Abdullah Hamidaddin (editor) - The Huthi Movement In Yemen_ Ideology, Ambition and Security in the Arab Gulf-I.B. Tauris (2022)

THE HUTHI MOVEMENT IN YEMEN
ii
THE HUTHI MOVEMENT IN YEMEN
Ideology, Ambition and Security

in the Arab Gulf
Edited by Abdullah Hamidaddin

I.B. TAURIS
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CONTENTS
Contributorsviii
Acknowledgmentsxiv
INTRODUCTION
Abdullah Hamidaddin 1
Section I
HUTHI IDEOLOGY AND BELIEF SYSTEM
Chapter 1
THE HUTHI MOVEMENT’S RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND
ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ZAYDISM IN YEMEN
Bernard Haykel 17
Chapter 2
TRANSFORMATION OF DOMINANT POLITICAL THEMES FROM THE
FOUNDER TO THE CURRENT LEADER OF THE HUTHI MOVEMENT
Mohammed Almahfali 37
Chapter 3
THE “SOFT WAR” AND THE PAST: THE HUTHI MOVEMENT’S USE OF
HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AS SOURCE OF LEGITIMACY
Alexander Weissenburger 57
S ection II
RECONFIGURING YEMEN’S SOCIETY
Chapter 4
TRIBES AND RULERS, 3.0—DOMINANCE AND THE “SUBALTERN” IN
HUTHI YEMEN
Marieke Brandt 77
Chapter 5
WOMEN UNDER THE HUTHI REGIME: GENDER, NATIONALISM, AND
ISLAM
Ewa K. Strzelecka 93
vi Contents
Chapter 6
HUTHI INFLUENCE ON EDUCATION: AN INVESTIGATION OF
INTERVENTIONS AND POLICIES
Shaker Lashuel 113
Chapter 7
PROPAGANDA, CREATIVITY, AND DIPLOMACY: THE HUTHIS’ ADAPTIVE
APPROACH TO MEDIA AND PUBLIC MESSAGING
Hannah Porter 139
Chapter 8
THE HUTHI ZAMIL: FOLK LITERATURE OR PROPAGANDA?
Emily J. Sumner 159
Section III
RE-ENGINEERING THE STATE
Chapter 9
“STATE” AND COERCIVE POWER IN YEMEN: THE HUTHIS AND THE
TRIBAL-SECTARIAN FIELD
Anthony Chimente 181
Chapter 10
HUTHI VISIONS OF THE STATE: A HUTHI REPUBLIC WITH AN
UNOFFICIAL IMAM
Charles Schmitz 199
Chapter 11
BECOMING THE STATE: HOW ANSAR ALLAH TOOK OVER AND ADAPTED
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
Joshua Rogers 217
Section IV
REGIONAL IMPACT
Chapter 12
HYBRID WARFARE—LESSONS FROM THE SAUDI-LED COALITION’S
INTERVENTION IN YEMEN 2015–202?
James Spencer 235
Contents vii
Chapter 13
THE YEMENI-SAUDI BORDER: THE HUTHIS AND THE EVOLUTION OF
HYBRID SECURITY GOVERNANCE
Eleonora Ardemagni 259
Chapter 14
MORE THAN A PROXY—THE HUTHIS AS A NON-STATE ACTOR WITH A
FOREIGN POLICY?
Maria-Louise Clausen 273
Index286
CONTRIBUTORS

Name Chapter Bio
Bernard Haykel S1_Chap1 Bernard Haykel is a scholar of the Arabian
Peninsula, focusing on the history, politics,
and economics of Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and
the other Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC).
He is professor of Near Eastern Studies at
Princeton University where he is also director
of the Institute for the Transregional Study of
the Contemporary Middle East, North Africa,
and Central Asia. Haykel has supervised over
ten PhD dissertations that deal with Arabian
politics and history and has received several
prominent awards. He earned his D.Phil.
in Oriental Studies from the University of
Oxford.
Mohammed S1_Chap2 Mohammed Almahfali is an affiliated
Almahfali researcher at the Centre for Advanced Middle
Eastern Studies, Lund University, Sweden. He
obtained his PhD in Arabic literature from
Cairo University in 2014, and worked as an
assistant professor at Hadhramout University,
Yemen. Mohammed’s research interests
include Arabic political, media and literary
discourse analysis, access to health, capacity-
building in higher education, and sustainable
post-conflict recovery strategies to address the
challenges in Yemen for the coming years. In
2017, he was awarded a two-year fellowship
from the Institute of International Education's
Scholar Rescue Fund (IIE-SRF) to work as a
researcher at Lund University, Sweden. Among
his recent research is the RAPP project for an
annotated bibliography about Human Rights
in the Arab world. Mohammed has also been
involved in
Contributors ix
work concerning how art and media can be

used as tools to enhance democracy, gender
equity, and social justice in Yemen. He is
currently working in the EU-funded EMME
project (Environmental Management in the
Middle East), which aims to develop capacity
in universities in Yemen and Iran, to deal with
environmental issues in these countries.
Alexander S1_Chap3 Alexander Weissenburger holds a Master’s
Weissenburger degree in Middle East, Caucasus and Central
Asian Security Studies from the University
of St. Andrews and an MA in Islamic Studies
from the University of Vienna where he
also taught courses in Arabic grammar
and politics of the Middle East. He is an
associated researcher at the Institute for Social
Anthropology of the Austrian Academy of
Sciences and a PhD candidate at the University
of Vienna. Alexander Weissenburger’s PhD
project investigates the ideology of the Huthi
movement.
Marieke Brandt S2_Chap4 Marieke Brandt is a researcher at the Institute
for Social Anthropology (ISA) of the Austrian
Academy of Sciences in Vienna. Her research
focuses on tribalism, tribal genealogy
and history, and tribe-state relations in
Southwest Arabia. She was a PhD fellow of
the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, DAAD fellow in
Sanaa, Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellow of the
European Union, and project leader of the
New Frontiers Groups Programme (NFG)
project “Deciphering Local Power Politics
in Northern Yemen” funded by the Austrian
National Foundation for Research, Technology
and Development. She is the author of the
award-winning Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A
History of the Houthi Conflict (Hurst/Oxford
University Press 2017).
x Contributors
Ewa K. S2_Chap5 Ewa K. Strzelecka is a research associate

Strzelecka at the Department of Social and Cultural
Anthropology at the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam. She holds a PhD degree in Social
Science from the University of Granada.
Before she came to the Netherlands, she was
an assistant professor at the Department of
Political Science and Public Administration at
the University of Granada in Spain. She also
held positions at universities and international
organizations in the UK, the United States,
Germany, Poland, Yemen, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Western Sahara, Morocco, Mozambique,
Bolivia, and India. She is the author of
Mujeres en la Primavera Árabe: construcción
de una cultura política de resistencia feminista
en Yemen (Women in the Arab Spring: the
Construction of a Political Culture of Feminist
Resistance in Yemen, CSIC, 2017). She leads
a research project Rethinking Peace-building:
women, revolution, exile, and conflict resolution
in Yemen, funded by the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation
program under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie
grant agreement.
Shaker Lashuel S2_Chap6 Shaker Lashuel is a Yemeni-American
educator and writer. As an educator working
for the public school system, he worked as a
teacher and later as a district administrator
serving the children of New York City for
more than fifteen years. In 2013, he moved to
Saudi Arabia, where he’s been working as the
Manager of Scientific Programs for a non-
profit foundation. Shaker graduated with a
BS in Geology from Brooklyn College, an MS
in Secondary Science Education from Long
Island University, a Master’s in Educational
Leadership from Moreland University, and a
Doctorate in Educational Technology from
Pace University. As a writer, Shaker has
focused on the Yemeni-American community
and issues relating to education in the Middle
Contributors xi
East. He has published several books in

Arabic (Yemeni American Stories, Steps to
Contentment, Improving Education: Practical
Field Experiences and has one book currently
under review: Professional Learning and
Teaching Communities); he has also served on
the editorial board of the Yemeni American
News since it was established in 2008.
Hannah Porter S2_Chap7 Hannah Porter is an analyst at the
international development firm DT Global
where she works on projects related to Yemen's
conflict and media. She earned her Master's
from the University of Chicago and wrote her
thesis on Huthi rhetoric and propaganda.
Emily J. S2_Chap8 Emily J. Sumner is a doctoral candidate in
Sumner Asian and Middle Eastern Cultures and Media
at the University of Minnesota. Her research
rests at the intersection of Arabic literature,
anthropology, and performance studies.
Her dissertation traces the transformation
and popularity of the Yemeni poetic genre
called zamil during the civil war, especially
its instrumentation by the Huthis in their
international media and local recruitment
campaign. It attends to the embodied
experiences in which the Huthi zamil is
embedded, including the ways that gender,
social position, and ideology structure these
experiences. Emily is also a researcher at the
Yemen-based Arabia Felix Center for Studies,
where she recently published “Experiencing the
Huthi Zamil” (2020). She presented an iteration
of this paper at the Middle Eastern Studies
Association (MESA) annual conference,
where she also presented her Master’s thesis,
an analysis of poetic sparring between
Yemeni and Saudi poets on social media. She
currently works as a graduate instructor of
Arabic for the University of Minnesota. Her
professional experiences include working as an
Arabic language translator and coordinator in
American hospitals. Emily is a superior speaker
of Arabic and has spent extensive time in
Yemen, Oman, and Syria.
xii Contributors
Anthony S3_Chap9 Dr. Anthony Chimente is a researcher

Chimente and advisor with Gulf State Analytics who
focuses on civil–military relations and the
fragmentation of state power and the sub-
communalization of violence around militias.
Dr. Chimente previously taught at Durham
University, where he earned his PhD and MA.
Charles S3_Chap10 Charles Schmitz is professor of Geography at
Schmitz Towson University in Baltimore, Maryland
where he has taught since 1999. Dr. Schmitz
is a specialist on the Middle East and Yemen.
He began his academic career as a Fulbright
Scholar and American Institute for Yemeni
Studies Fellow in Yemen in the early 1990’s.
Dr. Schmitz’ current research interests include
Yemeni political economy and the sociology of
contemporary Yemeni society.
Joshua Rogers S3_Chap11 Joshua Rogers is an Advisor and Senior Project
Manager at the Berghof Foundation, where
he works on political dialogue around the
conflict in Yemen. He advises on issues of local
governance in Yemen and leads Berghof ’s
efforts to integrate thinking about corruption
into peace processes and political dialogue
efforts. His research interests focus on the
political economy of conflict, state formation,
and rebel governance. He previously taught
at SOAS, University of London, and worked
for Saferworld, the EU Delegation in Sanaa,
and the International Network on Conflict
and Fragility. He holds a PhD in Development
Studies from SOAS.
James Spencer S4_Chap12 James Spencer is a retired infantry commander
who specialized in low-intensity conflict. He
is a strategic analyst on political, security, and
trade issues of the Middle East and North
Africa and a specialist on Yemen.
Eleonora S4_Chap13 Eleonora Ardemagni is an expert of Yemen,
Ardemagni the Gulf monarchies, and Arab military forces.
She is an associate research fellow at the Italian
Institute for International Political Studies
Contributors xiii
(ISPI), a teaching assistant (“History of

Islamic Asia”; “New Conflicts”) at the Catholic
University of Milan, and Yemen contributor
for The Armed Conflict Survey, International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Former
Gulf Analyst for the NATO Defense College
Foundation (2015–20), she is also Adjunct
Professor on Yemen at ASERI (Graduate
School of Economics and International
Relations).
Maria-Louise S4_Chap14 Maria-Louise Clausen holds a PhD in Political
Clausen Science from Aarhus University, Denmark,
and is a senior researcher at the Danish
Institute of International Studies (DIIS)
and a fellow in the Sectarianism, Proxies &
De-sectarianisation (SEPAD) project. Her
work centers on external state-building as
both administrative practices and a site for
competing notions of legitimate governance.
More broadly, her research critically reflects
on ideas and actors involved in political
governance at local, national, and international
levels. Geographically her work focuses on
the Middle East, particularly Yemen and Iraq.
She has published on these issues in journals
such as Third World Quarterly, Small Wars
and Insurgencies, Public Administration and
Development, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism
as well as International Affairs.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Neol Brehony, who was behind the idea
of this volume. A special note of thanks to Dr. Saud al-Sarhan, whose enthusiasm,
support for the concept, feedback, and encouragement were essential in me taking
on this project and overcoming key challenges throughout. I also want to thank
the Bloomsbury editorial team Sophie Rudland, Faye Robinson, Viswasirasini
Govindarajan, and KFCRIS researchers Ayael Al-Qarni, and Heba Albeity, for
their assistance, reviews, corrections, and patience throughout the process.
Without them this work will not have been possible.
I N T R O DU C T IO N
Abdullah Hamidaddin
e Huthis1—who prefer to refer to themselves as Ansar Allah (supporters of

