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Governance and Public Policy Notes
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Governance and Public Policy

Basic Concepts of Governance
a. Origin of the term Governance
 Greek roots, meaning “to steer”
 Governance came about as society developed from a nomadic existence to a
more settled civilization. As civilizations evolved, it became necessary for
societies within civilizations to form hierarchies for work. As population
increased, groups of people, generally elders formed rules to help each person
in the society, to benefit and to take on individual and collective responsibilities.
These groups of people were also responsible for maintaining peace, harmony
and order within a group and the collective of people. They were known as the
Government or the governing body.
 By the mid-16th century, however, government denoted a “system by which
something is governed” and by the early 18th century it further evolved to
acquire the meaning of a “governing authority.” In this process the term
governance gradually became marginalized, and by the 19th century it was
deemed to reflect an incipient archaism. For the next 100 years, it would hardly
be used as a political term. Dictionaries would define government in terms of a
governing authority, including the political order and its institutional framework,
while governance was treated as the agency and process of governing, and was
often viewed as archaic.
 However, during 1980s under economic reforms, especially under globalization
the use of term governance became popular with its emphasis on the process
and manner of governing to the notion of sustainable development. Meanwhile,
organizations such as the IMF, NGOs, the UN and its agencies, the World Bank
and international media were quick to pick up the term and use it in a variety of
ways.
 Global Governance: Lopez-Claros, A., Dahl, A., & Groff, M. (2020). A History of
Global Governance. In Global Governance and the Emergence of Global
Institutions for the 21st Century (pp. 30-64). Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
o The idea of bringing into being supranational organizations to resolve
disputes between states has a distinguished lineage, going as far back as
Dante Alighieri’s On World Government, Rousseau’s A Project of
Perpetual Peace and Kant’s proposal for a federation of nations
operating under the rule of law, and eventually evolving into “a perfect
civil union of mankind.”
o The League of Nations was a first attempt to pool national sovereignties
together to deal with the problem of war, a milestone in a long process
intended to strengthen the effectiveness of mechanisms of international
cooperation. The UN was initially conceived as an international entity

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founded on federalist principles, with substantial powers to enact laws

that would be binding on member states, but it emerged as a rather less
ambitious entity with two fundamental flaws: the principle of one
country–one vote in the General Assembly and the veto within the
Security Council, both undermining the democratic legitimacy of the
organization. The chapter also reviews the concerns raised by Grenville
Clark and others who thought that if member countries could not agree
upon well-defined powers that they would be willing to yield, no global
authority adequate to maintain peace would arise in our time.
b. Definition of Governance
 “The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised” –
Kaufman et al
 The way “… power is exercised through a country’s economic, political, and social
institutions.” – the World Bank’s PRSP Handbook.
 “The exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a
country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes, and institutions
through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal
rights, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences.” – UNDP.
 “Governance is the process of interactions through the laws, norms, power or
language of an organized society” – Mark Bevir, Governance: A very short
introduction.
 “Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate
governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined.” OECD
c. Definition of Good Governance

 Good governance has 8 major characteristics. It is participatory, consensus oriented,
accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive
and follows the rule of law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of
minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in
society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future
needs of society. – United Nations Economics and Social Commission for Asia and
the Pacific
 The World Bank introduced the concept in its 1992 report entitled "Governance
and Development". According to the document, good governance is an essential
complement to sound economic policies and is central to creating and sustaining
an environment which fosters strong and equitable development.
 The IMF feels that corruption within economies is caused by the ineffective
governance of the economy, either too much regulation or too little regulation.
 According to former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, "Good governance is
ensuring respect for human rights and the rule of law; strengthening democracy;
promoting transparency and capacity in public administration."

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unescap.org/resources/what-good-governance – UNESCAP Document on What is

Good Governance
d. Characteristics of Good Governance:

UNESCAP Document titled “What is Good Governance”
i. Participation,
 Participation by both men and women is a key cornerstone of good
governance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate
intermediate institutions or representatives. It is important to point out
that representative democracy does not necessarily mean that the
concerns of the most vulnerable in society would be taken into
consideration in decision making. Participation needs to be informed
and organized. This means freedom of association and expression on the
one hand and an organized civil society on the other hand.
 All men and women should have a voice in decision-making, either
directly or through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent
their interests. Such broad participation is built on freedom of
association and speech, as well as capacities to participate
constructively.
ii. Rule of law,

 Good governance requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced
impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, particularly
those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws requires an
independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible police force.
 Legal frameworks should be fair and enforced impartially, particularly
the laws on human rights.
iii. Transparency,
 Transparency means that decisions taken, and their enforcement are
done in a manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that
information is freely available and directly accessible to those who will
be affected by such decisions and their enforcement. It also means that
enough information is provided and that it is provided in easily
understandable forms and media.
 Transparency is built on the free flow of information. Processes,
institutions, and information are directly accessible to those concerned
with them, and enough information is provided to understand and
monitor them.
iv. Responsiveness,
 Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to serve all
stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe.
 Institutions and processes try to serve all stakeholders.

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v. Equity and Inclusiveness

 A society’s wellbeing depends on ensuring that all its members feel that
they have a stake in it and do not feel excluded from the mainstream of
society. This requires all groups, but particularly the most vulnerable,
have opportunities to improve or maintain their wellbeing.
 All men and women have opportunities to improve or maintain their
well-being.
vi. Effectiveness and Efficiency

 Good governance means that processes and institutions produce results
that meet the needs of society while making the best use of resources at
their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good
governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the
protection of the environment. Processes and institutions produce
results that meet needs while making the best use of resources.
vii. Accountability
 Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only
governmental institutions but also the private sector and civil society
organizations must be accountable to the public and to their
institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable to whom varies
depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or
external to an organization or institution. In general, an organization or
an institution is accountable to those who will be affected by its
decisions or actions. Accountability cannot be enforced without
transparency and the rule of law.
 Decision-makers in government, the private sector and civil society
organisations are accountable to the public, as well as to institutional
stakeholders. This accountability differs depending on the organisations
and whether the decision is internal or external to an organisation.
viii. Strategic Vision and Consensus Oriented

 There are several actors and as many viewpoints in a given society. Good
governance requires mediation of the different interests in society to
reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the
whole community and how this can be achieved. It also requires a broad
and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human
development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This
can only result from an understanding of the historical, cultural and
social contexts of a given society or community.
 Leaders and the public have a broad and long-term perspective on good
governance and human development, along with a sense of what is
needed for such development. There is also an understanding of the
historical, cultural and social complexities in which that perspective is
grounded.

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 Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad

consensus on what is in the best interests of the group and,. where
possible, on policies and procedures.
e. Collapse/Failure of Governance: its indicators diagnostic

tools & Effects
 Governance failure may be defined as the undesirable or adverse outcome from
a governance process. It may happen during designing, planning, and
implementation of a policy. This idea is also expressed in terms of policy failure
or state failure. – Amiya Kumar Das
 Corruption as a source of failure of good governance: Corruption and good
governance are antagonistic forces which actively operate in any developed or
underdeveloped country. While corruption spreads with leaps and bounds, good
governance is to be built brick by brick. Relative strength of corruption and good
governance determines the state of success or failure of the government to
achieve development objectives within a welfare state. Corruption flourishes
when the government of a country fails to strengthen the measures of good
governance on a regular basis. Periodic attempts of defensive nature against
corruption do not produce the desired results of social welfare. In order to
introduce a strategically sound system of good governance it is necessary to
examine the meaning and methods of corruption which threatens the existence
of good governance
 Measuring Governance: Governance is a complex phenomenon which has been
subject to wide-ranging analysis and elucidation by experts from different fields
of study. Different ideological orientations associated with this concept assume
varied systems of economic and political management and have diverse
viewpoints regarding importance of institutions to governance outcomes. This
lack of clarity and consensus has made measurement of governance difficult and
even controversial to some extent.
In many ways, measurement of governance is a political endeavor. Governance
appraisals can be based on external assessments, peer assessments and self-
assessments, each of which can yield conflicting results depending on the
agenda of the agency conducting the appraisal. For example, external
assessment may be conducted by donors and international NGOs. An example of
a peer assessment is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in which all
the states within the African Union have agreed to implement an instrument to
monitor honest, Corruption As A Source Of Failure Of Good Governance And
Management In transparent, accountable and participatory government (Gruzd,
2009). Finally, self-assessments are country-led evaluations that compiled by
government agencies, civil society, independent researchers, and other
stakeholder at country level. One of the main initiatives to build a measure of
governance which has generated internationally comparable data, and which is
generally accepted as a reliable external assessment source, is the Worldwide
Governance Indicators Project.

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The project has generated data on aggregate and individual governance

indicators in 215 countries, starting in 1996 and updated yearly since 2015.
Based on over 40 data sources from over 30 different organizations the WGIs
comprise of six dimensions of governance. These dimensions include voice and
accountability, political stability and lack of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption. The
indicators are criticized for lacking guidance towards concrete actions, having
hidden biases and being pitched to donor agencies instead of bringing forth
concern about the poor. Nevertheless, the WGIs have spurred scholarly
research and have brought forth the experiences and opinions of organizations
and individuals seeking to play a role in Governance Reforms (Kaufmann,
Kraay & Mastruzzi, 2010).
Other established datasets measuring governance include: Bertelsmann
Transformation Index (BTI) since 2008 looks at "public sector management ,
steering capability, resource efficiency, consensus building, and international
cooperation"; Sustainable Governance Indicators (SGI), since 2009 considers
"strategic capacity, inter-ministerial coordination, policy implementation, and
institutional learning"; Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) since 2006 indicating
"civil service training, remuneration, and performance, as well as the capacity of
political authorities"; Global Integrity Report since 2004 includes "financial
disclosure, conflict of interest, merit-based recruitment, and human resources
management for the civil service".
Governance Theories
a. Communitarianism
 Communitarianism is a philosophy that
emphasizes the connection between the
individual and the community. Its
overriding philosophy is based upon the
belief that a person's social identity and
personality are largely molded by
community relationships, with a smaller
degree of development being placed on
individualism. Although the community
might be a family, communitarianism
usually is understood, in the wider,
philosophical sense, as a collection of
interactions, among a community of
people in each place (geographical
location), or among a community who
share an interest or who share a history.
Communitarianism usually opposes extreme individualism and rejects extreme
laissez-faire policies that deprioritize the stability of the overall community.

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 Communitarian ideas have a long history, in the West, China, and elsewhere, but
modern-day communitarianism began in the upper reaches of Anglo-American
academia in the form of a critical reaction to John Rawls’ landmark 1971 book A
Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971). Drawing primarily upon the insights of Aristotle
and Hegel, political philosophers such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel,
Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer disputed Rawls’ assumption that the principal
task of government is to secure and distribute fairly the liberties and economic
resources individuals need to lead freely chosen lives. These critics of liberal
theory never did identify themselves with the communitarian movement (the
communitarian label was pinned on them by others, usually critics), much less
offer a grand communitarian theory as a systematic alternative to liberalism.
Nonetheless, certain core arguments meant to contrast with liberalism’s
devaluation of community recur in the works of the four theorists named above
(Avineri & de-Shalit 1992, Bell 1993, Berten et al. 1997, Mulhall & Swift 1996,
and Rasmussen 1990), and for purposes of clarity one can distinguish between
claims of three sorts: methodological claims about the importance of tradition
and social context for moral and political reasoning, ontological or metaphysical
claims about the social nature of the self, and normative claims about the value
of community.
 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/ncr.4100820305 - A
Communitarian approach to local governance.
b. Decentered Theory
 Mark Bevir came up with it in 2002
 There are two leading narratives of governance. One is a neoliberal one about
markets that is inspired by rational choice. The other is a story about networks
associated with institutionalism in political science. This paper argues that both
rational choice and institutionalism rely on assumptions about our ability to
read-off people's beliefs from objective social facts about them, and yet that
these assumptions are untenable given the philosophical critique of positivism.
Hence, we need to modify our leading theories and narratives of governance.
We need to decenter them. The paper then explores the distinctive answers a
decentered theory of governance would give to questions such as: is governance
new? is governance a vague metaphor? is governance uniform? how does
governance change? and is governance failure inevitable?
 A decentered analysis of governance departs from both the neoliberal narrative
and that of governance as networks. It encourages us to understand governance
in terms of a political contest resting on competing webs of belief, and to explain
these beliefs by reference to traditions and dilemmas. In doing so, it points
toward novel perspectives on questions that recur in discussions of governance.
 A decentered theory of governance highlights not only the difficulties managers
face in controlling markets and networks but also the possibilities and dangers
markets and networks pose for democracy. It encourages us to treat governance
as an opportunity to redefine democracy. It prompts us to search for patterns of
devolution, participation, control, and accountability that better reflect our

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capacity for agency, the contingency of our identities, the importance of moral
conduct as well as moral rules, and an aspiration toward an open community.
c. Libertarian Socialism
 Libertarian socialism rejects the concept of a state.[15] It asserts that a society
based on freedom and justice can only be achieved with the abolition of
authoritarian institutions that control specific means of production and
subordinate the majority to an owning class or political and economic elite.[22]
Libertarian socialists advocate for decentralized structures based on direct
democracy and federal or confederal associations[23] such as citizens'/popular
assemblies, cooperatives, libertarian municipalism, trade unions and workers'
councils.[24][25] This is done within a general call for liberty[26] and free
association[27] through the identification, criticism and practical dismantling of
illegitimate authority in all aspects of human life. Libertarian socialism is
distinguished from the authoritarian and vanguardist approach of
Bolshevism/Leninism and the reformism of Fabianism/social democracy.
 Libertarian socialism is a Western philosophy with diverse interpretations,
although some general commonalities can be found in its many incarnations. It
advocates a worker-oriented system of production and organization in the
workplace that, in some respects, radically departs from neoclassical economics
in favour of democratic cooperatives or common ownership of the means of
production (socialism).[51] They propose that this economic system be executed
in a manner that attempts to maximize the liberty of individuals and minimize
the concentration of power or authority (libertarianism). Adherents propose
achieving this through decentralization of political and economic power, usually
involving the socialization of most large-scale private property and enterprise
(while retaining respect for personal property). Libertarian socialism tends to
deny the legitimacy of most forms of economically significant private property,
viewing capitalist property relations as a form of domination that is antagonistic
to individual freedom.
 Critique of Libertarian Socialism: Right-libertarians view socialism as involving
state ownership of the means of production. As such, they consider libertarian
socialism to be an oxymoron.[354][355] In response, the now-defunct anarchist
Internet archive Spunk Library argued that "the word 'libertarian' has been used
by anarchist socialists for far longer than the pro-free market right have been
using it. This does not, of course, prove that the term is free of contradiction.
However, as we will show below, the claim that the term is self-contractory rests
on the assumption that socialism requires the state in order to exist and that
socialism is incompatible with liberty. This assumption, as is often true of
objections to socialism, is based on a misconception of what socialism is, a
misconception that many authoritarian socialists and the state capitalism of
Soviet Russia have helped to foster. It is the term 'state socialism' which is an
oxymoron."
 A long-standing criticism of libertarianism is that it presupposes an unrealistic
and undesirable conception of individual identity and of the conditions

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necessary for human flourishing. Opponents of libertarianism often refer to

libertarian individualism as “atomistic,” arguing that it ignores the role of family,
religious community, and state.
 Aside from the significant number of anarchist communist theorists such as
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin and Alexander
Berkman, some important contributors to libertarian socialist theory and
philosophy would be Noam Chomsky, Daniel Guerin, and Murray Bookchin.
d. Institutionalism
 In sociology and organizational studies, institutional theory is a theory on the
deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It considers the processes
by which structures, including schemes, rules, norms, and routines, become
established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior.[1] Different
components of institutional theory explain how these elements are created,
diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall into
decline and disuse.
 Institutional analysis is that part of the social sciences which studies how
institutions—i.e., structures and mechanisms of social order and cooperation
governing the behavior of two or more individuals—behave and function
according to both empirical rules (informal rules-in-use and norms) and also
theoretical rules (formal rules and law). This field deals with how individuals and
groups construct institutions, how institutions function in practice, and the
effects of institutions on each other, on individuals, societies and the community
at large
 Since the 1980s, however, there are cross-pollinations between the sociological
and economic traditions in institutional analysis. A new focus is to explain how
organizations and individuals within organizations make economic and
managerial decisions, particularly by investigating the non-rational, non-
economic, and non-psychological factors. This movement produced what is
known as the New Institutional Analysis.[7] The neo institutional approach has
several variants. One of them tries to improve economic models based on the
theory of public choice, and one of its applications is known as the institutional
analysis and development (IAD) framework developed by Elinor Ostrom 2009
Nobel Prize for Economics.[8] Another variant is influenced by organizational
sociology and seeks to integrate Max Weber’s work on bureaucratic mentality
e. Marxism
 Marx never clearly defined how Marxist thought will translate into a robust and
clearcut theory of Governance. Theories of governance were formulated from
Marxist teachings of Sociology and Economics.
 These theories are covered under the Regulation Theory of Governance.
 For more on Marx, see below.

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f. Neoliberalism
 Neoliberal governance, sustainable development, and local communities in the
Barents Region – Monica Tennberg et al.
 Neoliberalism – the ideology at the root of all our problems – Guardian Article
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/apr/15/neoliberalism-ideology-
problem-george-monbiot
 The political rationality of our time is neoliberalism, an approach to governing that
has spread in different variations across the globe in the last three decades (Harvey
2005). In simple terms, neoliberalism means the extension of market relations and
competition throughout society, including the realm of social interactions.
Neoliberalism is not an ideology, nor is it a policy; it is a governmentality for
advanced liberal societies, a set of governance practices which, as a political
rationality, also endeavours to impart sense to those practices (Larner 2000; Cotoi
2011). Neoliberalism is based on the idea of active use of freedom: the role of the
neoliberal state is to secure proper conditions for markets to function instead of
letting them operate freely as classical liberalism urges. The main elements of
neoliberal governance are support for free movement of goods, people and capital;
re-distribution of authority between governmental and non-governmental entities;
pro-market regulation; and an emphasis on social innovations that will advance
individual freedom and responsibility (Cerny et al. 2005).
 Neoliberalism in practice has been woven into a broad range of international,
national and regional plans, programmes and strategies in the form of de-regulation,
privatisation and rationalisation. However, it is many times paradoxical, a
combination of old and new practices of governance. The Nordic countries have
adopted neoliberal policies (Kuhnle 2000; Abrahamson 2010; Dahl 2012), but the
popular support for welfarestate thinking has led to the states adopting a policy of
containing rather than cutting social benefits and related costs. As a result, the
countries have entered a new era, that of the “post-welfare state”, characterised by
Kuhnle (2000, 118) as providing “a less generous state welfare and with a different
mix of welfare provisions”. In Russia, a new model of welfare is under construction,
characterised firstly by a considerable reduction of the state’s part in social policy,
secondly by an increased role for the regional and local authorities in the provision
of social services, and thirdly by substantial changes in the social position of citizens
in relation to the state. As a result, individual participation and responsibilities, as
well as the role of non-governmental organisations, have grown in providing social
services. The role of the state is still important in that it guarantees minimal social
standards. (Konstantinova 2009, 51.)
 Neoliberalism, or neo-liberalism,[1] is a term used to signify the political
reappearance of 19th-century ideas associated with free-market capitalism.[2]: 7 [3]
A prominent factor in the rise of conservative and libertarian organizations, political
parties, and think tanks, and predominantly advocated by them,[4][5] it is generally
associated with policies of economic liberalization, including privatization,
deregulation, globalization, free trade, monetarism, austerity, and reductions in
government spending in order to increase the role of the private sector in the

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economy and society.[14] The defining features of neoliberalism in both thought and
practice have been the subject of substantial scholarly debate.
 Neoliberalism has faced criticism by academics, journalists, religious leaders, and
activists from both the political left and right.[281][282] Notable critics of
neoliberalism in theory or practice include economists Joseph Stiglitz,[283] Amartya
Sen,[284] Michael Hudson,[285] Ha-Joon Chang,[286] Robert Pollin,[287] Julie
Matthaei,[288] and Richard D. Wolff;[289] linguist Noam Chomsky;[57] geographer
and anthropologist David Harvey;[80] Slovenian continental philosopher Slavoj Žižek,
[290] political activist and public intellectual Cornel West;[291] Marxist feminist Gail
Dines;[292] British musician and political activist Billy Bragg;[293] author, activist
and filmmaker Naomi Klein;[294] head of the Catholic Church Pope Francis;[295]
journalist and environmental activist George Monbiot;[296] Belgian psychologist
Paul Verhaeghe;[297] journalist and activist Chris Hedges;[298] conservative
philosopher Roger Scruton;[299] and the alter-globalization movement, including
groups such as ATTAC.
 The impact of the Great Recession in 2008 has given rise to a surge in new
scholarship that criticizes neoliberalism and seeks policy alternatives.
 Neoliberalism is commonly viewed by scholars as encouraging of globalization,[367]
which is the subject of much criticism.
 The emergence of the "precariat", a new class facing acute socio-economic
insecurity and alienation, has been attributed to the globalization of neoliberalism.
 Globalization can subvert nations' ability for self-determination
g. Rational Choice Theory

 Rational choice theory refers to a set of guidelines that help understand economic
and social behavior.[1] The theory originated in the eighteenth century and can be
traced back to political economist and philosopher, Adam Smith.[2] The theory
postulates that an individual will perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether an option is right for them.[3] It also suggests that an individual's self-
driven rational actions will help better the overall economy. Rational choice theory
looks at three concepts: rational actors, self-interest, and the invisible hand.
 Rational choice theorists argue that institutions structure people’s strategic
interactions with one another; stable institutions influence individuals’ actions by
giving them reasonable expectations about the outcome of the varied courses of
action from which they might choose.
h. Regulation Theory
 Just as sociological institutionalism sometimes draws on systems theory, so historical
institutionalism sometimes draws on Marxist state theory. The main approach to
governance derived from Marxism is, however, regulation theory. Karl Marx argued
that capitalism is unstable because it leads to capital overaccumulation and class
struggle. Regulation theorists examine the ways in which different varieties of
capitalism attempt to manage these instabilities. They study forms of governance in
relation to changes in the way these instabilities are masked.

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 Typically, regulation theorists locate the new governance in relation to a broader

socioeconomic shift from Fordism to post-Fordism. Fordism refers to a combination
of “intensive accumulation” and “monopolistic regulation”—a combination
associated with the mass production pioneered by Henry Ford in the 1920s.
Intensive accumulation rested on processes of mass production such as
mechanization, the intensification of work, the detailed division of tasks, and the use
of semiskilled labour. Monopolistic regulation involved monopoly pricing, the
recognition of trade unions, the indexing of wages to productivity, corporatist
tendencies in government, and monetary policies to manage the demand for
commodities. According to regulation theorists, intensive accumulation and
monopolistic regulation temporarily created a virtuous circle: mass production
created economies of scale, thereby leading to a rise in productivity; increased
productivity led to increased wages and so greater consumer demand; the growth in
demand meant greater profits because of the full utilization of capacity; and the
increased profits were used to improve the technology of mass production, creating
further economies of scale and so starting the whole circle going again.
 Regulation theorists ascribe the end of Fordism to various causes. Productivity gains
decreased because of the social and technical limits to Fordism. Globalization made
the management of national economies increasingly difficult. Increased state
expenditure produced inflation and state overload. Competition among capitalists
shifted the norms of consumption away from the standardized commodities
associated with mass production. All of these causes contributed to the end of not
only Fordism but also the bureaucratic Keynesian welfare state associated with it.
Although regulation theorists can be reluctant to engage in speculations about the
future, they generally associate the new post-Fordist era with the globalization of
capital, neoliberal politics, contracting out, public-private partnerships, and the
regulatory state.
Governance Indicators laid by World

Bank/IMF/UNESCO/UNDP/ADB, their Explanation &
Application Level in Pakistan
Overview of Pakistan’s Performance on the Worldwide Governance
Indicators:
In Pakistan, the goals of freedom of expression, freedom of association, and the presence of media free
from any outside influence are yet to be achieved. Pakistan’s score on “Voice & Accountability” during
the dictatorship of General Pervez Musharaf was -0.95 in 2007 which improved to -0.69 in 2017.
However during the rule (2018-2022) of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the ranking declined to 17 points
—rating was -0.84 in 2021.
The World Bank’s latest Worldwide Governance Indicators, based on data from 2016, rank Pakistan in
the 29th percentile for government effectiveness, the 27th percentile for regulatory quality, the 20th
percentile for rule of law, and the 19th percentile for control of corruption

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Wilson Center Document on Good Governance and Institutions in

Pakistan
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/2018-06-
pakistansinstitutions.pdf -
Available evidence across countries suggests a positive relationship between good governance and
economic growth. An IMF empirical study from 2003 found that governance has a statistically significant
impact on GDP per capita across 93 countries and governance explains nearly 75 percent of cross-
country variations in income per head.12 An Asian Development Bank study from 201013 shows that
developing Asian economies with government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law scoring
above the global mean (after controlling for per capita income) grew faster on average during 1998–
2008 than those economies scoring below the global mean. The authors conclude that good governance
is associated with both a higher level of per capita GDP and higher rates of GDP growth over time.
Numerous other studies have demonstrated the linkages between good governance and healthy
economic growth. A 1998 World Bank study explicitly linked governance to the notion of institutions,
defining it as “all aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and informal institutions in the
management of the resource endowment of a state.” The World Bank study found a high correlation
between governance quality and per capita income. The positive correlation between the 10-year
economic growth rate and governance quality supports the argument that good governance is an
important determinant of economic development. A later World Bank study found a direct causal effect
from better governance to higher per capita income across 175 countries between 2000 and 2001.15 A
negative causal effect is found from per capita income to governance, implying that improvements in
governance are unlikely to occur merely as a consequence of development. One scholar has reported
that better maintenance of the rule of law and political stability affect economic growth.16 Other
research finds that the rule of law indicator is positively and significantly correlated with the growth in
per capita incomes of the poorest quintile.17 A 2004 Asian Development Bank study18 discovered that
political stability and rule of law exhibit negative and significant relation with inequality as measured by
the Gini coefficient. World Bank analysis19 concludes that rule of law and accountability were both
positively correlated with growth. Some research argues that pro-poor reforms cannot have the
intended impact unless there are significant changes in the institutions of governance.20 Cross-country
studies have demonstrated that political instability, corruption, poor bureaucratic quality, absence of rule
of law, and expropriation risk are strongly correlated with lower investment and growth rates
A new branch of economics, coined by Douglass North as New Institutional Economics, has identified
institutional capabilities that states need to make markets function efficiently. North22 has defined
institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and social interactions
and include the laws, rules, customs, [and] norms constructed to advance and preserve social order.”
Regarding the connection between institutions and economic development, his view is as follows:
How do we account for poverty in the midst of plenty? We must create incentives for people to invest in
more efficient technology, increase their skills, and organize efficient markets. Such incentives are
embodied in institutions.
Other analysts demonstrate that institutions determine the fate of nations. Success comes when political
and economic institutions are “inclusive” and pluralistic, creating incentives for everyone to invest in the
future.

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Nations fail when institutions are “extractive,” protecting the political and economic power of only a
small elite that takes income from everyone else. Institutions that promote good governance and
facilitate broad-based and inclusive growth have come to occupy the current consensus on development
strategy. According to one study,24 good institutions ensure two desirable outcomes: relatively equal
access to economic opportunity (a level playing field) and the likelihood that those who provide labor or
capital are appropriately rewarded and their property rights are protected.
Among the components of good governance, human capital is associated with both economic growth
and equity. In a study on human capital and economic growth, the authors,25 using data for the 1996 to
2011 period for 134 countries, found strong evidence that the relationship between human capital and
economic growth is much less pronounced in countries with a low quality of governance. Preconditions
in the form of good governance are necessary for an educated labor force to contribute to the economic
growth of a country. Weak governance indicated by deteriorated law and order conditions, corruption,
and maladministration result in an inefficient utilization of human resources.
Researchers have explored linkages between governance and pro-poor growth in Pakistan for the period
of 1996 to 2005.26 This analysis indicates that governance indicators have low scores and rank at the
lowest possible percentile as compared to other countries. The results of this study show a strong link
between governance indicators and pro-poor growth. The authors’ econometric analysis shows a strong
relationship between good governance and reductions in poverty and income inequality.
The model of an elitist economy that was articulated in Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State”27 sets
out the historical context and drivers of the capture of the state and rigging of markets in Pakistan. It is
postulated that a narrow elite constituting about 1 to 2 percent of the population has used the state and
markets for political power and self-enrichment to the neglect of the majority of the population,
particularly the poor and the less privileged segments of society. This small minority has thus been able
to enjoy this unjust accumulation of wealth in the midst of widespread poverty and squalor. In the
absence of a neutral umpire, markets are rigged by the elites for their own advantage and thus market
outcomes and resource allocations are inefficient. The state, which should be ensuring the equitable
distribution of gains from economic growth, is also controlled by the same elite that evades taxes and
appropriates public expenditures for its own benefit. Inequities—whether interpersonal, regional, or
gender-focused— become commonplace in such an environment. Access to the institutions that deliver
public goods and services is intermediated by the elite through a patronage-based system.
a. Voice and Accountability

b. Political Stability and Absence of Violence
Undue interferences in the affairs of executive by the judiciary and military have
damaged the already fragile democratic fabric. It has promoted political instability
and/or politically motivated violence and the scourge of terrorism. Accordingly, the
score against “Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” worsened to -2.64
in 2009, mainly because of increased terrorism—a result of faulty policies of General
Pervez Musharraf. However, due to a major operation against terrorists in 2014 under
Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) by the army, with strong public and political support,
Pakistan witnessed significant improvement in 2018, securing ranking of -2.27.
Continuous monitoring and operations against terrorist groups by Pakistan’s security

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agencies and United States’ exit from Afghanistan played a significant role in improving
our ranking for this indicator—in 2021 it improved to -1.67.
c. Government Effectiveness
Factors like quality of public services, civil services and degree of its independence from
political pressures as well as the quality of policy formulations and their implementation
play a key role in developing citizens’ confidence in governments and institutions.
Successive governments in Pakistan—civil and military alike—have failed on these
accounts. India and Pakistan inherited similar governance structures on independence.
India has progressed significantly as its score for “Government effectiveness” improved
from -0.11 in 1996 to 0.28 in 2021, whereas Pakistan’s score was .0.68 in 1996 and -0.4
in 2021.
d. Regulatory Authorities & their Quality

Regulatory Quality in Pakistan: The average value for Pakistan during that period was
-0.64 points with a minimum of -0.91 points in 2004 and a maximum of -0.48 points in
1998. The latest value from 2020 is -0.72 points. For comparison, the world average in
2020 based on 192 countries is -0.02 points.
e. Rule of Law
One critical dimension is “rule of law”, which indicates the extent to which citizens have
confidence in institutions and governments, and to the extent they comply with rules
and regulations. In this regard, the role/performance of police and the courts is very
important. “Rule of law” still seems to be an alien concept in Pakistan where law
enforcement agencies have little or no respect/regard for the law, while courts have
failed to enforce the same. Unfortunately, there is a clear dichotomy/discrimination in
the treatment of various classes of society by both the police and courts. In 1996,
Pakistan’s score was -0.64 and after almost 25 years it stands at 0.63 in 2021.
It is pertinent to mention that while discussing the situation relating to ‘Rule of Law in
Pakistan’, the Report specifically points out: “In recent years, the courts have played a
more activist role in Pakistan’s politics, using the power of judicial review to overturn
legislation passed by parliament, including the 21st Amendment to the Constitution
(2015). Since then, the courts have also been accused of working with the military
establishment to prosecute opposition politicians belonging to the PML-N, but have also,
on occasion, asserted their independence by ruling against the military’s interests, as
was the case in the conviction of General Musharraf for high treason in December 2019”.
f. Control of Corruption
Crisis of Good Governance and Failure of Corruption Prevention in
Pakistan
In Pakistan, corruption has spread with leaps and bounds while in comparison initiatives
to improve governance have been weak and uneven, ultimately culminating in arrested
development and lost opportunities. In the context of the leaked Panama Papers, both
the ruling and opposition parties in Pakistan have leveled serious charges of corruption

