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Can Pak-India Nuclear Deterrence Hold
Can Pak-India Nuclear Deterrence Hold
Exactly 25 years ago, on May 28, Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests (a sixth was done on
May 30). The tests were a response to India’s five nuclear tests, conducted on May 11 and 13.
Both governments, after the tests, declared a moratorium on further testing. A quarter century
since May 1998, they have stuck to the moratorium, though neither has signed the
The nuclearisation of South Asia can be analysed from different angles. For our present
purpose, however, the main question is simple: while there’s general consensus among security
experts and nuclear establishments within India and Pakistan that nuclear weapons are a
deterrent, should we consider that proposition a truism for now and the time to come?
Having analysed these issues for a long time and advocated the deterrence framework, I have
come to believe that such unerring faith in deterrence might increasingly be misplaced for a
host of reasons. This is also true for other nuclear weapons states (NWSs). We should be less
sanguine about deterrence holding in all situations. Indeed, there’s now growing literature about
the world being “on the cusp of a Third Nuclear Age” where a number of factors are likely to
make the old belief in deterrence increasingly problematic if not entirely untenable.
This article primarily deals with India and Pakistan, a nuclear dyad in conflict. But some of the
observations here are also applicable to other NWSs, including those whose possession of
nuclear weapons have been “legitimised” by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
nuclear parity with India has served to deter a serious conflict between
the two countries, with our peculiar history and geography and the
draw the attention of the informed generalist to them. After listing those factors, I intend to
In a 2021 article for European Journal of International Security, titled Strategic non-nuclear
weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age, Andrew Future and Benjamin Zala describe the
Third Nuclear Age as the combination of Second Nuclear Age thinking — i.e., deployment of
Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons (SNNWs) — “with the return of the kind of major power
competition associated with the First Nuclear Age.” This combo, as experts have begun to note,
is highly dangerous.
So, what are SNNWs? Broadly, they are weapons with the “ability to engage targets at the
strategic level of warfare, where the adversary’s sources of national power are located.” They
The kinetic category includes the increasingly more sophisticated conventional precision-strike
capabilities: cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). This category also includes anti-satellite weapons and missile defences.
Missile defences, by denying the adversary strategic strikes, can offset the deterrent balance
and force adversaries into using overwhelming preemptive force. The ongoing Russo-Ukraine
The second, non-kinetic category, includes cyber attacks (which can be mounted with strategic
effect) and electronic-warfare capabilities (dominating the electromagnetic spectrum can not
only degrade or deny the environment for the adversary but achieve strategic results for the side
dominating the spectrum). Another aspect is information warfare and influence operations.
Again, we are witnessing the use of info war by both Ukraine/NATO and Russia. Misinformation
and disinformation campaigns, as is now widely known, serve to undermine trust in public
institutions and governments. They are also essential tools in influencing perceptions.
INTEGRATION, AI AND THE KILL CHAIN
While the SNNW technologies are disrupting the battlefield by getting increasingly more
Developments in artificial intelligence (AI) are also likely, by most accounts, to take the human
out of the decision-making loop. This is not hypothetical, since multiple such systems are being
tested and prototypes developed. Another problem is the presence of SNNWs in a nuclear
Since they “constitute an employable and credible weapon system that can engage the sources
of enemy power directly, skipping the tactical and operational levels of warfare”, nuclear
adversaries can use them thinking that they could keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold.
Also, in the case of NWSs there’s no way of knowing whether these weapons carry conventional
warheads.
Cross-platform integration and the introduction of AI — what we can call the Internet of Military
Things — is changing the concept of the decision-making speed and what the militaries call the
kill chain (it also throws up many ethical issues). Up until now, the kill chain was a series of
processes, executed sequentially. With AI, we are now looking at overlapping some of those
phases and completing them in parallel, to reduce the execution time of the chain.