Th
Allah)2—are a quasi-state actor leading a political coalition, and social movement
with a strong paramilitary core and an Islamist, anti-American ideology. Its
beginnings can be traced to January 2002, when Husayn al-Huthi called on
Muslims everywhere to publicly denounce the United States—and Israel—in the
aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan (in 2001). He believed that the invasion
was the prelude to a new phase of American control of the region, one that would
be more assertive and aggressive than during the Cold War, benefiting Israel
and undermining Arabs and Muslims across the Middle East. For al-Huthi,3 a
necessary condition to avert this prospective American hegemony was to raise
awareness on US plans, mobilize Muslim states and publics to reject US entreaties,
and revitalize the role of the Quran in the Muslim umma. He adopted the slogan
“God is Great. Death to America. Death to Israel. Cursed be the Jews. Victory be to
Islam.”4 Al-Huthi enjoined his then small number of disciples to repeat the slogan
at every possible opportunity, especially in mosques after communal prayers.
He also gave sermons from his home in Marran, a small village about seventy
kilometers west of Sa’ada. The sermons were recorded and disseminated via cassette
tape to different cities in the upper north of Yemen. Meant for a general audience,
the sermons emphasized the threat America posed, the downtrodden situation of
Muslims, and al-Huthi’s prescription—namely, to uphold the Quran, in its proper
interpretation, in Muslims’ daily lives. Little in his sermons was something unique
or different from what many radical Islamists in the region believe or pronounce.5
What marked out al-Huthi as distinctive was his emphatic encouragement of
his disciples and audience to publicly chant the aforementioned slogan. Soon it
became common to see young men, mostly under eighteen years of age, chanting
the slogan in mosques in Sanaa and Sa’ada after Friday prayers or other ritual
gatherings. One of the early labels given to Husayn and his followers was As-hab
al-Shi’ar (People of the Slogan). The Yemeni government reacted to the public
chanting with arrests, which only convinced Husayn and his growing band of
followers that the slogan was effective and that the United States perceived it as a
threat to its presence in the region. One thing led to another, and in 2004, Yemen’s
2 The Huthi Movement in Yemen
President Ali Abdullah Saleh decided to arrest Husayn al-Huthi. He resisted arrest,
instead volunteering to travel to Sanaa to meet President Saleh in person on the
condition that he not be harmed. Saleh rejected the offer, and after several failed
mediations, a limited military confrontation took place between the government’s
forces and Husayn and his followers, leading to his death in September 2004.
This might have been the end of it, but the situation in the upper north of
Yemen was already ripe for a broader confrontation with the government. The
local economy was in dire straits, and the frustration of the communities around
Sa’ada was approaching a threshold.6 Against this backdrop, Saleh decided to go
after Husayn’s father, Badr al-Din al-Huthi, and younger brother, Abdulmalik al-
Huthi, and other loyal followers. The result was five more military confrontations
between 2005 and 2010, which were much more devastating than the initial clash,
covered a wider geographic area, and brought tragic collateral consequences.
The Huthis survived the wars and, under the leadership of Abdulmalik al-Huthi,
grew to become a formidable military force. Husayn al-Huthi may have been
the instigator behind the events leading to the confrontation with the Yemeni
government, but the founding of the movement is more accurately attributed to
his younger brother.
In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2010–11, the Huthis found themselves
at the center of Yemeni political activity in Sanaa. The nature of the uprisings
differed from country to country across the region. It was less a popular uprising
in Yemen and more a confrontation between the tripartite ruling elite. Since
1978, Yemen had been ruled by an uneasy coalition of three main powerbrokers:
President Ali Abdullah Saleh (with ready access to state resources), Ali Muhsin
al-Ahmar, commander of the northwestern military district and the 1st Armored
Division and now vice-president, from the village of Bayt al-Ahmar (“House of
al-Ahmar”), from which Saleh also hails, and Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar,7 the
paramount shaykh of Hashid. Shaykh Abdullah died in 2007, after which his sons,
mainly Husayn and Hamid, assumed his mantle. In 2011, Saleh, Ali Muhsin, and
the al-Ahmar family clashed, leading to Ali Saleh’s ouster through an initiative
negotiated by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The GCC deal forestalled
Yemen’s slide into a civil war, with then Vice-President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi
assuming the presidency in February 2012.
President Hadi’s position remained precarious. He needed to balance the
powers of Ali Muhsin and the al-Ahmar family and address the power vacuum
caused by Saleh’s ouster, while at the time deal with the economic destitution, and
implement donor demands for the unpopular austerity measures.8 The Huthis
would benefit from this situation, and through a series of deft political maneuvers
and several military confrontations with the al-Ahmar family and Ali Muhsin, the
Huthis took control of Sanaa in 2014, announcing a “revolution” on September 21
of that year. The president soon found himself under the absolute control of the
Huthis and fled from Sanaa to Aden and from there to Saudi Arabia.
On March 26, 2015, a coalition of Arab countries under Saudi Arabia’s
leadership launched “Operation Decisive Storm” or “Storm of Resolve” against the
Huthis. The operation had two key goals, one internal and the other regional. Its
Introduction 3
main internal goal was to restore authority to the state, and its main regional goal
was to deter Iran from further intervention in the region. At the time of writing,
the war is already in its seventh year, and regardless of the final result, it seems
that the Huthis will remain a key player in Yemen’s cultural, social, economic, and
political scenes for the foreseeable future.9
The Huthis experienced multiple phases between 2002 and 2014. Starting
as a small paramilitary movement, they later evolved into a social movement
and then became a full-fledged political organization—by 2014, the group had
morphed into a quasi-state actor. Due to their long confrontation with the Yemeni
government and then the 2015 war, much of the focus on the Huthis has been
through the prisms of war and conflict. This perspective may have narrowed our
understanding of the essence of the movement and limited our ability to grasp the
specific ways the Huthis think and believe and—just as importantly—their impact
on Yemen and the region.
The Huthis have created a religio-political organization that has altered the
power configuration in Yemen and generated a social movement aspiring to
fundamentally reshape the country to fit their local and regional ambitions. Those
ambitions, in turn, are shaped by the imperatives of power preservation, social
and political constraints, the dictates of a distinctive Islamist ideology, and a vision
of sociopolitical order. The Huthis are changing Yemen’s religious landscape,
challenging traditional religious authority, reshaping tribal values and roles,
constructing collective memories and identities, infusing Yemen’s mediascape
with their ideological creed, and positioning Yemen’s foreign policy within a
regional policy of resistance to the United States. It is vital to understand all of
these dynamics and how they impact the region. The purpose of this volume is to
provide a comprehensive critical analysis of the Huthi movement and its impact
on Yemen and subsequently on the security of the Arab Gulf region.
Many academic papers have been written about the Huthis, and some books
on Yemen have discussed various aspects of the group. Regime and Periphery in
Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (2010),10 a principal monograph on the
Huthis, is ten years old, and its focus is on their history and the socioeconomic
and political factors leading to their rise. There are also very important and recent
books on Yemen that have analyzed various aspects of the Huthi movement, such
as Marieke Brandt’s Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Huthi Conflict
(2017), which is the most up-to-date and authoritative work on the Huthis,11 Helen
Lackner’s Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a
State (2017),12 and Laurent Bonnefoy’s Yemen and the World: Beyond Insecurity
(2018).13 Other important collections include Lackner and Varisco’s Yemen and
the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis (2017)14 and Day and Brehoney’s Global,
Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemeni Crisis (2020).15 Together they provide
important insights into contemporary Yemeni dynamics and many key aspects
of the Huthi experience, albeit through different methods and using varying
frameworks of analysis. Yet, many key issues remain to be addressed, which is the
objective of this volume. In filling this gap, the book, taking a synchronic rather
than diachronic perspective, addresses religious, cultural, political, and social
issues that have not been discussed before. It does so in light of the impact of
these issues locally, providing a holistic view on the movement and the way it is
changing Yemen and influencing the region.
Historical Context
For detailed review, I would refer the reader to the several aforementioned
historical studies. Here, I present but a brief overview that necessarily omits much
while highlighting the critical contexts that have enabled the rise and expansion
of the Huthis. The Huthi movement emerged in a complex multidimensional
context that includes republican anti-Hashimite/Zaydi rhetoric and constructed
exclusionary memories, a fractured state, economic breakdown, an elite cold
war, a Zaydi religious revivalist movement, anti-imperialist ideologies, Islamic
movements, and changes in the meaning of traditional Islam and the role of
the ͑ ulmā͗, the breakdown of Yemen’s political order, high illiteracy in the rural
areas, and the convergence of threat perceptions among the tribal communities
of the upper north. The trajectory the movement took was largely an outcome
of the key actors’ actions, reactions, and decisions. Nothing was inevitable in the
movement’s trajectory, the development of its ideology, or its impact on Yemeni
society, politics, and history.
Nevertheless, I think that the context generated two enabling factors: the
readiness of a broad popular base to be galvanized and the weakness of the
tripartite ruling elite. The following sections unpack some of the aforementioned
contextual factors in greater detail.
Republican Anti-Hashimite/Zaydi Rhetoric and Constructed, Exclusionary

Memories
Yemen is a country of contested, competing, and contradictory memories.
Various movements and social and political actors tell different histories of the
past, thereby constructing and shaping the memories of their respective followers.
Different actors select distinct moments in history as their imagined beginning
or to mark milestones. Sometimes the same historical events are interpreted
differently, creating different memories. These memories also serve competing
political and social goals. In this way, the past remains alive, if only as a shorthand
marker in the present.16
The al-Huthi family is from the Hashimi clans17 that migrated to Yemen in the
tenth century CE.18 Hashimites are also referred to as sāda or ashrāf. Historically
they had played political and scholarly roles in various Muslim communities.
There are two distinct histories of Hashemis in Yemen. One is the story of
Ahmad bin Isa al-Muhajir, who arrived in Yemen in the late tenth century CE
and established a presence lasting until today. From the twelfth century CE, his
descendants’ focus turned to spiritual and religious matters though they were
always players in the politics of the southern areas of Yemen. This spiritual
Introduction 5
legitimacy was a target of the communist regime in the south after 1967, and
many of their religious leaders were executed, brutally murdered, or exiled.
Today, families such al-Jifri, al-Attas, al-Bidh, al-Aydarus, and al-Fagih all come
from that lineage.
The first to arrive in the upper north of Yemen in the early ninth century CE was
Yahya ibn al-Hussayn, better known as Al-Imam al-Hadi (The Guiding Imam), a
sayyid scholar invited by some tribal leaders of Yemen to mediate between fighting
tribal factions in the Sa’daa region. His arrival and leadership launched an imamate
that waxed and waned for the next 1100 years until the coup of 1962.
The primary role of mediation that al-Hadi was invited to play would continue
to be the primary source of sustainability and durability of the imamate in the
upper north and the main factor defining the role of the sayyids. Competing
Yemeni tribes considered this outsider to be a neutral player and sometimes a
solution to the ongoing tribal competition over power. This mediating role would
arguably sustain the authority and legitimate the discourse of the Zaydi imamate.
Zaydi imams claimed that only sayyids are eligible to compete for the leadership
of the umma. For 1100 years, it appeared that the social and political structure in
the upper north benefited from this mediating role, which fitted well with that
discursive monopoly of entitlement. The end of the imamate era did not end the
mediating role of the sayyids nor their social status, especially in the rural areas.
The Huthi movement would later tap into this historical reservoir for legitimacy
and mobilization, recreating the myth of the sayyid as the leader who can best rise
against oppression and unify the umma.
From the early 1940s, the political and social opposition to the imamate regime
developed a counternarrative to the Zaydi religious discourse. And after the fall of
the imamate regime in 1962 (1970), the republican regime adopted that opposing
narrative, fostering what would come to be a binary “Manichaean” memory of pre-
1962 Yemen: the imamate was all evil, ugly, dark, and medieval, and the republic
was all good, beautiful, enlightened, and modern. Very quickly, this denigration of
the imamate extended to the Hashimites and then to the Zaydis, and a narrative
developed that framed these groups as a threat to the republic and its enlightened
values.
The new narrative could be framed as that of the “master-serf.” In this narrative,
all sayyids—not just the existing imam or the imamate as a regime—forced
themselves as masters onto the Yemeni people, who were treated through the
centuries as serfs. In this view, the 1962 revolution was the historical moment
when the serfs gained freedom and created a new relationship, framed as one
of “free serfs–restrained master.” The sayyid was depicted as the master toppled
from his throne, who now required careful monitoring and restraint lest he break
his chains and attempt to re-exert control. And the non-sayyids in Yemen were
depicted as the unchained serfs who had secured their freedom but needed to
guard it jealously and maintain it at all costs. This narrative—which presented
the former sayyid ruling class as an essentialized and monolithic entity—was
disseminated by the republican intelligentsia through every vehicle available to
the state—schoolbooks, public holidays, official speeches, and the like.
Hashimite identity has been depicted as a transhistorical and static fact—a

constant against a shifting historical backdrop. In fact, like all identities, it is a
historical concept, conceptualized, articulated, and expressed variously in different
sociopolitical and historical contexts. It is not easy to assess the actual impact of
this narrative and the memory it sought to create. Still, it would not be inaccurate
to say that it forcibly excluded Hashimites and Zaydis, who did not want to
downplay their social or religious identities, from the republican project. And in
the late 1970s and early 1980s, a Zaydi-Hashimite counternarrative developed—
that of a community being forced to suppress its identity and renounce its religious
heritage. A sense of victimization and perception of being oppressed would
become defining characteristics among many Zaydis and Hashimites from this
period onward.19
Thus, when the Huthi movement started to grow in power, many young sayyids
and Zaydis felt empowered by it, relating to it to varying degrees. It became a
source of a lost pride for these young people. In contrast, many older Zaydis and
Hashimites feared it would jeopardize the meager gains made in the 1990s. This
ambivalence would change after the Huthis entered Sanaa. For many, there was an
underlying sense of “we are back” or “you cannot suppress us forever,” even among
Zaydis and sayyids who did not support the Huthis.
Fractured State, Elite Conflict: The Arab Spring and the Breakdown of Yemen’s
Political Order
The rapid rise of the Huthis is hard to grasp outside the context of the weak and
highly fractured Yemeni state. Indeed, Yemen has long been more a constellation
of powers than a coherent state. As mentioned, the key power brokers formed
a tripartite structure—President Ali Abdullah Saleh, General Ali Muhsin al-
Ahmar, and the Ahmar family (Shaykh Abdullah al-Ahmar and his sons after
him, especially Hamid al-Ahmar). As president, Saleh was strong, but the state
was weak. The “state,” in a very loose meaning of the term, lacked effective control
over all Yemini territory and frequently competed with local communities.
There was a weak sense of legitimacy and a total absence of modern statehood’s
defining attribute—namely, a monopoly of legitimate violence. The key power
actors were behaving as agents within the country, where just one of the powers
had control of state institutions. Thus, the state was simply one power among
many.20
Yemen’s tripartite ruling system was briefly disrupted after Yemen’s unification
in 1990 with the entry of a new force—namely, the Socialists of the former People’s
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). The tripartite elite immediately
sought to suppress southern influence and exploit the newly acquired resources
of South Yemen. This led to the 1994 civil war, in which the Socialists were
pushed out. After that, a schism started to grow within the tripartite structure,
evolving by the end of the 1990s into a cold war between them. The situation
grew tenser when Saleh floated the idea of his son Ahmad as his successor. This
further distanced him from his former allies. This schism would last until the
Introduction 7
Arab Spring when it transformed into direct confrontation. That cold war would
play a role in determining the course of the conflict between the government and
the Huthis in 2004–10, and the direct confrontation would influence the course
of events after 2012.
As touched on, the events of the so-called Arab Spring unfolded in different
ways according to the particular situation in each country. In Yemen, there was
no revolution per se. As has become clear, the various revolutionary activities did
little more than facilitate a reshuffle of power among the existing Yemeni rulers.
The cold war between the three power centers turned into direct conflict when
Saleh, the Ahmar family, and Ali Al-Ahmar raised arms against each other, and
Saleh was almost killed in an assassination attempt. The political order finally
collapsed in 2014. The only thing that saved Yemen from what could have been a
devastating civil war was the aforementioned GCC initiative. Since then, Yemen’s
politics have been shaped by the quest for a new order.
eligious Revivalism, Mosque Politics, and Changes in the Meaning of Traditional

R
Islam and the Role of the ͑ulmā͗
In highlighting these points here, it is important to underplay the effect of
sectarianism as a factor in the rise of the Huthis.21 If sectarianism is used as an
analytical category referring to group identities founded on religious differences,
it does not apply to Yemen. It is undoubtedly true that distinct notions of Zaydism
and Sunnism exist in Yemen and that most individuals consider themselves either
Sunni or Zaydi. Moreover, some of those individuals speak ill of the other and may
express hate or exhibit animosity based on that difference. But it is inaccurate to
assume that there is a sense of a homogeneous group identity inward and outward,
entailing or implying group loyalty, roles, expectations, and group interests based
on Sunnism or Zaydism. Considering Zaydism and Sunnism as group identities
overlooks and obscures the multiple identities, affiliations, class differences, and
diversity of interests expressed by individuals subsumed under one religious
label. Zaydis and Sunnis in Yemen are not monolithic groups whose members are
equally committed to the group and a common theology. In other words, Zaydis
and Sunnis do not prioritize theological commitments and religious differences
when determining social and political interests.
Yemen’s religious landscape was historically divided between Zaydis, Shāfi͑ īs,
and, in some cases, Hanbalis. “Zaydism” is an umbrella term that encompasses
diverging religious opinions. Some lean toward Shi’ism, others toward Sunnism,
some more to rational theologians, such as the Mu’tazila, and others still more
toward textualists, such as Ahl al-Hadith.22 What mattered about Zaydism in
the debates of the twentieth century was that the imams of Yemen were Zaydis
and that the political theory of most Zaydis demanded that the imam (the
legitimate leader of the community) be a descendant of the Prophet (in addition
to exhibiting knowledge, piety, and wisdom). In the aftermath of the 1962 coup,
this did not present a problem, as there were Zaydi scholars whose opinions
accommodated a political system that did not demand a sayyid as leader. Also,
the initial republican rhetoric focused on the imamate and sayyids. But as
mentioned above, the imamate, Hashimites, and Zaydism were soon conflated,
and pious Zaydis would find their religious heritage a target of the government
and some of its allies.
Thus, the Zaydi revivalist movement was, in one way, a reaction to the post-
1962 narrative. Some of the revivalists were only concerned with revitalizing Zaydi
religious teachings in the community. Some of them, influenced by the Islamist
discourses of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian Revolution, were more
concerned with Islamizing the community while at the same time reviving Zaydi
history and religious heritage. In the 1980s, Zaydi activism was limited due to the
state’s concerns, but the 1990 unification of the two Yemens opened the country’s
political and media landscape. Zaydi activists simply exploited this opportunity to
revive their ancient traditions and teachings.
The Grand Mosque in Sanaa was the center of much of this activity in Yemen’s
capital and some of the rural areas, as well as the Markaz Badr (Badr Center)—a
newly formed entity by Murtadha al-Muhatwari. In Sa’ada, some of the young
activists also initiated summer youth camps under the label Forum of the Faithful
Youth (Muntada al-Shabab al-Mu’min), sometimes also known as the Believing
Youth. Some senior, more traditional ͑ulmā͗ supervised other types of youth camps
focused more on religious preaching and scholarly grounding. Before this, the
principal organized religious activism was divided between traditional Salafis and
the Muslim Brotherhood activists. Zaydi youth activism was soon to be perceived
as a turf war over mosques (being religious centers) and followers. The Salafi
and Brotherhood response to Zaydi revivalism generated intense counteractivity
among the Zaydi, leading to the politicization of religious affiliation, on the one
hand, and to the revival of the role of traditional and modern Zaydi ͑ulmā͗ in the
upper north, on the other.
Husayn al-Huthi—and other members of his immediate and extended family—
was active in this revival until the late 1990s, when he left for Sudan to acquire a
master’s degree in Quranic exegesis. He returned to Yemen with new religious ideas
and preached a new approach to revivalism, which most traditional and modernist
Zaydis did not accept. His ideas are covered in two chapters in this volume, so I
will not discuss them in detail here, albeit to note that Saleh’s response to Husayn
and later to the Huthi movement occurred against the background of those ideas.
The strong legitimacy of Hashimism in Yemen’s upper northern regions and the
spiritual influence of Zaydism played an essential role in creating a strong front,
albeit in different ways. If Hashimism helped the leadership of Abdulmalik al-
Huthi gain legitimacy, Zaydism played a vital role in creating the puritanical core
on which the fighting depended greatly.
The volume’s purpose is to present an overview of the Huthi movement and its
impact on the region. For that purpose, it is divided into four sections. The first
investigates the Huthi ideology and belief system through three interrelated issues.
Husayn al-Huthi’s thought marked a break with Zaydism and Islam as understood
by traditional ͑ulmā͗. Today some Huthis consider his religious ideas as the new
Introduction 9
Islam, while others are followers in politics but not in religion. Bernard Haykel’s
chapter examines the teachings of the movement and how its ideology fits into
broader Zaydi currents of thought and the contemporary political and intellectual
history of Yemen and that of the broader Islamic and Arab worlds. Mohammed
Almahfali examines the Huthi ideology and belief system by comparing the
key themes of the Malazim of Husayn al-Huthi and his younger brother and
leader of the movement Abdulmalik, highlighting the development of the Huthi
ideology between the movement’s inception and evolution into a quasi-state actor.
Alexander Weissenburger’s chapter examines the movement’s use of Yemeni and
Islamic history as reservoirs to generate historically based ideological narratives to
bolster its legitimacy.
The second section investigates how the Huthis are reconfiguring Yemen’s
society and the tools deployed to that end. Specifically, this section focuses on
three aspects of Yemeni society and the Huthi impact on them—namely, tribes,
women, and education. The tribe as a social unit has always played a key role in
Yemeni political and economic dynamics and has continuously adapted itself
to survive and thrive. Marieke Brandt examines changes made by the Huthis in
the relationship between tribes and rulers in the northern highlands of Yemen,
comparing the periods of the imamate and the republic. Women have always
played a critical role in various radical movements and militant organizations as a
resource for mobilization and legitimacy. Ewa Strzelecka discusses how the Huthis
have influenced gender dynamics and the role and status of women, contrasting
views of the “Huthis as a movement” and the “Huthis as a quasi-state actor.” Shaker
Lashuel investigates the Huthi movement’s influences on education and assesses
the extent to which education has been used to further their ideology and promote
their cause and aspirations.
The section also focuses on two key tools of influence—indoctrination and
narrative construction—and how these have been used to saturate the Yemeni
public sphere with the Huthi narrative. Hannah Porter discusses the evolution of
the Huthi media landscape and media productions that weave together key themes
of Huthi ideology through a network of programs, social media, and artistic and
poetic productions. Emily Sumner discusses the Huthi zamil (poetic tradition)
and the key differences between it and the traditional zamil. As a poetic tradition,
zamil is deeply embedded in Yemen’s cultural character and social practice. The
Huthis have appropriated this in their objective to normalize Huthi ideology and
indoctrinate their base.
The third section examines the ways the Huthis are changing the state and its
structures. It revisits the concept of the state as applied to Yemen, discusses Huthi
visions of the state, and examines aspects of change in the institutional structures.
Anthony Chimente examines the nature of state power and civil-military relations
in Huthi-dominated territories using a conceptual framework that situates non-
state actors, rather than the state, as the focal point of power. Charles Schmitz
assesses how the Huthis present their vision of a future state—namely, a
revolutionary model of a republican government guided from the outside by the
leader of a revolutionary movement. Joshua Rogers focuses on the impact of the

