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UK Cities Outlook 2024
UK Cities Outlook 2024
2024
About Centre for Cities
The UK’s economy is driven by the success of its largest cities and towns, which
generate opportunities and prosperity for people in all parts of the country.
Our mission is to help the UK’s largest cities and towns realise their economic
potential.
We produce rigorous, data-driven research and policy ideas to help cities, large
towns and Government address the challenges and opportunities they face – from
boosting productivity and wages to preparing for the changing world of work.
We also work closely with urban leaders, Whitehall and business to ensure our work
is relevant, accessible and of practical use to cities, large towns and policy makers.
Partnerships
Centre for Cities is always keen to work in partnership with like-minded organisations
who share our commitment to helping cities to thrive, and supporting policy makers
to achieve that aim.
72%
40%
9%
Sources: ONS, The Data City, Department of Energy Security and Net Zero
4. What needs to change
00
Testimonials IIII
01
The clash of politics and economics
in a general election year 03
02
How places have fared since 2010 09
03
City Monitor 33
Centre for Cities Centre for Cities
00
Cities Outlook
2024
Testimonials
Cities Outlook 2024 provides another vital overview Tackling the productivity challenge will be one of
of the contribution that cities of all sizes make to the big asks of the next government – and it’s an
driving economic growth across the UK – providing opportunity that we simply cannot afford to miss.
tens of millions of people with jobs and homes. For example, we know that if Liverpool’s productivity
increased to the national average, it would generate
And the potential further contribution of cities is an additional £4.5bn for our area.
immense: Core Cities UK and the RSA have found
that increasing the productivity of UK cities to the If we are serious about getting our economy firing
levels of their European peers would add an extra on all cylinders, then we need to see more action at
£100 billion a year to our national economy. a national level to break down regional imbalances.
As Cities Outlook 2024 shows, devolution is already
As this report from Centre for Cities shows, UK plc proving itself to be a catalyst for growth. The more
has stagnated since 2010. My home city of Bristol is powers we hand to local leaders, who understand
the only Core City ahead of the national average for the needs and priorities of their areas better than
productivity. We are one of very few places where anyone else, the faster we can start to address
gross disposable household income per head is up, the barriers that are holding our regions back from
however negligibly, since 2010, compared to what fulfilling their true potential.
would have been if 1998-2010 growth rates had been
sustained.
Mayor Steve Rotheram
The solution is simple. Cities must be empowered Mayor of Liverpool City Region
to help unlock and unleash the full potential of our
country.
01
Cities Outlook
2024
The clash of politics and
economics in a general
election year
inroads into the longstanding challenges that shape the UK’s economic geography.
The clash of politics and Inevitably, the politics of an election will drag politicians in directions that distort these choices
and decisions. There are three areas where this is likely to be a problem in the coming months
economics in a general
– the differing role of cities and towns in the national economy, planning reform and the
stuttering of London.
Planning reform
Box 1: Defining cities
This is an area where, for a long time, economics and politics have disagreed. The good news
is that both parties know that changes need to be made. And the Government has made some Centre for Cities research focuses on the UK’s 63 largest cities and towns,
progress with the changes set out in last year’s Levelling Up and Regeneration Act. defined as primary urban areas (PUAs). Unless otherwise stated, Centre for Cities
uses data for PUAs in its analysis – a measure of the ‘built-up’ area of a large
The reason for this consensus is the size of the problem. Centre for Cities showed in February city or town, rather than individual local authority areas. You can find the full
how the existing planning system, with its roots in the 1947 Town and Country Planning definitions and a methodological note at www.centreforcities.org/puas.
Act, has had a large role to play in the missing 4.3 million homes that the UK has built up,
compared with other European countries since the end of the Second World War.5
The politics here though have long been the barrier to change, and history reminds us that
rhetoric isn’t always followed with action, especially in this policy area. How serious either
party is will be revealed by the change they bring about after they are elected rather than the
words they choose to use in the run up to the election.
This isn’t just something that has been seen in the Capital – the poor performance of the
national economy since the financial crash has been felt across the country. The next chapter
of the 17th edition of Cities Outlook sets this out in detail.
This underwhelming growth has been a hallmark of the economies of almost every UK city
or large town. The chapter highlights the scale of the challenge for the next inhabitant of 10
Downing Street to overcome if the UK is to be markedly more prosperous by the end of the
decade.
5 Breach A and Watling S (2023), The housebuilding crisis: The UK’s 4 million missing homes, London: Centre for Cities
6 Rodrigues G and Bridgett S (2023), Capital losses: The role of London in the UK’s productivity puzzle, London: Centre for
Cities
02
Cities Outlook
2024
How places have fared
since 2010
since 2010 and the Conservative-led government since 2010. It also broadly covers the UK’s
economic cycle – in 2010 the economy was recovering from the global financial
crisis, while in 2021/22 it was bouncing back from the Covid-related recession.
The 1998-2010 period is used as a broad benchmark to put performance since
2010 into context.
The UK’s economic stagnation has been felt in every part of the country.
Addressing this presents a huge challenge for the next occupant of 10 The starting point: large differences in disposable incomes
Downing Street. across the country
The requirement for economic growth will be a key part of the debate in the run up to the next The coalition government came to power in 2010 with the aim of rebalancing the economy,
general election. While the economy is usually central in any election campaign, the UK’s poor both spatially and sectorally. The need to do this spatially was clear – as Figure 1 shows,
performance since the global financial crisis makes the requirement for growth a particularly disposable incomes in cities in the Greater South East in particular were much higher than
pressing one.7 And so it is no surprise that Keir Starmer has said that raising productivity they were further north. Disposable incomes in London were close to double what they were
growth will be Labour’s ‘obsession’,8 while Jeremy Hunt made growth the core theme of the in Blackburn and Hull, for example. And all large cities lagged behind the national average, a
last Autumn Statement. particular issue given the number of people who lived in them.
Cities are a key part of the UK economy – the 63 largest cities and towns are centres of
production, accounting for nine per cent of land but 63 per cent of output and 72 per cent of
high-skilled jobs. So their performance has been, and will be, an important factor in how well
the UK economy fares through the rest of the 2020s and beyond.
This chapter looks at the economic performance of cities since 2010, showing how they
have fared and what this means for the party that forms the next government. It does this by
looking at job creation, productivity, income and housing affordability. Where data is available,
it contrasts this performance to the 1998 to 2010 period to put this performance in context
(see Box 2).
7 Resolution Foundation and Centre for Economic Performance (2023), Ending Stagnation, A New Economic Strategy for
Britain, London: Resolution Foundation
8 Starmer’s full economy speech: “Labour will offer a new deal for the public”, LabourList, 4 December 2023
Figure 1: Gross disposable household income (GDHI) per head, 2010 (2022 prices) Most cities have experienced a jobs boom since 2010
In 2010 the requirement to create jobs was clear. As the UK economy was recovering from the
GDHI per head in
UK cities, 2010
global financial crisis, the unemployment rate was at its highest point since the mid-1990s.