In other words, the weapon is fired first, the find and fix processes overlap the flight time, and
the final target designation is sent to the weapon in flight, through a SATCOM channel. Now
bring AI into this and combine it with hypersonic missiles and you get an idea of how much time
human pilot. The AI pilot beat the human pilot in a 5-0 sweep in dogfight and manoeuvres.
According to DARPA, the trials were designed as a risk-reduction effort for its Air Combat
Evolution (ACE) programme to flesh out how human and machine pilots can share operational
control of a fighter jet to maximise its chances of mission success. The overarching ACE
concept is aimed at allowing the pilot to shift “from single platform operator to mission
commander”, in charge not just of flying their own aircraft but managing teams of drones slaved
While some of these technologies are expensive, others are not. The cost of many will steadily
come down further as they proliferate (drones are a case in point, as is cyber and digital
expertise). At this point, there are almost no regulatory frameworks for a number of emerging
technologies.
Integration and the digital environment has also brought other risks. In a January 2018 report,
the Royal Institute of International Affairs warned that US, British and other nuclear weapons
systems are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This is far from an abstract threat.
In 2010, the US Air Force lost contact with a field of 50 Minuteman III Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs) at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming for an hour, raising the terrifying
prospect that an enemy actor might have taken control of the missiles and was feeding
Earlier, in 2016, Andrew Futter wrote a paper for the Royal United Services Institute, titled ‘Cyber
Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy.’
Futter says: “There are two significant implications of this for nuclear weapons management
and nuclear strategy: first, increasing complexity, particularly through computerisation and
digitisation, raises the risk of normal accidents within the nuclear enterprise; and second,
complex systems used to manage nuclear forces contain inherent vulnerabilities, weaknesses
and bugs that might be exploited or manipulated in a variety of different ways by hackers.”
This is not all. In a January 2023 edited volume, The Fragile Balance of Terror: Deterrence in the
New Nuclear Age, professors Vipin Narang and Scott D Sagan point to what they call the
Gathered in the book are some of the top world experts trying to analyse the presence of
incorrect information; states facing multiple nuclear adversaries (regional subsystems) and
or otherwise spread rampantly; states possessing small nuclear arsenals which they fear may
not be reliable or survivable or over which they may not retain firm command and control.
As they put it: “Each of these factors alone, and especially in combination, generate risks that
our standard strategies of nuclear deterrence are simply unequipped to manage or address.”
This is just a bird’s-eye view of a much larger and complex body of literature, a corpus that is
increasing in volume, not as an exercise in alarmism but in analysing the emerging, uncertain
trends.
Some might say that it will be a while before some of these advanced technologies will get to
UAVs are already here, as are missile defences and precision, long-range artillery. India is
already seeking to bolster its anti-ballistic and cruise missile defences, developing MIRVs
essentially, nuclear-powered submarines which can carry ballistic and cruise missiles with
nuclear warheads.
These systems can both be non-nuclear and nuclear — i.e., they can carry tactical and strategic
warheads. Coupled with non-kinetic strategic options (cyber, electronic and information
warfare), they extend the same set of problems to India and Pakistan. In fact, given the
contiguity of this nuclear-armed conflict dyad, the chances of accidents, miscalculations and
There are a number of additional risk factors as far as India and Pakistan are concerned: they
are locked in a conflictual model; they have had multiple armed confrontations; both are
nuclear-armed with growing arsenals and capabilities; since 2014, but more so since 2016, there
is no dialogue framework between the two (covert channels notwithstanding); multiple military
and non-military confidence-building measures (hotlines etc) are hardly used to offset a crisis,
though they are used after a crisis begins to unfold; and the two sides’ respective positions on
This environment is known. But it also feeds into another set of problems that increases the
likelihood of a conflict:
b: India’s movement away from the declaratory no-first use policy, as contained in its 2003
doctrine, to what can now only be described as a non-stated first-use policy; and
c: India’s poor record of handling weapon systems and platforms, which increases the risk of
accidental conflict.
