. As we have seen, the
greater educational attainment of females is reflected in the high number of female
managers and professionals. Also, in the public sector a 2008 reform prompted gov-
ernment employers to provide married female workers with permanent employment
as they were formerly kept on a contract-by-contract basis after marriage (ESCAP
2014). This has provided female public sector workers with increased job security
that was previously lacking. A 2014 report noted that Brunei’s civil service was 51%
female (ESCAP 2014).
A second explanation might be found in the generous welfare provisions that
disincentivise local males from participating in the labour market. In any case, Brunei
shows a polarisation of the female workforce given the lowest-paid group is non-local
women and the highest-paid group is local women.
The employment of FDWs and higher educational attainment thus promote the
position of local women in the formal labour market. Other researchers have also
found that age, the total number of work position(s) held, employment of FDWs and
educational attainment are all factors that have significantly influenced the partici-
pation of women in the labour market (Anaman and Hartinie 2006).
7.6 Foreign Workers and the Female Workforce
Current immigration policies towards FDWs in Brunei are essentially demand based,
with few restrictions imposed on employment, though the issuing of employment
permits is prioritised for married Bruneian residents to discourage unmarried single
households from becoming employers. Generally speaking, FDWs are referred to
as amahs and there are three types of FDWs. The first are new recruits; the second
are FDWs previously employed in Brunei who are looking to extend their stays by
finding new employers at the end of their contracts; and the third are those who have
transferred from another employer before the end of their contracts. The employ-
ment of FDWs is not as costly in Brunei as in high-income societies such as Hong
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. Basic expenses for hiring an FDW include a return-
able bond of B$600 (US$438), a recruitment fee and one-way ticket of B$1000–1300
(US$780–949) and B$300 (US$219) for first-time registration with the government.
The vulnerability of FDWs and female migrant workers around the world has been
highlighted in much of the previous research. This vulnerability is chiefly due to them
being excluded from protection by local labour laws, being subjected to harmful and
predatory recruitment practices, and experiencing social and even physical isolation
in their workplaces in the receiving countries. FDWs’ working conditions, which
include but are not limited to working hours, rest days, wages, holidays and mater-
nity leave, are still mainly defined by contract negotiations between employers and
individual FDWs. However, these negotiations are never easy as there is an inherent
132 W. Asato
power imbalance in the relationship. In other words, as FDWs have relatively little
bargaining power, the actual working conditions they frequently end up with often
involve working long hours without rest days and sometimes without pay. In this
respect, Brunei is not an exception as a lack of an enforceable regulatory framework
is common in many destination countries.
According to a survey by advocacy groups based on interviews, the majority
of FDWs in Brunei are paid less than BN$1 per hour (Quratul-Ain 2014). It also
noted that many are working between 12 and 17 hours per day with monthly salaries
ranging from BN$200 to 300 for Indonesians and BN$300 to 400 for Filipinos. These
extremely low wages are partly due to the absence of minimum wage laws and partly
because of contract substitutions and amendments that take place upon arrival of the
FDWs in Brunei. This is particularly true for Filipinos after there was a demand from
the Philippine government to set a monthly minimum wage (Quratul-Ain 2014).
Failure to pay the cost of return trips back to the FDW’s home country is another
frequent complaint. However, the Department of Labour announced this problem
has reduced significantly since 2009 when improved enforcement was rolled out
(Quratul-Ain 2011). Placement fees chargeable to FDWs are another often-cited
issue of concern. These fees are BN$1000–2000 per person (Quratul-Ain 2014),
which workers must pay back through salary deductions. This means that workers
do not pay recruitment fees in their sending countries. The pay-later system still
enables those without significant financial capital an opportunity to work abroad. It
is often pointed out that migrant workers do not belong to the lowest economic class in
the sending country since applicants have to have financial capital in order to pay for
recruitment fees before departure. However, recruitment for FDWs is frequently from
the poorest sections of society, particularly in Indonesia, as this class of migrants is
much more vulnerable to exploitation by employers and migrant recruiting agencies.
Recruitment fees still remain problematic as they are often extravagant, sometimes
amounting to between four and 11 months’ salary. These fees frequently lead to
prolonged indebtedness where a failure to pay back moneylenders can be the cause
of harsh treatment and abuse.
The Philippine government has also noted that when migrants request help,
the embassy advises them to seek reconciliation rather than reporting the matter
to the police. As noted in the Brunei Times, the embassy ‘only reports to police if the
domestic worker insists, what they try to do most of the time is reconcile because the
chances are the worker will be on the losing end. They can easily be blacklisted, and
they can’t return to Brunei anymore and they don’t want that to happen’ (Quratul-Ain
2014). The vulnerability of FDWs is based not only on one-off instances, but con-
tinues throughout the duration of their contracts; in some of the worst cases, FDW
salaries can remain unpaid for more than three years (Syazwan 2014).
As in other countries, the lack of legal protection provided to FDWs is an issue.
This vulnerability mainly stems from: (1) the temporariness of migration and the
possibility of passport, visa or work-permit confiscation; (2) the isolation of domes-
ticity, which increases the risk of verbal, physical and sexual abuse, compounded
by the lack of a work/life distinction; (3) the lack of legal rights to coverage under
labour laws to protect them from underpayment, long working hours, low pay and
the withholding of wages and passports; and (4) indebtedness resulting from the
recruitment process.
Given these issues, there has been pressure for changes to Brunei’s policies
towards FDWs. International pressure has been placed on the government through
criticism in the US Department of State’s Trafficking in persons report and through
the ILO on account of it being a member of the organisation and having ratified
several of its conventions. This pressure has had three main consequences. First,
it has resulted in the growth of local advocacy and aid groups such as the Brunei
Council on Social Welfare and the Council of Women of Brunei Darussalam.8 This
civil society involvement also has much to do with the growth of a more conscious
middle class that is focused on human rights and a discourse on these rights that is
increasingly accepted in the public sphere. The second result is the increased bilat-
eral relationships with migrant-sending countries. This is particularly true in relation
to the Philippines and Indonesia as sending countries often assert some pressure on
migrant-receiving countries. Third, it has resulted in changes to the Employment
Order in 2009.
The Department of State’s report on human trafficking highlighted ‘poor labour
conditions that amount to involuntary servitude’ (US Department of State 2009:
88) with many domestic workers ‘required to work exceptionally long hours’; this
external pressure on an international scale prompted the adoption of the Employment
Order 2009 by the Brunei government. Despite this reform, the same report in 2011
again pointed out these domestic workers live under conditions ‘consistent with
involuntary servitude’ (US Department of State 2011). This report also stated that
the Brunei government ‘does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking’ but ‘is making significant efforts to do so’.
Though Brunei established a Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons Order 2004,
the matter of implementing anti-trafficking measures still remained. In 2012, women
involved in prostitution were allowed to stay in a public shelter without being fined or
convicted (Quratul-Ain 2012). The Brunei Times pointed out that this was a signifi-
cant improvement over previous years, as it showed a shift in views since the victims
were no longer regarded as criminals but as victims of trafficking (Quratul-Ain 2012).
The Brunei Council on Social Welfare also issued a report on FDWs in collabora-
tion with NGOs in migrant-sending countries. This was ground-breaking as local
NGOs in Brunei have rarely committed to tackling politically sensitive issues. The
report highlighted the many problems faced by migrant workers, particularly FDWs
in the process of recruitment, upon their arrival in the country and up to the end of
their contracts. Pressures from the international community seem to have reduced
vulnerability and improved the protection available to FDWs. Furthermore, issues
regarding FDWs attract the interest of the public not only because of media coverage
but also because a large number of the local population have direct knowledge of the
8 The Brunei Council on Social Welfare was established in 2009 ‘to help complement and supplement
efforts on social welfare programs, initiatives and activities’ made by the Brunei government. The
council’s main target groups are children, disabled people, the elderly, poor or needy residents and
vulnerable families (Brunei Council on Social Welfare 2017).
134 W. Asato
subject on account of their employment of an FDW. This public attention is similar

to the situations in Hong Kong and Singapore, where a significant proportion of the
upper and middle classes employ FDWs.
7.7 The Contestation and Struggle Over Ambiguous Laws

and Regulations
The migration policies of the Philippines have affected labour movements of FDWs
in many receiving states. Brunei is no exception in this respect. The implementation
of a minimum wage has had a strong impact on the working conditions of FDWs.
However, Brunei does not have a mandatory minimum wage and so the setting of a
minimum wage by the sending country is a source for potential conflict. In 2007, the
Philippine government set a monthly minimum wage for Filipino overseas domestic
workers in Asian countries at US$400, based on the household service worker reform
package. This came together with improvements to skills training which was led by
the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority. The main purpose of
these initiatives was to empower Filipino overseas domestic workers (cf. Centre for
Migrant Advocacy 2011). However, it was not until recently that the embassy of the
Philippines formally started to implement these policies in Brunei. According to an
article in the Brunei Times, the role of the embassy is to verify whether contracts meet
requirements and to endorse visas for Brunei. However, as there is no minimum wage,
the Department of Labour confirmed that wages were to be determined by mutual
agreement between employers and employees (Piri 2015). On the other hand, the
Brunei Council on Social Welfare that advocates the rights of vulnerable groups
(including migrant workers) welcomed the possible implementation of a minimum
wage for FDWs.
This implementation of a minimum wage by the Philippine government has had a
negative effect in that it has resulted in many Filipinos losing out in the international
job market. The Brunei Times shows that there was a 23% decline in the demand
for Filipino domestic workers upon introduction of the minimum wage (Zaili 2015).
Even though this is a rather ironic outcome, sending governments frequently do
not ensure proper working conditions of their overseas nationals in order to gain
greater shares in the international labour market and compete with other sending
countries at the expense of their own citizens. In an interview, officials from the
Indonesian Ministry of Health mentioned to me that establishing and enforcing better
working conditions would in turn mean having to compete for jobs with Filipino
workers who have better English-language skills and higher educational attainment.9
The Sri Lankan embassy in Singapore also pointed to similar reasoning despite
wanting to protect their overseas nationals from exploitative and unhealthy working
conditions. The international ‘auction system’ or race to the bottom among sending
9 Interview with the Indonesian Board of Development and Empowerment on Human Resources
for Health, Ministry of Health, Hanoi, 15 August 2017.
countries make it difficult for sending governments to protect workers. Implementing

‘better’ working conditions may not be a viable social policy choice for the sending
government, given the importance of market shares to national incomes through
remittances by overseas workers. This is evident in the implementation of a unilateral
‘minimum wage’ by the Philippine government which resulted in a decrease in the
number of domestic workers hired overseas, including in Brunei. For other sending
countries, a minimum wage can be seen as the benchmark of a ‘top nationality’.
Therefore, it can be inferred that the overseas working conditions of Indonesian
workers is less favourable than that of Filipinos. However, the rights of Indonesian
workers have been of concern for the governments of both countries. Bilateral talks
were a big step though negotiations have proven to be complicated. The Department
of Labour has continued to emphasise that there is no minimum wage in Brunei
and that wage levels should be determined by the market (Thien 2015b). This in
turn means that wage levels are dependent upon agreements between employers and
employees with little legal protection for the foreign workers who are in a vulnerable
position. It is argued that the government cannot enforce a minimum wage for for-
eigners as no such regulation exists for Brunei nationals. Therefore, any minimum
wage stipulation that was set in place by sending countries is unilateral, which then
puts into question the assurance of protection of migrant workers. The Indonesian
government has long wanted to have a formal agreement with Brunei on labour
placement and workers’ protection since 2008 (Piri and Syed Rory 2010). Despite
the ambiguous coverage and lack of enforcement, the Indonesian government took
advantage of the new Employment Order 2009, with the embassy warning recruit-
ment agencies in Brunei not to exceed the possible deductions that are outlined in
the order (Brunei Times 2011).
Furthermore, in 2010, Indonesia also declared that it would set a minimum wage
for their FDWs. This minimum wage was subsequently increased from US$250
to US$350, as declared in the memorandum of the embassy of 26 March 2015,
which also requires that workers receive nine hours of rest per day and a day off
once a week with additional compensation when a domestic worker does overtime.
In addition, recruitment agencies must be authorised by the embassy in Brunei so
that in effect working conditions are authorised by the Indonesian government. The
memorandum shows the government’s firm stance on the protection of Indonesian
migrant workers. However, this is not based on the kind of bilateral agreement the
government of Indonesia has been looking for. Indonesian embassy staff have also
provided consular services to their nationals in Brunei, including welfare consul-
tations (Adliena 2015). In 2016, an official from the embassy released a statement
saying that ‘more employers have met Indonesia’s demand for a standard minimum
wage for their workers in Brunei’ (Waqiuddin 2016). As of 2018, further talks are still
ongoing between Indonesia and Brunei regarding a memorandum of understanding
that would regulate ‘the placement and protection of migrant workers’ (Anya 2018).
The applicability of the Employment Order 2009 has continued to be called into
question. For example, it states the need for controls over the recruitment loan system.
Article 49 of the order specifies the recovery of advances and loans by employers with
subsections noting that these loans or advances ‘may be recovered in instalments by
136 W. Asato
deductions from salary spread over not more than 12 months’ and that this recovery
cannot be more than one-quarter of the salary (Government of Brunei Darussalam
2009). However, this is not the case for Indonesian domestic workers. According to
a Transient Workers Count Too report, Indonesian agencies charge B$1800–2400
(US$1312–1749) while the Brunei agents then charge the employer over B$3000
(US$2186) in order to make a profit. From this B$3000 charge, B$1200 (US$873)
is paid by the worker via monthly deductions. Though the Employment Order 2009
outlines the maximum percentage and duration for deductions for repayments that
may be made, many employers deduct far more than the stipulated amounts, leaving
these domestic workers in a situation of involuntary servitude. Some recruitment fees
collected via salary deductions have amounted to B$2500–2900 (US$1821–2112),
and many exceed more than half the monthly salary of the FDWs (Teo 2017: 12).
7.8 Conclusion
Brunei is often portrayed as a rentier state due to its low taxation and system of
generous welfare provision with weak redistribution that are supported through the
extraction and export of natural resources, namely oil and natural gas. Labour market
segmentation between nationals and foreign migrants often occurs in rentier states
with their welfare-dependent economies. However, Brunei’s labour market has some
unique features which include the higher educational attainment of females, a high
participation of women in the labour force, a higher number of female professionals
and a negative gender pay gap among local men and women, all of which are similar
to traits of developmental states. It would be reasonable to say that these unique
aspects enjoyed by local women are partly made possible by the employment of
FDWs who take on their domestic duties. This is done at a relatively low cost to
local women while they in turn are able to progress their own careers which produce
much higher value. The wage gap is greatest between local women and non-local
women, largely due to the minimal wages that FDWs earn which are often only
a third of what local females earn. These FDWs do so with much longer working
hours, without any minimum wage regulations and with high and unscrupulous wage
deductions to repay their recruitment fees. The productivity of local women is built
on the vulnerability and exploitation of FDWs, who are confined to the domestic
sphere. The implementation and enforcement of the Employment Order of 2009
and minimum wage stipulations are sketchy, and the legally flexible arrangement
of FDWs and their vulnerable working conditions remain possible as the sector has
very little regulation and is economically supported by Brunei’s middle class.
References
Abdul Salam, Asharaf, Ibrahim Elsegaey, Rshood Khraif, and Abdullah Al-Mutairi. 2014. Popu-
lation distribution and household conditions in Saudi Arabia: Reflections on the 2010 census.
SpringerPlus 3: 530.
Adliena H. Kamaludin. 2015. Indonesian workers still face minimum wage issues in Brunei. Brunei
Times, 5 October.
Anaman, Kwabena A., and Hartinie M. Kassim. 2006. Marriage and female labour supply in Brunei
Darussalam: A case study of urban women in Bandar Seri Begawan. Journal of Socio-Economics
35 (5): 797–812.
Anderson, Lisa. 1990. Policy-making and theory building: American political science and the
Islamic Middle East. In Theory, politics and the Arab world: Critical responses, ed. Hisham
Sharabi, 52–80. New York: Routledge.
Anya, Agnes. 2018. Indonesia, Brunei to make MOU on migrant workers. Jakarta Post, 3 May.
Asato, Wako. 2014. Incorporating foreign domestic workers as providers of family care: Case
studies of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. In Transformation of the intimate and the public
in Asian modernity, ed. Emiko Ochiai and Leo Aoi Hosoya, 190–234. Leiden: Brill.
Authority for Info-Communications Technology Industry of Brunei Darussalam [AITI]. 2010.
Brunei Darussalam household ICT survey report 2010. Bandar Seri Begawan: Authority for
Info-Communications Technology Industry of Brunei Darussalam.
Authority for Info-Communications Technology Industry of Brunei Darussalam [AITI]. 2016.
Brunei Darussalam household ICT survey report 2016. Bandar Seri Begawan: Authority for
Info-Communications Technology Industry of Brunei Darussalam.
Bahrain. 2010. Census summary result 2010. Population, housing, building, establishments and
agriculture census. http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/ess/ess_test_folder/World_Census_
Agriculture/Country_info_2010/Reports/Reports_6/BHR_FIN_REP_EN_2010.pdf. Accessed
29 Dec 2018.
Beblawi, Hazem. 1987. The rentier state in the Arab world. In The rentier state, ed. Hazem Beblawi
Beblawi, Hazem, and Giacomo Luciani. 1987. Introduction. In The rentier state, ed. Hazem Beblawi
Brunei Council on Social Welfare, Solidaritas Perempuan, Women’s Legal and Human Rights
Bureau, Inc., and Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on the ASEAN. 2014. Compliance with
women’s rights standards: The case of migration of domestic workers from Indonesia and
the Philippines in Brunei Darussalam. https://womenscaucusonasean.files.wordpress.com/
2014/01/compliance-with-womens-rights-standards_domestic-workers-from-indonesia-and-
the-philippines-in-brunei-2.pdf. Accessed 12 Dec 2018.
Brunei Council on Social Welfare. 2017. Majlis Kesejahteraan Masyarakat—Brunei council on
social welfare: About us. http://www.mkmbrunei.com/aboutus. Accessed 13 Dec 2018.
Brunei, Department of Planning, Development and Research, Ministry of Education. 2017. Brunei
Darussalam education statistics. 2016. Bandar Seri Begawan: Department of Planning. Ministry
of Education: Development and Research.
Brunei, Department of Statistics, Department of Economic Planning and Development [JKPE].
2003. Report on the 2001 population census. Bandar Seri Begawan: Department of Statistics,
JKPE.
Brunei, Department of Statistics, Department of Economic Planning and Development [JKPE],
Prime Minister’s Office of Brunei Darussalam. 2011. Population and housing census. Ban-
dar Seri Begawan: Department of Economic Planning and Development, Prime Minister’s
Office of Brunei Darussalam. http://www.depd.gov.bn/DEPD%20Documents%20Library/DOS/
BPP2011/Preliminary%20Report%20of%20BPP%202011.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Brunei, Department of Statistics, Department of Economic Planning and Development, Brunei
[JKPE]. 2016. Brunei Darussalam statistical yearbook 2015. Bandar Seri Begawan: Department
of Statistics, JKPE.
138 W. Asato
Brunei, Department of Economic Planning and Development, Brunei [JKPE] and International
Labour Organisation [ILO]. 2014. Labour force survey 2014: Preliminary report. Brunei: Depart-
ment of Economic Planning and Development and Geneva: ILO.
Brunei Darussalam, Government of. 2002. Laws of Brunei: Chapter 15—Brunei nationality. http://
www.agc.gov.bn/AGC%20Images/LAWS/ACT_PDF/cap015.pdf. Accessed 12 Dec 2018.
Brunei Darussalam, Government of. 2009. Employment Order 2009. http://www.agc.gov.bn/AGC%
20Images/LAWS/Gazette_PDF/2009/EN/s037.pdf. Accessed 12 Dec 2018.
Brunei Darussalam, Government of. 2017. https://www.gov.bn/SitePages/Wawasan%20Brunei%
202035.aspx. Accessed 12 Dec 2018.
Brunei Times. 2009. Concept of TVET in education system lauded. 29 March.
Brunei Times. 2011. The exploitation of Dewi. 24 July.
Centre for Migrant Advocacy. 2011. Survey research on the effectiveness of household service
workers policy reform package. Quezon City: Centre for Migrant Advocacy.
Chang, Grace. 2000. Disposable domestics: Immigrant women workers in the global economy.
Boston: South End Press.
Constable, Nicole. 2007. Maid to order in Hong Kong: Stories of migrant workers, 2nd ed. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. 1999. Social foundations of postindustrial economies. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Euromonitor International. 2016. United Arab Emirates country factfile. https://www.euromonitor.
com/united-arab-emirates/country-factfile. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration [GLMM]. 2014a. Bahrain: Estimated total employed non-
Bahraini population by sex and sector (public, private, domestic) (quarterly, 2003–2014).
http://gulfmigration.org/bahrain-estimated-total-employed-non-bahraini-population-by-sex-
and-sector-public-private-domestic-quarterly-2003-2014/. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration [GLMM]. 2014b. Kuwait: Employed population aged 15
and above by nationality (Kuwaiti/non-Kuwaiti), activity sector and age group (2014). http://
gulfmigration.org/kuwait-employed-population-aged-15-and-above-by-nationality-kuwaiti-
non-kuwaiti-activity-sector-and-age-group-2014/. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration [GLMM]. 2014c. Qatar: Economically active pop-
ulation aged 15 and above by nationalist (Qatari/non-Qatari), sex and activity sec-
tor (2014). http://gulfmigration.org/qatar-economically-active-population-aged-15-and-above-
by-nationality-qatari-non-qatari-sex-and-activity-sector-2014/. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration [GLMM]. 2018. Saudi Arabia: Non-Saudi domestic work-
ers by sex and main group of household occupations (Q2, 2018). http://gulfmigration.org/
saudi-arabia-non-saudi-domestic-workers-by-sex-and-main-group-of-household-occupations-
q2-2018/. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Hertog, Steffen. 2012. A comparative assessment of labour market nationalisation policies in the
GCC. In National employment, migration and education in the GCC, ed. Steffen Hertog, 65–106.
Berlin: Gerlach Press.
Hertog, Steffen. 2014. An assessment of nationalisation policies. GLMM Research Paper, No.
1/2014.
Hong Kong, Census and Statistics Department. 2015. Thematic household survey on sharing
of housework. https://www.statistics.gov.hk/pub/B11302562015XXXXB0100.pdf. Accessed 29
Dec 2018.
Hundt, David, and Jitendra Uttam. 2017. Varieties of capitalism in Asia: Beyond the developmental
state. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
International Labour Office. 2012. International standard classification of occupations: ISCO-08.
Geneva: International Labour Office.
International Labour Organisation [ILO]. 2018a. Unemployment, total (% of total labor force).
ILOSTAT Database. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS. Accessed 29 Dec
2018.
International Labour Organisation [ILO]. 2018b. Labor force participation rate, male (% of male
population ages 15+). ILOSTAT Database. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.
MA.ZS?locations=BN. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
International Labour Organisation [ILO]. 2018c. Labor force participation rate, total (% of total pop-
ulation ages 15–64). ILOSTAT Database. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS.
Ito, Kimio. 2014. Emerging culture wars: Backlash against ‘gender freedom’ (jenda furi in
Japanese). In Gender and welfare states in East Asia: Confucianism or gender equality?, ed.
Sirin Sung and Gillian Pascall, 137–151. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Izam Said Ya’akub, and Syazwan Sadikin. 2008. Bosses urged to give priority for jobs to locals.
Brunei Times, 9 April.
Koch, Natalie. 2015. Exploring divergences in comparative research: Citizenship regimes and the
spectacular cities of Central Asia and the GCC. Area 47 (4): 436–442.
Kuwait, Public Authority for Civil Information [PACI]. 2018. Private households by size, mem-
bers and number of households. http://stat.paci.gov.kw/englishreports/#DataTabPlace:family.
Kwon, Huck-ju. 2005. An overview of the study: The developmental welfare state and policy
reforms in East Asia. In Transforming the developmental welfare state in East Asia, ed. Huck-ju
Kwon, 1–23. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lan, Pei-Chia. 2006. Global Cinderellas: Migrant domestics and newly rich employers in Taiwan.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Leitner, Sigrid. 2003. Varieties of familialism: The caring function of the family in comparative
perspective. European Societies 5 (4): 353–375.
Low, K.C.P, and Sulaiman Zohrah. 2013. Women and human capital: The Brunei Darussalam
perspective. Educational Research 4 (2): 91–97.
Mahdavy, Hossein. 1970. Patterns and problems of economic development in rentier states: The
case of Iran. In Studies in economic history of the Middle East from the rise of Islam to the present
day, ed. M.A. Cook, 428–467. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Minnis, John R. 1998. Brunei’s seventh National Development Plan 1996–2000: Implications for
education policy and practice. Asia Pacific Journal of Education 18 (1): 25–37.
Ochiai, Emiko. 2011. Unsustainable societies: The failure of familialism in East Asia’s compressed
modernity. Historical Social Research 36 (2): 219–245.
Oman. 2010. Selected data and indicators from the results of general populations, housing and estab-
lishments censuses (2010–2003–1993). https://www.ncsi.gov.om/Elibrary/LibraryContentDoc/
ben_English%20_6823279d-e72e-4bf9-9a1a-dffb1cff0b62.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Oman, National Centre for Statistics and Information [NCSI]. 2018. Statistical year book. https://
www.ncsi.gov.om/Elibrary/LibraryContentDoc/bar_Statistical%20Year%20Book%202018_
a8b32d59-cdc9-4987-ba29-1e7ce78d5cca.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Piri, Sally. 2015. Labour issue on top of agenda, says new Philippine envoy. Brunei Times, 4 June.
Piri, Sally, and Syed Rory Malai Hassan. 2010. Envoys raise concern over non-payment of wages
to Indonesian workers. Brunei Times, 10 October.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 2013. Economic outlook for
Southeast Asia, China and India 2014: Beyond the middle-income trap. Paris: OECD.
Qatar, Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics. 2015. Analysis of the results of population,
housing and establishments census 2015. https://www.mdps.gov.qa/en/statistics/Statistical%
20Releases/General/Census/Outcome_Analysis_of_Census_of_Population_Housing_and_
Establishments_2015_en.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Quratul-Ain Bandial. 2011. Migrant workers’ complaints drop. Brunei Times, 20 August.
Quratul-Ain Bandial. 2012. Brunei on tier 2 of human trafficking list. Brunei Times, 22 June.
Quratul-Ain Bandial. 2014. Better justice for domestic workers. Brunei Times, 28 July.
Quratul-Ain Bandial. 2015. Greater protection awaits Indonesian workers in Brunei. Brunei Times,
8 February.
140 W. Asato
Research Office Legislative Council Secretariat. 2017. Foreign domestic helpers and evolving care
duties in Hong Kong. Research Brief Issue, No. 4. Hong Kong: Research Office Legislative
Council Secretariat.
Romero, Mary. 2000. Bursting the foundational myths of reproductive labour under capitalism: A
call for brave new families or brave new villages? American University Journal of Gender, Social
Policy and the Law 8 (1): 177–195.
Singapore, Department of Statistics. 2018a. Households. https://www.singstat.gov.sg/find-data/
search-by-theme/households/households/latest-data. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Singapore, Department of Statistics. 2018b. Resident households by household size, annual. https://
www.tablebuilder.singstat.gov.sg/publicfacing/createDataTable.action?refId=12305. Accessed
29 Dec 2018.
Singapore, Ministry of Manpower [MOM]. 2018. Foreign workforce numbers. https://www.mom.
gov.sg/documents-and-publications/foreign-workforce-numbers. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Sobrina Rosli. 2007. Bruneians opt for Vietnamese maids. Brunei Times, 29 January.
Syazwan Sadikin. 2014. Man fined $11,400 for failing to pay maid for more than 3 years. Brunei
Times, 21 November.
Taiwan, Ministry of Labour. 2016. Diao cha tong ji jie guo ti yao fen xi [Summary of survey statistics
on foreign worker management and implementation]. Taipei: Ministry of Labour, Taiwan. http://
statdb.mol.gov.tw/html/svy04/0442analyze.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Tayah, Marie-José, and Assaf Hadi. 2018. The future of domestic work in the coun-
tries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Abu Dhabi: Secretariat of the Abu Dhabi Dia-
logue. http://abudhabidialogue.org.ae/sites/default/files/document-library/2018_Future%20of%
20Domestic%20Work%20Study.pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Teo, Peter. 2017. Research brief—Migrant worker recruitment costs: Brunei. Singapore: Transient
Workers Count Too.
Thien, Rachel. 2012. 5,000 jobseekers cannot find work. Brunei Times, 29 October.
Thien, Rachel. 2015a. Caps on expat workers won’t hinder growth. Brunei Times, 10 March.
Thien, Rachel. 2015b. No mechanism to monitor Indonesian workers’ welfare. Brunei Times, 2
June.
Ubaidillah Masli. 2009. Brunei not doing enough to stop human trafficking. Brunei Times, 18 June.
Ubaidillah Masli. 2012. Gov’t to review business licences. Brunei Times, 18 March.
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP]. 2014.
Asian and Pacific conference on gender equality and women’s empowerment: Beijing +20
review—Brunei Darussalam country report. http://www.unescapsdd.org/files/images/Beijing20_
national_review_Brunei.pdf. Accessed 12 Dec 2018.
United Nations Population Division. 2008. Internal migrant stock (% of population). Trends in total
migrant stock: 2008 revision. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SM.POP.TOTL.ZS. Accessed
29 Dec 2018.
United Nations Statistics Division 1995. Compendium on human settlements. Statistics 1995:
Population, number of households, number of living quarters, average size of households,
average number of households and persons in living quarters: Country or area, urban-rural
areas, cities. https://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/housing/comp1995/TABLE06.
pdf. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
United States Department of State. 2009. 2009 Trafficking in persons report—Brunei. Washing-
ton, DC: United States Department of State. https://www.refworld.org/docid/4a4214cbc.html.
United States Department of State. 2011. 2011 Trafficking in persons report—Brunei. Washington,
DC: United States Department of State.
Vlieger, Antoinette. 2012. Domestic workers in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates: A socio-legal study
on conflicts. New Orleans: Quid Pro Books.
Walker, Peter. 2016. The Brunei Times suddenly closes after criticising Saudi Arabia’s Mecca visa
price-hike. The Independent, 8 November.
Waqiuddin Rajak. 2016. More employers agree to adopt standard minimum wage for Indonesians.
Brunei Times, 10 October.
World Economic Forum. 2017. The global gender gap report 2017. Geneva: World Economic
Forum.
World Health Organisation. 2018. Out-of-pocket expenditure (% of current health expenditure).
Global Health Expenditure Database. http://apps.who.int/nha/database. Accessed 29 Dec 2018.
Zaili Zafirah. 2015. Demand for Filipino helpers falls due to minimum wage. Brunei Times, 28
August.
Wako Asato is an associate professor at the Division of Transcultural Studies of Graduate School
of Letters, Kyoto University, Japan. He has conducted extensive research on ageing and care
migration in Asia and Europe, looking at the interaction of welfare regimes and citizenship
regimes; he also examines social integration in receiving societies. His major works in English
include the following: Welfare regime and labour migration policy for elderly care: New phase of
social development in Taiwan. Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work and Development 27 (2017);
and Incorporating foreign domestic workers as providers of family care: Case studies of Hong
Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. In Transformation of the intimate and the public in Asian moder-
nity, ed. Ochiai Emiko and Aoi Hosoya Leo (2014). He was presented with the Presidential Award
of the Philippines in 2014.
Chapter 8
A Space of Emancipation or a Space
of Insecurity? Gendered Dimensions
in Nepal Town, South Korea
Seonyoung Seo
Abstract The area near the Dongdaemun subway station in Seoul, South Korea,
took on the informal name Nepal Town in the late 1990s as Nepalese workers came
to be employed in small family-run garment factories located there and a Nepalese
community began to form. It is a place where low-income Nepalese workers, who are
often socially excluded, actively engage in diverse transnational community activities
as well as spatial practices. Although the number of female Nepalese workers in
South Korea has increased in recent years, Nepal Town is largely dominated by
male Nepalese workers who enjoy taking part in these activities during their days
off and holidays. I explore the complexities and implications of Nepal Town using
a multiscalar approach, based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted both there and
at Nepalese workers’ accommodation in remote agricultural areas of South Korea. I
argue for the ‘emancipatory potential’ of Nepal Town through the permanent presence
of Nepalese workers and their spatial practices. At the same time, Nepal Town can
be an intimidating place for Nepalese women. Drawing on the notion of ‘gendered
geographies of power’, the discussion aims to examine the gendered dimensions
of Nepal Town by analysing labour migration policies, the transnational Nepalese
community and the resilience of individual women in male-dominated spaces.
Keywords South Korea · Nepalese · Migration policy · Transnational

