ISSN 1019-3316, Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2018, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 254–271.

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2018.

Original Russian Text © A.A. Sarkisov, V.L. Vysotskii, 2018, published in Vestnik Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, 2018, Vol. 88, No. 7, pp. 599–618.

Environmental Problems

The Nuclear Accident Aboard a Nuclear Submarine in Chazhma Bay:

Event Reconstruction and Analysis of the Consequences
A. A. Sarkisova, * and V. L. Vysotskiia, **, #
aNuclear Safety Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences,
Moscow, Russia
*e-mail: sarkisov@ibrae.ac.ru
**e-mail: vvl@ibrae.ac.ru
Received February 7, 2018

Abstract—The authors analyzed events related to the largest nuclear accident in the history of the Soviet
Navy, which occurred on the nuclear submarine K-431 on August 10, 1985, during scheduled operations at a
dockyard in Chazhma Bay near Vladivostok. For reasons of security, the aftermath of these events remained
unknown to a wide circle of specialists and public for over 30 years, prompting ambiguous interpretations and
conjectures. This article describes the findings, including the collection, generalization, and systematization
of surviving incomplete and limited data; numerical and model calculations; and the analysis of the accident’s
causes and development. The radioactive and radioecological consequences, rehabilitation measures, and the
disposal of the formed radioactive waste and the damaged nuclear submarine are considered. The conse-
quences of the radioactive release into the Sea of Japan, the cloud traveling to the north along the Russian–
Chinese border, and the transborder transfer of radioactive substances for the populations of the neighboring
countries are evaluated for the first time.

Keywords: nuclear submarine, nuclear reactor, reactor core, runaway self-sustaining chain reaction (SSCR),
nuclear accident, thermal explosion, radioactive substances, contamination, trace, radiation exposure dose,
environment
DOI: 10.1134/S1019331618040068

Background of the domestic nuclear fleet. The cre-
ation of the domestic nuclear submarine fleet, nuclear
cruisers, and the world’s only powerful nuclear ice-
breaker fleet became possible thanks to the high
potential of fundamental science reached in the Soviet
Union. The implementation of these large-scale proj-
ects required the concentration of the latest scientific
achievements in various fields of knowledge, as well as
productive and human resources. It was possible to
change cardinally the face of the fleet and improve its
combat capabilities thanks to the development of a
large independent direction of the domestic nuclear
industry—marine nuclear power engineering [1].
For the record, the first nuclear-powered subma-
rine (NPS) was built in the United States. It was
launched in January 1954, but work to create it had
begun in December 1945, i.e., soon after the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The first Amer-
ican NPSs used pressurized-water (PW) and liquid
# Academician of RAS Ashot Arakelovich Sarkisov is a RAS Adviser.
Valentin Leonidovich Vysotskii, Dr. Sci. (Eng.), is a Laboratory
Head at the Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of
Sciences (IBRAE RAN).
metal–cooled (LMC) reactors as nuclear power
installations (NPIs).
The lag of the Soviet Union in this sphere was
explained by the fact that, right after the end of the
Great Patriotic War, our country had to focus its
efforts on the creation of atomic weapons in the con-
ditions of new external threats and owing to limited
economic capabilities. Nevertheless, the first Soviet
NPS Leninskii Komsomol was built just four years after
the creation of the first American NPS (it was named
in memory of the cognominal diesel submarine M-106
of the Northern Fleet lost on a combat trip in 1943).
This boat had 30 years of combat naval service, and
during its long operation, it was possible to identify
many design drawbacks and accumulate valuable
operational experience that helped improve the
domestic submarine fleet. In 1997, NPS Leninskii
Komsomol, considering its technical condition, was
decommissioned and later turned into a museum.
The 1958 launch of the first domestic NPS sym-
bolized not just the next stage in submarine fleet
development. This event was a revolutionary leap that
changed qualitatively the face of our Navy and its
combat capabilities. It is necessary to stress that ship-
board nuclear power engineering and nuclear subma-