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against each other. The judiciary is playing its part in giving verdict on the matter, even
though it faces serious challenges in carrying out a fair investigation due to all kinds of
pressures being exerted by entrenched interest groups.
Mega corruption scandals of mind-boggling proportions regularly surface, often

exposing the collusion between top political leadership and bureaucracy. For example,
an accountability court indicted former federal minister of petroleum Dr. Asim Hussain
and an ex-secretary petroleum Ejaz Chaudhry in a corruption reference of over Rs. 460
billion including misappropriation of quota in fertilizer scam, land fraud and money
laundering between 2010 and 2013. There are multiple examples of grand corruption
and collusion in higher judiciary, top military, powerful media houses and business
magnates. For example, the case of former Chief Justice of Pakistan, Iftikhar Chaudhry's
son allegedly taking money from a real-estate tycoon, Malik Riaz Hussain, in exchange
for favorable court decisions. The Asghar Khan case where it was ruled that Gen (retd)
Aslam Beg and Lt-Gen (retd) Asad Durrani had doled out money to politicians for
manipulating the results of 1990 elections. The AXACT fake degree scandal, in which a
sitting judge admitted to receiving Rs.5 million in bribe to acquit BOL TV ‟s CEO Shoaib
Shaikh.
Yet the perpetrators of grand corruption are seldom punished to the extent of their
crime due to widespread petty corruption in government and judiciary. As Javaid (2010)
has observed "there is breakdown of law and order because of pervasive corruption in
police and lower judiciary meaning that the influential, the wealthy and the mighty have
a fair chance of getting away with whatever they do, if they pay the right price at the
right stage". The Pakistani society on the whole tolerates corruption and as a result, The
Global Integrity Score Card (2010) shows that despite having a strong anti-corruption
legal framework, implementation of corruption prevention policy in Pakistan is very
weak.
Such is evident from Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (2015) dataset which
shows Control of Corruption as the second weakest area of governance in Pakistan after
Absence of Terrorism. Marginal gains in corruption control in 2015 since 2010 are offset
by marginal deterioration in Rule of Law during same time period. Overall score in terms
of Government Effectiveness and Regulatory Quality in 2015 remains in the 30th
percentile, which is low in comparison with other lower middle-income countries. The
only silver lining is in the Voice and Accountability area, which has shown some
improvement since 2005.
Governance failures in Pakistan are embedded in the country’s colonial past. British rule
in the Sub-continent linked accountability to the colonial masters instead of the citizens
thus restricting independence of the civil service (Ismail and Rizvi, 2010). But the real
issue here, as also pointed out by Hussain, & Hussain, (1993), is the inability of the
system to reform civil structures and to devise a strategy for strengthening democratic
institutions. Over the course of its political history, Pakistan has witnessed repeated
military interventions as well as the covert control of foreign hegemonic powers. This
has resulted in constant experimentation with the administrative systems and prevented
a natural evolution of responsive governance systems. Moreover, failure of governance
can also be attributed to the political stronghold of the feudal lords, the industrial

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bourgeoisie as well as elements in the military and bureaucratic establishment who

together find it in their self-interest to perpetuate an anti-development status quo.
Successive governments find it most convenient to place the blame on "wrong policies"
of formers regimes to explain their governance failures. The solution then is to simply do
away with institutions and systems established by past regimes, prosecute its
sympathizers and sink massive funds in establishing new institutions and initiating new
development projects. Other cosmetic changes are made in laws of the country to
appease the development community.
Any meaningful change is often thwarted as these laws are not implemented in their
true spirit. Such is the control of vested interests and incompetent officials in Pakistan
that even the best laws cannot address the glaring inequity in the provision of
education, health, civic services and infrastructure. Lop-sided priorities of leaders are
obvious. For example, building metros and high-speed trains, distribution of laptops and
other show-case projects instead of fixing fundamental issues of energy and water
crises, non-competitiveness of industry and problems with empowering the poor
masses. Maintenance of Law and Order, which is a fundamental duty of the state, has
also been extremely problematic in Pakistan. While the tentacles of terrorism have
spread throughout the world, Pakistan suffers most from its consequences despite
having an international image of sponsoring this heinous activity. The perception of poor
law and order in Pakistan reduces foreign investment further damaging a fragile
economy. Finally, governance reforms need to address the issue of climate change which
will affect future generations. Yet in Pakistan, despite the ever-growing environment-
related policies and institutions, pollution is growing at an alarming rate (Faisal, 2017). In
the final analysis of corruption and failure of good governance in Pakistan, it can be
stated that it is up to the People to make choices which are good for the country and not
only for self-interest. Electing honest leadership and forcing public sector managers to
remain ethical will eventually ensure accountability and meaningful governance reforms.
Public Policy and Planning Institutions and their role in

Planning
a. History of Economic Planning in Pakistan
Period of economic coordination (1947 – 1953): Pakistan’s first planning board was
established in 1950 with main emphasis on agriculture. Unfortunately, that plan was not
well implemented on time. There were no targets fixed for the plan and the planning
machinery was so weak to tackle with implementation. Therefore, the economic
planning efforts during this period was a complete failure.
Period of planning board (1953 – 1958): The planning board of Pakistan was renamed as
Planning Commission in 1953. The planning commission was facing the following
serious problems:
 Shortage of trained staff,

 Non-availability of accurate and reliable data,
 Uncertain conditions in the planning machinery

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 It was regarded as a rivalry between Ministry of Finance and the State Bank of
Pakistan
 Political instability
 Annual economic planning was never seriously followed
 Most of the economic advices were rejected by implementing authorities
 Economic priorities were not given due importance
 Budget decisions were also distorted
During this period, the First Five-Year Plan was made. Its implementation suffered due
to rapid changes in government and a lack of political support.
Period of planning commission (1958 – 1968): The third period of the planning process
began in October 1958 with the assumption of power by the military government of
Ayub Khan. The new regime chooses to make economic development through a marked
economy and reliance of the private sector as its primary objective. The new
government gave proper attention to achieve the following targets:
 Rapid industrialization in the country,

 Removal of food shortage,
 Removal of political instability, and
 To overcome the problem of deficit of balance of payment.
The status of the Planning Commission was raised to a Division in the President’s
secretariat. The President himself assumed the chairmanship of the Planning
Commission and Deputy Chairman, with the ex-officio status of a minister, was made the
operational head of the Commission. Provincial planning department was organised.
The Planning Commission was also provided the secretariat for National Economic
Council (NEC) which looked after the day-to-day work of NEC and was also responsible
for final approval for annual development.
During this period the Second Five-Year Plan (1960-65) was made. It was so successful
that Pakistan led to an example for hunger nations of the world. But unfortunately
Pakistan had to fight war against India in 1965. Then there was a hue and cry against
Ayub government and another government got the power.
Period of decline of planning commission (1968 – 1977): This is the period of decline of
Planning Commission as an important decision-making body coincided with the fall of
Ayub Khan’s government. During the Yahya Khan period (1969 – 1971), the serious
planning on national level was completely ignored. The Third Five-Year Plan (1965 –
1970) was virtually abandoned by the Yahya Khan’s government. In 1970, the Fourth
Five-Year Plan (1970 – 1975) was made and it was also a big failure because of the worst
political conditions and instable government policies. In 1972, the newly elected
government of Z. A. Bhutto decided to run the economy through annual planning, rather
than through a comprehensive five-year plan. During the same year, the Planning
Commission was placed directly under the control of Ministry of Finance as a Division.
During the period from 1972 to 1977, the Planning Commission, with very less powers,

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have very few favourable economic decisions. In other words, the Planning Commission
was powerless and ineffective.
Period of revival of planning commission (1978 – 1988): After taking charge of the
government, the Zia-ul-Haq’s regime emphasised on the needs of five-year plans. In
early 1980s, the Zia government took steps to revive the Planning Commission as an
effective and authoritative economic decision-making body.
During this period, two Five-Year Plans were formulated, i.e., Fifth and Sixth. In 1978,
the Fifth Five-Year Plan to cover the period of 1978 – 1983 was published. But the
Government failed to pursue the plan mainly because of uncertain political as well as
economic conditions at that time. The Sixth Five-Year Plan was formulated in 1983 to
cover the period 1983 – 1988. At that time, Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haq was the Finance
Minister. He formulated the plan and because of his great efforts, this plan was a
success. During his tenure, the Planning Commission has played a vital role in effectively
formulating and implementing the economic planning. Not only the Sixth Five-Year Plan,
but also the annual plans were formulated by the Planning Commission.
The period of (1988 – 1999): The period of 1988 to 1999 the period of political and
economic instability. During this period, four elected governments were dismissed by
the President on the charges of corruption. The role of Planning Commission was over-
shadowed by political decisions. Its role was just limited to the preparation and
submission of reports. It has nothing to do with the implementation of planning.
The Seventh Five-Year Plan was formulated during the Zia-ul-Haq period. But after his
death, in 1988, the newly elected government of Benazir Bhutto took over the charge
and so the Seventh Five-Year Plan has never been implemented. After the fall of
Benazir’s government in 1990, Nawaz Sharif’s government came into power. During his
tenure, he introduced privatisation, deregulation, and economic reform aimed at
reducing structural impediments to sound economic development. His top priority was
to denationalise some 115 public industrial enterprises, abolishing the government's
monopoly in the financial sector, and selling utilities to private interests. Although the
Nawaz Sharif government made considerable progress in liberalising the economy, but it
failed to address the problem of a growing budget deficit, which in turn led to a loss of
confidence in the government on the part of foreign aid donors. In 1993, the Nawaz
Sharif government was dismissed by the President on the charges of corruption. In the
parliamentary elections of 1993, Benazir Bhutto, once again, became the Prime Minister
of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the so-called Seventh Five-Year Plan period came to an end. In
1994, the Planning Commission publish the Eighth Five-Year Plan to cover the period
1993 – 1998. In November 1996, once again, the PPP government was dismissed by the
President on corruption charges. The parliamentary election was held in 1997 and, once
again, Mian Nawaz Sharif elected as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The targets of
Eighth Five-Year Plan were also not well achieved. For example, the target of wheat was
set at 18.3 million tons which could not be achieved by 1996-97 when its actual
production was 16.6 million tons. It was achieved in the last year of the plan but it again
slipped down to 17.8 million tons in the following year. Similarly the target of non-

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traditional oilseeds, grape and mustard was set at 0.4 million tons which was far below
the national requirements. Likewise, the projected plan period target of agricultural
credit of Rs 80.5 billion could not be achieved as the maximum credit given during the
plan period was Rs 37.7 billion and most of which went to the influential feudal lords
and politicians rather than to the common farmers. The Ninth Five-Year Plan was
formulated by Nawaz Sharif government to cover the period 1998-2003. Following were
the priorities of Ninth Five-Year Plan:
 Maintenance of fiscal deficit at a sustainable level,

 Maintenance of GDP growth at 7% p.a.
 Investment in physical infrastructure,
 Export-led industrialisation,
 End of agriculture-water dichotomy,
 Developing a civil society, etc.
Period of restructuring of economy (1999 – 2008): In October 1999, the Nawaz Sharif
government was dismissed with the military coup by Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez
Musharraf. The entire country was in a state of jeopardy. Before that, the businessmen
have already lost their confidence due to economic instability with the Nuclear Test,
freezing of foreign currency accounts, devaluation of rupee, and the Kargil War in 1998.
Therefore, the targets of Ninth Five-Year Plan were never been well implemented.
The era of General Pervez Musharraf is known as the era of economic and political
restructuring. During this era, the economy grew at an average growth rate of 5.1%
(started from 2.6% in 2000-01 to 8.4% in 2004-05). President General Pervez Musharraf
invited Mr. Shaukat Aziz to take charge of the Ministry of Finance in November 1999. He
very quickly assembled a team of highly trained economists and extremely talented civil
servants. To address the issue of the severe macroeconomic crisis and place the
economy on a path of sustained higher growth, financial stability, and improved external
balance of payments, the economic team launched a comprehensive set of economic
stabilization and structural reform measures. The government believed that
macroeconomic stability was vital for achieving higher and sustained economic growth,
creating employment opportunities and preventing people from falling below the
poverty line. It is with this view that a series of structural reform measures were
initiated in such areas as privatisation and deregulation, trade liberalization, banking
sector reform, capital market reform, tax system and tax administration reform,
agriculture sector reform etc. As a result, Pakistan’s economy started showing signs of
improvement by 2000-01 well before 9/11. Manufacturing sector grew 11% in 2000-01
against 3.6% in 1998-99, revenue collection increased to Rs. 396 billion against Rs. 308
billion, debt servicing declined from 64% to 57% of total revenue, export increased from
$ 7.8 billion to $ 9.2 billion. These are undeniable facts and well documented in official
publications. These improvements had taken place much before 9/11.
The present economic team under the stewardship of Shaukat Aziz has not only salvaged
a near bankrupt economy but has put it on a path of sustained high growth with
financial stability and considerably improved external balance of payments. Much has

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been done in the past five years. The country has witnessed a decline in poverty to 24%
in 2008 and other improvements in social indicators. The up-gradation of Pakistan in the
Human Development Index of the UNDP of 2005 was a vindication of the policies
pursued by the government during this period.
In 2005, the Government authorised the Planning Commission to issue the Tenth Five-
Year Plan namely ‘Medium Term Development Framework 2005-10’. The Medium Term
Development Framework (MTDF) 2005-10 had been conceived in the light of recent
socio-economic performance of the country, continuing supportive public policies and
challenges and opportunities emerging from the global economy. Wide-ranging
economic and financial reforms have made the economy open, liberalised and market
friendly. As a result, private sector has begun to play an active role in shaping structural
changes in the economy. The principal objective of the MTDF was to attain high growth
of 8.2 percent by the terminal year 2009-10 with a sustained annual average growth of
7.6 percent during the five-year period without compromising macroeconomic stability.
The second key objective was to achieve higher level of investment to meet the targeted
growth and to effectively address the perennial issues of poverty reduction,
employment generation, better access to basic necessities of life including quality
education and skill development for up grading the human resources, better health and
environment for the common man. The third crucial objective was to attract foreign
investment to a level required to become a fast growing economy like Malaysia. Last but
not the least, the MTDF would focus on growth which is just and equitable.
The plan had also anticipated the share of manufacturing sector in GDP to increase from
18.3% in 2004-05 to 21.9% in 2009-10. It was also anticipated that the production base
would be expanded through the development of engineering goods, electronics,
chemicals and other hi-tech industries. The Government was also anticipating fastest
growth of IT/Telecom sector. Pakistan had seen an explosive growth in IT/Telecom sector
in the last few years. The number of mobile phones achieved their 2007 targets two
years earlier, and the recent deregulation of LDI, WLL and other sections had served to
provide faster, better and wider coverage, all at lower cost. Nearly 60,000 IT
professionals were operating in the country with an annual turnover of Rs. 12 billion of
which 15% was exported. The plan had also estimated that major exports (gross) would
increase from Rs. 14.05 billion in 2004-05 to Rs. 28.12 billion in 2009-10.
The MTDF projected a rising growth rate for the agriculture sector from 4.8% in 2005-06
to 5.6% in the last year of the plan, i.e., 2009-10. The production of meat (beef, mutton,
poultry meat) was anticipated to increase from 2,275 thousand tonnes in 2004-05 to
3,124 thousand tonnes in 2009-10, and milk production from 29,472 thousand tonnes in
2004-05 to 43,304 thousand tonnes in 2009-10. The production of fisheries was
projected at an average annual growth rate of 4.8 per cent. The fish production increase
was projected from 574 thousand tonnes in 2004-05 to 725 thousand tonnes in 2009-10.
With the fall of Musharraf's Government in August 2008, the MTDF 2005-10 failed to
attract the new Government's attention, and never been prioritized by the Government,
therefore, most of its targets were failed to achieve.

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The chapter of Short-Term Economic Planning in Pakistan closed with the last MTDF
2005-10.
b. Institutional Framework for Policy Coordination and

Planning (ECNEC, Economic Coordination Committees of
the Cabinet, The Federal Cabinet, The Secretaries
Committee, The Prime Minister’s Secretariat, The
Planning Commission, The Finance Division, The Cabinet
Division, and all Federal Ministries for their respective
subjects)
National Economic Council
The apex institution for managing the economy of Pakistan has been provided in the
Constitution of Pakistan Article 156(2) of the Constitution states: ‘The National Economic
Council shall review the overall economic condition of the country and shall, for advising
the Federal Government and the Provincial Governments, formulate plans in respect of
financial, commercial, social and economic policies; and in formulating such plans, it
shall be guided by the Principles of Policy set out in Chapter 2 of Part II. Headed by the
chief executive of the country, the National Economic Council (NEC) has as its members
the provincial chief executives, cabinet ministers concerned with economic and social
development and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission (Annex I). A working
definition of Macroeconomic Framework is that it is a summary statement of a country's
development strategy and economic policies, based on past assessment and future
prospects and expressed in physical as well as financial terms. In this sense, the mandate
of the NEC covers all the key elements of the macroeconomic framework. Read with the
Principles of Policy laid down by the Constitution (Annex II) which guide policy
formulation, the mandate becomes a comprehensive development framework.
Vision statements, long term perspectives, five year plans, annual plans and the Public
Sector Development Programs (PSDP) require the approval of the NEC. Pakistan 2010
was the first ever vision statement approved by the NEC in 1998, while Vision 2030 will
be submitted to it soon. Similarly, the first perspective plan was endorsed in the mid-
sixties for 1965-85 and the last perspective plan, called the Ten Year Perspective Plan
2001-1, was approved on June 7, 2001. The practice of approving three-year rolling plans
also started within the framework of this Perspective Plan. Preparation and approval of
five year plans started in 1957, which came to a halt with the abortive Fourth Five Year
Plan 1970-75. It was resumed with the Fifth Five Year Plan 1978-83 and continued until
1998. The draft Ninth Five Year Plan 1998-2003 was prepared but not placed before the
NEC. The exercise has been re-started after the recent authorization by the NEC for the
preparation of the Medium Term Development Framework (MTDF) 2005-10.
Annual plans were introduced in 1968 and their preparation and approval has continued
without interruption. Annual development programs, these days called the PSDP, go
back to the start of planning in the fifties. These related to the public sector, while
annual plans take an overall view of the economy, public as well as private investment.

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Ever since its inception, the NEC has been meeting regularly before the budget towards
the end of May or early June. Since 2004, it has decided to meet during the fiscal year
also to consider mid-year economic reviews and to monitor the progress of major
projects and the utilization of the PSDP. In regard to projects and programs, the NEC has
delegated its authority to its Executive Committee, the ECNEC.
The Cabinet and the Parliament

Though an apex body, the plans approved by the NEC are in the nature of an advice to
the constituents of the Federation. In the light of this advice, the federal government
goes to the cabinet for the clearance of the federal budget, which incorporates
proposals regarding development and non-development expenditure, and the tax and
non-tax resources to be mobilized for financing, besides the debts to be incurred and
serviced. The final approval of the federal budget lies with the National Assembly. A
similar process is followed in the provinces. While the Senate does not approve money
bills, it debates the budgetary proposals and sends its recommendations to the National
Assembly, which is the constitutional forum for the approval of the budget.
The federal budget, prepared by the Ministry of Finance in the light of the directions
provided by the NEC, constitutes the official statement on fiscal policy. It is tabled in the
National Assembly of Pakistan and transmitted to the Senate of Pakistan in terms of
Article 80(1) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which requires that
an Annual Budget Statement of estimated receipts and expenditure for that year be laid
before the National Assembly and Article 73(1) mandating that a copy be transmitted to
the Senate of Pakistan. Again, as per Article 80 (2), the Annual Budget Statement shows
separately: (a) the sums required to meet expenditure described by the Constitution as
expenditure charged upon the Federal Consolidated Fund; and (b) the sums required to
meet other expenditure proposed to be made from the Federal Consolidated Fund.
In addition to the Federal Budget, the Cabinet approves other policies which are not
necessarily placed before the Parliament. Among economic policies, these include trade
policy prepared by the Ministry of Commerce, privatization policy, investment policy,
labor policy, etc. In the same genre lie various sectoral policies prepared by the
concerned line ministries, such as industrial policy, agricultural policy, water policy,
transport policy, housing policy, health policy, education policy, national conservation
strategy, etc.
Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) of the Cabinet

The ECC is not only the most frequented but also the most frequently convened Cabinet
Committee (Annex III). Meeting every fortnight, it is the main coordination point for
economic policies, especially fiscal, monetary, trade and tariff policies. It also adjusts
these policies to the events requiring urgent corrective action. The forum has been used
for the approval of some important policies as well. These include power policy and on-
lending policy for foreign credits. As the watchdog for prices and inflation, the ECC takes
remedial actions whenever and wherever necessary.

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Annual Plan Coordination Committee (APCC)

Of crucial significance is the observance of the discipline of the plan and its scheme of
proportions and balances. The plan can be altered when circumstances so warrant but
not without the concurrence of the NEC. After the five year plan is approved and
published, its successive annual plans are prepared by the Planning Commission,
deliberated upon at the Annual Plan Coordination Committee (APCC) and finally
approved by the NEC when it meets before the federal budget. The APCC is chaired by
the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission and is composed of provincial
planning and finance ministers and the concerned federal and provincial secretaries
(Annex IV). An annual plan document is published along with the budget documents.
The APCC also finalizes the PSDP as part of the Annual Plan. The PSDP is an annual
document which lists all the public sector projects/ programs with specific allocations
made for each one of them in that particular financial year. It is the operational side of
the five year and annual plans. In other words, it is that part of the country's annual
budget which deals with development expenditure, indicating the total cost of a project,
foreign exchange component of the total cost, expenditure incurred upto the end of the
last financial year, PSDP allocation for the current financial year together with its foreign
aid component. Proposals for the consideration of the APCC come from the Priority
Committee.
Appraisal and Approval of Schemes

A scheme is a proposal for a project or program. Plans frequently form the basis of
identifying new schemes. Under a systematic planning procedure, planners only
determine general guidelines for the fulfillment of overall development goals. These
goals are further translated into specific sectoral objectives, alongwith overall resource
allocation between them. Sectoral planning needs more specific information about the
resources and constraints of the sectors concerned. After the collection of this
information, disaggregated projects and programs are devised which are individually
appraised in the light of guidelines and macro-economic parameters provided by the
NEC/APCC.
Projects and programs to be included in the Public Sector Development Program require
approval of competent fora. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Executive Committee of National Economic Council (ECNEC): This is the highest body for
the approval of schemes. Projects and programs costing Rs.500 million and above are
approved by the ECNEC. It is headed by the Prime Minister/Finance Minister and has
representation from all development and economic Ministries and Provinces at the
Minister level (Annex VI).
Central Development Working Party (CDWP): Development projects costing between

Rs.40 million and Rs.500 million prepared by the Federal Ministries, Provincial
Governments, Autonomous Organizations, etc., are scrutinized for the purpose of
approval by the Central Development Working Party (CDWP) which is headed by the
Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission and includes as its members the Secretaries of

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the Federal Ministries concerned with development and the heads of the Planning
Departments of the Provincial Governments (Annex VII). Schemes with foreign funding
of 25 percent and above have also to come to CDWP. The Concept Clearance Committee
(CCC), which has the same composition and meets concurrently with the CDWP, allows
negotiations with foreign donors before the project is ready for approval. But a project
contract is only signed once it is approved by the CDWP for ensuring the availability of
local/counterpart funds. The schemes cleared by the CDWP costing more than Rs.500
million are submitted to the ECNEC for final approval.
Departmental Development Working Party (DDWP): This is the forum for approving
development projects/programs for Federal Ministries/Divisions/Departments costing
upto Rs.40 million. It is headed by the respective Secretary/Head of Department and
includes representatives of the Finance Division and Panning Commission (Annex VII).
Provincial Development Working Party (PDWP): Each Province has a Provincial

Development Working Party which is headed by the Chairman, Development
Board/Additional Chief Secretary (Development) and includes Secretaries of the
Provincial Departments concerned with development (Annex VII). The PDWP scrutinizes
and approves schemes costing upto Rs.200 million, with foreign exchange cost of less
than 25 per cent. Any scheme involving 100 per cent self-finance can be approved by the
PDWP for upto Rs.1000 million.
The Planning Commission is responsible for the development of appropriate cost and
physical standards for the effective technical and economic appraisal of the projects.
Before the projects are sanctioned by the CDWP/ECNEC, their technical appraisal is
carried out by the concerned technical sections of the Planning Commission. This
includes the engineering, commercial, governance, environmental and managerial
aspects. Economic Appraisal Section analyzes the projects from economic, financial and
social viewpoints.
Monitoring and Evaluation

The present method for planning, processing and reporting on development projects is
based on five proforma. Two of these deal with submission of project proposals (PC-I
and PC-II) and are required for the appraisal and approval of projects. Another one is
concerned with the progress of ongoing projects (PC-III) and the remaining two (PC-IV
and PCV) are to be filled in after completion of a project. As is obvious, PC-Ill relates to
monitoring. All project directors are required to submit quarterly progress report on a
prescribed proforma. The most important indicators are the achievement status of
financial and physical targets and the identification of bottlenecks. Inter-agency teams
coordinated by the Projects Wing of the Planning Commission also undertake periodic
site visits.
The purpose of monitoring is to assist in effective implementation while evaluation

provides lessons for the future. Evaluation is of two types: project evaluation and plan
evaluation. Project evaluation is carried out after completion. It focuses more on output
indicators than the input indicators used for monitoring. For the purpose of evaluation,

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PC-IV is required to be submitted when the project is adjuded complete and PC-V is to
be submitted annually for five years by the agency responsible for operation and
maintenance. Plan evaluation is concerned with the evaluation of a five year plan against
its physical and financial targets, policy thrusts and strategic shifts. Typically the Planning
Commission undertakes a mid-plan evaluation, preliminary evaluation and final
evaluation.
Monitoring of development projects is necessary to check cost and time over-runs in the
implementation of projects. Delay in completion of projects causes irreparable loss to
the economy. The examples of delayed projects are Ghazi Brotha Hydro Power
Transmission Project, Islamabad Peshawar Motorway (M-l), Neelum Jhelum Complex
and Thar Coal Power Project. Keeping this in view, the NEC decided on 29 May, 2003 that
monitoring of PSDP projects would be a top priority. The approach was changed from
2003-04 to undertake field monitoring of approved development projects costing Rs. 40
million and above. Projects costing less than Rs. 40 million would be monitored by
sponsoring ministries. The findings were communicated to the executing agencies and
placed on the external web for public review. Presentations were made to ECNEC/NEC
also. In fact, the ECNEC has been meeting quarterly and the NEC twice a year to properly
focus on monitoring.
This system involved all officers of the Planning Commission in field monitoring, and not
just the Project Wing. While it over-extended the staff capability, the involvement of the
concerned Ministries was not as much as to build the desired ownership. In order to
enable the Ministries to play a more proactive role in supervising their development
portfolio, it has recently been decided that in future, the ministries/divisions would
ensure regular monitoring of all their projects included in the PSDP and send a monthly
report for each project to the Planning and Development Division. In case of foreign
aided projects, a copy of the report would also be provided to the Economic Affairs
Division. The Principal Accounting Officers, i.e. the Secretaries are required to hold
monthly monitoring meetings personally so as to ensure effective implementation of the
projects under their jurisdiction. The Planning and Development Division will, however,
continue to undertake monitoring of projects on a selective basis. The Projects Wing has
been strengthened by the creation of an Evaluation & MIS Section. Also, development of
an electronic link to have a fast and regular exchange of information with the project
authorities, Ministries, EAD, Finance Division & AGPR & Provincial Governments is
planned.
The Prime Minister has also constituted a high level Project Monitoring Committee
under the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Finance and Revenue, which will
communicate the progress of projects costing Rs. 500 million and above to the Prime
Minister every month. The Projects Wing will be the focal point of all the monitoring and
evaluation activities of the Public Sector Development Program. Performance indicators
are being developed to access timely and efficient implementation of projects. The
outcome of the monitoring exercise will be presented on a quarterly basis to ECNEC and
biannually to NEC for seeking guidance and policy decisions. The Project Wing will
ensure that all the decisions and directives of NEC/ECNEC are implemented. Each

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executing ministry will establish a planning and monitoring cell as per ECNEC decision to
ensure effective monitoring of development projects. Strengthening the monitoring and
evaluation sections of provincial P&D Departments/Board to ensure effective
implementation of their development projects/programs, has become a priority.
Linkages with District Monitoring Development Committees under the Local
Government Ordinance will be ensured. Finally, better coordination with Pakistan
Planning and Management Institute (PPMI) for training of Project Directors in the fields
of Project Management, Monitoring and Evaluation is yielding good results.
The PPMI has initiated a training program for the project directors. The main objectives
of the training is to prepare professionals for the effective implementation of the
development projects. Efforts are being made to train all Project Directors of Projects
costing Rs. 100 million and above included in the PSDP 2004-05. Toward this end the
ECNEC has made PPMI's training course mandatory for officers to be appointed as
Project Directors.
Monetary and Fiscal Policies Coordination Board

Under its law, the State Bank of Pakistan is responsible for regulating the monetary and
credit system of the country. The general superintendence and direction of the affairs
and business of the State Bank vests in the Central Board of Directors. The Central Board
consists of the Governor, Secretary, Finance Division, Government of Pakistan; and seven
Directors, including one Director from each Province nominated by the Federal
Government while also ensuring representation to the agriculture, banking and
industrial sectors. The Governor is the Chairman of the Central Board and all decisions
are taken by the majority of members present and voting with the provision that in the
event of equality of votes, the Governor may exercise a casting vote. The Board:
 formulates, evaluates and monitors monetary and credit policy

 determines the expansion of liquidity, consistent with targets of growth and
inflation ensuring that the monetary and credit policy is consistent with
macroeconomic policy objectives
 determines and enforces the limit of credit by the Bank to the Federal and
Provincial Governments
 acts as a policy adviser to the Federal Government
 submits a quarterly report on the state of the economy to the Parliament.
As the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies is the domain of the State Bank
of Pakistan, a separate institution has been provided in the State Bank Act to ensure
overall coordination and harmonization of economic policies. Called Monetary and Fiscal
Policies Coordination Board, it meets before the announcement of the budget to avoid
policy anomalies and to enable the preparation of a consistent macroeconomic
framework. Its functions and composition are given at Annex VIII.
c. Role of Planning Commission in Policy and Planning

The Planning Commission (denoted as PC) (Urdu: ‫ پاکستان‬، ‫ )ماموری َہ منصوبہ بندی‬is a
financial and public policy development institution of the Government of Pakistan. The

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Commission comes under Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms. The Planning
Commission undertakes research studies and state policy development initiatives for the
growth of national economy and the expansion of the public and state infrastructure of
the country in tandem with the Ministry of Finance (MoF).
Since 1952, the commission have had a major influence and role in formulating the
highly centralized and planned five-year plans for the national economy, for most of the
20th century in Pakistan. Although the five-year plans were replaced by Medium Term
Development Framework, the commission still played an influential and central role in
the development of the programme. Furthermore, the Public Sector Development
Programmes (PSDP) also placed under the domain of the planning commission. The
commission's authoritative figures includes a Chairman who is the Prime Minister,
assisted by the deputy chairman, and a science advisor.
Other officials of the commissions includes Planning and Development Secretary of

Pakistan; chief economist; Director of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics;
executive director of Policy Implementation and Monitoring (PIM); and members for
Social Sectors, Science and Technology, Energy, Infrastructure, and Food and Agriculture.
[1]
As of 2019, the chairman is Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Imran Khan and the current
deputy chairman is Dr. Mohammad Jehanzeb Khan, a senior ranking officer of the
Pakistan Administrative Service
A new role of the Planning Commission

West Germany bought East Germany from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in
October, 1990 (known as German Reunification in history), and boldly decided to scrap
the manufacturing base of the merged entity almost completely. It was totally outdated
and could not contribute to the competitive edge of the national manufacturing
capacity. However, it has not occurred to our Planning Commission as yet that our
manufacturing capacity can only be enhanced to face global competition after a
profound assessment of the age structure of the various manufacturing sectors and
providing the resources needed for their renewal.
We have the chronic habit of copying the Indian model of institutional framework with
the exception of Civil Service. Our whole system has been refractory to the
enhancement of Civil Service quality right from 1958. The Planning Commission of India
was set up in March, 1950 and launched its first Five Year Plan for the period 1951-56,
not exactly following the Soviet Model for a centrally controlled economy. They have
been consistently and regularly formulating the plans and have now launched the 12th
Five Year Plan (2012-2017). It is the implementation of plans through a strong civil
service that has considerably reinforced the status of Indian Planning Commission.
The Planning Commission of Pakistan was constituted in steps. Khwaja Nazimuddin,

Prime Minister of Pakistan, was the first to initiate development planning. He
constituted an Economic Appraisal and Development Enquiry Committee in August,
1952, comprising Mir Laiq Ali, Zahid Husain, Mian Afzal Husain, Ghulam Faruque, Mirza