community · Gendered labour migration · Resilience
8.1 Introduction
In Asia, as international migration has grown rapidly since the 1980s and 1990s,
the movement of people across borders has increased. This has, in turn, contributed
to the reshaping of urban spaces in the fast-paced metropolitan cities of the region
Some parts of this chapter are drawn from Seo and Skelton (2017).
S. Seo (B)
Department of Sociology, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
e-mail: 98sonia@hanmail.net

144 S. Seo
(Wong and Rigg 2011). Often comprising a majority of migrants in a given area, low-
wage transnational migrant workers are also part of the experiences, contestations and
transformations of urban spaces. Within the large body of literature on international
migration within Asia, some attention is given to the negotiations and contestations
of migrant workers in their attempt to carve out or construct their own spaces in
cities. Focusing on the temporary occupation of public spaces by migrant workers
during their days off, studies have emphasised the agency of migrants in challenging
dominant social practices in Hong Kong (Constable 1997; Law 2002) and in Singa-
pore (Yeoh and Huang 1998; Wajihah 2015). Examinations of labour migration in
urban South Korea also demonstrate the ways in which low-wage migrant workers
temporarily or permanently form their own spaces, which have been described as
‘ethnic villages’ (Kim and Kang 2007), ‘ethnic enclaves’ (Seol 2011) and ‘weekend
enclaves’ (Jung 2010). These studies have significant implications for understanding
the relationships between migrants and urban spaces with regard to nation-states and
migration patterns. In particular, temporary labour migration regimes in Asia are
designed with an emphasis ‘on constraint, policing and exclusion rather than migra-
tion management’ (Hugo 2008: 38), which fundamentally impacts on the social and
spatial practices of migrants. Castles (2002) points out that regulatory migration
regimes and practices of exclusion and discrimination against migrants in receiv-
ing countries may lead to the development of enclave communities, which in turn
strengthen transnational links to home countries and foster a sense of solidarity among
the community. In this sense, the production of ‘ethnicised spaces’ by migrant com-
munities can be read as a form of survival and as a settlement strategy for low-wage
migrant workers as they try to create a sense of security in precarious working and liv-
ing conditions and experience social exclusion in receiving countries. Being social,
political and cultural subjects who are marginalised under temporary migration poli-
cies, their place-making practices in urban spaces imply ‘a subtle form of resistance’
(Elsheshtawy 2008: 985), with these spaces having ‘emancipatory potentials’.
Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise that migrant communities are not homo-
geneous but heterogeneous groups, with differing identity markers such as gender,
class, race, age and sexuality. Various subgroups of a national or ethnic community
may have different experiences in their place-making practices in the host countries.
Although such recognition calls for a closer examination of intragroup dynamics
within community, very little attention is paid to the dynamics of different groups
in studies on the relationship between migrants, communities and urban spaces in
Asia. In particular, as migration regimes and the gendered division in labour markets
create different outcomes in the everyday life of male and female migrants (McDow-
ell 2008), it is important to consider how the gendered process of migration affects
migrant communities and their place-making practices in urban locations.
This chapter addresses this gap in part by exploring the gendered dimensions in
the area of Dongdaemun in Seoul known as Nepal Town and within Nepalese migrant
communities in South Korea. Focusing on the South Korean state’s regulatory migra-
tion policies, Nepalese communities and practices of migrants, I interrogate how
gendered labour migration under the employment permit system (EPS) has led male
and female Nepalese migrants to have different experiences of Nepal Town and how
8 A Space of Emancipation or a Space of Insecurity? Gendered … 145
individual Nepalese women express their resilience in a male-dominated space. In

the first part, I introduce the context of the research by discussing gendered migra-
tion from Nepal to South Korea under the EPS and the expansion of Nepal Town. In
the second section, I examine the gendered dimensions of Nepal Town by analysing
the regulatory labour migration policies, gendered practices within the Nepalese
transnational community and the resilience of Nepalese women in male-dominated
spaces.
8.2 Gendered Labour Migration Under the Employment

Permit System and the Expansion of Nepal Town
In the early and mid-2000s, the South Korean government signed agreements with
several migrant-sending Asian countries, including Nepal, under the auspices of the
EPS. This was a new migration policy that aimed to manage the entire migration
process from predeparture to the return home through inter-governmental cooper-
ation. South Korea signed the agreement with Nepal in 2007, and since then the
number of Nepalese workers in the country has increased as well as the proportion
of women among these workers. As a result, gender segregation in the labour market
has intensified.
A Korean-language test has become the most important part of the application
process as it is compulsory for prospective migrants to pass it. Before the introduc-
tion of the EPS, migrants entered South Korea through private recruitment agencies
simply by paying huge amounts of money. The new migration process is now man-
aged by the Nepalese and South Korean governments and has lightened the economic
burden on migrants, but requires them to have greater foreign language skills and
a better educational background. Thus, educated Nepalese women, who were once
at a disadvantage under the old system due to a lack of financial support and social
networks in order to make their migration possible, now stand a good chance of
passing the Test of Proficiency in Korean (TOPIK), and this has made it easier for
Nepalese women to qualify for migration to South Korea.
Once prospective migrants pass the TOPIK, they go through a thorough medical
check-up and submit their EPS applications to the South Korean government office
in Nepal. Factory or farm employers in South Korea then select prospective migrants
and both parties agree to an initial three-year labour contract. In this selection process,
as employers in manufacturing industries prefer to employ men and farm owners in
the agricultural industry tend to select women, most Nepalese women employed
under the EPS work in different kinds of farms in remote agricultural regions while
most men work in industrial areas.
This gendered division of labour among Nepalese migrants is maintained by
the rules and regulations of the EPS. As the EPS does not allow migrant workers
to change jobs, they have no choice but to work in the same industry in South
Korea. Moreover, EPS workers are strongly restricted from changing jobs without the
146 S. Seo
permission of their employers, and even if they have unavoidable serious problems in
their workplaces, the number of changes is limited. Many migrants are thus unable
to avoid or negotiate conditions of exploitation, discrimination and human rights
violations in their workplaces. In particular, agricultural workers employed under
the EPS face harsher working conditions. According to Article 63 of the South
Korean Labour Standards Act, workers who are engaged in agricultural work and
the stockbreeding, animal husbandry and fishery industries are excluded from labour
law coverage regarding working hours, breaks and holidays. This article of ‘exclusion
from application’ allows unscrupulous employers to legally force migrant workers
employed in agriculture to work for long hours with low wages (NHRCK 2013). In
this gendered division of the migrant labour market, the position of Nepalese women
who work in the agricultural industry is therefore even more marginalised in terms
of poor working conditions, low earnings and irregular days off.
Alongside the increasing numbers of Nepalese women working in the agricul-
tural sector, one of the most notable changes that has occurred through the EPS is the
expansion of Nepal Town since the late 2000s. Nepal Town is located in Changshin-
dong, in the Jongno district of Seoul, and it usually refers to a number of small
lanes near the third exit of the Dongdaemun subway station where a dozen Nepalese
restaurants and shops are clustered (Chosun Ilbo 2007; Kyunghyang Shinmun 2008;
SBS News 2008b). However, Nepalese migrants tend to recognise it as a broader area
that extends from the Dongdaemun subway station to Naksan Park where Nepalese
workers live and work with other migrants and Koreans. According to the former
president of a Nepalese hometown association in South Korea, he moved to Dongdae-
mun in 1997 with his friends to work in small family-run sewing factories and they
were the first Nepalese group in this area (personal communication in Nepal, Jan-
uary 2013). Later, as a number of Nepalese restaurants and shops opened in the early
2000s, and more friends and relatives of Nepalese migrants moved to Dongdaemun,
this area became a gathering place for the community. After the EPS agreement
was signed in 2007, the number of Nepalese workers increased dramatically and
Nepal Town has emerged as the most popular hub for Nepalese living anywhere in
South Korea. They meet friends in restaurants and shops, and organise community
meetings, cultural events and sports games in Nepal Town during weekends and
holidays. Though the number of Nepalese women in South Korea has also increased
under the EPS, Nepal Town is monopolised by men, who enjoy activities available
there, while women are less visible in public spaces and community organisations.
Based on the experiences and narratives of Nepalese migrants, the following sec-
tions discuss these gendered dimensions in Nepal Town. The data were collected
through ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 2012 and 2013 in Nepal Town
and in agricultural areas in Gyeonggi-do and Chungcheongbuk-do. The fieldwork
comprised participant observation in Nepal Town, in-depth interviews with 39 infor-
mants and visual ethnography. All names used in this chapter are pseudonyms to
protect the privacy of the participants.
8.3 Gendered Dimensions in Nepal Town: State Migration

Policies, Transnational Community and Individual
Migrants
In interrogating the role of gender in the creation and transformation of transnational

social spaces, Mahler and Pessar (2001: 445) suggest a conceptual framework of
‘gendered geographies of power’. Among their three key dimensions of ‘geographic
scales’, ‘social locations’ and ‘power geometries’, I draw specifically on geographic
scales to capture how gender is embedded and functions simultaneously across dif-
ferent spatial and social scales from the state, to the community and individual. Such
multiscalar perspectives enable us to identify contradictions in gendered migration
processes in different domains and the complex ways they are interlinked (McIlwaine
2010).
8.3.1 State Migration Policies
The rules and regulations of the state are central in facilitating or constraining the
mobility of migrants and their relationships with the making of urban spaces (Collins
2012). Like other low-wage migrant workers who create their own clustering spaces
in large Asian cities, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, the place-making practices of
Nepalese workers in Seoul are closely tied to South Korean regulatory labour migra-
tion policies. As I have discussed elsewhere (Seo and Skelton 2017), the isolation
from friends and the precarious working and living conditions under the EPS led them
to gather in Nepal Town, and it has become a space with ‘emancipatory potential’ for
Nepalese workers against the spatial and social exclusion they experience. Before
the introduction of the EPS, the majority of migrants who entered South Korea on
short-term visas or through an industrial training programme ended up overstaying
their visas and became undocumented workers (see Lian, Chap. 9). Although those
migrants were more vulnerable to immigration crackdowns and labour violations
at workplaces due to their legal status, they were relatively free to change working
and living places. Though the EPS provides a legal channel for migrants to come to
South Korea with valid work visas and without the intervention of private recruit-
ment agencies, the mobilities of migrants in terms of their jobs and living places are
strictly controlled by the rules and regulations of the system. Before the EPS was put
into place, migrant workers tended to find jobs and accommodation together with
their friends after they arrived in the country. Workers entering the country under
the EPS are now placed in particular workplaces and accommodation is provided
according to their individual labour contracts. Once these migrants arrive in South
Korea and complete a three-day training course, their respective employers pick
them up and bring them to the company premises. Their dormitories are arranged
by the employers and are located on or close to work sites, in industrial districts or
remote agricultural areas. Consequently, migrant workers may often find themselves
148 S. Seo
in isolated places without any acquaintances. This proves to be particularly difficult

for these workers, especially in the early stage of migration, as without social net-
works of family, relatives or friends, their mobility is extremely limited, even to and
within public spaces. Thus, for these socially and spatially isolated workers, Nepal
Town is perceived as a landmark that is easier to reach than other places using public
transport and represents a space where they can meet Nepalese friends, foster new
connections with compatriots and reconnect with relatives during their days off and
holidays. Interestingly, the majority of Nepalese in South Korea refer to it not as
Nepal Town but as Dongdaemun.
Minu, a Nepalese man, came to South Korea through the EPS and worked for a
company in a remote area where he was clearly segregated from his fellow nationals.
Here he recounts the first day he visited Nepal Town:
In the beginning of my stay in Korea, I didn’t know how to get anywhere. Then a friend told
me ‘Come to Dongdaemun and wait in front of the [third exit].’ So, I went and just waited
for him there without any information about the place. Then, slowly I got to know there
are many Nepalese restaurants there and that Dongdaemun is a meeting point for Nepalese
people.
Like Minu, migrant workers under the EPS have less mobility in terms of working
and living spaces but their legal status enables them to freely engage in activities in
public places on their days off and holidays. Their free time is associated not with
familial, private or domestic places but with public spaces where workers may meet
friends or relatives, such as popular streets, shops, restaurants and bars. Minu speaks
about how he feels about Nepal Town and the friendships he has fostered with other
Nepalese men there:
I didn’t have any friends here from my own hometown and had only one childhood friend,
but he was living here illegally. I didn’t know about Dongdaemun at first, but after coming
here more, I made many friends. So now when I feel lonely, I come here with no specific
purpose and I will go to D or H restaurant to see my ‘brothers’. We would chat and joke.
It’s fun. I don’t feel lonely anymore. I feel like I have a real family, like how it was when
I was staying in Nepal. Now I think of Dongdaemun as my hometown. It’s a place to meet
and make friends.
As can be seen in Minu’s story, he feels at home in Nepal Town in the company
of fellow nationals. Interestingly, as South Korea’s labour migration policy seeks to
minimise migrants’ mobility and establish spatial and social isolation, many Nepalese
workers look for opportunities to establish connections, spend their leisure time and
maintain their autonomy (for example, by taking part in political activities) in Nepal
Town. The fact that Nepalese workers are subjected to alienation and exclusion from
the host society serves to strengthen community solidarity and transnational links to
home in Nepal Town. It is evident that Nepalese migrants have produced this space in
order to reduce feelings of isolation and to provide relief from oppressive workplace
conditions under the EPS.
Although these migrants are not directly challenging their treatment in their work-
places or the regulatory migration regime itself, I argue that their occupation and
appropriation of urban spaces can be read as the production of an emancipatory
space in three ways. First, their presence in public spaces implies that migrant work-
ers react against regulatory migration regimes. The EPS aims to discipline their
mobilities through strict rules and regulations that, as a consequence, often isolate
them from interactions with the public. But they make themselves visible as a col-
lective and interact with their compatriots as well as the Korean public in Nepal
Town. Second, as short-term migrants who are not granted long-term residence or
citizenship under the EPS, their continual presence and the establishment of Nepal
Town in urban spaces challenges the very notion of the ‘temporary’ in temporary
labour migration schemes. Drawing on the concept of ‘permanent temporariness’,
Collins (2012: 323) points out that the presence of short-term migrants can lead to
‘both passing and more long-term transformations of the urban built environment’.
Although individual migrants rarely settle permanently, their reterritorialisation of
physical space into an ethnicised space can threaten the established view that these
migrant populations are merely transitory. Third, such acts of claiming public urban
spaces by marginalised groups are expressions of their desire not to be alienated and
to affirm their identities, potentially holding onto the possibility of one day claiming
citizenship of the receiving country (Butcher and Velayutham 2009). The appropria-
tion of urban spaces by migrants is not just claiming access to public spaces but also
a transformation of their relationship with the city and the host country.
With regard to the question of gender, however, Nepal Town can be said to be
a male-dominated place. On weekends, the main street near the third exit of the
Dongdaemun subway station and the small lanes behind the street are crowded with
young Nepalese men, the majority of whom work for manufacturing companies in
industrial zones and in the metropolitan areas around Seoul. In contrast, it is difficult
for Nepalese women employed in rural areas to have enough time off to be able to
enjoy Nepal Town. Kobita, a Nepalese woman who had worked on a vegetable farm
for over a year under the EPS, had on average only two days off a month and she had
to work overtime whenever it was asked of her. As she was living in her employer’s
house, she considered it too difficult to turn down overtime or any other extra tasks
assigned to her. Despite being Buddhist, her bosses often brought her to their church
on Sundays. This is her account to me of how she felt about her days off:
I was so bored. There was nowhere to go. All I wanted to do was sleep. After the church
service, I came home immediately at 12 p.m. Then I went out for shopping and came home
straight after that. My employers would be unhappy with me if I returned after 7 p.m. I did
not go out much. Within my one year’s stay here, I only visited Seoul twice. It was during
Chuseok and Seolnal.1
According to an investigative report on the human rights of workers under the

EPS in the agricultural industry, the working conditions of migrant workers in agri-
culture can be harsh as it is low-paid intensive labour without a reasonable number
of days off. Migrant workers are afforded an average of 2.1 days off a month, while
workers who do not have days off account for 8.2% of the total migrant workforce
(NHRCK 2013). As noted in this report, due to the long hours spent on farms and the
1 Chuseok is a Korean mid-autumn festival held around the autumn equinox, while Seolnal is the
Korean New Year. Both are major holidays in South Korea.