war and Huthi policies on reconfiguring the Yemeni state by focusing on changes
to the local authorities and practices of administration.
The fourth section looks beyond Yemen and investigates the impact the Huthi
rise will have on the region writ large. James Spencer examines conventional and
asymmetric warfare, taking the 2015 war as a case study. Eleonora Ardemagni
examines the impact of the Huthi wars since 2004 on the securitization of the
Saudi-Yemeni relationship. Maria-Louise Clausen examines Huthi ambitions for a
regional role through their attempts at building foreign relations and how this will
be influenced by the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
While the volume aspired to present a holistic view of the Huthis through
the variety of themes covered, more needs to be done. As the reader will notice,
the chapters face limitations, highlighted by the authors themselves, such as
limitations of access to Yemen, which has been almost impossible since 2014.
More themes need to be discussed, especially those related to identity such as
Hashimism, Huthi resilience factors, command and control structure, culture of
militarism, relationship to the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” among other themes
that are key to a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the movement.
Moreover, comparative research needs to be done between the Huthis and other
similar phenomenon, as well as explicitly place them within the broader research
on the ideological, social, and political transformations of the Middle East, post-
colonialism, militant organizations, Islamism and Islamist movements, political
media, and contemporary Islamic schools of thought. Finally, and most challenging,
there needs to be a reflexive turn in Yemen studies, a critical exploration of the
assumptions almost unconsciously embedded in the theoretical frameworks,
concepts, and methods utilized to understand Yemen.23 This is especially necessary
as scholarly attention toward Yemen increases, demanding a revisit to the
scholarship of the past decades, to discover blind spots, highlight epistemological
and methodological biases, and point out inaccurate essentializations all too
common in any human intellectual endeavor.
Having said that the authors of this volume bring multiple methods, variety of
horizons, and diversity of backgrounds, presenting multiple theoretical starting
points of observation and analysis, which can lead to some diverging opinions
among them and expressed in this volume, which is most appropriate when
studying a complex phenomenon, especially one that is controversial, contentious,
and polarizing. Coherence has its strengths, but it sometimes comes at the expense
of reflexivity, diversity, balance, and internal debate. The authors also bring to the
topic a wide array of scholarship on radicalism, social movements, international
relations, politics, social anthropology, sociopolitical identity, discourse analysis,
collective memory, media, and Islamism with the goal of providing readers a
nuanced and multilayered approach to the understanding of this movement
and its local and regional impact. I am grateful to the authors who, despite the
Covid-19 restrictions, produced this collection and who privileged and humbled
me with the honor of being associated with their scholarship.
Introduction 11
Notes
1 The use of the spelling “Huthi” is widespread in English publications; following the
transliteration guidelines of the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES) I
prefer the spelling “Huthi.” Some contributors to this volume used the former spelling
and others used the latter.
2 The Huthis formally adopted this as the name of their movement during the uprisings
in Yemen 2011, taken from the Quranic verse “O you who have believed, be supporters
of Allah, as when Jesus, the son of Mary, said to the disciples, ‘Who are my supporters
for Allah?’ The disciples said, ‘We are supporters of Allah.’ And a faction of the
Children of Israel believed and a faction disbelieved. So We supported those who
believed against their enemy, and they became dominant.” Others have translated it as
“helpers of Allah.” See Saheeh International, “As-Saf—61:14,” https://quran.com/61/14?
translations=17,20,21,22,84,85,18,19,95,101 (accessed April 11, 2021).
3 “Al-Huthi” is a place-surname used by more than one family associated with the city
of Huth in Amran Governorate north of Sanaa. The followers of Husayn al-Huthi
and then his brother Abdulmalik were called Huthis by the Yemeni government and
the name continues to be used to this day, although as mentioned above, the Huthis
prefer Ansar Allah. To distinguish between the use of Huthi as a surname from that
of an eponymic designation, I will use al-Huthi for the former and the Huthis for the
latter.
4 For a brief history of the slogan, see Adam Taylor, “The History of ‘Death to America’,”
The Washington Post, February 15, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
worldviews/wp/2015/02/18/the-history-of-death-to-america/.
5 Calling for a “return to the Qur’an” is an all-too-common trope among Muslims. The
difference is in interpretations. Most of the calls posited by Islamists refer to variants
of Seyyid Qutb’s interpretation of the Qur’an. It is also worth noting that Muslim
Brotherhood Islamists and Salafis in Yemen rejected Husayn al-Huthi’s position
on matters of mutual agreement due to disagreement and competition on the local
religious landscape. For hating America and anti-imperialist Islamist discourse
compared between the Huthis and bin Laden, see Robert S. Snyder, “Hating America:
Bin Laden as a Civilizational Revolutionary,” Review of Politics 65, no. 4 (2003):
325–49, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034670500039061; Bin Laden, Osama. Messages to
the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence and trans. James
Howarth (London: Verso, 2005).
6 The sources mentioned below on the history of the Huthis highlight this all too well.
Also see Andreas Gros, Alexander Gard-Murray, and Yaneer Bar-Yam, “Conflict
in Yemen: From Ethnic Fighting to Food Riots,” New England Complex Systems
Institute, July 24, 2012, https://necsi.edu/conflict-in-yemen-from-ethnic-fighting-to-
food-riots; Brian M. Perkins, “Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression,” Studies
in Conflict and Terrorism 40, no. 4 (2017): 300–17, https://doi.org/10.1080/105761
0X.2016.1205368
7 Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar is not related to Abdullah al-Ahmar.
8 Ala’a Jarban, “Supporting and Failing Yemen’s Transition: Critical Perspectives on
Development Agencies,” Politics, Governance, and Reconstruction in Yemen, The Project
on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) no. 29 (January 2018): 46–50, https://
pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/POMEPS_Studies_29_Yemen_Web-REV.
pdf.
9 For the history of the movement, see Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen:
A History of the Houthi Conflict (Oxford, UK, Oxford University Press, 2017); Barak
Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern
Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2010), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG962.html. See also Abdullah Hamidaddin,
“Yemen: Negotiations with Tribes, States and Memories,” in Arab Spring: Negotiating
in the Shadow of the Intifadat, ed. I. William Zartman (Athens, GA: University of
Georgia Press, 2015), 116–14; International Crisis Group, “The Huthis: From Saada to
Sanaa,” 2014, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-
peninsula/yemen/huthis-saada-sanaa; Christopher Boucek and Marina Ottaway,
Yemen on the Brink (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2010).
10 Salmoni et al., Regime and Periphery.
11 Brandt, Tribes and Politics.
12 Helen Lackner, Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a
State (London: Verso Books, 2019).
13 Laurent Bonnefoy, Yemen and the World: Beyond Insecurity (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
14 Helen Lackner and Daniel Martin Varisco, eds, Yemen and the Gulf States: The Making
of a Crisis (Berlin: Gerlach Press, 2018).
15 Stephen W. Day and Noel Brehony, Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the
Yemen Crisis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
16 See Gabriele vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families
in Transition (Contemporary Anthropology of Religion) (New York, NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2005).
17 While there are no accurate, official, or reliable sources on the number of Hashimites
in Yemen, some estimate them to be between 7 and 12 percent of the population.
Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Yemen: Relationship and
treatment of Hashemites by authorities and other groups, including Houthis [Huthis]
and extremist groups (2012–August 2015), September 9, 2015, YEM105277.E, https://
www.refworld.org/docid/56a775a94.html.
18 Very little has been written in English about the sāda of Yemen. Two excellent
examples are vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality, and Luca Nevola, “Blood
Doesn’t Lie: Hierarchy and Inclusion/Exclusion in Contemporary Yemen,” PhD
thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca, 2014–15, https://boa.unimib.
it/bitstream/10281/88750/ 1/PhD_unimib_064148.pdf. There have been some
interesting works covering other regions. See, for example, Kazuo Morimoto,
ed., Sayyids and Sharifs in Muslim Societies: The Living Links to the Prophet (New
York, NY: Routledge, 2017); Lurencee Gautier and Julien Levesque, “Introduction:
Historicizing Sayyid-Ness: Social Status and Muslim Identity in South Asia,” Journal
of the Royal Asiatic Society 30, no. 3 (2020): 383–93, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1356186320000139
19 Nevola, “Blood Doesn’t Lie,” 19, 51–79; Luca Nevola, “Houthis in the Making:
Nostalgia, Populism, and the Politicization of Hashemite Descent,” Arabian
Humanities 13 (2020), https://doi.org/10.4000/cy.5917; vom Bruck, Islam, Memory,
and Morality.
20 The concept of the state is elusive, and its association with Yemen especially in the
context of terms such as “weak state” and “failed state” has been a source of debate
and controversy. See Lisa Wedeen, “Don’t Call Yemen a ‘Failed State,’” Foreign Policy,
Introduction 13
March 30, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/30/dont-call-yemen-a-failed-

state/; Kamilia al-Eriani, “Mourning the Death of a State to Enliven It: Notes on the
‘Weak’ Yemeni State,” International Journal of Cultural Studies 23, no. 2 (March 2020):
227–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877918823774; Sophia Dingli, “Is the Failed
State Thesis Analytically Useful? The Case of Yemen,” Politics 33, no. 2 (June 2013):
91–100, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9256.2012.01453.x.
There are many sources for a discussion on the meaning of a “state” and the debate
surrounding it; for example, see Clifford Geertz, “What Is a State If It Is Not a
Sovereign?: Reflections on Politics in Complicated Places,” Current Anthropology 45,
no. 5 (December 2004): 577–93, https://doi.org/10.1086/423972; Pierre Bourdieu,
Loic J. D. Wacquant, and Samar Farage, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure
of the Bureaucratic Field,” Sociological Theory 12, no. 1 (March 1994): 1, https://doi.
org/10.2307/202032
21 See Vincent Durac, “The Limits of the Sectarian Narrative in Yemen,”
Global Discourse 9, no. 4 (2019): 655–73, https://doi.org/10.1332/20437891
9X15718898814430; Abdullah Hamidaddin, “From Social Category to Social Identity:
The Emergence of a New Zaydism,” in Precarious Belongings: Being Shiʿi in Non-Shiʿi
Worlds, ed. Charles and Tripp and Gabriele vom Bruck (London, UK: Centre for
Academic Shiʿa Studies (CASS), 2017).
22 Bernard Haykel and Aron Zysow, “What Makes a Madhab a Madhab: Zaydi Debates
on the Structure of Legal Authority,” Arabica 59, nos. 3–4 (2012): 332–71, https://doi.
org/10.1163/157005812X629284; Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam: The
Legacy of Muhammad Al-Shawkani (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2003).
23 See Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Mats Alvesson and Kaj Sköldberg,
Reflexive Methodology (London, UK: Sage Publications Ltd, 2010).
14
Section I
HUTHI IDEOLOGY AND BELIEF SYSTEM