Few would have predicted what was about to happen. The economy has gone through a jobs
15,000 - 16,999 miracle since 2010, and most cities and large towns have benefited. By 2022, there were 4.6
17,000 - 18,999 million extra jobs in the UK than there were in 2010, considerably more than the 2.5 million
19,000 - 20,999 created between 1998 and 2010.
21,000 - 29,000
All but two of Britain’s 62 largest cities and towns had more jobs too. London led in relative
terms. Its total number of jobs grew by almost 30 per cent, adding a further 1.4 million
positions to the Capital’s economy – the equivalent of adding the whole of Wales to the UK
jobs market. It was joined by Luton, Reading, Cambridge and Milton Keynes in the top five.
And half of cities had jobs growth that was higher than the national average between 1998
and 2010. In contrast, Aberdeen and Worthing were the only two places that had fewer jobs
– the fall of around 9 per cent in Aberdeen being in stark contrast to most other parts of the
country.
While there is a reasonable geographic spread of the top performers, the sheer scale of
London’s performance means that the total share of British jobs has continued to cluster in
the Greater South East. In 2010, 38.8 per cent of all roles were located there; by 2022 it had
risen to 40.8 per cent.9 And for every one job created elsewhere in Britain, 1.2 were generated
in the Greater South East. While rebalancing and levelling up have been themes in policy since
2010, the divides between south and north have continued to widen.
Source: ONS
Note: Data has been adjusted to 2022 prices using the consumer price index
9 The Greater South East’s share of gross value added over that time increased from 45.9 per cent to 47.5 per cent
Figure 2: Most cities and large towns have seen strong jobs growth since 2010 Figure 3: Productivity growth was very low across most cities and large towns
Net new job creation in British cities and large towns, 2010 - 2022 Real output per hour growth across cities and large towns, 2010 - 2021
LonLudon
ton 30.5
30.4 Cities in the Greater South East Cities in the Greater South East
Aldersh ot 3.0 2.9
LonLudon
ton 29.230.3 Cities elsewhere in Britain
Slou g h 2.7 2.7 Cities elsewhere in Britain
R ea din g 27.6
28.2 Norw ich 2.3 2.3
Milton
Ca mKeybridg n ese 24.5
25.0 R ea din g 2.2 2.2
Milton
Ma n ch Key ester
n es 24.2
24.2 W orth in g 1.9 1.9
Liv erpool 23.5
24.1 BCra
rig w
h ton
ley 1.71.5
Ma
Canmch bridg
ester e 23.0
23.0 BCra
rig w
h ton
ley 1.5 1.5
B rig
Leeds
h ton 21.922.9 Hu ddersfield 1.4 1.3
B rig
Leeds
h ton 21.322.8 B elfa st 1.3 1.3
B la ckbu rn 20.6 22.7 New ca stle 1.3 1.3
W aBrrin
a rngsley
ton 20.121.6 W a rrin g ton 1.1 1.1
B aBrnristol
sley 19.7
20.6 D onCaca rdiff
ster 1.0 1.0
W a rrinB ristol
g ton 18.9
19.8 D onCaca rdiff
ster 1.0 0.9
E dinT bu
elford
rg h 17.919.5 Ca m bridg e 0.8 0.8
WBaakefield
sildon 17.5 19.4 New
Preston
port 0.8 0.8
Peterborou
Edin bu rgg h 17.1 19.4 New
Preston
port 0.8 0.8
D on ca ster 16.818.1 Portsm ou th 0.7 0.7
W
Ma a kefield
n sfield 16.617.6 Sw a n sea 0.7 0.7
MaB ansildon
sfield 15.817.4 W ig a n 0.7 0.7
TDelford
erby 15.717.0 G la sg ow 0.7 0.6
Peterborou
Cov en try gh 15.4
15.8 Ch a th a m 0.7 0.6
Ca
D erby
rdiff 15.0
15.5 W a kefield 0.7 0.6
Cov O en
x ford
try 15.5
14.9 North a m pton 0.6 0.6
O
Cax ford
rdiff 14.015.5 Sh eeffield
ff i eld 0.6 0.5
North Leicester
a m pton 13.5 15.3 Stoke 0.6 0.5
North Leicester
a m pton 13.414.8 Su n derla n d 0.5 0.5
Ch a th a m 13.3
14.5 B irm in g h a m 0.5 0.5
B irm in g h a m 12.9
14.1 Leicester 0.5 0.4
Aldersh ot 12.013.3 Nottin g h a m 0.4 0.4
G la sg ow 11.0
12.0 T elford 0.4 0.4
PlyB m
u rnouley
th 10.312.0 Ma n ch ester 0.4 0.4
B u rnHu leyll 10.0
10.6 BBlara
ckbu
dford rn 0.4 0.3
Ply mStoke
ou th 9.510.5 BBlara
ckbu
dford rn 0.4 0.3
Stoke
Hu ll 8.49.4 B u rn ley 0.3 0.3
B ou rnShem effield
ou th 8.29.3 BEirken
din buh earg d
h 0.3 0.3
New Ipsw
ca stle
ich 8.1
8.8 BEirken
din buh earg d
h 0.3 0.3
B ouNew
rn em caou stle
th 7.8
8.3 Lon
E x eter
don 0.3 0.3
SwIpsw
a n sea
ich 8.0
7.4 Lon
E x eter
don 0.3 0.3
Sh effYork
i e ld 6.57.8 Middlesbrou g h 0.3 0.2
B raWdford
ig a n 6.57.6 B ristol 0.3 0.2
Hu ddersfield
B ra dford 6.27.5 B ou rn em ou th 0.2 0.2
B la ckpool
W ig a n 6.27.3 Milton Key n es 0.2 0.2
Nottin
B la ckpool
gham 5.56.8
CovD uen
n de trye 0.1 0.0
Hu
Nottin
ddersfield
gham 5.26.2
Cov
D uen
n deetry 0.1 0.0
Ipsw ich 0.0 -0.1
Sou thSw am a npton
sea 5.26.0
Sw Lu ton
in don 0.0-0.1
Cra w York
ley 4.95.5
SwOin don
x ford -0.1-0.2
B irken
Crahwea le d
y 4.65.5
Ma O x ford
n sfield -0.1-0.2
Sou th a mhpton
B irken ea d 4.9
4.6
Ma nLu sfield
ton -0.2-0.2
Preston 4.3
4.8
Sou th en d -0.2 -0.2
New
Sw inport
don 4.1
4.7
B la ckpool -0.2-0.3
Norwport
New ich 4.6
4.1
Leeds
UK average
UK
-0.2 -0.3
Slou g h 3.6
4.1
B a sildon -0.4 -0.4
D u n dee 3.3
3.5
B a rn sley -0.4 -0.4
G louEx eter
cester 2.6
3.1
Peterborou g h -0.5-0.5
1998-2010 || 8.5
G louEcester
x eter 2.3
2.5
Ply m ou th -0.5-0.6
Middlesbrou
Portsm ougth h 0.82.1
Hu ll -0.6-0.7
Portsm ougth
Middlesbrou h 1.3
0.7
York -0.8-0.8
Su n derla n d 0.1
0.8 Liv erpool -0.8-0.8
W orth in g -1.1
-1.2 Sou th a m pton -0.8-0.9
8.5
Aberdeen -9.1
-8.3 D erby -1.9-1.9
-10 -5 00 55 10
10 15
15 20
20 2525 3030 -2.0-2.0-1.5 -1.5-1.0 -1.0-0.5 -0.50.0 0.00.5 0.51.0 1.01.5 1.52.0 2.02.5 2.53.0 3.0
Source: ONS
Source: ONS
Note: Data isn’t available for Belfast. To account for the break in the data in 2015 a scaling factor has been applied to the 2010
data to make it comparable with 2022 data. This factor is the ratio of the 2015 data produced by the old and new methodology. Note: Data has been deflated using the ONS’ regional GVA deflators
But productivity growth has been weak across the country 2010, an increase of £3,300 (in 2022 prices).