150 S. Seo
geographical remoteness from cities, many Nepalese women working in agriculture

rarely have the chance to visit urban areas (such as Nepal Town) over the weekends.
They have to deal with harsher working and living conditions compared to migrant
workers in other industries (such as manufacturing and construction). Women’s lim-
ited opportunities are a result of gender segregation in the labour market under the
EPS. As a consequence, not many women are to be found in Nepal Town. As it is a
male-dominated space, when women do visit around the area they are often watched
and have (unwanted) attention paid to them by men, particularly Nepalese men.
Kobita was staying in the Nepalese women’s shelter located in Nepal Town at
the time of the interview because she had lost her job and was looking for another
workplace. She describes her feeling of being intimidated when in Nepal Town:
Korea is a developed country, but just like Nepal where I cannot go out by myself, I cannot
go out by myself here [in Nepal Town] too. We are not Koreans, but Nepalese.… I don’t go
out by myself. When I walk on the streets after 9 p.m. here, I am afraid of Nepali people
and drunken people. It is scary at night. They didn’t make any trouble for me though. I felt
scared just like I did in Nepal.
As Kobita’s experience and narration imply, though Nepal Town is a place where
she goes for holidays and gets help from the Nepalese support network (such as
staying at a shelter), as a woman she feels insecure because this ethnicised space has
the same social atmosphere as Nepal where women’s physical mobility is limited.
Kobita’s statement shows how the spatial domination by Nepalese men and gendered
practices and thoughts in Nepal Town intimidate and affect the feelings of security
of women, constraining their freedom. This appears more obviously in women’s
relations in Nepalese transnational communities as they tend to reaffirm gendered
relations and ideologies.
8.3.2 Transnational Community
As the main meeting point for Nepalese workers, Nepal Town is also a space for
community organisations and their activities. There are more than 60 small-sized
Nepalese community organisations in South Korea and they are based most com-
monly on the locality, language, caste, religion and/or political affiliation of their
members (Bhatta 2009), with most Nepalese workers belonging to one or more of
these associations. Although Nepalese migrant workers account for only 3–3.5% of
migrant workers in South Korea (Ministry of Justice, Korea Immigration Service
2014), they have significant visibility in terms of organised activities such as cultural
performances, support services and political engagements. Some of the more popular
and well-known Nepalese community organisations have their offices and shelters in
Nepal Town to provide help to their members. The leaders and active members are
always busy with a packed schedule during weekends, including activities such as
meetings, fundraising programmes, sports and cultural events. These activities are
usually held in Nepal Town or near Dongdaemun.
When asked why they joined these community organisations, most interviewees
responded that it was mainly because they could count on the help and support that
was shared among members. The increasing number of migrants who join these com-
munity organisations can be seen as a reflection of their social position in South Korea.
As low-wage workers, the insecurity they face in their workplaces and everyday lives
is the main reason why they chose to be involved in community organisations. As
the state does not provide much support, community organisations often step in as
a safety network to solve their day-to-day problems as well as larger issues, such as
dealing with accidents, unemployment and cases of sudden and unexpected deaths.
Lisa is an undocumented Nepalese woman who could be deported by immigra-
tion officials at any moment. She thinks there is very little choice for her but to stay
in Nepal Town as it is regarded as safer than other places. Since the community
organisations try to protect Nepalese workers regardless of their gender and legal
status, they function as guardians to help people like Lisa who find themselves in
vulnerable situations. On the other hand, Nepalese women may be easily stigmatised
and controlled by members of the community once they are involved in the organisa-
tions or if they live in Nepal Town. When asked how she feels being in Nepal Town,
Lisa answers: ‘Not too bad and not too good. I feel good because I can find many
Nepalese people there, but feel uncomfortable when I smoke there.’ Although Lisa
demonstrated that she is economically independent and free from the control of her
family and relatives in Nepal, she knows that her everyday life and behaviour are
being closely watched by other members of the community. Since Nepalese migrants
create new connections and maintain their old links with Nepal and other parts of the
world, all news regarding the community can be disseminated back to Nepal through
transnational links. The following interviews with Minu and Lisa show how differ-
ently men and women feel about and continue to maintain the culture of ‘gossip’ in
Nepal Town. Minu recounts his conversations with friends in Nepal Town:
In Dongdaemun, I can know all the news about what happened everywhere. Where in Korea
accidents occurred, who is coming from Nepal, what people are doing in Nepal. All news
stories are announced. It’s like hearing a radio station’s undated news reports. After I have
listened to it all, I live without thinking about it for one or two weeks [in my living place]
and then I come again to update [laughs]. On meeting a friend … we ask ‘Did you hear
the news?’ and again we ask to another friend ‘Did you hear that story?’ We get updated
automatically. Sometimes we hear even something we don’t want to know because people
keep talking and talking here.
Minu, who regularly visits Nepal Town, enjoys listening and spreading ‘news
updates’ connected to South Korea, Nepal and other parts of world. In contrast,
Lisa, who is an undocumented worker living in Nepal Town, does not like being the
subject of gossip. She seems to be concerned about ‘transnational gossip’ (Dreby
2009), through which certain stigmatisation about her could be spread, even back to
Nepal. She notes:
152 S. Seo
I didn’t get involved in any kind of community programmes and community festivals. I have
no interest in them. I only have time for myself. The rest of my time is given to my boyfriend
and we just hang around and take a rest. But I don’t want to be [involved in the communities].
Too many people, too much talk, too many things. That’s why I don’t like that. I’m fine to
be myself.
As Lisa has done, other Nepalese women who want to live a more independent life
without the ‘watching eyes’ of the community also tend to keep a distance from or be
only partly involved in community activities. Maya came into the country under the
EPS and lives in Seoul but only goes to Nepal Town on rare occasions. She articulates
the current gender-biased perspective and how Nepalese men often watch Nepalese
women’s bodies and monitor their behaviour:
In Korea, we can drink. Also, we can wear any kind of clothes. In Nepal, if you wear a skirt,
even if it’s not a mini-skirt, men say bad things about us bula bula [blah blah]. But here
[in Korea], nobody does. If you are in Dongdaemun, people do because there are so many
Nepalese men. I don’t know why they think that way. If we wear such clothes, they criticise
us and tell us we have changed after coming to Korea.
As Maya states, although migration provides opportunities for women to liberate

themselves from the constraints of patriarchal control in their home countries, gender
oppression still persists within transnational communities in diverse ways (Willis and
Yeoh 2000). Like Lisa and Maya, most Nepalese women I interviewed expressed feel-
ings of being empowered by increased financial independence after they migrated to
South Korea. However, gendered practices, beliefs and ideology continue to oppress
these women in Nepal Town as well as within their transnational communities.
8.3.3 Resilience of Nepalese Women
The gendered ideologies that persist in Nepalese communities reaffirm the unequal
relations that hinder women’s mobilities and freedom, even while overseas. However,
given their social standing as low-wage female migrants, the agency these Nepalese
women exert can also affect the gendered geographies of power (Mahler and Pessar
2001). Just as Lisa chose to live in Nepal Town but chose not to be involved in any
Nepalese communities, everyday actions of women migrants are compromised and
negotiated in different domains. A field note I wrote in August 2013 after joining an
event with some Nepalese women on a Saturday night shows their resilience with
regard to the male-dominated space of Nepal Town:
In Subetcha restaurant, there was a Nepalese dohori performance that female and male
singers sing together [sic]. The restaurant was filled with 50–60 Nepalese people, and they
were dancing. Most of them were men with only four or five women there. Julie asked me to
go to Dongdaemun station together to meet and return with her roommate. There were small
groups of Nepalese men at every corner in the lanes on the way to the station. We went to exit
1 instead of exit 3, but finally met her roommate. On the way to Subetcha restaurant, I noticed
Nepalese men on the street gazed at Julie’s roommate with sparkling eyes. Julie spoke to her
roommate cynically: ‘See these guys. They are very interested in you.’ Turning to me, Julie
told me: ‘There are so many bad guys here. Look at that guy near exit 3. He approached us
and was gazing us [sic] strangely, so that’s why I pulled your arms and brought you to exit
1. [Clenching her fist] I want to hit them whenever I see such bad guys.’
While Nepalese women often face physical intimidation in Nepal Town, being
gazed at by unknown men and the ‘watching eyes’ of community members, they use
individual strategies to cope and challenge the oppression. Their resilience within
this male-dominated space is not a form of visible resistance. However, Lisa decided
not to be involved in community activities in order to keep her private life safe.
Instead of entering Nepal Town near third exit of the Dongdaemun subway station
(which is considered the main gate to Nepal Town), Julie and her roommate decided
to choose their own route. These women, as marginalised migrants, are involved with
producing this ethnicised space in South Korea, but at the same time are a vulnerable
group within the Nepalese community. They still struggle to make their own space
within and beyond Nepal Town where they have their own freedom.
8.4 Conclusion
In recent decades, the dramatic increase in low-wage migrant workers in Asia has
had an impact on the transformation of urban spaces throughout the region. These
migrant workers (who are not socially recognised as permanent residents in the cities)
create their own clustered spaces, whether they are weekly enclaves or permanently
ethnicised spaces. Their place-making practices not only change city landscapes
but also challenge the dominant social perceptions for temporary migrants who are
often socially and spatially excluded from the mainstream host society. Although
some studies have implied that these urban practices of migrants are influenced by the
gendered processes of transnational migration (see Yeoh and Huang 1998), very little
attention is paid to gendered dimensions in the relationship between transnational
migrants and cities in Asia. Thus, to explore and recognise the heterogeneity of
the Nepalese migrant community, this chapter examined the gendered dimensions
in Nepal Town in relation to the regulatory labour migration policies in place, the
presence of a transnational community and the resilience of female migrants from a
multiscalar perspective. First, I argued that the expansion of Nepal Town since the
late 2000s is tied to the institutionalised regulatory migration regime in South Korea.
The area of Dongdaemun in Seoul known as Nepal Town implies the ‘emancipatory
potential’ of a space where socially and spatially excluded migrants actively engage
in diverse community activities as well as local and translocal spatial practices.
However, I juxtaposed such emancipatory aspects of Nepal Town with the ways in
which a number of Nepalese women view it as an intimidating and restrictive place.
Given the narratives of these women, I argue that the spatial domination of men and
gendered practices and ideologies in Nepal Town all serve to impinge on the security
154 S. Seo
of Nepalese women, constraining their freedom. At the same time, I shed some light
on their resilience and their subtle strategies to survive and challenge the oppression
they face as a vulnerable group within a migrant community.
References
Bhatta, Madhabi. 2009. 10,000 Nepalese diaspora emerging in Korea. Korea Times, 23 October.
Butcher, Melissa, and Selvaraj Velayutham. 2009. Dissent and cultural resistance in Asia’s cities.
Castles, Stephen. 2002. Migration and community formation under conditions of globalization.
Chosun Ilbo. 2007. A little corner of overseas in Seoul. 5 April. http://english.chosun.com/site/data/
html_dir/2007/04/05/2007040561010.html. Accessed 5 Dec 2018.
Collins, Francis Leo. 2012. Transnational mobilities and urban spatialities: Notes from the Asia-
Pacific. Progress in Human Geography 36 (3): 316–335.
Constable, Nicole. 1997. Maid to order in Hong Kong: Stories of Filipina Workers. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Dreby, Joanna. 2009. Gender and transnational gossip. Qualitative Sociology 32 (1): 33–52.
Elsheshtawy, Yasser. 2008. Transitory sites: Mapping Dubai’s ‘forgotten’ urban spaces. Interna-
tional Journal of Urban and Regional Research 32 (4): 968–988.
Hugo, Graeme. 2008. Demographic change and international labour mobility in Asia-
Pacific—Implications for business and regional economic integration: Synthesis. In Labour
mobility in the Asia-Pacific region: Dynamics, issues and a new APEC agenda, ed. Graeme
Hugo and Soogil Young, 1–62. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Jung, Hyun Joo. 2010. 대학로 “리틀마닐라” 읽기: 초국가적 공간의 성격 규명을위한 탐색 [Read-
ing ‘Little Manila’ along Deahangro: Exploring the conceptualisation of transnational spaces].
Journal of the Korean Association of Regional Geographers 16 (3): 295–314.
Kim, Eun Mee, and Jean S. Kang. 2007. Seoul as a global city with ethnic villages. Korea Journal
47 (4): 64–99.
Kyunghyang Shinmun. 2008. [르포]외국인 100만 명 시대 ‘서울의 이방인터전’ [(Reportage) The
era of living with one million of foreigners ‘Home of foreigners in Seoul’]. 19 February. http://
weekly.khan.co.kr/khnm.html?mode=view&code=115&art_id=16851. Accessed 5 Dec 2018.
Law, Lisa. 2002. Defying disappearance: Cosmopolitan public spaces in Hong Kong. Urban Studies
39 (9): 1625–1645.
Mahler, Sarah J., and Patricia R. Pessar. 2001. Gendered geographies of power: Analysing gender
across transnational spaces. Identities 7 (4): 441–459.
McDowell, Linda. 2008. Thinking through work: Complex inequalities, constructions of difference
and transnational migrants. Progress in Human Geography 32 (4): 491–507.
McIlwaine, Cathy. 2010. Migrant machismos: Exploring gender ideologies and practices among
Latin American migrants in London from a multi-scalar perspective. Gender, Place and Culture
17 (3): 281–300.
Ministry of Justice, Korea Immigration Service. 2014. 출입국ㆍ외국인정책 통계월보 [2014년
6월호] [Monthly statistics on immigration and immigration policy, June 2014]. http://www.moj.
go.kr/doc_html/attach/imm/f2014//20140718199503_4_1.hwp.files/Sections1.html. Accessed 7
Nov 2018.
National Human Rights Commission of Korea [NHRCK]. 2013. 2013 Survey report for human
rights of migrant workers in the agricultural and dairy industries. Seoul: NHRCK.
SBS News. 2008. [마켓&트렌드] “여기가 서울이야? 프랑스야?” [Markets and trends: ‘Is this
Seoul or France?’]. 24 January. http://news.sbs.co.kr/section_news/news_read.jsp?news_id=
N1000367333. Accessed 7 Nov 2018.
Seo, Seonyoung, and Tracey Skelton. 2017. Regulatory migration regimes and the production of
spaces: The case of Nepalese workers in South Korea. Geoforum 78: 159–168.
Seol, Dong-Hoon. 2011. Ethnic enclaves in Korean cities: Formation, residential patterns and com-
munal features. In Asian cities, migration labour and contested space, ed. Tai-Chee Wong and
Jonathan Rigg, 133–155. New York: Routledge.
Wajihah, Hamid. 2015. Feelings of home amongst Tamil migrant workers in Singapore’s Little
India. Pacific Affairs 88 (1): 5–25.
Willis, Katie, and Brenda S.A. Yeoh (eds.). 2000. Gender and migration. Northampton, MA: Edward
Elgar.
Wong, Tai-Chee, and Jonathan Rigg. 2011. Asian cities, migration labour and contested space.
Yeoh, Brenda S.A., and Shirlena Huang. 1998. Negotiating public space: Strategies and styles of
migrant female domestic workers in Singapore. Urban Studies 35 (3): 583–602.
Seonyoung Seo is a postdoctoral fellow at Yonsei University, South Korea. Her doctoral research
examines neoliberal labour migration regimes and changing class identities of migrants, with a
case study of Nepal–South Korea migrations. Her research interests include transnational labour
migration in and from Asia, identity, urban space, migrant community, labour geography and crit-
ical development studies. Her recent publications include the following: Temporalities of class in
Nepalese labour migration to South Korea. Current Sociology (2018).
Chapter 9
International Migration and the Politics
of Multiculturalism in Japan, South
Korea and Singapore
Lian Kwen Fee
Abstract International migration has become a permanent feature of the high-

performing economies of Asia. This is accompanied by increasing social and cultural
diversity, which has become challenging for governments to manage. Government
responses to multiculturalism are the result of both exogenous and endogenous influ-
ences. Although Japan and South Korea are essentially committed to monocultural-
ism, their policies on managing the influence of other ethnic groups differ. Singapore
is exceptional because the country has a long history of multiethnic communities. In
all three countries, domestic political circumstances are critical to the interpretation
and practice of multiculturalism.
Keywords Migration · Multiculturalism · Japan · South Korea · Singapore ·

Politics
9.1 Introduction
In the 1980s, multiculturalism was an important issue in the intellectual and politi-
cal discourses of Western liberal democracies in the wake of post-war immigration
of so-called guest workers to meet the demands of the economic boom up to the
early 1970s. This influx of migrant workers initially came from elsewhere in Europe,
especially Mediterranean societies, but they were later sourced from non-European
countries and regions, such as Turkey and North Africa. Many Western governments
have attempted to articulate policies on multiculturalism to reflect these social trans-
formations. However, rarely have such policies been unambiguous or successful.
After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Britain, France
and Germany retreated from promoting multiculturalism, taking a harder line towards
immigration and the presence of migrants, and they are now less inclined to accom-
modate their cultural, religious and ethnic differences. However, this does not mean
that multiculturalism is no longer an issue or of interest to receiving societies. The
Lian, K. F. (B)
Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei
e-mail: kwenfee.lian@ubd.edu.bn

158 Lian, K. F.
reality is that many societies around the world have become so ethnically and cultur-
ally diverse as a consequence of immigration—due to both historical colonialism and
contemporary globalisation—that the management of issues and differences relating
to inclusion and integration is a continuing challenge for governments.
As migrant workers entered their labour markets in large numbers in the 1980s and
1990s, the governments of the receiving countries in East Asia (namely Japan and
South Korea) were forced to grapple with the problems of increasing cultural diver-
sity in societies that have previously been relatively homogenous, with Singapore
being an exception. Like the liberal democracies of Western Europe in the 1980s,
the governments of East Asian and Southeast Asian societies have been confronted
with the question of multiculturalism more and more in recent years. In this chapter,
I sketch an analytical scaffold for examining multiculturalism and suggest how some
of the issues raised can be used to understand multiculturalism in three Asian coun-
tries—Japan, South Korea and Singapore—in addition to examining how they have
influenced policy development in response to increasingly diverse populations.
9.2 Politics of International Migration

and Multiculturalism
It is implicit, if not always made obvious, that the reasons behind and the methods
utilised by governments in adopting multiculturalism as a policy to manage ethnic
diversity are both fundamentally linked to what created the differences in cultures in
the first place. For post-war Western European countries and the rapidly developing
East Asian and Southeast Asian economies, the emergence of multiethnic societies
resulted from the migration of foreign labour in response to economic growth and
the receiving countries’ increasing dependence on migrant labour. When attempting
to understand how multiculturalism is conceived and translated into government
policies and practices, one should consider the politics of international migration, a
call that was made by Zolberg (1981) when he argued that the role of the state is
critical to the regulation of migration.
There have been various theoretical contributions on the role of the state in migra-
tion, particularly from the viewpoints of political economy. The classical realist
argument proposes that governments regulate international migration according to
national interests, and these may include economic considerations, such as popula-
tion and labour markets, as well as cultural ones, such as race and religion (Hollifield
1992: 569–572). On the other hand, classical liberalism favours free trade and foreign
investment in order to maximise efficiencies in economic growth and minimise the
dualities of national and international economies, thereby downplaying the impor-
tance of labour migration and the need for the state to regulate migration. Hollifield
(1992: 573–577) suggests that there is a better way to explain the politics of migration
by combining both the realist and liberal positions in a theory of hegemonic stability.
He proposes that in the post-war period of economic growth, it was in the interests
9 International Migration and the Politics of Multiculturalism … 159
of the state(s) to promote free trade and a liberal order, including the free movement
of labour. Referring to this phenomenon as ‘embedded liberalism’, Hollifield argues
that if international labour markets are allowed to operate freely the ‘collective good’
of an open economy will be promoted and will eventually benefit all participants.
Such a liberal order also involves the promotion and protection of individual rights in
order to facilitate the free movement of labour and has ramifications for how nation-
hood and citizenship are conceived and practised. These, in turn, have consequences
for migration and migrant communities.
Embedded liberalism, or what is now more commonly referred to as ‘liberal con-
straint’, is a theory that has been influential in explaining why states in a globalised
economy do not have complete autonomy in the restriction or admission of foreign
migrants. In a critical assessment of the theory, Boswell (2007: 79–87) identifies
and evaluates three sources of liberal constraint. The first source is from individual
and group struggles for equal rights or justice and is associated with civil society.
Boswell contends that where civil society is concerned, two pertinent issues should
be addressed: who is mobilised to fight for the expansion of rights and why? The
conventional explanation for this is domestic class conflict; however, this is compli-
cated when it involves the rights of ethnic minorities, hence the relevance of migrant
communities and the issue of multiculturalism. Class mobilisation may or may not
work to advance the cause of immigrants and other ethnic minorities.
The second source of constraint are domestic liberal institutions (such as bureau-
cracies), which are driven by the logic of administrative efficiency, and an inde-
pendent judiciary committed to applying legal principles, assuming that there is a
legitimate democratic system that recognises the separation of powers. A variation of
the institutional theory is that the state allows liberal institutions some autonomy in
order to support the conditions for the continued accumulation of capital. Capitalist
production and the accumulation of wealth necessarily favour liberal immigration
policies.
Third, in a globalised environment, common norms and conventions have become
even more significant in governing the behaviour of states in international relations.
Although Boswell argues that these norms reflect the systems and values of hege-
monic liberal states, human rights have universal appeal in providing for the norma-
tive treatment of both individuals and groups. Boswell continues by noting that states
may have an interest in building an international reputation in promoting humanitar-
ian values and human rights; however, this is likely to be less effective than if it is
domestically or nationally driven.
The theory of liberal constraint is a potentially valuable input to how we interpret
the politics of migration. However, it needs some refining, as Boswell (2007: 87–91)
proposes, specifically in unpacking the role and interests of the state in influencing and
controlling migration. First, the development of policies affecting labour migration
and migrant communities is mediated by ideas and institutions independent of the
state. Second, there should be a more nuanced understanding of the interests of the
state, as opposed to a reductionist interpretation. As an actor, the state has to maintain
its legitimacy. As Boswell argues, liberal welfare regimes must provide international
and internal security for their citizens, maintain the conditions for the accumulation
160 Lian, K. F.
of wealth, ensure that citizens are treated fairly by respecting their rights, and uphold
the rule of law and the separation of powers. Inevitably, these functional imperatives
lead to tension as the state strives to maintain a balance between the interests of the
parties involved.
Multiculturalism falls squarely within the politics of migration. In the first
instance, the term is shorthand for how states attempt to manage ethnic differences
and population diversity in the receiving societies created by the influx of foreign
workers and their families. In doing so, governments may sometimes have to con-
tend with the existence of indigenous or ethnic minorities that have previously gone
unrecognised. Multiculturalism fundamentally deals with issues of inclusion and
exclusion. Thus, multiculturalism is not just about policies but it is also about the
politics of acceptance and resistance, contended by groups, organisations, political
parties and individuals, both internally and externally. In terms of official policies,
multiculturalism can refer to two different forms. It can mean the promotion of minor-
ity rights and addressing issues of political, social and economic equality, including
the reform of public institutions to accommodate minority identities. Multicultural-
ism may also refer to the recognition of cultural diversity where the rights of ethnic
minorities to promote and maintain their language, customs and religion are respected
but the state does not make concerted efforts to either uphold or advance these rights.
The former is a more substantive form of multiculturalism while the latter is largely
symbolic.
To summarise, liberal constraint is relevant to how we make sense of the politics
of international migration and multiculturalism. Boswell’s contribution is to situate
liberal constraints in how the state acts to ensure its continuing power and legitimacy.
Before I compare the practices of multiculturalism in the countries selected, I reiterate
the point raised earlier on how ideas and institutions mediate and shape policies
and practices at the level of the state. The work of Schrover and Schinkel (2013:
1124–1125) on how we use language to frame our understanding of migration is
particularly relevant. Discourses, Schrover and Schinkel argue, rely on nodal points
(I refer to these as reference points) to provide stability and coherence to the way we
think and talk about an issue. In migration discourse, government leaders, politicians,
journalists and academics use the concepts of nation and integration implicitly or
explicitly to frame their discussions of how migrant populations should be treated.
These words become the reference points of how we understand and debate migrant
issues. It is difficult for scholars and policymakers to think outside of this frame
of reference when they deal with the problem of migration. So, as Schrover and
Schinkel state, discourse is constituted by social practice, the act of discussion and
informing the public which may directly or indirectly contribute to policymaking,
and which in turn defines discourse.
Another point regarding the discourse of migration is the fact that when we talk
about migration these days it is often in the context of being a problem that needs to be
overcome. This is problematisation—the process in which actors such as academics,
politicians, journalists, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and lawyers analyse
a situation, define it as a problem, expand on it and suggest a solution (Schrover and
Schinkel 2013: 1126–1290). Once problematised by institutional actors, this framing
becomes naturalised, and it is thus increasingly difficult to think or talk about the
issue outside such dominant points of reference. Academics problematise migration
in four ways: they see it as an economic (cost and benefit), humanitarian (how we
treat migrants), security (order and cohesion) and cultural (us versus them) issue.
In the rest of this chapter, I trace the trajectories along which multiculturalism
has evolved in Japan, South Korea and Singapore in relation to several of the issues
I have raised. In doing so, I offer explanations for how each of the governments
of these high-performing economies in East and Southeast Asia have had to make
sense of and manage the challenges of ethnic differences and cultural diversity that
arose due to economic globalisation and the demand for foreign labour. The influx
of foreign workers into Japan, South Korea and Singapore has been exacerbated
by fertility declines to below replacement levels and ageing which has increased
population dependency ratios (Kim and Oh 2011: 1564–1566). By the mid-1990s,
Japan was regarded as having an aged population, defined as 60 years and over, while
South Korea is rapidly ageing and expected to achieve a similar status by 2019 (Kim
2009a: 79), while Singapore is expected to be aged by 2020. One significant trend
arising from these changes in the social structure of East Asian and Southeast Asian
societies is the increase in international marriages, which comprised over 6% of total
marriages in Japan in 2006 declining to 3.25% in 2013 (Nippon 2015), and nearly
14% in Korea in 2005 falling to 7.4% in 2015 (Kim 2009a: 82; Korea Daily 2016).
9.2.1 Japan
In the late 1980s, Japan saw the entry of a substantial number of foreign work-
ers, attracted by the high appreciation of the yen and labour shortages caused by
an economic bubble (Tai 2009: 318–319). Despite an official policy of not accept-
ing unskilled foreign workers, migrants from Asia entered Japan (both legally and
illegally) to work in occupational sectors that the local population did not want to.
The question of whether the labour market should be liberalised involved politi-
cians, officials and business leaders. In 1990, a revision of the Immigration Control
and Refugee Recognition Act, the most important reform in immigration policy in
post-war Japan, came into effect. The amendment to the act together with other legis-
lation provided for the category of long-term residents in order to regularise the status
of an estimated 900,000 Koreans and some 200,000 Chinese (many from Taiwan)
who were former colonial subjects and their descendants (referred to as Zainichi)
and had been living in Japan over several generations (Kibe 2006: 416; Yamamoto
2012). The presence of the Korean population in Japan is particularly relevant to the
issue of multiculturalism as large numbers of Koreans flowed to and from Japanese
cities in the period between the annexation of Korea by Japan 1910 until the Second
World War (Chapman 2006: 479). Many Koreans were conscripted for the war by
the Japanese.
This act also extended long-term residence to the Nikkeijin diaspora, the descen-
dants of Japanese nationals who had emigrated to other regions and countries,
162 Lian, K. F.
particularly to Latin America and the Philippines. Apart from the provision for
long-term residence which applied to certain groups of immigrants, the revision of
the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act also changed the patterns of
entry of foreign workers into the country. Those who had Japanese ancestry could
enter through the ‘front door’, those who had managerial and technical expertise
could enter through ‘side doors’, primarily via a trainee internship programme,
while undocumented workers (low-skilled labour mainly from Asia) entered through
‘back doors’.
By the mid-1990s, the number of foreign workers who had entered the country
under the liberalised regime of a globalising economy exceeded that of the migrant
communities created by Japan’s colonial expansion (Tai 2009: 321). In response, the
government promoted naturalisation among the latter that resulted in a decline of the
number of migrants of colonial origin. Although Japanese nationality laws do not
explicitly specify that cultural assimilation is necessary for citizenship, the Ministry
of Justice in practice requires applicants for Japanese nationality to live Japanese
lifestyles. One condition required to qualify for citizenship is ‘upright conduct’; in
practice, this is often interpreted to mean cultural assimilation (Surak 2008: 564).
However, many Koreans avoided naturalisation because they refused to give up their
ethnic identity. Naturalisation was seen to be tantamount to assimilation, and it did
not necessarily mean the end of discrimination. Many found it was easier to hold
on their identity as a Zainichi Korean or Chinese living in Japan than attempting to
pass as Japanese through naturalisation (Htun 2012). One way the Zainichi Koreans
maintained their ethnic identity was to send their children to schools that offered a
Korean curriculum in order to avoid the pressures of assimilation found in main-
stream schooling; however, many of these schools were not fully recognised by the
government and their students were at a disadvantage when they applied for admis-
sion to universities. The Zainichi also adopted the idea of a dual identity, using terms
such as Korean-Japanese or Japanese of Korean background to describe themselves
(Chapman 2006: 487).
Japan has been widely represented in both political and academic discourses as
a culturally homogenous society. Its aboriginal population, the Ainu, have been dis-
criminated against and regarded as an invisible minority. In the post-war era under-
pinned by US-sponsored political liberalisation, the Ainu began an unremitting effort
to gain official recognition by drawing international attention to their plight and by
sending delegations to the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations
Working Group on Indigenous Populations (Kibe 2006: 415–416). The Japanese
government finally relented in 1997 and enacted the Law for the Promotion of the
Ainu Culture and for the Dissemination and Advocacy for the Traditions of the Ainu
and the Ainu Culture. The Ainu were finally given official recognition as a legitimate
ethnic minority, their culture was promoted, and the spread of national understand-
ing throughout the country of the Ainu and their heritage was endorsed. This was
a significant departure from the official view of Japanese ethnocultural uniformity,
though it made no acknowledgement of historical injustices, such as the suppression
of the Ainu people and the attempted erasure of their culture and traditions, or indige-
nous rights to land and resources. It would thus appear that the external sources of
the liberal constraint (participation in international organisations concerned with the