16
1
T H E H U T H I M OV E M E N T ’ S R E L IG IO U S A N D
P O L I T IC A L I D E O L O G Y A N D I T S R E L AT IO N SH I P
T O Z AY D I SM I N Y E M E N
Bernard Haykel
The doctrines of the Huthi movement (aka Ansar Allah or the “partisans of God”)
represent a radical rupture with Zaydi tradition as well as with the generally
accepted teachings of Islamic theology and law.1 This can be gleaned from the
movement’s ideology with its wholesale rejection of the traditional interpretive
methodologies of Islamic theology and law. Instead, the movement offers a
highly politicized, revolutionary, and intentionally simplistic, even primitivist,
interpretation of the religion’s teachings and their implementation in practice. This
is encapsulated in the movement’s slogan or “shout” (sarkha), which appears on its
flag and is ritualistically repeated by its followers: “God is the greatest; Death to
America; Death to Israel; Cursed are the Jews; Victory to Islam.” In this regard, the
Huthis are not unlike certain other Islamist movements that disregard elements of
the tradition while radically and selectively reinterpreting those that prove useful
to their aims.
Members of the movement base their views principally on the oral lessons—
delivered in both classical Arabic and colloquial Yemeni—of Sayyid Ḥusayn b.
Badr al-Dīn al-Hūthī (d. 2004), the founder of the movement. These teachings are
transcribed and collected in a 2129-page online Adobe Acrobat document titled
the Malāzim (Fascicles), which has become the reference text for the movement—a
credal document for its followers.2 So important is this text that there are Android
smartphone applications of the Malāzim that provide easy-to-use didactic and
search functions.3 The Malāzim are now akin to the collected works of Lenin or Mao
for providing guidance to the movement’s followers. And, according to a number of
Yemenis I have interviewed, the Malāzim have surpassed the older canonical works
of the Zaydi sect in political and religious authority. This has engendered criticism
and resistance from traditional Zaydis, and while the Huthis have at times tried to
accommodate the traditionalists, in more recent years, we see real tensions arising
between the two groups, including violence being used to silence the traditionally
oriented Zaydis. The recent destruction by the Huthis of one of Sanaa’s oldest
mosques, Jāmi‘ al-Nahrayn, may perhaps be a manifestation of such a clash.4
The Malāzim are now being taught as a core text by the Huthi’s Ministry of
Religious Endowments in its “Higher Institute for Orientation and Guidance”
(al-Ma‘had al-‘ālī li-l-tawjīh wa-l-irshād).5 In addition, members of the Huthi
movement have produced multiple studies about the teachings of Husayn al-Huthi,
who is referred to not only as the “Martyr Leader” (al-shahīd al-qā’id) but also as
“The Quran’s Companion” (qarīn al-Qur’ān) and more recently as “The Quran’s
Martyr” (shahīd al-Qur’ān).6 Among these books are some that focus on his views
on nurture and education.7 Through such works, his followers hope to elevate his
status to that of a global and historical revolutionary figure, comparable to Ho Chi
Minh in Vietnam or Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. And, as with Khomeini, they see
his message and program to be universal in their applicability.
This chapter aims to introduce the salient aspects of Husayn al-Huthi’s
teachings and will try to situate them in the modern political and intellectual
history of Yemen and that of the broader Islamic and Arab worlds. Husayn al-
Huthi’s intellectual formation remains somewhat obscure, and his biography is
increasingly shrouded in myth and legend. His life was cut short at the age of forty-
five, when he was killed and decapitated by Yemeni government troops in 2004.
We do know that he received a traditional Zaydi religious education and was the
son of one of the most prominent, and prolific, Yemeni scholars of modern times,
Sayyid Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī (d. 2010). He was well versed in the Islamic sciences
and his views, as reflected in the Malāzim, are in no way the result of ignorance of
the Islamic tradition and its attendant sciences, unlike, say, Muammar al-Gaddafi’s
views as expressed in the Green Book. Still, it is difficult to trace the source of
his idiosyncratic and anti-traditional views or to understand how he imagined
these teachings would be implemented in practice, despite the fact that activism
(ḥaraka) occupies a central place in his oeuvre. His teachings appear to have been
only partially developed at the time of his death, and he no doubt intended to
elaborate further on the modalities of their implementation. What we have in the
Malāzim was elaborated during a relatively short period of about three years, from
2002 to 2004. These doctrines have reached us through transcribed oral lessons
and some video and audio recordings that he mostly gave in his native village of
Marrān and in the town of Sa‘da.
The Political Context
By contrast with the opacity of the sources of his ideological formation, the political
context in which al-Huthi developed his views is well known. Yemen had suffered
from decades of poor governance, authoritarian abuse, and systemic corruption
under the rule of President Ali Abdullah Salih (d. 2017). It was, and remains, the
poorest Arab country and is buffeted by chronic political and economic instability
as well as internal divisions based on tribal, sectarian, regional, and genealogical
affiliation. Foreign interference in its internal affairs, whether by neighboring
states or global powers, has been a constant feature since at least the republican
revolution of 1962.
1. Huthi Movement’s Religious and Political Ideology 19
Al-Huthi was keenly aware of the above, and his lectures and speeches express
his frustrations with Yemen’s politics as well as his views about the predicaments
of the broader Islamic and Arab worlds. Thus, we can glean from the Malāzim
how he felt about the condition of the Zaydis in modern Yemen and how they
fared vis-à-vis other Muslim sects. Although al-Huthi considers other Muslim
groups as perhaps somewhat better off than the Zaydis, he describes them all
as being politically weak and economically backward. He generally laments the
plight of the global Muslim community (umma) in the modern world. For him,
the Zaydis in Yemen were especially marginalized, oppressed, and backward,
and this was a source of extreme personal anguish.8 He particularly chafed at the
discrimination that sayyid families, like his own, had experienced, especially in
the Sa‘da region, under republican rule since the early 1970s—a situation that got
worse during the rule of President Ali Abdullah Salih due to his divisive politics
and the increasing presence and dominance of the Salafi Sunnis in the country.
Domination by the Salafis was the result of the Yemeni and Saudi governments’
political support and financial patronage of this group from the early 1970s.
The aim of the Salafization policy in Yemen was to produce across the country
a homogenized and hadith-oriented Sunni form of Islam, one that would be
politically quietist and obedient to the authority of the state. A second goal of
this policy was to produce co-opted Salafi religious leaders who would replace the
traditional religious elites, and especially those from the various families claiming
descent from the Prophet Muhammad (sayyids). It was they who had historically
headed the Zaydis in the north as well as the Sufi Shafi‘i Sunnis in the south.9
One of the leading figures among the Salafis was the late Shaykh Muqbil al-Wādi‘ī
(d. 2001), who established a major center—called Dār al-Ḥadīth—for the teaching
of Salafism in his native village of Dammāj in the region of Sa‘da. From here he
and his students polemically engaged the Zaydis and provoked vituperative and
at times violent exchanges over questions of religious belief and practice. This
also included the destruction of graves in Sa‘da’s main cemetery by the Salafis. The
Huthis crushed the Salafis in this region in 2014 and destroyed this institution of
Salafi proselytism.
Husayn al-Huthi’s Political and Intellectual Itinerary
To understand Husayn al-Huthi, we must draw on what little we know about his
personal, intellectual, and political itinerary. He was elected to parliament in 1993
as a member of Hizb al-Haqq. This was a Zaydi political party that was formed
in the aftermath of the unification of the two Yemens in 1990 and that sought to
represent Zaydis in the new climate of political liberalization. The relatively open
political environment lasted until the civil war of 1994, after which the country’s
politics became dominated by President Saleh’s divisive political activities. Yemen
reverted to authoritarianism, witnessed increasing acts of political violence, and
saw the promotion by the government of Islamism of both the Muslim Brotherhood
and Salafi varieties. This atmosphere led to Husayn al-Huthi’s frustration and
disappointment with electoral politics, and he did not run again for parliament in
the elections of 1997. During this period, he continued to be deeply involved with
a Zaydi revivalist movement called al-Shabab al-Mu’min (The Believing Youth) in
the Sa‘da region and elsewhere. Al-Huthi had helped establish this group in the
1980s, and it engaged in opening teaching institutions, summer camp activities
for students, and the publication of manuscripts. Members of this group also
developed relations with the religious seminaries (ḥawza) in Qom in Iran as well
as those in Najaf in Iraq. Al-Huthi traveled to Iran with his father during this time.
There is no evidence, however, that either converted to Twelver Imami Shiism or
that they openly adopted Khomeini’s ideas, as Husayn al-Huthi did later.10 It is
clear that al-Huthi was concerned about the preservation of the Zaydi heritage and
community and was seeking ways to revive its political and religious fortunes. He
decided to pursue advanced Islamic studies for an MA degree in the Sudan, and it
is possible that he thought this academic credential would help him in a leadership
role after his return.
The 1990s was a period of considerable Islamist political ferment in the Sudan.
The regime of Omar al-Bashir and its principal ideologue, Hasan al-Turabi
(d. 2016), hosted large international gatherings and sought to unite in Khartoum
a plethora of Islamist groups and leaders, including various Shiite Islamists as well
as Osama bin Laden and the members of Al-Qaeda. Al-Huthi was exposed to
numerous revolutionary Islamist ideologies during his stay in Khartoum in the late
1990s, and it is likely that this influenced his own political thinking. The subject
of his thesis was a study and critical edition of Kitāb al-Burhān, a commentary on
the Quran by the Zaydi imam Abū ’l-Fatḥ al-Daylamī (d. 444/1052–3).11 While
there is no evidence that al-Huthi adopted any of al-Daylamī’s specific teachings,
he may have found inspiration in this imam’s life and in the short-lived imamate
that he established in Yemen.12 What is certain, however, is that al-Huthi regarded
the early Zaydi imams, such al-Hādī Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn (d. 298/911) and his
forefathers, as the last exemplary scholars and leaders. The later imams—those
after the fifth AH / eleventh CE century—he deemed to have deviated from the
“original” beliefs of Islam, which implied that their teachings were not to be
followed. He saw the later imams, including even such eminent ones as al-Manṣūr
‘Abd Allāh b. Ḥamza (d. 614/1217), as having adopted and elaborated complex
theological and legal principles and interpretive methodologies that create
barriers between the Muslim believers and the direct and uncorrupted message of
the Quran. Such criticism of the medieval scholarly tradition is common among
reformist religious thinkers, including both Zaydis and Salafis. They each, in their
own way, argue that the later scholastic tradition adopted and developed complex
positions that amount to reprehensible innovations (bida‘) and must therefore be
rejected. Huthi’s dismissive view of the later imams, and in effect of much of the
later Zaydi tradition, is one of the main reasons for the tension between the Huthis
and the more traditionally minded Zaydis.
As mentioned, while overseas, al-Huthi was also exposed to the Islamist regime
of Omar al-Bashir and the ideas of Hasan al-Turabi and those of the Muslim
Brotherhood more generally.13 He also was a keen reader and admirer of Ayatollah
Khomeini whose opinions—particularly those that pertain to Islam’s revolutionary

revival as well as the vilification of the West and America—al-Huthi often cites
in his lectures in the Malāzim. Last though certainly not least, al-Huthi was fully
informed of the ideas of the global jihadis, and in particular Al-Qaeda’s propaganda
and militant activities, which culminated in the 9/11 attacks. These events, as is
well known, provoked a sustained global American political and military response,
which had violent repercussions on Yemen and the wider Islamic world, and which
al-Huthi described as a frontal attack on Islam, both as a faith and as a community.
Like al-Qaeda, he saw and seized upon this conflict as an opportunity to mobilize
Muslims in self-defense, and 9/11 effectively became the launching pad for his
political movement of resistance to Salih’s rule. It was after 9/11 that the Huthi’s
slogan or “shout” was first heard.14 In other words, Al-Qaeda’s presentation of world
politics—as a campaign by the forces of unbelief against Islam and Muslims—was
one al-Huthi used in his effort to mobilize Yemenis against the government in
Sanaa. This is because after 9/11 Ali Abdullah Salih’s government publicly allied
itself with the United States in the so-called War on Terror, and began receiving
training and materiel from Washington with which to fight the jihadis who were
active in Yemen. Al-Huthi saw this as an opportunity to criticize Salih, even though
as a Zaydi, al-Huthi viewed the Salafi jihadis as mortal enemies because of their
abiding hatred for and attacks on Shiites.
Al-Huthi’s reformist project should probably be understood as a reaction to
the dire political, economic, and intellectual conditions in Yemen in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. The radical and simplistic characteristics of his views and those
of the movement he spawned, best captured in the Huthi “shout,” perhaps explain
his broad appeal among many Yemenis. These features may also have contributed
to the political and military success of his followers in the civil war that continues
to rage in the country. One way to think of Huthism is as an ideology of deliberate
simplism and revolutionary activism. Yet, the influences that have contributed to
al-Huthi’s own thinking and the formulation of his ideology are neither simple
nor few—his worldview is composite, quite modern, and, as with other Islamist
ideologies, represents a radical rupture with the past. Let us now turn to the two
most salient features of this ideology.
The Guidance of the Quran and that of the Prophet’s Family
There are a number of different ideological streams that feed into Husayn al-
Huthi’s worldview and teachings, and it is therefore difficult to slot him into a neat
ideological category. These include Khomeinism, Muslim Brotherhood Islamism,
Salafi-jihadism, Shi‘i-sayyid particularism, Zaydism, Yemeni nationalism, as well
as third-world anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. It is hard to disentangle
these diverse threads or to assign greater importance to one than another. That said,
there are two distinctive, albeit undertheorized, ideas that al-Huthi propagated and
which seem to capture the entirety of his reformist political project and ideological
outlook.
The first is the notion of the guidance of the Quran (hady ’l-Qur’ān) or what is
also sometimes referred to as the “way” or the project of the Quran (masīrat al-
Qur’ān, al-mashrū‘ al-Qur’ānī). Al-Huthi claims that the Quran contains all that is
needed for Muslims to implement the reforms necessary to empower the Muslim
community (umma) and to retrieve its lost glory. And his followers often refer to
al-Huthi himself as the "Speaking Quran" (Qur’ān nāṭiq), and in so doing elevate
him to being the embodiment of the holy text. The second is the guiding role of
the family of the Prophet Muhammad (Ahl al-Bayt or al-‘itra) in leading the entire
Muslim community throughout history. By following the lead of what he terms
the “leaders of guidance” (͗a͑lām al-hudā), the community is able to apprehend and
then implement the Quran’s guidance and thereby establish the order that God
has decreed for mankind. In what follows I will discuss each of these ideas and
show how the first marks a radical break with Islamic intellectual and religious
tradition, while the second constitutes a covert repackaging of the Zaydi doctrine
of the imamate.
The Exclusive Reliance on the Quran and the Denial of Tradition
Even cursory investigation of the Malāzim shows the centrality of the Quran
in al-Huthi’s discourse. Most of these lessons, each a discrete fascicle, consist of
commentary on chapters and verses of the Quran, among them sūras of Āl ͑ Imrān,
al-Nisā’ or al-Nisā’, and al-Mā͗ida. The “Program for Ramadan” (al-Barnāmaj
al-ramaḍānī) is characterized as “Lessons in the Guidance of the Noble Quran”
(Durūs min hady ’l-Qur’ān al-karīm). Even when not directly commenting on
the Quran, the lessons invariably revert to the idea of its guidance as a means of
reforming Muslim belief and practice. Al-Huthi’s obsessive focus on the Quran,
and the centrality he accords to it, is eminently practical for his political project.
All Muslims agree on the prime importance of the Quran, and it can therefore help
overcome the sectarian and ideological affiliations that have divided Yemenis as well
as the global Muslim community. In other words, al-Huthi’s appeal to the Quran’s
guidance and his claim that it provides the only way to overcome the divisions and
problems of the Islamic world appear at face value to be a powerful and effective
argument. Yet, this is not where his argument ends, and it is his additional claims
about the Quran and how the Islamic tradition relates to it that have proven most
controversial, not least to his fellow but more traditionally minded Zaydis.
At the center of al-Huthi’s program lies the claim that Muslims have deviated
from the Quran’s teachings and must therefore correct their relationship to what it
preaches (khiṭāb). Only then can the Quran’s mission, which is to produce an ideal
community of believers, be accomplished. The deviation that has taken place is
the result of effects that theology (‘ilm al-kalām) and jurisprudential theory (uṣūl
al-fiqh) have had on how to understand the Quran. Each discipline has created
conceptual and hermeneutic principles that have no basis in the Quran itself or
in the period of Islam’s emergence in Mecca and Medina. As a result, the Muslims
have fallen into disagreement (ikhtilāf) and discord (shiqāq) and are no longer able
to read the “ocean of guidance and truth,” that is, the Quran. Instead, the Quran
has become ensnared in (conceptual) webs (hadhā al-baḥr mushabbak ‘alayhi).15
Here is how al-Huthi describes how disagreement prevents the application of the
Quran’s message.
Disagreement about the Quran prevents its implementation (iqāmat al-kitāb).