Things look decidedly less positive from a growth perspective when looking at productivity. Despite its poor productivity growth, London was the only city that saw its disposable income
At the national level, it increased by an annual average of 0.6 per cent in real terms between per head rise faster than the national increase between 1998 and 2010. On average, incomes
2010 and 2021, much more sluggish than the average annual growth of 1.5 per cent between of Londoners were almost £4,300 higher than in 2010 (in 2022 prices), and Box 3 discusses
1998 and 2010. what drove this. It was followed by Brighton, Worthing and Aldershot. Meanwhile, Burnley and
Aberdeen had lower incomes than in 2010 and, on average, people in Glasgow were just £34
And this was seen across most of the country. Comparing city performance post-2010 to better off (see Figure 5). And this is before housing costs are accounted for, which as Box 4
the national average between 1998 and 2010 underlines how poorly almost everywhere has shows worsened in most places.
performed. Just five cities had productivity growth rates that were higher than the national
average between 1998 and 2010, all of which were in the Greater South East (see Figure 3). Once again, the scale of London combined with its performance had an impact on how
More alarmingly, 18 had become less productive according to ONS figures over the period, incomes grew in different parts for the country. For every £1 increase per head outside of the
with Derby seeing the largest fall in output per hour of any city or large town. Greater South East13 between 2010 and 2022, they rose by £2.36 within the area.
Despite the seven fastest-growing cities all being in the Greater South East, there was little
difference in productivity growth between this part of the country and the rest of the UK.
This is because, conversely to the story for jobs, London’s productivity slowdown more than Box 3: Components of London’s disposable income growth
countered the growth of places like Slough and Brighton. The Capital led UK productivity
growth before the financial crisis,10 but it has close to flatlined since, increasing by an average London still saw the largest absolute growth in per capita disposable income
of just 0.3 per cent per year between 2010 and 2021. This ranked it 38th out of 63 cities and despite its sharp productivity slowdown. Looking at the components of disposable
was a key cause of the wider UK slowdown seen over the period. income shows that this was mainly made up from increasing income from
employment, rather than from income from housing or other assets, for example.
This combination of strong job growth but poor productivity growth suggests that many of And salary data shows that this wasn’t the result of large wage gains – the growth
the roles created were in lower productivity activities. At a national level, around two-thirds was low for all wage earners. It is the rapid increase in jobs, with more people in
were taken by households in the bottom half of the income distribution between 2009/10 employment (the Capital had an employment rate of 76 in 2022, up from 68 per
and 2019/20,11 and while the data isn’t available at the sub-national level, the analysis above cent in 2010).
suggests this played out across most cities. The UK hasn’t struggled to create jobs, which is
very welcome. It does, however, appear to have struggled to generate ‘good jobs,’ to use a
phrase used by both Rishi Sunak and Keir Starmer.12
10 Rodrigues G and Bridgett S (2023), Capital Losses: The role of London in the UK’s productivity puzzle, London: Centre for
Cities
11 Resolution Foundation and Centre for Economic Performance (2023), Ending Stagnation, A New Economic Strategy for
Britain, London: Resolution Foundation
12 See for example ‘Keir Starmer speech unveiling Labour’s mission to cut bills, create jobs and provide energy security for
Britain’, 19 June 2023 and ‘Better Jobs and a Fair Deal at Work’, Hansard 12 May 2021 13 Including Northern Ireland
Figure 5: Since 2010, only London saw disposable income growth outstrip that
Box 4: Housing has also become less affordable in most cities seen at the national level between 1998 and 2010
This disposable income growth slowdown has come at a time when housing
affordability – already an issue in 2010 – has gotten worse. Housing has become Real change in gross domestic household income per head, 2010 - 2021 (2022 prices)
less affordable in almost every city (see Figure 4). And cities in the Greater South
East, where the affordability challenge was already most acute, have tended to Lon don 4,325 Cities in the Greater South East
see the greatest increases – eight of the 10 cities with the largest deterioration B rig h ton
W orth in g
2,843
2,772
Cities elsewhere in Britain
were in this part of the country (with London having the biggest change). Exeter Aldersh ot
B ristol
2,339
2,281
and Bristol also made the top 10. Assuming that this has meant that rents have York
Sou th en d
2,175
2,168
also increased means that the disposable incomes of renters in particular will B a rn sley 2,133
North a m pton 2,124
have been squeezed still further. O x ford
W a rrin g ton
2,096
1,928
Portsm ou th 1,772
Edin bu rg h 1,661
Just five cities have seen an improvement. All three cities in the North East – Nottin g h a m
R ea din g
1,628
1,586
Middlesbrough, Newcastle and Sunderland - along with Blackpool and Aberdeen, Lu ton
Hu ddersfield
1,575
1,558
saw housing become slightly more affordable. Slou g h
D erby
1,555
1,505
Ma n sfield 1,479
Ch a th a m 1,419
Figure 4: Cities in the Greater South East have tended to see housing Preston
B ou rn em ou th
1,417
1,417
affordability deteriorate the most Ma n ch ester
D on ca ster
1,345
1,316
Ipsw ich 1,291
Leeds 1,275
Source: ONS
Note: resident wages are taken from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings in this chapter because data
from Pay as You Earn tax records, as is used in the Data Monitor section, begins in 2014.
Note: Data has been deflated using the consumer price index
Data isn’t available for Belfast.