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Ahmad Isphani, Muhammad Ali Habib and Atwar Hussain, some of the top ranking
experts in the country with considerable experience in trade, industry, banking and
commerce to advise him and his government. Then the National Planning Board was
redesignated as Planning Commission in October, 1958. The First Five Year Plan (1955-
60) had already been launched in 1957. Later on the Planning Commission was
restructured and its functions redefined in August, 1961. Then in April, 2006, the
Government revamped and strengthened the Planning Commission with a view to
ensuring that it played an effective role as the apex planning and coordination body of
the country. The unfortunate result was that at the top it became practically a glorified
parking lot for retired persons reemployed at high salaries. With the passage of time the
political overlap in respect of planning has been increasing. The momentum of
industrialisation gained in early 60’s was abruptly halted in early 70’s after the wholesale
nationalisation. The industrial development was put into reverse gear. The country has
not recovered from the damage so far primarily because of inherent weakness in the
planning process and lack of direction. The insensitivity of the Planning Commission
about what has been going on the ground can only be explained by the sheer lack of
competence on the part of its management of which the recent miserable examples are
16 billion rupees Drinking Water Project (2005), and Rental Power Project (2008-2010)
involving loss of 30 billion rupees according to the report of the Auditor General of
Pakistan for the Year 2010-11.
The Planning Commission has been relegated to the status of an onlooker. The Planning
Commission started suffering from hiccups after the 8th Five Year Plan (1993-98). The so
called Roll-on-Plans were initiated from 1998-99 to 2004-05, resulting in reduction of the
share of investment in infrastructure and social sectors by two third. A Medium Term
Development Framework for the period 2005-10 was prepared. Subsequently the
Planning Commission came up with Perspective Plan Vision – 2030, which was launched
by the President of Pakistan in August, 2007. This vision was not supported by any
statistical analysis. Specific targets and resource provisioning were considered
unnecessary. The organisational setup of the Planning Commission was again
restructured in 2007.
Lately, rethinking in respect of the role of Planning Commission has emerged,

particularly in view of the 18th Amendment of the Constitution, implying devolution of
government services including planning to the provinces. At present the capacity of the
provinces is supposed to be weak. According to an analytical study on “Enhancing
Government Effectiveness in Pakistan” prepared by the Competitiveness Support Fund
(2011) “the Planning Commission is currently oriented towards project management;
insufficient attention is given to the development of the nation as a whole.” Moreover,
the conclusion drawn by this analysis is extremely disappointing: “All of these changes
come at a time when the Planning Commission does not possess a sufficient number of
staff with the qualifications and experience that the new environment requires”.
It is now interesting to view the blog posted in early 2011 by the current Deputy
Chairman of the Planning Commission, who has come out with drastic observations in
respect of the strategy and model followed for planning. According to him “An

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unintended consequence of our policies has been the stifling of internal markets, cities
and communities, which play a critical role in fostering productivity, innovation and
entrepreneurship and ultimately promote growth, prosperity and development. There is
a tremendous need to review Pakistan’s development process.” He is promoting a New
Development Approach, which obviously implies that the vision 2030 conceived in 2006
has now to be remodeled. The NDA is short on actionable plans and long on polemics.
One of the commentators posted his uncharitable comments on the blog: “All points
presented in the draft are the text book solution to economic problems of Pakistan.”
Surprisingly the head of the Planning Commission could not perceive the fundamentals
and acknowledge the severe restrictions imposed on the purview of the Planning
Commission after the 18th Amendment. First of all, it would be misguiding to call the
previous plans as national plans. The national economy as a whole comprises the Civilian
Sector, Defence Affairs & Services, and the so called Black Economy. So, what we have
been planning so far was covering one fourth of the total spectrum of economic
activities at best.
The Planning Commission never realized the need for legislative support to the polices
declared by the government in order to ensure continuation of the fiscal resources
required for their successful culmination. We have yet to see any contribution made by
the Planning Commission in respect of the legislative business to support policy
development by the Parliament. Scores of policies have been announced by the Federal
Government, simply by executive action e.g. National Energy Policy (2005), National
Environmental Policy (2005), Energy Conservation Policy (2006), Development of
Renewable Energy for Power Generation (2006), National Sanitation Policy (2006), and
National Drinking Water Policy (2009) etc. Additionally now, the 18th Amendment of the
constitution stipulates devolution of subjects to the provinces like Environmental
Pollution & Ecology, Population Planning & Social Welfare, and Education by omitting the
Concurrent Legislative list.
The Planning Commission never acknowledges the fact that it is the Minister of Finance,
Chairman of the Central Development Working Party, who ultimately calls the shots
while approving the Public Sector Development Projects; plan or no plan. The Federal
Bureau of Revenue has its own Strategic Planning Wing. Is there a nexus between the
strategies developed by this wing with that of the Planning Commission? One arrives at
the very disconcerting conclusion that our prime planning institution is in complete
disarray at present. It is high time that we say good buy to the World Bank oriented
mind-set. It has not delivered the goods.
The Planning Commission has not been able to capture the stark fact that “technology
increasingly transforms the military, political and economic land scape in which the
government must operate”. The Commission never realised the vital importance of
technology assessment. We are on the threshold of a third industrial revolution. Mass
manufacturing is turning towards more individualised production. According to an
analysis “just as digitilisation has freed some people from working in an office, the same
will happen in manufacturing”. What would be the spill over for us? Any body’s guess!
Despite the rise of outsourcing and off-shoring that enabled the enterprises the world

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over to use lower-wage countries as workshops, we could not cash in on the windfall. On
the contrary our industrialists were pitifully forced to outsource their own products
elsewhere.
The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohammad, was once asked as to how he
started planning the development of his country. He simply answered “We started
looking towards the east”. That summarises the vision. Japan had an excellent growth
record after recovering from the economic disaster of World War II. The Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI), created in 1949, facilitated the early
industrialisation through technological intelligence and help in licensing foreign
technology, amongst other measures. Which recounting the history of MITI, a very
interesting feature has been revealed. The Prime Ministers of Japan were expected to
serve tenure as MITI minister before taking over the government. This tradition, a sort of
internship, continued as late as 1980s. It obviously displays the compelling need for
educating the top politician in the art of economic planning. In 2001, the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) was created to take over the role of MITI. Very ably
manned, METI has been responding historically to the changing needs of the society.
Rightly claimed “its history is the history of Japan’s progress”. Unfortunately we were
never tempted to even study the Japanese model closely. An answer to this intriguing
question has not been discovered so far.
The role of technologies in economic progress is well established. The core issue now,
therefore, is to assign entirely a new role to the Planning Commission; it should be asked
to plan for delivering resource – efficient growth of the country. It is imperative to
develop a Roadmap integrating specific technologies with economic development.
Technologies for transfer should be identified after tracking their trajectories covering all
sectors of economic activities. Mechanisms for their acquisition and deployment have to
be carefully worked out.
Entrepreneurs are the key source of wealth creation, competitiveness, jobs and
innovation. However, they need to be supported in respect of licensing and procedures.
In future the Planning Commission should assume the role of service provider for
sustaining the free market economy in Pakistan.
Revitalizing the Planning Commission – The IGC
Summary This paper considers the key problems confronting the Pakistan Planning
Commission; briefly examines the essentials of planning for a mixed economy; draws
lessons from the experience of countries, both developed and developing, that have
formulated and implemented successful plans; and suggests measures to revitalize the
Planning Commission. Some suggestions are put forward for continuous upgrading of
the institution’s skills in the longer run. The paper also describes ways in which
policymakers can learn from their counterparts in successful countries in the
neighborhood.
Compared with its glory days of the 1960s and early 1970s, the Planning Commission
today confronts four major problems:

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 The increased globalization and privatization of the Pakistan economy have

vastly reduced the space for planning by the former methods, whereby the
government set targets and could use licensing and other direct controls to help
realize them.
 The Planning Commission does not possess sufficient staff with the
qualifications and experience required by the new economic environment.
 The passage of the 18th amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan has
delegated responsibility for several important economic sectors to the
provinces. This poses special problems of coordination of ends and means
between the Center and the provinces, which are made more difficult if the
federal and provincial governments are formed by different political parties.
 The Planning Commission has lost substantial parts of its role to other ministries,
especially the Ministry of Finance.
If the Planning Commission does not quickly adapt to the new economic environment,
rethinking its role and adjusting its focus and methods, its remit will be confined to the
public sector development program, whose contribution to the country’s development
effort is steadily decreasing.
The Planning Commission must develop a program to regain its role as the key strategic
thinker for the government and the main repository of its economic expertise. This will
require the Planning Commission:
 To be selective in its planning targets—by rigorously prioritizing what goals must

be met and which must be provided all necessary resources, and those that are
of less importance.
 To substantially develop its capacity to formulate policies—by training and
expanding its staff; and harnessing outside resources, such as consultants, think
tanks, and universities.
 To work with other institutions (such as the State Bank of Pakistan, the Ministry
of Finance, the Federal Bureau of Statistics) to address areas of common
concern (such as developing a macroeconomic model and generating a unified
set of macroeconomic projections).
 To improve co-operation between the public and private sectors by bringing
together important elements of the government and the private sector.
 To substantially increase interaction with the provincial planning departments.
 To learn from the experience of countries that have successfully confronted
problems similar to those facing Pakistan.
 To continuously upgrade its stock of skills by reintroducing the system of
scholarships for study abroad on the lines of the successful programs of the
1960s and 1970s.
Planning and Development Architecture in Pakistan, A Strategic Review – USAID
The Planning Commission was set up with the core mandate of ‘assisting in defining the
national vision and undertaking strategic planning.’ 8 As the apex planning machinery of
the government, its role covers both: shaping the contours of the economic planning

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and ensuring that the development planning in the country conforms to the identified
national priorities. The Rules of Business, 1973, lay down the functions of the Planning
Commission which among others, include:
 Preparation of comprehensive National Plan for economic and social

development
 Identification of regions, sectors, and subsectors lacking adequate portfolio of
projects and taking steps to stimulate preparation of sound projects in those
areas
 Organization of research in various sectors of the economy to improve the
database and information as well as to provide analytical studies to help
economic decision making
The role of the Planning Commission, thus, was envisioned as a ‘think tank’, setting the
direction and leading the policy discourse on economic planning and development.
Over the years, the ever- changing economic and political landscape in the country and
its accompanying factors have had their implications on the role and remit of the
Planning Commission. Various commentators have mapped these changes over time.
The International Growth Centre Report (Revitalising the Planning Commission, January
2011) observes that ‘globalization and privatization, insufficiency of qualified staff,
decentralization to the provinces, and an erosion of its remit pose serious challenges to
the Planning Commission.’ It goes on to comment that ‘if the Planning Commission does
not quickly adapt to the new economic environment, rethinking its role and adjusting its
focus and methods, its remit will be confined to the public sector development program,
whose contribution to the country’s development effort is steadily decreasing.’ The
study findings also resonate with this observation.
Many of the respondents interviewed during data collection for this research believed
that over the years, the Planning Commission was losing its ‘edge’ as the national
planning machinery.
The recent years have witnessed a steady erosion of the role of Planning Commission,
including losing substantial parts of its role to other ministries, especially the Ministry of
Finance. A case to the point is the development of the strategy for poverty reduction,
which has been entrusted to the Ministry of Finance, whereas it unquestioningly falls
within the remit of the Planning Commission as part of its core mandate.9 Many
respondents cite the steady depletion in the capacity and erosion of staff quality at the
Planning Commission as one of the major reasons for the erosion of its remit.
It also appears that the changing policy environment, an increased focus on globalization
and privatization, and the recent decentralization to the provinces following the passage
of the 18th Amendment, has also triggered the need to review the present role and
capacity of the Planning Commission. The increased globalization and privatization of
the Pakistan economy, for example, has vastly reduced the space for planning by the
former methods, whereby the government set targets and used direct controls to help
realize them. The new economic environment requires a different set of skills and a

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policy mix to address the emerging challenges of reduced fiscal space and control. The
present skill set at the Planning Commission needs to be brought to par with the
qualifications and experience required by the evolving economic context.
In reviewing the role of the Planning Commission, the study findings also indicate that
apart from the challenges posed by the external environment, there are some internal
challenges that need to be taken into account.
One such area appears to be the lack of distinction between the role of the Planning
Commission and the Planning and Development Division (PDD), which serves as the
Commission’s secretariat and at present both appear to be performing the same
functions. A review of the current functions of the Planning Commission reveals that at
present, the commission operates more like a project division with its Members mainly
responsible for supervising the technical sections. There has been no input, policy
guidelines or research and analysis on key development issues from the Commission in
the recent times.
An analysis of the international comparators also reveals that the focus of the planning
system should be economic growth, with the Planning Commission as the key ‘driver’ as
the institutional mechanism executing this role. There is thus, a need to review the role,
remit and focus of the Planning Commission with a view to re-orient it more strongly
around economic development and revert it back to its envisioned strategic role of
leading the macro economic planning of the country
Recommendations:
 In consonance with the above findings, there is a clear need to refocus the role,
remit and functions of the Commission and draw a clear distinction between the
role of the P&DD and the Planning Commission. As a key first step the
Commission may consider developing a change/ re-orientation program
involving its focus, mandate, culture, interaction with stakeholders and structure
aimed at strengthening its strategic role as the planning machinery of the
country.
 The re-orientation program should be complimented by developing its capacity
and expertise through focus local training and expanding its professional and
technical staff; clarifying and clearly delineating its role and functions and
strengthening its institutional set up with a focus on research, policy analysis
and reforms. The present institution of the Pakistan Planning and Management
Institute (PPMI) should be restructured and strengthened to develop and
implement need-based focused training programs. The Institute’s training
curriculum and content should be periodically reviewed and updated. The study
recommends up-gradation of the PPMI into a Centre of Excellence with the core
mandate of providing cutting edge capacity development and training services
to the planning machinery in the country.
 Success in the new economic environment requires the Planning Commission to
be selective in its planning aims, focus on strategic thinking and policies and
mobilize the potential of other agencies. In an increasingly challenging economic

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context with competing priorities and shrinking fiscal space, one of the key roles
the Planning commission can play is that of setting development planning
priorities and prioritizing goals in line with the long term vision. As the Pakistan
economy becomes more complex and privatized, the Planning Commission will
increasingly have to develop the tools and hire staff with the appropriate
background or train some of its existing officials for indicative planning.10
 As a key driver in developing the macroeconomic framework of the country and
determining macro planning parameters, the Planning Commission is also
entrusted with the responsibility of assessing the implications of the public
sector development expenditure on the growth targets. The study findings
indicate that given its position as the fulcrum planning and policy reform, there
is a need to focus on and strengthen the Commission’s role of evaluation and
impact assessment in terms of reviewing policy implications on development
programs.
d. Strategic Planning at Federal, Provincial and Local

Government
Federal Government
Provincial Government
Local Government
e. Role of International Donors in Policy Formulation (IMF
Document “Memorandum on Economic and
Financial Policies 2013/14–2015/16,” that
underpins almost all public policies.)
The Aid-Policy Network in Pakistan – PIDE
The aid policy network is a complex web of multiple actors involved in the aid delivery
system, connected through interdependent relations that dene foreign aid policy and
priorities for the development sector. The aid delivery system is often perceived as if it
was a linear chain that links a donor government to a recipient country beneciary via
various intermediary organisations (Gibson et al., 2005). This notion ignores the complex
network of diverse and interdependent actors involved in the aid delivery system.
With a steady evolution of global events over the last six decades, today’s aid
architecture has become far more complex, involving a range of actors, structures and
processes. In Pakistan, the aid establishment is now substantial. As of 2013, there were
32 ocial bilateral and 12 ocial multilateral donor agencies (plus 18 UN agencies)
operating in Pakistan, managing some 2094 project activities (OECD, 2015). At the
recipient end, 38 divisions of 33 federal ministries and around 150 provincial some
15,000 to 20,000 NGO/CSOs operating in the country. The presence of these numerous
actors in the country, their contrasting priorities for the development process, and
overlapping project activities add up to the complexity of aid delivery in Pakistan.
In my research paper for the 2017 Australasian Aid Conference – titled ‘The Aid Policy
Network in Pakistan: Actor-Network Analysis’ – nine strategic groups of actors in the aid

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policy network in Pakistan were identied. All these actors or groups of actors play roles
in managing the aid policy process based on their position in the network, policy
interests and the resources they carry. Since there is a need to understand the network
structures and processes shaping foreign aid decisions, the paper oers a renewed
understanding of the complexities, interdependencies and constraints involved in
managing the aid policy process in a recipient country such as Pakistan. In so doing, it
contributes to the understanding of aid effectiveness.
Exploring the complex linkages and interdependencies between actors of the aid policy
network, my research suggests that carrying an important or less substitutable resource
(such as a large volume of funds) does not necessarily guarantee an inuential role within
the network. For instance, despite being the largest ocial bilateral donor to Pakistan,
China was not considered as inuential as other major bilateral donors. This was perhaps
due to the limited involvement of Chinese ocials in policy forums and public policy
debates concerning the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and restricted
communications with other development partners. Similarly, in strategic bilateral
relations, Asian and Gulf bilateral donors were sometimes considered to be more
trustworthy development partners than USAID and the Western (OECD-DAC) bilateral
donors. This perception of the respondents was widely based on the trade and
economic sanctions Pakistan faced in the past at the hands of Western donors.
After decentralisation, Pakistan experienced a large-scale restructuring of governance at

the provincial level during 2011-2013. As a result of this, 17 federal ministries/divisions,
which previously interacted with development partners on the MDGs, have been
devolved to the four provincial governments. These new institutional arrangements will
have an impact on managing aid policy processes and network interactions. This would
lead to extensive engagements with numerous actors, capacity constraints at the lower
tiers, readjustments of coordination and collaboration practices, and higher transaction
costs. More interestingly, at present four dierent political parties have governments in
the four provinces of Pakistan. Each province, led by a dierent political party (or
alliance), thus has dierent political manifestoes and development priorities. Eventually,
this has made the aid delivery system in Pakistan even more fragmented and complex,
operating at multiple levels.
Last but not least, many of the problems of international development aid are known to
the actors involved in the aid delivery system in Pakistan. However, there has been a lack
of collective action on practical steps to make foreign aid more eective that adds to the
complexity of the aid policy process. Evidence suggests that donors tend to be pro-active
and aid seems to be supply-driven in Pakistan, partly due to the absence of an inclusive
actionable development policy framework and the limited capacity of the state. This
provides opportunities for donors to dominate the policy debate and pursue their own
priorities.
To make the aid delivery system work better, an enlightened donor approach based on
more demand-driven economic and technical assistance is required. An indigenous
version of the “foundation model” could make development aid efforts more productive

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under the provincial devolution and localization of the Sustainable Development Goals.
Nevertheless, the federal and provincial governments need to work on formulating
policy frameworks under their respective development agendas and to build public
sector capacity in a bid to make aid efforts more productive in Pakistan.
f. Public Policy and Implementation in Key Sectors (i.e.,

Health, Education).
Accountability
a. General Introduction to Accountability and its concepts
(Standards, Symbolism, regional and country-wide
comparisons, a Review of Contemporary Studies)
 Strictly speaking, accountability means that someone (X), who has been put in a
position of responsibility (r) in relation to the interests of someone else (Y), is
required to give an account (to Y) of how s/he has discharged the assigned
duties, and that, concomitantly, Y is in a position to either punish or reward X’s
conduct in relation to (r).
 What is Accountability? Accountability is a form of liability that refers to who
and for what and what is accountable, which is understood as the obligation of
the holder of the trust to provide accountability, presenting and reporting all
activities that are his responsibility to the party who provides the trust has the
authority to hold such accountability. The decision-makers of the government,
the private sector and community organizations are accountable to the public
and to the agencies concerned. The form of liability depends on the type of
organization concerned. Accountability basically provides a very important role
in creating a good governance activity as a part of improving public confidence
in government performance. The conception of accountability can be seen that
government officials are not only accountable to higher authorities in the
institutional chain of command but also accountable to the general public, non-
governmental organizations, mass media and many other stakeholders. Public
accountability consists of two kinds, namely (1) vertical accountability and (2)
horizontal accountability. Vertical accountability is accountability for the
management of funds to higher authorities, such as accountability of work units
to local governments, regional accountability to the central government, and
etcetera. And then horizontal accountability is the responsibility that is conveyed
to the general community. In this paper, the research method used is literature
study or literature review. According to the concept of good governance that to
create a good governance, it is necessary cooperation between important
components that include government as the holder of power, society as a social
element and the private sector as a partner of the government. Therefore, the
government as the holder of power that gains legitimacy from the state, has the
responsibility to create the general welfare through the organs of the
government concerned.

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b. Types of Accountabilities
If the accountability mechanism enters parliament, the term is known as Political
accountability. In the area of justice, there is the term known legal accountability, but
when the mechanism of entering administrative areas is known as the term
administrative accountability (Bovens, 2008).
a. Political Accountability
Political accountability is when a politician makes choices on behalf of the
people and the people have the ability to reward or sanction the politician. In
representative democracies citizens delegate power to elected officials through
periodic elections in order to represent or act in their interest. The challenge
then becomes why would rulers with such power, who presumably have
divergent interests from the people, act in the best interest of the people?
Citizens can rely on rewards or sanctions to threaten or reward politicians who
might otherwise act in a manner that is antithetical to the people's interest.
Accountability occurs when citizens only vote to re-elect representatives who act
in their interests, and if representatives then select policies that will help them
be re-elected.[16] "Governments are 'accountable' if voters can discern whether
governments are acting in their interest and sanction them appropriately, so
that those incumbents who act in the best interest of the citizens win reelection
and those who do not lose them."
Representatives can be held accountable through two mechanisms: electoral

replacement and rational anticipation. In electoral replacement citizens vote to
replace representatives who are out of step with their interests. Rational
anticipation requires that representatives anticipate the consequences of being
out of step with their constituency and then govern in accordance with citizens'
wishes to avoid negative consequences. Accountability can still be achieved even
if citizens are not perfectly knowledgeable about representative's actions as long
as representatives believe that they will be held accountable by citizens they will
still act in accordance with the citizens' interests
b. Legal/ Judicial Accountability

The phrase judicial accountability describes the view that judges should be held
accountable in some way for their work. This could be public accountability—
getting approval from voters in elections—or accountability to another political
body like a governor or legislature
Judicial Accountability cannot be separated from Judicial Independence. Judicial

independence is a term that has two distinct meanings as it applies to matters of
the judiciary. In one context, it refers to the idea of separation of powers, called
institutional independence, where the judiciary is kept separate from other
branches of government. The main reason for establishing judicial independence
is to avoid improper influence on the court from the other branches of
government.

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The other commonly used context is called decisional independence, and it

refers to an ideal whereby judicial decision-making is able to exist free of undue
influence from outside agents who are acting from partisan or special-interest
motivations, rather than being motivated by the demands and ideals of justice
A central—no, the central—issue capturing the attention of so many analysts is

how to balance judicial independence and judicial accountability. Only the
thoughtless and the lazy prefer total independence or total accountability. The
tough intellectual work goes to the questions of (a) striking the best balance
between independence and accountability, and (b) which institutional structures
would contribute to maintaining the desired balance.
Judicial Accountability in Pakistan

Qazi Faez Isa case as an example of Judicial Accountability.
In the wave of accountability in the country, it seems timely to submit before the
Honorable Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP) to make the judiciary accountable as
the CJP earmarked the New Judicial Year 2015-2016 as “a year of judicial
accountability”. The outgoing Chief Justice also pointed out significant flaws in
our judicial system. The Pakistan Bar Council (PBC) has recently asked the
Supreme Court (SC) to restrain all those judges of the superior judiciary against
whom complaints are pending before the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) from
performing their duties. It is the first time that a voice for judicial accountability
has echoed in the SC and PBC. So, this opportunity should be availed to reform
and strengthen our justice system.
At the outset, it may be stated, however, that judges cannot be held accountable
like the manager of a football team or an employee of a corporate body. The
very nature of the judicial function requires the independence of the judiciary so
that judges can decide cases without fear and favor. If a judge could be removed
just because a politician or a senior judge does not like his decision, that will
undermine the possibility of a fair trial. It may also lead judges to make decisions
pleasing those who could remove or promote them. Therefore, judges should be
accountable in different ways: accountability to senior judges through the
system of a writ, appeal, and revision; accountability to the public through the
publication of judicial decisions and annual judicial statistics; accountability
through the SJC. These means to ensure a considerable degree of accountability
in the judiciary.
The CJP said: “the Supreme Judicial Council is being activated in view of the
pending complaints before it under Article 209 of the Constitution against
different judges”. He further said that the process of self-accountability would
not be a one-sided affair and that bar councils would also revive their
disciplinary committees. So, PBC and the Provincial Bar Councils should also
expedite the pending proceedings against fellow lawyers for alleged professional
misconduct and negligence etc.

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The judiciary may also promote accountability in its own ranks making the
appointment process more transparent. It will lend institutional credibility and
independence to the judiciary. The 18th amendment attempted to make the
appointment process of judges more inclusive by allocating some role to a
Parliamentary Committee (Art.175-A) which was diluted through the 19th
amendment. In the SC judgement on the 18th and the 21st amendment, due
attention has not been brought to the matter of judicial appointments
suggesting a double-ended constitutional mechanism for the nomination of
judges. It may be argued that nomination of judges by the concerned Chief
Justice of High Court alone amounts to a sort of discrimination in the selection
process. Under this process, only those are considered for appointment who are
nominated at the sole discretion of Chief Justice of High Court. So, a nomination
at the first instance should be made by a constitutionally composed body of
judges and lawyers to make the first nomination an objective process.
In the United States, the Senate Judiciary Committee consisting of eighteen

members has a significant role in the process of appointing Supreme Court
justices. In Canada, the lawyers submit a written application to a screening
committee consisting of judges, lawyers, government officials and other public
members before their appointment as judges. In Pakistan, the recommendation
of the Judicial Commission and the Parliamentary Committee may also be made
public. The people should know why a particular lawyer has been preferred for
nomination and appointment on others. The judicial appointments may not be
treated as a ‘state secret’ as doing justice begins with an objective and open
procedure of appointments of judges. Mystique, if any, in the judicial
appointments may not foster judicial accountability
The process of accountability should begin from the bench and bar both. In
keeping with the promise of our Constitution (Article 37) to provide ‘inexpensive
and expeditious justice’, the bar should hold lawyers accountable for their
professional negligence in the conduct of cases and behaviour towards litigants
and courts, and the bench should hold fellow judges accountable for violating
the judicial code of conduct. Bar councils should constitute effective disciplinary
committees to decide pending applications against lawyers quickly and the SJC
should decide pending complaints as per mandated by the Constitution.
Finally, our justice system can be reformed only if members of the legal
profession implement their farewell sermons and speeches in true letter and
spirit. Thus, we can hope that the declared Judicial Year 2015-2016 ushers an era
of institutional accountability in Pakistan. If the bench and bar succeed to
initiate the process of accountability in our legal institutions, it will go a long way
to uplift the legal professions and make other institutions accountable to an
independent judiciary.

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c. Administrative Accountability
 Administrative accountability may be defined as the evolution of appointed
career employees and officials in terms of whether their actions are within or
outside the bounds of their authority.
 The general sense of accountability is required or expected to justify actions or
decisions. This is the dictionary meaning of accountability. But in governmental
affairs particularly in public administration it has special implications and the
concept is regarded as an important part. It implies that the representatives
elected by the people must give explanations of the electorate for all these
policies and actions. This is a very important part of democracy-particularly
representative form of government. This is a very common cause that a person
by whom he is elected is accountable to him or them. This is not only a
commonsense affair but the very foundation of democracy.
 A quite reasonable definition of the term is: “The requirement for represen-
tatives to answer to the represented on the disposal of their powers and duties
and act upon criticisms.” The ministers are accountable to the legislature, and
the members of the legislature are accountable to the electorate. It may be
explained in another way
 Administrative accountability in the context of this research is represented by
the performance accountability system of government agencies, hereinafter
abbreviated as SAKIP. It is a systematic series of activities, tools, and procedures
designed for setting and measuring, collecting data, classifying, summarizing,
and reporting performance on government agencies, in the context of
accountability and improving the performance of government agencies. The
implementation of SAKIP is carried out for the preparation of Performance
Reports of Government Agencies (LKJ) as stipulated in Presidential Regulation
No. 29 of 2014 concerning the Performance Accountability System of
Government Agencies and Regulation of the Minister of Administrative Reform
and Bureaucratic Reform (PermenpanRB) No. 53 of 2014 concerning technical
guidelines for performance agreements, performance reporting and review
procedures for performance reports of government agencies
 According to Antonio Bar Cendon, in the vertical dimension, administrative
accountability is the relationship that connects low administrative positions
with political or administrative superiors. In contrast, in the horizontal
dimension, administrative accountability connects individual organizers and
public administration as a whole (a) with citizens, as service users, but also (b)
with other external organs of supervision and established controls for this
purpose, such as supervisory bodies, audits, financial supervisors,
"ombudsmen". Here are some indicators of Administrative Accountability: 1)
Operational Basis: Actions that are very fulfilled by the legality of rules and
procedures. 2) Internal accountability intended: higher political authority and
administrative agency authority. 3) The intended external accountability:
Oversight and control by external institutions, the community as a subject and
the judiciary. 4) Subjects of affairs: Forms and procedures carried out with

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administrative actions. 5) Criteria: Formal criteria, namely compliance with the

rules and procedures set. 6) Mechanisms: external supervision and control
mechanisms, administrative complaints and legal procedures. 7)
Consequences: Improvement of administrative actions (confirmation,
modification, cancellation), sanctions or rewards to implementing officials and
compensation for the community. (Rohmah, 2018).
 In contrast to administrative accountability, social accountability refers to the
"social contract" between the government and the community as a basic
instrument in developing the principle of accountability from governance
practices (Pattiro, 2014). The essence of social contracts is the participation of
the community to ensure the implementation of the principle accountability in
every policy, budgeting and public service. The original form of social
accountability for public services is the Citizen Charter. The core of this Citizens
Charter is the government, and the community will mutually agree on public
services that will be carried out by the government and accepted by the
community. Strong efforts from the government and service providers are
needed to work together with the community to ensure that the "social
contract" can work well.
d. Professional Accountability
 Professional accountability has become a novel way to instill discipline into
government activities . It occurs when public officials rely on skilled
employees and experts to provide appropriate solutions for technically
difficult and complex problems. Authority can be enforced through
performance standards, codes of ethics, or licensure in governments .
Technical specialists in public agencies such as medical or legal staff may be
subject to investigations or sanctions from review boards or disciplinary
committees in their profession. Professional accountability can be escalated
when public administrators are more exposed to internationally- recognized
professional standards.
e. Private vs. Public Accountability

Analysis of accountability within the public administration literature tends, not
surprisingly, to adopt a public sector focus. The emphasis is on the accountability
of public power, on how to make governments, their agencies and officials, more
accountable to their ultimate owners, the citizens. However, governments are
increasingly contracting public services out to the private sector or transferring
responsibility for services altogether to the private sector. Citizens thus find
themselves relying more and more on private organisations for the provision of
services. At the same time, international trends towards greater economic
liberalisation and deregulation have steadily increased the power of private
sector organisations.
How private organisations can be made publicly accountable therefore becomes

an increasingly pressing issue. From this perspective, the continuing
preoccupation of public administration with the accountability of public

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agencies seems, if not beside the point, at least to be missing a large part of the
point. Like the classical liberal theory of the state, which underlies the division
between public and private law, such a preoccupation mistakenly assumes that
state power is the only threat to freedom and ignores the often, greater threat
from private economic power. This article therefore examines the extent to
which private organisations are accountable to citizens, the respects in which
private sector account-ability is both similar to and different from public sector
accountability, and the pressures that may be leading to an increasing
convergence between the two sectors.
Accountability is a notoriously imprecise term (Day and Klein 1987; Thynne and
Goldring 1987; Sinclair 1995; Mulgan forthcoming). For present purposes, it will
be taken to refer to certain obligations that arise within a relationship of
responsibility, where one person or body is responsible to another for the
performance of particular services. The obligations in question are, first, to
account for the performance of their duties and, second, to accept sanctions or
redirection. Formally, the relationship is one of superior and subordinate or of
principal and agent, where subordinates or agents are held accountable to, and
receive directions from, their superiors or principals. In practice, however, the
subordinate agent is typically the more dominant partner in the relationship,
thus giving rise to wellknown problems of principals’ control over agents.
Accountability requirements provide opportunities for otherwise weak and
defenceless principals to seek to impose some curbs on powerful organisations
and individuals who are supposed to be serving their interests
Accountability is not the only means of making suppliers of goods and services
responsive to their clients. In public choice terms, accountability is a ‘voice’
rather than an ‘exit’ option. It assumes that the client or customer needs to
engage in argument with a particular agency rather than simply transfer his or
her custom to an alternative agency. In many cases where competitive markets
operate, exit may be the more effective means of coping with recalcitrant
suppliers and of making them more responsive to the demands of customers. In
the public sector, as is commonly recognised, competition and market choice
have been unusual (though not unknown) and greater reliance is therefore to be
placed on accountability mechanisms. Even in the private sector, however,
competition is often not a sufficient guarantee of responsiveness to the public.
Monopolies and oligopolies are common, for example in transport and
telecommunications. Moreover, even where alternative private suppliers
compete effectively, individual customers often cannot afford simply to exit
without compensation for unsatisfactory service, particularly in cases of major
purchases, such as a house or car. In such instances, voice options become as
necessary as they are in dealing with public sector organisations.
Issues taken up by members of the public through avenues of accountability

may be roughly divided into two groups, those where explanation or redress is
sought in relation to decisions made in the individual or group’s own particular

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case (‘particular accountability’) and those where citizens seek to question or

influence general government policy or the general conduct of a business
(‘general accountability’). The distinction between particular cases and general
policies is not hard and fast because a general policy may be tantamount to a
particular decision in certain cases. For instance, government policy over media
ownership rules is equivalent to specific decisions in relation to identifiable
individual media companies. If local property holders question the adequacy of
an industrial company’s anti-pollution practices, they may, in practice, be
demanding better protection of their own property interests. For analytical
purposes, however, the distinction is sufficiently clear to provide a useful
framework for comparing accountability in the public and private sectors.
Neither sector, it must be noted, is uniform in structure. Each contains a variety

of different types of organisation with differing types of accountability
processes. In the public sector, a key variable is the degree of ministerial
accountability. At the centre are core government departments, usually and for
most purposes under direct ministerial control. Beyond them is a range of
executive agencies and statutory bodies, each publicly owned and ultimately
accountable to ministers or parliament but with varying degrees of distance
from direct ministerial control (O’Faircheallaigh et al. 1999:86–8). To simplify
comparison, the core department or executive agency under close ministerial
control will be taken as the representative case of public sector accountability
but it should be remembered that many public organisations are less directly
accountable to ministers and parliament.
The private sector is still more heterogeneous. For instance, private sector
organisations can be divided into those that are run on commercial principles to
deliver a profit to their owners, and the so-called ‘third sector’, that is, non-
public organisations with purposes other than profit, notably charitable or
cooperative organisations. Within the commercial private sector, businesses vary
widely, ranging from small one-person or family businesses, through larger,
privately owned companies, to companies owned by many thousands of
shareholders owning shares traded through stock exchanges. The law makes an
important distinction between ‘private’ companies, where the number of
shareholders and their right to transfer shares are limited, and ‘public’
companies that are free of such restrictions and whose shares may be traded
(Ffrench 1994:15). The Corporations Law also divides private companies into
‘large proprietary’ and ‘small proprietary’ companies.
Accountability arrangements differ according to the type of company. For

instance, ‘public’ and ‘large proprietary’ companies are subject to more
stringent disclosure requirements than ‘small proprietary’ companies, while
companies listed on the stock exchange must comply with the rules set down by
the stock exchange. A complete analysis of accountability in the private sector
would therefore need to take account of these differences. The present
comparison will focus on public and large proprietary companies on the grounds

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that they are most closely analogous to government agencies and may pose the
largest threat to individual freedom.
c. National Strategies against Corruption and remedial

measures
Accountability in Pakistan:
Public Accountability and anti-corruption generate strong interest and are of
vital importance to the public and effective governance in Pakistan, public
accountability is often reduced to mean only anti-corruption and thus associated
with criminal activity. However, the layered checks and balances that constitute
public Accountability for achieving an efficient and honest administration in
Pakistan are very complex.
The Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP), Public Accounts Committees (PACs) of
National and Provincial Assemblies, National Accountability Bureau (NAB),
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Federal and Provincial Ombudsman,
Provincial Anticorruption Establishments, Federal and Provincial Services
Tribunals, Federal and Provincial Public Services Commissions, Prime Minister's
and Chief Ministers', Inspection Commissions/Teams, Establishment Division and
Services & General Administration Departments in provinces are all part of the
administrative edifice developed over the years to ensure Public Accountability.
Irrespective of the language, culture or social norms of a specific region, there
are certain integral values that remain unchanged across borders and divides.
For instance, nowhere in the world have we ever seen masses demanding
widespread anarchy and disorder; on the contrary, world over people want a
functional system of governance to maintain rule of law in the society.
Accordingly, it seems safe to assume that to see order and stability in the society
is something that is inherent to all human beings. It is this integral need that
propels us all to rally behind political leaders, cheer for them during processions
and vote for them during elections – all the time hoping that the leader of our
choice will bring prosperity once s/he is in power. However, our desire to see
betterment in the society is not time bound and so it does not cease to exist
upon casting the vote. This desire continues even after a new government is in
place, driving us to scrutinize policies and actions of our governments and
leaders. It is this drive for constant improvement in the environment around us
that gives rise to another integral value that people across the world hold dear:
accountability.
Accountability, by many, is considered the fourth leg of the metaphorical chair of
good governance. It helps the masses to evaluate the effectiveness of public
officials and public offices, ensures that they are performing to their full
potential and ensures that at any given point in time there is enough public
pressure on the political leaders to be responsive to the community they are
meant to serve.