254
 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY
rines in general are our true national treasure. While
the developers of nuclear weapons had the opportu-
nity to draw upon intelligence information, in creating
shipboard nuclear power supply installations, scien-
tists and designers worked totally autonomously.
A very special role in NPS NPI design belongs to
the prewar advanced school of Soviet scientists and
personally to Academician A.P. Aleksandrov, who is
justly called the father of shipboard nuclear power
engineering. Many decisions that underlay the cre-
ation of the first NPS appear trivial from today’s per-
spective; however, at the time when they were made,
the developers faced serious difficulties because of the
insufficient scientific basis and shortage of informa-
tion. In particular, at the very beginning of the work,
everybody was concerned with the uncertainty about
the behavior of the liquid-filled reactor core under
swinging, lurches, and trim differences. Inevitable
dynamic reactions and flywheel effects could disturb
not only the smooth motion of the coolant but also the
neutron balance of the core.
True, after analysis and calculations, it became
clear that the concerns were exaggerated. Inertia
forces, which arise in swinging conditions, are so small
compared to the total rest masses that there are no rea-
sons to dread them. As a result, Aleksandrov et al.
came to the final conclusion that the reactor should
have a water moderator and a fast-thermal neutron
spectrum, and light water should be used as a coolant
under a pressure that would ensure the necessary sup-
ply before boiling. Note that power reactors of this
type had not been built in our country; therefore, the
task that lay ahead was really pioneering. As for the
nuclear power plant in general, from the very begin-
ning, the developers chose the traditional boiler-and-
turbine scheme, producing steam in the steam gener-
ator, heated by the water of the primary circuit.
With all the external similarity of traditional steam
power plants and shipboard NPIs (in both cases, there
is a heat source, a steam generator, pumps, separators,
condensers, a turbine, etc.), there is a fundamental
difference in the nature of the heat source itself. The
use of the nuclear reactor as such entailed the need to
study new regularities of heat exchange and hydrody-
namics in it. Despite the fact that water as a coolant
had long been used in boilers, nuclear energetics
involved new technological requirements and regular-
ities of water behavior in high radiation fields, consid-
ering in addition the properties of canning materials
not used previously and the features of forced heat
flows in a water-conveyance system of a new shape.
The problem of heat transfer from the fuel rods to the
coolant required the development of studies on heat
transfer crises in slot-type channels of complex
shapes, definition of heat transfer coefficients for new
geometries and profiles, and the creation and study of
the role of various heat transfer intensifiers.
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
255
The one-dimensional and averaged approaches
previously used in hydrodynamics, when only static
pressure drops in water-conveyance system sections
and average cross-section velocities were determined
for heat-exchange apparatuses, turned out to be insuf-
ficient. The necessity arose to develop experimental
methods to study current speeds, picking up pulsation
components; identifying pulsation sources and spec-
tra, as well as vortex structures; optimizing pulsation-
flow modeling; and developing 3-D flow calculation
methods.
The formation of a vortex-free water-conveyance
system with mandatory leveling of the pressure field in
heat and outlet collectors became topical. All these
scientific problems were solved within 10−12 years by
the creative teams of the Institute of Physics and
Power Engineering, the Central Boiler and Turbine
Institute, the Research and Design Institute of Energy
Technologies, and other institutions.
Large-scale theoretical and experimental work
resulted in the creation in 1956 of a basic small-scale,
highly stressed, and highly maneuverable NPI with
two water-cooled and water-moderated (WWR) reac-
tors that met the specific requirements for submarine
use.
Simultaneously with NPI work, exploratory
research was done to improve the traveling speed of
submarines. This problem was studied at leading
hydrodynamic research institutions, but especially
actively at the Institute of Hydrodynamics of the Sibe-
rian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences under
the supervision of Academician M.A. Lavrent’ev.
Research into the boundary layer resulted in methods
to optimize the geometric shape of a streamlined body
and principles affecting the boundary layer to reduce
resistance of motion. Many of these works were pio-
neering, and some of their practical applications had
no analogs in the world practice in those years.
Our atomic submarines of the first generations
compared favorably with the pivotal performance data
of that time, such as speed, the depth of submersion,
the mix and performance of armaments, and surviv-
ability. However, unfortunately, they had a high noise
level, which reduced their acoustic stealth. Therefore,
the task of improving the acoustic performance of
domestic NPSs became particularly urgent. This
turned out to be extremely difficult, as was the devel-
opment of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) detection
equipment, and required broad fundamental and applied
studies. As a result, submarines were silenced by 1.5 times
on average, and noise pressure was decreased by more
than four times over 30 years, from 1970 to 2000.
Speaking about the role of science in creating the
domestic nuclear submarine fleet, we note the great
role of academic research councils as coordinators of
fundamental and applied research. For example, the
leading one was the Research Council on the Complex
Problem of Hydrophysics, established in 1967 and
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
256 SARKISOV, VYSOTSKII
headed by Academician B.P. Konstantinov and then
from 1970, by Academician Aleksandrov for 23 years.
The competences of the council included a wide range
of issues, but the main point for many years had been
the stealthiness and the design of ASW detection
equipment for the potential adversary. The Research
Council on Hydrophysics coordinated extremely effi-
ciently all work in this sphere in the country.
Many urgent naval problems were dealt with by the
Research Council on Hydrodynamics Problems
established in 1960. Its first chairman was Academi-
cian Lavrent’ev. The Research Council on Deep-
Water Submarines Comms Located in Combat
Patrolling Areas was established in the late 1970s. Its
chairman Academician V.A. Kotel’nikov played a
great role in the organization and activity of the coun-
cil. The Research Council on Applied Problems under
the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences,
established in 1967 and headed by Academician
V.M. Glushkov, a famous specialist in mathematics
and cybernetics, dealt with the use of computers and
mathematical methods, including those for the benefit
of the Navy.
A high integration of science and shipbuilding
came out during the creation of the Project 705
(α class) submarines with intermediate-spectrum
nuclear reactors, cooled by a lead–bismuth coolant.
The mixed feelings toward this project on behalf of the
Navy commanders and several specialists were well
known. It was due to the need to create a separate
expensive coastal infrastructure for the technical
maintenance of these submarines. It may be said with-
out exaggeration that the implementation of this proj-
ect in the early 1970s became a unique scientific and
technological breakthrough, outrunning the existent
level by several decades. Considering the principal
novelty of the power installation and the first-used all-
round automation system, this project could only have
been implemented widely using the latest achieve-
ments of science and technology.
Perhaps, it was the only case in our country when
four academicians, the leading specialists in their
respective fields, at one time were scientific supervi-
sors of the submarine design. First, let us recall
A.P. Aleksandrov, who supervised the work in general.
The nuclear power installation was the responsibility
of Academician of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences
A.I. Leipunskii; the creation of automatic control sys-
tems was supervised by Academician V.A. Trapez-
nikov; and the electrical equipment, by Academician
of the Armenian Academy of Sciences A.G. Iosif’yan.
Had it not been for the difficult economic situa-
tion, the new direction using a liquid-metal coolant in
the submarine fleet could have been eliminated from
the drawbacks typical for any initial period in the
development of original projects, and it could have
become an equal alternative in the development of
domestic NPSs.
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
In subsequent years, nuclear submarines were con-
structed at four shipyards at steadily increasing rates. It
is significant that, by the end of the 1980s, the number
of Soviet nuclear submarines (248) exceeded the total
number of launched NPSs of all other countries put
together, and the capacity of the power reactors of all
domestic nuclear combat ships and civilian vessels was
comparable to the total capacity of the nuclear power
plants built in the Soviet Union. Each new NPS gen-
eration reached a new level in submarine building.
Returning to the early domestic designs, note that
the first-generation NPSs were supplied with NPIs
with two VM-A-type WWRs with a 70-MW thermal
capacity each (the 1985 nuclear accident in Chazhma
Bay occurred on a first-generation Project 675 NPS
with a VM-A reactor).
The intensive use of the atomic fleet necessitated
the creation of a powerful service infrastructure and
sharply increased requirements on NPI operation cul-
ture. Considering number of accidents typical for the
nonatomic fleet, such as fires, explosions, floods, col-
lisions, strandings, etc., the accident rate of atomic
ships did not fall outside the average statistical level. A
special place among the accidents belongs to nuclear
accidents and those related to the loss of circuit tight-
ness. Their prevention on the atomic fleet has always
been a priority of the highest level due to potential
heavy consequences associated with the hazard of
radionuclide release into the submarine volume and
further, into the environment.
The intention to minimize the gap with the United
States during NPI and first-generation NPS reactor
designs sometimes entailed nonoptimal design solu-
tions and technological errors. For these reasons, NPS
operation was often accompanied by small but fre-
quent local hazardous radiation accidents associated
with losses of the coolant of the primary circuit and
steam generators. A significant fact is that almost all
large accidents with unfavorable radiological and radi-
oecological consequences happened with the first-
generation NPSs (K-19 of Project 658, 1961; K-11 of
Project 627, 1965; K-431 of Project 675, 1985; and
K-192 of Project 675, 1989; 56 NPSs were built in
1958−1968, 29 of them were of Project 675). The
cause was that the first-generation reactors, in terms of
nuclear and radiation safety, had design drawbacks
associated with extreme spatial branching and a large
volume of the primary circuit, large-diameter pipe-
lines that interconnected the main pieces of equip-
ment (reactor, steam generators, pumps, heat
exchangers, pressurizers, etc.), and initially approved
overstated operating parameters (the water tempera-
ture in the primary circuit reached 300°С; the pressure,
200 atm; and the steam temperature, 250°С) [2, 3].
NPI design and technical drawbacks also created
problems in the organization of protection during
emergency depressurization of the primary circuit and
during rupture of the numerous pulse tubes, connect-
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY
Vladivostok
Ussuri Bay
Dunai Chazhma Bay
St
passage
re
Western
lok
Ba
y
ge
ass a Ba
y
np vsk
ste
r vlo
Pa
Ea
Fig. 1. The Strelok Naval Base near Vladivostok. The site
of the NPS K-431 nuclear accident on August 10, 1985, in
Chazhma Bay, settlement of Dunai.
ing the primary circuit with monitoring and measuring
equipment. In addition, the monitoring and measur-
ing equipment during NPI commissioning made it
possible to track nuclear processes in the reactor only
when it reached the minimal controlled level of capac-
ity. The reactor was started-up by a special operator-
calculated program that moves the controls.
When the reactor is shutdown, the shim rod lattice
is in the lower limit position. The lattice position
under which the critical state is reached and the self-
sustaining fission chain reaction (SSCR) begins (the
shim rod launching position) depends on the degree of
fuel burn-up: the higher the burn-up, the higher the
lattice position. In the reactor core loaded with fresh
fuel, the launching position of the lattice is the lowest.
This particular circumstance in combination with
imperfect reloading equipment and personnel errors
later led to the nuclear accident on NPS K-431 in
Chazhma Bay.
Amid all the radiation and nuclear accidents with
NPS NPIs, surface ships, and the nuclear icebreaker
fleet in the Soviet Union and Russia, from 1960
through the present, associated with coolant loss and
core meltdown, as well as runaway self-sustaining
chain reactions (there were six of them), the nuclear
accident on NPS K-431 was the most hazardous one.
By the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES), it
corresponds to level 5 (other accidents with ship reac-
tors reached levels 2−4). By this scale, only two acci-
dents in the world were assessed as level 7 (the Cher-
nobyl NPP and NPP Fukushima-1), and one as level 6,
PA “Mayak.” The accident frequently referred to at
the Three Mile Island Nuclear Generating Station,
the largest in US history, corresponded to level 5.
Accident site and region description. The Pacific
Fleet (PF) underwent qualitative changes in the post-
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
257
war period. It was equipped with the most advanced
weapons: submarine and surface vessels, missile-car-
rying nuclear submarines with long cruising capaci-
ties, unrestricted ocean service, and powerful strike
capabilities. This allowed the fleet to drive out from
coastal waters into the World Ocean. Since 1968, the
presence of the fleet ships in the Pacific and Indian
oceans has become routine practice.
Kamchatka and Primorskii Krai were made the
main regions for the PF NPS bases. In Primorskii
Krai, such a naval base was located in Strelok Bay and
adjacent bays at the distance of 30−40 km from Vlad-
ivostok across Ussuri Bay (Fig. 1).
In the mid-1950s, the Chelomei Design Office
developed cruise missile P-6 with a range of 300 km,
which could hit targets by nuclear or high-capacity
high-explosive warheads. On August 17, 1956, the
USSR Council of Ministers issued a resolution to
begin developing NPSs that were capable of carrying
not only antiship missiles P-6 but also strategic cruise
missiles P-5M to strike primarily aircraft carriers, as
well as various coastal targets. Note that no marine
power at that time had nuclear-powered submarines
armed with cruise missiles.
The Rubin design office, headed by the General
Designer P.P. Pustyntsev, designed the submarine.
The designers were pushed very hard due to the tense
international situation, and, to meet the deadline, they
took the Project 651 diesel submarine armed with four
cruise missiles as the basis for the new NPS. The Proj-
ect 675 NPS power installation consisted of two reac-
tors whose design features had already been worked
out on the Project 627 NPS (Leninskii Komsomol).
The construction was fast and on a massive scale: in
1963−1968, 29 submarines were given to the Navy,
15 of which went to the Northern Fleet and 14, to the
Pacific Fleet, including NPS K-431, which became
the site of a nuclear accident in the future.
The Project 675 nuclear twin-shaft submarine had
two (light nonsealed and strong sealed) hulls with ten
compartments in them. The main power installation
(39 000 hp) included two VM-A reactors (2 × 70 MW),
two steam turbines, and two main geared-turbine
units. The reactors were located behind the conning
tower in the sixth uninhabited (only those who kept
watch were there) reactor room. The berthing com-
partments (second and ninth) were located 20−30 m
away from the reactors (Fig. 2). The NPS environment
was protected against radiation by a solid-state biolog-
ical protection, equipment, construction elements,
and submarine hull, as well as by seawater pumped
between the light and strong hulls.
During NPS operation, the energy resource and
reactivity margin necessary to maintain the chain
reaction in the reactors decrease as the fuel gradually
burns up. Then, to restore the energy resource, the
scheduled refueling of the reactors is done. The spent
fuel is replaced with “fresh” fuel by loading new fuel
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
258 SARKISOV, VYSOTSKII

assemblies into the reactor core (RC). The refueling

procedure is a series of disassembling and assembling
operations to replace the RC completely with subse-
quent physical and power start-up. In special cases,
unscheduled refueling is done for troubleshooting.
The first-generation NPSs were scheduled to be
refueled once every 5−7 years, on average; for exam-
ple, NPS K-431 had its reactors refueled two times
before the accident. Coastal and floating maintenance
bases (CMBs and FMBs) were created for such oper-
ations in the Northern and Pacific fleets. Refueling is
a critical and complex technical operation, during
which, in addition to core replacement, the spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste should be handled.
Modern NPSs are refueled much less frequently due to
the higher energy resource of the new-type reactor
cores and the improved reliability of the power equip-
ment.
To ensure safety at the refilling point, restricted
areas are established mandatorily. The entire sur-
rounding area, including NPSs, logistics vessels—
floating maintenance base or repair ship (RS), float-
ing radiation-measuring barge (FRMB)—and part of
the dockyard are set off as a radiation safety restricted
area (RSRA). The only personnel that is admitted
there are those involved in refuel preparation, work
performance, and watchkeeping. Inside the RSRA, a Forward
MBT hardware MBT
small controlled access area (CAA) is formed addi- 5 5
cubicle
tionally, i.e., premises and sections where operations 3rd-level Entrance
with sources of ionizing radiation are performed. recess corridor