protection of human and minority rights) do have some influence, however limited,
on the Japanese government’s position on migration and minority issues. With the
rise of Japan as an economic power in the 1970s and its official joining of the Group of
Seven (G7) in 1975, the government became concerned about its international image
and status—especially after growing criticism from international organisations about
its failure to meet human rights responsibilities, for example its low intake of refugees
for many years (Surak 2008: 559). As a G7 member, Japan also subscribed to several
important international human rights conventions. In 1984, the government com-
mitted itself to ‘internationalisation’ (Chapman 2006: 491). Its ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1979 and the 1951 Refugees Convention
in 1981 has been attributed to the elimination of the nationality requirement in the
provision of social security benefits. As a result, Zainichi Koreans and other settled
aliens were eligible for national pensions and health insurance (Kibe 2006: 418).
The next landmark development in Japan’s immigration policy came in 2005 when
the Ministry of Justice introduced the Third Basic Plan for Immigration Control (Tai
2009: 326–327). The basic plan marked a significant departure from previous immi-
gration policies which were concerned only with the admission of migrants. The
basic plan turned its attention instead to providing a more welcoming environment
for long-term foreigners in acknowledgement of the need for an ‘integration’ policy.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications subsequently announced a
programme to promote tabunka kyosei, which translates as the recognition of cul-
tural differences of various nationalities and races or multicultural community build-
ing, to be undertaken by both municipal and prefectural governments. This scheme
was targeted at helping immigrants and foreign residents in several ways, including
improving communication through the use of multiple languages, support services
for housing, education, work, health and welfare, and policymaking through the col-
laboration of the government, businesses and NGOs. In promoting tabunka kyosei,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications highlighted the need to cre-
ate a society that valued diversity. In official discourse, the idiom was viewed with
ambivalence and misgiving given the belief that the use of the term ‘multicultural’
would undermine the dominant ideology of monoculturalism.
It is important to point out that ever since discussions began in the 1980s about the
challenges Japan faced in terms of a labour shortage and a rapidly ageing population,
pressure has mounted on the government from industries and organisations to alter
immigration laws to better facilitate the employment of foreign labour. By the mid-
2000s, large corporations together with pro-immigration NGOs lobbied members of
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party to introduce tabunka kyosei policies to support
the recruitment of foreign workers (personal communication with Naomi Hosoda,
2018).
As Tai (2009) argues, there are two ways of looking at this interpretation of
multiculturalism. One is to regard it as a genuine integration policy at the local level,
especially by civil society groups and NGOs, as well as local government officials to
a lesser extent. Here there is some tension between central and local government. The
164 Lian, K. F.
national government does not support the idea of naturalised citizens maintaining
their ethnic identity and culture, unlike some local governments and NGOs (Tai
2007). Due to security concerns, the Ministry of Justice is unwilling to cede authority
to local governments who appear to be promoting a generally more inclusive policy
towards migrants (Yamamoto 2012: 435). The other is simply a commitment to inter-
nationalisation by the central government. However one interprets multiculturalism,
it obviously does not involve integration because the public discourse shared by most
Japanese is that Japan is a monocultural society. At best, the discourse on multicul-
turalism initiated by the basic plan is to provide social support for foreign nationals
who are medium- to long-term residents in the country. It may even be viewed as a
token acknowledgement of cultural diversity, but it is certainly not a move to accept
the increasing presence of immigrants and the cultures they bring with them.
9.2.2 South Korea
Like Japan, the entry of migrant workers into South Korea gathered pace in the
late 1980s due to increasing economic globalisation. Against the historical back-
drop of the encroachment of Western powers and Japanese imperial ambitions in
the peninsula in the late nineteenth century, the post-war developmental state has
to be set in the context of the rise of Korean ethnic nationalism, with successive
governments seeking to promote a national identity based on a common bloodline
(Lee 2009: 364–367). The first Korean nationality law (Nationality Law No. 16 of
20 December 1948) embodied the practice of citizenship based on jus sanguinis;
only children whose fathers were ethnically Korean qualified to be nationals. In the
post-war years, state-led economic development was regarded as a national project
necessary for South Korea to catch up with the developed nations, particularly in
the years in which the Liberal Party and its successors—the Democratic Republican
Party, the Democratic Justice Party and the Grand National Party—led conserva-
tive governments. For these governments, Watson (2010: 337–338) asserts, South
Korean nationalism and democracy were fundamentally tied to neoliberalism, the
flow of migrant labour and capital on a global scale. The government’s espousal of
multicultural policies, Watson continues, was simply an expedient response to the
need to tap into the global migrant labour market in order to establish South Korea
as an industrial powerhouse.
The promotion of a South Korean identity that is both essentialist and exclusive,
which has dominated official discourse for over 60 years since the Korean War, has
been contested in recent years (Lee 2009: 364) as a consequence of two developments:
(1) the diversification of the South Korean population; and (2) the emergence of
a robust civil society in the wake of the democratisation process. Similar to the
Japanese government’s belated recognition of the Nikkeijin in the 1990s, the Korean
government began to adopt a relatively more liberal immigration policy towards the
large pool of ethnic Koreans who had left the country to reside in China because of
political and financial difficulties during the period of Japanese colonial rule over
Korea (Seol and Skrentny 2009: 152–154; Kong et al. 2010: 260–261). Referred
to as Joseonjok, it is estimated that they number around two million. For much
of the first decade of this century, overseas ethnic Koreans constituted the largest
source of immigrants to South Korea, totalling over 365,000 in 2007 (Kong et al.
2010: 261). Despite their common ethnic origins, Joseonjok were often relegated
to a subaltern status and were brought into South Korea under the guise of the
discriminatory industrial technical training programme; they provided much-needed
and cheap low-skilled labour for local enterprises and were frequently the victims
of human rights violations. Originally, the policies that were in place only allowed
for Joseonjok to obtain work visas for short-term and low-skilled work but now
they allow for long-term visas. However, many Joseonjok still feel ostracised and
stigmatised.
The other source of cultural diversity stemmed from the increasing frequency
of international marriages. This began in the 1990s when many South Korean men
working in the agricultural and fishing sectors were unable to find local women as
partners as many had begun to shun rural lifestyles and moved to urban areas. The
greatest number of foreign brides came from China, followed by Vietnam and the
Philippines. Estimates of cross-cultural marriages in the period from 2005 to 2009
vary between 10 and 14% of all marriages (Kim 2009a; Lee 2009; Kong et al. 2010;
Kim 2012; Ahn 2013). The popularity of international marriages soon spread to urban
areas as commercial matchmaking agencies were set up. In 2007, more than 90%
of naturalised immigrants were international marriage immigrants, with the Chinese
still constituting the overwhelming majority (Kong et al. 2010: 263). It is projected
that the children of mixed marriages will have a significant impact on South Korean
society. One prediction is that nearly a third of all children born in 2020 will be of
mixed Korean and Asian parentage (Kim 2009a: 85).
No discussion of the politics of multiculturalism is complete without some refer-
ence to the democratisation process and the growth of civil society in South Korea.
I draw on Kim Sunhyuk’s (1998) discussion of the development of civil society in
South Korean politics. Until the late 1980s, the country was ruled by military and
authoritarian regimes. Following the violent suppression of the pro-democracy move-
ment in 1980, in which thousands of public officials, professors, teachers, pastors,
journalists and students were arrested on various charges, a broad alliance of labour-
ers and labour unions, students, youth organisations and religious leaders emerged in
the next few years. As this civil society movement pushed for constitutional reform
and democratisation through mass rallies and widespread signature campaigns, the
few opposition parties that had emerged were given support. In 1987, direct presi-
dential elections were adopted as the authoritarian regime was forced to concede to
demands by civil society groups and the opposition party. That year marked a turn-
ing point for the transition to democracy. Over the next 10 years, the pro-democracy
movement and the mobilisation of civil society ebbed and flowed depending on
whether an authoritarian or liberal administration was in power. By the mid-1990s,
as the strength of civil society appeared to be receding, political activism was resur-
rected in response to both the incumbent president’s refusal to proceed with charges
against two former presidents (who were found culpable of corruption, treason and
abuse of power) and to the railroading of labour reforms which would have weakened
unions and led to mass layoffs. Although civil society groups have mainly focused on
166 Lian, K. F.
political and economic reforms, the movement has expanded to embrace other issues
over the years. These include environmentalism, human rights, the reform of the large
industrial conglomerates and opposition to state-sponsored mega projects. Another
notable interest of civil society is in foreign policy and international relations as a
consequence of an increasing awareness of how they affect the daily lives of ordinary
citizens, such as the location of US military bases. Kim Sunhyuk (1998) concludes
that the democratisation of South Korean society was consolidated in the late 1990s
by civil society and mass mobilisation in a society that reacts readily to perceived
injustices, whether political, economic or social.
It is against these broader political processes and the development of civil society
that the public discourse on migration and multiculturalism was conducted and even-
tually translated into government policies in South Korea. In a move similar to the
Japanese trainee internship programme, in 1991 the Korean government introduced
its industrial technical training programme to bring in low-skilled workers to satisfy
the demands of the local labour market. As noted earlier, the programme encouraged
the abuse and victimisation of workers, both Joseonjok and foreign workers, with
no protection under the country’s labour laws; many left to join the undocumented
workforce which subsequently swelled over the years (Seol and Skrentny 2009:
154). The human rights violations associated with the scheme (including withheld
wages, abuse and discrimination) were taken up by NGOs and the media, which put
significant pressure on the government to address the issue. In 1995, a public demon-
stration initiated by 13 Nepalese workers alerted Koreans to the plight of migrant
workers and in turn spawned the growth of migrant advocacy organisations in the
major cities (Kim 2009b: 683). Several of these, such as the Joint Committee of
Migrant Workers in Korea, the Ansan Migrant Workers’ Centre and the Network
for Migrants’ Rights, have influential roles in migrant advocacy and enjoy official
recognition. However, these groups are only politically significant because they are
led by Korean activists who often take a paternalistic attitude towards migrants. It
could be said that they are actually fighting a proxy battle against the government
and employers (Kim 2012: 107–108), with migrant workers being relegated to a
more secondary role. In this manner, migrant advocacy is largely only prioritised if
it is subsumed within the context of a fledgling democracy and public anxiety over
the possible return of authoritarian rule. As Chung (2010: 680) comments, ‘human
rights activists, labour unions and citizen groups that had played central roles in the
earlier democratization movement applied tools used to incorporate labour, women
and the poor within Korean society to make claims for migrant workers’ rights’.
The public discourse on immigration in South Korea may be further examined by
observing how the mass media have represented the situation of migrant workers.
In an analysis of how perceptions of immigrants are reflected in the press, Park
(2014: 1574–1581) points out that both migrant workers and marriage migrants have
been widely portrayed as the victims of exploitation, violence and human rights
violations since the early 2000s. The prevailing discourse on the victimisation of
foreigners highlighted by the local media can be explained by the political activism
of the labour movement and its involvement in the struggle for democratisation. The
matter thus attracts relatively more attention than in the other receiving countries of
Asia with a large number of migrant workers. Furthermore, it was not so long ago,
in the 1970s and 1980s, that South Korea was a sending country and had similar
experiences of its nationals suffering hardships, exploitation and discrimination as
foreign labour overseas.
The discourse of multiculturalism has been influenced by the press and the gov-
ernment. It was not until the mid-2000s, during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration,
that multiculturalism was given significant attention by the media in acknowledging
the increasing diversity of South Korean society. In 2006, the Ministry of Gender
Equality and Family announced plans for promoting the social integration of both
‘mixed-race and immigrants’ and ‘female marriage migrants and their family’ (Ahn
2013: 32). In April of same year, the government also introduced a plan to promote
and further develop the social integration of non-ethnic Korean immigrants and also
biracial people (Ahn 2018: 47).
Additionally, the Support for Multicultural Families Act was introduced in 2008
for the benefit of foreigners married to South Koreans. The act is aimed at improv-
ing ‘the quality of life of multicultural family members’ through the prevention of
social discrimination and prejudice via support services such as classes in Korean
culture and language, parenting education, health care and education for children of
multicultural families. Multiculturalism was now established by the government as
the official rhetoric, but its meaning needs unpacking.
In Lee Hye-Kyung’s (2008: 120) view, the plan marked a shift of focus away
from immigration policies to population policies. It also represented a change in
thinking about marriage migrants as they were now seen as foreigners who were to
be integrated into the host society as members of South Korean families. At another
level, the shift may also be interpreted as potentially ignoring some of the bigger
issues regarding migrant workers and instead prioritising the multicultural family
(Ahn 2013: 34–37). As Ahn Ji-Hyun explains, the discourse around migrant workers
had always been framed in terms of labour and labour rights. By the mid-2000s,
the term ‘multicultural’ began appearing in government policy documents as well
as the mainstream media. It was acknowledged that South Korea was no longer a
monocultural society and, although references to multiculturalism included migrant
workers, the focus was squarely on the formation and integration of the multicultural
family. State-sponsored multiculturalism targets female marriage migrants from
Southeast Asian countries, and the government is more likely to fund activities that
assist marriage migrants and their South Korean families rather than migrant workers
(Kim 2012: 108). Clearly, then, the so-called discursive tilt towards multiculturalism
and the policies introduced by the government are regarded as a form of assimilation
(Lee 2008: 120; Ahn 2013: 32).
9.2.3 Singapore
Multiculturalism in Singapore has its origins in the expansion of colonial capital-

ism in Southeast Asia since the eighteenth century. The Dutch, British and French
168 Lian, K. F.
established their presence in the region in search of primary commodities to drive

their industrial economies, and they soon found themselves competing with each
other in establishing territorial influence, particularly in the nineteenth century. Both
the British and Dutch colonial powers in the region kept their borders open (Kaur
2009: 277) and migrant workers from southern China and southern India soon flooded
the colonies. In Malaya, most of these workers arrived as indentured labour. Those
from China were recruited by European agencies or by Chinese business interests
through kinship networks; Indian migrants were sponsored by plantation houses or
by the colonial administration for public works. A small minority of migrant workers
arrived as free labour in search of better economic prospects. Throughout its rule, the
British colonial administration adopted a relatively liberal policy towards immigra-
tion in order to meet labour shortages. Migrant labour, ranging from manual labour
to merchants and clerks, was desperately needed to develop the local economy.
Singapore was founded as a free port and a British colony in 1819. It was to be
a staging post for British trade routes between India and Canton and also to weaken
the strong control the Dutch held over trade throughout the Indonesian archipelago.
Almost immediately Singapore attracted immigrants and settlers from South Asia,
the Malay and Indonesian archipelagos and southern China, as well as Arabs, Euro-
peans and Eurasians who had an influential role in the mercantile and administrative
communities. Soon the British found themselves administering the port of Singapore
on the basis of ethnic enclaves that were assigned to the Chinese, Indians, Malays
and Europeans. By the late nineteenth century, the municipal population was 74%
Chinese, 14% Malay or Javanese and 8% Indian, with the rest mainly being Eurasian
and European (Yeoh 1996: 38). Remarkably, the ethnic composition of the population
has remained largely unchanged, even up to the present.
What is even more remarkable about Singapore is that its development as a
sovereign nation was not by choice but a consequence of its expulsion in 1965
from Malaysia after a short-lived two-year period, despite being an integral part of
colonial Malaya. In stark contrast to Japan and South Korea, where monoculturalism
was the foundation of nationhood, multiculturalism was both critical to Singapore’s
national origins and central to its national identity. The political circumstances that
led to this are worth noting.
By the end of the Second World War, Britain had committed itself to withdrawing
from the territories it had colonised. In devolving independence to its colonies, it was
mindful of doing so by ensuring that the incoming government had popular support
while not jeopardising British commercial and strategic interests in the period of
decolonisation. The British were also aware that the colonial societies it had created
were plural societies in that they were very ethnically diverse, often separate and that
there was little to hold them together, despite the critical need for unity in a newly
independent state. The plan for British Malaya was to establish a Malayan Union
that would have provided equal rights and citizenship to all the ethnic communities
present, namely the indigenous Malays and immigrant Chinese and Indians, and
relegated the political powers of the traditional Malay leaders who had exercised
a great deal of influence as sultanates. The proposal, mooted after the end of the
Second World War, provoked widespread protests from the Malays who believed
that their status as an indigenous community would be diminished as immigrant