full-scale mobilisation in 2001-02. The Indian political and military leadership drew two lessons
from that mobilisation: the requirement for a forward-leaning posture, and developing strategies
to punish Pakistan in limited engagements that do not escalate — i.e., assuming there is a band
If India were to play within that band, goes the theory, it would be very difficult for Pakistan to
This was the start of India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. Cold Start is a limited-war strategy designed to
As an explainer in The Economist put it, the strategy envisaged “having nimbler, integrated units
stationed closer to the border [that] would allow India to inflict significant harm before
international powers demanded a ceasefire. By pursuing narrow aims, it would also deny
This thinking is flawed and rests on the assumption that, in any first or possibly second round,
India will gain an upper hand, forcing Pakistan to either escalate or blink. If Pakistan does
escalate, India believes the international opinion will be on India’s side and Pakistan will have to
climb down.
But events may not follow India’s script, as was evident in February 2019. Pakistan’s aerial
retaliation and complete domination of that point of conflict forced India to threaten missile
strikes, a big no between a nuclear dyad. International pressure, Pakistan’s promised response
and Islamabad’s decision to return the downed Indian pilot served to de-escalate the situation.
But things could have got worse: what if India hadn’t missed the target in Balakot and killed
seminary children; what if, under pressure, Pakistan had actually engaged and destroyed the
Indian targets that were selected for engagement? What if India had followed through on its
possibly be traced back to the chance factor that the Indian strike package missed its target.
At the politico-strategic levels, relations remain tense, with little to no dialogue between the two
sides since August 5, 2019, when India unilaterally and illegally revoked the autonomous status
deteriorating relations result in a higher probability of conflict between the two sides.
India’s 2003 Nuclear Doctrine declares that India is wedded to no-first use (NFU) — i.e., India will
not be the first to use nuclear weapons, unless it is attacked with nuclear weapons. The NFU
declarations, as experts have widely argued, are political, not operational statements.
In a 2019 article for International Security, Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang argued that
“Indian officials are [increasingly] advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have
begun to lay out exceptions to India’s long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the
preemptive use of nuclear weapons.” There is also other evidence that India has come a long
way since the 2003 doctrine and is no longer tied down by NFU operationally.
Additionally, as is evident from debates on NFU, it is very difficult to verify a state’s NFU
declaration. For instance, Li Bin, a professor at China’s Tsinghua University and an expert in
nuclear strategy, argues that, without knowledge of a state’s size of nuclear force, its force
composition, the accuracy of its weapons (for counterforce targeting) and conventional force
The operational insignificance of NFU is also evident from what Nato officials found in the
classified documents on Warsaw Pact war plans after the fall of the Berlin Wall. French diplomat
and strategic expert Therese Delpech, wrote that “…military records of the Warsaw Pact that fell
into German hands demonstrated beyond doubt that Russian operational plans called for the
use of nuclear and chemical weapons in Germany at the onset of hostilities, even if Nato forces
On March 9, 2022, at 6:43pm, the Air Defence Operations Centre of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)
picked up and began tracking a high-speed flying object which, after flying for some time inside
Indian airspace, sharply changed course and manoeuvred towards Pakistani territory. It violated
Pakistan’s air space and ultimately fell near Mian Channu in Pakistani Punjab’s Khanewal
district.
The next day, the Director-General Inter-Services Public Relations (DG-ISPR) briefed the media
on the incident. The DG-ISPR noted that “It is important to highlight that the flight path of this
object endangered many international and domestic passenger flights…as well as human life
and property on ground. Whatever caused this incident to happen… it, nevertheless…reflects very
The Indian government kept silent for two days after the incident before publicly confirming that
one of its missiles had been accidentally launched while undergoing “routine maintenance” and
On March 15, six days after the incident, speaking in the Indian parliament, Indian defence
He stated that: “It was later known that the missile fell in Pakistan’s territory. The incident is
regrettable. But it’s a relief that no losses happened. I’d like to inform the House that the
Government has taken this matter very seriously and [an] official order for a high-level probe has
been given.”