The personnel can enter and exit CAA through a SG SG

radiation monitoring point (RMP). On NPSs, the
RMP includes the light hull near the reactor room, the
reactor room, and a temporary protective structure,
which professionals used to call the “hut.” An aperture
of 6 × 4 m, cut in the light and strong hulls above the
reactors, behind the conning room is protected by the
“hut” against atmospheric precipitation. In the
absence of specific operations, the “hut,” the reactor
room, and passages to adjacent compartments are
locked with racks and sealed. This principle was fol-
lowed to recharge the reactors on NPS K-431 at the
pier no. 2 in the waters of the naval dockyard no. 30
(SRZ-30) in Chazhma Bay (Fig. 3).
Two support vessels, FRMB-12 and RS-133, and
NPS K-42 under repair were in the near zone with a
radius of up to 50 m relative to the NPS [4]. Five sub-
marines under repair, logistics vessels—FRMB-5, the
crane vessel Chernomorets, and two motorboats—were
at adjacent piers nos. 2 and 3 (120−150 m away).
Floating docks FD-11 and FD-48 and the houseboat
Sura were 150−500 m away. The territory adjacent to
the piers had a checkpoint, the radiation monitoring
point, through which the axis of the radioactive plume
passed through, and nearby, a radiobiological labora-
tory, utility buildings and facilities, an open metal stor-
age area, and dockyard bays and shops.
recess recess
BPT
B = 9.2 m
Fig. 2. A Project 675 NPS at sea. Cross section of the reac-
tor compartment. MBT and BPT are the main ballast and
biological protection tanks. Filled with seawater. SG is
steam generators.
Open floating dock FD-41 (to the right behind
FD-48, not shown in Fig. 3), in which the heavy air-
craft cruiser Minsk was repaired, was 500−800 m away
from the accident site in Chazhma Bay. The accident
site was 1400−1700 m away from the outskirts of the
adjacent settlements Dunai and Temp, which were
separated by a range of mud volcanos 20−160 m high
and a fully stocked wood with underbrush. The oppo-
site bank of Chazhma Bay, 500−600 m away, was also
protected by a range of mud volcanos 20−50 m high
and a forest with underbrush.

HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 88 No. 4 2018

 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY
Houseboat Sura FD-11
K-108
SS
FRMB-5
Pier
RB
L CV
re tal
e
us
P
wa Me
RM
ho Po
we
rf
ac
ilit
xis
y
ut a
fallo
tive
ioac
Rad Hull dock
shop (HDS) Shop 10
2
Shop 3
op
Sh
Fig. 3. Vessel positions in Chazhma Bay and facilities at SRZ-30 before the accident. The dotted line shows the 150-m radius from
the accident site; in the insert are NPS K-431 and logistics vessels.
Precursors and causes of the accident, a runaway
self-sustaining chain reaction, and a thermal explosion.
Three months before the accident, the spent nuclear
fuel from two reactors of NPS K-431 was unloaded
and replaced with the “fresh” fuel. The manager and
specialists of the reloading crew of CMB 375 were well
experienced in such operations, having received spe-
cial additional training, due instruction, and clearance
to work. The physics specialist was trained at the
Kurchatov Institute of Nuclear Energy and authorized
to do independent nuclear hazardous operations.
Ten days before the accident, which happened, as
was already mentioned, on August 10, 1985, the
reloading crew went through routine operations of
sealing the reactor head with tightness inspection
through hydraulic tests. At the end of the first four
days of tests, the aft reactor was accepted for opera-
tion. To check the tightness of the head fastening of
the fore reactor, excessive pressure was also used, but a
dripping leakage was detected between the head and
the reactor vessel. An attempt to eliminate the leakage
by tightening the fastening nuts was unsuccessful.
Nine minutes after the second pressure rise, water
appeared in the gap again. The pressure was removed,
and the manager of operations reported the on-the-
ground situation to his superiors on August 4.
After a closer examination of the leakage spot, a
welding rod was found that had been left through neg-
ligence between the head and the vessel. This was
immediately reported to the Fleet Maintenance Man-
agement on August 8. The urgent replacement of the
broken seal gasket was required, but there happened to
be none at CMB 375. Maintenance Management
communicated that it would be delivered only on
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
259
ACCIDENT SITE Above the power module, 80 R/h
Adjacent modules up to 7 R/h
SS 58
ts
RS-133 48
3 re FD
no mo
her
K-431
C
K-42
Pier 2
Seawater specific activity
2.0 × 10–6 Ci/L
1
MB-16
er
Pi
RS-133
K-431
K-42
FRMB-12
Pier 2
Monday, i.e., August 12. On August 10, the chief engi-
neer of CMB 375 and the reloading manager, consid-
ering the unfavorable situation at hand, made an inde-
pendent decision before noon to lift the reactor head.
Before lifting the reactor head, whose lower part
fits tightly 40 cm deep into the vessel, the fastening
nuts should be removed (the reactor becomes untight).
Since the lifting of the shim rod lattice is associated
with the release of large excessive reactivity, a special
device, which keeps the lattice rod in the lower posi-
tion, is mounted above the reactor head to ensure
nuclear safety. In the normal refueling mode, the rod
freely comes out through the center of the head. How-
ever, if the head is skewed, the rod can consensually be
jammed in the aperture and will start to rise when the
head is lifted. This situation is extremely dangerous
and inadmissible, because the “physical weight” of the
shim rod lattice, designed to compensate for the full
initial reactivity margin, exceeds the total fraction of
delayed neutrons (0.0064) by a factor of several times.
Its uncontrolled rise can make the reactor prompt crit-
ical and cause a criticality excursion and a subsequent
thermal explosion [3]. This particular situation
resulted from incorrect personnel operations on NPS
K-431 on August 10, 1985.
At 11 h 55 min Vladivostok time, two thermal
explosions occurred one after the other within 36 ms
(according to the National Research Center Kurcha-
tov Institute estimations) inside the reactor, when the
head was lifted. Radioactive substances and nuclear
fuel were expelled outside the NPS, causing great
destruction. Analysis of nuclear SSCR accidents and
numerical estimates show that the time of a single
energy surge could have been 1−4 ms, and the peak
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
260 SARKISOV, VYSOTSKII
capacitance could have reached 1.5 × 109 W (5 ×
1019 fissions). The second energy surge was smaller,
2 × 108 W (6 × 1018 fissions). The difference between
them is that after the first SSCR, the geometry of the
reactor core was disturbed and the water turned into
steam, significantly reducing the intensity of the fis-
sion chain reaction as a result of a sharp decrease in the
formation of thermal neutrons [5–7].
Such SSCR-resultant high fission rates produce
short powerful neutron and gamma-quantum fluxes
that go beyond the reactor vessel. However, in this sit-
uation, their impact was significantly reduced due to
the reactor cores being located 4−5 m below the water-
line, i.e., below the water surface, in the uninhabited
part of the submarine. For this particular reason, the
SSCR did not cause strong radiation impacts on NPS
K-42 and RS-133 moored nearby, because the reac-
tor’s biological protection and also the layer of seawa-
ter separating them reduced all types of radiation by
millions of times. The release of radioactive sub-
stances outside the NPS was the highest hazard in this
situation.
The air blast generated by the explosion spread at
the velocity of sound over the bay and dockyard terri-
tory. The subsequent radiation monitoring of the
coastline and territory showed that the blast shock
front transferred horizontally some radioactive sub-
stances to a distance of 1000 m from the explosion site
during the first 3 s. For comparison: the smoke cloud
rose by only 20−25 m over the same interval. During
the explosion, part of the nuclear fuel was released
from the reactor and started to fall as a gray powder in
a 50- to 100-m radius around the NPS. In addition,
small highly active fragments of the destroyed reactor
core scattered across the area within a radius of up to
150−200 m from the accident site. A fireball of 4−5 m
in diameter and 900−1100°С, which appeared above
the reactor compartment right after the explosion,
existed for 1 s at most but led to a powerful fire in the
compartment, which took 4 h to extinguish. Then a
gray-black cloud, containing radioactive substances,
formed and rose 20−25 m above the NPS, and,
expanding to 20−30 m, began to drift slowly with the
wind toward the dock.
Combustion products, fission-product poison,
“hot” radioactive particles, and small and large frag-
ments of the destroyed in-reactor structures, reactor
room, and protection “hut,” contaminated by radio-
active substances, began to fall out of this cloud onto
the vessels, piers, and waters of Chazhma Bay within a
radius of 50−100 m. The reactor head with remains of
the destroyed reactor core attached to it with a total
weight of about 6−7 t was ejected to the same height
(about 20−30 m) and then fell back into the reactor
room, punching the strong hull of the NPS. The sub-
marine began to overflow, necessitating its being kept
afloat by a crane vessel after the fire was extinguished
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
under extremely severe radiation conditions and mov-
ing to shallow waters.
Then the smoke cloud continued to move at a
speed of ~5 m/s downwind in the direction opposite to
the settlements and turned into the marker of the
radioactive path above the dockyard territory and
beyond. As the cloud entered the fully stocked wood,
eyewitnesses observed its collision with the lower part
of the nearest mud volcano of 70 m high (600−700 m
away from the accident site) and slow movement ups-
lope to a height of 40−50 m from the ground. After-
wards, the cloud, brushing the tops of lower volcanos,
struck into the uninhabited territory of the Dunai Pen-
insula, leaving behind a 5.5-km radioactive trace from
the accident site to Ussuri Bay and beyond.
As is known, the scale of a nuclear accident and its
consequences are most fully characterized by the rate
of radioactive release. When assessing its value, some-
times, the need arises to consider separately each
source of radioactive substances that contaminate the
environment. There were three of them in the situa-
tion under consideration. The first is the “fresh”
nuclear fuel, the source of alpha radiation. The second
source is beta–gamma radionuclides and a negligible
amount of alpha emitters, which formed during the
SSCR under prompt 235U fission. The third source is
beta–gamma activation products, accumulated before
the accident in the reactor structures as a result of
many years of service.
The initial alpha activity of the “fresh” nuclear fuel
in VM-A reactors is ~6 × 109 Bq (230−240 kg of 235U
and 238U). Calculations based on the results of moni-
toring of the radioactive contamination of the envi-
ronment showed that 3−3.5% of the total nuclear fuel
(7−8 kg) could have fallen on the coastal radioactive
trace with a total alpha activity of about 2 × 108 Bq (for
comparison, the release during the Chernobyl acci-
dent was ~3.5%, or ~6500 kg of 235U and 238U). The
larger part of the fuel (60−70%) in the form of melt
mixed with RC metal structures remained in the reac-
tor vessel and the reactor compartment. The rest fuel
fell out around the NPS on the vessels, piers, coast-
line, and waters of Chazhma Bay. Most of fuel that was
on the coastline, piers, and vessels was gathered and
buried, but this was impossible to do in the bay waters.
Radioactive substances are still in the bottom sedi-
ments under the silt between piers nos. 2 and 3.
For comprehensive assessment of 235U fission
product formation, the energy release during the first
SSCR burst was associated with the maximal possible
rate, 5 × 1019, which was equivalent to the explosion of
350 kg of trinitrotoluene (TNT) with the energy-burst
power of ~1.5 × 109 W, and during the second SSCR,
6 × 1018 (37 kg of TNT; power, 0.2 × 109 W). For these
conditions, release results consistent between the Rus-
sian (the Kurchatov Institute and IBRAE RAN [4, 6,
8, 9]) and foreign (NATO [7]) specialists were
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY
Activity, Ci
106 1 min 1h 1 day 10 days 1 month
104 142Cs
102
100 131Te
131I
10−2
141Ce
10−4 0
10 101 102 103 104 105 106 107
Time, s
Fig. 4. Decrease of total activity and main short-lived
235
U-fission products, formed as a result of the accident,
excluding radioactive noble gases. The estimates made for
the fission rate of 6 × 1018.
obtained for the following main dose-forming radio-
nuclides: 131I, ~40 ± 15 GBq; 137Cs, ~1.7 ± 0.7 GBq;
and 90Sr, ~1.6 ± 0.8 GBq. The release of 60Co, accu-
mulated in the reactor over the two previous cam-
paigns, was ~16000 ± 6000 GBq.
Decrease of the total activity of the 235U instant fis-
sion products, disregarding the release of radioactive
noble gases at the fission rate of 6 × 1018 and the main
short-lived radionuclides, calculated by the specialists
of the Kurchatov Institute, is given in Fig. 4 [4, 6]. It
shows that 1 min after the accident, the total release
activity decreased by more than ten times; 1 h after, by
1000 times; and one day after, by 105 times. Two−three
hours after the accident, 131I became the main dose-
forming fission product in the ground layer of the
atmosphere (Т1/2 = 8.04 days), but its activity did not
exceed 1% of the 60Со release (Т1/2 = 5.27 years).
The subsequent perennial observation of the radio-
active contamination of the environment on the terri-
tory of dockyard no. 30, the Dunai Peninsula, and
adjacent seawaters showed that the NPS K-431
nuclear accident had led to the formation of a “cobal-
tic” radioactive trace. This nickname of the Chazhma
trace is explained by the fact that the fraction of 60Со
contained in the anthropogenic radionuclides in the
soil, water, fauna, and fl ora was 90−99% of the total
activity.
The radioactive trace. When assessing the radio-
ecological consequences of the NPS K-431 nuclear
accident, three zones of radioactive trace formation
were distinguished for analysis: the first is the accident
site, the dockyard and adjacent waters; the second is
the coastal zone of the Dunai Peninsula; and the third
is associated with the remote (Peter the Great Gulf,
southern Primorskii Krai) and transboundary transfer
of radionuclides (across the Russian–Chinese border)
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
261
by air and sea (exit to the neutral waters of the north-
western part of the Sea of Japan).
To this day, the water area within a 50- to 100-m
radius around the accident site has been the area of
highly radiation-contaminated bottom sediments [4].
However, the NPS represented the highest radioactive
hazard during the accident. The exposure dose rate
(EDR) in the reactor room 1 m away from the reactor
head and the destroyed core reached 2000−3000 R/h,
and in leakage radiation areas (narrow gamma-ray
beams), 4000−7000 R/h. The density of surface radio-
active contamination was 10 6–109 decays/(cm2 min),
and the EDR at 3−5 m above the reactor room was
150−250 R/h.
In the direction of the radioactive plume, the EDR
dropped gradually but remained sufficiently high,
0.2−2 R/h, in the controlled area up to 200 m wide
near the NPS (the checkpoint, piers, ships, NPS).
The highest radiation came from small fragments of
the destroyed RC assembly, scattered across the terri-
tory. EDR from them reached 50−200 R/h, requiring
to form a special group to search, collect, and bury
them. The density of surface radioactive contamina-
tion in this area was the highest, reaching 10 4–
106 decays/(cm2 min) (Fig. 5).
The first day after the accident, the EDR and con-
tamination density on the dockyard territory and espe-
cially on the radioactive trace axis remained high,
reaching in some places 300 mR/h and
105 decays/(cm2 min), correspondingly. On the sec-
ond−third days, as a result of the short-lived fission
products decay, these indicators decreased by
3−7 times; however, the decrease of activity slowed
down later, because radionuclides that belonged to
activation products with half-life periods of tens and
hundreds of days and several years began to play a
decisive role.
On the first day after the accident, the specific
activity of the near-NPS seawater reached an exces-
sively high level, (1−3) × 108 Bq/m3. The main long-
lived radionuclides were 60Co (65−90%) and 54Mn
(4−16%), as well as 137Cs and 90Sr (below 1%). Two-
to-three days later, their content decreased substan-
tially in the upper water layer owing to turbulent diffu-
sion. Radionuclides dissipated and passed to lower
horizons, after which the stream moved them to adja-
cent Strelok Bay. Not only the water but also the bot-
tom sediments and biota were contaminated up to
3−5 km from the accident site.
By the end of two months, the radiation situation
in the waters of Chazhma Bay had normalized in gen-
eral, except for the radioactive contamination of the
bottom sediments between piers nos. 1−3. The area
where EDR was the highest and changed from 1 to
150 mR/h (net of the radiation from the destroyed RC
fragments) was ~50000 m2 (Fig. 6) [4].
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
262 SARKISOV, VYSOTSKII

Distance, m
250
Grid 10 × 10
Pier 3

Depth, m
200 Radioactive
cloud
Reactor head and
assembly 26 blowout, 0
EDR > 10 000 R/h
Large particles and 2
150 solid slag fallout area,
EDR ≈ 3–6 R/h 5
Pier 2

RS-133 10
K-431
100 K-42 15
FRMB-12
20
Contaminated surfaces Reactor room
area boundary, EDR ≈ 2000–3000 R/h
EDR ≈ 0.5–2 R/h 24
50
Fragments of destroyed
assembly 26,
EDR ≈ 50–200 R/h

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

Distance, m

Fig. 5. The radiation situation in the accident site 1−5 min after the NPS K-431 NPI exploded. Chazhma Bay, depth scale, m.

The further search for and identification of

drowned fragments of the destroyed RC using remote
telemetric inspection of the bottom, conducted by the
0.02−0.05 0.05−0.1 0.1−0.2 0.5−10 mR/h Pacific Fleet specialists in 1991, revealed no foreign
objects in places with the maximal EDR values. The
bottom was covered with an undisturbed silt layer 10–
30 cm thick. Of the 28 radioactive anomalies identified
0.1−0.2
by measuring equipment, the highest EDRs of 1.4 and
6.4 R/h were only found in two places. They were side
over 150
by side 100 and 110 m from the coastline portside of
the wrecked NPS. EDRs from the rest of the frag-
0.2−0.6 ments changed within 20−280 mR/h. They all con-
centrated on a narrow area (120−150 m long and
40−60 m wide), oriented toward the dockyard along
pier no. 2, where the radioactive cloud moved after the
0.1−0.4 explosion of the reactor [4].
Large highly active fragments of the destroyed RC
0.1−0.3 assembly, which fell out during the accident on the
0.2−0.8 0.2−0.3 pier, NPS, and logistics vessels, were gathered into
containers and buried during decontamination, and
EDR measured on Aug. 17–21, 1985 (mR/h) small fragments, including radioactive reactor poison,
“hot” particles, and dispersed nuclear fuel, were
0.01 0.02 0.06 0.2 1 10 >150 mR/h washed overboard and settled down on the bottom.
Radiation survey, performed by a detachment of
Fig. 6. Reconstructed field of radioactive contamination of
bottom sediments in Chazhma Bay during the first ten the fleet’s chemical regiment in the woodland on the
days after the accident. The circles are bottom EDR mea- second day after the accident, showed that the main
surement sites. radioactive trace was localized within a narrow zone

HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 88 No. 4 2018

 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY 263

(a) Pγ, μR/h

y
ur i Ba
Uss 1200

1000
C 3.7 km 240

Chazhma Bay 60
B 2.2 km
20

A 1.0 km 10

3
(b) (c)
Decay/(cm2 min) μR/h
25 000 9
8
20 000 7
6
15 000
5
4
10 000
3
5000 2
1
0 0
9 11 13 15 17 19 21 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
Aug. Aug.
А B C

Fig. 7. Observation points (A, B, C) to monitor soil contamination dynamics on the coastal radioactive trace from August 11
through August 19, 1985. (а) The trace plotted according to the monitoring performed in 1991, (b) beta-contamination density,
and (c) EDR values.