These combined trends have impacted on the level and nature of Figure 6: Absolute child poverty has decreased in the majority of cities, particularly
poverty in the UK in Wales and some parts of the Greater South East, but many Midlands cities have
seen increases
Despite their disproportionate benefit from the job creation that has happened since 2010,
those at the bottom end of the income distribution appear to have been most affected by
this poor disposable income growth. Using children in poverty as a proxy shows that relative Proportion of children living in absolute poverty, percentage point change, 2014 - 2021
poverty has become a bigger problem since 2014 (the earliest the data is available).
Nottin g h a m 7.1 Cities in the Greater South East
D erby 6.8 Cities elsewhere in Britain
The good news is that absolute child poverty has decreased slightly overall between 2014 and Leicester 6.3
Ma n sfield 5.8
2021. This measure is based on a fixed baseline of 2010 median income, so this slight decline Stoke 4.1
B irm in g h a m 4.0
is consistent with the rise in incomes, however sluggish, over this period. Middlesbrou g h 3.9
T elford 3.6
North a m pton 3.5
Cov en try 3.5
But this wasn’t the case in many cities. While more than half saw declining absolute child G la sg ow 3.4
Aberdeen 3.0
poverty rates, those in the Midlands (led by Nottingham, Derby and Leicester) saw the largest Cra w ley 2.5
New ca stle 2.5
increases (see Figure 6). In all Scottish cities absolute child poverty rates rose, while all Welsh D u n dee 2.4
Edin bu rg h 1.7
cities saw significant decreases. Su n derla n d 1.4
Portsm ou th 1.3
Slou g h 0.8
Sou th a m pton 0.5
In contrast, the proportion of children in relative poverty has risen in every UK city except Aldersh ot 0.4
O x ford 0.3
Belfast (see Figure 7). Relative poverty is measured as having less than 60 per cent of R ea din g 0.2
Ch a th a m 0.2
median income in the same year. This indicates that while incomes in most cities have grown B rig h ton -0.1
Liv erpool -0.7
among the poorest households, it has been at a slower rate than average earners, meaning Milton Key n es -0.7
B irken h ea d -0.7
their relative position has worsened. As a consequence, in 2021 there were six UK cities, all Leeds -0.8
B la ckpool -0.8
of which are in the Midlands and the North of England (Bradford, Blackburn, Birmingham, B ristol -0.9
B u rn ley -0.9
Burnley, Derby and Leicester) where over a third of children were in households in relative W orth in g -0.9
Ipsw ich -0.9
poverty. There were none in 2014. Lon don -1.0
B ou rn em ou th -1.1
W a rrin g ton -1.4
Sh effield -1.4
Alongside this, there has been a change in the nature of poverty – in-work poverty has been Ma n ch ester -1.6
Preston -1.7
increasing in almost all areas of the UK. Figure 8 shows that the share of children living in G lou cester -1.8
Hu ddersfield -1.9
relative poverty who are from working families has risen in all cities except those in the East E x eter -1.9
Sw in don -2.0
of England. The upshot is that while in-work poverty was primarily a Greater South East W ig a n -2.1
Ca m bridg e -2.3
phenomenon in 2014, it is increasingly spreading across the rest of the country. In 2014, the York -2.3
B ra dford -2.3
Greater South East accounted for 17 of the 20 cities with the highest share of children in Norw ich -2.5
Ply m ou th -2.6
relative poverty. In 2021, it was 13 of the top 20 (noting the top 11 were all still in the Greater W a kefield -3.0
B a rn sley -3.0
South East). Sou th en d -3.0
D on ca ster -3.1
Lu ton -3.6
Ca rdiff -3.7
Sw a n sea -3.8
B la ckbu rn -4.0
B a sildon -4.2
Hu ll -4.8
Peterborou g h -5.0
New port -5.7
B elfa st -6.5
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Figure 7: In contrast to absolute poverty, share of children in relative poverty has Figure 8: An increasing share of child poverty is seen among in-work households in
increased in all cities except Belfast all cities besides those in the East of England
Proportion of children living in relative poverty, percentage point change, 2014 - 2021 Percentage point change in the share of children in relative poverty from working households,
2014 - 2021
Nottin g h a m 12.7 Cities in the Greater South East
D erby 12.1 Cities elsewhere in Britain
Leicester 11.7 Sw a n sea 25.1 Cities in the Greater South East
Ma n sfield 11.3 New port 23.3 Cities elsewhere in Britain
Middlesbrou g h 10.3 Ca rdiff 21.1
B irm in g h a m 10.2 Portsm ou th 13.1
Stoke 9.9 O x ford 12.9
T elford 9.3 Sou th a m pton 12.5
Cra w ley 8.9 Ch a th a m 12.3
G la sg ow 8.4 Aldersh ot 12.1
Cov en try 8.4 Ply m ou th 11.1
New ca stle 8.2 Middlesbrou g h 10.9
B u rn ley 8.1 New ca stle 10.8
D u n dee 8.1 R ea din g 10.5
Liv erpool 8.0 Su n derla n d 10.2
Su n derla n d 8.0 B rig h ton 10.2
Portsm ou th 7.6 W orth in g 9.9
Slou g h 7.5 Slou g h 9.7
North a m pton 7.0
Hu ll 8.9
B la ckpool 7.0
Lon don 8.8
Sou th a m pton 6.9
Milton Key n es 8.7
Aberdeen 6.6
Cra w ley 8.6
B la ckbu rn 6.3
G lou cester 8.5
Ma n ch ester 6.2
E x eter 7.6
Ch a th a m 5.8
Sw in don 7.3
Ipsw ich 5.6
Nottin g h a m 7.1
B irken h ea d 5.6
Liv erpool 6.8
O x ford 5.5
Ma n sfield 6.8
B ra dford 5.4
B ristol 6.1
Milton Key n es 4.7
W a rrin g ton 6.0
Leeds 4.6
Stoke 5.8
Hu ddersfield 4.5
Leicester 5.8
Edin bu rg h 4.5
W ig a n 5.1
Sh eff i e ld 4.4
T elford 5.0
W orth in g 4.3
Preston 4.2 D erby 4.7
B a rn sley 4.7
B rig h ton 4.2
W ig a n 4.2 B irken h ea d 4.7
Taken together, these trends imply the following: Figure 9: On average people in most cities and large towns have less money in their
pockets than if disposable incomes had grown at pre-2010 rates
• Strong jobs growth has lifted many households out of absolute poverty between 2014
Cumulative difference in gross disposable household income per
and 2021, although this is not the case in many cities in the Midlands and the North. head if the city economy grew at 1998-2010 rates (£, 2022 prices)
• In contrast, increases in relative child poverty suggest low-income households have still Aberdeen -45,240 Luton -7,660
fared worse compared with average-earning households over the period. Burnley -28,090 Stoke -7,360
Glasgow -23,500 Southampton -7,070
Combining this with the evidence of increasing in-work poverty suggests that job growth Milton Keynes -21,610 Newcastle -6,860
without productivity growth has merely shifted poor households into work, rather than Cambridge -21,340 Brighton -6,660
alleviating poverty altogether. Dundee -17,730 Sheffield -6,380
Birkenhead -17,540 Reading -5,920
The result is that most places are worse off than if pre-2010 Ipswich -17,390 Doncaster -4,750
cities or large towns. But it has had a difficult period since. This shows both the
35,000
upsides and the downsides of being dependent on a particular industry.