Singh’s statement raised a number of technical and strategic questions, justifying Pakistan’s
demand that any inquiry into the launch must involve a team of technical experts from Pakistan.
Pakistan’s statement also listed seven fundamental questions: the exact type of the
missile/projectile that was accidentally launched; what was the missile’s programmed flight
path; how and why it had veered from its flight path, stressing, as an Indian analyst termed
“justifiably”, that “such an incident had the possibility of precipitating a prospective crisis if
Islamabad had opted to react, as it was completely unaware that the missile was unarmed”; was
the missile fitted with a self-destruct mechanism (if not, why not and if it were, why and how the
device had malfunctioned); and what technical measures and procedures, if any, does India
In addition to the technical questions — answers to which are vital for a number of reasons,
including strategic stability, safety and security — the important question is whether India
From Singh’s statement that India “later learnt” that the missile landed in Pakistani territory, it is
obvious that, while the missile was in flight and even after it had gone off course, India did not
inform Pakistan, either because it failed to monitor the missile’s flight or deliberately withheld
the information.
No matter which way one cuts it, whether the operators were incompetent or complicit, the
incident is indicative not just of India’s inability to handle sensitive technology, but also of the
deeply worrying communication gaps between India and Pakistan, a contiguous nuclear dyad
Serious questions have been raised by analysts within and outside India about multiple
incidents and accidents that have happened over the years during equipment and systems
handling.
As noted by one Indian analyst, “the Indian military services over the last several years have
witnessed many high profile tragedies and mishaps.” During PAF’s Operation Swift Retort on
February 27, 2019, while there was a dogfight going on over the skies along the Line of Control,
Indian ground air defence shot down one of its own Russian Mi-17V5 ‘Hip’ medium-lift
In two other incidents, “India’s indigenous Arihant [nuclear] submarine [was left] out of
commission for many months in 2018; and a fire and explosion on board an Indian Kilo-class
As nuclear weapons states outside the framework of the NPT, Pakistan and India have certain
legal and normative responsibilities. Their civilian nuclear programmes are under the
India, which has a 123 Agreement with the United States, has been trying to become a member
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is already a member of the Missile Technology Control
Regime. Pakistan, for its part, has constantly argued against discriminatory approaches to
non-proliferation and disarmament. While supporting efforts on the CTBT and Fissile Material
Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Pakistan continues to argue for a standardised approach to these
It has also flagged the requirement of regulating the emergence of new technologies, including
hypersonic missiles, lethal autonomous weapons, cyber security, military uses of artificial
There are two sets of problems in finding common ground. One is, of course, the nature of
relations between India and Pakistan and the disputes that underpin it. The other is India’s
perception of itself as a regional power that must find a place at the high table.
A good example of that, among others, is India’s bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations
Security Council (UNSC). This desire, coupled with India’s tense relations with China, means that
India is unwilling to accept a broader bilateral arrangement with Pakistan that it might consider
as hampering the development of its conventional and nuclear military capabilities in relation to
China.
The second problem is the desire by the United States to partner India and look at New Delhi as
a net security provider in this region. This strategic approach is not just about India’s market and
economic potential but also the US’ competition with China. These problems, going forward, will
CONCLUSION
Emerging technologies are increasing the risks in nuclear environments. For India and Pakistan
the risks are much higher for the reasons cited above. There are a number of military confidence
building measures in place between India and Pakistan but they have, at best, been partially
respected.
As the situation stands, India does not seem to have much appetite to engage with Pakistan.
Pakistan, on its part, has shown the desire to resume the normalisation process but has
preconditioned it with India’s reversal of its August 5, 2019 decision that revoked the special
In the foreseeable future, there does not seem to be much space for a serious dialogue on
The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. He tweets @ejazhaider