400−600 m wide and up to 4000 m long, the total
width of the Dunai Peninsula being 5.5 km. To moni-
tor the dynamics of activity decrease, three reference
points in the trace were chosen for observation (A, B,
C), where EDR (R) and the density of beta contami-
nation (Rβ) of the soil were measured daily. Analysis of
the findings showed that Rβ, represented mostly by
short-lived 235U fission products, decreased during the
first day by 7−10 times, and the EDR, by only
1.5−3 times, because it was mainly due to the gamma
radiation of activation products (Fig. 7) [4, 10].
The further monthly and subsequently annual radi-
ation monitoring of the trace was vested in the radia-
tion safety service of the dockyard and the fleet’s
chemical service, which also conducted expanded
radioecological studies, involving independent regula-
tors. In addition, by the order of the administration of
Primorskii Krai, several independent organizations
performed sample monitoring and individual investi-
gations. Table 1 exemplifies the results of an indepen-
dent examination to identify the radionuclide compo-
sition of soil contamination on the Dunai Peninsula
and the bottom sediments in Chazhma Bay [11]. Spe-
cialists of the Pacific Fleet Chemical Service, the radi-
ation safety service of the SRZ 30, and the Far East
Branch of RPA “Typhoon” (Vladivostok), the leading
scientific organization of the Federal Service for
Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring,
conducted the studies.
The data in Table 1 show that the sample contain-
ing 235U, which was taken from the accident site, also
contained 60Co in addition to the main long-lived fis-
sion products, 137Cs and 90Sr. This indicates that
during melting, nuclear fuel and in-reactor structures
formed poorly soluble intermetallides. Long-lived fis-
sion products, 137Cs and 90Sr, are also formed inevita-
bly during SSCR in the RC with “fresh” nuclear fuel,
but their amount is hundreds and thousands of times
smaller than that of the activation products (60Co) pre-
viously accumulated in the in-reactor structures. For
this particular reason, the radioactive contamination

HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 88 No. 4 2018

264 SARKISOV, VYSOTSKII
Table 1. Specific activity of man-made radionuclides within the coastal radioactive trace and the site of accident with the
nuclear power installation of K-431 in Chazhma Bay (1998, Bq/kg of dry weight)
Sampling
location 235U
Coastal trace (1.3−3 km from accident site, <5
Dunai Peninsula) <5
<5
Pit lake (0.7−1.1 km from accident site) <5
<5
Chazhma Bay bottom sediments <5
(accident site, R up to 100 m) <5
<5
(5.3 ± 0.08) × 103 (7.4 ± 0.05) × 10 4
* The background due to global fallout was 1−5 Bq/kg.
According to [12], the permissible concentration of 60Co in the tidal-zone soil was 3.7 × 102 Bq/kg and of 137Cs, 2.59 × 103 Bq/kg. In
some places of the accident site with high EDR values, the 60Co content reached 105–108 Bq/kg.
The bottom sediments were sampled in the upper layer of 0–3 cm.
of the environment in Chazhma Bay and on the coast
was practically fully predetermined by 60Co.
The absence of 235U in the soil samples of the bot-
tom sediments in the pit lake and soil on the Dunai
Peninsula indicates that the main part of radioactive
substances that entered the ground layer of the atmo-
sphere was aerosols, and this ensured their transfer
over long distances, forming a coastal radioactive
trace. Intermetallides (“hot” particles), as one of the
heaviest fractions of the release, settled down quickly
in the waters of Chazhma Bay and fell out on the ter-
ritory adjacent to the dockyard.
Returning to the time of the accident, we should
note that as early as the first 15 min after the thermal
burst in the reactor, the transfer of radioactive sub-
stances by an air-vapor cloud and the consequences
were analyzed by the specialists of the Pacific Fleet
Chemical Service. Data and scenarios of event devel-
opment, prepared beforehand at the stage of reactor
reloading planning, were used. Simultaneously, the
picture was updated properly by entering real data
about the wind direction and speed in the accident
area and Peter the Great Gulf, provided by the Naval
Hydrographic Service, as well as by using operational
data about the characteristics of the nuclear accident
from the site. All information was sent to Vladivostok
and analyzed by the specialists of the computation and
analytical station.
A preliminary conclusion based on assessments
was made under the most unfavorable conditions of
the cloud traveling directly through Ussuri Bay, the
radioactive contamination of its opposite coast (Vlad-
ivostok and its suburbs) would not require the emer-
gency evacuation of the population (see Fig. 1). Then,
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
Specific activity, Bq/kg
60Co 137Cs 90Sr
(4.9 ± 0.08) × 10 4 47 ± 11 19.0 ± 3.6
4 76 ± 33 30.2 ± 4.5
(1.6 ± 0.04) × 10
4 41 ± 13 30.1 ± 3.5
(4.1 ± 0.03) × 10
4 < 2* 2.9 ± 3.2*
(2.5 ± 0.04) × 10
4 < 2* 1.4 ± 3.6*
(4.2 ± 0.04) × 10
3 260 ± 30 2.8 ± 3.1*
(1.6 ± 0.09) × 10
(5.3 ± 0.05) × 10 4 130 ± 55 3.4 ± 3.7*
(4.3 ± 0.40) × 103 95 ± 20 3.3 ± 3.1*
230 ± 40 3.7 ± 3.5*
the specialists of the Chemical Service and the com-
putation and analytical station and other fleet depart-
ments, went to the accident site to assess and normal-
ize the radiation situation at the dockyard.
Despite this preliminary forecast, during the first
hour after the accident, the fleet’s chemical regiment
was ordered to perform a large-scale radiation survey,
including Vladivostok and adjacent regions, as well as
up to 15 settlements within the zone of probable prop-
agation of the radioactive cloud (radius of 40−50 km).
Several hours later, the survey results showed that the
radioactive contamination was not detected anywhere,
and the conclusion was made that the hazardous cloud
had dissipated above Ussuri Bay. The previous fore-
cast was confirmed, that allowed focusing all efforts on
safety assurance and accident mitigation. Radiation
survey continued for another several months for the
tasks of the rehabilitation of buildings, structures,
roads, dockyard shops, territories, and waters.
However, it was impossible to define the general
trajectory of radioactive substances propagation in the
surface layer of the atmosphere, as well as their radia-
tion and radioecological consequences during that
period due to the absence of full information on the
wind field above Peter the Great Gulf and the neces-
sary prediction software that had been developed by
the present day. Nevertheless, the studies in this direc-
tion continued. One such stage is the period of
1997−1998, when the IBRAE RAN specialists made a
hindcast of the past events using the developed soft-
ware TRACE. Field data obtained by the Pacific Fleet
specialists were used as the boundary conditions [9, 13].
As a result, previously unknown initial characteristics
of the radioactive contamination of the coastal trace
were restored (Fig. 8). It was established, in particular,
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY 265

Trudovoe
Qitaihe Hulin Δ 20−28 h
12.00 14.00 Mishan
15.00 Lesozavodsk

Jixi
y
Ba Rechitsa
CHINA RUSSIA
ri Khanka
su
Us Tsarevka Lake

13.00 Kamen'-Rybolov
Sukhodol
Spassk-Dal'nii
Vladivostok Bolshoi Pogranichnyi Khorol'
Δ 10−14 h
Kamen' Suifenhe Chernigovka

Chuguevka
Arsen'ev

Dongning Pokrovka
Primorskii Krai
Mysovoi Ussuriisk
Petrovka
Δ 3−5 h
Ussuri Bay Fokino
Artem
Trudovoe
Bol'shoi Kamen' Partizansk
Chazhma Vladivostok
Amur Bay Fokino
Bay Russkii
Slavyanka Island
Dunai Nakhodka

Fig. 8. Propagation of air masses over Ussuri Bay from the time of the accident, 12:00 until 15:00 on August 10, 1985, and the
territory of Primorskii Krai−China during subsequent 3−28 h, plotted according to a hindcast. The solid line in the left of the
figure is the average trajectory.