Around 30 per cent of jobs in Aberdeen’s export base – the part of the economy 30,000
that trades with other areas of the UK and the world – are directly related to oil
and gas. And unlike the 2000s, this sector struggled in the 2010s. The result is
25,000
that the city has lost an estimated 9,000 jobs in areas related to oil and gas.
This is likely to have impacted the amount of money spent in the city – the number 20,000
of retail jobs fell by almost 30 per cent compared with 6 per cent nationally. And
house prices have been affected too – averages were 3.4 per cent higher in 2022
than in 2010 (compared with a national increase of 50 per cent) and were 15 per 15,000
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
cent down on their 2014 peak.
Figure 10: Disposable income growth lagged well behind the pre-2010 trend in
Aberdeen and London Policy churn has continued since 2010
There certainly hasn’t been a lack of action in terms of sub-national economic policy over the
Aberdeen past 14 years, with a plethora of initiatives introduced. There have been four main narratives to
the policy approach.
Real gross domestic household income (£)
30,000 • This concept was largely abandoned by the May government, which focused more on
industrial strategies, including the creation of local industrial strategies.
25,000
• And with the Johnson government came levelling up, which has continued into the Sunak
government, even if it has had less focus.
20,000 Sitting under this have been a range of funds, deals, new structures, area-based policies and
task forces designed to improve growth across the country (see Figure 11). Much of it hasn’t
had a great deal of impact, and some has come in for sharp criticism.14
15,000
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
14 National Audit Office (2022), Supporting local economic growth: Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities,
London: The Stationery Office
Source: Adapted from Pacione M (2009), Urban Geography: A Global Perspective, Third Edition, London: Routledge and National Audit Office (NAO) (2019) Local Enterprise Partnerships: An Update on Progress. London: NAO.
Trailblazer Devolution Deals
Community Renewal Fund
Innovation Accelerators
Transport Settlements
Training & Enterprise
Policy churn isn’t just a hallmark of the past 14 years though. Figure 11 also shows that the
Single Regeneration
Urban Regeneration
County Combined
Levelling Up Fund
Investment Zones
Agency / English
Regeneration Bill
Levelling Up and
City Challenge 1997 to 2010 period was similar in its approach, which in turn was seen in the decades before
Partnerships
the Regions
Authorities
it.
City Pride
Freeports
Councils
Budget
As the Levelling Up White Paper highlighted, this is a problem that limits any attempts to
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2020
1990
Mayoral Development
Housing Action Trusts
important prerequisite for the next government to be able to show progress when it goes to
Inner City Compacts
Mayoral Combined
the electorate. Two recent policy initiatives offer increased hope that this consistency can be
Corporations
Towns Fund
City Grants
Authorities
achieved.
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1985
2015 George Osborne in 2014 and since expanded. While these institutions will take time to impact
1979 - 1997 | Conservative government
the performance of their economies, they have already been able to tailor policy to their areas
Urban Development Grants
Regional Development
Devolution Deals
Enterprise Zones
Garden Festivals
Local Enterprise
The second is the Levelling Up White Paper itself. While not perfect, one of its most welcome
Partnerships
aspects is a setting out of government strategy for improving the performance of different
City Deals
Schemes
Boards
parts of the country that includes identifying trade-offs and areas where policy should be
Grant
focused.
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1980
2010
A major economic headache for the coalition government in 2010 was how to get the economy
Urban Development
Figure 11: A timeline of sub-national economic policies since 1965
creating jobs again to offset the impact of the global financial crisis. Given what has
Corporations
White Paper
(expansion)
Pathfinders
happened over the past 14 years, this will be less of a concern for the next government.
Initiative
Agency
Areas
Fund
Trust
Clearly, what will be an issue is productivity growth. Not only has the UK performed poorly
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2005
1975
relative to international peers (despite their own struggles), most of its cities have struggled
too. And even London, which led UK productivity growth up until the global financial crisis,
Local Strategic Partnerships
has hit the buffers. This has had implications for how incomes have grown and the number of
Sustainable Communities
Management Pathfinders
Local Authority Business
Working Neighbourhood
Growth Initiative
Neighbourhood
Despite the slowdown in the Greater South East, growth in jobs means its share of the
Olympics
country’s employment, output and income have increased further. On these measures, not
Fund
Plan
▪
▪
▪
2000
1970
And housing, especially in the Greater South East, is a larger issue. It’s even more
New Deal for Communities
Neighbourhood Renewal
Regional Development
Urban Regeneration
National Coalfields
Urban Programme
This is quite some in-tray for the next government. The factor that ties these issues together is
1964 - 1970 | Labour govt
Programme
Companies
growth, specifically a lack of it. Many of the country’s economic problems – high taxes, high
Agencies
projects
Fund
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▪
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▪
1965
1995
national debt, poor income growth and rising relative poverty – have come about because of
poor productivity growth.
Improving productivity must be the focus of the next parliament if economic performance
since 2010 isn’t to be repeated over the remainder of the 2020s. Both main parties have
committed to focusing on growth and taking a long-term approach to this. But how serious
they are will be shown by the policies they put in place.
National-level policies, such as business investment tax reliefs, immigration and the UK’s
trading relationships with the rest of the world, will have a big influence on improving
productivity across the country. Getting these policies right will be a central part of achieving a
stronger UK economy irrespective of anything that falls under the banner of levelling up.
But these national policies will have different impacts in different places. To make the most
of any opportunities, they will need to be complemented by a set of place-based policies that
follow best practice over the past 14 years. Specifically, the next government should:
• Stick with the levelling up agenda and its focus on improving the performance
of the largest cities outside London. Given the ongoing underperformance of large
UK cities relative to their international peers, it’s difficult to see how there can be a more
prosperous UK economy without these cities playing the same role that their equivalents
in other developed countries play. This focus needs to be backed with a multi-decade
programme of policies, as has been seen in Germany.15 Strategies without action don’t
bring about change.