This is exactly the same issue that is raised in the verse (“Those who differ
regarding the Quran,” 2:176). . . they have prevented the truth from being
implemented in practice and realistically from within [the teachings of] the
Book among the people. God has created the truth in such a manner that means
exist to establish it among the people.16
For al-Huthi, the Quran offers a unique framework, which he labels “the rightly-
guided laws or practices that are preached by the Quran” (nawāmīs aw sunan al-
hidāya fī al-khiṭāb al-Qur’ānī).17 It also presents a comprehensive vision (ru’ya
shāmila) and a methodology (manhajiyya) which is sufficient for establishing
its aims (maqāṣid) of building both man, as an individual, and society, as a
collective. Furthermore, “it presents issues in an integrated fashion” (yuqaddim
al-qaḍāyā amāmaka mutarābiṭa).18 By contrast, al-Hūthi held that the science of
jurisprudence has an approach that disaggregates issues, treating matters discretely
and thereby producing a welter of contradictory views and rulings. Even more
dramatically, al-Huthi goes on to criticize the entire religious tradition for having
developed the “instrumental sciences” (‘ulūm al-āla), that is, auxiliary fields such
as grammar, syntax, morphology, rhetoric, because, as a Huthi official ‘Abd al-
Malik al-‘Ijrī explains, “these [sciences] stripped the Arabic language of its spirit
and transformed it into dry rules that do not aid in understanding the ways Arabs
address one another.”19 Another consequence of this is that the Quran is now
considered to have multiple meanings, to suit the needs of whoever is quoting it.
This is why al-Huthi goes on to criticize those who argue that the Quran can bear
multiple meanings (al-Qur’ān ḥammāl wujūh) when he says:
This is absolutely not true. For if this were so, the Quran would be deceitful
(mudāhin) . . . But no, all of it provides a single meaning . . . error arises when
you approach the Quran and you are no longer your natural self (mā ‘ādak
ṭabī‘ī),20 no longer an Arab, and your apprehension of the Quran is through your
theoretical knowledge of the Arabic language, and language techniques. Those
who, for example, claim to use an instrumental science (ālah) to understand
the Quran, or to derive a ruling [from it], are not natural. This is an unsound
method . . . The Quran is as Imam al-Qāsim [ibn Ibrāhīm] stated: “When you
turn your back on it, it turns its back on you.”21
Al-Huthi appears to attribute to the entirety of the Quran an all-encompassing and

unequivocal message, one not open to various interpretations. He also denies the
principle of abrogation (naskh) and a number of other hermeneutic principles that
are fundamental to the way in which the text has been traditionally interpreted.
The critique continues beyond the science of Quranic commentary (tafsīr)

when al-Huthi attacks the traditions of Islamic theology and law. He rejects,
for example, the legal principle of independent reasoning (ijtihād) because this
allows for different opinions and rulings, leading to confusion and division. For
him, the highly individualistic nature of ijtihad prevents a unified understanding
of the text and thwarts unified action by the community as a whole. Additional
details of al-Huthi’s critique of the scholarly tradition are beyond the scope of
this article, but it should be clear that his program, which is now labeled by
his followers as the “Quranic Way,” involves a radical break with the religious
tradition and as well as a reordering of religious authority around a new
interpretive methodology.22
The Doctrine of the “Leaders of Guidance” or the Imamate

by Another Name?
The imamate is the institution that mainly distinguishes Zaydism from other
sects of Islam. Unlike Twelver Shiism, the Zaydis have maintained that a living
descendant of the Prophet Muhammad—one who satisfies a number of rigorous
qualifications—must make a “call” (da‘wa) to himself as the imam, be recognized by
the community as such and, if necessary, “come out” (khurūj) against unjust rulers
to establish a righteous Islamic state. This was the dominant doctrine of rule from
the time of the first Zaydi imam in Yemen, al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaqq Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn
(d. 298/911) and it theoretically remained so until the death of the last ruling
imam al-Nāṣir Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā Ḥamīd al-Dīn in 1962. The imamate, however, was
vilified in republican ideology and historiography after the 1962 revolution. It was
depicted as racist because it privileged the political and social domination of the
Prophet’s descendants (sayyids), who claimed northern Arab descent (‘Adnānīs),
over Yemenis of non-sayyid descent and who claimed to be of southern Arab
origin (Qaḥṭānīs). Numerous republican intellectuals, among them Muḥammad
Maḥmūd al-Zubayrī, Qāḍī Ismā‘īl al-Akwa‘, and the Arab nationalist Dr. ‘Abd al-
Azīz al-Maqāliḥ, promoted this view, which in turn legitimized the marginalization
if not outright persecution of traditional Zaydi scholars and prominent sayyid
political families. As recently as 2004, Yemen’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism
reprinted Muhammad al-Zubayri’s The Imamate and Its Threat to Yemen’s Unity
(al-Imāma wa khaṭaruhā ‘alā wiḥdat al-Yaman) with a preface by President
Saleh, in which he warns Yemenis of the Huthis and their desire to revive “the
non-Islamic clerical rule of the imams” (ḥukm al-͗a͗imma al-kahanūtī). The idea of
imamic rule as being racist is still prevalent among Yemenis. Because of this, Zaydi
sayyids, whether members of the Huthi movement or otherwise, who have sought
to become politically active have been extremely reluctant to discuss the imamate
let alone claim a desire to restore it as a system of rule. For instance, the Ḥizb al-
Ḥaqq, a party largely led by Zaydi sayyids and founded after the unification of
the two Yemens in 1990s, formally abjured the institution of the imamate, and
the Huthis themselves have not invoked it in their public statements.23 In fact, the
Huthis have officially remained committed to a republican form of government,

and have made a point of celebrating September 26, 1962—the day on which
the Hamid al-Din dynasty was toppled by republican army officers—as a day of
national independence. They also celebrate the “September 21 Revolution,” which
marks the day they captured Sanaa in 2014. This is likely to supersede the other
commemoration.
While not explicitly mentioning the imamate, Husayn al-Huthi in the Malāzim
does discuss the topic of wilāya (rulership) after the Prophet Muhammad, by
which he means specifically the alleged designation of Imam Ali by the Prophet
Muhammad as his successor in 10 AH/632 CE during a sermon he gave at a
location called Ghadīr Khumm.24 This is an event that Zaydis have traditionally
celebrated, since at least the eleventh/seventeenth century, and which was banned
by the republic until the 1990s. Since their takeover of Sanaa, the Huthis have
revived this celebration across the regions they control. Al-Huthi argues that since
Islam regulates all aspects of life, including the affairs of the family and inheritance,
it is inconceivable that it would not also regulate affairs of the Muslim community
as a whole. Islam, he states, “is both a religion and a state (dīn wa dawla), and Islam
has come down from God as a comprehensive system for all of life’s affairs (niẓām
shāmil li-l-ḥayāt kullihā), and would not ignore any aspect.”25 As a system of rule,
traditional Zaydism restricted leadership to an imam from the Prophet’s family.
But perhaps because the term got a bad reputation in republican times, al-Huthi
developed a new terminology and asserted that leadership can still be found in a
person called a “Leader of guidance” or “the Guiding Eminence” (‘alam al-hudā).26
This is a term that has no precedent in the Zaydi tradition and appears to signify
a universal leader for the world—a super-imam whose role is more encompassing
than that of a traditional Zaydi imam.
The doctrine of ‘alam al-hudā is not elaborated in al-Huthi’s Malāzim, but some
discussion about it can be found in a lesson al-Huthi provides on the chapter of Āl
‘Imrān in the Quran.27 Here he explains that there must at all times be a guide who
can lead the community and embody the guidance of the Quran. While this person
is to be a descendant of the Prophet, it is not clear how he is to be identified or what
exactly his prerogatives are. The person is not defined in the way that an imam
is, with a set number of qualifications and prerogatives. Instead, he represents a
cosmic revolutionary ethos and acts as a guide for the community and the world.
Here is how al-Huthi explains the role of the ‘alam al-hudā:
The community needs guidance from God in the form of books and living
leaders of guidance. God did not say “God’s revelations are recited to you” and
stop there. He continued “and amongst you is His Messenger” (Quran III:101),
a leader, a man from among you. A leader of guidance, embodying this Quran,
revolving around it, guiding through its guidance, embodying the mercy and
guidance of the Quran. . . . The Quran here states that the community is in need
of the Quran, in need of a leader in whom the Quran is embodied and who is
a continuation of the Messenger [Muhammad] (bi-ḥāja ilā ‘alamin yatajassad
fīhi al-Qur’ān wa huwa imtidād li-l-rasūl), an heir to the Messenger in every
age. Does this mean that the community will need leaders of guidance around
whom to revolve? [Indeed], they embody the Quran and guide and lead by it
and endeavor to apply it in the community.28
According to ‘Abd al-Malik al-‘Ijrī—the high-level official and intellectual in the

Huthi movement—the ‘alam al-hudā concept refers to a well-guided and divinely
inspired leadership (qiyāda musaddada wa mulhama), consisting of a model
person (insān namūdhajī). This is not a traditional religious scholar, nor a rank
comparable to the Guardian Jurist (al-walī al-faqīh) in Twelver Shiism nor yet an
executive office such as an imam in the Zaydi tradition. Rather, for al-‘Ijrī, the
‘alam al-hudā is an epistemological concept (maqūla ma‘rifiyya) that supplants
these other categories of person, and is “a social and historical force that aims to
transform individual and social consciousness, and is closer to being a doctrine of
ethical leadership (qiyāda akhlāqiyya).”29
Whatever the ‘alam al-hudā is in theory or in practice, and it is far from being
clearly articulated in the movement’s writings, it is an institution that has a practical
manifestation in the figure of ‘Abd al-Malik al-Hūthī, the late Husayn’s brother
and the leader of the movement since 2004. The rule of the Huthi movement
indicates that a new religious and political ideology is being spread in Yemen.
That rule includes a series of unprecedented decrees such as calling the Huthi
supreme leaders “The Speaking Quran,” the establishment of a 20 percent tax
(khums) on certain forms of wealth (e.g., metals extracted from mines, oil), and
the proceeds to be distributed to indigent Zaydi sayyids, the revamping of the
educational curriculum along Huthi ideological lines, and the commemoration
of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn b. Ali (d. 61 AH/680 CE). The leader of
the movement is an authoritarian figure who brooks no dissent, not unlike the
Supreme Leader in Iran. And while some Yemenis are willing to adopt these views,
others are being coerced into accepting them. What is most intriguing, however,
is the fraught relationship the Huthis have with traditional Zaydis, some of whom
have found Husayn al-Huthi’s revolutionary ideas to be unacceptable because they
violate the sect’s teachings.
Traditional Zaydis versus the Huthis
The relationship between the Huthi movement’s leadership and traditional Zaydis
is opaque. By traditional Zaydis, I mean those who adhere to the teachings of
the Zaydi sect as developed in Yemen over the centuries, beginning with al-Hādī
Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn and coalescing in the canonical legal and theological writings
of imams such as Yaḥyā Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1436) and al-Manṣūr al-Qāsim b.
Muḥammad (d. 1029/1620). It is clear that Husayn al-Huthi’s ideas, as presented
in the Malāzim and through the action of his followers, have provoked a
negative reaction among traditional Zaydis. This has to do with al-Huthi’s views
on the irrelevance, indeed the misguidance, of the traditional Islamic sciences,
his invention of the ‘alam al-hudā doctrine, his reformulation of Islam as a
revolutionary political ideology strongly inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideas

on global politics, and his elevation of active hatred for America and Jews to a
creedal belief. Tensions arose in the aughts of this century over these issues and
over whether military action against the Saleh government in Sanaa was the best
way to advance Zaydi interests.
The first public reaction to the Huthis by the traditionalists was in 2004, when
Husayn al-Huthi was still alive. It took the form of “A Declaration by Zaydi
Scholars” (Bayān min ͑ulamā͗ al-Zaydiyya) and was published in Hizb al-Haqq’s
newspaper al-Umma. At the time the party had become weak and was under the
leadership of the late Hasan Zayd. The declaration was signed by a number of the
leading scholars in Sanaa.30 In it, these scholars warn against Husayn al-Huthi’s
teachings in the Malāzim and declare them to be reprehensible innovations and
errors (bidà wa ḍalālāt) that are in no way associated with the Zaydi sect or
the teachings of the Prophet’s family. The scholars informed the public that it is
impermissible to listen to, approve of, or affirm al-Huthi’s views. In particular,
two passages are singled out from the Malāzim as evidence of the heinous nature
of al-Huthi’s views. These deserve to be reproduced because they underscore the
rupture that traditional Zaydis assert al-Huthi’s teachings represent. Speaking in
the plural, al-Huthi states in the Malāzim:
We have found ourselves in the end spending our days with books that are
entirely error-filled, from start to finish, such as the books on jurisprudence and
its principles. These lie at the heart of all the error we find ourselves in, [they
are] the reason for the immobility and defeat of the Zaydis, the reason for the
low vitality of the Zaydis. This is wholly different from what had prevailed [in
times past] among our ancestors of the Prophet’s house and their supporters.
[These books] are what we spend our nights studying and we carry them to the
mosques, and yet how far they are from the reality of the mosques.31
Switching to the first person singular and in a different lesson in the Malāzim,
al-Huthi states:
I feel from my study of the Noble Quran and from my contemplation of reality—
and in the minds of many I may be wrong—that the Zaydis live in a state of
humiliation that is worse than that which was imposed [by God] on the Children
of Israel (Banū Isrā’īl). Our scholars, students and our entire society live in a state
that is more demeaning and humiliating than that which God almighty inflicted
on the Children of Israel because we have abandoned our responsibility. . . . I
personally believe that the worst thing that has afflicted us and distanced us
from the Quran, from God’s religion, from a sound vision of life and religion,
from God almighty is the science of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh). I will state
it clearly: The science of jurisprudence is among the worst sciences, and the
science of theology, which the Mu‘tazila invented, is the vilest cause that has led
us to this dreadful state and has distanced us from God, from His Messenger and
from His prophets.32
Husayn al-Huthi’s attack on the Mu‘tazila and their influence is not new in
Zaydi history. Many premodern imams and scholars were critical of their sway.33
What is new, however, is the wholesale dismissal of the Islamic scholarly tradition.
And more troubling still is the Huthi movement’s replacement of this tradition
with the Malāzim. This is what has generated a sustained reaction from the
traditional scholars, who are mostly based in Sanaa and who see their teachings
under attack.
The clash between the Zaydi scholars in Sanaa and the Huthis also has a social
dimension, in that each represents a distinct group of Zaydi sayyids. On the one
hand, the Huthis are provincial sayyids, drawn mostly from the Sa‘da region, and
have experienced sustained persecution from the republican government in Sanaa,
especially during President Saleh’s rule. The six wars that Saleh waged against the
Huthis, between 2004 and 2010, were important in generating a particular martial
ethos and a political experience that is not shared by other sayyids in Yemen. In
contrast, the learned sayyid families of Sanaa constitute an elite scholarly group
who feel themselves to be the guardians of the Zaydi tradition as well as the leaders
of the national community. And while the Sanaa sayyids did lose power after
1962, most still kept their properties and held positions in the judiciary, public
administration, and in business. In other words, their relationship with the central
government, while at times tense, did not involve sustained persecution.
A fraught tense relationship existed, but it ultimately resulted in an attempt at a
formal reconciliation between the Huthis and the traditional Zaydi scholars. This
took place during the Arab Spring events that shook Yemen in 2011 and resulted
in political instability. The various Zaydi constituencies felt the need to unite their
ranks in the debates that were taking place between different political factions
over the future constitution of the country. The form the reconciliation took was a
public document of common principles that the Huthi leaders and eminent Zaydi
religious scholars signed in 2012. Titled “The Intellectual and Cultural Charter”
(al-Wathīqa al-fikriyya wa-l-thaqāfiyya) and published online, this document
reiterated the commitment of all the parties to traditional Zaydi theological
and legal doctrines (e.g., divine attributes, justice, punishment, ijtihād) as well
as to the chosenness and guiding role of the Prophet’s family (Ahl al-Bayt) and
the historical Zaydi imams.34 While the Huthi signatories sought to address the
concerns of the traditional scholars, they also insisted that certain elements of
Huthi ideology be included in the statement. For instance, mention is made of
the United States and Israel as the principal enemies of Islam. Here is how this is
stated:
Commanding right and forbidding the wrong, armed struggle against the
oppressors, and standing up to the arrogant ones are among the greatest
religious duties, imposed on all persons. Loyalty to God’s friends and enmity
towards God’s enemies is a religious duty—as God has legislated—especially
against the leaders of unbelief who are represented in our time by America and
Israel and those who help, are loyal to, and stand with them in enmity to Islam
and Muslims. [This is] imposed by God [as an obligation] on His worshippers.35
owever, the Huthis also tried to assuage the sensibilities of the traditionalists
H
by downplaying Husayn al-Huthi’s contempt for the tradition’s scholars and their
books. This delicate matter is treated as follows:
The criticism of the scholars is not directed at the scholars of the Ahl al-Bayt, nor
at their active partisans, nor at their sciences. Rather, it is directed at those who
reject the obligation to engage in armed struggle (jihād) against the oppressors
as well as the obligation to command right and forbid wrong. Indeed [the
criticism is directed] at those who advocate silence and obedience to those to
whom obedience is forbidden.36
Yet even within the Zaydi tradition itself, the teachings of the early imams are to
be privileged over those of later ones, which is in keeping with Husayn al-Huthi’s
own views. Here is how the document presents this point:
In general, all are in agreement about the method (manhaj) of the Ahl al-Bayt
with respect to their principles and beliefs and to which the guiding imams have
adhered from the dawn of Islam to our present time, from the earliest to the
most recent. Yet, we prefer (nurajjiḥ) the method of the earliest imams such as
al-Hādī [Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn] and al-Qāsim [b. Ibrāhīm] because they are closer
to the Quranic method (al-uslūb al-Qur’ānī) and the divine nature (al-fiṭra al-
rabbāniyya).37
As for the question of the restoration of the imamate, the document says nothing
about whether and how this would take place, preferring instead to use allusive
language. Prevarication on this point is to be expected given the highly divisive
nature of the imamate in republican Yemen. The document handles this in a section
titled “chosenness” (isṭifā’), which highlights the special role that the Ahl al-Bayt
play as leaders of the community of believers, but leaves unanswered whether the
imamate is to be restored and how an imam would be selected.
We believe that God Almighty chose the People of the House of His messenger
and made them guides to the community (umma) and the heirs of the Quran
after the messenger until Judgment Day. God arranges for someone in every age
to be a lighthouse for His worshippers, able to command the community and to
advance all its needs. Our method for establishing and selecting the leader is the
methodology of the People of the House [Italics added].38
With this Charter issued and signed, it appeared that the Huthis had rejoined
the fold of the tradition or at least were seeking to accommodate its adherents.
This attempt at resolving differences did not last long. According to my Yemeni
interlocutors, the Huthis’ commitment to the traditional teachings was not sincere,
and once their political and military fortunes improved, they abandoned the
principles articulated in the document. In fact, the Huthis insisted on propagating
the views in the Malāzim, including those which denigrated the teachings of the
Zaydi sect. In particular, the Huthis appeared again to dismiss the standard books
on theology and jurisprudence, which Zaydi traditionalists held in great regard as
sources of religious authority.
In the ongoing civil war, which began in 2014, many of Sanaa’s sayyids have
fought on the side of the Huthis, and many men from elite scholarly families
have lost their lives. This has created strong bonds between certain members of
the two groups, so that many sayyids now see a secure future only in a Yemen
controlled and dominated by the Huthis. Nonetheless, there are other sayyids,
as well as non-sayyid Zaydis, who consider the Huthis and their teachings to
represent a threat to traditional teachings and a danger for their survival in
Yemen. The latter have to be cautious in their criticism because the Huthis are
brutal in their treatment of those they consider to be dissidents. One of these
dissidents is a sayyid and a scholar called Yaḥyā b. Ḥusayn al-Daylamī, who until
recently preached and taught in the Jāmi‘ al-Nahrayn mosque. This is one of
Sanaa’s oldest and is located within the UNESCO built-heritage protected area.
Al-Daylamī has criticized the Huthis in his sermons during the last six years. It
appears that because of this the mosque had become a locus of Zaydi opposition,
and for this reason, it was recently demolished by the Huthis. The pretext was that
its prayer niche (miḥrāb) was not properly oriented toward Mecca.39 Since then,
the Huthis have warned other preachers of serious consequences if they do not
support the movement’s program.40 As long as the Huthis remain in power and
are willing to use force to enforce their will, it is likely the traditional Zaydis will
avoid a direct confrontation and seek to preserve the tradition in whatever way
they can without provoking the Huthis’ wrath.
Conclusion
The teachings of Husayn al-Huthi represent a radical break not only with Zaydi
teachings but with the Islamic scholarly tradition as a whole. In this respect, it is
similar to other Islamist ideologies, such as Khomeinism or that of the Muslim
Brotherhood and al-Qaeda, which also constitute modern ruptures with the past,
while often claiming to represent an authentic continuation of the true Islam of the
early centuries. As an ideological framework and a means by which sayyids can
recover their political status in Yemen, the Huthi movement represents an extreme
form of revolutionary activism. If they should be defeated on the battlefield, they
will have placed the Zaydi tradition and the survival of Yemen’s Zaydi sayyid
communities in extreme danger. The vengeance that non-sayyids and non-Zaydis
will seek to exact is terrible to contemplate. The context of systematic persecution
of the sayyids in Sa‘da helps explain the emergence of the Huthi movement
and its revolutionary ideology. The latter consists of largely giving up the Zaydi
tradition, replacing it with a mixture of Khomeinism, global jihadism, and a
willfully simplistic worldview. These are encapsulated in the Huthi “shout” and
the rambling and disorganized lectures in Husayn al-Huthi’s Malāzim. It is hard
to see how this ideology can produce a successful and stable political project. That
said, the Huthis’ focus on redressing the corruption of the past regime and the
obsession with producing a culture of political defiance (ṣumūd), while developing
strong relationships with the tribes and adopting many of their cultural practices,
are new features of Yemen’s political landscape and may lead to resilience of the
Huthi phenomenon. Only time will tell. Nonetheless, Huthism is perhaps best
understood as a manifestation of the destruction wrought upon Yemen by decades
of poor governance, corruption, and the abuse of power by the late Ali Abdullah
Saleh and his regime. And while this might be a fitting epitaph for a brutal dictator,
Yemen certainly deserves better than to be ruled by no less brutal revolutionaries;
while Zaydism, which is one of Islam’s richest intellectual traditions, is unjustly
maligned by being falsely identified with the Huthis.
Notes
1 I would like to thank several interlocutors for providing me with texts, references,
and insights as well as for their willingness to talk to me at length about the Huthi
movement. They are: Dr. Abdallah Hamidaddin, Dr. Ali Muhammad Zaid, Mr. Salem
Bahfi, Mr. Ahmad Abd al-Ali al-Shami, Mr. Ali al-Bukhayti, and Mr. Abd al-Malik
al-‘Ijri. I wish to thank Michael Cook and Frank Stewart for reading and commenting
on a draft of the chapter. I extend my gratitude to all who have helped me better
understand Yemeni history and politics, and any errors of fact and interpretation
are entirely my own. For more on the Huthi movement, refer to the following titles:
Abdullah Lux, “Yemen’s last Zaydī Imām: The shabāb al-muʾmin, the Malāzim, and
‘ḥizballāh’ in the thought of Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī,” Contemporary Arab
Affairs 2, no. 3 (2009): 369–434; Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells,
Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica,
CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG962.
html (accessed March 30, 2021); Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A
History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst, 2017); Luca Nevola, “Houthis in the
Making: Nostalgia, Populism, and the Politicization of Hashemite Descent,” Arabian
Humanities, no. 13 (2020), http://journals.openedition.org/cy/5917 (accessed
March 30, 2021); ACAPS (Assessment Capacities Project), “Yemen: the Houthi
Supervisory System,” June 17, 2020, https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/
files/20200617_acaps_yemen_analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf
(accessed March 30, 2021).
2 This file titled Malāzim al-shahīd al-qā’id Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī—ḥuzma
kāmilatan (“Fascicles of the Martyr Leader Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi—the
Complete Collection”) can be downloaded from the following site: https://alsarkh.
blogspot.com/2018/09/pdf.html (accessed December 14, 2020).
3 See, for example, https://apkpure.com/ar/‫القرآن‬-‫هدي‬-‫من‬/quraan.courses.malazim
(accessed December 16, 2020).
4 See ‘Iṣām Ṣabrī, “al-Asbāb al-ḥaqīqiyya allatī dafaàt al-Ḥūthiyyīn ilā hadm Jāmi‘ al-
Nahrayn,” al-Mushāhid, February 16, 2021, https://almushahid.net/72960/ (accessed
March 30, 2021).
5 Based on an interview with a Yemeni religious scholar who wishes to remain