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So, how can accountability be exercised? What mechanism should an average

voter adopt to have his/her concerns heard? Who should we complain to and
how can we reach such people and offices.
In Pakistan there are a number of institutions whose sole or partial purpose is to

ensure that the government and its officials run the affairs of the state as
transparently as possible. There are also specialized institutions where general
people like you and I can lodge a complaint or register a concern that we might
have regarding the functioning of the government.
Most of us here in Pakistan are well aware of the National Accountability Bureau
(NAB). With its offices in all the major cities of the country, NAB is Pakistan’s
apex anti-corruption organization. Any and every Pakistani citizen is eligible to
approach NAB with evidence against guilty government office holders, whether
political or bureaucratic. The icing on the cake for the informer is that if the
corrupt official is convicted because of his/her tip, NAB will also reward him/her!
While NAB is the primary government organization entrusted with the task of
ensuring transparency, other public institutions include Public Accounts
Committee, the Judicial Commission, Election Commission of Pakistan,
Ombudsman institutions, the Federal Investigation Agency and various
provincial agencies. For economic governance, there is another set of
institutions: the State Bank of Pakistan, the Competition Commission of Pakistan
and the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan.
Apart from government organizations mentioned above, the Parliament itself is
one of the most important structures in the ‘chain of accountability’. The
Parliament does not merely form the bridge between people and the
government, but its role is also critical because it is also the institution to which
many accountability institutions report. Moreover, a Parliament and its elected
representatives are important vehicles through which citizens and civic groups
can also extract enforcement of various laws and policies.
Finally, the citizens have a dual role when it comes to ensuring accountable
governance. On one hand the government generates data regarding its
functioning to keep the citizens informed and on the other hand, the citizens
themselves are an important source to generate data for better accountability.
Confused? Let me explain! You see, in the age of smart phones, 24/7 internet
connectivity and social media platforms such as Twitter, citizens can now hold
the government and its officials accountable without a moment’s delay.
In short, there are sound mechanisms in place to ensure checks and balances for
transparent and effective governance. However, it is not just the responsibility of
the government to ensure the effectiveness of these mechanisms, but every
citizen also has an important role to play. So, whether it’s reaching out to NAB
with important evidence or raising hue and cry on social media, you and I are
the most important players in ensuring good, transparent governance!

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Bureaucracy
a. Concept of Bureaucracy
Introduction
The term bureaucracy refers to a body of non-elected governing officials as well as to an
administrative policy-making group. Historically, a bureaucracy was a government
administration managed by departments staffed with non-elected officials.[2] Today,
bureaucracy is the administrative system governing any large institution, whether
publicly owned or privately owned.[3][4] The public administration in many jurisdictions
and sub-jurisdictions exemplifies bureaucracy, but so does any centralized hierarchical
structure of an institution, e.g. hospitals, academic entities, business firms, professional
societies, social clubs, etc.
There are two key dilemmas in bureaucracy. The first dilemma revolves around whether
bureaucrats should be autonomous or directly accountable to their political masters.
The second dilemma revolves around bureaucrats' behavior strictly following the law or
whether they have leeway to determine appropriate solutions for varied circumstances.
Various commentators have argued for the necessity of bureaucracies in modern society.
The German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) argued that bureaucracy constitutes
the most efficient and rational way in which human activity can be organized and that
systematic processes and organized hierarchies are necessary to maintain order, to
maximize efficiency, and to eliminate favoritism. On the other hand, Weber also saw
unfettered bureaucracy as a threat to individual freedom, with the potential of trapping
individuals in an impersonal "iron cage" of rule-based, rational control.
History,
Although the term "bureaucracy" first originated in the mid-18th century, organized and
consistent administrative systems existed much earlier. The development of writing (c.
3500 BC) and the use of documents was critical to the administration of this system, and
the first definitive emergence of bureaucracy occurred in ancient Sumer, where an
emergent class of scribes used clay tablets to administer the harvest and to allocate its
spoils.[18] Ancient Egypt also had a hereditary class of scribes that administered the
civil-service bureaucracy.
In China, when the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) unified China under the Legalist system,
the emperor assigned administration to dedicated officials rather than nobility, ending
feudalism in China, replacing it with a centralized, bureaucratic government. The form of
government created by the first emperor and his advisors was used by later dynasties to
structure their own government.[20][21] Under this system, the government thrived, as
talented individuals could be more easily identified in the transformed society. The Han
dynasty (202 BC - 220 AD) established a complicated bureaucracy based on the
teachings of Confucius, who emphasized the importance of ritual in a family, in
relationships, and in politics.[22] With each subsequent dynasty, the bureaucracy
evolved. In 165 BC, Emperor Wen introduced the first method of recruitment to civil
service through examinations, while Emperor Wu (r. 141–87 BC), cemented the ideology

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of Confucius into mainstream governance installed a system of recommendation and

nomination in government service known as xiaolian, and a national academy whereby
officials would select candidates to take part in an examination of the Confucian classics,
from which Emperor Wu would select officials. (See Fukuyama)
Instead of the inefficient and often corrupt system of tax farming that prevailed in
absolutist states such as France, the Exchequer was able to exert control over the entire
system of tax revenue and government expenditure.[35] By the late 18th century, the
ratio of fiscal bureaucracy to population in Britain was approximately 1 in 1300, almost
four times larger than the second most heavily bureaucratized nation, France.[36]
Thomas Taylor Meadows, Britain's consul in Guangzhou, argued in his Desultory Notes
on the Government and People of China (1847) that "the long duration of the Chinese
empire is solely and altogether owing to the good government which consists in the
advancement of men of talent and merit only," and that the British must reform their
civil service by making the institution meritocratic.[37] Influenced by the ancient
Chinese imperial examination, the Northcote–Trevelyan Report of 1854 recommended
that recruitment should be on the basis of merit determined through competitive
examination, candidates should have a solid general education to enable inter-
departmental transfers, and promotion should be through achievement rather than
"preferment, patronage, or purchase".[38][37] This led to implementation of Her
Majesty's Civil Service as a systematic, meritocratic civil service bureaucracy.
Neutrality
The average civil servant lasts approximately 30-40 years in an Administration. Opinions
about him change three to four times during this period, from seeing him as a useful
instrument, then as an obstructive force and finally as a full-fledged interlocutor. This
paper discusses changing views on the neutrality of public administration and different
ideas on the appropriate role of the bureaucracy in a democracy. It will go into the
subjects of subservience, representativeness, the division of responsibilities by
specialization and the reduction of the size of bureaucratic tasks as ways of avoiding the
paradox of bureaucracy and democracy. March and Olsen put the problem aptly when
they said: ‘Everyone “knows” that policy making and administration should be kept
distinct. At the same time, everyone “knows” that policy making, and administration
cannot be kept distinct and that the distinction itself is difficult to make precise’
Good governance is closely linked with sustainable and equitable development. But
however good they may be, policies will have little positive impact unless the institutions
implementing them are effective and efficient. One of the main institutions required for
good governance is a competent, neutral, honest bureaucracy.
Steel Frame of the State

Over the course of the past six decades, the so-called steel frame of the civil service that
Pakistan inherited from colonial India has become decidedly rusty.1 The ineffectiveness
of state institutions due to the diminishing capacity, over-politicization and corruption of
the bureaucracy and its political masters is seriously undermining Pakistan’s economic,
social and political development. In addition the failure of Pakistan’s state institutions to

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protect the welfare of its citizens, provide adequate social services and promote the rule
of law are eroding the legitimacy and stability of the state.
International attention is belatedly focusing on Pakistan as a result of concerns over the

destabilizing effects of an increasingly aggressive Taliban-led insurgency in this nuclear-
armed state. One result of this attention is the commitment of large amounts of foreign
aid by international donors, including $7.5 billion by the U.S. government over the next
five years. The rapid increase in foreign aid, however, combined with the decreasing
capacity of Pakistan’s state institutions to spend these funds in an effective and
accountable manner, are likely to result in much of this aid simply fueling the very
corruption that is eating away the legitimacy of state institutions.2
This paper argues that, for these large amounts of foreign aid to have significant
benefits, the government of Pakistan and its international donors will have to prioritize
rebuilding and repairing the dangerously weakened steel frame of the civil
service.3 After briefly providing some historical context, the paper outlines some of the
main civil service reform priorities. It then discusses some of the political factors and
interest groups that have contributed to the very limited reform progress to date. The
paper concludes that future progress will not depend on more donor-driven technical
assessments of what needs to be done, but rather on better strategies and tactics to
address the politics of civil service reform, including creating a broader constituency
supporting reform.
Historical Background
Pakistan’s colonial heritage has heavily influenced its political culture as well as its
bureaucratic and political institutions.4 For the purposes of this study, the legacy of
executive rule by a powerful bureaucracy is particularly worth highlighting. During the
19th and 20th centuries, colonial administrators developed powerful and highly
centralized bureaucratic institutions, administered by the famed Indian Civil Service
(ICS), to rule the empire. While representative institutions were gradually introduced
into colonial India, the role of these elected bodies was to serve as advisory rather than
policymaking bodies, and to deal with local administrative matters rather than
substantive issues. They were never intended to be democratic institutions that
transferred power to elected representatives, but rather were designed to help
legitimize and strengthen the authority of the bureaucratic state.5 The power imbalance
between the very strong bureaucratic institutions that Pakistan inherited from colonial
India and the very weak representative and democratic institutions has been one of the
greatest causes of political instability in Pakistan since its independence.
During the six decades since the departure of the last British colonial administrator,
Pakistan’s bureaucratic institutions have remained much stronger than its democratic
institutions. The concentration of power in the executive branch, usually controlled
directly or indirectly by the civil and military bureaucracies, has been at the expense of
the legislature as well as the judiciary. Like the elected institutions during the colonial
period, Pakistani legislatures have often had little more than an advisory or rubber
stamp function, do not usually initiate legislation and serve primarily to legitimize the

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exercise of power by the executive branch of government. It is the executive, supported

by the bureaucracy, that typically initiates legislation, often bypassing the National
Assembly altogether by promulgating presidential ordinances.6 The major change that
has taken place over time is that the power and influence of the civilian bureaucracy has
increasingly been replaced by the power and influence of the military.
A second colonial legacy that still heavily influences Pakistan’s political culture and
institutions, as well as its electoral politics, is the institutionalization of patron-client
political relationships between the bureaucracy and local elites. In return for patronage
—often in the form of land grants, pensions and titles—feudal landlords, religious
leaders and tribal and clan leaders were co-opted by colonial administrators to provide
political stability and collect revenues. After independence, this direct patron-client
relationship between the bureaucracy and local elites strengthened the image of the
bureaucracy as the providers of patronage, influence and security and undermined the
development of political parties that normally would have played this intermediary
role.7 The bureaucracy’s important role as patron also contributed to the desire of every
family to have one member employed in government service to serve as a problem-
solver and provider of patronage.
Steel Frame of the State – India
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, young India's first Home Minister, spoke to the first batch of
Indian Administrative Service officers at Metcalf House in Delhi in a special address on
April 21, 1947. Patel played a key role in incorporating the princely states into the Indian
Union. Patel’s association with civil servants extends long before he took over as the
Home Department of the interim Indian government. Before he stepped into the
freedom struggle, Patel was a very successful barrister in Ahmedabad who often dealt
with British civil servants on issues concerning law and order in the city.
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, our first Home Minister envisioned the civil services to be the
‘steel frame’ of good governance of the country. And this steel frame continues to serve
the nation, following and respecting the first address of Patel saying “Your predecessors
were brought up in traditions which kept them aloof from the common run of the
people. It will be your bounden duty to treat the common man as your own.”
Civil Servants - From British Era to Indian Independence
Civil Servants for the East India Company used to be nominated by the Directors of the
Company and thereafter trained at Haileybury College in London and then sent to India.
Following Lord Macaulay’s Report of the Select Committee of British Parliament, the
concept of a merit-based modern Civil Service in India was introduced in 1854. The
Report recommended that the patronage-based system of East India Company should be
replaced by a permanent Civil Service based on a merit-based system with entry through
competitive examinations. With the coming years, the system witnessed various reforms
and improved to include Indians from all classes and regions.

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Partition and the violent chaos associated with it, the claims of sovereignty from various
pockets, and economic stagnation were critical features of the time. Since the majority
of the civil servants in the British-era Indian Civil Service (ICS) were British citizens born
in the United Kingdom, only a small number of them stayed back in India after
Independence. There were legitimate concerns about how a newly independent India
would rule the region.
RELATED STORIES
Fortunately, the country had Sardar Patel on its side, and he went on to build a new steel
frame of the country, which is still the backbone of Indian administration today.
Civil Servants - Steel Frame of India
Leaders of the Indian National Congress, who were deeply involved in the freedom
movement, had no knowledge of administrative procedures. After the British left, they
needed capable administrators. Despite opposition from other freedom fighters, Patel
began assembling a team of capable and effective officers to support the nation's
administrative machinery.
“You can realise what a year-old government has to do to maintain peace and bring
about prosperity. The steel frame on which India relied so far is now broken….50% of
which was foreign went across the seas. Partition further weakened it… We have only a
small number of civil servants left…outsiders cannot appreciate their work. Many of
them loyal workers and patriots are working with us night and day. All we have been
able to achieve whether it be in the sphere of states or in Kashmir or in any other
theatre, have been possible only because of their loyalty and wholehearted support,”
said Patel, during a speech on October 15, 1949.
Negative Connotations Associated with the term

For almost two decades (i.e. 1950–1970) the academic community presented
bureaucracy in the developing countries as engine of growth, development and
an agent of change [Lapalambora (1963) and Apter (1967)]. Bureaucracy in
Pakistan provided a lead and received laudatory comments for its role in
initiating economic development and promoting political stability [Huntington
(1968); Von Vorys (1965) and Braibanti (1966)]. Bureaucratic elites and public
institutions were expected to provide leadership, order and stability. Again,
Pakistani bureaucracy stood the test and fulfilled these expectations [Huntington
(1968)]. By the late 1960s that witnessed movements of popular protest and
agitation against the authoritarian and repressive role of the government, the
opposition political parties, and a segment of the print media started portraying
the bureaucracy as an instrument of oppression. This portrayal had an impact on
public consciousness. Bureaucrats were seen as being inimical to their interests.
By the mid-1970s the academic community and the World Bank (both in their
own wisdom and direction) began to reassess and reevaluate the role of
bureaucracy [Donell (1973) and Laporte (1975)]. In the early 1980s the World
Bank studies began casting aspersions on bureaucracy’s ability to promote order

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and development in the Third World. Corruption, inefficiency, bloated size,

absence of accountability, and resistance to change were portrayed as the
manifestations of bureaucracy [World Bank Report (1983–1993)]. The academic
community raised concerns about authoritarian values and corrupt practices
that bureaucracies promoted in the developing countries—i.e. violation of
human rights and suppression of liberties. The academic community recognized
and conceded some positive contribution of bureaucracy in the direction of
growth and development [Burki and Laporte (1986)]. In short negative images of
bureaucracy and a cry for reform dominated the policy and academic research
environment.
b. Theories of Bureaucracy
Max Weber
Max Weber has been one of the most influential users of the term bureaucracy in
its social science sense. He is well-known for his study of bureaucratization of
society, and many aspects of modern public administration go back to him. A classic,
hierarchically organized civil service of the continental type is—if basically
mistakenly—called "Weberian civil service."
Weber described the "ideal type" bureaucracy in positive terms, considering it to be

a more rational and efficient form of organization than the alternatives that
preceded it, which he characterized as "charismatic domination" and "traditional
domination." According to his terminology, bureaucracy is part of legal domination.
However, he also emphasized that bureaucracy becomes inefficient when a decision
must be adapted to an individual case.
According to Weber, the attributes of modern bureaucracy include its impersonality,

concentration of the means of administration, a leveling effect on social and
economic differences, and implementation of a system of authority that is practically
indestructible. Thus, bureaucracy goes beyond division of labor in a broad sense,
although that is a necessary condition for the existence of bureaucratic systems. It
involves precise, detailed definitions of the duties and responsibilities of each
person or office. Administrative regulations determine areas of responsibility and
control the allocation of tasks to each area.
In Weber's analysis, a bureaucratic organization is governed by the following seven

principles:
1. official business is conducted on a continuous basis

2. official business is conducted with strict accordance to the following rules:
a. the duty of each official to do certain types of work is delimited in terms
of impersonal criteria
b. the official is given the authority necessary to carry out his assigned
functions
c. the means of coercion at his disposal are strictly limited and conditions
of their use strictly defined

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3. every official's responsibilities and authority are part of a vertical hierarchy of

authority, with respective rights of supervision and appeal
4. officials do not own the resources necessary for the performance of their
assigned functions but are accountable for their use of these resources
5. official and private business and income are strictly separated
6. offices cannot be appropriated by their incumbents (inherited, sold, etc.)
7. official business is conducted on the basis of written documents.
Weber described the bureaucratic official as having the following characteristics:
 is personally free and appointed to his position on the basis of conduct

 exercises the authority delegated to him in accordance with impersonal
rules, and his loyalty is enlisted on behalf of the faithful execution of his
official duties
 appointment and job placement are dependent upon his technical
qualifications
 administrative work is a full-time occupation
 work is rewarded by a regular salary and prospects of advancement in a
lifetime career.
He also noted that an official must exercise his judgment and his skills, but his duty is
to place these at the service of a higher authority. Ultimately he is responsible only
for the impartial execution of assigned tasks and must sacrifice his personal
judgment if it runs counter to his official duties.
From Bureaucracy to Oligarchy
Weber saw bureaucracy as a system of control based on rational rules, with the goal
of achieving maximum efficiency:
Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the

basis of knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically
rational. (Weber 1947:339)
Weber saw bureaucracy as a means of increasing the efficiency of government.

However, just as any tool can be misused in the wrong hands, he recognized that it
would not necessarily function in this ideal fashion. Indeed, bureaucracy has been
seen as having the potential to develop into an oligarchic system of political
domination. Robert Michels saw this outcome as inevitable, a sentiment he
expressed in his "Iron Law of Oligarchy."
THE BUREAUCRACY OF PAKISTAN: FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MAX WEBER’S ‘IRON

CAGE’ PHILOSOPHY – Muhammad Uzair Hashmi and Shajeea Shuja
The 'Theory of Bureaucracy' is considered to be one of the most widely used

administrative models. It was conceptualized by Max Weber, who envisioned it as a
rational, impersonal, rule-bound, hierarchical system having a clear division of labor
and specialization. Despite suggesting a highly mechanical administrative system,

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Weber was well aware of the challenges that overemphasis of rationality may pose.
He predicted that extreme rationalism of bureaucratic capitalism could result in
individuals descending into the quagmire of the 'Iron Cage.' He stated that "It is
horrible to think that the world would one day be filled with little cogs, little men
clinging to little jobs and striving towards the biggest ones."
Max Weber in his 1905 book "Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des
Kapitalismus" referred to a "Stalhartes Gehause" metaphor, which the translated
means "shell as hard as steel." Steel being a product of the human fabrication,
serves as an allegory to modernity, whereas shell symbolizes modern capitalism,
which confines the human. The concept was interpreted as "Iron Cage" by American
sociologist Talcott Parsons in his 1930 translation of Weber's book (Baehr, 2001).
Weber, an advocate of systematic bureaucracy while regarding rationality as
prerequisite of modern world and changing nature of administration (Yüksel, 2014),
feared that instrumental rationality would subject individuals to oppressive routine.
In his opinion, the "instrumental rationality" would not only lead to humans
becoming less empathetic and impersonal but would also result in them being solely
concerned with efficiency, i.e., maximum results with minimum effort. He postulated
that ascent of "instrumental rationality" would forge an "Iron Cage," restricting
universal freedom of the human, and it would require a herculean effort to escape
the cage (Anderson, 2004). Additionally, servitude to the rational order would enter
the humans into a machin-esque age where they will serve as the raw material
required to produce a final product for the consumption of another (Feenberg,
1998). Weber anticipated that bureaucracy with its inherent rationality and inbuilt
continuity would turn public into subjects; permanence that is intrinsic to
bureaucratic rule would in time provide it with such clout and influence that despite
all its malpractices, it will remain unaccountable and unimpeded. The latter part of
article attempts to analyze germaneness of these Weberian ideas to Bureaucracy of
Pakistan in its current state.
Weber’s Ideal Bureaucrat
The established and now traditional literature on the bureaucracy is largely derived
from the work on the 19th century social scientist Max Weber. The Weberian
bureaucrat was expected to conform to norms of rationality, specialisation, political
neutrality, meritocratic recruitment and long term career ladders among other
characteristics [Weber (1968)]. The notion of political neutrality set out in the
Weberian framework requires that the bureaucracy to be indifferent to the political
party in power and to ensure that their actions are based on neutrality and
impartiality with regard to all political parties. The bureaucrat is regarded as a public
servant who operates solely in the interest of the public and should not bow to
pressure from the political process or parties. The Weberian construction of the
ideal bureaucrat as a rational, efficient, and achievement-oriented provides the
template for evaluating the actions and effectiveness of the bureaucrat. The
Weberian bureaucrat is regarded as an agent of the state; an agent who is
characterised as functioning not on an inherent sense of motivation but on an

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externally imposed set of criteria. The implication is that the actions of the
bureaucrat should not be driven by any intrinsic values but are instrumental in
nature. The duties of the bureaucrat in the civil service are restricted to policy
implementation as part of the executive 4 arm of the state. The instrumentality of
bureaucratic behaviour is a consequence of the autonomy gained from externally
imposed rules. It is the very principles of meritocratic recruitment that ensures that
bureaucrats embark on well defined, non-politicised and predictable long term
career paths. These rules provided the basis for a Weberian bureaucracy that was
achievement and goal oriented, protected from political interference, and following
norms of rationality, discipline, specialist knowledge. These objective standards and
impersonal rules that provided the framework for running the bureaucracy in turn
ensured stability and predictability in the organisation. The bureaucratic
organisation was consequently the most stable, predictable and ‘Once fully
established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to
destroy’[Weber (1968), p. 87].
Marx
Karl Marx theorized about the role and function of bureaucracy in his Critique of
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, published in 1843. In Philosophy of Right, Hegel had
supported the role of specialized officials in public administration, although he never
used the term "bureaucracy" himself. By contrast, Marx was opposed to
bureaucracy. Marx posited that while corporate and government bureaucracy seem
to operate in opposition, in actuality they mutually rely on one another to exist. He
wrote that "The Corporation is civil society's attempt to become state; but the
bureaucracy is the state which has really made itself into civil society.
In Karl Marx's theory of historical materialism, the historical origin of bureaucracy is

to be found in four sources: religion, the formation of the state, commerce,
and technology.
According to Marx's analysis, the earliest bureaucracies consisted of castes of

religious clergy, officials, and scribes operating various rituals, and armed
functionaries specifically delegated to keep order. In the historical transition from
primitive egalitarian communities to a civil society divided into social classes and
estates, occurring from about 10,000 years ago, authority is increasingly centralized
in, and enforced by, a state apparatus existing separately from society. This state
formulates, imposes and enforces laws, and levies taxes, giving rise to an officialdom
enacting these functions. But the growth of trade and commerce adds a new,
distinctive dimension to bureaucracy, insofar as it requires the keeping of accounts
and the processing/recording of transactions, as well as the enforcement of legal
rules governing trade. A fourth source of bureaucracy inheres in the technologies of
mass production, which require many standardized routines and procedures to be
performed. This type of bureaucracy is nowadays often called a technocracy, which
owes its power to control over specialized technical knowledge.

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In Marx's theory, bureaucracy rarely creates new wealth by itself, but rather
controls, coordinates, and governs the production, distribution, and consumption of
wealth. The bureaucracy as a social stratum derives its income from the
appropriation of part of the social surplus product of human labor. Wealth is
appropriated by the bureaucracy by law through fees, taxes, levies, tributes,
licensing etc. Bureaucracy is therefore always a "cost" to society, but this cost may
be accepted insofar as it makes social order possible, and maintains it.
Conflict Theory and Bureaucracy
The Marxist offshoot, Conflict Theory, regards each member or group in an

organization as attempting to maximize their benefits at the cost of the others.
Conflict theory contrasts directly with Talcott Parsons' functionalism, which states
that each part of an organization has a well-defined role with no need to alter that
position. Conflict theorists argue that bureaucracy can never be perfectly effective
due to competition, structural inequalities, and the conflict among the parts that
results from these.
John Stewart Mill

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was an influential philosopher, economist, politician,
and senior official in the East India Company. A controversial figure in 19th-century
Britain, he advocated the use of classical economic theory, philosophical thought,
and social awareness in political decision-making and legislation. Many of his views,
including those on the legal status of women and on slavery, were quite liberal for
the day.
Mill combined economics with philosophy. He believed in a moral theory called

utilitarianism—that actions that lead to people's happiness are right and that those
that lead to suffering are wrong. Among economists, he's best-known for his 1848
work, Principles of Political Economy, which became a leading economic textbook for
decades after its publication.
Other significant books include On Liberty, A System of Logic, The Subjection of

Women, and Utilitarianism.
John Stuart Mill’s Theory of Bureaucracy within Representative Government:

Balancing Competence and Participation – Beth E. Warner
The relationship between bureaucracy and representative government has been a

subject of concern to public administration since its inception. John Stuart Mill
addressed this question in an 1861 essay, in which he explained his theory of
government. Mill suggests a role for public administration that is not only
legitimate, but also necessary for good government. His writings contain
remarkable references to the concerns addressed in current theories of public
administration. Mill worked to balance the spirit of popular government with
governance by the most educated, skilled, and experienced of the nation, whether
they were citizens, elected representatives, or administrative officials. This article

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examines Mill’s theory and the contribution it makes to current public

administration discussion.
Writing in the early 1860s, political scientist John Stuart Mill theorized that
successful monarchies were essentially bureaucracies, and found evidence of their
existence in Imperial China, the Russian Empire, and the regimes of Europe. Mill
referred to bureaucracy as a distinct form of government, separate from
representative democracy. He believed bureaucracies had certain advantages, most
importantly the accumulation of experience in those who conduct the affairs.
Nevertheless, he believed this form of governance compared poorly to
representative government, as it relied on appointment rather than direct election.
Mill wrote that ultimately the bureaucracy stifles the mind, and that "a bureaucracy
always tends to become a pedantocracy."
As a civil servant in the East India Company and witness to government expansion
and reorganization in the mid-nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill developed an
interest in civil service reform. In an essay supporting the 1854 Northcote-Trevelyan
Report and his later political treatises, Mill argued for competitive civil service
recruitment. These writings have been relatively neglected by Mill scholars, but I
posit that they elucidate a contested aspect of his theory. Mill advocated democracy
and expert bureaucracy and, although researchers see tension between these
systems, I argue that Mill saw them as compatible. Consequently, Mill's theory might
be more consistent and complete than many believe, and the public administration
debate should perhaps no longer be seen in terms of an opposition between
expertise and democracy.
Woodrow Wilson
Writing as an academic while a professor at Bryn Mawr College, Woodrow Wilson's
essay The Study of Administration[65] argued for bureaucracy as a professional
cadre, devoid of allegiance to fleeting politics. Wilson advocated a bureaucracy that
"is a part of political life only as the methods of the counting house are a part of the
life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product. But it is, at
the same time, raised very far above the dull level of mere technical detail by the
fact that through its greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting
maxims of political wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress."
Wilson did not advocate a replacement of rule by the governed, he simply advised
that, "Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the
tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices". This
essay became a foundation for the study of public administration in America.
Wilson argued that administration is the most obvious part of the Government
and the least discussions happen around it. He further says that despite being the
executive, the operative and the most visible side of the Government and being as
old as the Government itself it has remain hidden from the scrutiny and inspection
of writer, authors and subject matter experts where it should have been the centre

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of debates and researches. He shows little appreciation towards the obsession

regarding the constitution of Government, the philosophical approach towards the
existence of State, the sovereignty or some greater meaning lying at the heart of the
Government. Basically what he meant was the know-how of the actual business of
Governing people and how that can be made more efficient.
In the context of the early 20th century USA and the world in general, Wilson and his
ideas regarding administration made sense. Life had changed much since the good
old days of farms and cattle and now there were complexities of trade and
commerce, stocks and bonds and financers and then the national debts, the ever
increasing conflicts between the capitalist class and the workers. In the light of these
developments, ways the Government can function also needed a change which
unfortunately was not assessed adequately resulting in inefficiency and wastage of
resources.
In addition to above aspects, the Government’s sphere of work was expanding, like
the postal service in America and rail-road lines in Europe. So, if the transition was
happening at the grass root level say for example to manage rail-road, national
commissioners were made in addition to older state commissioners, the resulting
extension of administrative function became a matter which needed to be delicately
handled and not carried out in haste.
Wilson also clarified that the studies conducted in the field of public
administration were mostly carried out by French and German academicians and
were therefore not entirely relevant and suited to the needs of the American
people and State in its original form. He suggested that any principle adopted from
Europe would have to be Americanized and modified for the complex and multiform
state and a highly decentralized form of Government in the USA.
Wilson had carefully studied the administrative practices of not just France and
England but a small nation like Prussia and praised the ruler Frederick the Great who
regarded himself as the chief servant of the people and his office as a public trust.
He also wrote favorably of Napoleon and his recasting of French administration after
ending the monarchial rule. He however; wrote harshly about the ways of English
administrators and those of his own country; pointing out that their history was not
of administrative development but of legislative oversight. There were little progress
made in Government organizations but vast leaps taken in law making and political
criticism.
While reading Wilson one cannot help but wonder that whether enthroning public
opinion in the matters of Government a wise decision at all? The dark side of it is
that it becomes a larger obstacle to manage; since any change or reform proposed
needs to get pass veto at so many levels. To sum up, Wilson proposed a very no-
nonsense and businesslike approach to administration which should be free of
shackles of political doctrines.