communities gained in political and economic influence (Lian 2016: 13) and the
power and sovereignty of Malay rulers were diminished. In short, the Malays wanted
a post-independence Malaya to retain a monocultural identity, and thus in 1948 the
Malayan Union was replaced by the Federation of Malaya and Malay rulers were
restored to power.
Although Singapore was not incorporated in the formation of the Malayan Union
in 1946, the British did not rule out its inclusion. An expanded Malaysia was formed
in 1963 that comprised the existing Federation of Malaya along with North Borneo
(now Sabah), Sarawak and Singapore. The significance of the proposal for a Malayan
Union, however, precipitated a political battle that was to last for the next 20 years. A
Malay ethnonationalist movement provided the impetus for Malay leaders to entrench
their claim to political dominance while non-Malay communities grew increasingly
anxious over the direction that the new nation was taking. It was in the shadow
of peninsular politics that the political development of Singapore unfolded. In a
society consisting of migrants with a Chinese majority, English-educated Anglophile
leaders struggled to carve out a political niche that could balance the aspirations of
a culturally diverse immigrant population against the indigenous claims to a more
privileged status (Lian 2016: 14). The People’s Action Party, which has governed the
island since 1959, found the recipe in multiculturalism. Its determination to establish
political recognition of ethnic and cultural diversity as the raison d’être for a newly
independent Malaysia resulted in its expulsion in 1965, after a period of tense race
relations, unrest and riots.
Since then, multiculturalism has been enshrined as Singapore’s national ideology.
What is remarkable about Singapore is that it is the first country in the world to
officially espouse multiculturalism, even though countries like the United States,
Canada and Australia have had a far longer history of immigration. The reason
is that multiculturalism is both deeply embedded in Singapore’s political origins
and fundamental to its birth as a nation. In the early years of its independence, the
promotion of multiculturalism had its detractors from radical groups within the Malay
minority and Chinese majority, but by the 1980s any resistance had largely been
overcome as Singapore continued to prosper on a global scale. Most Singaporeans
have benefited from the growing economy and rising standards of living over the
years. The Singaporean government has skilfully represented multiculturalism as a
practice of inclusion, compatible with a society that thrives on merit and competition.
As mentioned earlier, multiculturalism may refer to either the symbolic
recognition of ethnic diversity that is often showcased in the public recognition
and celebration of the cultural practices of ethnic communities or to the protection
and maintenance of the rights of ethnic minorities. In Singapore, the practice of
multiculturalism encompasses both and is institutionalised. First, a bilingual policy
dictates that along with English (the preferred medium of educational instruction),
it is mandatory for all students to learn their mother tongues with Mandarin,
Malay and Tamil being offered as well as other selected languages. Second, the
practice of parliamentary democracy has been adapted through a system of group
representation constituencies; each constituency group must have a minimum of
170 Lian, K. F.
one candidate that is of a minority race to ensure that members of parliament are
representative of the entire population, especially with constituencies that have
significant multiethnic communities. The largely ceremonial office of the president
of the Republic is nominated and elected by rotation between the founding ‘races’
of Singapore. In local government, it is a requirement that ethnic minorities are
represented in town councils and the management of community centres. Third,
most Singaporeans live in public housing subsidised by the government. The ethnic
integration policy, implemented in 1989, is in place to promote racial integration via
the allocation of apartments following designated racial proportions, ensuring that
such neighbourhoods remain multiethnic. Fourth, the practice of minority religions,
namely Islam and Hinduism, is supported by the state through the Islamic Religious
Council of Singapore and the Hindu Endowments Board which are responsible
for managing and administrating mosques and temples, organising major religious
festivals and advising the government on religious matters. Lastly, the Singaporean
government also sponsors ethnic-based self-help organisations that provide social
support to citizens who belong to minority groups.
Since the colonial era, Singapore has prospered because it adopted a free market
policy and a liberal regime towards immigration. On achieving full independence
after separation from Malaysia in 1965, the government embarked on the promotion
of labour-intensive export-orientated manufacturing to drive its economy. Its suc-
cess in the 1970s accelerated the demand for both low-skilled and skilled labour,
which it readily met by drawing on the large pool of Malaysians from across the
Causeway. The historical ties between and cultural compatibility of the two soci-
eties provided minimal challenges to the integration of a migrant population, which
simply reflected the multicultural character of its citizenry, namely Chinese, Malays,
Indians and others. By the 1980s, it sourced labour from non-traditional countries
like Thailand, Bangladesh and Myanmar to meet growing demand, especially from
the construction industry, while domestic workers were recruited from Indonesia and
the Philippines. Economic recession in the mid-1980s forced planners to restructure
its economy towards regionalisation, by focusing on value-added manufacturing and
the financial and service sectors (Hui 1997: 114). Since the 1990s, and in response
to the need for highly skilled labour and professionals, migrants from East to South
Asia were encouraged to work and even to settle in Singapore. Chinese from Hong
Kong and China were particularly sought after; so were highly qualified South Asian
information technology workers, engineers, scientists and financial personnel (Hui
1997: 116–117). Despite the liberalisation of immigration as a consequence of the
regionalisation and internationalisation of its economy, integration and settlement are
only directed at those migrants from a professional and ‘talent’ background—who
are able to contribute to the development of knowledge-based industries. Low-skilled
workers, especially those from South and Southeast Asia, continue to be treated as
temporary labour.
The practice of a liberal immigration regime in Singapore from the beginning
has contributed to an ethnically plural society. Because of its geographical location
and its dependence on human resources to drive its economy, it has been able to
tap into cheap labour from within the region as and when required. Although its
migration policies are fundamentally influenced by economic imperatives, it does
not have to contend with the political and cultural barriers that Japan and South Korea
have (as monocultural societies) to open up immigration. Such immigration creates
ethnic diversity but it does not pose, as far as the government is concerned, serious
challenges to its integrity as a nation. Out of a total population of 5.64 million, there
are 1.64 million non-residents who are in Singapore for work, study or family reasons
(Singapore Department of Statistics 2018). They are there on a temporary basis, and
the overwhelming majority will eventually return to their countries of origin. The
influx of migrants from China and South Asia in recent years has resulted in some
resentment from the local population who, despite having similar ethnic origins,
regard them as a threat to the Singaporean way of life (Lian 2016: 28). However,
as a senior cabinet minister expressed confidently, as long as 65% of the population
are born and bred Singaporeans, the existing multicultural foundation of society will
remain intact.
9.3 Conclusion
In an international neoliberal order, it is a truism to say that no state can act on its
own; neither will it surrender readily to a free market for capital and labour. Most
governments strive to mediate the demands of an international economy and balance
them against what they perceive to be the interests of their citizens. Nowhere is this
more evident than when they have to deal with international migration driven by the
needs of a global economy. It is a challenge that the high-performing economies of
Japan, South Korea and Singapore have had to face since the late 1980s.
As societies become more socially and culturally diverse as a consequence of
immigration, states have struggled to enact policies that can overcome the challenges
posed by this increasing diversity. Castles (1995) identifies three major responses of
nation-states to immigration and ethnic diversity. Differential exclusion refers to a
situation in which foreign immigrants are incorporated in certain areas (such as the
labour market) but have no access to welfare support and are not granted the full
rights of citizens such as political participation. The rationale is that migrants are
regarded as temporary. The assimilationist option requires immigrants to surrender
their cultural identity and become indistinguishable from the majority population
by adopting their cultural norms and practices. Although assimilationist policies
have generally been abandoned to be replaced by what is currently described as
‘integration’, which recognises that the process is a gradual one, the ultimate goal
is still that foreigners should be absorbed into the dominant culture. The pluralist
model is committed to granting equal rights to immigrants, especially the retention
and maintenance of their cultural identities. This option requires the state to intervene
to effect change through policies on multiculturalism. Assimilationist policies are
exclusionary while the pluralist model is far more inclusionary.
Earlier I argued that multiculturalism should be examined within the politics of
international migration, and, in this respect, the theory of liberal constraint is rel-
evant to making sense of multiculturalism in Japan, South Korea and Singapore.
172 Lian, K. F.
Its efficacy needs to be qualified, however. To reiterate, the influence of liberal con-
straint is attributed to civil society, domestic liberal institutions and international
norms. In the case of Japan, the pressure to adopt multiculturalism has its origins
in its rise as an economic power in the 1970s and its induction into membership of
G7 countries. Over the years, Japan came under increasing criticism for its failure
to fulfil its international obligations in a neoliberal economic order; for example, the
promotion of humanitarian values and human rights through the intake of refugees.
Although it had ratified several international conventions on human rights in the
1980s, it was not until the late 1990s that it recognised its aboriginal population as
a legitimate ethnic minority. And it was not until 2005—even though immigrants
had been entering Japan in significant numbers albeit unofficially since the late
1980s—that the government reluctantly acknowledged their presence by introduc-
ing programmes targeted at providing welfare for immigrants. It also extended its
nationality law in the 1990s to allow for its former colonial subjects to be natu-
ralised, though in practice this was conditional upon their cultural assimilation. Its
support for multiculturalism is largely at a surface level in keeping with its image
to internationalise, rather than embodying substantive changes. The government’s
commitment to monoculturalism has never wavered, and it enjoys popular support
of the majority of the country. International norms have had some influence in the
recognition of multiculturalism in Japan but their impact is limited because such
norms are externally generated while industrial and business interests have played
a more significant role in persuading the government to adopt some form of mul-
ticulturalism. However, there is no political will within Japanese society to adopt
substantive multicultural policies and practices.
It was around the early to mid-2000s that the South Korean government accepted
that the country was no longer a monocultural society. In the early 2000s, the
widespread exploitation of migrant workers and marriage migrants received pub-
lic attention and featured in the local mass media, in contrast to other receiv-
ing countries in Asia where issues of the mistreatment of foreign immigrants
do not attract much interest from local society. In South Korea, the advocacy
of migrant workers’ rights is particularly strong in urban areas and cities, with
local NGOs playing a significant role. This is because migrant advocacy is
closely linked to the political activism of the strong labour movement. Given
the country’s history of authoritarian and military rule up to the 1980s and pre-
vious violations of human rights, the political mobilisation of South Koreans,
including workers, students and religious activists, has given rise to a civil soci-
ety that has grown in strength over the years. In the struggle for democracy,
the citizens’ movement against political authoritarianism and the violations of
human rights has been given much legitimacy when it is linked to international
organisations. Hence, it is in the interest of the pro-democracy movement to work
closely with civil society groups to internationalise their struggle. For this reason,
migrant worker groups have benefited from this alliance. Thus, the continuing pres-
ence of a strong civil society facilitated by democratisation has strengthened the
efficacy of international norms and standards in influencing the acceptance of multi-
culturalism in the country, at least in public discourse and the government’s rhetoric.
However, if we look closely at the policies introduced to support international mar-

riages and provide assistance and benefits for so-called multicultural families, they
are designed to facilitate the integration of immigrants into a monocultural soci-
ety rather than the adoption of the pluralist model, which is the gold standard for
multiculturalism.
The efficacy of the liberal constraint theory then has to be qualified. While it has
contributed to the shift towards a more accommodative approach to the presence of
migrant communities in both Japan and South Korea, its influence has been indirect.
As long as the liberal constraint is externally driven, it will only have a limited
influence on the incorporation of immigrants into the social fabric of Japanese and
South Korean societies. Where it is motivated by domestic political interests, progress
towards an inclusive multicultural society may be forthcoming. In this respect, South
Korea is more advanced than Japan in expanding the rights of foreign residents
and legal immigrants. As Chung (2010: 684) argues, South Korea’s approach is to
focus on providing support to and protection of foreigners through centralised top-
down policies and programmes, while Japan’s policies are more directed towards
supporting the participation of foreign residents in the local community through
decentralised coordination between local governments, civil society and foreigners.
However, both countries’ policies are a long way from truly accepting the presence
of ethnic minorities in a relatively homogenous society and recognising that at some
time in future the states may evolve in a more multicultural direction.
In stark contrast to Japan and South Korea, Singapore comes closest to meeting
the pluralist model of protecting the rights of ethnic minorities and supporting their
cultural identities by espousing unequivocally the ideology of multiculturalism and
establishing norms of conduct expected of a multicultural society. Singapore has also
institutionalised multicultural practices in education, political participation, religious
practices and social housing. Indeed, the country’s multicultural practices broadly
embrace social inclusion through direct interventions by the state. It has been able
to do this effectively because the political origins and foundation of the country are
based on a long history of multiculturalism.
References
Anh Ji-Hyun. 2013. Global migration and the racial project in transition: Institutionalising racial
difference through the discourse of multiculturalism in South Korea. Journal of Multicultural
Discourses 8 (1): 29–47.
Anh Ji-Hyun. 2018. The new face of Korea. In Mixed-race politics and neoliberal multiculturalism
in South Korean media, ed. Ahn Ji-Hyun, 35–72. Cham: Springer.
Boswell, Christina. 2007. Theorising migration policy: Is there a third way? International Migration
Review 41 (1): 75–100.
Castles, Stephen. 1995. How nation-states respond to immigration and ethnic diversity. Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies 21 (3): 293–308.
Chapman, David. 2006. Discourses of multicultural coexistence (tabunka kyōsei) and the ‘old-
comer’ Korean residents of Japan. Asian Ethnicity 7 (1): 479–497.
Chung, Erin Aeran. 2010. Workers or residents? Diverging patterns of immigrant incorporation in
Korea and Japan. Pacific Affairs 83 (4): 675–696.
174 Lian, K. F.
Hollifield, James F. 1992. Migration and international relations: Cooperation and control in the
European community. International Migration Review 26 (2): 568–595.
Htun Tin Tin. 2012. Social identities of minority others in Japan: Listening to the narratives of Ainu,
Buraku and Zainichi Koreans. Japan Forum 24 (1): 1–22.
Hui, Weng Tat. 1997. Regionalization, economic restructuring and labour migration in Singapore.
International Migration 35 (1): 109–130.
Kaur, Amarjit. 2009. Labour crossings in Southeast Asia: Linking historical and contemporary
labour migration. New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 11 (1): 276–303.
Kibe, Takashi. 2006. Differentiated citizenship and ethnocultural groups: A Japanese case. Citizen-
ship Studies 10 (4): 413–430.
Kim, Andrew Eungi. 2009a. Global migration and South Korea: Foreign workers, foreign brides
and the making of a multicultural society. Ethnic and Racial Studies 32 (1): 70–92.
Kim Hyuk-Rae, and Oh Ingyu. 2011. Migration and multicultural contention in East Asia. Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37 (10): 1563–1581.
Kim, Nora Hui-Jung. 2009b. Framing multiple others and international norms: The migrant worker
advocacy movement and Korean national identity reconstruction. Nations and Nationalism 15
(4): 678–695.
Kim, Nora Hui-Jung. 2012. Multiculturalism and the politics of belonging: The puzzle of multicul-
turalism in South Korea. Citizenship Studies 16 (1): 103–117.
Kim Sunhyuk. 1998. Civil society and democratization in South Korea. Korea Journal 38 (2):
214–236.
Kong Dongsung, Kiwoong Yoon, and Yu Soyung. 2010. The social dimensions of immigration in
Korea. Journal of Contemporary Asia 40 (2): 252–274.
Korea Daily. 2016. International marriage decreasing in South Korea. 18 November. http://www.
koreadailyus.com/international-marriage-decreasing-in-south-korea/. Accessed 2 Jan 2019.
Lee Hye-Kyung. 2008. International marriage and the state in South Korea: Focusing on govern-
mental policy. Citizenship Studies 12 (1): 107–123.
Lee Yoonkyung. 2009. Migration, migrants, and contested ethno-nationalism in Korea. Critical
Lian Kwen Fee. 2016. Multiculturalism in Singapore: Concept and practice. In Multiculturalism,
migration and the politics of identity in Singapore, ed. Lian Kwen Fee, 11–29. Singapore: Springer
and Brunei: Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam.
Nippon. 2015. A look at international marriage in Japan. 19 February. https://www.nippon.com/en/
features/h00096/. Accessed 2 Jan 2019.
Park Keumjae. 2014. Foreigners or multicultural citizens? Press media’s construction of immigrants
in South Korea. Ethnic and Racial Studies 37 (9): 1565–1586.
Schrover, Marlou, and Willem Schinkel. 2013. Introduction: The language of inclusion and exclu-
sion in the context of immigration and integration. Ethnic and Racial Studies 36 (7): 1123–1141.
Seol Dong-Hoon, and John D. Skrentny. 2009. Ethnic return migration and hierarchical nationhood:
Korean Chinese foreign workers in South Korea. Ethnicities 9 (2): 147–174.
Singapore Department of Statistics. 2018. Population in brief, 2018. Strategy Group, Prime Min-
ister’s Office. https://www.strategygroup.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/
population-in-brief-2018.pdf. Accessed 2 Jan 2019.
Surak, Kristin. 2008. Convergence in foreigners’ rights and citizenship policies? A look at Japan.
Tai, Eika. 2007. Korean ethnic education in Japanese public schools. Asian Ethnicity 8 (1): 5–23.
Tai, Eika. 2009. Japanese immigration policy at a turning point. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal
18 (3): 315–344.
Watson, Iain. 2010. Multiculturalism in South Korea: A critical assessment. Journal of Contempo-
rary Asia 40 (2): 337–346.
Yamamoto, Beverley Anne. 2012. From structure invisibility to visibility: Is Japan really going to
accept multiethnic, multicultural identities? Global Studies in Culture and Power 19 (4): 428–439.
Yeoh, Brenda S.A. 1996. Contesting space: Power relations and the urban built environment in
colonial Singapore. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
Zolberg, Aristide. 1981. International migrations in political perspective. International Migration
Review 15 (1): 3–27.
Lian Kwen Fee is professor of sociology at the Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei
Darussalam, Brunei. His academic background is in political and historical sociology, and his
research interests focus on race and the state, migration and multiculturalism. His most recent pub-
lications include the following: Multiculturalism, migration, and the politics of identity in Singa-
pore (as contributing editor, 2016); International migration in Southeast Asia (as co-editor, 2016);
and, Tamil migration to colonial Malaya 1930s–1950s. South Asian Diaspora 10 (as co-author,
2017).
Glossary of Non-English Terms
ate older sister

bula bula blah blah
Chuseok Korean mid-autumn festival
dohori type of Nepalese folk song
haram forbidden
Joseonjok ethnic Koreans living in China
kababayan compatriot
kafala sponsorship system to monitor migrant workers
kafeel individual employer or sponsor
khulasat al-qaid family book issued to Emirati nationals who can trace their
Emirati ethnic lineage in the UAE to at least 1925
kuskos kubeta scrub toilets
mahr bride wealth
maldita mean spirited
Nikkeijin Japanese immigrants from Japan and their descendants residing in
foreign countries
puti white (person)
Seolnal Korean New Year
tabunka kyosei recognition of cultural differences of various nationalities
multicultural community building

Asia in Transition 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6899-8
178 Glossary of Non-English Terms
tinda-tinda selling goods informally in public markets

wasta connections
Zainichi foreign citizens residing in Japan, implying temporary residence
Index
A government, 8, 79
Abu Dhabi, 64–65, 84, 102n3, 103, 105, 108 Indonesian, 136
domestic worker(s) in, 48 recruitment, 39n6, 43, 49, 79, 132, 135,
economy, 104 145, 147
expatriate(s) in, 104 state, 4, 7
government, 104, 109 Agricultural
migrant(s) in, 100, 104 industry, 43, 145–146, 149, 165
Philippine schools in, 83 worker(s), 146
Abu Dhabi Dialogue, 101n2 Agriculture, 25, 146, 149–150
Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, 104 AGS, see Arab Gulf states
Abu Dhabi Executive Council Communication Ahn Ji-Hyun, 167
Committee, 109 Ainu culture, 162
Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate, 105 Al Khalifa family, 15
Accumulation of capital, 159 Al Mansoori, Ali Majed, 105
Activism Al Mazeina, Khamis, 105
in Arab Gulf states, 41, 50 Al Nahyan, Abdullah bin Zayed, 108
non-governmental organisation, 41 Al Nahyan, Khalifa bin Zayed, 107
political, 165–166, 172 Al Nahyan, Mohamed bin Zayed, 103, 105
social, 50 Al Nahyan, Nahyan bin Mubarak, 99
in South Korea, 165–166, 172 Al Owais, Abdul Rahman Mohammed, 103
Activist(s) Al-Ali, Nadje, 76n2
religious, 172 Al-Amal, 102
Administration Al-Ketbi, Ebtisam, 105
in Arab Gulf states, 3 Al-Qasimi, Lubna bint Khalid, 102
colonial, 168 Al-Sabah family, 14, 16
South Korea, 165, 167 Ali, Syed, 77
AFP, see Armed Forces of the Ali’s Film, 106
Philippines AlShehabi, Omar, 80n5
Africa, 87 American
Ageing, 126 culture, 90n22
in Japan, 5, 9, 161, 163 school(s), 82–83, 83n12
in Singapore, 9, 161 universities, 85
in South Korea, 5, 9, 161 women, 64
Agencies Amnesty International, 98
European, 168 Ansan Migrant Workers’ Centre, 166

Asia in Transition 8, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-6899-8
180 Index
Anti-Discrimination Law (UAE), 8, 102 labour market, 4, 7, 14, 16–18, 20, 26, 44,
Antigovernment movements 97, 100, 128
Bahrain, 19, 31, 33 marriage(s) in, 5, 7, 57, 64
Kuwait, 31–32 migrant labour in, 3, 98
Aqdar Initiative, 109 national security in, 57
Arab(s), 3, 7, 44, 65, 68n14, 79, 103 nationality in, 20, 65, 69, 79–80, 90
citizen(s), 59 naturalisation in, 13n1, 17, 56, 70
community, 67 OFWs in, 63–64
countries, 5, 78 permanent residence in, 79
gender relations, 50 professional(s) in, 41, 79–80
labour, 3 quota(s), 18–20
migrant(s), 3, 58, 168 as rentier states, 3, 8, 33, 118, 120
migration, 77n3 ruling families, 3, 5, 14
nationalism, 31 society, 104
societies, 7 student(s) in, 82–86
in UAE, 69, 109 workforce, 16, 20, 58, 104
Arab Gulf states Arab Spring
activism in, 41, 50 in AGS, 13–14, 19, 26, 102n4, 117
administration in, 3 in Bahrain, 14, 31–32
Arab Spring in, 13–14, 19, 26, 102n4, 117 Arabian Peninsula, 3, 77, 79
authoritarianism in, 14 Arabian Sea, 77
business in, 19, 79 Arabic, 69, 109
cities in, 81 education, 128
citizen(s), 3, 6, 13n1, 14–15, 17–18, 25, 91, values, 101
117 school(s), 82
citizenship, 3, 16–17, 56–57, 75–76, 82, 88, Arabic (language), 6, 45–46, 59, 66–69, 76, 82,
111 102, 128
civic ethnocracy in, 16 Armed Forces of the Philippines, 42, 42n8
class in, 98 Asato, Wako, 8, 115–141
conflict in, 32 Asia, 8–9, 76, 167
cosmopolitan population in, 3 developmental state(s) in, 8, 117
division of labour in, 6, 13, 18, 25 labour from, 162
domestic worker(s) in, 41–42, 50 labour migration in, 144
economy, 16, 76, 104 migrant(s), 2, 79, 118, 144, 153, 161,
education in, 3, 64, 82–83, 85n15, 86, 91 172
employer(s) in, 7, 38, 41–42, 46–51, 80, 98 migration in, 1–2, 116, 119, 143–144
ethnocracy in, 6, 13–14, 26 Asian, 6, 31, 76, 91, 127, 145, 158, 165
exclusion in, 65, 69, 98 cities, 76, 81, 144, 147, 153
expatriate(s) in, 13, 78, 80, 98 developmental state(s), 8
Filipino(s) in, 43n9, 77, 81, 83, 86, 89 labour, 3
foreign labour in, 5 migrant(s), 3–4, 57, 78n4, 80–81, 91
foreign worker(s) in, 8, 13, 56, 77–78, rentier state(s), 127
80n6, 82, 88n18, 90–91, 98 worker(s), 58, 78n4
Goan(s) in, 77, 90 youths, 7, 77, 86, 92
governance in, 13, 104 Asian-ness, 57
government(s), 5, 8, 14, 18–19, 31, 80n6, Assimilation, 57, 76, 90, 167
98 cultural, 3, 162, 172
health care in, 3, 8, 76, 78 Assimilationist
higher education in, 64 policy, 171
as host society, 75–76, 90, 98–99 Australia, 7, 70, 84, 86–87, 89, 110, 169
human rights in, 8, 42, 97–98, 111 universities, 85, 85n15, 87
inclusion in, 4, 7, 56–57, 65, 69, 98 Australian
Indian(s) in, 77–78, 81, 83, 86 education, 82
intermarriage in, 57, 64, 71 visa, 89
Index 181
Authoritarian Branding, 98–99, 105–106, 110

elite, 116 Britain, 7, 56–57, 66, 70, 84–85, 90, 163, 168
governance, 117 citizenship of, 63n11
government(s), 14 education in, 91
politics, 18 Goan(s) in, 89
regime(s), 14–16, 18, 26, 32–33, 117, 165 universities, 86
rule, 166, 172 British, 167–169
rulers, 15 colonial power, 168
Authoritarianism, 117 colony, 168
in Arab Gulf states, 14 education, 122n5
in Middle East, 15 protection of Gulf, 78
in South Korea, 172 school(s), 82–83, 83n12, 84, 86, 89
British India, 79
B British Malaya, 168
Bahrain, 3, 13–15, 20, 38n2, 56, 56n3, 76, 97 Brunei Darussalam
antigovernment movements, 19, 31, 33 class in, 133–134, 136
and Arab Spring, 14, 31–32 domestic work in, 122, 128
business in, 31 foreign domestic worker(s) in, 115–116,
citizen(s), 26, 30–31, 33 116n1, 122m, 125–127, 132–136
division of labour in, 28–29 economy, 8
domestic workers in, 126 education in, 8, 122, 126–128, 130–131,
economy, 30, 32 134, 136
ethnocracy in, 32–33 employer(s) in, 115, 120, 122, 125,
foreign worker(s) in, 56n3 131–132, 134–136
government, 13, 31–32 equality in, 130
household(s), 30 foreign labour in, 125
human rights in, 98 foreign worker(s) in, 115–116, 122, 125,
labour market, 28, 30–32 135
marriage(s) in, 60 gender equality in, 128, 130
migrant(s), 17, 25, 28, 99 Filipino(s) in, 127, 132, 134–135
Muslim(s) in, 31 government, 120, 122, 125–128, 130–131,
naturalisation, 17 133, 133n8
population, 31 health care in, 117, 128
as rentier state, 118 higher education in, 8, 126–128, 131, 134,
ruling families, 32 136
school(s), 83 human rights in, 133
workforce, 20–22, 25–26, 29, 32 immigration, 131
Bahraini(s), 20, 30–31, 59 and Indonesia, 135
citizen(s), 31 industrialisation in, 127
labour market, 30 labour market, 115–117, 120, 122–123,
worker(s), 28, 30 128, 131, 136
Bangladesh marriage(s) in, 120, 131
labour, 170 migrants in, 120
migrant(s) from, 3, 62, 78 migrant labour in, 125
Bangladeshi(s), 78 migration to, 115–116, 120, 125
Bel-Air, Françoise De, 62 migration policy, 116, 134
Bolivia, 16 minimum wage, 115, 132, 134–136
Bombay, 78, see also Mumbai national development in, 127
Boswell, Christina, 159–160 naturalisation in, 120
Boundaries NGOs in, 126, 133
ethnic, 16 population, 8, 120
religious, 57 quota(s), 122
182 Index
recruitment agencies, 130–136 China, 164–165, 168, 170