anonymous.
6 See http://althawrah.ye/archives/617031 (accessed March 15, 2021) and http://
www.d-althagafhalqurania.com/newsDetail/1alrYwwUcg26bp5SDpdzYA== (accessed
March 15, 2021).
7 See Ḥamūd b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Ahnūmī, al-Tarbiya fī fikr al-shahīd al-qā’id al-sayyid
Ḥusayn b. Badr al-Dīn al-Ḥūthī, Sanaa: al-Majlis al-Zaydī al-Islāmī, 1438/2017.
8 See Malāzim, Sūrat Āl ‘Imrān, al-dars 1, 10, where al-Huthi compares the inferior
condition of the Zaydis to that of other Shi‘i sects who are more successful in
defending their rights. He writes: “the Zaydis are trifled with by a school headmaster,
a provincial head, a thief, a local district head, a governor or a soldier, in order words
[they are in] a very bad condition. . . . Why have [the Zaydis] become like humiliated
Arabs under the feet of Jews and Christians? It is because we have abandoned that
which we have been summoned to follow [i.e., the Quran], so that we are now under
the feet of those who were humiliated [by God], those upon whom [He] imposed
humiliation and abasement [cf. Quran 2:61]. Are we the Zaydis not under the feet
of the Sunnis? [This is] because we have abandoned our prime responsibility, and
pretend to be the Ahl al-Bayt, and [yet] no longer believe in the cause of the ‘two
weighty things’ (thaqalayn): ‘God’s Book and My [i.e., the Prophet’s] family.’ Others
believe in these, though they have not applied them. They believe in them because
the [thaqalayn] is a sound prophetic tradition. . . . So long as we don’t believe in the
thaqalayn, we will remain downtrodden, and we will not be rewarded with glory,
power, and dominion. And we will remain unable to offer anything [substantive] to
Islam.”
9 For more on the Salafi influence in Yemen, see Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform
in Islam (Cambridge: Hurst, 2003), Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen (London,
2011), and Samy Dorlian, La mouvance zaydite dans le Yémen contemporain: une
modernisation avortée (Paris: Harmattan, 2013). The Zaydi sayyids of the north
are not the same group as the sayyids of the south. They have different lineages
(northerners are overwhelmingly descendants of al-Hasan b. ‘Ali, whereas the
eponym of the southern sayyids is al-Husayn b. ‘Ali) and different sectarian affiliations
(Zaydis in the north and Shafi‘is in the south). For the sayyids in southern Yemen,
see Abdallah Bujra, The Politics of Stratification: A Study of Political Change in a South
Arabian Town (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971) and Engseng Ho, The Graves of Tarim:
Genealogy and Mobility across the Indian Ocean (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2006).
10 During fieldwork in Yemen in the mid-1990s I was able to find only one Twelver
Shii bookstore in the entire country, Maktabat al-Zahrā’ in Sanaa. Its owner told me
that about forty Yemenis had converted to Imami Shiism. There is no doubt that the
Iranian revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini held a particular fascination for some
Zaydis, but Khomeini’s doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh)
and the political system represented by the Islamic Republic were largely deemed to
be inapplicable in Yemen.
11 It is not known whether al-Huthi ever completed this and obtained his degree. A copy
of al-Burhān can be found in Firestone Library, Princeton University, https://catalog.
princeton.edu/catalog/7849550 (accessed December 19, 2020).
12 s.v. Deylamī, Abū’l-Fatḥ Nāṣer, Encyclopaedia Iranica, Vol. VII, Fasc. 3 (2011), 338
(Wilferd Madelung), https://iranicaonline.org/articles/deylami-abul-fath-naser
(accessed December 19, 2020). Al-Daylamī was a Zaydi imam who in the fifth/
eleventh century left the Caspian regions of Iran for Yemen, where he established a
short-lived imamate before being killed by an Isma‘ili political rival. Imam al-Daylamī
is alleged to have held eccentric theological and legal views, and it is possible that he
inspired al-Huthi as a model of independent scholarship and political adventurism.
This conjecture requires further study before it can be firmly established. It is in part
based on interviews with followers of al-Huthi, including Aḥmad ‘Abd al-‘Alī al-
Shāmī (interview on December 11, 2020).
13 For more on the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on Husayn al-Huthi, see
Muḥammad al-Maḥfalī, Athar Ḥasan al-Bannā fī khiṭāb Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, Arabia
Felix Center for Studies, 2021, https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/ws/files/94759755/_Arabia_
Felix_Studies.pdf (accessed July 12, 2021).
14 The first public display of the Huthi movement’s “Shout” (sarkha), in the form of
flyers on the walls of Sa‘da, occurred after the events of 9/11/2001 during and after
the commemoration of ‘Īd al-Ghadīr, which fell on March 3, 2002. The ‘Īd al-Ghadīr
annually commemorates the 18 Dhū `l-Ḥijjah 10 AH, the day on which, according
to Shi‘is, Ali Ibn Abi Talib was designated by the Prophet Muhammad as his
successor.
15 See al-Malāzim, Sūrat al-Baqara, al-dars al-thāmin, 2003, 24. Also see ‘Abd al-Malik
al-‘Ijrī, “Jamā‘at Anṣār Allāh: al-khiṭāb wa-l-ḥaraka,” Muqāraba siyāsiyya, no. 2, Jan–
Mar (2017) 14, http://www.yecscs.com/article/85 (accessed December 21, 2020). This
article is a study and analysis of Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī’s views and ideology by a prominent
member of the movement. It offers a sophisticated and well-informed analysis of
his views and teachings. Al-‘Ijrī is the head of the Yemeni Center for Strategic and
Advisory Studies (Markaz al-Dirāsāt al-Istirātījiyya wa-l-Istishāriyya al-Yamanī),
a member of the political council of the Ansar Allah movement, and a frequent
commentator and spokesman for the movement in the media. He appears to be an
influential member of the movement’s leadership. Al-‘Ijrī can be seen at meetings
between representatives of the Huthi movement and such figures as Iran’s supreme
leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Hasan Nasrullah, the general secretary of Hezbollah
in Lebanon. He kindly exchanged WhatsApp messages with me and provided me
with published and online sources, and we had a telephone interview on December
12, 2020.
16 See al-Malāzim, Sūrat al-Baqara, al-dars al-thāmin, 2003, 24.
17 al-‘Ijrī, “Jamā‘at Anṣār Allāh,” 15.
18 See al-Malāzim, Sūrat al-Baqara, al-dars thālith, 2003, 1; Sūrat al-Nisā’, al-dars al-
thāmin ‘ashar, 2003, 23; Sūrat al-An‘ām, al-dars al-rābi‘ wa-l-‘ishrūn, 2003, 3.
19 Al-‘Ijrī, 16.
20 This is colloquial Yemeni Arabic.
21 Al-Malāzim, Madīḥ al-Qur’ān, al-dars al-thānī, 2003, 8.
22 For more details on al-Huthi’s critique of the tradition, see al-‘Ijrī, “Jamā‘at Anṣār
Allāh,” which is cited earlier. Al-‘Ijrī is a high-ranking member of the Anṣār Allāh
movement and is clear in his exposition of al-Huthi’s views and in acknowledging
their radical departure from the tradition.
23 For more on Hizb al-Haqq’s political program and its view of the imamate, see
Bernard Haykel, “Rebellion, Migration or Consultative Democracy? The Zaydis and
Their Detractors in Yemen,” in Le Yémen contemporain, ed. Rémy Leveau, Franck
Mermier et Udo Steinbach (Paris: Karthala, 1999), 193–201.
24 Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, “Amr al-wilāya,” in al-Malāzim, 1577–81.
25 Ibid., 1581 or 4 of the treatise.
26 Al-Huthi uses the term in both the singular and the plural, seeing a guiding role for
the Ahl al-Bayt as a collective, but also for a select individual among them, the ‘alam,
who is to be considered the leader of the entire umma.
27 Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, “Durūs min hady al-Qur’ān al-karīm Surat Āl ‘Imrān,” in al-
Malāzim, 369–84.
28 Ibid., 374 or 5 of the treatise.
29 al-‘Ijrī, “Jamā‘at Anṣār Allāh,” 28.
30 For a copy of this declaration as well as a partial reading of its contents, see http://
alhamdinews.blogspot.com/2013/03/blog-post.html and https://www.facebook.com/
Kashefnews/videos/660749364017319/ (accessed March 30, 2021).
31 Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, “Ma‘rifat Allāh wa‘duhu wa wa‘īduhu, dars 15,” in al-Malāzim, 181
or 18 of the treatise.
32 Ḥusayn al-Ḥūthī, “Mas’ūliyyat ṭullāb al-‘ulūm al-dīniyya,” in al-Malāzim, 1747–8 or
11–12 of the treatise.
33 Imam al-Qasim b. Muhammad in the eleventh/seventeenth century was quite critical
as were others who had abandoned Zaydism, such as Hadith-oriented traditionists
like Ibn al-Amir and Shawkani. For more on this, see Wilferd Madelung, Der Imam
al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965),
and Bernard Haykel, Revival and Reform in Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003).
34 al-Ḥūthī, ‘Abd al-Malik et al. “al-Wathīqa al-fikriyya wa-l-thaqāfiyya,” February 13,
2012, https://www.nashwannews.com/oldnews/16669 (accessed March 30, 2021).
35 al-Ḥūthī, “al-Wathīqa al-fikriyya wa-l-thaqāfiyya,” February 13, 2012, 5.
36 Ibid., 5.
37 Ibid., 6.
38 Ibid., 7.
39 See ‘Iṣām Ṣabrī, “al-Asbāb al-ḥaqīqiyya al-latī dafa‘at al-Ḥūthiyyin ilā hadm Jāmi’ al-
Nahrayn,” al-Mushāhid, February 16, 2021, https://almushahid.net/72960/ (accessed
March 30, 2021).
40 See “‘Ulamā’ wa murshidūn: al-shahāda wa-l-shahīd kalimat ḥaqq rabbāniyya
li-man yuqātil al-kufr wa ahlah,” al-Thawra, March 26, 2021, http://althawrah.ye/
archives/665233 (accessed March 30, 2021).
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36
2
T R A N SF O R M AT IO N O F D OM I NA N T P O L I T IC A L
T H E M E S F R OM T H E F OU N D E R T O T H E C U R R E N T
L E A D E R O F T H E H U T H I M OV E M E N T
Mohammed Almahfali
Introduction
An all-out war in Yemen began in March 2015, after five months from the Huthi
siege of the Yemeni capital, Sana‘a, and the presidential palaces, and the takeover
of the government in September 2014. Yet the current all-out war was preceded
by six rounds of conflict between the Yemeni government and the Huthi group:
round 1 from June 2004 to September 2004, round 2 from March 2005 to May
2005, round 3 from November 2005 to early 2006, round 4 from January 2007
to June 2007, round 5 from March 2008 to July 2008, and round 6 from August
2009 to February 2010.1 The chapter not only is limited to this conflict but also
considers other factors that helped the emergence of the movement, such as the
failure of the international community to provide supportive measures toward
resolving the conflict,2 in addition to other internal and external factors, socially,
economically, and ideologically.
From the first round until the current ongoing war, the conflict has often been
defined against regional contexts, such as the Iranian-Saudi proxy war or the
Sunni-Shiʿa divide,3 wherein Saudi Arabia supports its ally, the internationally
recognized Yemeni government, while Iran secretly supports the Huthis with arms
and money, with obvious media and political support.4
On September 10, 2004, during the first round of the war, the Yemeni Ministry
of Defense announced the killing of Husayn al-Huthi in the Jarf Salman area in the
Marran district of Sa‘da governorate, by the army troops. Since then, the Huthis
celebrate this day as an anniversary of “martyrdom of the leader” every year.5 The
killing of Husayn al-Huthi represented a pivotal stage in the history of the Huthi
movement, and it also signified a shift in the creation of its discourse. In addition,
the discourse changed shape, with the movement’s shift from the advocacy stage
to the fighting stage.
Affiliated researcher, Centre for Advanced Middle Eastern Studies, Lund University,
Sweden.
The movement before 2004 grew mainly through lectures given by Husayn
al-Huthi, which are called “the Huthi Malazim.”6 They were originally recorded
on cassette tapes while he was delivering them in mosques and at gatherings
in the Sa‘da governorate between 1999 and 2004, in order to publish his ideas.
These recordings have been transcribed by one of his students, who worked on
converting the audible text in the tapes into written text.7 Some believe that the
original recordings contained some issues that were avoided in the transcript,
including repetitions and other flaws.
The importance of the Malazim also lies in providing researchers with the
material through which to explore the ideology of the Huthi movement: the
discourse can be analyzed in order to support the arguments with clear evidence.
Reference can be made here to Hamad Albloshi,8 who studied the ideology of the
Huthi movement by analyzing Husayn al-Huthi’s Malazim. He addressed these
lectures to answer two main questions: Is the Huthi insurgency sectarian-based,
and is it part of the overall competition between Sunni and Shi‘a in the Middle
East? The paper’s findings importantly reveal the ideological foundations of the
Huthi movement and clarify the movement’s starting points, which are based on
two main axes—Muslim/non-Muslim and Sunni/Shi‘a—with other details related
to these two axes, such as defining the problem and solution for Muslims, jihad,
and the relationship with Iran, as well as the relationship between Muslims and
the West. Despite the apparent convergence between this chapter and Albloshi’s
study, we aim here to conduct a comprehensive analysis that does not only discuss
religious ideology but seeks to explore the dominance of political themes as well
the transformation of these themes from the stage of the founder of the movement
to the current leader, using empirical tools to support our theses.
We argue that an analysis of the political themes in Malazim may reveal some
of the essential causes of the Yemeni conflict and the emergence of the Huthi
movement and its ideological roots.
The discourse of Malazim represents some of the most important literature
of the Huthi movement, which relies on expanding and recruiting new followers
and strengthening its control over Yemeni society. Meanwhile, the speeches
of Abdulmalik al-Huthi, the current leader of the Huthi group, were one of the
main pillars guiding the movement’s path with regard to domestic politics or
communicating with external actors.
After the killing of Husayn al-Huthi in 2004, his brother Abdulmalik led the
movement,9 through a period of political upheavals in Yemen including the Arab
Spring, the events that followed, and the ongoing conflict which started in 2015.10
The Huthi leader’s speeches work as political statements that define the Huthis’
position on political developments and the war.11 Meanwhile, Husayn’s lectures
help to define the frame of reference for the group, on the one hand, and play a
major role in mobilization, on the other.
Against this background, the chapter addresses the transformation of the
dominant political issues in Huthi discourse from the founder to the current
leader. In order to analyze these themes and their reflections, the chapter attempts
to answer the following questions: (1) What are the dominant political themes
2. Transformation of Dominant Political Themes 39
in Malazim’s discourse and in Abdulmalik’s speech, (2) how were these themes
transformed between the founder and the current leader, (3) what themes have
emerged and/or disappeared, and (4) what are their relationships with the political
and social contexts in Yemen and the region?
Methodology
This study relies on multiple methods of discourse analysis, starting with the new
digital tools as well as the use of basic ideas of Critical Discourse Analysis when
analyzing texts and the content of other discourses. The discourse concerns how
various sentences flow, one after the other, and how they relate to each other to
create meaning or to facilitate interpretation.12 This helps us reach a clear view
that can help to uncover the direction of these discourses and measure their
relationship to what surrounds them at the social and political level.
In order to determine the data, more than sixty of Husayn al-Huthi’s
lectures (Malazim) were reviewed, although only forty of them were eventually
selected. Special criteria were adopted in selecting these samples, which have
comprehensively to include political, intellectual, and religious topics that he was
discussing. Repeated issues were excluded, especially lectures concerning religious
topics and interpretation of the Quran. More than half of Husayn’s lectures discuss
the interpretation of the Quran, so a random sample was taken from them and
repeated lectures were excluded. Although some of these lectures have religious
titles, they include “political content because Husayn al-Huthi relied heavily on
religion as a tool for recruiting his adherents.”13 Likewise, only forty speeches for
Abdulmalik were chosen. I was eager that the sample is randomly selected without
considering the content, but taking into account the context in which it was
delivered, in parallel with the context in which Husayn’s lectures were delivered,
for example, Day of Ghadeer, the Wilayah, International Quds Day. These are
common themes between the two speeches, but the chapter seeks to uncover how
the two speeches addressed these issues. This will allow us to compare the content
of the discourses in the contexts.
The selection criteria are as follows:
1. Repeated topics were mostly excluded; for example, for the interpretation of
the Quran only five lectures were selected.
2. Contexts that are similar in Husayn’s lectures and Abdulmalik’s speeches, such
as Welayah, ʿīd al-GhadĪr, and International Quds Day, were included.
3. The sample contains various political, religious, and intellectual issues.
For the analysis of the data, the Ghawwas application (“diver” in English) was
used, as it provides more features than any other freely available corpus processing
tool for Arabic, including n-gram frequency.14 Ghawwas was used to determine
the dominant words, leading us to use the other Critical Discourse Analyses
approaches to dig deeply into the political themes, as well as allowing us to discover
how they emerge and disappear, and to link these findings with the political and
social situations.
The first step in analyzing the discourse based on the corpus linguistic is to
obtain the data that represent the state of the discourse to be analyzed and then
revealing it and then revealing the initial lists of frequency.15 In this chapter, eighty
texts were selected for both: Husayn al-Huthi, forty texts with a total of 217,493
words;16 Abdulmalik al-Huthi forty texts, with a total of 149,279 words,17 after
deleting the prepositions, conjunctions, and pronouns. Although the number of
samples is equal, there is a difference in the number of the words because Husayn’s
lectures were distinguished by being long. Meanwhile, Abdulmalik’s speeches
became shorter; I believe that this is due to the fact that Abdulmalik seeks to
address a wider range of people, and this calls for the speech to be shorter and
more focused.
I did not predetermine the words with political connotations but instead the
studied texts were examined in a neutral manner in order to ascertain the most used
words, identify those words that hold political meaning, and then analyze them
by examining their contexts and discover how they are expressed and presented
to the public. All of this is compared with the accompanying political and social
variables with an attempt to achieve an objective explanation of why these themes
appear or fade away, based on the data provided by the words themselves.
In order to analyze political themes, the tools of the Critical Discourse Analysis
were used to analyze the data, especially the methodology of framing from Robert
Entman, who described the strategy of framing that makes some topics salient by
placement or repetition, or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols,
or which excludes some of those topics,18 and then analyzing the contexts and
their implications and how they build arguments. The political themes and their
transformations are not only analyzed but rather are placed within the framework
of the political discourse in general that envelops the discourse of the movement.
So, in the first step, we entered the eighty texts into the Ghawwas application
to extract the most frequent words in the discourse. Second, the word list was
extracted, adding the number of occurrences of each work to an Excel document,
ordered from most to least frequent. Third, we excluded prepositions, conjugations,
pronouns, and words that have no political connotation. Fourth, the twenty most
political words in each discourse were selected and ordered from most to least.
Fifthly, we explored the political themes within these words. Finally, we analyzed
the themes by examining the dominant words in their contexts within the texts
and their political, social, and cultural situations, as well as comparing between
the two discourses.
Data Analysis
An analysis of the political discourse of the Huthi movement helps to reveal the
great difference in its status. For example, a previous study argued that Huthis
were constructed themselves as an oppressed group whose members are bound
Table 2.1 The twenty most frequent political words in the two discourses
Political Words Frequency