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c. Role of Bureaucracy in Pakistan

Bureaucracy Needs Reforms – Ishrat Hussain
For ordinary citizens, it is civil servants who are most germane to their daily life.
Pakistan was fortunate to have inherited a steel frame for its bureaucracy from
the British. Initially, the civil services remained true to their tradition of
maintaining law and order and collecting land revenue. But the requirements of
a newly independent country went beyond this narrow set of functions.
Pakistan’s civil services system and processes did not adapt to changed
circumstances. They remained frozen in time and were unresponsive to the
people’s needs and aspirations. This status quo suited the military government
that came to power in 1958 and the coalition of military-civil services that ruled
the country until 1971 to the exclusion of the political leadership.
The post 1971 era ushered in a popularly elected government that decided to
break the frame of the civil services and make them more pliable and flexible.
The constitutional protection responsible for the civil servants’ independence
and neutrality was withdrawn. The quasi-monopoly of the Civil Services of
Pakistan in appointments and allocation of top positions was demolished. All
different cadres were brought at par and unified under a common pay scale,
recruitment and training.
These reforms did not address the larger question of the delivery of public
services to the population at large. Except for a couple of thousand officers
recruited by the Central Superior Services, the majority of civil servants
remained confined to ex-cadre or non-cadre jobs. Several thousand doctors,
educationists, teachers, scientists, engineers, economists and accountants in the
public sector had limited opportunities for career progression.
The resultant demotivation, demoralisation and despondency among the
majority of civil servants was reflected in the poor services delivery. Indifference,
inaction and apathy towards clients and a mindset resisting change in the
process became ingrained in their behaviour.
The antiquated system of primary interaction between the state and citizen
taking place through low-paid, ill-equipped, poorly educated, rude functionaries
such as the patwari, thanedar and sub-divisional officer enjoying enormous
discretionary powers remained entrenched along with ram-pant corruption,
inefficiency and poor governance.
The 2001 devolution to local governments abolished the post of deputy
commissioner who formed the single-point anchor for both citizens and
government leaders. Whether it was law and order, security and safety, land
records, revenue collection or development work, the DC was assigned
responsibility and was held accountable for the results. The DC-SP duo played a
crucial role in enforcing the state’s writ in the district.
The new system that replaced the old one was still being tested and tried and
there were many ambiguities, lack of clarity and operational difficulties that
needed to be addressed. But before this system could grow roots it was
dismantled in 2008. The vacuum thus created by abolishing the 2001 system has

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strengthened non-state actors, various mafias, criminals and extortionists.

Development projects, that had picked up speed because of the ownership and
leadership of the district nazims, also fell into a state of disarray.
At the policymaking level, job insecurity forced the civil servants to align with
the political parties. Successive governments brought in their favourite civil
servants to occupy key positions. Loyalty rather than competence became the
acid test for survival. The winners in this game included political leaders and
acquiescent civil servants while the losers were ordinary citizens who ceased to
have access to the government and had no way of having their grievances
redressed.
Reforming the Civil Services in Pakistan:

A detailed blueprint and action plan for reforming the civil services was
prepared after analysis and stakeholder consultation. The basic
recommendations can be implemented without much difficulty provided they
are taken as part of an integrated and interlinked chain. Selecting one while
excluding others can prove to be disastrous.
First, the concept of the superior and subordinate services and the distinction
between cadre, ex-cadre and non-cadre, should be replaced with equality of all
services at all levels of government. Terms and conditions in matters of
recruitment, promotion, career progression, and compensation should be
similar for all. Any officer can compete for the National Executive Service or
Provincial Executive Service that will man high policymaking positions.
Second, a district service should be constituted for each district government
comprising teachers, health workers, sanitary workers etc in Grade 1–16 who
already work in the district. The present preoccupation of politicians with
transfers and postings would come to an end with this change.
Third, recruitment at all levels should be on a competitive basis and on merit
and in observance of the provincial quotas in all Pakistan and federal services.
Public service commissions would hold the recruitment tests and interviews.
Fourth, the mandatory completion of training at mid-career and senior positions
should be a pre-requisite for promotion. The present system of AERs should be
replaced by objective-based performance evaluation system.
Fifth, a fair and equitable compensation system should be based on
performance, and teachers, health workers, police, technical and professional
experts should be taken out of the national pay scale and given different pay
scales according to local labour market conditions. Future recruitment in Grades
British legacy
In 1608, when the British arrived for trading purposes, India was not a unified
state ruled by one monarch but a morass of warring princely states. Throughout
India, depending upon the polity and its ruler, several administrative systems
were in use. All states lacked a systematic recruitment process for staffing of the
public administration offices. Instead, individuals were granted these posts
through rampant nepotism, favoritism and/ or political patronage (Kincaid,

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2018). The grant of the Diwani of three provinces in 1765 to the British,
operating under the East India Company banner, lay the foundation of their
emergence as the sole territorial power in India. For the first time, the British
were responsible for the civil administration of large areas in India, and to
ensure effective control, a need for a robust administrative system was felt. This
need marked the beginning of the first systematic civil service system in India
and led to the formation of the Covenanted Civil Service, which was reserved
solely for the British, and the candidates were nominated by the Directors of the
Company (Ascoli, 2019). In 1833, with the passing of the Charter Act of 1833,
Indians were permitted into government services for the first time, and a lower
category of the Indian Civil Service known as Uncovenanted Civil Service was
formed.
While this allowed Indians’ entry into administration, but their prospects were
blocked by a rigid service system, which ensured that they could not rise above
subordinate positions. It must be noted here that despite the 1833 Act calling
for racial equality in employment to the government service in India, the Indian
Civil Service till the middle of the 19th Century comprised solely of the British
elite in the top positions (Sabharwal & Berman, 2017). It was only with the
passing of the Charter Act of 1853 that India got its first modern civil service.
The Act abolished the patronage-based system and replaced it with merit-based
system of competitive examination as the mode of recruitment for the
Covenanted Civil Services. Theoretically, this provided natives an equal
opportunity of entering the upper echelon of the civil administration. In
practice, as the exam was held in England, it was practically impossible for the
Indians to sit for these exams due to the financial implications of undertaking a
voyage to England (Sabharwal & Berman, 2017). In 1858, under the provisions of
the Government of India Act of 1858, India became a direct British colony, and
the Indian Civil Services was reinstituted under the office of the Secretary of
State for India; furthermore, provision was made for the Indians to be admitted
to service. Likewise, the Civil Services Act of 1861 laid down that "any person,
whether Indian or European, could be appointed to any of the offices provided
that he had resided for a minimum of 7 years in India." However, these
proclamations remained a dead letter and could not help the Indians secure
employment in the Covenanted Civil Service. From 1860 onwards, all efforts to
establish simultaneous civil service exams in India and England were stymied at
all levels and in near concurrence by all British officials linked with India; it was
not till 1922 that simultaneous exam became a reality. These circumstances led
to only 111 Indians competing for civil service exam between 1862 to 1886, out
of which only 19 were successful (Compton, 1967). Lee Commission appointed
in 1923, by British government to deliberate the Natives composition in
Covenanted Civil Services, recommended that 40% of the future entrants to civil
services should be Natives another 40% appointments should be held by the
British while the remaining 20% senior posts should strictly be filled on merit
basis. Through the Indianization of the civil service, the British hoped to

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maintain and prolong their rule in India. The proposed structure of Covenanted
Civil Services by Lee Commission endured till partition of British India in 1947
(Sabharwal & Berman, 2017).
The successful candidates for the Covenanted Civil Services, irrespective of

having passed the examination in London or India, were trained for a period of
one or two years in England at the University of Oxford, the University of
Cambridge, or the School of Oriental Studies in London. This system was
indubitably aimed at producing a cadre of individuals that would serve the
British Imperial interests in India by any means possible (Shantha, 2014). British
weakened by the First World War, had a Cimmerian need of the local support to
sustain their hold in India, created a new class of Indians which, besides being
efficient and exclusive, remained aloof and was class conscious. These native
bureaucrats still Indian in appearance thought and functioned in wholly British
fashion. The Indian Civil Services (ICS), with its many administrative branches
such as the Home Government, the Indian and the Colonial Services, and
Diplomatic Services, without compunction executed all the imperial canons and
directives (Sabharwal & Berman, 2017). ICS demonstrated its allegiance to the
British Empire at all times; it was never more evident than amid the period of
resistance when the whole machinery was used to suppress the nationalist
movements. It can thus be plausibly argued that the highly organized, well-knit,
and well-regulated civil service played a pivotal role in protracting the British
rule in India (Burra, 2012).
Post-partition Bureaucracy
With the exodus of the British from the region in 1947, British India was
partitioned into two independent states – India and Pakistan and the Indian Civil
Services were divided between the two dominions. Both countries chose to
retain the British bureaucratic model, which was based on the Weberian model.
The Bureaucracy in India came to be known as Indian Administrative Services,
while its counterpart in Pakistan, was named the Central Superior Services of
Pakistan (Mollah, 2011). During the colonial era, the Indian Civil Servants were
trained as representatives and, as such, were an extension of the British Raj
(Mollah, 2015). They were trained to be the 'agents of the masters' and put in
place by the British Imperial powers to govern the citizens as subjects of the
Queen. These purveyors of the British Imperialism, regarded as the prestigious
and privileged class of the society, trained to be mere public administrators and
not the public servants. This mentality persevered after independence with
minor modifications. The local politicians replaced the Queen and became new
masters. This continued legacy thus gained bureaucrats' unquestionable political
as well as administrative powers (Kalia, 2013). The proceeding section of the
article uses specific scenarios identified by Weber, when presenting his
antithesis of the theory of bureaucracy, to examine the bureaucratic structure of
Pakistan. We will explore the twists and turns Pakistani bureaucracy took during
the frequent political instability of the country during its 72-year existence. The

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brief inroad into the postcolonial history of the bureaucracy is taken to help
understand how far the deeply entrenched hierarchies, machinelike structure,
impersonality and rules and regulations ingrained in the Pakistani bureaucracy
warrants its foray into realm of Weber’s Iron Cage and helped it to consolidate
unprecedented powers.
civil-military relations
Bureaucracy before Zia
The military regime under General Ayub Khan provided a challenge and an
opportunity to the CSP. The challenge was that initially the military held the CSP as
partly responsible for creating political chaos in the country: Therefore they
applied pressure on the CSP cadre to mend its ways. In the first instance the
military appointed about 272 armed forces officers to important administrative
positions in the civil service. In the early 1959, it charged that 13 CSP officers had
indulged in “corruption, misconduct, and inefficiency”. After a summary trial the
regime forcibly retired the officers. This shook the confidence of the CSP cadre.
[Burki (1969)]. The military regime demonstrated that it meant business and
would purge the CSP, if they did not mend their ways. Thirdly, in August 1959, the
regime appointed a Pay and Service Commission, which was headed by A. R.
Cornellius, the Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan, who was known for his
anti-CSP views. By such measures the regime conveyed the impression that it
aimed to reorganise and restructure the services which implied eroding the power
and privileges of the CSP. The CSP were able to resist the challenge that the
military regime posed. The CSP showed pragmatism, flexibility and a certain
degree of esprit de corps to reach an understanding and compromise with the
military regime. Finally, in the same year an Economic Pool was created to manage
the senior positions in the Ministry of Finance, Commerce and Economic Affairs.
40 percent of the pool’s positions were to be filled by non-CSP officers. The CSP
perceived it as yet another effort to undermine their position, as previously these
positions were totally reserved for the CSP.
According to the changing needs of the country, the Establishment Division,

devised a policy that starting from 1959, all CSP officers will be provided training in
fields pertaining to Economics, Public Administration, Community Development,
Finance, Accounting etc. Resultantly, by 1968, about 79 CSP officers had obtained
training in 17 American and British universities [Burki (1969)]. Braibanti records
that the Ford Foundation and USAID played a major role in building training
institutions and providing fellowships for the civil servants [Braibanti (1966)]. By
changing the direction of training to new fields, the Establishment Division was
able to not only strengthen the status of the CSP cadre, but also equipped a
generation of civil servants who could lay claim on professional expertise in
financial management, community development and good governance.
This new breed of civil servants, enthusiastically supported the two programmes
of the military regime, the Basic Democracies and Rural Development Programme.

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Both these programmes, enormously increased the power, privilege, prestige of

the CSP cadre officers, who served in the districts. It also increased their
interaction with the local politicians. Consequently, although the district officer
was able to promote some sort of community development and welfare, yet as a
cadre the CSP ran into conflict with the politicians. In the rural setting of Pakistan,
the politicians perceived them as ‘political manipulators’ and ‘instruments’ of the
military regime.
Thus by conceding entry of the military officers to the CSP cadre, reformulation of
training programmes, and by enthusiastically supporting the policies of the
military regime, the CSP were able to protect their elite status. The cadre was
skillful in resisting and subverting the onslaught of Cornellius Commission report
and its recommendations. But in the aftermath of Ayub’s fall the CSP could not
retain their power and glory. Their reputation was tarnished and their confidence
was shaken.
Bureaucracy under Zia
In 1977, Bhutto’s regime was overthrown by a military coup spearheaded by
General Zia Ul Haq. The authoritarian rule under a military head of state that
followed was unusual in its moderate treatment of existing institutions [Burki
and Baxter (1991)]. The bureaucrats were not required to relinquish their
existing posts, nor did the new government institute any drastic transfers of
bureaucrats. To the contrary, the Zia administration chose to constitute the
Anwar-ul-Haq Commission to rehabilitate and promote some level of
confidence, among the Civil Services, particularly the CSP. There appears to be a
contradictory swing between existence of political democracy and possibility of
pursuing political neutrality in Pakistan. While the democratic government of
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto undertook widespread and extreme 1973 administrative
reforms, particularly the removal the constitutional guarantee, the dictatorial
regime under Zia was keen to consolidate the functions of the bureaucrat. In a
similar comparison, the PPP, under Benazir Bhutto’s government (and PML
under Nawaz Sharif) regarded political neutrality with suspicion as bureaucrats
were regarded as being supported of the erstwhile party in power and therefore
oppositional to the new government. On the other hand, the military
dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf was relatively supportive of the
bureaucracy.
My experience was that by in large the military process was more

rational, they at least understand the issues, compared to the
democratic leaders, the attitude of the democratic leaders was, that
now we are the boss and we have to decide…In my experience the army
generally was more rational and abiding by the law. (Bureaucrat 1)
This oppositional relationship between democracy and political neutrality is in

stark contrast to the established proposition that democratic government will
direct the bureaucracy to follow principles of political neutrality. The explanation

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may lie in the fact that the bureaucracy as a part of the executive arm of the
state is regarded more favourably by strong authoritarian forces that adopt a
statist approach while democratic governments that must ensure a political
settlement tend to consider the existing bureaucracy in an oppositional light.
In a political environment where bureaucrats are regarded as oppositional to a

new incoming elected government, the principle of political neutrality
transforms into a negative feature, one that indicates an absence of allegiance
to the new government.
In your mind you can be neutral, but you can’t tell them on their face.
Others will be more politically inclined than you and you will look bad in
comparison. You will not then be successful. Your friend will be District
Commissioner (DC) Lahore and you will be DC of some God forsaken
place. And the boss will give the reason 'he does not have initiative, he
can’t do his job well. (Bureaucrat 6)
We bureaucrats suffer; we are always trying to clarify the perceptions,

and say “no I am not with so and so”. You seem to just go around giving
explanations and talking to the politicians, that “it seems that you are
annoyed with me? (Bureaucrat 25)
Under the present circumstances it is not possible to be politically

neutral....the politicians expect the bureaucrat to pitch in one side or the
other. There is the concept of loyalty, it is not loyalty to the state, it is not
even loyalty to some organizations, but loyalty to the person. So if one is
loyal to Nawaz Sharif or Benazir their chances of success are higher
when they come into power. (Bureaucrat 25)
Bureaucrats who persist in following the political neutrality principle find that
they are singled out for punishment for a lack of loyalty to the new
administration. The new found power that politicians, particularly ministers had
over the careers of bureaucrats was regarded as a considerable hardship by
bureaucrats.
Once I left the service I was hounded for a bit, wherever I would get a
job, the prime minister would interfere and get me sacked. I guess he
really disliked me. He (then PM) got me sacked from two organisations,
and then I finally got a job because his government was toppled.
(Bureaucrat 12)
The increasing interference of the ministerial class over the bureaucracy

emerges as a particularly contentious area. Both sides accuse the other of
exceeding their brief and thereby obstructing the delivery of development
programmes.

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neutrality
Political neutrality for the purpose of this paper primarily implies that the bureaucracy is
above and beyond politics. It is neutral and impartial. It is not aligned with, has a
preference for, or biased against any political party. Loyalty is to the public and not to 3
one political personality or party. The primary objective of the bureaucrat is to provide
public service without political alignment, bias, preference, or interference. Political
neutrality also implies that there is no political interference in appointments of public
servants. And appointments are made purely on the basis of merit and competence.
Political neutrality if it holds, gives the public servant a sense of security. The bureaucrat
will be assigned to a post based on his merit, and it would be his skill of execution that
would be sufficient to take him to the next hierarchal level. All bureaucrats would work
based on principles of hard work and independent and impersonal thinking, and there
would be no benefit to be gained from currying favours with the political masters. Hence
for the bureaucracy to be productive there is the need to make it independent from
political intervention and pressures that would enable the civil servant to perform public
service in an efficient and professional manner.
dilution of neutrality
Reducing the Politicization of the Bureaucracy
From 1947 to 1971 the civilian bureaucracy played the dominant role in Pakistan’s
policymaking and as such was insufficiently controlled or influenced by elected
politicians. During this period, there was limited scope for interference from politicians
as the bureaucracy, particularly the elite Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP), maintained
control over the selection, training and posting of its members and was therefore able to
retain its institutional autonomy.9 The student demonstrations and political unrest that
led to the collapse of General Ayub Khan’s regime in 1969, followed by the bloody civil
war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, seriously undermined the
political strength and legitimacy of both the civil and military bureaucracies. Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto exploited this weakness after coming to power in 1971 and set out to redress the
power imbalance between the elected and unelected institutions of the state. As the
following quote demonstrates, he was particularly vocal in castigating the civil service
and blaming it for many of the country’s ills:
No institution in the country has so lowered the quality of our national life as to what is
called Naukarshahi [bureaucratic rule]. It has done so by imposing a caste system on our
society. It has created a class of ‘Brahmins’ or mandarins, unrivalled in its snobbery and
arrogance, insulated from life of the people and incapable of identifying itself with
them.10
Less than three months after coming to power, Bhutto sent a clear message of who was
in charge by compulsorily retiring approximately 1,300 civil service officers. This was
followed in 1973 by sweeping administrative reforms designed, in part, to weaken the
elite CSP cadre and to increase political influence and control over the powerful
bureaucracy.11 Central to this strategy was the introduction of a policy of “lateral
recruitment” as a way to increase political influence over the bureaucracy and to ensure

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that Bhutto’s policies and programs could be implemented in the face of a self-
interested bureaucracy that was resistant to change.
The measure promoted by Bhutto that was to have the most far-reaching and damaging
consequences for the effectiveness and integrity of the civil service, however, was the
1973 Constitution’s redaction of the protection that had been afforded to the civil
service in previous constitutions. These protections, which were present in the 1956,
1962 and interim 1972 constitutions, included safeguards against the dismissal,
reduction in rank or compulsory retirement of public servants.12 This measure was
deliberately designed to undermine the independence of the civil service. The rapid
politicization of the civil service quickly followed. In July 1974, an Urdu daily in Lahore
identified one hundred senior civil service political appointees who were close relatives
and associates of ministers in Bhutto’s cabinet.13 More recently, this politicization is
vividly demonstrated before and after elections when thousands of civil servants are
posted or transferred to serve the wishes of their political masters. It has become
increasingly difficult for civil servants to get postings, transfers or promotions without
the support of a political patron.
The politicization of the bureaucracy as a result of Bhutto’s administrative reforms did

have the positive result of giving elected representatives more influence over unelected
institutions. The frequent misuse of this influence, however, has also resulted in the
politicization of the civil service to such an extent that it has all but destroyed the
concept of a neutral and competent civil service.14 Many of the senior government
officials interviewed during my field research pointed to the urgent need to address this
problem. According to one, “The most important issue today for the civil service is to
restore constitutional security. Bhutto’s 1973 Constitution and Civil Service Ordinance
killed the civil service.”15 Another noted, “Insecure people do not perform well and by
making the civil servants insecure it reduced the performance of the bureaucracy.”16
While reducing politicization by restoring a certain degree of constitutional protection to

the civil service is critically important, the political obstacles in the path of achieving this
reform objective are formidable. The main challenge is that the politicians and military
officers who would need to bring about this change prefer to have a weak and
subservient civil service rather than a strong and independent one. A retired senior civil
servant explained:
Bhutto removed the civil services protection by taking it out of the 1973 Constitution. He
tinkered with the system to make sure the bureaucracy became completely docile and
pliable. Now you can’t get promotions or good postings without political support. In the
late ‘70s and early ‘80s Zia initially wanted to restore some of the guarantees to the
bureaucracy…When Zia realized that he’d be tying his own hands by making the
bureaucracy more independent he stopped pushing to restore constitutional protection.
Politicians also want a full hold on the bureaucracy. We suggested to [President Pervez]
Musharraf to restore constitutional protection to the civil service but he didn’t take a
decision. He also wanted the power to remove civil servants without any reasons
given.17

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Reversing the Militarization of the Bureaucracy
As noted earlier, one notable departure from the colonial legacy of bureaucratic rule is
that the political power and influence of the civilian bureaucracy has been reduced
significantly as the bureaucracy became more subject to the political influences of both
civilian and military governments. The military, however, has succeeded in strengthening
and consolidating its preeminent position, not only as Pakistan’s strongest bureaucratic
institution, but also as its strongest political institution and interest group. This is best
illustrated by the nearly three decades of direct military rule since independence and
indirect rule by the civil and military bureaucracies for much of the rest of Pakistan’s
history.
From 1958 to 1969, the military regime under General Ayub Khan took measures to
reign in the powers of the CSP, but overall there was a close symbiotic relationship
between the military and the civilian bureaucracy.18 The systematic militarization of the
bureaucracy began in earnest following General Zia ul-Haq’s overthrow of the Bhutto
government in a military coup in 1977. Many senior civil service officers welcomed
Bhutto’s downfall, as they believed his administrative reforms had undermined their
power and independence. As one remarked, the “CSP was back in the saddle” and “the
natural comity of interests between civilian and military bureaucrats had been
restored.”19 While Zia ul-Haq did reverse some of Bhutto’s reforms, such as the lateral
entry of civilian bureaucrats, he offset this by increasing the lateral entry of military
officers into the civilian bureaucracy. Zia ul-Haq also ensured that the civilian
bureaucracy did not regain its preeminent position in policymaking by deliberately
failing to restore the powerful CSP cadre.20 The net effect was not to decrease the
influence of politicians over the bureaucracy, but to increase the influence of the
military.
For similar reasons, both civilian and military rulers want the political benefits of being
able to provide jobs in the bureaucracy as patronage and to ensure that, in a
bureaucracy that is resistant to change, they have their loyalists in key positions to
promote their policies. Both the Ayub and Bhutto governments inducted small numbers
of retired or released military officers into the civilian bureaucracy, but the practice was
never institutionalized. General Zia ul-Haq not only recruited many more officers and
placed them in higher ranks of the bureaucracy, he also institutionalized the practice by
establishing quotas that reserved 10 percent of the vacancies in the officer grades in the
civilian bureaucracy for former military officers.21
Although exact figures are hard to come by, interviews and press accounts suggest that
former President Musharraf’s government took the practice of appointing serving and
retired military officers into the civilian bureaucracy to “unprecedented”
levels.22 During much of his rule, all the major civil service institutions were headed by
retired military officers. These included the Federal Public Service Commission
responsible for overseeing recruitment, the two main civil service training institutions
for mid- and senior-level officers, as well as the Civil Service Reform Unit.

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Not surprisingly, this practice was frequently cited in interviews as a cause of growing
disgruntlement amongst civil servants who saw their promotion prospects blocked by
military appointees. While the civil service has historically viewed the military as their
natural allies and politicians as the major threat to their power and influence, the large-
scale appointment of military officers into senior positions in the civil bureaucracy may
be reversing this perception. Of course, Pakistani politicians also resent the increasing
monopolization of power and policymaking by military rulers. According to one senior
political party leader:
Twenty years ago the Army was a state within a state. Today the Army is the state—
everything else is appendages. The Army controls all state institutions—civil service,
foreign policy, economic policy, intelligence agencies, judiciary and the legislature.
They’ve monopolized policymaking.23
A growing cause for concern is that, as the civilian bureaucracy continues to decay, the
administration of state institutions will become increasingly dependent on the capacity
of military rather than civilian personnel. Foreign donors, led by the United States, risk
exacerbating this problem by focusing more attention and resources on developing the
capacity of military rather than civilian institutions and personnel. Over time, the effect
is compounded. A Pakistani scholar noted with concern the growing imbalance between
the governance capacities of the civilian and military bureaucracies:
The military has become organizationally and institutionally stronger in the last twenty
years—especially in terms of their governance skills. The military now gets much better
governance and administrative training than the civilian bureaucracy. At the same time,
the civilian bureaucracy is suffering from institutional decay and moving in the opposite
direction. This has changed the power balance from the colonial era and the first two
decades after independence when the civilian bureaucracy was the strongest institution.
The Army is replacing the CSP and the District Management Group.24
Although the military is undoubtedly the strongest state institution, there are still
constraints on its power. Pakistan’s democratic traditions and institutions are weak, but
the military cannot ignore them altogether. Increasingly it must accommodate the
growing domestic and international pressures to govern through democratically elected
institutions. This was vividly demonstrated by the lawyers’ movement of 2007 and 2008,
which helped force President Musharraf to hold National and Provincial Assembly
elections in February 2008 and to resign as president six months later.
political allegiance
Politicisation of the bureaucracy on the other hand is one of the key causes of
the decline in the civil service systems. The lack of job security due to politically
motivated decisions on recruitment, promotion and dismissal and the lack of
career perspective for the staff due to the ever increasing number of posts
subject to political appointments all contribute to declining efficiency of the
bureaucrats. The incentive to work hard, to be fair, to be efficient erodes in such

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contexts. The link between performance and reward is broken and individual
merit is relinquished by political interventions and the efficiency and
productivity of the organisation are compromised. In senior, significant positions
like secretary of education, economic affairs, commerce, and finance etc, the
qualities of ability and competence should be the criteria for the appointment,
as the appointee and its skills are for the execution of tasks essential for national
development. In a situation where these positions are awarded to political
loyalists and not to those who are the best equipped for the job, economic
development is held hostage. When a bureaucrat is not politically neutral and is
politically aligned to serve the interests of a co-opted individual, who is pursuing
personal benefit, at the cost of national interest, then service delivery suffers.
Political alignment results in serving merely the interests of politicians and their
constituency, ensuring the politicians’vote bank, working for selected interests
and not for the common man. So lack of political neutrality would imply that the
public servants are serving selected individuals interests and not the common
man. Economic development of the country is not the priority but the interest of
particular individuals and their parties takes precedence. And the bureaucracy is
no longer following and respecting the guiding principles of its profession.
The Pakistani state has been regarded as ‘a weak state’for the last three decades
on account of the inability of the elected government to successfully broker
political stability. The development literature locates this weakness in the
political and ministerial machinations rather than attributing it to any inherent
characteristics of the bureaucracy as an organisational structure. In the 1990s,
the literature emerging from international institutions and academia located
Pakistan’s failure to develop in the malfunctioning apparent in the Pakistani
bureaucracy. This shortcoming was linked to the increasing politicisation of the
bureaucracy and its growing and explicit links to the ministerial structures
[World Bank (1998)]. In particular, there was a focus on the inability of individual
bureaucrats to follow the organisational rules due to a set of perverse incentives
that were misaligned with the development objectives of the bureaucracy. Such
an organisational shortcoming came to be regarding as a lack of capacity with
regard to governance functioning within the bureaucracy [Khan (2000, 2001)]. In
more recent years, the inability of the Pakistani state to ensure development
and to maintain the peace has marked it out as a fragile or failed state [Kaplan
(2008)]. There is now a growing concern that the inability of the Pakistani state
has been due to an excessive politicisation of the Pakistani state.
Power
corrupting the incumbent
institutional degradation
On gaining independence, Pakistan did not inherit a well-established and
functional governance and planning structure nor the skilled and trained
manpower and expertise to manage and steward the new country. The situation

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was indeed critical especially in the wake of a very fragile economy and the
gigantic problem of settling and rehabilitating almost eight million refugees.
Fully cognizant of the key role of bureaucracy in these highly testing

circumstances, the Quaid in his address to the civil servants in Peshawar urged:
“Governments are formed and governments are defeated. Prime Ministers come
and go but you stay on and therefore there is a very great responsibility placed
on your shoulders. You should have no hand in supporting this political party or
that political party, this political leader or that political leader — this is not your
business.” (April, 1948)
Inspired by Quaid’s exhortation, bureaucracy did exceedingly well in responding

to the overwhelming challenges. From almost a vacuum start in the absence of
even the minimal infrastructure, through sheer hard-work and passionate
commitment, it managed to develop reasonably adequate capacity; acquired
the necessary techno-professional competence; and established a robust
governance architecture to carry out decisions regarding planning, development
and services delivery. Impartiality, objectivity, fairness and merit, by and large,
constituted the core values in the conduct of state affairs. Within 15 years of its
inception, the country emerged as one of the fastest developing economies of
the world. Its extraordinary social and economic performance in the 1960s was
in particular acknowledged as a model for replication elsewhere in the
developing world.
However, over the years, bureaucracy has witnessed a colossal decline as an

institution primarily owing to its own status quo orientation and rapacity of the
senior civil servants to retain lucrative posts and associated perks and privileges
and be used as a tool of the rulers, military or political, to advance their interest.
The junior cadres, willy-nilly, became a part of the journey downhill. In this
mucky flow, mediocrity and incompetence, complacency and corruption and
sycophancy and servitude became the defining axioms of civil service modus
operandi.
Pakistan as post-colonial legacy had acquired an administration-driven

governance system rooted in the Government of India Act 1858 which was
designed to enforce imperial rule in the colonial territories through a strong
“steel frame” of elite group of exceptionally talented and competent men. The
hierarchical administrative apparatus of permanent secretaries, provincial
governors and the district officers constituted kernel of the administrative set-
up. This “path dependency” and adoption of the bureaucratic structure and
culture, in due course, led to serious institutional distortions in the wake of
prevalent “client-patron relationship” between the government and the
traditional land-based political elite yearning for official patronage.
Ill luck would have it, the politicians acquiesced to this administration-driven
governance system. The military rule in 1958-1971, 1977-1988, 1999-2008 to
implement the praetorian designs aggravated the situation. Ayub Khan

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dismissed around 1,300 civil servants in 1959 to purge bureaucracy by a single

order while Gen Yahya did away with 303 civil servants in 1969. Gen Zia went
further to institutionalise the intake of 20% quota of army officers directly into
the civil service. Gen Musharraf, through the implementation of his ill-conceived
devolution and decentralisation plan of 2001, truncated the time-tested district
governance system, weakened the writ of the government by abolishing
executive magistracy and invested the district level politicians with huge
administrative and financial powers which they were neither trained nor capable
to exercise. The most atrocious legacy of his reforms was the replacement of
Police Act 1861 by the Police Order 2002 which mercilessly exposed the people
directly to the batons, boots and guns of police. The lack of independent
accountability to and oversight of district Police by the District Magistrate
massively increased Police’s vulnerability to be abused as coercive tool of
oppression in the hands of despotic rulers. The recent police-gardi around 25
May against innocent citizens to deny them the right of political protest and
brazen violation of the sanctity of chaadar and chardiwari speaks of the travesty
and aberration of the force.
Paradoxically, the post-1971 “democratic periods” of popularly elected

governments in 1971-1977, 1989-1999 and 2008 to present also witnessed
scanty efforts to establish the supremacy of political institutions or to reform
civil bureaucracy. Under the garb of “reforming” civil service, instead, ad hoc
and slapdash measures were introduced which, as the subsequent evidence
reveals, were geared more towards taming bureaucracy to meet the self-serving
political interests. Prime Minister ZA Bhutto unceremoniously sent home as
many as 1,400 civil servants in 1973. He withdrew the constitutional security of
the civil servants and introduced “lateral entry” system on the pretext of
“professionalising” the civil service to induct “politically loyal” professionals and
experts to head key positions. Even civil service reforms of 2020-21 by PTI
government smacked of mere patchwork confined to streamlining disciplinary
action against delinquent civil servants and introducing performance-
competence-integrity based promotion. The rapid transfers and postings of
senior civil servants including the senior most bureaucrats, Chief Secretary and
IGP in Punjab, is a palpable testimony of their politically motivated and
perfidious approach to reforming civil bureaucracy.
The cumulative impact of this deplorable decline, during the course, has
altogether changed the occupational culture and organisational norms of
bureaucracy. The widely pervasive state of institutional paralysis find eloquent
expression in: gross rationality deficit in policy, planning and programming
processes as the civil servants blindly follow the personal commands of the
political masters and even create ex-post justification of their unsustainable
actions; proliferation of symbiotic groupings and networks between the ruler-
politicians and bureaucrats based on loyalty for patronage appointments of
“blue-eyed-hand-picked officers” through legal and extra legal means; autocratic