as rentier state, 8, 115–118, 120, 122, 125, Korean(s) in, 164
136 migrant(s) from, 171
trafficking in, 133 Chinese
unemployment in, 115–116, 122, 125 business, 168
welfare, 117 in Japan, 161–162
women, 8, 128, 130–131 in Singapore, 168–170
worker(s) in, 122 in South Korea, 165
workforce, 115–116, 122, 124–125, 127, Christian(s)
131 Filipina(s), 40n7, 44, 46, 48–49, 64–65
Brunei Council on Social Welfare, 126–127, Filipino(s), 49
133–134 Indian, 83
Brunei Times, 126, 126n6, 132–134 in Philippines, 6, 42–43, 49
Bruneian(s), 122, 131 in UAE, 63n11, 65
citizen(s), 120–121, 124 Chung, Erin Aeran, 166, 173
citizenship, 115–116, 120–121, 123, 128, Chungcheongbuk-do, 146
130 Chuseok, 149, 149n1
civil society, 133 CISCE, see Council for the Indian School
household(s), 8, 116, 116n1, 119–120, Certificate Examination
125–128, 131 Cities, 85, 153
labour market, 123 in AGS, 81
workforce, 116, 125 Asian, 76, 81, 144, 147, 153
Buddhist, 149 business, 100
Business global, 2
in AGS, 19, 79 Gulf, 81
Bahrain, 31 Japanese, 161
Chinese, 168 metropolitan, 143
cities, 100 South Korean, 166, 172
Japanese, 161, 163, 172 Citizen(s), 116–118, 159–160, 164, 171
AGS, 3, 6, 13n1, 14–15, 17–18, 25, 91, 117
C Arab, 59
Canada, 7, 57, 70, 84, 87, 89, 169 Bahrain, 26, 30–31, 33
Filipino(s) in, 68 Bruneian, 120–124
universities, 85, 89 female, 4, 62, 62n8, 122–124
Canadian University Dubai, 85 inequality between, 30
Canton, 168 Kuwait, 16, 25–26, 30–33
Capital and migrant(s), 3–4, 14, 16–18, 20, 57
accumulation of, 159 Philippine, 70, 79
social, 55, 65, 69–71, 91 Qatar, 26
Capitalism, 117 of rentier state(s), 118
colonial, 167 Saudi Arabia, 26
Capitalist production, 159 second-class, 49
Caste, 64, 102, 150 Singapore, 170
Castles, Stephen, 2–3, 144, 171 South Korea, 166, 172
Catholic(s), 64, 79 UAE, 15, 58, 62, 68, 70
Catholic Church, 106 Citizenship, 1–3, 57n4, 59, 63n11, 69–70, 80,
CBSE, see Central Board of Secondary 87–89, 92, 118–119, 159
Education in AGS, 3, 16–17, 56–57, 75–76, 82, 88,
Central Board of Secondary Education, 83, 111
83n10 of Britain, 63n11
Chalcraft, John, 31 of Brunei, 115–116, 120–121, 123, 128,
Changshin-dong, 146 130
Index 183
cultural, 69 ethnic, 7, 75, 91, 144, 168–170

economic, 59, 69 expatriate, 78, 98
Emirati, 7, 62, 62n8 Filipino, 7, 37, 45, 51, 66, 68, 88
and foreign worker(s), 69 global, 7
global, 92 Indian, 77–78
and integration, 69 indigenous, 169
Japanese, 162 Iraqi, 66
of Kuwait, 4, 6 migrant, 2, 4, 7, 9, 50, 98–100, 106–107,
law(s), 62n7, 71, 76, 120 111, 144, 153–154, 159, 162, 169, 173
Malaya, 168 multicultural, 163
Malaysian, 89 Nepalese, 143–146, 148, 150–154
Philippine, 7, 68, 68n15 organisations, 146, 150–152
policy, 58, 60, 69, 75 transnational, 2–3, 143–145, 150, 152–153
quasi-, 3 tribal, 60
regulation of, 71 Conflict
in rentier states, 118 in AGS, 32
in South Korea, 149, 164 class, 159
UAE, 7, 51, 55–56, 58, 58n5, 59–60, 62, cultural, 13
62n7, 63n11, 66–71, 103, 105, 108 in Philippines, 42, 42n8, 43
United States, 63n11 religious, 42
and youth(s), 77, 80, 91 sectarian, 32
Civic ethnocracy social, 8, 101, 110
in AGS, 16 in UAE, 8, 101, 110
Kuwait as, 6 Construction
Civil society, 159 industry, 5, 76, 79, 101, 150, 170
in Brunei, 133 worker(s), 63, 102n3
in Japan, 163, 172 Contract(s)
in South Korea, 9, 164–166, 172–173 work, 17, 48, 63
Class, 37, 41, 57, 144 Cosmopolitan(s), 2, 76
in AGS, 98 population in AGS, 3
in Brunei, 133–134, 136 society, 55
conflict, 159 UAE as, 55, 60
mobilisation, 159 Council for the Indian School Certificate
in UAE, 44, 50–51, 56–57, 67, 101, 110 Examination, 83, 83n11
Cohesion Council of Women of Brunei Darussalam, 133
social, 5, 13, 57 Court(s)
Collins, Francis Leo, 149 Dubai, 65
Colonial, 58 sharia, 63
administration, 168 Cultural, 56, 59, 80, 161, 170
capitalism, 167 assimilation, 3, 162, 172
Malaya, 168 boundaries, 57
rule, 79, 164 citizenship, 69
societies, 168 conflict, 13
subject(s), 161, 172 difference, 9, 57, 66, 118, 157, 163
Colonial power(s) diversity, 9, 55, 58, 103–104, 110,
British, 168 157–158, 160–161, 164–165, 169, 171
Dutch, 168 identity, 171, 173
Colonialism, 158 norms, 16, 101, 171
and Japan, 162, 164 policy, 58
Portuguese, 79 subject(s), 144
Colony, British, 168 tolerance, 104
Community, 87, 92, 109–110, 147 Culture, 63, 65, 70, 99, 106, 164, 171
Arab, 67 Ainu, 162
Emirati, 106, 111 American, 90n22
184 Index
Emirati, 110 Asian, 8, 118

Korean, 167 East Asia, 4, 117
Philippine, 83 economy, 4
Japan as, 4, 117
D Malaysia as, 117
Davao del Sur, 38n1 and migrants, 118, 125
Davidson, Christopher, 85n15 South Korea as, 117
De-Arabisation of migrants, 31 Developmentalism
Decolonisation, 168 welfare, 117
Democracy, 16, 117 Diaspora
movement(s), 165, 172 Nikkeijin, 161
Singapore, 169 Difference(s)
South Korea, 164–166, 172 cultural, 9, 57, 66, 118, 157, 163
Democratic Justice Party (South Korea), 164 ethnic, 9, 118, 157, 160–161
Democratic Republican Party (South Korea), religious, 118, 157
164 Differential exclusion, 171
Democratic Dirigisme, 117
governance, 117 Discourse
politics, 116 human rights, 133
Democratisation migrant-friendly, 8, 97–99, 103–106,
South Korea, 9, 164–166, 172 108–111
Denizenship, 3 on migration, 1–2, 14, 160, 166–167
Department of Economic Development (Abu on multiculturalism, 164, 166–167, 172
Dhabi), 105 North–South, 2
Department of Economic Planning and political, 163
Development (Brunei), see Discrimination, 4, 6, 51, 87, 98, 162,
Jabatan Perancangan dan Kemajuan 166–167
Ekonomi against migrants, 144, 146
Department of Labour (Brunei), 132, 134–135 against Muslims, 41–42, 44, 49–50
Department of State (USA), 126, 133 racial, 102
Dependency, 32 religious, 102
on foreign labour, 7–8 Disparities
on foreign worker(s), 116 economic, 18, 80, 98
on migrant labour, 125, 158 Distribution
population, 161 labour, 120
Desi, 90n22 welfare, 117
Development, 104–105 Diversity
economic, 3–4, 8, 60, 99, 101, 103, cultural, 9, 55, 58, 103–104, 110, 157–158,
117–118, 164 160–161, 164–165, 169, 171
of global economy, 9 ethnic, 158, 168–169, 171
of labour market, 17 social, 8, 99, 105–106, 109–110
national, 106–107, 127 Division of labour, 16, 18, 20
policy, 110, 158–159 in AGS, 6, 13, 18, 25
political, 169 in Bahrain, 28–29
Singapore, 4, 116–118, 125 gendered, 144–146
social, 104 in Kuwait, 19, 25–26, 28, 31–32
strategy, 4, 79 in Qatar, 19, 23–24, 26
Taiwan, 4, 117–118 in Saudi Arabia, 23–24
Thailand, 117–118 in UAE, 44
Developmental state(s), 4–5, 115–119, 126, Domestic work, 78, 119
136, 164 in Brunei, 122, 128
in Asia, 8 feminisation of, 120
Index 185
Domestic worker(s), 120, 122n4, 133 female domestic worker(s) in, 115–116
in Abu Dhabi, 48 labour migration to, 5–6
in AGS, 41–42, 50 migrants from, 170
in Bahrain, 126 population, 5
in Brunei, 115–116, 116n1, 122m, Economic
125–127, 132–136 citizenship, 59, 69
in Dubai, 38, 45, 47–48, 65–68 development, 3–4, 8, 60, 99, 101, 103,
Filipina, 40n7, 43, 47, 64, 79, 127, 134 117–118, 164
Filipino, 39n6, 40n7, 127, 132, 134–135, disparities, 18, 80, 98
170 equality, 160
Indonesian, 64, 127, 132, 135–136, 170 globalisation, 161, 164
in Middle East, 6, 38, 43, 50 growth, 4–5, 60, 100, 104, 110, 158
Muslim Filipina, 6–7, 37–38, 41, 43, 45, integration, 70
47–49, 51 policy, 117
in Oman, 126 power, 16, 42, 69, 163, 172
in from Philippines, 6, 170 reforms, 166
in Qatar, 47, 125–126 rights, 58
in Saudi Arabia, 48, 126 strategy, 118
in Singapore, 125–126, 128, 131, 134, 170 Economy, 159
in Southeast Asia, 115–116, 127 Abu Dhabi, 104
Sri Lankan, 64 AGS, 16, 76, 104
in Taiwan, 125, 127, 131 Bahrain, 30, 32
in UAE, 40n7, 44–45, 51–52, 101 Brunei, 8
Vietnamese, 127 and developmental state(s), 4
Dongdaemun, 9, 143, 146, 148–153 East Asia, 158, 161
Dual identity, 162 global, 2–3, 9, 159, 162, 171
Dubai Private Education Landscape 2013/14, international, 171
82 Malaya, 168
Dubai Strategic Plan, 112 Middle East, 15
Dubai, 69, 84–87, 90–91, 102n3, 105–106 oil, 14–16, 30, 33, 110
court, 65 political, 158
domestic worker(s) in, 38, 45, 47–48, rentier, 116
65–68 Singapore, 169–170
education in, 82, 86, 88 UAE, 8, 110
Filipino(s) in, 68, 77, 87n18, 88, 88n19 and women, 8
Indian(s) in, 77, 107 Education, 44, 49, 51, 57n4, 87, 91, 130
marriage(s) in, 65–66 in AGS, 3, 64, 82–83, 85n15, 86, 91
migrant labour in, 99 Arabic, 128
migrant worker(s) in, 62–63, 98–100, 104 Australian, 82
as multicultural, 104–105 British, 122n5
nationality in, 87 in Britain, 91
Philippine school(s) in, 84, 86 in Brunei, 8, 122, 126–128, 130–131, 134,
school(s), 82–84, 86 136
student(s) in, 82, 86–88 in Dubai, 82, 86, 88
university, 86–88 female, 131
youth(s) in, 77, 87–88 and Filipino(s), 77, 83–84, 86, 88, 90, 134
Dutch disease, 25–26, 31 global, 7
Dutch colonial power, 168 in India, 83n10, 84, 86
and Indian(s), 77, 82n9, 83–84, 86, 89
E in Japan, 163
East Africa, 79 in Kuwait, 82n9, 89
East Asia, 2, 158 in Middle East, 7
developmental state(s), 4, 117 and Muslim Filipina(s), 40n7, 41
economy, 158, 161 and Nepalese, 145
186 Index
in Philippines, 66–67, 84, 86 Environmentalism, 166

policy, 83n10 EPS, see Employment permit system
in rentier state(s), 15 Equality
in Singapore, 169, 173 in Brunei, 130
in South Korea, 167 economic, 160
in UAE, 58, 60, 62 gender, 120, 127–128
Western, 83–84, 86, 91 political, 160
and women, 8, 122, 126–128, 130–131, social, 160
136 in UAE, 109
Egypt wage, 130
migrant worker(s) from, 3, 31, 62, 65, 78 welfare, 117
Elite(s), 14–16, 18 Ethnic, 6, 62, 102
authoritarian, 116 boundaries, 16
political, 116 community, 7, 75, 91, 144, 168–170
Embedded liberalism, 159, see also Liberal differences, 9, 118, 157, 160–161
constraint diversity, 158, 168–169, 171
Emirates News Agency, see Wakalat Anba’a al enclaves, 9, 81, 144, 168
Emarat group(s), 6, 16, 75, 77–78, 81, 105, 144,
Emirates Policy Center, 105 157
Emirati(s), 8, 44, 48, 58, 60, 62, 62n8, 67, identity, 162, 164
68n14, 69, 80, 104, 106–107, 109–111 Korean(s), 164–165
citizenship, 7, 62, 62n8 majority, 6
community, 106, 111 minority, 159–160, 162, 169–170, 172–173
culture, 110 Ethnic integration policy
female, 131 in Singapore, 170
government, 58 Ethnic nationalism
national identity, 60 Korean, 164
society, 70, 109 Ethnicity, 57
women, 60, 62, 101 in UAE, 44, 58, 70
Emiratisation, 58, 71, 80 Ethnocracy, 15–16, 33, 98
Employer(s) in AGS, 6, 13–14, 26
in AGS, 7, 38, 41–42, 46–51, 80, 98 in Bahrain, 32–33
in Brunei, 115, 120, 122, 125, 131–132, civic, 6, 16
134–136 in Kuwait, 6, 32
Japanese, 5 and migrant(s), 16
Muslim, 44 and nationality, 6
in South Korea, 145–147, 149, 166 racial, 16
UAE, 45, 69, 101, 101n2, 102 religious, 16
Employment Order 2009 (Brunei), 115, 133, Ethnocratic
135–136 policy, 13
Employment permit system, 5, 9, 144–150, 152 regime(s), 16
Empowerment, 37, 40 Eurasian(s), 168
of Muslim Filipina domestic worker(s), 37, Europe, 7, 77, 85, 157
40–42, 47, 50–52 universities in, 85, 85n15
of women, 7, 40, 42 Western, 158
Enclaves European Union, 89
ethnic, 9, 81, 144, 168 European, 168
English agencies, 168
newspaper, 85, 101, 108 countries, 119, 158
school(s), 83, 83n12 universities, 85
English (language), 38n5, 46, 66–68, 76, 79, Exclusion, 1–2, 4, 56, 144, 146
128, 134, 169 in AGS, 65, 69, 98
Index 187
differential, 171 Feminisation

labour market, 40 of domestic work, 120
and multiculturalism, 160 of migration, 57
of Nepalese, 147–148 of work, 131
politics of, 98 Fertility rates
in UAE, 7, 37, 40–41, 55–57, 69–71 in Japan, 5, 9
Expatriate(s), 55, 118–119 in Singapore, 9
in Abu Dhabi, 104 in South Korea, 5, 9
in AGS, 13, 78, 80, 98 FIFA, see Fédération Internationale de Football
community, 78, 98 Association (International Federation of
female, 101 Association Football)
Goan, 90 Filipina(s), 64, 66, 79
in Kuwait, 50 Christian, 40n7, 44, 46, 48–49, 64–65
in UAE, 8, 63n11, 101, 102n3, 105, 110 domestic worker(s), 40n7, 43, 47, 64, 79,
Export-orientated 127, 134
industrialisation, 4–5 household(s), 43
manufacturing, 170 marriage(s), 7, 64–65, 69
‘Express Your Love for the UAE’, 109 Muslim(s), 38, 38n5, 40n7, 41, 44, 50, 65
Extremism Muslim domestic worker(s), 6–7, 37–38,
in Middle East, 43, 110 41, 43, 45–49, 51
religious, 8, 102–103, 105 student(s), 75
in UAE, 7, 40n7, 44
F Filipino(s), 68n15, 70
Facebook, 109 in AGS, 43n9, 77, 81, 83, 86, 89
Familialisation policy, 128 in Brunei, 127, 132, 134–135
Familialism, 126 in Canada, 68
Family book, 58, 69 Christian, 49
Family network(s), 86, 91 community, 7, 37, 45, 51, 66, 68, 88
FDW, see Foreign domestic worker domestic worker(s), 39n6, 40n7, 127, 132,
Federal National Council (UAE), 15, 101 134–135, 170
Fédération Internationale de Football in Dubai, 68, 77, 87n18, 88, 88n19
Association, 98 and education, 77, 83–84, 86, 88, 90, 134
Female and higher education, 134
citizen(s), 4, 62, 62n8, 122–124 and intermarriage, 64, 68–69
education, 131 in Kuwait, 75
Emirati(s), 62 marriage (s), 55–57, 64, 69
expatriate(s), 101 migrant worker(s), 7, 41, 43n9, 46, 51, 56,
Indian(s), 64 63–64, 77, 79, 91
labour force participation, 8, 115, 120, migration of, 77
122–125, 127, 136 Muslim, 38n1, 41
migrant worker(s), 64, 131, 144, 167 and NGOs, 41
Muslim, 65 student(s), 76–77, 84, 87–88
Nepalese, 9, 143–144, 152–153 in UAE, 51, 56–57, 68, 83–84
overseas Filipino worker(s), 64 in United States, 68
professional(s), 8, 115–116, 122, 128, 131, welfare of, 79
136 youth(s), 7, 75–77, 83–86, 88, 90–91
sexuality, 43 Flag Day (United Arab Emirates), 99, 107
student(s), 87, 128 Foreign domestic worker(s), see also Muslim
wage gap, 130, 136 Filipina domestic worker(s)
workforce, 122, 124–125, 131 in Brunei, 8, 116, 125–127, 131–132, 134
Female domestic worker(s) in Hong Kong, 125, 131, 134
in East Asia, 115–116 Foreign labour, 161, 167
in Hong Kong, 129 in AGS, 5
in UAE, 37–52 in Brunei, 125
188 Index
dependence on, 7–8 education, 7

in Japan, 8, 163 labour market, 97, 110, 164
migration of, 158 market, 25, 125
Foreign worker(s), 56, 119, 160 migration, 57
in AGS, 8, 13, 56, 77–78, 80n6, 82, 88n18, mobility, 89
90–91, 98 Globalisation, 2, 104, 158
in Bahrain, 56n3 economic, 161, 164
in Brunei, 115–116, 122, 125, 135 and migration, 2, 7
and citizenship, 69 Goa, 77, 85, 89–90
dependence on, 116 school(s), 85
in Hong Kong, 118 Goan(s), 79, 89
in Japan, 5, 161–163 in AGS, 77, 90
in Kuwait, 80 in Britain, 89
in Singapore, 118, 161 expatriate(s), 90
in South Korea, 5, 9, 161, 166 migrant worker(s), 79, 90
in UAE, 8, 58, 62, 80, 97, 101, 103 Governance
France, 63n11, 66, 110, 157 in AGS, 13, 104
Francis, Pope, 105 authoritarian, 117
French, 167 democratic, 117
policy, 117 in UAE, 68
school(s), 83 Government(s), 16, 25, 32, 115–116, 119, 128
French (language), 68 Abu Dhabi, 104, 109
Fujairah, 77, 84 agencies, 8, 79
AGS, 5, 8, 14, 18–19, 31, 80n6, 98
G authoritarian, 14
G7, see Group of Seven Bahrain, 13, 31–32
Gaisano, 43 Brunei, 120, 122, 125–128, 130–131, 133,
Gargash, Anwar, 103 133n8
GCC, see Gulf Cooperation Council Indonesian, 135
Gender, 37, 50, 64, 128, 130, 144, 147, 149, Japanese, 5, 9, 158, 161–164, 172–173
151–152 Kuwait, 13
inequality, 8 and migration, 2, 158, 163–164, 166,
and migration, 2, 152 171–172
pay (wage) gap, 8, 115–116, 122, 130–131, and multiculturalism, 157–158, 160, 164,
136 166–167, 172
in UAE, 51 Nepalese, 145
Gender equality, 120 Oman, 13, 15, 80n6
in Brunei, 127–128, 130 Philippine, 40n7, 42, 68n15, 79, 83, 87n18,
Gender segregation 127, 132, 134–135
in labour market, 44, 50, 145, 150 Qatar, 13, 15
Gendered Saudi Arabia, 13, 15
division of labour, 144–146 Singapore, 9, 161, 169–171
ideology, 150, 152–153 South Korean, 9, 145, 158, 161, 164,
migration, 144–145, 147, 153 166–167, 172
General Santos City, 38n1, 38n4, 43, 49 UAE, 8, 13, 58, 60, 62, 66, 68, 70, 80n6,
Germany, 63n11, 110, 157 100–101, 101n2, 102, 102n4, 103–104,
Global gender gap report 2017, 130 106–111
Global Slavery Index 2018, 98 Western, 157
Global Grand National Party (Korea), 164
cities, 2 Greek, 38, 48
citizenship, 92 Group of Seven, 163, 172
community, 7 Group(s)
economy, 2–3, 9, 159, 162, 171 ethnic, 6, 16, 75, 77–78, 81, 105, 144, 157
Index 189
human rights, 98 AGS, 75–76, 90, 98–99

migrant, 2, 63, 162 South Korea, 148, 167
religious, 57, 105 UAE, 37, 41, 49, 101, 108
Growth Household(s)
economic, 4–5, 16, 60, 100, 104, 110, 158 Brunei, 8, 116, 116n1, 119–120, 125–128,
population, 58, 101, 104 131
Guatemala, 16 Bahrain, 30
Gujarat, 78 Filipina(s), 43
Gulf Cooperation Council, 19, 38n2, 56n1 Kuwait, 125
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Muslim, 43–44
programme, 62 services, 48, 76, 134
Gulf Labour Markets, Migration and Singapore, 125
Population programme, 4 Human rights, 159
Gulf, see also Arab Gulf states in AGS, 8, 42, 97–98, 111
cities, 81 in Bahrain, 98
lifestyle, 76, 88, 90 in Brunei, 133
oil states, 2 discourse, 133
universities, 85n15 group(s), 98
Gyeonggi-do, 146 in Japan, 163, 172
organisations, 42, 50, 100, 102, 102n3
H in Qatar, 98, 111
Haines, Chad, 99 in South Korea, 146, 149, 165–166, 172
Health care, 15 in UAE, 100–102, 102n3, 103, 110
in AGS, 3, 8, 76, 78, 85n15 violations, 97, 146, 165–166, 172
in Brunei, 128 Human Rights Council (UN), 98, 103
in Japan, 117, 117n2 Human Rights Watch, 98, 102n3
in rentier state(s), 117n2 Humanitarian values, 159, 172
in Singapore, 117
in South Korea, 167 I
in UAE, 58 Identity
Hegemonic stability theory, 158 cultural, 171, 173
Higher education, 91 Emirati, 60
in AGS, 64 ethnic, 162, 164
in Brunei, 8, 126–128, 131, 134, 136 Korean, 164
and Filipino(s), 134 minority, 160
in Philippines, 84 Muslim, 41
in UAE, 60, 84 South Korean, 164
Western, 84 Ideology
and women, 60, 126–128, 130–131 Arab nationalist, 31
Hindu gendered, 150, 152–153
merchants, 78 of monoculturalism, 163
Hindu Endowments Board (Singapore), 170 of multiculturalism, 173
Hinduism, 170 radical, 3
Hollifield, James F., 2, 158–159 Singapore, 169
Hong Kong, 117–118, 170 ILO, see International Labour Organisation
foreign domestic worker(s) in, 125, 131, IMF, see International Monetary Fund
134 Immigration, 1, 10, 158
female labour force participation, 129 AGS, 3–4, 7, 18, 80
foreign worker(s) in, 118 Brunei, 131
migrant(s), in, 144 Japan, 161, 163, 171
migration to, 116 law(s), 89, 163
Horinuki, Koji, 8, 97–114 liberal, 159, 164, 168, 170
Hosoda, Naomi, 1–11, 75–95 liberalisation of, 170
Host society, 90n22, 153 and multiculturalism, 157, 169
190 Index
policy, 1, 3–4, 7–8, 18, 97, 115–116, 131, worker(s), 135