that 3−5 min after the explosion at point A and
6−8 min after at point B, Rβ was ~50000 and
~6000 decays/(cm2 min), correspondingly. Eleven to
thirteen minutes after (point C), Rβ dropped sharply to
~900 decays/(cm2 min) because of the intensive filtra-
tion of the lower part of the radioactive cloud by the
forest. As a result, it was not more than
100 decays/(cm2 min) on the coast of Ussuri Bay
5.5 km away from the accident site and was compara-
ble to the natural background, 3−5 decays/(cm2 min)
5−7 km from the coast. The EDR at point A with
12−15 mR/h decreased to 2 mR/h on the Ussuri Bay
coast. It reached the upper limit of the natural back-
ground, 0.02 mR/h in the waters of Ussuri Bay 5−7 km
from the coast and the average value (0.01 mR/h)
7−10 km away.
It followed from the hindcast results that after the
radioactive cloud went out of the dockyard (~600 m),
the main mass of radioactive substances was concen-
trated in the surface layer of the atmosphere as it trav-
eled above the Dunai Peninsula at a height of 30−150 m
above sea level, abetted by low solid clouds and driz-
zle, which limited the vertical propagation of the cloud
(the height of the mud volcanos was 30−70 m). In
these conditions, the fallout density of 137Cs and 90Sr in
the coastal trace constantly decreased, as the cloud
moved away from the accident site, from 0.07 to
0.001 Ci/km2, which was smaller than permissible
norms for the normal mode of human residence
(under 1 Ci/km2). The fallout density of 60Со turned
out to be higher. It reached 5 Ci/km2 on the Ussuri
Bay coast, 50−100 Ci/km2 in the central part of the
Dunai Peninsula, and over 200 Ci/km2 outside the
dockyard (500−600 m from the accident site). Had the
radioactive plume come through Dunai settlement, it
would have been necessary to evacuate people, which,
fortunately, did not happen.
As a result of the studies conducted, the release of
the main dose-forming radionuclides was clarified:
(1.2 ± 0.3) × 1013 Bq for 60Со, 4.1 × 109 Bq for 90Sr,
4.4 × 109 Bq for 137Cs, and 37 × 109 Bq for 131I. How-
ever, even at this stage, the problem remained
unsolved. After the radioactive cloud had reached the
Ussuri Bay coast, it was impossible to identify its fur-
ther trajectory along Peter the Great Gulf and Primor-
skii Krai.
Remote and transboundary transfers of radionu-
clides. Studies in this field continued not only in Rus-
sia but also abroad. For example, Japanese and Euro-
pean specialists assessed in 1997−2002 the conse-
quences of hypothetical accidents that could have
happened during the dismantling of Russian NPSs
near Vladivostok. One of them fully correlated by task
assignment and initial data with the nuclear accident
that had occurred in Chazhma Bay in the summer of
1985. The difference was in the direction selected for
the transfer of radioactive cloud, typical of winter sea-
son, when southern winds prevailed, carrying the

HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 88 No. 4 2018

266 SARKISOV, VYSOTSKII
impurities to the coasts of Japan and Korea, as well as
in the fact that this study did not consider radionuclide
dispersal by sea.
Analysis of the transfer and dispersal of passive
impurity was done using the WSPEEDI software,
developed at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Insti-
tute (JAERI), to assess the radiation consequences of
hypothetical accidents at Japanese nuclear power
plants with radionuclide releases into the ground layer
of the atmosphere. The program was verified by the
results of the large-scale European Tracer Experiment
(ETEX), which recorded tracer concentrations at dis-
tances of up to 2000 km from the source, divided into
a mesh grid 50 × 50 km [14].
The estimates showed that, ~16 h after the accident
near Vladivostok, radionuclides that had released into
the atmosphere quickly dispersed above the Sea of
Japan owing to turbulent diffusion. One hundred to
three hundred kilometers away from the source, their
content decreased 1013–1015 times in the central part of
the radioactive cloud and 1016–1018 times at the
periphery. Having set the 131I release rate at 29 GBq
[7], the authors showed that if a SSCR starts in the
reactor with “fresh” nuclear fuel, the air contamina-
tion on the eastern coast of Japan will not exceed 3 ×
10–3–3 × 10–5 Bq/m3. Using the forecast results, the
JAERI experts assessed the doses of internal and
external radiation of the Japanese population by inhal-
ing the air and the precipitation of radioactive sub-
stances in the soil. The estimates showed that even
without considering the 131I radioactive decay and
short-lived radionuclides 133I, 135I, and the 137Cs half-
life period from the human organism, the expected
exposure doses for the Japanese population would be
small and would not exceed millionths of the annual
dose of natural radiation of the population, which is
harmless for humans (similar assessments were
obtained for the Korean population).
European specialists came to the same conclusion
in 2002, having made an independent forecast for the
consequences of hypothetical SSCR accidents in NPS
reactors near Vladivostok not only with “fresh” but
also with spent nuclear fuel [15]. However, the studies
[14, 15] were neither aimed at a comprehensive fore-
cast of radioactive substance transfer by air and sea nor
at assessing the consequences of hypothetical acci-
dents for the populations of Primorskii Krai, China,
Japan, and Korea. As is known, such studies require
consideration of the local characteristics of relief and
seawater areas near the accident sites, as well as in
adjacent areas and on the boundaries of the
coast−sea−coast transition, which was difficult to
achieve using the existing prediction software with a
50 × 50-km spatial resolution.
The next and more complete study phase on this
problem, which generalized the previous works and
supplemented them with new data and integral vision,
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
was a hindcast of the consequences of the Chazhma
Bay accident done at IBRAE RAN in 2017 and 2018.
The impulse to develop qualitatively new modeling
methods was the NPP Fukushima-1 accident in 2011.
From that time, IBRAE RAN began to create a system
for predicting the radiation situation based on prog-
nostic meteorological fields of a high spatial resolution
(2 × 2 km) at 40 vertical levels [16, 17]. Calculations
were made using weather forecasts by the Hydromete-
orological Center of Russia and conditions to adapt to
the characteristic features of the accident site.
In studies on the Chazhma Bay nuclear accident,
the areas that formed the radioactive trace comprised
all stages of its development: the initial zone (6 × 5 km,
~20 min after the accident) covered the formation of
the trace on the Dunai Peninsula; the intermediate
zone (70 × 90 km, 0.3−3 h after the accident), covered
the waters of Peter the Great Gulf; and the final zone
(400 × 600 km, ~3−30 h after the accident), applied to
the continental part of Primorskii Krai and the adja-
cent Heilongjiang Province in northeastern China.
The trajectory analysis of moving air masses on the
day of the accident above the Dunai Peninsula and
Peter the Great Gulf (the closest, Ussuri Bay) revealed
the extremely complex character of their movement
(Fig. 8). The air masses moved most compactly above
the forestland of the Dunai Peninsula, resulting in a
relatively narrow radioactive trace. At a distance of
5−15 km from the coast of Ussuri Bay, the air streams
began to drift apart, and at the exit from the bay, open-
ings, circulations, and reverse flows occurred caused
by coastal relief inconsistencies and, correspondingly,
wind velocities along them. Beyond Ussuri Bay, in the
southern part of Primorskii Krai, the movement of air
masses stabilized and took a relatively stable direction
northward up to Khanka Lake; however, after the lake,
they began to drift apart again near the Russian–Chi-
nese border (see Fig. 8).
The forecast of change in the radiation situation on
the Dunai Peninsula as a result of the passage of the
radioactive cloud showed that at the initial stage of the
formation of the radioactive trace, the 60Со-depen-
dent EDR changed from several tens to a few units of
mR/h. Above Ussuri Bay, 12−15 km from the coast, it
became comparable with the natural coastal back-
ground, 10 μR/h. After 1.2−2 h, as a result of intensive
dissipation in the central part of the bay (20−40 km),
EDR decreased sharply to 1−0.1 μR/h with no adverse
effect on Vladivostok’s recreation zone (beaches,
resorts) and settlements (Fig. 9). Then, through the
top of Ussuri Bay, the radioactive cloud entered the
continental part of southern Primorskii Krai and
began to move northward. An additional increase in
the soil EDR did not exceed 1% of the natural back-
ground. Near Khanka Lake, the cloud divided into
two unequal parts. The smaller part went north along
the state border into Chinese territory, and the larger
part moved in parallel in Russian territory, turning
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY
0.1 μR/h
Vladivostok
1 μR/h
10 μR/h
20 km
Dunai
Fig. 9. Radioactive contamination of the Dunai Peninsula
and Ussuri Bay after the NPS K-431 nuclear accident of
August 10, 1985 (hindcast).
gradually into small-sized clouds, dissipating in the
vast space (Fig. 10).
The forecast data, given in Fig. 10, show that at 100
and 300 km from the accident site, the volumetric
activity of air in the ground layer was about 0.1−1.0
and 0.01−0.1 Bq/m3, respectively. These values were
hundreds and thousands of times smaller than the
average annual permissible volumetric activity for
60Со (11 Bq/m3) and 131I (7.3 Bq/m3) and were not
considered hazardous for the population.
Returning to the previous events, note that the per-
missible volumetric activity of 60Со was below stan-
dard already at the top of Ussuri Bay, several unities in
the central part of the bay, and thousands and tens of
thousands of times higher at the entrance to the bay.
However, under these circumstances, owing to a
smaller (hundreds of times) initial release of 131I into
the atmosphere compared to 60Со, the 131I content in
the ground air layer did not exceed the permissible
standard practically across the entire area of Ussuri
Bay. Ussuri Bay played an extremely important role of
a protective barrier, ensuring the safety of the popula-
tion of Primorskii Krai and preventing an additional
radiation burden over percent fractions−units com-
pared to the natural radioactive background.
Field studies and model calculations continued for
many years after the nuclear accident to reproduce the
dynamics of anthropogenic radionuclide transfer by
air and by seawater. Some IBRAE RAN seawater stud-
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
267
ies were performed in 1997 and 1998 jointly with US
specialists [18]. The specialists of the Pacific North-
west Laboratory, Richland, plotted flow fields in Stre-
lok Bay to forecast the transfer of anthropogenic
radionuclides from Chazhma Bay to the Sea of Japan,
using the Princeton Ocean Model, 1987, adapted to
Strelok Bay (spatial resolution of 400 × 400 m). The
forecast results were compared with experimental data
obtained from the Pacific Fleet accident site [13].
The flow field forecast from the surface to the bot-
tom of the bay, as well as subsequent calculations,
showed that radioactive substances after the accident
released to the Sea of Japan predominantly with the
surface layer of water through the eastern passage of
Strelok Bay. They entered the western passage at a
much lower rate and in a limited amount, because a 5-
to 25-m deep pit in it, separated from the open sea by
shallow waters, slowed down the transfer process. The
radionuclides moved mostly in the middle and bottom
layers of the water and settled on the bottom (Fig. 11).
Stable northern winds also hindered the contami-
nated seawater to exit quickly by the surface of the
western passage of Strelok Bay toward the shortest dis-
tance to Peter the Great Gulf and the Sea of Japan on
the day of the accident and for the next several days,
making it move in the opposite direction, through the
eastern passage. For this reason, the radionuclides
moved along the eastern passage of Strelok Bay for
4−5 days and formed a broad plume 10−15 km wide
approaching the Sea of Japan.
The initial radioactive contamination of the surface
seawater layer near the wrecked NPS in Chazhma Bay
being ~2 × 108 Bq/m3 (5 × 105 times higher than the
permissible concentration, 370 Bq/m3, for the mixture
of radionuclides of an unknown composition [12]),
4−5 days later, at the exit from the eastern passage of
Strelok Bay, the content of radionuclides in the water
decreased to 0.5−2 Bq/m3 (less than 0.01 of the per-
missible concentration). During the following 5 days,
this value decreased significantly in the open part of
the Sea of Japan, reaching a dilution of millions of
times [19]. Respectively, anthropogenic radionuclides
in concentrations exceeding permissible values did not
reach the coasts of China, Korea, and Japan and did
not affect fishing in the neutral waters of the Sea of
Japan (Fig. 12).
These studies led to the important conclusion that
Strelok Bay also played the role of a powerful natural
protective barrier in relation to Peter the Great Gulf
and the northwestern part of the Sea of Japan. The
special importance of this circumstance considering
the previous studies is associated with the fact that the
consequences of the accident caused a serious concern
for the population not only in Primorskii Krai but also
in Japan, Korea, and China, because everybody
thought that radioactive substances right after the
accident went by air directly to Vladivostok, its sub-
urbs, and China and that the contaminated water
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
268 SARKISOV, VYSOTSKII