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and coercive pattern of governance with corruption, nepotism, mediocrity and

“ability to deliver” assuming the criteria for postings and promotions; wastage of
a large majority of brilliant civil servants who are penalised incessantly for lack
of “political loyalty” thus severely compromising the ability of the state to
provide quality services or protect citizens’ rights; and regressive institutions
averse to reforms either from within or without.
A well-functioning and efficient bureaucracy at all levels is fundamental to

stability, security and economic growth. Bureaucracy needs to be revitalised as
an efficient institution to conduct public affairs. For this to happen, a broad
national consensus across the political spectrum is sine qua non to depoliticise
bureaucracy and embark on systemic reforms athwart the entire gamut of
institutional management i.e. recruitment, deployment, learning and
development, promotion and career advancement, compensation and benefits
and human resources information systems. A civil service invested with the
necessary skills-mix and techno-professional competence and driven by the core
values of integrity and commitment, motivation and morale, objectivity and
impartiality, and equity and fairness is fundamentally imperative to handle the
massive development challenges faced by the country. A real commitment of
the political parties is sine qua non which, given the current scenario, is perhaps
asking for the moon.
constitutional guarantees
indexing of salaries with the CPI or lack thereof
d. Public Administration and Code of Ethics (Effectiveness of
the Estacode and the Code of Ethics, Comparison with
other countries)
Public Policy Formulation and Implementation

a. The Policy Making Process:
How Policies are Made (Six including diagnosis and six stages
with cautions to be exercise at each stage)
Problem Emergence
Either public opinion or elite opinion expresses dissatisfaction with a
status quo policy. The problem is defined and articulated by individuals
and institutions such as mass media, interest groups, and parties.
Agenda Setting
The definition of alternatives is crucial to the policy process and
outcomes. Before a policy can be formulated and adopted, the issue
must compete for space on the agenda (list of items being actively
considered). An idea must make it through several levels, including the
broad political system agenda, the congressional and presidential

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agendas, and the bureaucratic agenda. Key actors in agenda setting

include think tanks, interest groups, media, and government officials.
Consideration of Policy Options

From the problems that have been identified and have made it onto the
various agendas, policies must be formulated to address the problems.
Those policy formulations then must be adopted (authorized) through
the congressional process and refined through the bureaucratic process.
Of course, a non-decision (inaction, or defeating a proposal) is, itself,
policy making.
Decision-making
Each year, Congress must decide through the appropriations process
how much money to spend on each policy. Generally, a policy must first
be authorized (adopted) before money can be appropriated for it in the
annual budget.
Implementation
Executive agencies (the bureaucracy) carry out, or implement, policy.
Implementation could include adopting rules and regulations, providing
services and products, public education campaigns, adjudication of
disputes, etc.
What is Policy Implementation?
 Represents the stage where government executes an adopted

policy as specified by the legislation or policy action.
 At this stage, various government agnecies and departments,
repsonsible for the respective area of policy, are formally made
responsible for implementation.
 Policy implementation is what happens after a bill becomes law.
(Theodoulou and Kofinis, 2004)
Once the government has legitimized some form of public policy such as
a law, statute, edict, rule, or regulation, the stipulations of that policy
must be put into action, administered, and enforced to bring about the
desired change sought by the policy-makers. This task defaults to the
government executive and necessitates the designation of a government
agency as having the responsibility for the new policy. Theoretically the
responsible agency is given the requisite resources and authority to
ensure that the new policy is carried out as intended, but in reality, this
does not always occur.
As discussed in the first four lessons of this course, public policy is

implemented to effect some change in the behavior of a target
population and it can normally be assumed that this change will
ameliorate some public problem. Therefore, it stands to reason that

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unless the stipulations of a given policy are actually carried out, the
problem will persist. As soon as the tenets of the new policy are
implemented, a detailed policy evaluation can be conducted to
determine if the desired results are being obtained and if not, why not,
and what needs to be changed. More will be discussed concerning
policy evaluation later in this lesson.
Administrative agencies accomplish most of the day-to-day work of

government therefore they have the most immediate and direct impact
on the daily lives of citizens than do any other government entities
(Anderson, 1990). Dye indicates that implementation involves all of the
activities designed to carry out the policies enacted by the legislative
branch. These activities include the creation of new organizations
departments, agencies, bureaus, and so on or the assignment of new
responsibilities to existing organizations. These organizations must
translate laws into operational rules and regulations. They must hire
personnel, draw up contracts, spend money, and perform tasks. All of
these activities involve decisions by bureaucrats decisions that
determine policy (2005, p. 52). One critical aspect of policy
implementation is the high degree of discretion afforded to the
bureaucrats and agency procedures to transform laws into action as
outlined by Dye above. Administrative decision-making has a significant
impact the determination of who receives benefits and who is restricted
as a result of the implementation of any policy. Administrative decision-
making also has a far-reaching impact on society as a result of the
promulgation of agency regulations, contracting, licensing, inspections,
enforcement, adjudication, and the actual discretion for agencies to
interpret their own agency rules.
Evaluation
Numerous actors evaluate the impact of policies, to see if they are
solving the problems identified and accomplishing their goals.
Evaluation looks at costs and benefits of policies as well as their indirect
and unintended effects. Congress uses its oversight function and the
General Accounting Office for evaluation, agencies evaluate their own
performance, and outside evaluators include interest groups, think
tanks, academia, and media. Evaluation frequently triggers identification
of problems and a new round of agenda setting and policy making.
Policy Implementation & Role of Bureaucracy

Pfiffner and Presthus (1960) call bureaucracy the social instrument that could bridge the
gap between legislative intent and its fulfillment. Bureaucratic influence over policy
implementation is significant, ranging from virtual nullification of some legislation to the
limited discretion involved in administering a detailed statute. But in every case
discretion is involved.

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Public policies are made, implemented and evaluated by public officials and by
governmental institutions duly authorised or specifically established to do so. The
relationship between the policy makers (the legislature or the ministers), and policy
implementers (the bureaucrats as well as governmental and non-governmental
institutions) is likely to affect policy implementation. The institutions established
specifically for policy implementation, for example state departments, the courts and
quasi-autonomous (or para-statal) institutions, have through their executive activities, a
greater or lesser degree of direct contact with public.
The bureaucrats are considered to be the agency of government for getting the benefits
of legislation to the public through implementation of various policies, which are
enacted by the governmental agencies from time to time. The implementation of
policies by the bureaucracy helps in building the credibility of political executive in the
eyes of common people.
Policy implementation involves a number of steps. The very first is to study and
understand the policy statement and determine whether the executors should go ahead
with implementation as prescribed. This entails several pertinent queries such as would
the support staff and resources be adequate enough, would the staff be able to perform
their tasks effectively, what additional resources and information would be required and
what criteria would be adopted to evaluate and assess the policy outcomes.
Implementation should be a fact-finding as well as a problem-tracing exercise. Though
the bureaucrats are assigned the task of implementation, the political executive controls
the process through control over policy finances.
The bureaucrats play a dual role of performing the ‘output’ functions of executing
policies and programmes and also the ‘input’ functions, which relate not only to policy
making but also influencing public attitude towards the government. The important
duties of the bureaucrats are to: (i) Execute policies and orders, as prescribed by the
government, (ii) Maintain and keep in order the overall administrative apparatus which
lies within its official charge, and (iii) Give advice to the political executive regarding
rules of procedure, regulation etc.
The public policy, owing to a lack of time, information or expertise, is sometimes framed
in general terms. the executive institutions are therefore responsible for supplying the
details pertaining to policy execution, with the result that the administrative process can
be regarded as an extension of the legislative process, and as such puts bureaucrats at
the centre of the arena. The problems that could be encountered in policy
implementation, the resources that would be needed for execution, the work
mechanism and nature of policy execution and agencies to be involved in are some
pertinent issues that are decided during the policy making phase itself by the ministers
and bureaucrats.
Public policy legislation becomes significant only when efficiently implemented, usually
by the bureaucrat. His actions or inactions can, therefore, seriously make or impede the
success of a particular policy. Successful implementation of policy depends on the
insight of the official and whether he identifies himself with the policy aims of the

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legislator. In fact, he is supposed to do nothing that could prove to be embarrassing to

the minister, but has to treat the aims of the policy as his very own and work towards
achieving them.
The bureaucrats’ decisions pertaining to policy implementation are limited to decisions

that correspond to the political policy of the government of the day. The decisions of the
bureaucrats should, if possible, be those decisions, which the minister would have taken
if he were personally implementing the policy. In other words, the bureaucrat is
expected to implement policy with the same goodwill of the minister and is to render
services in order to provide products to the public irrespective of personal prejudice or
bias. Since the bureaucrat always executes his tasks in a political milieu, all his decisions
are a mixture of political and administrative considerations, the bureaucrats cannot
dissociate themselves from the political ideology of the government of the day; neither
can they dissociate themselves from the policies embodied in legislation.
Apart from being the chief formulators of the bill, the bureaucrats are also, to a great
extent, responsible for help and advice in the process of passing a bill through
Parliament. Without the help and cooperation of the bureaucrats, the minister could
find himself in a position where he is confronted with wide-ranging questions pertaining
to policy related issues, which the bill deals with. Ministers and bureaucrats are thus
partners in the passing of a bill.
When implementing policies, the bureaucrats have direct powers. Because of

complexities of the modern government and administration, they are granted the right
to exercise discretion in the execution of policy. The exercise of discretion gives them a
chance to prevent the perusal of policy goals to which they are opposed. They are thus
in a position to delay the implementation of policies, or only partially implement them.
It is often found that both the political leadership and the citizens blame the permanent
executive (the career bureaucrats) for the lack of proper execution of the policies. The
bureaucrats, on the other hand, feel that they do not get the due support and
infrastructure from the political executive. The bureaucracy makes the policy objectives
clear to the citizens and persuades them to adhere to the policies. Such an attempt
smoothens the task of policy implementation. The bureaucracy, especially at cutting-
edge level, tries to be closer to the public and endeavours to placate the interest groups.
By virtue of their position at the interface between citizens and the State, street level
bureaucrats have significant opportunities to influence the delivery of public policies.
These street level bureaucrats or the front-line workers are responsible for many
significant tasks from determining programme eligibility, allocating benefits, judging
compliance, imposing sanctions, and exempting offenders from penalties. They thus
operate as important lynchpins that not only deliver but actively shape policy outcomes
by interpreting rules and allocating scarce resources. The policies implemented by the
street level workers are closest to the requirements of the citizens. (Meyers and
Versanger, 2003)
As policy implementation is a complex process, bureaucrats have to take many policy

decisions themselves. They also have to determine which decisions should be taken by

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the ministers themselves. The relationship between the minister and the bureaucrat and
the political circumstances surrounding an issue will determine what is decided and by
whom the final decision is made. In practice, it is accepted that the bureaucrat is the
catalyst in policy implementation, whilst the final policy decisions are in the domain of
the minister.
The continued exposure of the bureaucrats to political matters and their expert
knowledge of specific public issues, helps them, in due course, to learn to answer
questions related to policy in such a way that the material they provide to their ministers
can be advantageously used to defend a policy in Parliament and elsewhere. In practice,
this means that the bureaucrats participate in defending the policy of the government,
irrespective of the party in power. The bureaucrat has, thus been referred to as a
permanent politician, whose views are extremely important in modern-day government,
and as an expert, he is a co-ruler in the administration. This could lead to a position
where the minister is totally dependent on the bureaucrats, in that the minister is not
fully conversant with all the aspects of policy either because of being new to the office,
or because of not taking cognisance of the results of policy monitoring.
Training
One of the most critical problems highlighted in interviews with civil servants was the
increasing inability of the civil service to attract and retain the best and the brightest at
the officer levels.25 The Chairman of the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC), the
institution responsible for overseeing recruitment to the officer levels, noted that there
was a worrying deterioration in the caliber of applicants taking the civil service exam.
Several senior civil servants also mentioned the difficulty of finding capable junior
officers to work in their departments. Some even recounted how they had discouraged
their children from joining the civil service and that the incentives that had led them to
join and stay in the civil service were no longer there.
The three main motivations cited by interviewees for joining the civil service in the past
were power, prestige and job security. Starting with the removal of the constitutional
protection of the civil service by Bhutto in 1973, however, the perception was that all
three of these incentives had been eroded. While many still do take the civil service
exam, the main motivations cited by interviewees were: 1) lingering but misplaced
perceptions of what the civil service used to be; 2) high rates of educated
unemployment; 3) corruption opportunities; and 4) the desire to have one family
member in the bureaucracy to help access patronage and solve problems. None of these
factors, however, are going to motivate the most promising young graduates to join the
civil service.
Another serious problem affecting recruitment and retention at the officer grades is the
compression of salary scales over time. This has resulted in government employees in
lower grades (one to sixteen) still being paid competitively with the private sector, but
those in the officer grades (seventeen to twenty-two) are increasingly being paid
considerably less than the private sector. During the past decade an increasingly
dynamic and growing private sector, especially in banking and telecommunications,

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means that the brightest young graduates can now earn considerably more working in
the private sector than if they join the civil service.26 For political reasons, little progress
has been made in addressing this problem by raising the salaries of the underpaid officer
levels, while keeping the lower grades at current levels. As a former Establishment
Division secretary noted, “Decompressing salaries is politically very difficult because
you’ll please only 4.5 percent of civil servants and antagonize 95 percent. These junior
grades would come out and strike and protest.”27
In addition to offering more competitive remuneration to senior civil servants, nearly all
the public administration reform commissions have highlighted the need for a
comprehensive overhaul of all stages of human resource policies, including recruitment
and induction procedures, post-induction training, career planning and development
opportunities and performance appraisal mechanisms that reward strong
performance.28 In particular, the independence and capacities of the Federal and
Provincial Public Service Commissions must be strengthened in order to promote more
open and transparent merit-based recruitment.29
Pervasive Inertia and how to break it

Bureaucratic Inertia definition
Bureaucratic inertia refers to a position in which the bureaucratic principles and

operations of an institution become so complex and time-consuming that they prevent
the efficient operation of the company’s core activities. In other words, bureaucratic
organisations perpetuate themselves and their focus turns to abiding by established
protocol rather than core activities and goals.
The endpoint of bureaucratic inertia is a point where the organisation expands

separately from its core growth areas. For example, a law firm may open new offices in
existing areas for the purpose of ‘growth’ without considering whether there’s demand
for their core services in that area.
Information and Bureaucratic ritualism
he inefficiency of bureaucracy has always been blamed for all the ills which have been
facing the country. Perhaps even rightly so, as the bureaucratic ritualism and red tape
surrounding each and every activity of the public and government organization has
deterred them from taking any firm initiative. In Pakistan the government machinery
and its everyday working is run by bureaucracy and even we depend on them to manage
everything. But over the years the civil servants and public officials have stepped away
from the basic job description, of serving the public and have adopted the approach of
applying their authority over the citizens, whom they have vowed to serve. This
unchecked and most of the times unlawful use of authority, can be observed to have
increased every time a democratic setup has been replaced by a dictatorial rule. This has
also resulted in large scale corruption and nepotism, as they realize that they are
answerable to no one.

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Article 19-A introduced in the 18th Amendment of the 1973 Constitution presents a
silver lining in the clouds. The article directs the public institutions to share the required
information of public interest with the citizens. This has been called as the Right to
Information (RTI). According to the Freedom of Information (FOI) law, which governs the
rules and regulations of RTI, this information is not only to be shared on demand, but
periodical publications are also required to disseminate information. This can be termed
as the first step of truly empowering the people, in contributing towards the governance
of the country. Unfortunately although almost everyone knows the political aspects of
the 18th Amendment, but there is no awareness regarding RTI or FOI. Either the people
have been deliberately kept in the dark over the subject or the aspect has been
overshadowed by the political perception of the amendment.
Still there are citizens who are aware and there are organizations, who have been
working on freedom of information in Pakistan since a long time. There have been
information requests filed under the article, by certain individuals and organizations.
Recently nine information requests have been filed with various departments in
Baluchistan. These requests are queries on developmental work and other civic issues
and demand no information on any sensitive issue. This has been initiated with the hope
that once precedence has been set and a habit has been developed in the citizens, to
engage and question the government machinery, perhaps there will be an improvement
in the prevalent situation. But it has been observed that the filing of the information
requests with the relevant departments has been ignored. Where the law clearly states
that a response to the applicant should be given within 21 working days, the application
seems to be lost somewhere in this complex bureaucratic setup. Although there is a way
to file complaints over non-compliance of these requests by the public departments, but
this process also takes a common citizen through a complex set of procedures. The
complaints have been filed with the Provincial Mohtasib by the concerned citizens and it
is hoped that as the office of Mohtasib is there to resolve the complaints of the public, it
will also take concrete measures in this regard.
This withholding of information in the backdrop of bureaucratic ritualism and red tape is
unacceptable. The public demands to know what is happening in the state apparatus,
why there is so much corruption, where and how are the funds for various projects
being utilized, why is there a shortage of resources and energy, who or what is
responsible for the deteriorating security situation? It is understandable that this is a
nascent democracy and of course it will take time to brush aside the mindset present in
our institutions, nurtured by dictatorial regimes. In the end, it will all come down to the
insistence of the citizens to hold accountable the public officials and pressurize them in
giving the answers to the questions, which concern every Pakistani. Just as the state
machinery has been forced to reveal the Kharotabad incident report, which had been
initially decided to be kept a secret, but under considerable public outcry was released;
the institutions will also have to be pursued into the habit of sharing information with
the public.
The withholding of information, only points to the fact that there is something wrong
and the picture that is being painted to the masses is not an accurate one. The mindset

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and perception present in our public sector departments has no place in a democratic
setup. The lowest ranking official to the highest seat of power are answerable to the
people. The institutions and officials have declared and vowed to serve the public and
not their own vested interests. It has to be realized by the officials and the public also
that, times have changed and democracy demands the active participation of the
citizens in the governance of the country. The country is no longer run by a junta, where
the citizens have been kept at the bottom of the pyramid. The concept of democracy
values the opinion of each and every individual and these opinions will only be
generated if proper information is available to them. Right to information is a tool which
serves the purpose of not only disseminating information, but also strengthening the
institutions in the long run.
Lack of Decision Making

Culture of postponement and delays
Lack of resources
Political interference
Ability to say “No.”
b. Policy Analysis, The Quest for Solutions (Lack of research
in policy analysis, Lack of coordination among
departments, secrecy, openness)
Policy analysis consists of not only examining and bringing improvements in the process
of formulating policies but also evaluating the choices and outcomes of the policies. The
quality and eventually the usefulness of a policy depends on a scientific, professional
and detailed analysis of the existing or proposed policies. It is only when the public
policy making bodies are supplied with the data regarding the causes, consequences,
costs and implement ability of a policy, with stress on its utilization in policy adaptation,
that the promotion of rationality in public policy making moves a step forward.
Unfortunately, owing to constraints such as the restricted availability of information,
exorbitant costs of gathering information, information overload, political considerations
and ever-changing demands and priorities of the society, no systematic analyses of the
public policy can provide all answers to policy defects. Nevertheless, through public
policy analysis, information on priorities and certainties becomes available to the policy
makers to serve as the basis for policy decisions.
Policy analysis could be descriptive, prescriptive or comparative. Its dimensions include

purposes, interventions, political feasibility, beliefs, perceptions, and other
determinants. In order to make a detailed and systematic examination of any policy, the
analysts ought to be fairly clear about the meaning and goals of the policy under study.
Bureaucrats have to see what policy choices have been made and why, what are the
benefits and losses, what difference does the money make, what is the impact of policy;
and how should the policies be evaluated. The bureaucrats thus have to keenly observe
and evaluate the role of different structures and processes in policy execution. Again, as
we read in the case of policy monitoring, systematic policy analysis is also dependent on
adequate policy making.

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Yehezkel Dror has listed nine standard features of policy formulation method, which can
help in policy analysis. These are:
i. There should be some clarification of values, objectives and criteria for policy
making
ii. The method should include identification of the alternatives, with an effort to
consider new alternatives
iii. The method should include preliminary estimation of expected pay offs from the
various alternatives and a decision on whether a strategy of minimal risk or of
innovation is preferable
iv. There is a need to establish a cut off horizon for considering the possible results of
the alternative policies and identification of the expected results, relying on
available knowledge and institution
v. Analysis of alternatives should deal with both quantitative and qualitative factors
in order to overcome the limitations of current systems analysis and advance
towards policy analysis
vi. The method should include an effort to decide whether the issue is important
enough to make more comprehensive analysis worthwhile
vii. The composition of a mix of experience, rationality and extra-rationality should be
relied on
viii. Explicit techniques such as Simulation and Delphi should be used; and
ix. ix) The method should include explicit arrangements to improve policy making by
encouraging intellectual effort.
After the crucial issues requiring urgent policy attention are identified, it has to be
ascertained by the bureaucrats whether such issues could make for viable policies or
not. The bureaucracy engages itself in analyzing the pros and cons of the issue that is
taken up for policy formulation. It frames and reframes policy proposals keeping in view
its viability, future prospects, resources available and acceptability. It also has to see that
Constitutional provisions do not get sidelined in framing of public policies. Thus, the
bureaucrats prepare for policy analysis at the time of policy formulation itself.
The bureaucrats are often too hard-pressed by day-to-day cases and workloads to be
able to reflect on new policy. The administration of existing policies generally occupies
their major time. Forecasting expenditure, preparing explanatory briefs on current
policy, negotiating with interest groups and administering of subordinate personnel
often adds to the neglect of the policy-making function by the higher bureaucrats. The
desirable role of senior civil servants in policy analysis is now receiving attention from
policy experts in the developed and developing countries. Accepted patterns of senior
civil servants’ recruitment, training and careers are increasingly being recognised as
inadequate for meeting the changing needs of the day.
Policy analysis and policy management are demanding activities in which abstract (but
evidence based) thinking must be applied to pressing issues. Therefore, intensive efforts
are needed for appropriate training of bureaucrats in policy analysis and management.
There is a need for preparation of suitable texts, training materials, and computer

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programmes etc. and this requires highly qualified and experienced trainers. These
training needs raise serious difficulties; more so, as inadequate training efforts in policy
management for senior bureaucrats may cause much more damage than benefit.
Therefore, urgent action is needed to prepare adequate policy analysis for essential
training activities. Improvement in the skills of senior bureaucrats does take time and is
not only a matter of development, but of working arrangements, as well as
organisational settings. Without political support and the willing cooperation of top
administrators, little can be done. Furthermore, the all round improvement of the senior
bureaucrats is only one dimension of the problems of policy analysis.
The bureaucrats as policy analysts have to view the policies in the light of the
significance of the role of political executive in policy formulation, The role of ruling
party, opposition parties and legislative committees has to be examined by the policy
analysts in order to bring forth how a policy virtually comes in to being. If politicians are
the masters of policy ideas, then certainly, as has been observed, the bureaucracy is the
master of routine and technique. It does not actually present feasible means to carry out
policies but translates what is feasible into policy. The bureaucracy may wish to be
innovative but is frequently limited by a dependency on accepted procedures for a
definition of what can and should be done. If stress is on increased accountability; then
bureaucrats would most certainly retreat behind a wall of procedures for protection,
thus bidding good bye to the much desired flexibility and innovativeness (B. Guy Peters,
op.cit.). Even the role of the judiciary in policy making should come under the purview of
policy analysis.
The analysts of the policy have to also examine the implementation mechanism and the
role played by governmental and non-governmental actors. Policy analysis has become
more problematic in the contemporary context of governance against the backdrop of
globalisation and networking among many agencies. With the coming of international
agencies and taking over or contracting out of many public services such as power
distribution, water supply and civil aviation by private operators, policy monitoring and
analysis have become cumbersome exercises. The bureaucrats have a complex role in
case of analyses of such public policies, which are being implemented in collaboration
with national and international private and non-state actors. This is another area that
requires systematic deliberation by the old as well as the new participants in policy
analyses.
c. Policy Evaluation: Assessing the Impact of Public Policy,

Program Evaluation- Success and failure of Govt.
 Policy evaluation can be better defined as a process by which general
judgments about quality, goal attainment, program effectiveness, impact,
and costs can be determined
 Once public policy has been operationalized through the formal adoption of laws,
rules, or regulations, and the bureaucracy has taken action to implement the
policy, some form of evaluation needs to be accomplished to determine if the policy
has achieved the desired outcome or impact. Public policy represents the
expenditure of limited public resources and or restrictions on certain types of
individual or organizational behavior. Consequently, the public has a right to expect
that their government officials are accountable for the validity, efficiency, and

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effectiveness of those policies. Policy evaluation is therefore an absolutely critical

stage in the policy process whereby �we can determine whether a policy �s effects
are intended or unintended and whether the results are positive or negative for the
target population and society as a whole (Theodoulou and Kofinis, 2004, p. 191).�
In essence, policy evaluation is the process used to determine what the
consequences of public policy are and what has and has not been achieved.
 What is Policy Evaluation?
o Elected officials, policy makers, community leaders, bureaucrats, and the

public want to know what policies work and what policies don't.
o The purpose of evaluation is to determine whether an

implemented program is doing what it is supposed to.
o Through evaluation, we can determine whether a policy's

effects are intended or unintended and whether the results
are positive or negative for the target population and society as a
whole.
 At first glance, policy evaluation appears to be a straightforward concept however a

closer inspection of the process reveals that policy evaluation can be equally as
political and divisive as any other stage of the policy process. Policy evaluation
provides additional opportunities for the myriad political interest groups and policy
actors to attempt to influence the life of a specific policy. Favorable evaluations of
the impact of a given policy will tend to perpetuate the implementation and life
cycle while unfavorable evaluations may give rise to change or possibly policy
termination. Depending on the proclivity of any interest group or policy actor, the
perception of how well a policy or program is performing or being implemented can
have far-reaching impact.
 The retrospective analysis of any public policy or government action is bounded by

a number of real-world constraints, such as time, budget, ethical considerations,
and policy restrictions (Theodoulou and Kofinis, 2004, p. 193), as well as political
ideologies, values, experiences, measurement instruments, goal clarity, and
institutional biases. The key to understanding and interpreting the results of any
policy evaluation is that some degree of bias is inherent in the process. However,
this shortcoming should not prevent efforts to produce fair and unbiased policy
evaluation products, at least as much as possible. The objective of policy
evaluation is to discover policy flaws and to attempt to correct them given all of the
limitations incumbent in the overarching policy process. In its simplest form,
evaluating a public program involves cataloging the goals of the program,
measuring the degree to which the goals have been achieved, and, perhaps,
suggesting changes that might bring the performance of the organization more in
line with the stated purposes of the program (Peters, 2007, p. 163).
 Most models of policy evaluation ground their analytical perspective in the logical
process used to determine the disparity between what was conceptualized by the
initial policy goals and what has actually been accomplished by the policy or
program as implemented. However, many other models focus their analysis on
different objectives such as what is the true purpose of the evaluation, what is the
role of the evaluator in the process, how broad or narrow should the scope of the
evaluation be, and finally how should the evaluation be organized and conducted,
for example what measurement instruments should be employed to determine
success or failure. Theodoulou and Kofinis (2004) identify four generic types of the
most commonly used policy evaluation typologies and they are: process evaluation,
outcome evaluation, impact evaluation, and cost-benefit analysis.
 Types of Policy Evaluation

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i. Process Evaluation: this type of evaluation analyzes how well a policy or

program is being administered.
ii. Outcome Evaluation: Outcome evaluation as described by Theodoulou and
Kofinis focuses more on the readily available and tangible results of policy.
iii. Impact Evaluation: The objective of this type of evaluation is to determine
whether a given public policy or program is in fact achieving the intended
impact as visualized by the various policy actors who either supported or
opposed the given policy
iv. Cost-Benefit Evaluation: Simply stated, a cost-benefit analysis is the
comparison of the costs associated with a policy or program to the benefits
generated by the policy.
As increasing pressures are brought to bear on the public sector to perform its role
more effectively and efficiently, evaluation will probably become an even greater
source of conflict. Negative evaluations of a program’s effectiveness and efficiency
now will be more likely to lead to the program’s termination than in more affluent
times. The content of an evaluation, the values that are contained in it, and even
the organization performing the evaluation will all affect the final assessment.
Evaluation research is now a major industry involving numerous consulting firms
(beltway bandits), universities, and organizations within government itself. These
evaluative organizations will have their own perspectives on what is right and
wrong in policy and will bring those values with them when they perform an
analysis (Peters, 2007, p. 175).
As such, Peters identifies seven important barriers to effective policy evaluation

that can impede the seemingly simple but operationally difficult process of
determining what actually occurred as a result of government action and more
specifically determining the level of performance of a public policy of program. It is
equally important for both policy evaluators and the consumers of policy evaluation
to understand the basic nature of these difficulties. Specifically, anyone engaged in
policy evaluation must appreciate the degree of bias and unintentional, albeit
sometimes intentional, confusion that can occur as a result of the difference
between what is being measured during a policy evaluation and what policy-
makers thought the policy should achieve. All too often evaluators, administrators,
and the public focus on measurement statistics that are easy to obtain but have no
real relationship between what has been accomplished compared to what the
original intent of the public policy was. The following text block identifies the seven
barriers as enumerated by Peters and it is followed by a brief description of each.
Barriers to Effective Policy Evaluation
i. Goal Specification and Goal Change

ii. Measurement
iii. Targets
iv. Efficiency and Effectiveness
v. Values and Evaluation
vi. Politics
vii. Increasing Requirements for Evaluation
Multi-level Governance in Pakistan

a. Legislature:
National Assembly
 PILDAT Analysis of the Third Year of the 15th National Assembly
 The National Assembly is a democratically elected body consisting of a total of
342 members who are referred to as Members of the National Assembly
(MNAs), of which 272 are directly elected members and 70 reserved seats for

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women and religious minorities. A political party must secure 172 seats to
obtain and preserve a majority
 Constitution, which was passed unanimously by the National Assembly in April
1973, provides a federal parliamentary system of government, with the
President as the ceremonial head of the state and an elected Prime Minister
as the head of the government. Under Article 50 of the Constitution the
federal legislature is the bicameral Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), which
comprises the President and the two Houses, the National Assembly and the
Senate. The National Assembly, Pakistan's sovereign legislative body, makes
laws for the federation under powers spelled out in the federal legislative List
and for subjects in the concurrent List, as given in the fourth schedule of the
Constitution. Through debates, adjournment motions, question hour, and
standing committees, the National Assembly keeps a check on the
government. It ensures that the government functions within the parameters
set out in the Constitution and does not violate the people's fundamental
rights. The Parliament scrutinizes public spending and exercises control of
expenditure incurred by the government through the work of the relevant
standing committees. The Public Accounts Committee has a special role to
review the report of the auditor general. The Senate, the upper house of the
Parliament, has equal representation from the federating units balancing the
provincial inequality in the National Assembly, where the number of members
is based on population of the provinces. The Senate's role is to promote
national cohesion and harmony, and work as a stabilizing factor of the
federation. The Senate has 104 members who serve six-year terms which are
alternated so that half the senators are up for re-election by the electoral
college every three years. The National Assembly consists of 342 members.
The Constitution does not empower the President to dissolve the National
Assembly. The Senate is not subject to dissolution. Only the Parliament can
amend the Constitution, by two-thirds majority vote separately in each House
 Article 50 of the Constitution provides that the Parliament shall consist of
president and the two houses known as the National Assembly and the
Senate. The National Assembly has an edge over the Senate by legislating
exclusively on money matters. With exception to money bills, however, both
the houses work together to carryout the basic work of the Parliament, i.e.
law making.
 The bill relating to the Federal Legislative List can be originated in either
house. If the House passed a bill through majority vote, it shall be
transmitted to the other house. If the other house passes it without
amendment, it shall be presented to the President for assent.
 If the bill, transmitted to the other house, is not passed within ninety days or
rejected, it shall be considered in a joint sitting to be summoned by the
President on the request of the house in which the bill was originated. If the
bill is passed in the joint sitting, with or without amendments, by the votes
of majority of the members of the two houses, it shall be presented to the
President for assent.