• Continue with devolution. Passing appropriate powers down to the geography
the economy operates over gives places a greater ability to deal with economic
underperformance and change. The trailblazer deals with Greater Manchester and the
West Midlands mark significant progress in devolution, relative to 2010. The next stage
should be to pass fiscal powers to London and other large city regions, while addressing
the clear funding challenges faced by local government following decisions taken under
the banner of austerity.16
• Reform the planning system. The discretionary case-by-case nature of the existing
planning system creates uncertainty and has resulted in decades-long deficits in
housebuilding, squeezing London and the Greater South East in particular. If this is to
change, the next government should build on steps taken in the 2023 Levelling Up and
Regeneration Act to move to a rules-based approach for planning, which exists in other
countries.17
15 Enenkel K and Rösel F (2022), German Reunification: Lessons from the German approach to closing regional economic
divides, London: Resolution Foundation
16 Breach A, Bridgett S and Vera O (2023), In place of centralisation: A devolution deal for London, Greater Manchester, and
the West Midlands, London: Centre for Cities
17 Breach A and Watling S (2023), The housebuilding crisis: The UK’s 4 million missing homes, London: Centre for Cities
Figure 12 shows that they account for 9 per cent of land but 63 per cent of output and 72 per
cent of knowledge-based jobs in the private sector – the sorts of jobs that the UK will need more
There is considerable variation in the economic performance of cities and towns across the UK. of if it is going to see productivity growth throughout the rest of this decade.
The purpose of this chapter is to show the scale and nature of this variation by highlighting the
performance of the 63 largest urban areas* on 17 indicators covering:
Figure 12: Cities as a share of the national total
• Population • Employment
• Productivity • Skills
72%
40%
• Wages • Environment 9%
Sources:
Land area: Census 2021, ArcGIS
Greenhouse gas emissions: Department for Energy Security and Net Zero 2023, greenhouse gas emissions per capita, 2021 data
Scan Population: ONS 2023, Population estimates-local authority based by five-year age band, 2021 data
for New Economy Firms: Data City, 2023, ONS Population Estimates 2023
a High-skilled residents: ONS 2023, Annual Population Survey, resident analysis, 2022 data. NISRA, 2023, Labour Force Survey, 2022
data.
ll
GVA (£bn): ONS 2023 Regional gross domestic product: local authorities, 2021 data
y data
Private KIBS jobs: ONS 2023, Business Register and Employment Survey, 2022 data
www.centrefo
rci
tie
g/
dat
a /data -tool/
Centre for Cities
Which cities' or large towns' population has been growing the most
or the least?
Ca m bridg e 17.9
Peterborou g h 15.4
Milton Key n es 15.0
E x eter 14.4
North a m pton 12.6
R ea din g 12.5
Table 1: Population growth T elford 12.4
Cov en try 11.8
Slou g h 11.2
Sw in don 10.7
Population Population B ristol 10.7
percentage change, Population, Population, absolute change, Leicester 10.5
Rank City 2012-2022 (%) 2012 2022 2012-2022 Lu ton 10.2
E din bu rg h 10.2
Cra w ley 9.7
10 fastest-growing cities by population W a kefield 9.1
Leeds 8.5
1 Cambridge 17.9 124,679 146,995 22,316 Ma n ch ester 8.2
2 Peterborough 15.4 188,675 217,705 29,030 G lou cester 8.1
B u rn ley 8.0
3 Milton Keynes 15.0 254,003 292,180 38,177 Sou th a m pton 7.4
productivity than the national average are in the South, with the exception of Edinburgh. E din bu rg h 41.4
Cra w ley 40.7
B a sildon 39.0
• GVA per hour in the Greater South East was £42.50 in 2021. It is the only region that is more Norw ich 37.0
productive than the national average. GVA per hour in the rest of Great Britain was £32.10. Ch a th a m 37.0
Ca m bridg e 36.8
B ristol 36.6
• The Greater South East’s strong performance is led by its cities, where the average GVA B rig h ton 36.5
per hour was 29 per cent higher than non-urban areas in the region. This results from the Un ited Kin g dom 36.3
Portsm ou th 36.2
advantages that urban settings provide to high-knowledge businesses in particular. Ab erdeen 35.8
Cov en try 35.8
• However, cities in the rest of Britain were only 0.1 per cent more productive than non-urban Sou th a m pton 35.6
Ipsw ich 34.7 25.8 - 30.1
areas in the rest of the country. Ca rdiff 34.6 30.2 - 34.7
Su n derla n d 33.9
34.8 - 42.1
• Most notable is that with the exception of Bristol, all large cities lag behind the national W a rrin g ton 33.7
42.2 - 51.5
E x eter 33.3
average. Their size should mean that they instead lead the national economy, as happens in Peterborou g h 33.1 51.6 - 62.9
other western European countries.18 It is this underperformance that is the main cause of Lu ton 33.1
B ou rn em ou th 32.9
the wider underperformance of the economy outside of the Greater South East. B la ckpool 32.7
Preston 32.7
Ma n ch ester 32.5
Leeds 32.5
Rank City GVA per hour, 2021 (£) Rank City GVA per hour, 2021 (£) O x ford 31.9
D erby 31.9
Leicester 31.7
Middlesbrou g h 31.7
10 cities with the highest GVA per hour 10 cities with the lowest GVA per hour North a m pton 31.6
1 Slough 62.9 54 Wigan 28.7 B irm in g h a m 31.5
B irken h ea d 31.3
2 Aldershot 59.0 55 Dundee 28.4 T elford 31.1
3 Worthing 51.5 56 Bradford 28.4 New ca stle 31.0
Liv erpool 30.8
4 Reading 48.6 57 Gloucester 28.2 W a kefield 30.7
Nottin g h a m 30.1
5 London 48.1 58 Hull 28.1 Sw a n sea 30.1
6 Swindon 47.5 59 Stoke 27.4 New port 29.9
B u rn ley 29.4
7 Milton Keynes 42.1 60 Barnsley 27.3 Sh e ffi eld 29.2
8 Edinburgh 41.4 61 Doncaster 26.1 Hu ddersfield 29.2
Ma n sfield 29.2
9 Crawley 40.7 62 Blackburn 26.0 Ply m ou th 29.2
W ig a n 28.7
10 Basildon 39.0 63 Southend 25.8 D u n dee 28.4
United Kingdom 36.3 B ra dford 28.4
G lou cester 28.2
Hu ll 28.1
Source: ONS 2023, “Regional gross domestic product: local authorities”, “Subregional productivity: labour productivity indices by lo- Stoke 27.4
cal authority district”, 2021 data. Note: GVA measures the contribution of each individual producer, industry or sector to the economy B a rn sley 27.3
D on ca ster 26.1
of the United Kingdom excluding Value Added Tax (VAT); other taxes on products and subsidies on products.