Husayn Abdulmalik
No Theme Frequency Theme Frequency
1 Allah 5843 Allah 2035
2 Qur’an 2085 People (Sha‘b) 1699
3 Jews 753 Umma 1429
4 Umma 636 Yemen 942
5 Israel 569 Aggression (al-ʿUdwān) 639
6 USA 496 Israel 512
7 Issue 450 Qur’an 412
8 Islam 427 USA 352
9 Yemen 351 Saudi 344
10 Imam20 348 Policy 334
11 Terrorism 286 Regime 240
12 Enemies 262 Islam 209
13 Christians 245 Imam 167
14 Jihad 146 Issue 167
15 Movement 120 Governmen 156
16 Iran 114 Welayah21 109
17 Party 111 Corruption 96
18 Slogan 94 al-Husayn 81
19 Khomeini 89 Qaidah 74
20 Legitimacy 85 Army 66
by religion and oppression, rather than by a nationalist bond.19 However, it may

have been different later, when the Huthis were in control of state institutions and
became almost completely integrated into them. Arguably, the movement’s shift
from the opposition position to power may change many of the political concepts
that can be explored through analysis.
Findings
The most frequent words extracted by Ghawwas were numbered, starting with the
most frequent (Table 2.1) as a first step, and then the emergence of these themes
and their dominance over other political themes were studied and analyzed and
a comparison made between them. The second step included identifying the five
most important words that appeared in one discourse and disappeared or faded
away in the other, with the reason for all of this being clarified.
Religion and Political Discourse
The first observation on these themes is the domination of religious tendency,

which occupies first place in both discourses; even those that try to discuss the
political issues move toward that from a religious standpoint. Both discourses
use the same strategy; for example, Husayn used religion by interpreting verses
from the Quran. In addition, he relied on stories of the struggles of Shiʿa imams
with the authorities of their day, to encourage Zaydis to stand against repression
and injustice.22 Likewise, Abdulmalik used some of these interpretations in his
speeches.
In the two discourses, the first word repeated after the prepositions and
conjunctions was the word of Allah (God). This seems normal as a result of the
use of many verses from the Quran, supplications and others, in addition to the
repetition of hadiths, sayings, and religious arguments. The word of Allah in
this context constitutes 2 percent of the total words of Husayn’s discourse, and
1 percent of the total number of words in Abdulmalik’s discourse. This difference
appears to be consistent with the movement’s transformation, as well as the shift
in discourse from a religious discourse dealing with political issues to a political
discourse that uses religious concepts.
The word “Allah” is associated with the word “Quran” in the two most frequent
words in this discourse, which brings it into line with the religious literature.23
Because the Huthi movement was a religious movement, Albloshi believes that it
was important for them to rely on Islamic terms, to give religious justification to
their uprising.24
Religious rhetoric in political discourse can overwhelm people with an array of
different emotions, leading individuals to identify with a broad and varied range
of interests, where people receive political speech with the influence of religious
feelings.25 In Yemeni society especially, the religious sector is one of the key factors
that can be used as a weapon by politicians to promote their ideologies.26 It seems
that the Huthi movement understands this strategy, as it produces a political
discourse using a lot of religious terms and promotes religious concepts; this is
obvious in Abdulmalik’s discourse. And in return, in Malazim we find religious
lectures, but they discuss many political issues. Even when interpreting the Quran
or when celebrating religious occasions, Husayn al-Huthi sought to link current
political events with religious debate. In this way they employ religious discourse
in political discourse and vice versa.
In Husayn’s discourse (the word “Allah”) is related to one of jihad principles,
where (true) believers spread the truth to non-believers;27 he says in one of his
lectures: “Muslims basically when they are asked to carry one message, they unite
to spread the religion of Allah, and to raise the word of Allah, to spread this religion
among other nations.”28 He believes that the mission of the Umma is to spread
religion to the world, and it is the same jihadist principle that all jihadist discourses
use. That is why the word of Allah is repeated either by verbal association with the
(word of Allah) or in other contexts. It appears in its religious contexts or in other
intellectual and political contexts.
In Abdulmalik’s discourse, verbal association with (the word of Allah) was not
mentioned, and instead, he uses (the path of Allah): “The obligation of jihad for
the path of Allah in its correct and constructive sense to ward off injustice, to ward
off tyranny, to face evil, to protect the umma, to protect its independence and
dignity.”29 Abdulmalik used the concept of the path of Allah instead of the word of
Allah, and both concepts are used from a religious perspective, which understands
jihad as a “struggle or exertion of one’s power in Allah’s path against that which
is evil; its goal is to destroy evil, to spread belief in Allah and to make His words
supreme in this world.”30
Most of the titles of Husayn’s Malazim have a religious connotation such as
“Interpretation of the Qur’an,” Wilayah “‘Guardianship’,” and “Lectures from the
Quraan,” while most of Abdulmalik’s titles have political significance or discuss
political topics such as “After 24 days of Aggression,” “After the Attack on the
Protesters,” and “The First Anniversary of the 21 September Revolution.” In this
scenario, the dominance of religious themes seems to be to some extent justified
for Husayn by describing what he provides as religious lectures. Therefore, it
appears from the aforementioned results that he passes on political concepts in the
context of religious discourse, whereas Abdulmalik passes on religious concepts in
the context of political discourse.
Bigoted Discourse
There is no doubt that the Huthi speech is fundamentally based on an essential idea
that places hostility to the Jews clearly and explicitly, based on their famous slogan:
“God is great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to
Islam,” which was used for the first time in a religious school in Sa’da on January
17, 2002, and was adapted from a similar Iranian slogan.31 But the assertion of the
phrase “a curse upon the Jews” confirms that the motivation behind including
this line in the slogan is simply anti-Semitism,32 in addition to also being anti-
Christian, as we will see.
The Huthis try to justify that the notions of cursing and death have political
connotations,33 but it did not convince others,34 since this is incitement against the
Jewish community, which forms an essential part of the environment of Yemeni
society in Sa’da—the same environment from which the Huthi movement was
launched.
Nevertheless, bigotry is not limited to the well-known Huthi slogan, as this
chapter has clarified another serious result, reflecting the bigotry contained in
the movement’s discourse in general. It turns out that the word “Jews” occupied
third place among the total words used in the overall speeches of Husayn al-Huthi
studied (Table 2.1).
Husayn affirms, in all his lectures, the idea of cursing the Jews, stressing that
this curse is a consolidation of the idea of cursing found in the Quran. He is, rather,
re-activating these (Qura‘nic) concepts, according to him, stressing: “We will curse
the Jews and the Christians, we will curse America and Israel.”35
In another context, he says: “Jews are enemies of all believers,”36 and that “the
Jews and the Christians are the evil.”37 Jews also hold the responsibility for the
poverty of Islamic peoples: “Millions of dollars go into the pockets of our enemies
from the Jews and the Christians.”38
Then he turns to accuse everyone who is not hostile to the Jews and Christians,
starting with the Sunni Muslims: “It is known that the Jews and the Christian
are second class among the Sunnis, and they do not classify them as Mushrekīn
(polytheists) as we classify them.”39
Moreover, he focuses on Jews, using many words that are downright negative,
such as “the malice of the Jews” and “the hostility of the Jews,” and connects all of
that with the Christians, although sometimes he reconsiders this judgment and
says: “As for the Christians, they have become victims of the malice of the Jews.”40
The clear and direct language of bigotry that dominates Husayn’s lectures
begins to decline, significantly, in Abdulmalik’s discourse, so that the word “Jews”
appears, in the entirety of the discourse, almost fifty times, and most of what is
mentioned talks about the Jewish lobby, or links Zionism and Judaism.
Indeed, the language of bigotry toward the Jews did not completely disappear
from Abdulmalik’s discourse; rather, it took an indirect form. Most of the phrases
with which he mentioned the Jews seemed to criticize what he called the loyalty
of Muslims to them or the dependence of politicians on Jews, in an apparent
continuation of the conspiracy theory consolidation. Also, and extensively, he
directed hostile language toward Israel, which ranked the sixth most frequent
word in his speeches, and he worked to link Israel with other movements’ enemies,
internally and externally.
In one of his speeches, he says, skeptical of the national belonging of the Jewish
citizen: “The Jew continues to live generation after generation in the Arab region
and he feels that he is not from this Umma.”41 This quote shows Abdulmalik’s view
on the Jewish community; although his speech is less directly bigoted, he doubts
the Jews’ feelings of belonging to their homeland, and therefore he considers them
traitors who cannot be trusted.
As for the discussion of Christians, the word was only mentioned seven times,
and emerged in the context of clarifying the concept of Ahl al-Kitāb (the people
of the holy books, which are the Jews, Christians, and the Sabians), as used in
the Quranic context. It was also mentioned in another context describing the
deviations occurring in humanity as the result of deviations in Jews and Christians.
In the comparison between Husayn and Abdulmalik’s discourse, we found that
Husayn’s discourse was direct in the language of hostility toward other religions,
while Abdulmalik used a less harshly bigoted language. This can be understood as
the Huthi movement’s attempt to transform into a political movement; they do not
want to show the world that the movement is hostile to other religions or cultures,
especially Christianity.
Identity Determinators
The nation, Islam, homeland, and other terms are among the most important
components of identity in its political form42 and are used to achieve several
gains. Like other Islamic religious groups, the Huthi movement employs the term
“Umma” to address a wide range of people beyond modern national concepts