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 If the bill is presented to the President for assent, he shall assent to the bill
in not later than ten days. If it is not a money bill, the President may return it
to the Majlis-e-Shoora with a message requesting that the bill be
reconsidered and that an amendment specified in the message be
considered. The Majlis-e-Shoora shall reconsider the bill in a joint sitting. If
the bill is passed again, with or without amendment, by vote of the majority
of the members present and voting, it shall be presented to the President
and the President shall give his assent within ten days; failing which such
assent shall be deemed to have been given.
 Under the Constitution, the Parliament may also legislate for two or more
provinces by consent and request made by those provinces. If the federal
government proclaims a state of emergency in any province, the power to
legislate about that province is vested in the Parliament. But the bills
passed by the Parliament during the state of emergency, shall cease to be
in force after the expiration of six months from the date that the emergency
is lifted. Nevertheless, the steps already taken under these acts shall
remain valid.
Senate
 First convened in 1973, the Senate's composition and powers are
established by the Article 59 of the Constitution of Pakistan.
 Each of the four provinces are represented by 23 senators regardless of
population, while the Islamabad Capital Territory is represented by four
senators, all of whom serve staggered six-year terms.
 The Senate has several exclusive powers not granted to the National
Assembly, including the powers of making parliamentary bills as a being
enforced into law. Elections are held every three years for one half of the
Senate and each Senator has a term of six years.[5] The Constitution does
not allow for the dissolution of the Senate
 The main purpose for the creation of the Senate of Pakistan was to give
equal representation to all the federating units since the membership of the
National Assembly was based on the population of each province. Equal
provincial membership in the Senate, thus, balances the provincial
inequality in the National Assembly.
 There are one hundred senatorial seats. There are 18 women Senators;
Pakistani constitution requires that there be at least 17 women Senators.
Members of the Senate are elected according to Article 59 of the
Constitution.
 The Constitution provides that there shall be a Cabinet headed by the Prime
Minister which is collectively responsible to the National Assembly. The
Prime Minister is chosen from the National Assembly. The Federal Ministers
and Ministers of State are appointed from among the members of
Parliament. However, the number of Federal Ministers and Ministers of
State who are members of Senate, shall not at any time, exceed one fourth
of the numbers of Federal Ministers.
Provincial Assemblies
 PILDAT Scorecard on Performance of Provincial Assemblies

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o A PILDAT Comparative Performance Analysis of 4 Provincial

Assemblies puts the Sindh Assembly at the top by scoring the
highest at 69 out of 100, followed by the Provincial Assembly of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa at 67, the Balochistan Assembly at 60 and the
Provincial Assembly of the Punjab at a score of 58.
o Interestingly, according to the Public Opinion Poll conducted by
PILDAT on the Quality of Democracy in Pakistan,1 the highest Net
Performance Rating (NPR) given to any Provincial Assembly for its
legislative performance was for the Balochistan Assembly at +22%,
followed by the Punjab Assembly at +5%. The Sindh Assembly which
has passed the highest number of bills for the first Parliamentary
Year scored the lowest NPR amongst all the Provincial Legislatures at
-19% followed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly at -9%. This
lack of corroboration between the public perception and the
legislative activity of the Assemblies could denote either one of two
factors: either that the citizens are not well acquainted with the
legislative activity of their Provincial Assembly or, they are not
satisfied by the subject areas legislated upon.
 According to Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution, the federation of Pakistan
comprises four provincial units, Balochistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab
and Sindh. Each provincial unit has its own elected legislative body called a
provincial assembly that sits in the provincial capitals. A provincial cabinet is
selected from among the members of the provincial assembly and is headed
by the Chief Minister who is elected by the provincial assembly from among
its members.
 Legislative powers are shared between the federal and provincial
governments which is generally more suitable for large countries like
Pakistan because provincial governments can be more responsive to the
needs of citizens than a centralized government. The federal legislative list
provided in the fourth schedule of the Constitution bifurcates the legislative
powers. All matters other than those mentioned in the federal list fall in the
legislative powers of the provinces.
 According to the Constitution, the provincial assemblies are responsible for
the following:
o Electing the Speaker, Deputy Speaker and Chief Minister.
o Acting as the electoral college for the election of the President of
Pakistan and senators of the respective province.
o The provincial assembly is empowered to make laws for the
province with respect to criminal law, criminal procedure, evidence
and any matter not enumerated in the Federal Legislative List.
o It cannot, however, make any law that is repugnant to the
injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah,
which is repugnant to any provision of the Constitution, inconsistent

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with a federal law, violates or contravenes any fundamental rights or

is not in consonance with the Principles of Policy.
o Financial accountability like, legislating spending, including passing
the annual and supplementary budgets of the provinces.
o Overseeing the government.
o According to the 18th amendment, provinces are now granted
power and autonomy to establish local government systems and
transfer political, administrative and financial responsibility and
authority to elected representatives. It also increased the
administrative and financial autonomy of the provinces.
 The term of the provincial assemblies is five years from the date of their first
meetings. General Elections for all assemblies are held on same day, hence
all four provincial assemblies initiate their five-year terms around the same
time. This helps the governments decide for one day of dissolution of the
assemblies after five years and makes elections possible on a single day for
all the assemblies.
b. Judiciary
The Judicial System of Pakistan – Dr. Faqir Hussain
Overview
Khalid, Professor. (2012). Role of Judiciary in the Evolvement of Democracy in
Pakistan. 142.
 Geoffery K. Roberts opines that “judiciary is the branch of government and

administered by the executive branch, in cases where dispute arises as to
meaning, validity or supposed branch of such laws” (1971: 61). Judiciary is
the guardian of the mass liberties and rights. Its independence is one of the
essentials of democracy. It because of such significance H. Rahman asserts
that. “Nothing touches the welfare and security of the citizen more than the
judiciary. No mass, therefore, can over-estimate the importance of the
mechanism of justice” (Rahman, 1958: 189). Moreover The Universal
declaration of human rights Art.10 and the international covenant on civil
and political rights Art.14 (1) proclaim that everyone should be entitled to a
fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal
established by law. An independent judiciary is indispensable to the
implementation of this right. Simply stated, judicial independence is the
ability of a judge to decide a matter from pressure or inducements.
Additionally, the institution of the judiciary as a whole must also be
independent by being separate from government and other concentrations
of power. There are several hurdles in the way of an independent judiciary. A
very tactful control is required when there is question of the control of army
by judicial means. A mature political system must possess maturity. It is only
because of this maturity there can emerge the virtue of accommodation,
acceptance, flexibility, transparency and accountability. In the institution like

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army there is required sound process of socialization that can be helpful in

making it accept the supremacy of civilian institutions.
 The judiciary of Pakistan (Urdu: ‫ )پاکستان کی عدلیہ‬is a hierarchical system
with two classes of courts: the superior (or higher) judiciary and the
subordinate (or lower) judiciary. The superior judiciary is composed of the
Supreme Court of Pakistan, the Federal Shariat Court and five High Courts,
with the Supreme Court at the apex. There is a High Court for each of the
four provinces as well as a High Court for the Islamabad Capital Territory.
The Constitution of Pakistan entrusts the superior judiciary with the
obligation to preserve, protect and defend the constitution.[1] Neither the
Supreme Court nor a High Court may exercise jurisdiction in relation to
Tribal Areas, except otherwise [2] provided for.[3] The disputed regions of
Azad Kashmir and Gilgit–Baltistan have separate court systems
Supreme Court
 Established in accordance to the Part VII of the Constitution of Pakistan,
it has ultimate and extensive appellate, original, and advisory
jurisdictions on all courts (including the high courts, district, special and
Shariat court), involving issues of laws and may act on the verdicts
rendered on the cases in context in which it enjoys jurisdiction. In the
court system of Pakistan, the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of legal
and constitutional disputes as well as final interpreter of constitutional
law, and the highest court of appeal in Pakistan.
 In its modern composition, the Supreme Court is incorporated of Chief
Justice of Pakistan, sixteen justices and two ad hoc who are confirmed
to their appointment by the President upon their nominations from the
Prime Minister's selection based on their merited qualifications. Once
appointed, justices are expected to complete a designated term and
then retire at 65 years old, unless their term is terminated through
resignation or impeachment by the Supreme Judicial Council resulted in
a presidential reference in regards to the misconduct of judge(s). In their
discourse judgement, the justices are often categorized as having the
conservative, textual, moderate, and liberal philosophies of law in their
judicial interpretation of law and judgements.
 As compared to the practice elsewhere in the world, particularly the
United States and United Kingdom, where fewer cases reach the apex
court, the Supreme Court of Pakistan deals with cases, far beyond its
capacity to handle. Its jurisdiction ? original as well as appellate ? is
fairly wide. Besides entertaining civil and criminal appeals from the High
Courts, the Court also hears appeals from the judgments against the
Federal Shariat Court, Federal/provincial service tribunals and some
special courts. The Court also entertains cases of violation of
Fundamental Rights under its original jurisdiction i.e. Art 184(3). As a

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consequence, there is always huge number of pending cases before the

Court. As per latest data available, on 31st December 2013, a total of
20,480 cases were pending 39 in the Supreme Court. Approximately,
14000 – 16000 cases (both petitions and appeals) are annually filed in
the Court. The current backlog is about 2200 cases. In addition,
thousands of applications/letters are annually received under Article
184(3) of the Constitution and processed by the Court. Obviously, the
Court has a very heavy workload.
 To facilitate the litigant public and ensure prompt disposal of cases, the
Court generally operates through benches, working at the Principal Seat
and the 4 Branch Registries, one at each provincial metropolis. Such
benches work, almost round the year. Whereas the constitution of
Benches and their operation in various cities facilitate the public and
ensures justice at the doorstep; the system does affect the quality of
judgments and deprives the Court of collective wisdom, so very vital for
the apex Court, dealing with important issues, involving the
interpretation of law/Constitution. There is, therefore, perhaps a need
to re-examine the wisdom of bench system, which is however not
possible with the present workload, and rising trend of institution of
cases, due to the wider jurisdiction of the Court. A way out may be the
transfer of the court appellate jurisdiction under Art 212 (appeals in
service matters) to High Courts. The High Courts could handle the extra
workload, as there strength was recently increased (in 2008) and they
are currently operating with full strength. Thus, they could deal with
appeals arising out of the judgments of the provincial service tribunals.
The appeals against verdicts of (Federal) Service Tribunal may be filed at
the Islamabad High Court; its strength however requires increase due to
heavy pendency before it.
High Courts
 There is a High Court in each province and yet another High Court for
the Islamabad Capital Territory. Each High Court consists of a Chief
Justice and other puisne judges. The strength of Lahore High Court is
fixed at 60, High Court of Sindh at 40, Peshawar High Court at 20, High
Court of Balochistan at 11 and Islamabad High Court at 7. Qualifications
mentioned for the post of a judge are, 10 years experience as an
advocate of a High Court or 10 years service as a civil servant, including
3 years 40 experience as a District Judge or 10 years experience in a
judicial office
 For the appointment of judges of High Courts, in the past, the practice
used to be that initially the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court
would prepare a list of candidates which was submitted to the
President, through the Governor of the province and the Chief Justice of
Pakistan. The President made the final selection from the said list.
Subsequently, however the Supreme Court, in the case of 41 Al-Jehad

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Trust v Federation ruled that the recommendation of the Chief Justice of

Pakistan and Chief Justice of the High Court shall be binding on the
President, except for sound reasons to the contrary. The court further
ruled that the most senior judge would have legitimate expectancy of
being appointed as the Chief Justice, except for concrete and valid
reasons, to be recorded by the President.
 An extremely controversial provision in the Constitution had been the
transfer of a judge from one High Court to another, without his consent
or after consultation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan or Chief Justices
of the concerned High Courts. The original 1973 Constitution made such
a transfer subject to such consent as well as consultation. A proviso
added by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act 1976, empowered the
President to order such transfer for a period, not exceeding one year;
and the President Order No. 14 of 1985 extended such period from one
to two years. This clause was however deleted by the Constitution 18th
Amendment and the original clause resorted. Now a judge of a High
Court cannot be transferred without his consent and consultation with
the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Chief Justices of both the High Courts.
Lower Courts
 The Subordinate Judiciary may be broadly divided into two classes; one, civil
courts, established under the Civil Courts Ordinance 1962, and two, criminal
courts, created under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. In addition,
there also exist other courts and tribunals of civil and criminal nature,
created under special laws. Their jurisdiction, powers and functions are
specified in the statutes, creating them. The decisions and judgments of
such special courts are assailable before the superior judiciary (High Court
and/or Supreme Court) through revision or appeal. The provincial
governments fund the justice sector. The civil and criminal courts judges and
their terms and conditions are regulated under the provincial rules. The High
Court, however, exercises administrative control over such courts. The civil
courts consist of District Judge, Additional District Judge, Senior Civil Judge
and Civil Judge Class I, II & III. Similarly, the criminal courts comprise of
Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge and Judicial Magistrate Class I, II &
III. Law fixes their pecuniary and territorial jurisdictions. Appeal against the
decision of civil courts lies to the District Judge and to the High Court, if the
value of the suit exceeds specified amount. Similarly, in keeping with the
quantum of penalty, appeals against criminal courts lie to Sessions Judge or
High Court
c. Functioning of the offices:

President of Pakistan,
 The president of Pakistan, officially the President of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, is the ceremonial head of state of Pakistan and the commander-in-
chief of the Pakistan Armed Forces.

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 The office of president was created upon the proclamation of Islamic

Republic on 23 March 1956. The then serving governor-general, Major-
General Iskander Mirza, assumed office as the first president. Following the
1958 coup d'etat, the office of prime minister was abolished, leaving the
Presidency as the most powerful office in the country. This position was
further strengthened when the 1962 Constitution was adopted. It turned
Pakistan into a Presidential Republic, giving all executive powers to the
president. In 1973, the new Constitution established Parliamentary
democracy and reduced president's role to a ceremonial one. Nevertheless,
the military takeover in 1977 reversed the changes. The 8th Amendment
turned Pakistan into a semi-presidential republic and in the period between
1985 and 2010, the executive power was shared by president and prime
minister. The 18th Amendment in 2010 restored Parliamentary Democracy
in the country, and reduced presidency to a ceremonial position.
 The Constitution however, vests the president with the powers of granting
pardons, reprieves, and the control over the military; however, all
appointments at higher commands of the military must be made by the
President on a "required and necessary" basis, upon consultation and
approval from the prime minister.
Prime Minister of Pakistan

 Pakistan's prime minister leads the executive branch of the federal
government, oversees the state economy, leads the National Assembly,
heads the Council of Common Interests as well as the Cabinet, and is
charged with leading the National Command Authority over Pakistan's
nuclear weapons arsenal.[15][16][17] This position places its holder in
leadership of the nation and in control over all matters, both internal affairs
and foreign policy.[18] The prime minister is elected by the members of the
National Assembly and is therefore usually the leader of the majority party
in the parliament. The Constitution of Pakistan vests executive powers in the
prime minister, who is responsible for appointing the Cabinet as well as
running the executive branch, taking and authorizing executive decisions,
appointments, and recommendations that require prime ministerial
confirmation.
 Constitutionally, the prime minister serves as the chief adviser to the
president of Pakistan on critical matters; and plays an influential role in
appointment in each branch of the military leadership as well as ensuring
civilian control of the military through chairman joint chiefs, although this
does not necessarily happen in tandem. Prime ministerial powers have
significantly grown with a delicate system of check and balance by each
branch. The position was absent during the years of 1960–1973, 1977–1985,
and 1999–2002 due to imposed martial law. In each of these periods, the
military junta led by the president had the powers of the prime minister

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Office of Governor,
 The constitutions of India and Pakistan draw heavily on their common
colonial ancestor, the Government of India Act, 1935. This is particularly so
on the office of the governor. He is the only constitutional functionary who
cannot be removed from office for misconduct so long as he enjoys the
backing of the appointing authority, the president, who, however, is
removable on impeachment by parliament.
 Article 101 (1) of the constitution of Pakistan says that the governor “shall
be appointed by the president after consultation with the prime minister”.
Clause (3) says that he “shall hold office during the pleasure of the
president”.
Offices of:
Chief Minister
 The chief minister is the head of the provincial government, whereas in
contrast, the governor is the nominal head, or the "de jure executive" and
does everything under the guidance of the chief minister. The chief minister
is elected by the provincial assembly and is the leader of the provincial
Legislature.
 The parliamentary system in Pakistan follows the Westminster system.[2]
Hence the ministers of the provinces are elected by the members of the
legislature, and the majority party is invited to elect a leader, whose tenure
lasts for five years. The people do not elect the head of the government,
rather they elect their representatives only. In turn their representatives
select the head of the government. The head of the government, once
elected, enjoys almost exclusive executive powers.
Federal Cabinet
 The Cabinet of Pakistan is a formal body composed of senior
government officials chosen and led by the Prime Minister.[1] All cabinet
members sworn in are designated Minister and are seated at their
respective ministries located in the Pakistan Secretariat.
 There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Prime Minister at its
head, to aid and advise the President in the exercise of his functions. The
Cabinet, together with the Ministers of State, shall be collectively
responsible to the Senate and the National Assembly. A Minister who for
any period of six consecutive months is not a member of the National
Assembly shall, at the expiration of that period, cease to be a Minister
and shall not before the dissolution of that Assembly be again appointed
a Minister unless he is elected a member of that Assembly: Provided
that nothing in this clause shall apply to a Minister who is a member of
the Senate. Provided that the number of Federal Ministers and Ministers
of State who are members of the Senate shall not at any time exceed
one-fourth of the number of Federal Ministers

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— Article 81C-96D: The Federation of Pakistan; Part-III, Chapter 3:

Federal Government, The Constitution of Pakistan
Cabinet Committees
 Cabinet committees are groups of ministers that can “take collective
decisions that are binding across government”.[1] They are partly designed
to reduce the burden on the full cabinet by allowing smaller groups of
ministers to take decisions on specific policy areas. These committees have
been around in some form since the early 20th century.
 Cabinet committees should not be confused with select committees, which
are parliamentary bodies that scrutinise what government does.
 Cabinet Committees in Pakistan
1. Economic Coordination Committee
2. Cabinet Committee for Disposal of Legislative Cases
3. Cabinet Committee on Privatization
4. Cabinet Committee on Chinese Investment Projects
5. Cabinet committee on Energy
Federal Secretariat
Provincial Secretariat
d. Local Government system, Its Efficacy, Performance &
Causes of Success, or Failure
Division Government
The four provinces, capital territory and two autonomous territories of Pakistan
are subdivided into 37 administrative "divisions". These divisions were abolished
in 2000 but restored in 2008. The divisions do not include the Islamabad Capital
Territory or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, which were counted at the
same level as provinces, but in 2018 the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
were subsumed into Khyber-Paktunkhwa Province and allocated to neighboring
divisions therein.
Zila (District) Government

A district is the first tier of local government. In total there are 149 districts in
Pakistan, of which several are city districts. A District Government or a City
District Government and Zillah Council form the governing body, with the
District Coordination Officer serving as the administrative head.[8] The District
Governor or Zila Nazim used to be the executive head of districts until 2010,
when the government shifted power to the District Coordination Officers. Their
role is similar to district governors, with responsibility for implementing
government strategy and developing initiatives arising out of it.
Tehsil Government
Among the three tiers of local government, Tesil government is second tier of it.
It is where the functions, responsibilities and authorities of districts government
is divided into more smaller units, these units are known as "Tehsil". The Tehsils

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are used in all over the Pakistan except Sindh province where the word "Taluka"
is used instead, although the functions and authorities are same. The head of
the Tehsil government is "Tehsil Nazim" who is assisted by the tehsil Naib-Nazim.
Every tehsil has a Tehsil Municipal Administration, consisting of a Tehsil council,
Tehsil Nazim, tehsil/taluka municipal officer (TMO), Chief officer and other
officials of local council.
Union Administration
Members of Union Council including Union Administrator and Vice Union
Administrator are elected through direct elections based on adult franchise and
on the basis of joint electorate. However, for the election to the reserved seats
for Women in Zila Council proportionately divided among Tehsils or Towns shall
be all members of the Union Councils in a Tehsil or Town. It is the responsibility
of the Chief Election Commissioner to organize and conduct these elections.
Federalism, Devolution and Decentralization

Federalism in Pakistan – Dr. Mohammad Waseem, 2010
Federalism, Provincial Autonomy, and Conflicts – Zubair Faisal Abbas, CPDI
a. Constituents’ participation in Federal Structure

Federalism
 Federalism as a political system is primarily concerned with the idea of developing a
manageable system of governance thus establishing an orderly arrangement among
different tiers of government in a nation. Establishing a manageable and
accommodative system is the real test for federalism which should ensure that the
general and regional governments coordinate with each other while remaining
independent. In a way, federalism is about division of power in a well-structured way
(Ariyo, 2003).
 Another body of knowledge argues that a federal political order is the genus of
political organization that is marked by the combination of shared rule and self-rule.
Therefore, federalism is the theory which discusses the principles of dividing
authority and power amongst the participating groups, be those states or
associations or common institutions. In this sense, a federation is composed of a
common government along with a territorial division of power between constituent
units called provinces, cantons or states.
 Representation of states in central government policy-making is part of the essence
of federalism. However, there are exceptions in rules in theory and in practice. For
example in Canada, the provinces do not carry veto power to strike down policies
but the federal and provincial governments are locked in a system in which the
federal government has to sign formal, contractual agreements with the provinces
passing through a lengthy process of striking bargains. Likewise in Russia, Spain,
Germany and Australia formal policy-specific multilateral bargaining bodies including
the states and the central government has evolved. this is especially true of
Germany and Australia (Rodden, 2004).

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Federalism in Pakistan
 Pakistan has been a federation since independence, partly as the constitutional
legacy of British India, partly as the result of necessity from 1947 to 1971 when it
comprised two non-contiguous territorial units and partly because the provinces had
developed distinct ethnic and linguistic identities of their own as sovereign states.
British India brought them and various lesser states under the imperial control,
mostly directly but also indirectly
 From the 1935 India Act onwards, the heavy pro-federation bias in the division of
subjects has characterized all constitutional arrangements. The list of subjects has
shifted from three (federal, provincial and concurrent) in 1935 and 1956, to one
(federal) in 1962 to two (federal and concurrent) in 1973, with residual powers lying
with the provinces (1962, 1973). The federation penetrated deep into the domain of
the concurrent list. Provinces sought to remove this list because the federation
would always prevail over them in a case of conflict. The federal bias
comprehensively defined the taxation structure. However, a long-term trend in favor
of provincial subjects has been visible. (Ahmed, 2007: 71-78, 102) The 18th
Amendment of 2010, discussed in more detail below, empowered provinces to raise
loans at home and abroad, and issue security guarantees on the provincial
consolidated fund. In an innovative measure, it provided for joint and equal
ownership of the mineral wealth found in a province or its adjacent waters by the
federation and the provinces. Also, it gave the sales tax on services (but not on
commodities) to provinces. The Amendment abolished the concurrent list in
principle and transferred 40 of its 47 subjects to provinces.
 The intrusive role of the federation vis-‡-vis provinces operated in the domain of
appointing governors, high court judges and the higher bureaucracy. Constitutional
federalism has been effectively countered by bureaucratic centralism. In 1948, the
civilian bureaucracy was centralized on an all-Pakistan basis. The federal
government-controlled recruitment, training, posting, transferring, promoting and
demoting of officers. Contrary to the older pattern of recruitment of civil servants
under ICS in British India on the basis of provincial cadre, the civil bureaucracy in
Pakistan was recruited on the basis of federal cadre. This remained a hotbed of
controversy whereby provincial governments felt helpless in the face of a centralist
bureaucracy that managed the affairs of the provinces of their posting by giving
priority to the interests of the federation.
 Federalism has been a mainstream idea system in the politics of the Subcontinent.
The demand for Pakistan has some common threads with the demand of federal
structure under the British Raj. In fact, the Lahore resolution adopted by the All India
Muslim League had argued for a federal structure to protect the interests of ethnic
minorities under the then prevailing majoritarion democracy.
 The story of federalism, however, is not very impressive. By using the legal structure
to hold together the federating units the state does not appear to be very
responsive towards the demands of provinces. The distribution of powers had
actually been the most pressing issues between East and West Pakistan and till 1971
all constitutions intended to create federal structure with balance of power clearly

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tilting favourably towards the centre. This trend has not promoted healthy practices
to flourish federalism. Under both the civilian and military rule, the federal agencies
such the military and civil bureaucracies seem to dominate the policy, financial and
political avenues.
 The control of federal agencies over legislative, economic and administrative powers
have built a sense of discontent and rise of ethnic nationalism and polarization in
the federating units. While the federal agencies seem to be overpowering, they have
failed to address the issues of horizontal inequalities which emerge owing to
regional disparities in economic development. The ever-increasing differences in the
levels of poverty and affluence create sense of deprivation amongst social groups
especially in smaller provinces. When these groups try to become politically active,
they strive to raise identities which federal agencies look with suspicion and
sometimes take them as movement for secession. Ultimately, the economic
deprivations and inequalities give rise to situations of violent conflicts and military
actions.
 It appears that the state of Pakistan needs to address many questions
simultaneously. It needs to attack the issues of economic disparity with full force and
in the most direct way. It needs to generate employment creation potential in the
areas of Balochistan and FATA. At the same time, it needs to deliver on the promises
made under the 18th Amendment Act 2010. Delivering on the promises does not
mean only devolution of political, administrative and financial authority but also a
conscious effort to build capacities of the provincial governments to use
opportunities created by increased fund availability.
 Pakistan needs to focus on the dividends which political participation in decision-
making by the ethnic minorities can bring for economic development and social
harmony. There is no doubt that the democratically elected government since 2008,
is trying to create enabling environment to strengthen the federal structure with
provinces being given more space on financial, administrative and policy matters.
However, there are issues of exclusion and inclusion along ethnic lines within the
provincial boundaries. There are ethnic divisions within Punjab, Balochistan, Sindh
and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa clearly divided along the levels of poverty and affluence.
There is a strong need to address these issues on priority basis. At the same time,
the province-like status awarded to the Gilgit-Baltistan region requires special
attention so that the development and democratic representation deficit is
meaningfully addressed and process of integration moves fast.
 Federalism and democracy can be a good resource for conflict management.
However, majoritarian form of decision-making needs to be tailored with
consociational form of accommodation of ethnic minorities. It requires affirmative
actions to support the left-outs to be mainstreamed. The democratic Pakistan must
know that “singular-identity” view can breed conflict and violence while multiple
identities with freedom of choice in non-contrasting identities creates tolerance
(Sen, 2007). Finally, it appears that for federalism to succeed in Pakistan, the issues
of identity and conflict must be addressed using legal, intellectual, economic, and

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political strategies. These strategies must create space for consociational regimes
moving ahead of majoritarian democratic polity.
18th Amendment
 The 18th Amendment passed in April 2010 was billed as the most comprehensive
reform package after the passage of the 1973 Constitution. Ever since the return of
the civilian rule in 2008, there was a popular demand of the whole spectrum of
political leadership to repeal the 17th Amendment passed under Musharraf and
reform the Constitution in the light of the Charter of Democracy.
 The SPCCR spent 385 hours on its deliberations and received 982 proposals from the
public. In the process, it expanded its agenda beyond the Charter of Democracy and
dealt with various other controversial matters. The 18th Amendment made almost
100 changes, including:
i. Abolishing the concurrent list in principle, transferring the residuary
powers to provinces; ï
ii. Restoring parliamentary sovereignty, by repealing Article 58 (2) (B); ï
iii. Expanding the jurisdiction of the Political Parties Act to FATA, thereby
encouraging political parties to field their candidates from that region in
future elections.
iv. Making the CCI a more substantive body.
v. Restricting the space for issuing presidential ordinances
vi. Providing for the Chief Election Commissioners appointment on the basis
of agreement between the government and the opposition
vii. Establishing a Judicial Commission comprising 7 members, including 4
judges, the law minister, the attorney general and a representative of the
Supreme Court Bar Association; and
viii. Re-naming NWFP as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
 Lesser voices represented various unresolved but lingering issues that failed to win a
consensus of PCCR. For example, ANP demanded election of president on a
rotational basis from all federating units, starting with the smaller provinces. MQM
demanded creation of a few seats in the federal and provincial assemblies for
overseas Pakistanis through amendments in Article 51 and 106. JI demanded for
president not to exercise his 20 powers of clemency in cases relating to Hadood or
Qasas laws. PKMAP, the Pakhtun nationalist party in Balochistan, wanted a separate
Chief Commissioners province to be called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Southern and
renaming of FATA as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Central. (PCCR Report, 2010)
 Critique of the 18th Amendment: Critics of the 18th Amendment pointed to the
failure to meet the agenda of the Charter of Democracy. For example, there was: no
provision for a Federal Constitutional Court; no merger of FATA in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa; no independent accountability commission to replace NAB; and no
accountability of ISI and MI to civilian authority. Some claimed that the 18th
Amendment, much like the 1973 Constitution itself, did not provide for an
independent Election Commission, an independent judiciary, an independent
commission for accountability and a mechanism for a third tier of government at the
local level. The lobby for provincial autonomy, especially in Sindh, criticized the

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Amendment for: completely ignoring the Senate in terms of power sharing; making
NEC unrepresentative of the federation by giving prime minister the power to
nominate four members on his own instead of providing for representatives of four
provinces, and continuing with Article 62 carrying the Islamic provisions for eligibility
of electoral contestants and thus alienating religious minorities and secular-minded
people in general. Some found that the Amendment diffused the demand for
provincial autonomy more than addressed it frontally, averting the re-opening of the
thorny issues of administrative and fiscal decentralization. (Halepoto, 2010)
 There are dissenting voices on the effectiveness of the Eighteenth Constitutional
Amendment in resolving essential problems facing the federation. For example, it
has been argued that under Article 143, the powers of the Federal Government have
actually been increased from Concurrent List to nullify the provincial legislation in
case of dispute. It has also been argued that the amendment did not really respond
to the linguistic sensitivities of ethnicities and did not acknowledge regional
languages such as Punjabi, Pushto, Balochi, Brahviand Sikaiki as languages of
national importance30. However, there are many provisions in the current
amendment which create more space for the provincial governments. Even the
Article 172 says that mineral oil and natural gas within the Province or the territorial
waters adjacent there to shall vest jointly and equally in that Province and the
Federal Government. With the abolition of Concurrent List, the provinces have got
jurisdiction over matters such as sales tax on services, duties in respect of succession
to property, and estate duty in respect of property.
 It must be noted that there are provisions now in the constitution which create
demand for consociational regimes to protect the rights of under-represented
ethnicities in the institutions which matter in decision making. This is a time when
the following type of distribution might be looked at again and Balochis and Sindhis
are accommodated in a better way to let the federation be strengthened
b. Principle of Subsidiarity in Public Service Delivery

Principle of Subsidiarity: Concept and Criteria - AISTĖ ČEPUKAITĖ

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What is the Principle of Subsidiarity?

 Subsidiarity is a principle of social organization that holds that social and political issues
should be dealt with at the most immediate (or local) level that is consistent with their
resolution.
 Analysis of the evolution of the concept should be started from antiquity, when,
according to Aristotle (Vaišvila 2004, p. 88), subsidiarity meant the idea of prosperity for
all with an emphasis on the organic relationship between the whole and differentiated
parts within the state organization. Although this conception is rather abstract, in the
sense of the subject, the relationship here is limited to the state.
 The concept of subsidiarity in post-modern times is found in the documents of the
European Union (EU; first in Maastricht Treaty of 1992), though it was used much earlier
in informal discussions keeping with the traditions of Catholic social thought
(Dromantienė and Česnuitytė 2011, pp. 15–16). However, as the authors say, the EU
social policy, unlike countries of the Catholic tradition, distinguished the principle of
subsidiarity from the solidarity principle which refers to assistance to a person or social
groups and puts more emphasis on the fact that external intervention is only possible
when a Member State is unable to achieve certain goals and intervention actions are
subsidiary only, while decisions must be taken at the lowest level possible, as close as
possible to the citizens, in order to maintain their autonomy, that is, the goal of the
collective action is an individual; however, no collective effort should do something that
the person is capable of doing. Subsequently, the Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 (Popławska
2000, pp. 16–18). presents the principle of subsidiarity in such a way that action carried
out by the State, in comparison with the action carried out by local authorities, would be
much more beneficial because of its scale and effectiveness. Therefore, without any
exaggeration we can say that the EU Treaties recognize the legal-political principle of
subsidiarity and aim to organize the growing number of competences that are shared
between the EU, the Member States and substate levels of government and it is a
foundation block to multilevel governance on the European level (Pazos-Vidal 2019, p.
2). Despite the fact that the subsidiarity is one of the most important political principles
in the EU, there is still vital discussion at the European level on how to bridge the gap
between the ideal and the reality (Lopatka 2019).
What are the Criteria for Applying the Principles of subsidiarity?