134, 159, 161, 163–164, 167–168, 170 Indonesian archipelago, 168
Portugal, 89 Industrial
settler, 1 policy, 4
Singapore, 168–170 technical training, 165–166
South Korea, 9, 147, 151, 164, 166–167, Industrialisation, 118–119
171 in Brunei, 127
temporary, 1 export-orientated, 4–5
UAE, 8 South Korea, 5
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Industry, 4–5, 122
Act (Japan), 161–162 agricultural, 43, 145–146, 149, 165
Inclusion, 1, 158 construction, 5, 76, 79, 101, 150, 170
in AGS, 4, 7, 56–57, 65, 69, 98 manufacturing, 5, 9, 145, 150
and migrant(s), 2, 56, 69–71 oil, 58, 78
and multiculturalism, 160, 169 tourism, 79
in Singapore, 169, 173 Inequality, 37, 40, 42, 50–51
in UAE, 7, 37, 40–41, 55–57, 69–71 between citizens, 30
and women, 40–41 gender, 8
Independence Day (Philippines), 68 Informal networks, 6
India, 63n11, 65, 77, 79, 83, 85–86, 90, 168 Institution(s)
education in, 83n10, 84, 86 liberal, 159, 172
migrant worker(s) from, 3, 62, 76–77, 168 Institutional theory, 159
Indian(s), 47n11 Integration, 1–2, 57, 70, 90, 158, 160, 164,
in AGS, 77–78, 81, 83, 86 171, 173
Christian(s), 83 and citizenship, 69
community, 77–78 economic, 70
in Dubai, 77, 107 policy, 97, 106, 163, 170
and education, 77, 82n9, 83–84, 86, 89 racial, 170
female worker(s), 64 social, 76, 97, 106, 119, 167
in Malaya, 168 Intermarriage, 3–4, 57, 57n4, 70
migrant(s), 77, 79, 86, 91, 107, 168 in AGS, 57, 64, 71
in oil industry, 78 and Filipino(s), 64, 68–69
school(s), 81n6, 82–83, 83n12, 84–86, 89, in Japan, 5–6, 161
91 in UAE, 55, 60, 63, 68–69, 71
in Singapore, 168, 170 International Covenant on Civil and Political
student(s), 77, 82n7, 83–84, 86 Rights, 163
universities, 86 International Covenant on Economic, Social
women, 64 and Cultural Rights, 163
youth(s), 7, 75–77, 81, 83, 86, 89–91 International economy, 171
Indigenous International Federation of Association
community, 169 Football, see Fédération Internationale
minority, 160 de Football Association
population, 31 International Labour Day, 8, 99, 106
rights, 162 International labour market, 8, 134, 159
Indonesia, 133 International Labour Organisation, 98, 122,
and Brunei, 135 130, 133, 162
migrant(s) from, 3, 78 International marriage(s), 5, 57, 57n4, 70, 161,
Indonesian 165, 173
agencies, 136 International Organisation for Migration, 98
domestic worker(s), 64, 127, 132, 135–136, International Philippine School, 83
170 Iran, 38n3, 78
government, 135 Iraq, 66
Index 191
Iraqi, 7, 65–66, 70 Japanese, 161–162, 164, 166

community, 66 business, 161, 163, 172
invasion of Kuwait, 3, 8, 78, 89 cities, 161
Ishii, Masako, 1–11, 37–54 citizenship, 162
ISIS, see Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant colonial rule, 164
Islam, 65, 68, 170 employer(s), 5
Islamic government, 5, 9, 158, 161–164, 172–173
movement(s), 102 lifestyle, 162
subjects, 82 nationality, 162, 172
values, 101 NGOs, 163–164
UAE as, 103 in Philippines, 162
world, 106 society, 162–164, 172–173
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore, 170 Javanese, 168
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Islamic State of Jeddah, 83
Iraq and the Levant), 102, 102n4, 105 Johnson, Mark, 41
Islamophobia, 43 Joint Committee of Migrant Workers in Korea,
Israel, 16, 43n9 166
Italy, 68 Jongno, 146
Jordan, 43n9, 45
J Jordanian, 45, 48–49
Jackson, Cecile, 2 student(s), 82n7
Jain, merchant(s), 78 Joseonjok, 165–166
Japan, 5, 157, 163, 171 Judaism, 16
ageing in, 5, 9, 161, 163 Judiciary, 159
Chinese in, 161–162
civil society, 163, 172 K
and colonialism, 162, 164 Kabeer, Naila, 37, 39–40
as developmental state, 4, 117 Kafala, 4, 8, 17–18, 56, 56n3, 59, 80, 98, 103,
education in, 163 108, 110–111
fertility rates in, 5, 9 Kapiszewski, Andrzej, 78n4
foreign labour in, 8, 163 Kerala, 89
foreign worker(s) in, 5, 161–163 migrant(s) from, 78, 107
health care in, 117, 117n2 Khalifa Student Empowerment Program, 109
human rights in, 163, 172 Khatris, 78
immigration, 161, 163, 171 KHDA, see Knowledge and Human
intermarriages in, 5–6, 161 Development Authority
Korean(s) in, 161–163 Khojas, 78
labour law, 5 Kim Sunhyuk, 165–166
law(s), 172 Kinship, 16, 90
labour market, 158, 161 network(s), 168
local government, 163–164, 173 tribal, 14
marriage(s) in, 6, 161 Knowledge and Human Development
migrant(s) in, 5, 118, 158, 161, 172–173 Authority (Dubai), 82, 82n8
migration to, 9, 163 Koch, Natalie, 98
migration policy, 161, 163 Korean(s), 6, 9, 146, 149–150, 164–167, 172,
as monocultural society, 9, 164 see also South Korean
and monoculturalism, 157, 163, 168, 172 in China, 164
as multicultural, 163, 172 culture, 167
and multiculturalism, 9, 158, 161, 164, ethnic, 164–165
171–172 ethnic nationalism, 164
naturalisation in, 162 identity, 164
population, 161 in Japan, 161–163
undocumented worker(s) in, 5, 162 migrant(s), 165
welfare in, 117 nationality, 164
192 Index
nationalism, 164 Saudi Arabia, 129

Korean (language), 145, 167 Singapore, 129
Korean War, 164 South Korea, 129
Koser, Khalid, 76n2 Southeast Asia, 127
Kuala Lumpur, 89 Thailand, 129
Kutch, 78 Labour law
Kuwait, 3–4, 14 Japan, 5
antigovernment movements, 31–32 Qatar, 98
citizen(s), 16, 25–26, 30–33 reform(s), 98
as civic ethnocracy, 6 violations, 5
citizenship, 4, 6 Labour market, 32, 158, 171
division of labour in, 19, 25–26, 28, 31–32 AGS, 4, 7, 14, 16–18, 20, 26, 44, 97, 100,
education in, 82n9, 89 128
ethnocracy in, 6, 32 Bahrain, 28, 30–32
expatriate(s) in, 50 Brunei, 115–117, 120, 122–123, 128, 131,
Filipino(s) in, 75 136
foreign worker(s) in, 80 development, 17
government, 13 exclusion in, 40
household(s), 125 gender segregation in, 44, 50, 145, 150
Iraqi invasion of, 3, 8, 78, 89 global, 97, 110, 164
labour market, 28, 80 international, 8, 134, 159
Philippine school(s) in, 75 Japan, 158, 161
society, 15 Kuwait, 28, 80
student(s) in, 82, 89 Philippines, 6, 37, 40–43, 50m, 52
workforce, 20–21, 26 policy, 102
Kuwait City, 75–76 professional(s), 110
Kuwaiti(s), 26, 28, 31, 83 reform(s), 102
citizen(s), 16 Saudi Arabia, 20
employer(s), 47 segmentation, 119, 136
politics, 28 South Korea, 145–146, 150, 158, 166
Kuwaitisation, 80 UAE, 37, 40, 44–45, 50, 80, 102
Kwon Huck-ju, 117 women in, 40, 119–120, 131, 144, 146, 150
Labour migration, 70, 158, see also Migration
L in Asia, 144
Labour to East Asia, 5–6
Arab, 3 policy, 5, 100–101, 101n2, 143–145,
from Asia, 162 147–148, 159, 161, 164, 173
Asian, 3 to South Korea, 143–145, 147–149, 153
from Bangladesh, 170 Labour Standards Act (South Korea), 146
distribution, 120 Language, 56n2, 63, 65–66, 70, 131, 150, 160,
division of, 6, 13, 16, 18–20, 25–26, 28–29, 163
31–32, 44, 144–146 Arabic, 6, 45–46, 59, 66–69, 76, 82, 102,
foreign, 5, 7–8, 125, 158, 161, 163, 167 128
from Myanmar, 170 English, 38n5, 46, 66–68, 76, 79, 101, 108,
recruitment of, 5, 127, 130, 163 128, 134, 169
reform(s), 111, 115, 165 French, 68
regulation of, 4 Korean, 145, 167
from Thailand, 170 Malay, 169
Labour force participation Mandarin, 169
female, 8, 115–116, 120, 122–125, 127, Tagalog, 38n5, 76
136 Tamil, 169
Myanmar, 127 Latin America, 162
Oman, 129 Law(s)
Qatar, 129 anti-discrimination, 8, 102
Index 193
citizenship, 62n7, 71, 76, 120 Local government(s)

immigration, 163 Japan, 163–164, 173
Japan, 172 Singapore, 170
labour, 5, 98 UAE, 106
nationality, 162, 164, 172 London, 89
naturalisation, 68n15 Longva, Anh Nga, 6, 15–16, 50
Philippine, 68n15 Low-skilled workers, 63, 166, 170
Qatar, 98 Luzon, 87
rule of, 160
shariah, 63 M
South Korea, 164 Madakkara, Iqbal, 107, 107n6
UAE, 62, 62n7, 102 Mahdavi, Pardis, 50
Law for the Promotion of the Ainu Culture and Mahdavy, Hossein, 116
for the Dissemination and Advocacy for Mahler, Sarah J., 147
the Traditions of the Ainu and the Ainu Majority, ethnic, 6
Culture (Japan), 162 Malay(s), 168
Leader(s) leader(s), 168–169
Malay, 168–169 ruler(s), 169
religious, 165 in Singapore, 168–170
Lebanese, 66–67 Malay (language), 120, 169
Lebanon, 43n9, 66–67 Malaya, 168–169
Lee Hye-Kyung, 167 citizenship, 168
Legitimacy, 5, 117, 172 colonial, 168
political, 6, 117 economy, 168
regime, 117 Indian(s) in, 168
state, 99, 159–160 Malaya, Federation of, 169
Levitas, Ruth, 56 Malayan Union, 168–169
Lian Kwen Fee, 1–11, 157–175 Malaysia, 127, 168–170
Liberal as developmental state, 117
immigration, 159, 164, 168, 170 migrants in, 118
institution(s), 159, 172 multiethnic, 89
policy, 128, 159, 164, 168 Malaysian(s), 170
state(s), 159 citizenship, 89
welfare regimes, 159 Mandarin (language), 169
Liberal constraint, 159–160, 163, 172–173, Manila, 85, 87, 88n19
see also Embedded liberalism university, 84
theory, 10, 159, 171, 173 Manufacturing, 25, 78
Liberal democracies companies, 149
Western, 157 export-orientated, 170
Western Europe, 158 industry, 5, 9, 145, 150
Liberal Democratic Party (Japan), 163 Marginalisation
Liberal Party (Korea), 164 of women, 7
Liberalisation Market
of immigration, 8, 170 global, 25, 125
political, 162 labour, 4, 6–8, 14, 16–18, 20, 26, 28, 30,
Liberalism, 158 32, 37, 40–45, 50, 52, 80, 97, 100, 102,
embedded, 159 110
Lifestyle Marriage(s), 57n4, 70, 118, see also
Gulf, 76, 88, 90 Intermarriage(s)
Japanese, 162 in AGS, 5, 7, 57, 64
rural, 165 in Bahrain, 60
urban, 81 in Brunei, 120, 131
194 Index
in Dubai, 65–66 from Kerala, 78, 107

Filipina, 7, 64–65, 69 in Japan, 5, 118, 158, 161, 172–173
Filipino, 55–57, 64, 69 Korean, 165
international, 5, 57, 57n4, 70, 161, 165, 173 in Malaysia, 118
in Japan, 6, 161 in Middle East, 2, 78, 118
in Qatar, 60 Nepalese, 9, 144–146, 148, 151
in South Korea, 5–6, 9, 165–167, 172 and oil economy, 16
in UAE, 7, 60–63, 63n11 from Pakistan, 3, 62, 65, 78
Matsukawa, Kyoko, 7, 75–94 from Palestine, 3, 78
Matsuo, Masaki, 6, 13–35, 44 from Philippines, 3, 7, 62, 76–78
May Day, see International Labour Day professional(s), 79–80, 170
Mazrui, Ali A., 16 regulation of, 79–80, 147, 149
Mediterranean societies, 157 second-generation, 75–77, 81–82, 85–92
Merchant(s), 168 from South Asia, 5, 7, 58, 78–79, 168,
group(s), 16 170–171
Hindu, 78 and state-building, 8
Jain, 78 values, 99
Muslim, 78 workforce, 8–9, 16, 58, 79, 118, 149
South Asian, 79 Migrant labour, 5
Southeast Asian, 79 in AGS, 3, 98
Metropolitan cities, 143 in Brunei, 125
MFDW, see Muslim Filipina domestic worker dependency, 125, 158
Middle East, 7, 49, 58, 75, 105 in Dubai, 99
authoritarianism in, 15 policy, 102–104, 107, 111
domestic worker(s) in, 6, 38, 43, 50 in Qatar, 111
economy, 15 in Singapore, 168
education in, 7 in South Korea, 118, 146, 164
extremism, 43, 110 in UAE, 102, 106–107
Islamic movement(s) in, 102 Migrant worker(s)
migrant(s) in, 2, 78, 118 in Dubai, 62–63, 98–100, 104
Muslim(s) in, 6, 49 from Egypt, 3, 31, 62, 65, 78
politics, 105 female, 64, 131, 144, 167
temporary immigration in, 1 Filipino, 7, 41, 43n9, 46, 51, 56, 63–64, 77,
Migrant(s), 2, 4, 7, 9, 50, 98–100, 106–107, 79, 91
111, 144, 153–154, 159, 162, 169, 173 Goan, 79, 90
in Abu Dhabi, 100, 104 from India, 3, 62, 76–77, 168
Arab, 3, 58, 168 and nationality, 13n1, 55, 80
Asia, 2, 79, 118, 144, 153, 161, 172 from Nepal, 62, 78
Asian, 3–4, 57, 78n4, 80–81, 91 in Oman, 17, 79
in Bahrain, 17, 25, 28, 99 in Qatar, 17, 78, 99
from Bangladesh, 3, 62, 78 in Saudi Arabia, 17, 98
in Brunei, 120 in Singapore, 144, 147, 158, 161, 168,
from China, 171 170
and citizen(s), 3–4, 14, 16–18, 20, 57 in South Korea, 5, 8, 118, 145, 147, 150,
de-Arabisation of, 31 158, 164–165
and developmental state(s), 118, 125 from Southeast Asia, 5, 78–79, 170
discrimination against, 144, 146 from Sri Lanka, 3, 62, 78
from East Asia, 170 from Sudan, 62
and ethnocracy, 16 from Syria, 31
group(s), 2, 63, 162 and Thailand, 118
in Hong Kong, 144 from Turkey, 157
and inclusion, 2, 56, 69–71 from Yemen, 3, 62, 78
Indian, 77, 79, 86, 91, 107, 168 Migrant-friendly discourse, 8, 97–99, 103–106,
from Indonesia, 3, 78 108–111
Index 195
Migration, 50, 70, 85, 92, 159, 161, 171, Ministry of Internal Affairs and
see also Labour migration Communications (Japan), 163
in AGS, 1–2, 14, 63, 75–76 Ministry of Justice (Japan), 162, 164
in Asia, 1–2, 116, 119, 143–144 Ministry of Labour (United Arab Emirates),
Arab, 77n3 101n2, 102, 107, see also Ministry of
in Brunei, 115–116, 120, 125 Human Resources and Emiratisation
discourse, 1–2, 14, 160, 166–167 Minority
to East Asia, 5 ethnic, 159–160, 162, 169–170, 172–173
feminisation of, 57 identities, 160
of Filipino(s), 77 indigenous, 160
of foreign labour, 158 rights, 9, 160, 163
and gender, 2, 152 Mobility
gendered, 144–145, 147, 153 global, 89
global, 57 social, 57
and globalisation, 2, 7 Modernisation theory, 117
and government(s), 2, 158, 163–164, 166, Monocultural society
171–172 Japan as, 9, 164
to Hong Kong, 116 South Korea as, 167, 172–173
to Japan, 9, 163 Monoculturalism
from Nepal, 145 ideology of, 163
and Philippines, 134 and Japan, 157, 163, 168, 172
policymakers, 3 and South Korea, 157, 168
politics of, 158–160, 171 Moro(s), 38m1, 42
regime(s), 2, 9, 144, 148–149, 153 Movement(s)
regulation of, 158 antigovernment, 19, 31–32
to Singapore, 5, 9, 116, 170 democracy, 165, 172
from South Asia, 3 Islamic, 102
to South Korea, 5, 9, 144–145, 147, 151, Multan, 78
164, 166–167, 171 Multicultural
temporary, 9, 132 community, 163
in UAE, 58, 63, 97 Dubai as, 104–105
in West, 1 Japan as, 163, 172
Migration policy, 97, 143–144 policy, 157–158, 160, 164, 171–172
Brunei, 116, 134 society, 2, 9
Japan, 161, 163 Singapore as, 170–171, 173
South Korea, 143, 145, 148, 164 South Korea as, 164, 167, 173
Singapore, 170 UAE as, 105
South Korea, 143, 145, 148, 153, 164, 166 Multiculturalism, 9, 157–160
Military bases discourse on, 164, 166–167, 172
United States, 166 and exclusion, 160
Mindanao, 38n5, 42 and government(s), 157–158, 160, 164,
Minimum wage, 40n7 166–167, 172
Brunei, 115, 132, 134–136 ideology of, 173
regulation, 135–136 and immigration, 157, 169
Ministry of Culture, Youth and Social and inclusion, 160, 169
Development (United Arab Emirates), and Japan, 9, 158, 161, 164, 171–172
99 policy, 171
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (United Arab and politics, 160, 165, 171
Emirates), 104 and Singapore, 158, 161, 167–169, 171,
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (South 173
Korea), 167 and South Korea, 9, 158, 161, 165–167,
Ministry of Human Resources and 171–173
Emiratisation (United Arab Emirates), Multiethnic
102 Malaysia, 89
196 Index
nation(s), 77 Arab, 31
Philippines, 77 Korean, 164
Singapore, 157, 170 Nationality Law No. 16 (Korea), 164
society, 158 Nationality, 3, 56n2
Mumbai, 85, see also Bombay in AGS, 20, 65, 69, 79–80, 90
Murdoch University (Dubai), 86–88 in Dubai, 87
Muslim(s), 65, 68–69 and ethnocracy, 6
in Bahrain, 31 Japanese, 162, 172
discrimination against, 41–42, 44, 49–50 Korean, 164
domestic workers, 6–7, 37–38, 41, 43, 45, law(s), 162, 164, 172
47–49, 51 and migrant worker(s), 13n1, 55, 80
employer(s), 44 Philippine, 68n15
female, 65 policies, 69
Filipino(s), 38n1, 41 in UAE, 6–7, 37, 41, 44–45, 50, 55, 59–60,
household(s), 43–44 62, 69
identity, 41 Naturalisation
merchant(s), 78 in AGS, 13n1, 17, 56, 70
in Middle East, 6, 49 in Bahrain, 17
in Philippines, 42–43 in Brunei, 12
society, 49 in Japan, 162
in UAE, 51, 58, 63n11, 65 law(s), 68n15
women, 6, 38n5, 44 in Oman, 17
Muslim Filipina(s), 38, 38n5, 40n7, 41, 44, 50, policy, 13n1, 70
65 in Qatar, 17
domestic worker(s), 6–7, 37–38, 41, 43, 45, in UAE, 7, 59, 67, 69–71
47–49, 51 NCERT, see National Council for Educational
and education, 40n7, 41 Research and Training
empowerment, 37, 40–42, 47, 50–52 Neoliberalism, 164
overseas worker(s), 38n5 Nepal, 145, 148, 150–152
in Saudi Arabia, 41 migrant worker(s) from, 62, 78
Myanmar migration from, 145
labour from, 170 Nepal Town, 9, 143–153
labour force participation, 127 Nepalese, 46, 49, 148–150, 152
community, 143–146, 148, 150–154
N and education, 145
Naksan Park, 146 exclusion of, 147–148
National, The, 108 female(s), 9, 143–144, 152–153
National Council for Educational Research and government, 145
Training (India), 83n10 migrant(s), 9, 144–146, 148, 151
National Day (United Arab Emirates), 8, 99, in South Korea, 9, 143–155
107, 107n6, 108–109, 111 undocumented worker(s), 151
National development women, 143, 145–146, 149–154
in Brunei, 127 worker(s), 46, 48, 143, 145–148, 150–151,
in UAE, 106–107 166
National identity Network(s)
Emirati, 60 family, 86, 91
Singapore, 168 informal, 6
South Korea, 164 kinship, 168
UAE, 109, 111 social, 65, 69–70, 88n19, 90, 106, 145, 148
National security, 56 Network for Migrants’ Rights, 166
in AGS, 57 New Delhi, 83
Nationalisation New Zealand, 87
policy, 4, 120, 127 universities, 86
Nationalism Newspaper(s), 57
Index 197
English, 85, 101, 108 P

NGO, see Non-governmental organisation Pakistan
Nikkeijin diaspora, 161, 164 migrant(s) from, 3, 62, 65, 78
Non-governmental organisation, 160 Pakistani, 46, 82n7
activism, 41 Palawan, 42
in Brunei, 126, 133 Palestine
and Filipino worker(s), 41 migrant(s) from, 3, 78
Japanese, 163–164 worker(s) from, 31
Philippine, 38n5 Palestinian(s), 7, 48, 58, 68, 68n14
in South Korea, 166, 172 Palm Jumeirah, 38, 47
Non-resident Indian(s) Park Keumjae, 166
quota, 86 Parliamentary democracy, 169
Norms Parolin, Gianluca, 13n1
cultural, 16, 101, 171 Patriarchal society, 3–4, 50
sexuality, 43–44 Patriotism
North Africa, 157 in UAE, 107
North America, 7, 77, 85n15 Pay (wage) gap
North Borneo, 169 gender, 8, 115–116, 122, 130–131, 136
North–South discourse, 2 People’s Action Party (Singapore), 169
NRI, see Non-resident Indian Permanent residence, 70
Nusseibeh, Zaki, 105 in AGS, 79
in UAE, 59
O Persian, 38, 38n3, 48
OFW, see Overseas Filipino worker(s) Persian Gulf, 78
Oil Pessar, Patricia R., 147
boom, 3, 16, 31, 77–79 Philippine
revenues, 3, 13–15, 18, 32–33 citizen(s), 70, 79
Oil economy, 14–16, 30, 33, 110 citizenship, 7, 68, 68n15
and migrant(s), 16 culture, 83
Oil industry, 58, 78 government, 40n7, 42, 68n15, 79, 83,
Indian(s) in, 78 87n18, 127, 132, 134–135
Oil states labour market, 6
Gulf, 2 law(s), 68n15
Oman, 3, 14–15, 38n2, 56n1, 76, 97–98, 118 nationality, 68n15
domestic worker(s) in, 126 NGOs, 38n5
government, 13, 15, 80n6 society, 37, 41
Indian school(s) in, 83 Philippine Department of Education, 83
labour force participation, 129 Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, 83
migrant worker(s) in, 17, 79 Philippine Overseas Employment
naturalisation in, 17 Administration, 39n6, 40n7
Philippine school(s) in, 83 Philippine school(s), 83–84, 91
as rentier state, 118 in Abu Dhabi, 83
workforce, 19–20 in Dubai, 84, 86
Omani, 59 in Kuwait, 75
Ong, Aihwa, 58 in Oman, 83
Organisation(s) in Saudi Arabia, 83
community, 146, 150–152 Philippines, 7, 38, 38n1, 38n5, 39, 39n6,
human rights, 42, 50, 100, 102, 102n3 42–43, 46, 48–49, 51–52, 66–67, 70,
Outsourcing, 130 76, 77n3, 81, 83–88, 88n19, 133, 165
Overseas Filipino worker(s) Christian(s) in, 6, 42–43, 49
in AGS, 63–64 conflict in, 42, 42n8, 43
female, 64 domestic worker(s) from, 6, 170
in West Asia, 63 education in, 66–67, 84, 86
198 Index
higher education in, 84 activism, 165–166, 172