B la ckbu rn 26.0
Sou th en d 25.8
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
18 Swinney P and Enenkel K (2020), Why big cities are crucial to ‘levelling up’, London: Centre for Cities
Business dynamics Figure 15: Business start-ups and closures per 10,000 population, 2022
Table 4: Business stock per 10,000 population Table 5: Ratio of private sector to publicly-funded jobs
Business stock per 10,000 Business stock per 10,000 Change, 2021- Private to public ratio, Private sector jobs, Publicly funded jobs,
Rank City population, 2022 population, 2021 2022 (%) Rank City 2022 2022 2022*
10 cities with the highest number of businesses 10 cities with the highest proportion of private sector jobs
1 London 582.4 597.1 -2.4 1 Crawley 6.4 74,000 11,500
2 Brighton 494.7 506.5 -2.3 2 Slough 4.7 70,000 15,000
3 Northampton 423.3 467.2 -9.4 3 Warrington 4.3 114,500 26,500
4 Reading 416.4 434.7 -4.2 4 Aldershot 4.1 87,000 21,000
5 Milton Keynes 413.8 434.3 -4.7 5 Luton 3.8 87,000 23,000
6 Basildon 402.4 407.3 -1.2 6 Swindon 3.8 90,500 24,000
7 Slough 398.0 417.8 -4.7 7 Reading 3.7 167,500 45,000
8 Warrington 395.6 409.8 -3.5 8 London 3.7 4,969,000 1,360,000
9 Aldershot 393.4 404.5 -2.7 9 Milton Keynes 3.5 142,000 40,500
10 Southend 388.0 385.1 0.8 10 Telford 3.5 74,500 21,500
10 cities with the lowest number of businesses 10 cities with the lowest proportion of private sector jobs
54 Barnsley 267.0 271.3 -1.6 53 Plymouth 1.8 76,000 42,000
55 Newcastle 264.4 268.2 -1.4 54 Swansea 1.8 104,000 58,500
56 Stoke 259.4 266.2 -2.5 55 Gloucester 1.8 42,500 24,000
57 Swansea 251.9 256.4 -1.8 56 Liverpool 1.7 224,000 131,500
58 Hull 250.7 243.5 2.9 57 Birkenhead 1.6 65,000 39,500
59 Newport 249.6 249.9 -0.1 58 Exeter 1.6 59,000 38,000
60 Middlesbrough 241.8 250.2 -3.3 59 Worthing 1.5 29,000 19,000
61 Plymouth 235.1 235.7 -0.2 60 Dundee 1.4 46,000 32,000
62 Dundee 233.9 234.2 -0.1 61 Cambridge 1.4 66,000 46,000
63 Sunderland 216.9 220.9 -1.8 62 Oxford 0.9 59,000 64,500
Great Britain 381.4 389.5 -2.1 Great Britain 2.8 23,613,000 8,306,000
Source: ONS 2023, Business Demography, 2022 data; ONS 2023, Population estimates, 2021 and 2022 data.
Source: ONS 2023, Business Register and Employment Survey, 2021 and 2022 data.
Note: Northern Ireland data not available, so the figure for Great Britain is shown.
*Publicly-funded jobs are defined as those jobs that fall into the sectors of public administration and defence, education, and health.
This means that this definition captures private sector jobs in these sectors but also captures jobs such as GPs and those in universi-
ties that the standard ONS definition does not.
Innovation Figure 16: New economy firms per 10,000 working age population, 2023
advanced manufacturing that are at the forefront of new technologies and innovations. Their E x eter 33.2
Ca rdiff 33.2
performance is important for the UK’s productivity and prosperity because they are at the O x ford 33.1
W orth in g 30.7
frontier of the economy and the number of new economy firms in a city serves as a proxy for B ou rn em ou th 30.4
located in cities in the Greater South East, and 7 of the 10 cities with the largest numbers of Preston 21.9
B u rn ley 21.9
new economy firms per population are in the Greater South East. B elfa st 21.8
Ipsw ich 21.0
Leicester 20.6
D erby 20.5
Table 6: New economy firms per 10,000 working age population Nottin g h a m 20.4
Sh effield 20.2
Slou g h 20.0
B la ckpool 19.7
New economy firms New economy firms Hu ddersfield 19.6
per 10,000 working per 10,000 working G la sg ow 19.5
Rank City age population, 2023 Rank City age population, 2023 B la ckbu rn 19.4
T elford 19.3
10 cities with the highest number of new economy 10 cities with the lowest number of new economy G lou cester 18.8
firms firms B irm in g h a m 18.6
Cov en try 18.6
1 Brighton 46.8 54 Bradford 14.7 Sw in don 18.6
2 Cambridge 43.2 55 Mansfield 13.8 B irken h ea d 18.1
Stoke 17.9
3 London 43.2 56 Doncaster 13.5 Peterborou g h 17.5
New ca stle 17.4
4 Milton Keynes 37.0 57 Wakefield 13.4 D u n dee 17.4
5 Warrington 34.5 58 Hull 13.4 Ply m ou th 16.5
Liv erpool 16.0
6 Aldershot 33.6 59 Barnsley 13.4 Lu ton 15.5
7 Reading 33.4 60 Newport 12.9 Ch a th a m 15.3
Cra w ley 15.0
8 Exeter 33.2 61 Wigan 12.7 Sw a n sea 14.9
B ra dford 14.7
9 Cardiff 33.2 62 Middlesbrough 12.4 Ma n sfield 13.8
10 Oxford 33.1 63 Sunderland 12.4 D on ca ster 13.5
W a kefield 13.4
United Kingdom 25.6 Hu ll 13.4
B a rn sley 13.4
New port 12.9
Source: The Data City, 2023; ONS 2023, Population estimates, 2022 data. W ig a n 12.7
Middlesbrou g h 12.4
Su n derla n d 12.4
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
752.3
G rea ter Sou th E a st S o u th e n d Lo n d o n
• The average weekly workplace wage in cities was £709 in 2023 - higher than the UK average
of £666. However, this was the result of a strong performance of a small number of cities -
just 17 cities had an average weekly wage that was above the UK average. Na tion a l Un ite d K in g d o m | 666.1
• There is also a clear divide between the Greater South East and the rest of the country: the
average weekly wage for jobs in the South East was 23 per cent higher than in the rest of the
660.5
country. Scotla n d Dundee A b e rd e e n
• That said, while many cities lag the national average, a number of them lead their regional
averages. Cities such as Belfast, Manchester, York and Newcastle are examples of this. This
622.0
underscores the importance of cities in their regional contexts even if they underperform in North W est Burnley Warrington
the national context.
616.1
Table 7: Average weekly workplace earnings W est Midla n ds S to ke Co v e n try
10 cities with the highest average weekly workplace 10 cities with the lowest average weekly workplace
earnings earnings
1 London 875 54 Sunderland 569 604.8
2 Slough 853 55 Doncaster 567 Sou th W est P ly m o u th S w in d o n
573.1
North E a st S u n d e rla n d N e wc a s t l e
520 540 560 580 600 620 640 660 680 700 720 740 760 780 800 820 840 860 880
Source: ONS 2023, Annual Population Survey, resident analysis, April 2021 – March 2023
Note: Northern Ireland data not available, so the figure for Great Britain is shown. Data for Belfast is for the calendar years 2021 and
2022.