 Analysis of the application of the principle of subsidiarity reveals a lack of criteria to
justify the transfer of government functions to a higher level. A general condition is that
such a transfer occurs when a certain function fails to be adequately performed at a
lower level. However, without knowing specific circumstances it is impossible to
determine whether the transfer of a certain function was justified. One of the most
frequently used criteria is efficiency. The Lithuanian Public Administration Law stipulates
that activities of public administration entities must be based on the principle of
subsidiarity which holds that decisions must be adopted and implemented at the most
efficient level of public administration.
 Efficiency means performance that uses the lowest amount of inputs to create the
greatest amount of outputs. It is outputs divided by inputs. If moving a function to a

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higher-level lead to a better ratio of the two, then the rule of subsidiarity comes into
effect.
 However, this is not an easy criterion to follow as it requires knowing specific numerical
values of outputs and spending on particular occasions. In addition, the efficiency
criterion is too narrow to define the rule of subsidiarity. In the division of functions, it is
also essential to ensure that the principle freedom of action is not restricted.
 Explicit criteria are needed to perform a justified evaluation of the division of functions
between central and local governments. Such criteria should help even when specific
conditions and circumstances of a situation are unknown.
 The following outlines the criteria for the division of functions between the central and
local governments following the principle of subsidiarity. The criteria include
differentiation of consumer preferences, economies of scale, competition, and
externalities. Importantly though, prior to applying these criteria, the principle of
freedom of action at a lower level should be observed. The move to a higher level
should be made only when the lower level fails to cope with its functions or when
functions are performed inefficiently
o Differentiation of Consumer Preferences: Functions are transferred to the
central level when citizens’ preferences are highly homogeneous and/or
geographically uniform.
o Economies of Scale: Functions should be transferred to the central level when
high economies of scale occur.
o Competition: Functions should be transferred to the central level when
competition between municipalities which provide certain public services are
not functional.
o Externalities: Functions should be moved to the central level when their
provision produces large spill-over effects between municipalities.

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c. Decentralization Model of Kerala

Introduction
The first
Administrative Reforms Committee of the State headed by late Shri E.M.S.
Namboodiripad recommended, way back in 1958 for a strong Local Government system
to ensure that the gains of freedom and democracy would flow to the disadvantaged,
marginalized and exploited sections of society. Yet, Kerala did not develop a strong local
government system either in the rural areas or urban areas. As happened elsewhere in
India, the State Government assured responsibilities in all the development sectors,
departments became very strong and carved out exclusive spheres for their activities
jealously ring fencing their turf. The original concept of concerted action for community
development introduced through the Block system was ignored. To complicate matters,
parastatals in the form of Boards, Corporations, Authorities, Agencies and Societies
sprung up in different areas of developmental governance. In this scenario Village
Panchayats and Urban Local Governments were pushed to the margins and naturally
atrophied.
There was a brief attempt at a comprehensive and well-structured local government

system at the district level through powerful district Councils in the early 90’s. But their

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powers were taken away within the first six months of their functioning. However, after
the passage of the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution, Kerala carried out
pioneering reforms and set out on the path of rapid and wide-ranging decentralization
The Committee on Decentralization of Powers (popularly known as Sen Committee) laid

down the key principles of devolution of functions which have been adhered to by
government in practice. The relevant portion of the recommendations are extracted
below:
Autonomy
The LSGIs should be left to function freely and independently. Government supervision
should be limited to the obligatory and regulatory functions of the LSGIs. In
developmental matters, only national and state priorities and general guidelines need be
indicated to help them take their own decisions. Of course, autonomy does not mean
sovereignty. A multilevel exercise of developmental functions implies the existence of a
sphere of independent action at each level, a sphere of cooperative and coordinated
action, a sphere of delegated agency function, and a sphere of guidance from above, in
the descending order of magnitude. Autonomy has three basic aspects:
 Functional autonomy
 Financial autonomy
 Administrative autonomy
LSGIs have to be assigned clear functional areas with the required resources, staff and
administrative infrastructure and enabled to raise resources and to take independent
decisions and implement them. Autonomy implies that various levels of LSGIs especially
the Panchayats should not be seen as hierarchically organized, with one unit controlling
the others below it. However, there is need for active co-operation, co-ordination,
complementation and integration. These could be attained by the iterative process of
consultation and the system should be so designed as to facilitate such a process.
Subsidiarity
It means what can be done best at a particular level should be done at that level and not
at a higher level. If this principle is applied, the process of transferring functions and
powers should start from the level of the Grama Sabhas and Ward Committees and go
up to the Union Government. Only residual functions need get allotted to the higher
level.
Role-Clarity
This would govern the exercise of autonomy. Decentralised development implies unity of
vision and diversity of means. This calls for a clear perception by the various levels of
their role in the developmental process so that the sub-systems can support each other
and do not work at cross-purposes. There must be clarity at the conceptual and
operational level about what each tier of local self-government can do in each area of
development. Of course, neat divisions are not possible, nor are they desirable. Yet
functional clarity should be there. Only this can facilitate proper devolution of powers,
their creative exercise and a meaningful monitoring of the whole process.

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Complementarity
This is closely related to the principle of role-clarity. While functions should not be
overlapping and repetitive, they should merge into an overall unity through a process of
horizontal integration. This would mean that the activities of higher levels should
complement those of the lower levels and the programmes implemented by all agencies
in a given LSGI would be consistent with local needs and priorities and would converge
into an integrated local plan.
Uniformity
This implies that the norms and criteria for selection of beneficiaries, sites or
prioritization of activities and pattern of assistance within a given LSGI would be the
same for all programmes implemented within its area irrespective of the agency
sponsoring such a programme.
People’s Participation:
It is necessary to involve the people fully, particularly those sections hitherto excluded
from the development process. And participation should not be limited to mere
information giving or consultation or contribution or even, seeking prior concurrence. It
should reach the level of empowering the people to take their own decisions after their
analysing their situation. Genuine participation is not the same as mobilization.
The LSGIs provide the institutional structure to facilitate participatory democracy. The
reservation of seats for women, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the various
LSGIs is meant to ensure greater participation of vulnerable sections in the process of
development. People’s participation should be there in all stages of a development
programme right from identification of a need and formulation of a scheme through its
planning, implementation, operation and maintenance as well as monitoring and
evaluation phases. The Grama Sabhas and Ward Committees are ideal vehicles for
promoting direct decision-making and mobilizing local resources in cash, kind and labour
Accountability:
The LSGIs are accountable to the people within their jurisdiction, and, in certain
respects, to the whole nation. The accountability to the people is not to be left to the
elections alone to be settled. There has to be provision for continuing social audit of the
performance of the LSGIs in the Grama Sabhas and Ward Committees as well as by
special groups. The accountability to the nation can be ensured through objective audit,
both concurrent and post-facto.
Transparency
Every decision taken has to be based on norms and criteria evolved on the basis of social
consensus and the rationale behind each decision has to be made public. There should
be freedom to the people to know every detail of how money is going to be spent,
before a scheme is taken up; and how it was spent, after its completion. The procedures
and the language of the administration need to be demystified and made people
friendly.

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Critique of the Kerala Model

Though the Kerala experience is largely portrayed as a linear experiment within the
grand narrative of progress, development and deliberative democracy,6 concerns have
simultaneously been raised as to whether KM as an economic system could be sustained
in the absence of further growth and whether it has reached its limits. It is often argued
that as a redistributive state, it is no longer sustainable unless it is capable of generating
growth and re-prioritising its social allocation patterns aiming at a disciplinary cut in
social sector expenditures, particularly on health and education, the two pillars of KM. It
is suggested that a stagnation in growth has led to a crisis in the state mandating
increased capital investment, market reforms, extension of market rationalities into
social servicesand so on. The role played by the economists in Kerala in yoking the state
to market rationality, often due to the emergent crisis, is significant; whether it was
pursued as a conscious project or was a matter of mere coincidence is something we do
not intend to address in this chapter.
While the Kerala experience has been a reasonably successful experiment, the general
academic tendency to portray it as a model worth emulating has thus turned out to be
just another regime of truth for two reasons. The model is often paraded as one which
has benefited most social sections of Kerala society in a quiet negation of the class/caste
plurality that truly exists in the state, and the larger unequal power relations that have
been reproduced over the years and reified within its sociopolitical construct. Second,
the real truth about the various social sections remains camouflaged by official
discourse, and the complacency generated by this regime of truth forecloses all
possibilities of a counter-discourse, thus lending ever greater power to this regime. The
Kerala Model as taught, explained and researched, remains trapped within the recycled
paradigm of progress and development for all, an equation first highlighted by the
United Nations in the mid-1970s. However, the dominant narrative, which has often
assumed the status of an economic variant of orientalism, has also been critiqued
sporadically from varying standpoints, broadly, from the point of view of a prolonged
exposure to the neo-colonial world economy, the growth of a speculative economy and
surplus drain, the plight of the outliers and depressed castes and the failure of policies
and planning (see Rammohan and Raman 1990; Rammohan 1991, 2000; Kunhaman
1994; Kurien 1995; Omvedt 1998; Tharamangalam 1998, 2006; Bijoy and Raman 2003;
Sreekumar and Sanjeev 2003; Sreekumar and Parayil 2006; Jacob and Bandhu 2009;
Raman 2009).
Subsequent exploration of this sanctified model has failed to generate any critical
understanding of the other side of the Kerala experience as enjoyed by its communities
and its people in general. The dominant discourse on KM continues to miss the major
concerns of the minorities and the marginalised; and through this silence, the unheard
and the unsaid is further marginalised, in terms of both material and non-material
concerns. Moreover, it fails to address the three major challenges that the state faces –
the widening inequality among social sections, an increasing asymmetry of power
relations with respect to its historically evolved marginalised communities, and the
challenges (and the possibilities) they encounter in this contemporary era of

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globalisation. There is hardly any discussion on how people, as distinct and collective
identities, experience their daily lives, and how they negotiate and engage with the
structure authorities – the state, the local hegemonic social classes and global capital.
Moreover, the status of women remains unaddressed, particularly their subordination in
terms of work participation, gender equality, freedom of expression and so on – all in
turn rendering them victims of unequal power relations.
While affirming that reforms create and have created economic opportunities, one
cannot ignore the fact that growing unemployment, inequalities in income and land
distribution, commercialisation of education, the reversals in health status indicators,
the frequent visitations of vector-borne diseases, ecological hazards and so on have
adversely affected the positive aspects of the Kerala ‘Model’
The data clearly indicates the existence of wide disparities among social groups and the
development attainments of the Muslims in the state are only marginally above those of
the most deprived section in the Indian social hierarchy – the scheduled castes and the
scheduled tribes – but significantly below those of other caste/religious groups and the
much-heralded state averages
Notwithstanding resistance, the state moves towards market-driven reforms wherein

external funds are privileged over internal resources, the reasons for which are probed
within the context of social structures of accumulation and emergent power relations. It
is argued that with the diversion of resources towards debt servicing and compliance
with policy conditionalities, the collaboration with the ADB is likely to undermine social
democracy. What ensues is a double collapse: a collapse of the Kerala Model of social
development and the demise of an iconized Left
Kerala Model application in Pakistan
Role of Citizens in Governance

 The term citizen has an inherently political meaning that implies a certain type of
relationship between the people and government. Citizens have a set of rights and
responsibilities, including the right to participate in decisions that affect public
welfare. In addition to the intrinsic democratic value, participation is an instrumental
driver of democratic and socio-economic change, and a fundamental way to
empower citizens. Emphasizing locally-led, issue-driven approaches, NDI programs
focus on citizens organizing around their interests and taking actions throughout the
political cycle to open, access and occupy political space. We recognize that citizen-
centered activism – driven by real community needs and desires – is a powerful
transformative force.
 Civil society organizations (CSOs) are a vehicle through which citizens can aggregate
their interests, voice their preference and exercise the power necessary to affect
sustained change. However, this requires CSOs learning to work together and to play
a variety of complementary political roles that include: acting as watchdogs;
advocates; mobilizers; educators; researchers; infomediaries; and policy analysts.

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Through technical and financial assistance, NDI has supported the efforts of more
than 15,000 civic groups across the globe.
 Citizen participation is a key element of a good governance system. It provides
private individuals and groups the opportunity to inform, influence, monitor and
evaluate public decisions, processes, and actions.
 In many countries, there is a growing movement in public administration and
political science calling for a new mode of governance that brings governments and
citizens together for public policymaking in order to address the democratic deficits
and the growing citizenship.
 Earlier on, the only way that the public would participate in policy decisions was
during the elections where they would vote for their political leaders. After that
decision-making was left for the elected politicians not withstanding that they
channeled their policy efforts to what they deemed important but not what the
public deems importance. Citizen participation, however, eliminates the probability
of political leaders making the wrong decisions for the community they serve since it
ensures that the citizens are in the middle of the decision making process. Citizen
participation in the modern age relates to improved democracy, more accountability
for public offices and better decision-making process
 Citizen participation in formulating policies ensures that the policies are grounded
on citizens preferences and that citizens understand the tough decisions that the
government has to make for the public good (Fagence, 2014). Thus, citizen
participation eliminates issues of citizen objection to the different policies since they
are associated with the policies and know exactly what the policies are meant to
achieve. Arguments against citizen participation argue that democratic theories are
not comprehensive in establishing who, where and how the participation should be.
Additionally, the opponents establish between democracy and citizen participation
contesting the democratic threshold occupied by participation (Haruta, 2010).
 The growing development for the government to draw in with residents and civil
society is also being impelled by arising proof that resident commitment improves
development outcomes, reduces poverty, and encourages peace by promoting social
inclusion. The rapid ascent in availability or connectivity, 24/7 instant
communications, and online media likewise empowers governments to connect all
the more broadly with residents. Citizens and governments around the globe are
progressively concerned with, and ready to go up against poor governance and
corruption. Citizen and civil society engagement to demand and promote good
governance can improve by and large the viability of Good Governance and
anticorruption programs.
 Many people feel a sense of commitment to their neighbourhood and are actively
involved in activities to improve the quality of life there. This is called ‘citizen
participation’. For example, local residents engage in voluntary work, organise litter-
clearing campaigns, set up collectives to purchase solar panels or form local care
cooperatives. They may also be involved in the decision-making about the municipal
budget.

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Citizen Participation in Good Governance of Pakistan

Citizen Engagement in Pakistan – DFID Final Report, Oct 2019
DFID uses the term ‘citizen engagement’ to mean mechanisms for voice and
accountability; those that lead to public-involving, citizen-centered collaborative public
management. From the literature review conducted for this assignment, it is apparent
that a multiplicity of terms and concepts apply to the broad umbrella of ‘citizen
engagement’, including social accountability mechanisms, social movements,
‘participation’, and public consultation. It can include the take-up of social benefits or
social protection mechanisms as well as engagement in political processes (such as
elections). A useful definition is ‘the processes by which public concerns, needs and
values are incorporated into decision-making’.
Citizen engagement within DFID’s nomenclature can be direct (people’s immediate

engagement) or indirect (through representatives or representative organisations
(intermediaries). The global evidence and that from Pakistan indicates that it is deeply
contextual – informed by social and cultural norms, political structures, local, national
and regional events, demographic factors and history.
Mandated Engagement This refers to mechanisms that are set up by government to

elicit citizen engagement. This can either be a specific mechanism or institution that is
dedicated to citizen engagement (such as an Ombudsperson office) or a mechanism by
which government invites citizens to engage in the course of developing policy or
practice, such as a consultation period in the course of legislative review or a plebiscite.
Non-Mandated Engagement This is often called ‘informal’ or ‘non-invited’ engagement,

whereby citizens engage or collaborate with state actors, political actors and civil society
to influence decision-making of state institutions. For this document, the term
‘nonmandated’ is preferred as these mechanisms can be more formal than the term
‘informal’ reflects.
Non-mandated engagement refers to a variety of means by which citizens engage or

attempt to engage with policy makers, legislature or service providers. It can include
citizen activism such as petitions, demonstrations or lobbying through social or
traditional media. It can also include engagement through intermediaries such as civil
society organisations and it can include citizen engagement through non-governmental
governance structures such as traditional, tribal or religious institutions (such as jirga).
There can be some overlap between mandated and non-mandated engagement. For
instance, a social movement can use both mandated (such as a public consultation) and
non-mandated (media exposure) means to achieve a change in policy; or a non-
mandated activity may lead to a mandated mechanism (such as where an on-line
petition gets taken up by parliamentarians). In Pakistan, a jirga can be adopted by
government as a means of communicating with communities.
Key Findings of DFID Report on Citizen Engagement in Pakistan

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 Mandated mechanisms for CE in Pakistan are mostly for citizens to make complaints
about service-delivery. There is little by way of mandated avenues for consultation,
co-design or accountability for policy, budgeting or planning.
 Those most marginalised - who stand to gain most from CE – are least likely to have
access and face the greatest barriers to engagement with the state, through
mandated or non-mandated mechanisms.
 The most significant barrier to CE across both provinces is a ‘trust deficit’ whereby
citizens (particularly marginalised groups) have little faith that the state is interested
in their views or experiences and does not consider itself accountable to citizens. »
 Digital mechanisms for CE, while demonstrating government commitment to
hearing from citizens about service delivery, risk amplifying inequalities, gaps in
service delivery and the trust deficit. Women, the very poor, rural populations and
people with disabilities (PWD) are particularly excluded from digital CE mechanisms.
 In a time of political change, economic constraint, shrinking space for civil society
and urbanisation, CE is all the more important yet less likely to be prioritised by
government institutions struggling under a series of burdens.
 CE in the newly-merged districts (NMDs) in KP pose a particular challenge as most
citizens more used to relying on traditional structures.
 Non-mandated mechanisms face a challenge of sustainability. Tending to be
‘projectised’ and lacking self-sustaining means, civil society organisations (CSOs) face
constraints in identifying entry points for CE that result in sustained change. »
 There is a dearth of provision or even attention to the safeguarding issues that can
prevent effective (or any) citizen engagement. The literature, also, is largely silent on
this issue, while both civil society and government are yet to address these
concerns.
Good Governance in Islam

a. Quranic Guidance on Good Governance
Introduction
 Good governance in the Qur’an embodied in the form of ra ḥmah and amānah to
achieve the good and happiness of living in the present and the future. In the
Qur'an, good governance is based on the faith (īmān). Īmān will make people
feel safe because of doing what has become obligations and they will be asked
for it. Īmān is used to reveal two things in the Qur’an. First, īmān used for the
name for a set of rules that must be obeyed and implemented by people.
Second, īmān used for the submission of the soul for truth (al- ḥaqq) with
authentication (taṣdīq) through the heart, speech and action
 Rahman (1980) explains that the main purpose of the Qur’an is a social order
that can run on the earth based on fairness and ethics. Goodness in this world is
in the form of health, safety, adequacy, good son, faithful partner, and the
toughness of competition. To achieve this goodness, people have to effort and
struggle to seek allowed and good livelihood (rizq ḥalāl ṭayyibah) and also has
good characters (akhlāq karīmah). Goodness in the hereafter is away from
insurgence (ma‘ṣiyat) and cause that leads to punishment. This goodness can

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only be achieved by faith (īmān) and good action. Goodness in the hereafter is
reward and survived punishment (AlZuhaylī, 1418 H). This is not only for
themselves, but also to parents, families, communities and countries. One also
must fulfill obligations to those who have helped him (4:85). It creates a cycle of
goodness from themselves to others, and from others to themselves (Khan,
2000).
 Explanation of good governance in the Qur’an begins with explaining human
nature. They are created in different and pairs (49:13). In obeying the rule, some
have faith (īmān) and some have not (2:253; 4:55). Those who believe will obey
every rule and leave the ban on the basis of trust, loyalty and full commitment
to the rule. While they are hypocritical and do not believe, they will run and not
adhere to the rules. Obeying the rules are not easy, but it requires a deep heart
and full commitment. Obedience is a sure sign of faith. Therefore, the concept of
salvation lies in obedience itself (Yahya, 2002).
Transparency in light of Quranic Teachings

Transparency is needed in the context of global change due to the need to
create trust for broad cultural and geographical distance. For example business
needs valid information about the market, the opportunities and the risks,
political relations requires investigation of valid information about the objectives
and strategies across countries, the protection of public health requires global
information sources to determine the possible outbreak, global institutions like
the United Nations and World Bank began to familiarize openness (Holzner and
Holzner, 206).
Transparency is an effort to attain goodness and improvement. Goodness in the

Qur'an revealed with iḥsān that always associated with ḥasanah, namely
everything that is considered blessing and mercy obtained in the form of the
soul, the body and the situation of people. Goodness includes rational, empirical
and desire. Iḥsān is divided into two tipes, the first is giving pleasure or kindness
to others and the second is to be kind and good to himself. Therefore, people
who do well to others, they also indirectly do well to themselves (17:7).
Likewise, everything that exists in this world is basically created in goodness
(32:7) and all designed to goodness (16:90).
In the economic field for example, the Qur'an has implemented the importance
of accounting and justice (2:282). However, the position of i ḥsān is above fair
(‘adl) because is fair should give what has to become while i ḥsān is providing
more and better. Fair is an obligation (wājib) that had to be done, while i ḥsān is
an option (sunnah) and not everyone can do it (Al-A ṣfihānī, 1412 H). People who
have nature of iḥsān will always give good service to everyone, not only in terms
of information, but also the responsibility for all activities done. In addition, they
also are friendly and always smiling to those who want the disclosure of
information about policy, its implementation, results and responsibilities. This
process is not only done on the principle of fair (what has to become), but also
providing more and better than what everybody wants. In the face of global

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change, a person or the government must know how the position before and
after to improve and make better country and governance. So in this case, the
transparency of information taken not just errors description or shortcomings of
the past, but also to fix it for the good of the future (2:178; 4:125; 41:34).
Iḥsān includes three fundamental aspects. The first is worship (‘ubūdiyyah).

People are obliged to do iḥsān in worship, by performing all kinds of worship,
such as prayer, fasting, pilgrimage, and by the right way, such as perfect
conditions, pillars, sunnah, and ethics (5:93). It will not likely be able to be done
by a servants, unless the current implementation of the rituals they met with a
very strong taste also with full awareness that God constantly monitor, control
and see them. So that they feel always seen and observed by Him (9:16, 47:19,
35; 49:18). At least, the servants feel that God always monitor, control and see
them and with this they can perform the rituals properly and perfectly, so that
the results of such worship will be as expected (al-Bukhārī, 2001). Other
worships are respecting to believers, educating children, the intention for every
permissible to gain the riḍā of Allah, fighting corruption, public training on the
concept of good governance and so on. Therefore, the Messenger of Allah
(pbuh) always wanted his ummah in such circumstances, namely being aware to
realize iḥsān in worship. The second is mu‘āmalah. In mu‘āmalah, i ḥsān
explained by God’s saying:
Worship Allah and join none with Him (in worship); and do good to parents,
kinsfolk, orphans, al-masākīn (the needy), the neighbour who is near of kin, the
neighbour who is a stranger, the companion by your side, the wayfarer (you
meet), and those (slaves) whom your right hands possess. Verily, Allah does not
like such as are proud and boastful. (2:36)
The last is akhlāq. Iḥsān in akhlāq is the fruit of worship and mu‘āmalah (33:21;
60:4, 6). Servants will reach the level of iḥsān if they do worship as the
expectations of the Prophet, which is to worship Allah as if theysee Him, and if
they cannot see Him, Allah always sees us (al-Bukhari, 2001). If we want to see
the value of iḥsān in a person, we will find it mu‘āmalah life. How people do
good mu‘āmalah with human beings, environments, works, families, and even to
itself, as done by the Prophet (68:4) is sure sign of i ḥsān.
Transparency based on iḥsān is not done just to get a loan from another
institution or want to be respected by other countries, but purely for the good
of the country itself. If a country do well action, automatically donors will come
without any invitation. Transparency should be carried out by government or
people as if they are being monitored by someone else. If they are not being
watched by others, then surely other people are always watching them.
Therefore, good action and doing well is the foundation that must be done in
transparency.

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Accountability in light of Quranic Teachings

Accountability is the evaluation of implementation or performance process of
the organization to be accountable and responsible as well as feedback for the
leadership of the organization. It is hoped to improve the performance of the
organization in the future. The concept of accountability is distinguished into
three kinds, namely accountability, responsibility and responsiveness.
Accountability is a concept relating to external standards that determine the
truth of an action by the state administration or public bureaucracy.
Accountability assessed by outside persons or institutions. Therefore,
accountability is often referred to objective responsibility (Gaventa & McGee,
2013). Public bureaucracy called accountable when they assessed objectively by
the public and they can be held accountable for all actions, attitudes, and
behaviors to the people where power and authority given. Objective
responsibility is from external control that encourage or motivate government to
work hard so that the purpose of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the
organization can be achieved (CUI-ITB, 2004).
In the Qur'an, accountability relates to taqwā which is an indicator of people in

the account for what they had done. Etymologically, taqwā is means avoiding
anything from something to something else. The wiqāyah means making or
using something to avoid something. Meaning of ittaqi Allāh is making avoiding
between you and God (al-Qazwini, 1979).
According to al-Aṣfihānī (1412 H), waqā wiqāyah is protecting something from

everything that can hurt and harm. Taqwā is made in avoiding anything feared
(min mā yukhāf), and then al-khawf is often called taqwā and taqwā called
khawf. Later, in the definition of the Sharia, taqwā is to protect self from
something that could lead to sin by leaving forbidden things (al-ma ḥẓūr).
According to Rashid Rida, taqwā is to make protection between us and the anger
of God to avoid the causes of disappointing or degrading self in the world and
torture in the hereafter (al-Husayni, 1990).
Quraish Shihab (1996) defines the terms of taqwā as avoid, namely avoiding
from the punishment of God, both in this world and in the hereafter.
Punishment of God in the world is the result of a violation of the laws of God
that is applicable this world (based on causality law), while punishment in the
hereafter is due to a violation of the laws of Sharia. The law of God in the world
in food for example is who eats dirty or bad food will suffer pain. Results of this
violation are God’s punishment. Then the command of taqwā in the context of
food in this world is demanding that any food that ingested does not result in
disease or in other words to provide security for the eaters, and also must be do
not violate laws of Sharia in the hereafter.
The principle of taqwā is someone will be accounted and asked for all of the
activities that he did, whether it an obligation or an option. By taqwā, person
will avoid the consequences of punishment both in the present and future. The

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consequences of the rule are due to a mechanisms and procedures of violation

that have been determined. Thus, taqwā itself will keep a person’s behavior to
restrain himself for any restrictions that may harm himself or an institution.
Therefore, indirectly, man will do good things for the good of themselves and
the institution in the future. Taqwā process is not necessarily the joint
evaluation, but oneself is enough to carry out the evaluation. Taqwā is started
with the principle of tawbah (2:160; 4:17, 146; 5:39).
Taqwa is synonymous with obedience to Allah, the Messenger and government

(4:59). Obedience is not to say there is no protest or rebellion. When there are
no good rules, such as corruption, political conflict, absence of accountability of
the state, absence rule of law, moral degradation or state relations which are out
of control, then there should be resistance to existing law. This is reflected in the
Qur’an 30:41-42; 2:11, 27, 205; 8:64; 7:56, 85; 11:116; 12:73; 13:25; 16:88;
17:48; 26:152; 28:77 (Rahman, 1980).
Conclusion
Transparency and accountability have a very important role in building good
governance. Transparency provides information disclosure and policies
implemented by the government or other institutions. Accountability is the
responsibility and the consequences of what has become the decisions and
policies. With these two things, all the rules and policies can be monitored,
controlled and held to account so that creates good governance.
Concept of iḥsān shows that the behavior will always be transparent and well.
One will always be consistent with what they did, whether requested or not. It’s
equivalent with the concept of transparency. Whereas being able to exercise and
control selfness because of the consequences of what had done and paying
attention to what has been and will be done represented by concept of taqwā.
It’s also same with the concept of accountability. Concepts of i ḥsān and taqwā
must be based on īmān that will determine all human actions and can determine
human deeds and actions. When a person is convinced that all the rules and
policies made is for the good of themselves and others, then he will immediately
implement them. While those who do not have īmān will only see, even against
the rules.
Īmān is supported by iḥsān which people are not just doing a regulatory rules
and policies, but he did more than that. They will obey and implement the rules
made well and kindly so that can provide benefits to others. They will do it even
if no one asks, controls or monitors. They serve people in need with friendly and
politely. Īmān is also strengthened by taqwā where people will avoid things that
harm others, in addition to implement and obey with the rules. With taqwā,
people would keep him from doing bans and they are ready with all the
consequences for their actions.

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b. Concept of Governance and its application considering

Quran; Sunnah and Fiqh.
 The Ruler is vicegerent of Allah and is afforded this responsibility on behalf of the
people. This allows the ruler to be kept under control. The Holy Quran says:
“These are the limits set by Allah, so do not go near them” – Al Baqarah: 187
 The Ruler is made doubly responsible, both to Allah in the after life and to people on
earth in this life.
 Relationship of ruler with subjects is threefold.
1. He acts as an agent for his subjects in dealing with other nations.
2. He acts as the guardian, protector of rights, interests and well being of his
people.
3. He also acts as partner in times of strife and happiness with his people.
c. Good Governance in Islam – Dawn Article

However, we have a shining example when the Holy Prophet (PBUH) became head of the
state of Madina and exemplified good governance. He created a bond of brotherhood
among the Muslim citizens, concluded agreements with non-Muslims and remained
concerned about their welfare. He upheld the Islamic value system in which justice
remains central. He declared that all humans are the offspring of Adam and that there is
no difference between Arab and non-Arab (Ajam).
Islam is a religion which guides us in all aspects of human life. Our value system
originates mainly from the Holy Quran and our progress is forever dependent on its
application. We find a number of Quranic injunctions considered to contain the
essentials of good governance.
First is the concept of amanah (trust). Allah says that to Him belongs whatever is in the
heavens and whatever is on earth.
Every human being is a trustee on earth. All his possessions, including health, wealth,
livelihood, power and status belong to Allah. One who performs his or her duties
honestly and diligently is upholding his amanah.
Allah enjoins believers to “…Betray not Allah and His Messenger, nor betray knowingly
your amanah [things entrusted to you and all the duties which Allah has ordained for
you]” (8:27). In the light of this concept, no one in authority is absolute; one has to
remain answerable to his conscience.
Another important principle of good governance is that the ruler must be sincere and of
impeccable character. He must consider himself not a ruler but a servant. Similarly, he
should be mindful of his every act, that it should not harm his subjects. Those who
transgress their limits are the most disgraceful, and the Quran refers to them as
zalimoon.
Merit is also one of the important principles of good governance, whereby all
appointments in state and non-state organisations are made on the basis of

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competence. Every human is born with certain inherent competencies and those who
actualise their competencies with hard work, integrity and honesty get a premium.
Nature rewards them for being active and hardworking. The Quran says “And that man
can have nothing but what he does” (53:39). In meritocratic societies people upgrade
themselves professionally and grow economically due to their performance,
competence and ability.
Islam encourages Muslims to acquire knowledge and occupy the best position in their
societies. We read the life story of Hazrat Yousuf who was in captivity but was called to
head the food ministry because of his high degree of competence and knowledge. He
was thus able to prevent the impending famine.
Here knowledge became fundamental in governance. Many Western societies are ahead
of us because of knowledge and it is the demand of the present time that our
parliament and all lawmaking and law-enforcing bodies be occupied by knowledgeable
people.
Similarly, the concept of taqwa is also closely linked to good governance. It is an all-
inclusive concept which says that every believer should be mindful of Allah’s
omnipresence and be aware of accountability. We live in the constant presence of Allah.
No act goes unrecorded and no one escapes the accountability of his or her doings. If a
public servant develops such a sense of Allah’s presence in his mind and heart, it would
result in peace and well-being in society.
The absence of taqwa in any society often leads towards unethical practices. For
example, our present-day society is in the grip of widespread corruption. This is the
result of poor governance over the years.
When a politician submits a fake degree to stand in elections, when a police party kills a
person in a fake encounter, when a businessman evades taxes, when a builder uses
outdated material, when a teacher skimps on class work in order to sell his time
privately and when a doctor recommends a drug to gain commission from a
pharmaceutical firm then the concept of taqwa is grossly violated. The foundations of
society are undermined and the nation’s future is ruined.
Many think they will escape judgement but the Quran says “And We have fastened every
man’s deeds to his neck and on the Day of Resurrection We shall bring out for him a
book which he will find wide open” (17:13).

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Governance and Public Policy Notes

Central Superior Services (National University of Sciences and Technology)

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Governance and Public Policy

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founded on federalist principles, with substantial powers to enact laws

c. Definition of Good Governance

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unescap.org/resources/what-good-governance – UNESCAP Document on What is

d. Characteristics of Good Governance:

ii. Rule of law,

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v. Equity and Inclusiveness

vi. Effectiveness and Efficiency

viii. Strategic Vision and Consensus Oriented

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 Good governance mediates differing interests to reach a broad

e. Collapse/Failure of Governance: its indicators diagnostic

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The project has generated data on aggregate and individual governance

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necessary for human flourishing. Opponents of libertarianism often refer to

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g. Rational Choice Theory

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 Typically, regulation theorists locate the new governance in relation to a broader

Governance Indicators laid by World

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Wilson Center Document on Good Governance and Institutions in

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a. Voice and Accountability

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d. Regulatory Authorities & their Quality

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Mega corruption scandals of mind-boggling proportions regularly surface, often

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bourgeoisie as well as elements in the military and bureaucratic establishment who

Public Policy and Planning Institutions and their role in

 Shortage of trained staff,

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 Rapid industrialization in the country,

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 Maintenance of fiscal deficit at a sustainable level,

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b. Institutional Framework for Policy Coordination and

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The Cabinet and the Parliament

Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) of the Cabinet

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Annual Plan Coordination Committee (APCC)

Appraisal and Approval of Schemes

Central Development Working Party (CDWP): Development projects costing between