Qitaihe Hulin
Qitaihe
Mishan 0.01 Bq/m3
China Lesozavodsk Russia Mishan 0.01 Bq/m3
Jixi China Russia
Jixi
0.1 0.1
Khanka Primorskii Krai
Primorskii Krai
Lake
Khanka
Kamen'-Rybolov
Kamen'- Lake
Spassk-Dal'nii Rybolov Spassk-Dal'nii
Pogranichnyi Khorol'
Suifenhe Chernigovka Pogranichnyi Khorol'
Kavalerovo Suifenhe Chernigovka
Chuguevka Kavalerovo
Arsen'ev Chuguevka
Arsen'ev
Dongning Pokrovka Dongning Pokrovka
Ussuriisk Ussuriisk
1.0 0.1 Bq/m3

Artem Artem
Trudovoe Trudovoe
Vladivostok Bolshoi Kamen' Partizansk Vladivostok
Bolshoi Kamen' Partizansk
Amur Bay Fokino Amur Bay Fokino
Russkii Russkii
Slavyanka Slavyanka
Island Nakhodka Island Nakhodka

Fig. 10. Radioactive cloud dynamics and travel over the territory of Primorskii Krai and China 6 and 20 h after the nuclear acci-
dent in Chazhma Bay (hindcast).

1990

km
0 2 4 Abrek Bay
Chazhma Bay
5 50 5

5
50
50

50
5

5
5

Putyatin Island
Strelok Bay

Fig. 11. Forecast for radioactivity transfer by the seawater surface layer through the western (left) and eastern (right) passages of
Strelok Bay. The actual contamination of the bottom sediments of the western and eastern passages of the bay. The 1990 moni-
toring data, Bq/kg.

reached the Sea of Japan. The subsequent joint inter-
national Russian−Japanese−Korean marine expedi-
tions of 1994, 1995, and 1997 with IAEA participation
confirmed the absence of contamination of bottom
sediments with 60Со in the Sea of Japan and other seas
of the Pacific region [20].
Human losses, damage incurred on human health
and the environment, radioecological rehabilitation
operations. Eight officers and two sailors who were in
the reactor room died instantly as a result of the blast
effect, high temperature, and radiation injuries.
Another two men (an officer and a former sailor) died
several years later. The largest radiation burden was
received by the military personnel who extinguished
the fire and fought for the survival of the sinking NPS
K-431, as well as those who dealt with emergency decon-
tamination of NPS K-42, FRMB-12, and RS-133. Sta-
tistics showed that of the selected ~90% of the partic-
ipants in rehabilitation (1841 people), the military per-
sonnel received the highest doses: 1 man, over 150 rem;
25 people, 100−150 rem; 23 people, 50−100 rem;
43 people, 25−50 rem; 36 people, 15−25 rem;
133 people, 5−15 rem; 643 people, 0.5−5 rem, and
9 people, less than 0.5 rem. Among the dockyard
workers and personnel, 2 people received 25−50 rem;
1 man, 15−25 rem; 41 people, 5−15 rem; 284 people,
0.5−5 rem; and 600 people, less than 0.5 rem [13].
The K-431 nuclear reactor and reactor room were
destroyed, and the entire NPS was contaminated with
radioactive substances. The condition of the NPS after
such a severe accident excluded its restoration; it was
decommissioned and anchored in Pavlovskii Bay for

HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES Vol. 88 No. 4 2018

 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY
125 km
Vladivostok
Nakhodka
1 settlement of Dunai.
2
3 was not removed, because it was in an uninhabited
4 part of the forestland. On the second day after the
0 5 250 km
6
Fig. 12. Reciprocal dilution of the contaminated seawater
coming from Strelok Bay to the Sea of Japan over five days
after the accident. 1−6 means diluted by 101–10 6 times.
many years. Later it was put into a three-compartment
block at the Far Eastern Zvezda factory and isolated in
a storage facility at Razboinik Bay near the accident
site in 2011. NPS K-42 moored close by was not oper-
ated after the accident, was also retired from the fleet,
laid up for a long time, and decommissioned in 2003
(one of the reasons for dismantling was radioactive
contamination). Repair ship RS-133, which lifted the
reactor head, received light and moderately severe
mechanical damage and a high radioactive contami-
nation. It was decontaminated and repaired for a long
time, but was put into service and was used as intended
for over 15 years (now decommissioned).
About 30% of the territory of dockyard 30 and the
buildings, structures, and workshops on it had to be
decontaminated many times. The most important
facilities were put into operation within 1−3 months;
the rest, step-by-step; they were operated in a limited
mode. The dockyard’s rehabilitation period finished
in nine months. The decontamination of the piers,
coastline, and the territory adjacent to the dockyard
required great efforts. Here is an example that shows
the scale of radioecological rehabilitation. A mud vol-
cano of 70 m high, which was the first to meet the
radioactive cloud and was very contaminated, was
removed within two years after the accident. Its clean
underlying rocks were used to reduce the surface
radioactive contamination to permissible levels, and
they were used for other needs, which were acceptable
by the radiation safety standards.
Simultaneously with bottom dredging for 3−5
years after the accident, the bottom sediments were
partly decontaminated near the construction of a new
moorage wall for surface ships in the dockyard waters
(~200000 m2) and a processing area adjacent to the
dockyard on the side of the pit lake (~35000 m2).
In 1992, temporary radioactive waste storage
(~2000 m3), which was created in the radioactive trace
2 km away from the dockyard during the first days
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
269
after the accident for the urgent decontamination of
dockyard 30, was liquidated. For the waste accumu-
lated in nine months from the decontamination of the
dockyard and adjacent territories, five trench storages
with a total holding capacity of ~8000 m3 were created
and filled up at CMB 375, located 7 km away from the
The coastal radioactive trace on Dunai Peninsula
accident, the area of the maximal radioactive contam-
ination (~2 km2) was identified, marked with radiation
precaution signs, and fenced. The contaminated bot-
tom deposits of Strelok Bay (~30 km2) and part of
Ussuri Bay adjacent to the radioactive trace (~40 km2)
were also left for natural decontamination due to an
insignificant radioecological hazard.
The maximally contaminated section of Chazhma
Bay (~12000 m2) around the accident site was also left
for natural decontamination. This decision was made
due to the impossibility to decontaminate the bottom
sediments at depths down to 30 m in the absence of
necessary technical facilities. The subsequent peren-
nial monitoring showed that the radiation situation on
the accident site remained generally normal, meeting
the existing requirements on personnel and vessel
safety against all types of radiation. This was associ-
ated with the fact that the settled anthropogenic radio-
nuclides were reliably screened by the 3- to 30-m sea-
water layer (a water layer 2−3 m thick reduces the 60Со
gamma radiation by 10 4 times). The 60Со content in
seawater at 0.5 m from the bottom is 10−200 Bq/m3
(less than 0.05 of the permissible concentration) and
3−5 m higher, <1 Bq/m3; the 137Cs and 90Sr contents
have been 3−5 Bq/m3 all these years. As a result, the
specific activity of anthropogenic radionuclides in the
fauna and fl ora does not exceed 0.001−0.1 of the per-
missible concentration.
The decision to leave the accident site for natural
decontamination was socioeconomically and radio-
ecologically justified. It was based on the long-term
results of extended monitoring of the radioecological
situation at the accident site, performed by navy spe-
cialists jointly with the dockyard’s radiobiological lab-
oratory. To this end, the bottom sediments were sys-
tematically mapped and target samples of fauna and
flora species were selected back in the early 1990s. The
movement of bottom layer waters in Chazhma Bay,
the spatiotemporal transformation of the contami-
nated area, and the migration of radionuclides along
trophic chains were studied. This made it possible to
predict changes in the radioecological situation in the
bottom sediments for 15 years ahead, until 2015,
showing the acceptability of the natural decontamina-
tion mode, and this was constantly confirmed by the
expert assessments of independent organizations and
supervisory bodies. A similar approach was also used
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
270 SARKISOV, VYSOTSKII
to monitor the radioecological situation in the coastal
radioactive trace.
In addition, the decision for natural decontamina-
tion was largely made due to the fact that leaving the
radioactive contamination on the bottom was less haz-
ardous than the expected high radiation risks that
could appear during the radioecological rehabilitation
of the waters. Over the past 30 years, the devised
approach fully proved its value. Nevertheless, the
problem of rehabilitating the Chazhma Bay waters
cannot be considered finally solved because small
fragments of the destroyed reactor core still remain in
the sludge. Moreover, now we have acceptable meth-
ods and ways of decontaminating such pollutants [21].
It is important to note that the consequences of the
nuclear accident would have been much more severe
and of a greater scale had such an accident happened
before the reloading of the reactor core, because spent
fuel has a much higher radioactive potential than the
“fresh” fuel does.
***
Despite the ultimately unfavorable circumstances,
the human factor should be considered the main cause
of the nuclear accident with NPS K-431. It could have
been avoided had the operations been conducted com-
petently and had the refueling supervisor been highly
responsible in handling the material and had he not
made an inadmissible decision to use improperly the
refueling equipment when lifting the reactor head,
which was also followed by his upper managers
responsible for the preparation and performance of
this operation. The nuclear safety requirements on
lifting the reactor head with filled core and coolant
forbid unauthorized persons to remain in the reactor
compartment, except for the shift at work, which was
violated and led to the death of servicemen not impli-
cated in the operation. In addition, according to
instructions, when the reactor head was lifted using
the crane boat RS-133, the waters where nuclear-haz-
ardous operations were conducted should have been
closed in case of unexpected events, which was not ful-
filled.
An important physical feature of lifting the head of
a loaded reactor after the replacement of spent nuclear
fuel with “fresh” fuel is that the launch position of the
shim rod lattice in a VM-A reactor was just several tens
of millimeters from its lower limit position, while for
the spent core, this distance was several times larger.
Therefore, when the core is loaded with “fresh” fuel,
even a tiny upward displacement of the lattice could
lead to a runaway self-sustaining chain reaction. How-
ever, this potential hazard was neglected by the hands,
and the physicist, having underestimated it, perished
together with other servicemen.
Considering the drawbacks of the technical device
used to refuel VM-A reactors on the first-generation
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
NPSs, the subsequent generations of reactors have
improved equipment, and their design excludes unau-
thorized displacement of compensators when the head
is lifted.
Before the development and wide use of nuclear
energetics, the safety of technosphere facilities was
limited to various technical measures. The specifics of
nuclear energetics required a wider approach, which
was called safety culture [22]. Safety culture is a new
concept of engineering as the human attitude to safety
problems when duties are performed. According to the
definitions adopted by the International Nuclear
Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), it is a set of charac-
teristics and features of the activities of organizations
and individuals that gives the highest priority to the
safe operation of nuclear energy facilities.
The lessons of the severe nuclear accident in
Chazhma Bay prove once again the inalterability of
the strict performance of safety culture provisions, the
neglect of which was one of its main causes.
REFERENCES
1. The Role of Russian Science in the Creation of Domestic
Submarine Fleet, Ed. by A. A. Sarkisov (Nauka, Mos-
cow, 2008) [in Russian].
2. A. A. Sarkisov, L. B. Gusev, and R. I. Kalinin, Funda-
mentals of the Theory and Operation of Marine Reactors
(Nauka, Moscow, 2008) [in Russian].
3. A. A. Sarkisov and V. N. Puchkov, The Physics of Tran-
sient Processes in Nuclear Reactors (Energoatomizdat,
Moscow, 1983) [in Russian].
4. Yu. V. Sivintsev, S. M. Vakulovskii, V. L. Vysotskii, et
al., Anthropogenic Radionuclides in Seas That Wash Rus-
sia: Radioecological Aftermath of Radioactive Waste Dis-
posal into Arctic and Far-Eastern Seas (White Book
2000) (IzdAT, Moscow, 2005) [in Russian].
5. T. P. McLaughlin, D. P. Monaha, N. L. Pruvost, et al.,
A Review of Criticality Accidents 2003 Revision (Los Ala-
mos National laboratory, Los Alamos, 2003) [in Rus-
sian].
6. Yu. V. Sivintsev, “The fission rate during the nuclear
submarine accident in Chazhma Bay in 1985,” At.
Energ. 89 (3), 256 (2000).
7. NATO/CCMS Pilot Study: Cross-Border Environmental
Problems Emanating from Defence-Related Installations
and Activities, Phase II: 1995−1998, Final Report, Vol.
4: Environmental Risk Assessment for Two Defence-
Related Problems, Report No. 227 (NATO, 1998).
8. Yu. V. Sivintsev, “Was the Chazhma accident a Cher-
nobyl of the Far East?,” At. Energ. 94 (6), 472–479
(2002).
9. R. V. Arutyunyan, V. A. Danilyan, V. L. Vysotskii, et al.,
Analysis and evaluation of radiological consequences of
the nuclear accident in Chazhma Bay, Preprint of the
Nuclear Safety Inst., Russ. Acad. Sci., Moscow, 1998,
preprint no. IBRAE-98-09 [in Russian].
10. Yu. V. Sivintsev, V. L. Vysotskij, and V. A. Danilyan,
“Ecological consequences of a radiation accident on a
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018
 THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT ABOARD A NUCLEAR SUBMARINE IN CHAZHMA BAY
nuclear submarine in Chazhma Bay,” At. Energ. 76 (2),
158−160 (1994).
11. E. L. Chaikovskaya, V. L. Vysotskii, and D. V. Gichev,
“Regularities of the formation of the radiation situation
on Primorskii Krai territory,” At. Energ. 91 (3),
223−237 (2001).
12. Manual to Monitor Radioactive Contamination of the
Environment and the Internal Radiation Exposure of the
Military Personnel of Vessels with Nuclear Power Units
(RKVS-90) (Voenizdat, Moscow, 1991) [in Russian].
13. V. A. Danilyan, V. L. Vysotskii, A. A. Andreev, et al.,
The Accident with the Nuclear Power Unit of Nuclear
Submarine K-431 on August 10, 1985, at Naval Dock-
yard 30 in Chazhma Bay: Materials of the Pacific Fleet
Commander’s Report to the Russian Presidential Repre-
sentative in Primorskii Krai (Vladivostok, 1992) [in Rus-
sian].
14. M. Takano, V. Romanova, Hiromi Yamazawa, et al.,
“Reactivity accident of nuclear submarine near Vladi-
vostok,” J. of Nucl. Sci. Technol. 38 (2), 143−157
(2001).
15. Yu. V. Sivintsev, The Radioactive Legacy of the Russian
Pacific Fleet Operations and Its Potential Impact on
Neighboring Countries, Final Review Draft (Interna-
tional Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxen-
burg Austria, 2002).
16. R. V. Arutyunyan, L. A. Bol’shov, D. A. Pripachkin,
et al., “Assessment of the radionuclides release at the
severe accidents on the Fukushima-1 NPP (Japan),”
At. Energ. 112 (3),159−163 (2012).
HERALD OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
271
17. R. V. Arutyunyan, D. A. Pripachkin, O. S. Sorokov-
ikova, et al., “The PARRAD system and its testing in
actual emissions of radioactive substances into the
atmosphere,” At. Energ. 121 (3), 169–173 (2016).
18. Migration of Radioactive Contaminants from the 1985
Chazhma Bay Submarine Reactor Accident and
Fire−Joint U.S.–Russian SCOPING Investigation
(Pacific Northwest National Laboratory−PNNL,
Richland, Washington; Nuclear Safety Institute
(IBRAE) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Mos-
cow, 1998).
19. S. V. Antipov, A. A. Sarkisov, V. L. Vysotskii, et al.,
Radioecological Consequences of the Operation and Utili-
zation of Nuclear Fleet Facilities in the Far East Region
(IBRAE RAN, Moscow, 2010) [in Russian].
20. H. B. L. Pettersson, H. Amano, V. I. Berezhnoy, et al.,
“Anthropogenic radionuclides in sediments in the NW
Pacific Ocean and its marginal seas: Results of the
1994, 1995, 1997 Japanese–Korean–Russian expedi-
tions,” Sci. Total Environ. 237/238, 213–224 (1999).
21. A. A. Sarkisov, Yu. V. Sivintsev, V. L. Vysotskii, and
V. S. Nikitin, The Nuclear Legacy of the Cold War on the
Arctic Bed: Radioecological and Technical–Economic
Problems of Radiation Rehabilitation of Seas (Yulius,
Moscow, 2015) [in Russian].
22. A. A. Sarkisov, “The phenomenon of perception of the
nuclear energy hazard in social consciousness,” Herald
Russ. Acad. Sci. 82 (1), 8−16 (2012).
Vol. 88 No. 4 2018