78. 3 4. 8
Sou th W est P ly m o u th B o u rn e m o u th W est Midla n ds T e l f o rd B i r mi n g h a m
77. 0 4. 1
G rea ter Sou th E a st Wo r t h i n g I p swi c h North W est Wa r r i n g t o n L i ve rp o o l
75. 2
E a st Midla n ds Nottingham N o rth a m p to n
3. 9
North E a st S un d e r l a n d M i d d l e s b r o ug h
74. 8
Scotla n d Dundee E d in b u rg h
3. 7
G rea ter Sou th E a st C a mb r i d g e L ut o n
74. 3
W est Midla n ds B i r mi n g h a m T e lfo rd
Na tion a l Un ite d K in g d o m | 3. 7
74. 2
Yorksh ire a n d 3. 3
B ra d fo rd Y o rk
T h e Hu m ber E a st Midla n ds N o r t h a mp t o n Derby
73. 8 3. 2
North W est B u rn le y Wa r r i n g t o n W a les S wa n s e a N e wp o r t
73. 6 3. 1
W a les C ardiff N e wp o r t North ern Irela n d B e l f a st
71. 9 3. 0
North ern Irela n d B e l f a st Scotla n d Edinburgh D undee
71. 2 2. 5
North E a st N e wc a st l e S un d e r l a n d Sou th W est E xe t e r G l o uc e ste r
62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0
Centre for Cities Centre for Cities
High-level qualifications
60 Dundee 3.4
Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) is the classification given to different qualifications and replaces the National Vocational
61 York 3.0 Qualifications (NVQ) measure that has historically been reported by ONS. RQF level 4 plus captures qualifications from Higher Nation-
al Certificates though to doctorates.
62 Chatham 2.6
United Kingdom 7.0
Source: ONS 2023, Annual Population Survey, resident analysis, 2022 and 2021 data,
Note: Northern Ireland data not available, so the figure for Great Britain is shown.
13. 6 54. 2
North ern Irela n d Belfast Scotla n d Aberdeen Edinburgh
8. 8 50. 8
W a les Swansea Newport G rea ter Sou th E a st Southend Oxford
43. 7
8. 0 Sou th W est Swindon Bristol
Scotla n d Dundee Glasgow
42. 6
8. 0 North W est Blackburn Warrington
North E a st Sunderland Newcastle
41. 4
8. 0 W a les New port C a r d i ff
Yorksh ire a n d
York Hull
T h e Hu m ber
40. 4
8. 0
W est Midla n ds Telford Stoke
North W est Preston Blackburn
38. 9
Yorksh ire a n d
W a k e fi e l d York
Na tion a l Un ite d K in g d o m | 7. 0 T h e Hu m ber
7. 0 38. 8
E a st Midla n ds Northampton M a n s fi e l d North ern Irela n d Belfast
5. 5 37. 8
Sou th W est Exeter Plymouth E a st Midla n ds M a n s fi e l d Derby
5. 4 36. 7
G rea ter Sou th E a st Ch a t h a m Southend North E a st Sunderland Newcastle
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
Centre for Cities
Housing affordability Which cities or large towns have the most or least affordable
housing?
Table 13: Housing affordability ratio Figure 23: Housing affordability ratio, 2023
O x ford 15.4
Rank City Affordability ratio Average house price, 2023 (£) Annual wages, 2023 (£) Lon don 13.5
B rig h ton 13.1
B ou rn em ou th 12.2
10 cities with the highest affordability ratio Ca m bridg e 11.8
E x eter 11.5
1 Oxford 15.4 618,000 40,200 W orth in g 11.3
Source: Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities, Dwelling stock estimates in England: 2022, England 2021-2022 data;
National Records of Scotland, Housing and Dwellings in Scotland, 2022, Scotland 2021-2022 data; Welsh Government dwelling stock
estimates by local authority and tenure, 2022, Wales March 2021- March 2022 data; Northern Ireland Department of Finance, Annual
housing stock statistics, 2023, Northern Ireland 2021-2022 data.
Environment Figure 25: Greenhouse gas emissions per capita, 2020 - 2021 (t)
Air quality Which cities or large towns have the best or worst air quality?
Figure 26: Number of days a year of poor air quality, 2023
Table 17: Number of days a year of poor air quality
Su n derla n d 7 12 2023
Number of days with poor air quality, D u n dee 6 9 2022
Rank City 2023 E din bu rg h 1 9
Cra w ley 11 18
10 cities with the best air quality B elfa st 4 11
1 Sunderland 7 New ca stle 12 12
Aberdeen 6 13
2 Dundee 9 W orth in g 14 21
3 Edinburgh 9 Slou g h 15 23
B rig h ton 15 17
4 Crawley 11 Sw in don 16 22
York 16 21
5 Belfast 11 W a rrin g ton 16 20
6 Newcastle 12 Ch a th a m 17 25
Aldersh ot 17 23
7 Aberdeen 13 G lou cester 17 21
8 Worthing 14 B la ckbu rn 17 18
Lu ton 18 28
9 Brighton 15 Ca m bridg e 18 28
10 Slough 15 Cov en try 18 24
Preston 18 19
B u rn ley 18 19
G la sg ow 9 18
10 cities with the worst air quality R ea din g 19 28
54 Norwich 24 North a m pton 19 24
D on ca ster 19 21
55 Birmingham 25 Liv erpool 19 21
56 Manchester 25 W ig a n 19 19
Hu ll 17 19
57 Bristol 26 Ipsw ich 20 26
B a sildon 20 23
58 Mansfield 26
New port 19 20
59 Nottingham 26 Stoke 19 20
B irken h ea d 18 20
60 Southend 26 T elford 17 20
61 Bournemouth 27 D erby 16 20
Peterborou g h 21 28
62 Swansea 31 O x ford 21 27
63 London 34 Sh e ffi eld 21 22
W a kefield 21 21
B a rn sley 21 21
Ca rdiff 21 21
E x eter 20 21
Source: Met Office 2023, number of days of poor air quality, Dec 2022 – Dec 2023 data.
B la ckpool 18 21
Note: data for the 9th of October 2023 was discounted die to moderate and high DAQI forecasts over a large area of the UK that was
Middlesbrou g h 17 21
not observed. Milton Key n es 22 28
Portsm ou th 22 25
Hu ddersfield 22 22
Ply m ou th 13 22
Sou th a m pton 23 24
Leeds 22 23
Leicester 22 23
B ra dford 21 23
Norw ich 24 29
B irm in g h a m 25 27
Ma n ch ester 23 25
Sou th en d 26 31
B ristol 23 26
Nottin g h a m 23 26
Ma n sfield 20 26
B ou rn em ou th 25 27
Sw a n sea 20 31
Lon don 34 36
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40