Japanese in, 162 development, 169
labour market, 6, 37, 40–43, 50m, 52 discourse, 163
migrant(s) from, 3, 7, 62, 76–78 economy, 158
and migration, 134 elite(s), 116
multiethnic, 77 equality, 160
Muslim(s) in, 42–43 legitimacy, 6, 117
student(s) in, 88 liberalisation, 162
unemployment in, 63 power, 16, 168
universities, 84, 86, 88 reform(s), 166
youth(s), 77 regimes, 3
Plural society, 168, 170 rights, 59, 117
Pluralism, 57 Politics
Pluralist authoritarian, 18
policy, 171, 173 democratic, 116
POEA, see Philippine Overseas Employment of exclusion, 98
Administration Kuwaiti, 28
Policy in Middle East, 105
assimilationist, 171 of migration, 158–160, 171
citizenship, 58, 60, 69, 75 and multiculturalism, 160, 165, 171
cultural diversity, 58 South Korean, 165
development, 110, 158–159 Population
economic, 117 Bahrain, 31
education, 83n10 Brunei, 8, 120
ethnic integration, 170 dependency, 161
ethnocratic, 13 East Asia, 5
familialisation, 128 growth, 58, 101, 104
French, 117 indigenous, 31
immigration, 1, 3–4, 7–8, 18, 97, 115–116, Japan, 161
131, 134, 159, 161, 163–164, 167–168, policy, 167
170 South Korea, 5, 161, 164
industrial, 4 Portugal, 89
integration, 97, 106, 163, 170 immigration, 89
labour market, 102 Portuguese
labour migration, 5, 100–101, 101n2, colonial rule, 79
143–145, 147–148, 159, 161, 164, 173 immigration law, 89
liberal, 128, 159, 164, 168 Poverty, 2
migrant labour, 102–104, 107, 111 Power
multicultural, 157–158, 160, 164, 171–172 economic, 16, 42, 69, 163, 172
nationality, 69 political, 16, 168
nationalisation, 4, 120, 127 Western, 164
naturalisation, 13n1, 70 Private sector, 6, 18–20, 26, 28, 31–32, 85n15,
pluralist, 171, 173 122, 125
population, 167 Production
protection, 51, 98, 102 capitalist, 159
reception, 2 Professional(s), 7, 118
rent allocation, 31–32 in AGS, 41, 79–80
social, 2, 135 female, 8, 115–116, 122, 128, 131, 136
social integration, 97, 106 labour market, 110
Policy Agenda 2007–2008, 104 migrant(s), 79–80, 170
Policymakers, 160 Protection policy, 51, 98, 102
migration, 3 Public sector, 6–7, 18–19, 26, 28, 31–32, 44,
Political 85n15, 125, 131
authority, 3 Punjab, 78
Index 199
Q Regime(s)
Qaboos bin Said Al Said, Sultan, 15 authoritarian, 14–16, 18, 26, 32–33, 117,
Qatar, 3, 8, 14–15, 38n2, 47, 56n1, 76, 97–98 165
citizen(s), 26 ethnocratic, 16
division of labour in, 19, 23–24, 26 instability, 110
domestic worker(s) in, 47, 125–126 legitimacy, 117
government, 13, 15 migration, 2, 9, 144, 148–149, 153
human rights in, 98, 111 political, 3
labour force participation, 129 welfare, 2, 126, 159
labour law, 98 Regionalisation, 170
law(s), 98 Regulation
marriage(s) in, 60 of citizenship, 71
migrant labour in, 111 of labour, 4
migrant worker(s), 17, 78, 99 of migrant(s), 79–80, 147, 149
naturalisation in, 17 of migration, 158
as rentier state, 118 minimum wage, 135–136
school(s), 83 Religion, 38, 41, 49, 51, 55, 57, 63, 63n11, 70,
workforce, 20, 23, 25 102, 105–106, 150, 158, 160, 170
Qatari(s), 59 Religious, 56n2, 62, 80, 106, 170, 173
Quasi-citizenship, 3 activist(s), 172
Quota(s), in AGS, 18–20 affiliation, 41
in Brunei, 122 boundaries, 57
non-resident Indian, 86 conflict, 42
differences, 118, 157
R discrimination, 102
Race, 102, 106, 144, 158, 170 ethnocracy, 16
relations, 169 extremism, 8, 102–103, 105
Racial group(s), 57, 105
boundaries, 57 leader(s), 165
differences, 9 radicalism, 105
discrimination, 102 tolerance, 104
ethnocracy, 16 Rent allocation policy, 31–32
integration, 170 Rent-seeking, 4
Radical Rentier state(s), 15, 117, 119
groups, 169 AGS as, 3, 8, 33, 118, 120
ideology, 3 Asian, 118, 127
Radicalism, 8 Bahrain as, 118
religious, 105 Brunei as, 8, 115–118, 120, 122, 125, 136
Rangaswamy, Padma, 90n22 citizen(s) of, 118
Reception policy, 2 citizenship in, 118
Recruitment economy, 116
agencies, 39n6, 43, 49, 79, 132, 135, 145, education in, 15
147 health expenditure in, 117n2
Brunei, 130–136 Oman as, 118
of labour, 5, 127, 130, 163 Qatar as, 118
Reform(s) theory, 15
economic, 166 UAE as, 118
institutional, 103, 160 welfare in, 126
labour, 111, 115, 165 Revenues
labour market, 102 oil, 3, 13–15, 18, 32–33
labour law, 98 Rights
political, 166 economic, 58
welfare, 40 of ethnic minorities, 159–160, 169, 173
200 Index
human, 8, 42, 50, 97–98, 100–102, 102n3, Indian, 81n6, 82–83, 83n12, 84–86, 89, 91
103, 110–111, 133, 146, 149, 159, 163, Philippine, 75, 83–84, 86, 91
165–166, 172 in Oman, 83
indigenous, 162 in Qatar, 83
minority, 9, 160, 163 Saudi Arabia, 83
political, 59, 117 Sharjah, 46, 83, 85
social, 58 Schrover, Marlou, 160
Roh Moo-Hyun, 167 Second World War, 161, 168
Rule of law, 160 Second-class citizen(s), 49
Rule Second-generation migrant(s), 75–77, 81–82,
authoritarian, 166, 172 85–92
colonial, 79, 164 Sectarian conflict, 32
Ruler(s), 19 Sectarianism, 31–32
authoritarian, 15 Segmentation
Malay, 169 labour market, 119, 136
UAE, 106, 108 Seo, Seonyoung, 9, 143–155
Ruling families Seolnal, 149, 149n1
AGS, 3, 5, 14 Seoul, 9, 143–144, 146–147, 149, 152–153
Bahrain, 32 Services
UAE, 107 household, 48, 76, 134
Rural, 118, 149 social, 119
lifestyle, 165 welfare, 104
Settler immigration, 1
S Sexuality, 144
Sabah, see North Borneo female, 43
Safavid dynasty, 78 norms, 43–44
Salmiya Indian Model School, 81n7 Sharia
Sangil, 38, 38n1, 45–46 court, 63n11
Sarangani, 6, 38, 38n1 38n4, 38n5, 39, 41–44, law, 63
46 Sharjah, 77
Sarawak, 169 school(s), 46, 83, 85
Saudi Arabia, 3, 14, 38n2, 45, 48, 56n1, 66–67, Shi‘a, 31
76, 97–98 Sindh, 78
citizen(s), 26 Singapore, 9, 134, 157, 168–169, 171
division of labour, 23–24 ageing in, 9, 161
domestic worker(s) in, 48, 126 Chinese in, 168–170
government, 13, 15 citizen(s), 170
labour force participation, 129 democracy, 169
labour market, 20 as developmental state, 4, 116–118, 125
migrant worker(s) in, 17, 98 domestic worker(s) in, 125–126, 128, 131,
Muslim Filipino(s) in, 41 134, 170
Philippine school(s) in, 83 economy, 169–170
school(s), 83 education in, 169, 173
workforce, 19–20, 25–26 ethnic integration policy, 170
Schinkel, Willem, 160 fertility rates in, 9
School(s) foreign worker(s) in, 118, 161
American, 82–83, 83n12 government, 9, 161, 169–171
Arabic, 82 health care in, 117
Bahrain, 83 household(s), 125
British, 82–83, 83n12, 84, 86, 89 ideology of, 169
Dubai, 82–84, 86 immigration, 168–170
English, 83, 83n12 inclusion in, 169, 173
French, 83 Indian(s) in, 168, 170
in Goa, 85 labour force participation, 129
Index 201
local government, 170 migrant(s) from, 5, 7, 58, 78–79, 168,

Malay(s) in, 168–170 170–171
migrant worker(s) in, 144, 147, 158, 161, migration from, 3
168, 170 South Asian, 78, 90n22
migration to, 5, 9, 116, 170 merchant(s), 79
migration policy, 170 technology worker(s), 170
as multicultural, 170–171, 173 South Korea
and multiculturalism, 158, 161, 167–169, activism in, 165–166, 172
171, 173 administration, 165, 167
multiethnic, 157, 170 ageing in, 5, 9, 161
national identity, 168 authoritarianism in, 172
society, 169–171 Chinese in, 165
student(s) in, 169 cities, 166, 172
Singaporean(s), 169–171 citizen(s), 166, 172
Siraf, 78 citizenship, 149, 164
Social civil society, 9, 164–166, 172–173
activism, 50 democracy, 164–166, 172
capital, 55, 65, 69–71, 91 democratisation, 9, 164–166, 172
cohesion, 5, 13, 57 as developmental state, 117
conflict, 8, 101, 110 education in, 167
development, 104 employer(s) in, 145–147, 149, 166
diversity, 8, 99, 105–106, 109–110 fertility rates in, 5, 9
equality, 160 foreign worker(s) in, 5, 9, 161, 166
mobility, 57 government, 9, 145, 158, 161, 164,
network(s), 65, 69–70, 88n19, 90, 106, 145, 166–167, 172
148 health care in, 167
policy, 2, 135 as host society, 148, 167
rights, 58 human rights in, 146, 149, 165–166, 172
services, 119 industrialisation, 5
Social integration, 76, 119, 167 labour force participation, 129
policy, 97, 106 labour migration in, 143–145, 147–149,
Society 153
AGS, 104 labour market, 145–146, 150, 158, 166
Arab, 7 law(s), 164
civil, 9, 133, 159, 163–166, 172–173 marriage(s) in, 5–6, 9, 165–167, 172
colonial, 168 migrant labour in, 118, 146, 164
cosmopolitan, 55 migrant worker(s) in, 5, 8, 118, 145, 147,
Emirati, 70, 109 150, 158, 164–165
Japanese, 162–164, 172–173 migration to, 5, 9, 144–145, 147, 151, 164,
Kuwait, 15 166–167, 171
monocultural, 9, 164, 167, 172–173 migration policy, 143, 145, 148, 153, 164,
multicultural, 2, 9 166
multiethnic, 158 as monocultural society, 167, 172–173
Muslim, 49 and monoculturalism, 157, 168
patriarchal, 3–4, 50 as multicultural, 164, 167, 173
Philippine, 37, 41 and multiculturalism, 9, 158, 161, 165–167,
plural, 168, 170 171–173
Singapore, 169–171 national identity, 164
South Korean, 165–167, 172–173 Nepalese in, 9, 143–155
Southeast Asian, 158 NGOs in, 166, 172
UAE, 37, 44, 67, 69, 71, 99–106, 108–111 population, 5, 161, 164
Western, 1 student(s) in, 162, 165, 172
Solidaritas Perempuan, 126 undocumented worker(s) in, 5, 147, 151,
South Asia 166
202 Index
unemployment in, 151 Summit on the Global Agenda, 105

workforce, 149, 166 Sunni, 31–32
South Korean, 165, see also Korean Support for Multicultural Families Act (South
identity, 164 Korea), 167
nationalism, 164 Syria, 65
politics, 165 migrant worker(s) from, 31
society, 165–167, 172–173 Syrian, 47, 64
Southeast Asia, 117, 161, 167
domestic worker(s) in, 115–116, 127 T
labour force participation, 127 Tagalog, 38n5, 76
migrant worker(s) from, 5, 78–79, 170 Tai, Eika, 163
Southeast Asian(s), 167 Taiwan, 161
merchant(s), 79 as developmental state, 4, 117–118
societies, 158 domestic worker(s) in, 125, 127, 131
Sponsorship system, see Kafala Tamil (language), 169
Sri Lanka Technical Education and Skills Development
migrant worker(s) from, 3, 62, 78 Authority (Brunei), 134
Sri Lankan(s), 82n7, 134 Temporary immigration, 9, 132
domestic worker(s), 64 in Middle East, 1
State-building Test of Proficiency in Korean, 145
and migrant(s), 8 Thailand
State(s) as developmental state, 117–118
agencies, 4, 7 labour from, 170
developmental, 4–5, 8, 115–119, 125–126, labour force participation, 129
136, 164 and migrant worker(s), 118
legitimacy, 99, 159–160 Theory
liberal, 159 hegemonic stability, 118
rentier, 3, 8, 15, 33, 115–120, 122, institutional, 159
125–127, 136 liberal constraint, 10, 159, 171, 173
welfare, 58, 69, 117 modernisation, 117
Strategy rentier state, 15
branding, 99, 110 Third Basic Plan for Immigration Control
development, 4, 79 (Japan), 163
economic, 118 Time Out Dubai Kids, 82
Student(s) Tolerance
in AGS, 82–86 cultural, 104
in Dubai, 82, 86–88 religious, 104
female, 87, 128 TOPIK, see Test of Proficiency in Korean
Filipina, 75 Tourism industry, 79
Filipino, 76–77, 84, 87–88 Trafficking
Indian, 77, 82n7, 83–84, 86 in Brunei, 133
Jordanian, 82n7 Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons Order
in Kuwait, 82, 89 2004 (Brunei), 133
in Philippines, 88 Trafficking in persons report, 116n1, 126, 133
in Singapore, 169 Transient Workers Count Too, 136
in South Korea, 162, 165, 172 Transnational community, 2–3, 143–145, 150,
Subject(s) 152–153
colonial, 161, 172 Tribal
cultural, 144 community, 60
Islamic, 82 kinship, 14
Sudan Turkey
migrant worker(s) from, 62 migrant worker(s) from, 157
Sulu archipelago, 42 Twitter, 101
Index 203
U as multicultural, 105
UAE, see United Arab Emirates Muslim(s) in, 51, 58, 63n11, 65
UAE Vision 2021, 104 national development in, 106–107
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates, 19 national identity, 109, 111
Undocumented worker(s) nationality in, 6–7, 37, 41, 44–45, 50, 55,
in Japan, 5, 162 59–60, 62, 69
Nepalese, 151 naturalisation in, 7, 59, 67, 69–71
in South Korea, 5, 147, 151, 166 patriotism in, 107
Unemployment permanent residence in, 59
in Brunei, 115–116, 122, 125 as rentier state, 118
in Philippines, 63 ruler, 106, 108
in South Korea, 151 ruling families, 107
United Arab Emirates society, 37, 44, 67, 69, 71, 99–106,
Arab(s) in, 69, 109 108–111
as cosmopolitan, 55, 60 workforce, 103, 110
Christian(s) in, 63n11, 65 United Nations Human Rights Council, 98, 103
citizen(s), 15, 58, 62, 68, 70 United Nations Security Council, 105
citizenship, 7, 51, 55–56, 58, 58n5, 59–60, United Nations Working Group on Indigenous
62, 62n7, 63n11, 66–71, 103, 105, 108 Populations, 162
class in, 44, 50–51, 56–57, 67, 101, 110 United States, 43, 56–57, 70, 84, 90n22, 126,
conflict in, 8, 101, 110 157, 169
division of labour in, 44 citizenship, 63n11
domestic worker(s) in, 40n7, 44–45, 51–52, Filipino(s) in, 68
101 military bases, 166
economy, 8, 110 Universities
education in, 58, 60, 62 American, 85–86
employer(s) in, 45, 69, 101, 101n2, 102 Australia, 85, 85n15, 87
equality in, 109 Britain, 86
exclusion in, 7, 37, 40–41, 55–57, 69–71 Canada, 85
expatriate(s) in, 8, 63n11, 101, 102n3, 105, Dubai, 86–88
110 in Europe, 85, 85n15
Filipina(s) in, 7, 40n7, 44 European, 85
Filipino(s) in, 51, 56–57, 68, 83–84 Indian, 86
foreign worker(s) in, 8, 58, 62, 80, 97, 101, Manila, 84
103 New Zealand, 86
gender in, 51 Philippines, 84, 86, 88
governance in, 68 Western, 85
government, 8, 13, 58, 60, 62, 66, 68, 70, University of Portsmouth, 86
80n6, 100–101, 101n2, 102, 102n4, Urban
103–104, 106–111 lifestyle, 81
health care in, 58 spaces, 9, 143–144, 147–149, 153
higher education in, 60, 84 Uttar Pradesh, 79
as host society, 37, 41, 49, 101, 108
human rights in, 100–102, 102n3, 103, 110 V
immigration, 8 Values
inclusion in, 7, 37, 40–41, 55–57, 69–71 Arabic, 101
intermarriage in, 55, 60, 63, 68–69, 71 humanitarian, 159, 172
as Islamic, 103 Islamic, 101
labour market, 37, 40, 44–45, 50, 80, 102 migrant, 99
law(s), 62, 62n7, 102 Vatican City, 105
local government, 106 Vietnam
marriage(s) in, 7, 60–63, 63n11 brides from, 165
migrant labour in, 102, 106–107 Vietnamese
migration to, 58, 63, 97 domestic worker(s), 127
204 Index
Violations and inclusion, 40–41

human rights, 97, 146, 165–166, 172 Indian, 64
labour law, 5 in labour market, 40, 119–120, 131, 144,
Visayas, 84 146, 150
Vora, Neha, 77, 85n15, 90, 90n22, 98 marginalisation of, 7
Muslim, 6, 38n5, 44
W Nepalese, 143, 145–146, 149–154
Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat, 99, 103 Work, contract(s), 17, 48, 63
Walk Free Foundation, 98 feminisation of, 131
WAM, see Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat Worker(s), see also Domestic worker(s) and
(Emirates News Agency) Migrant worker(s)
Watanabe, Akiko, 7, 55–73 agricultural, 146
Wawasan Brunei 2035, 127 Asian, 58, 78n4
Welfare Bahraini, 28, 30
in Brunei, 117 in Brunei, 122
distribution, 117 construction, 63, 102n3
equality, 117 Indonesian, 135
of Filipino(s), 79 low-skilled, 63, 166, 170
in Japan, 117 Nepalese, 46, 48, 143, 145–148, 150–151,
reform(s), 40 166
in rentier state(s), 126 from Palestine, 31
services, 104 Workforce
state, 58, 69, 117 AGS, 16, 20, 58, 104
Welfare regimes(s), 126 Bahrain, 20–22, 25–26, 29, 32
liberal, 159 Brunei, 115–116, 122, 124–125, 127, 131
Western, 2 female, 122, 124–125, 131
West Asia Kuwait, 20–21, 26
OFWs in, 63 migrant, 8–9, 16, 58, 79, 118, 149
West Oman, 19–20
economic development in, 3 Qatar, 20, 23, 25
migration to, 1 Saudi Arabia, 19–20, 23, 25–26
Western South Korea, 149, 166
countries, 1, 76, 84, 86, 88 UAE, 8, 103, 110
education, 83–84, 86, 91 World Cup, 98, 111
government(s), 157 World Economic Forum, 105
higher education, 84 World Expo, 106
liberal democracies, 157 World Health Organisation, 117
powers, 164
societies, 1 Y
universities, 85 Yemen, 47
welfare regimes, 2 migrant worker(s) from, 3, 62, 78
Western Europe, 158 Yemeni(s), 47n11, 58, 68n14
Wilkins, Louisa Youth(s)
Women Asian, 7, 77, 86, 92
American, 64 and citizenship, 77, 80, 91
Brunei, 8, 128, 130–131 in Dubai, 77, 87–88
and economy, 8 Filipino, 7, 75–77, 83–86, 88, 90–91
and education, 8, 122, 126–128, 130–131, Indian, 7, 75–77, 81, 83, 86, 89–91
136
Emirati, 60, 62, 101 Z
empowerment of, 7, 40, 42 Zainichi, 161–163
and higher education, 60, 126–128, Zolberg, Aristide, 158
130–131

978-981-13-6899-8

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

978-981-13-6899-8

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

978-981-13-6899-8

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Asia in Transition 8

Lian Kwen Fee

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/13611

ISSN 2364-8252 ISSN 2364-8260 (electronic)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2019933699

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019

Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam Lian Kwen Fee

1 Introduction: Migrants in the Middle East and Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

9 International Migration and the Politics of Multiculturalism

About the Editors

Lian Kwen Fee is professor of sociology at the Institute of Asian Studies,

Naomi Hosoda is associate professor at the School of Global Humanities and

Wako Asato Division of Transcultural Studies, Graduate School of Letters, Kyoto

AED United Arab Emirates dirham

Fig. 2.1 Share of national workers in the public sector, 1962–2011 . . . . . . 19

Table 2.1 Number of national and migrant workers in the AGS,

Lian Kwen Fee, Naomi Hosoda and Masako Ishii

Keywords Asia · Arab Gulf states · Migrants · Foreign labour · Inclusion ·

The understanding of integration outcomes is usually framed within two models

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 1

transnational communities proliferate, states will manage the status of foreigners by

badly victimised by employers and state agencies) is encouraged in a labour market

Keywords Arab Gulf states · Rentier states · Authoritarianism · Division of

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 13

2.2 Authoritarianism, Migrants and the Oil Economy

The AGS have several distinct commonalities, such as authoritarian governments,

2.2.1 Authoritarianism and the Oil Economy

2.2.2 Ethnocracy and Authoritarianism

2.2.3 Migrants and the Oil Economy

Bahrain 2010 185,055 526,175 73.98

2.2.4 Division of Labour: The Heart of Ethnocracy

2.3 Analysing Ethnocracy in the Arab Gulf States

2.3.1 National Divisions of Labour: Occupations for Citizens

Fig. 2.1 Share of national workers in the public sector, 1962–2011

Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of

Other National 1549 1.67 62.21 4.07 – – – –

Percentage Percentage Percentage of Percentage of

Other National – – – – 31306 1.68 13.02 0.72

2.3.2 Time Series Analysis

National 69.36 69.73 67.07 32.70 8.05 6.13 14.90

Migrant 38.39 83.05 81.68 81.46 83.67 80.51

statistics for other years. It is represented in this table as ‘clerical work’

Masaki Matsuo is an associate professor at the School of International Studies, Utsunomiya

Abstract This chapter examines the empowerment of Muslim Filipina domestic

Keywords United Arab Emirates · Domestic workers · Women’s empowerment ·

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2019 37

Fig. 3.1 Sarangani region, the Philippines

East ranged from PHP5000 to PHP10,000 (US$100–200) in 2009.6 In total, most

3.2 Inclusion in the Foreign Labour Market of the AGS

The Philippines is a predominantly Christian country with a Muslim population

of the population there is Christian. Moreover, increased Islamophobia, due to the

3.3 Inclusion and Exclusion in the Segregated Labour

3.4 Type B MFDWs Assisting Fellow Filipino Workers

3.5 Type B MFDWs and Their Empowerment

3.5.1 Radjina’s Experiences

3.5.2 Miranda’s Experiences

3.6 Conclusion: Understanding Empowerment of MFDWs

Keywords United Arab Emirates · Intermarriage · Filipino · Citizenship ·

ensure the rights of foreign workers is lacking.