and simple religious affiliation using historic interpretations of what constitutes
nationhood.43 We argue that focusing on the term “Umma” in this context is an
essential part of knowing the determinators of identity and how it was formed in
the Huthi movement discourse.
Hence, the two discourses are almost identical in the use of the word “Umma.”
However, the significant and decisive difference between its use in the discourses
is that it harmonizes with other ingredients of identity in Husayn’s discourse, while
there are other determinants of identity in Abdulmalik’s.
For example, determinants of identity appear in Husayn’s discourse as follows:
Umma and Islam, while the word “Yemen” appears later. On the other hand,
the word “people” appears as the second word in Abdulmalik’s discourse, with a
frequency of 1,699 times, before the word “Umma.”
It is a major shift between the two discourses, as the word of the people was not
dominant in Husayn’s lectures, which focused on a wider and greater level than
the level of the people. Husayn, in the entirety of his discourse, seeks to address
the Umma, and the recipients are all Muslims; even when he returns to address the
Yemenis, he only looks on them as part of the Islamic nation. For him, the Umma
are all Muslims, not just the Yemenis.
For example, we see Husayn talking about the Umma and what he means by
this term, explaining its roles and what it should do, saying:
What we are seeing today is that this Umma, which was required to be the
one who roamed the seas, length and width, so it would stand on the coasts of
Europe and the coasts of America, unfortunately, is the same Umma that, along
with its leaders, are subjected to be humiliation, shame and surrender.44
As for the word “people,” even if it appears in Husayn’s discourse, it is intended

to describe the people in general (the Palestinian people, the Arab people, the
American people, etc.) or the people in exchange for governments. In a few places,
not more than twenty times in the entirety of his lectures, he meant the Yemeni
people.
On the contrary, Abdulmalik tried to balance addressing the Umma in general,
as this speech as an extension of the foundations of the movement discourse, and
the people (the Yemeni people) he introduces himself not only as the current
leader of the movement but also as a supervisor of the Yemeni state officials after
Huthi gained control.
Abdulmalik’s discourse now targets not only the Yemeni people but has become
more precise in the details of what he is addressing: categories of the people,
attitudes of the people, demands of the people, values of the people, and money
of the people.
Therefore, it becomes clear that the shift in the discourse path is a shift from the
transnational to the national track, by assigning the discourse from Islam to the
homeland, and from the Umma to the people.
Who Is the Enemy?
Defining identity in the political context may require identifying the enemy. This
occurs in order to manage political power internally and externally45 by directing
the literature of the discourse toward a specific enemy who bears the blame for
mistakes and failures, as well as in order to give people justifications for accepting
the actions that are being taken, especially in theocratic and dictatorial regimes
and by populists46 who are looking for justifications for their continuation in the
power or for their expansion and coming to power.
The matter is no different for groups, as they play the same role by ordering
the other both structurally and psychologically by turning the stranger (Jews
and Christians and others in this discourse) into an enemy, so that a discourse of
exclusion is constructed, thus creating a common belief system to strengthen the
foundation of the group/movement and its followers.47 It appears from the analysis
that identifying the enemy was one of the most dominant aims of the discourse,
which is in line with this orientation in which the group seeks to form a unified
vision, about who they are and who is their enemy.
Husayn al-Huthi focused on America and Israel as two clear political entities,
which he saw as the cause of all the devastation of the Umma, and he also linked
it to other religious entities that are closely related to both America and Israel,
namely the Jews and Christians.
In his discourse he repeatedly emphasized the nature of hostility toward the
Umma, as he claims, by America and Israel, and that they are one entity, behind
which stands the “historical hostility of the Jews and the Christians,” and that
all the tragedies that people are facing are due to America, even confirming that
terrorism has its sources and roots in America.
Hence, he indicated that the relationship of Shiʿa with this entity (the enemy)
is a relationship of conflict and confrontation, as he believes that true Shiism is
standing in the face of America and the Jews. He made America and Israel the first
enemy and that the people should stand behind this Shiʿa movement in order to
confront them. He answered the question of what Shiʿa means by saying: “It means
the responsibility and duties of this religion for the Umma. The Shiʿa are the ones
who stand in the face of [America and Israel], and in the face of the Jews.”48
When he approaches Saudi Arabia, he puts it close to friendship with America;
however, he does not accuse it of being a direct enemy, except from this collusion,
like the rest of the other regimes that he sees surrendering to American hegemony.
Elsewhere, he accuses it of spreading Wahhabism.
From this point of view, it becomes clear that the enemies of the Umma, from
Husayn’s perspective, are primarily America and Israel, and then other parties who
are helping America and Israel in several ways, such as collusion, surrender, and
not taking responsibility.
Abdulmalik takes the same direction: the enemy remains America and Israel
as one of the starting points of the movement’s basic discourse that forms the
foundation of the argument from which it starts. However, the transformations of
the discourse begin to take on more subtle dimensions, starting with the creating of
“local enemies” who work as proxies for the external enemy (America and Israel).
The Huthi’s discourse still describes America as the primary cause of all
Yemen’s problems, even calling the current war “the Saudi-American aggression.”
Moreover, it appears that Saudi Arabia was included in the list of enemies of the
movement.
Abdulmalik’s discourse added new enemies to the list, such as Saudi Arabia
and its allies, claiming that whether they are from the internationally recognized
governments or other groups, they are mere proxies for Saudi Arabia and, surely
behind it, America.
Iran, between Attendance and Absence
The chapter does not seek to discuss the doctrinal relationship between the
Huthis (the Zaydis) and Iran (the Twelvers), despite its importance, as this matter
was addressed in a previous study examining the relationship between the Huthis
and Iran.49 It is difficult to determine the extent of the religious relationship or
doctrinal connection between the Huthis and the Iranian regime; however, there
certainly is a relationship, and Husayn al-Huthi did not conceal his fascination
with the Iranian model, holding Ayatollah Khomeini to be a just and righteous
leader, whose efforts to resist Western influence in the Middle East should be
imitated.50
From this standpoint, it becomes obvious that there are two main words that
reflect the dominance of Iran in the mind of Husayn Al-Huthi, as they are among
the twenty most frequently used words in his discourse, namely Iran (114) times
and Khomeini (89) times.
This result, which is deduced on a quantitative basis, illustrates the extent of
Iran’s influence on Husayn’s thought, not Iran as a state but as an ideology for the
Islamic Revolution with its symbols, such as Khomeini.
In his view, the Islamic Republic of Iran was the best example to follow, and
its founder, Khomeini, was the best leader to imitate. He referred positively to
Khomeini because of Iran’s position in the world and because of Iranians’ ability to
resist Western pressures and remain self-reliant. In his discourse, Khomeini was a
just and righteous leader and a great man who was able to humiliate his enemies;
he was also impressed by Khomeini because he had planted the seeds of animosity
toward Israel and the United States in Iran.51
The link between Iran and Umma in general is noticeable from Husayn’s
discourse when he says, for example: “The enemies target not only Iran and
Hezbollah but the entire nation.”52 He also considers Iran the protector of Umma,
as he stressed that Iran is the only one who can protect the nation.
This power makes him proud of the Iranian model and that it is more capable
of confronting the enemies:
After the Iranians had been threatened, they said: If America strikes, or if it
thinks about striking, they will be hit by a direct and severe blow. They know
Iran, and they know the people of Iran, as well as they know that Iran has been
able to build itself militarily, economically and culturally.53
Elsewhere he says: “The West takes Iran into account but, it does not consider the
rest of Muslims and Arabs.”54 In general, it can be said that Iran’s presence as a state
and ideology dominates all his discourse, as he places the Muslims represented by
Iran against the West represented by America and Israel.
Iran, as mentioned above, overlapped in Husayn’s awareness with Khomeini,
and the Islamic Revolution and its ideology. In many places in his lectures, he
expressed this mixing by saying: “Khomeinian Iran.” More precisely, Imam
Khomeini’s influence over Husayn al-Huthi appears to be very profound. This is
evidenced by Husayn’s discourse, where he describes Khomeini as “Ibn Ali” (Ali’s
son),55 which is a high rank in Shiʿa thought that reveres Ali as the legitimate
heir to power in the Welᾱyah (Guardianship loyalty). He also quotes many of
Khomeini’s political, intellectual, and religious phrases, which provides a clear
vision of Khomeini’s position in the thought and awareness of Husayn al-Huthi.
The presence of Iran in Abdulmalik’s discourse is different. He tried to distance
himself from praising Iran or Khomeini, and when he mentions Iran, he might
add in the context of its praise that it is involved in the anti-Israel project regarding
the issue of the Arab-Palestinian conflict. He also sometimes seeks to deny the
relationship between Iran and the Huthis, as he says in one of his speeches: “There
is no Iranian hegemony in Yemen.”56
In some contexts, he praises Iran in a completely neutral way, such as when he
says: “Iran is a major Islamic country.”57 Likewise, in other places, although it does
not deviate from the neutral description, he mentions the “siege of the Iranian
people” and he discusses “the strategic relations between Iran and other countries
in the region.” As for Khomeini, he has never been mentioned in Abdulmalik’s
analyzed discourse except in reference to his declaration of the last Friday of each
Ramadan as International Jerusalem Day.
It is paradoxical that this absence of Iran’s presence and its dominance in
Abdulmalik’s discourse comes in light of the practical presence of Iran in the
context of its direct support for the Huthi movement and its current war with
the internationally recognized government supported by the Arab coalition led
by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. International reports have confirmed that Iran is
involved in illegally supplying the Huthis with arms, fuel, and money.58 So, by
comparing the two discourses, we find that Iran is strongly present in Malazim,
but it is absent from Abdulmalik’s speeches. However, Iran is now present in
the reality of the current conflict in Yemen, which means that Iran’s dominant
presence in Husayn’s discourse is matched by Iran’s dominant actual presence in
the movement’s and Yemen’s political scene.
Transformation of Political Themes
Although approximately 50 percent of the themes are identical in the two

discourses, there is an important observation: that is, the emergence of other
themes and disappearances. This emergence and disappearance are closely related
to the movement and its political transformations, from the stage of advocacy and
mobilization to the stage of confrontation and then control and governance.
Table 2.2 Five Words That Are Dominant in

Abdulmalik’s Discourse and Nondominant in Husayn’s
Husayn’s Non-dominant Political Themes

Policy 11
Regime 12
Government 29
Saudi 34
Army 40
Table 2.3 Five Words That Are Dominant in Husayn’s

Discourse and Nondominant in Abdulmalik’s
Abdulmalik’s Non-dominant Political Themes

Khomeini 3
Christians 7
Terrorism 9
Iran 22
Jews 28
The important observation here is the emergence of political terms that refer to
the structure of the state, such as the word “people,” which defines the relationship
between the authorities and the citizens.
Likewise, the government and army words were not completely hidden in
Husayn’s discourse; however, they were marginal, while the focus at that time was
on a broader level. The discourse was not only general but the target group of the
discourse seemed to be broader than the small community from which Husayn
al-Huthi started.
It is clear that the brgoted discourse that was directly dominant in
Husayn’s discourse, by attacking the Jews and Christians and linking them
to the conspiracy theory against Muslims, has decreased to a small degree
in Abdulmalik’s discourse, and when it appears at a few points, it takes an
indirect way. This transformation of the discourse seems to be justified with the
transformation of the Huthi movement into the political action, where it wants
to show the international community that it is a peaceful political movement
that is neither racist nor hostile to the other, while the racist discourse against
other religions is still active.
It is also possible to notice the shift in Iran’s dominance within the discourse.
Iran, the Islamic Revolution, and Khomeini were dominant themes in Husayn’s
discourse, while Iran at that time did not directly intervene in the Yemeni reality in
general and/or even in support of the Huthis in particular. At the outbreak of the
last war and before, and with the increasing accusations directed against Iran of
being involved in supporting the Huthis, Iran’s hegemony over the speeches does
not appear. Rather, Khomeini’s name is rare in Abdulmalik’s discourse.
Conclusion
The analysis of the dominant political themes in the discourse of the Huthi
movement gains its importance from the status of the content on which it works,
as it concentrates on analyzing two of the movement’s most significant entities:
Malazim, the lectures of the founder Husayn al-Huthi, and the political speeches
of the current leader Abdulmalik al-Huthi.
The choosing of the Ghawwas application enabled us to access as much data
as possible in order to extract the dominant themes and then reach conclusions
based on empirical methods that contribute to strengthening the analysis and
clarifying its dimensions and implicit significances.
Ghawwas showed the most frequently used words, and the first twenty
were chosen from the frequency list, after deleting prepositions, conjunctions,
pronouns, and words that have no political connotation. By specifying the twenty
most frequently used words that have political meaning or refer to political
significance in the two discourses, it became clear that nine of the twenty words,
almost 50 percent of the discourse, are identical, despite the objective difference
between the position of the movement in the era of Husayn and its position now.
The analysis showed the domination of the religious orientations that cover the
rest of the aspects, in approaching local issues or those related to the international
situation more broadly.
It was also found that Husayn al-Huthi’s discourse in his Malazim was dominated
by the language of bigotry against other religions in a clear and direct way either
by attacking the Jews or by promoting a conspiracy theory that claims that Jews
are the cause of all the world’s miseries, especially in the Islamic world. He also
attacks Christians, even though he considers them, in some places, to be victims
of the Jews as well. Meanwhile, Abdulmalik’s discourse tries to reduce the intensity
of bigotry, in line with the movement’s attempt to deal with the international
community in order to present itself as an acceptable political alternative in the
future of Yemen. Although this bigoted language has not disappeared, he uses it
indirectly, as well as transforming hostility toward the Jews as a religion to Israel
and linking all the movement’s enemies internally and externally with Israel and
the United States.
The analysis revealed how the terminology that defines political identity is
transformed, starting from the word “Umma” in Husayn’s discourse and ending
with the use of the word “people,” which is a shift from generality to specificity,
in line with the movement’s shift from calling for global change to working on
control in its local context. The same appeared in the selection of the enemy, from
America and Israel to Saudi Arabia, as well as local enemies.
Interestingly, the chapter showed the movement’s position on Iran, and how
the Malazim discourse demonstrated Iranian dominance, through the presence
of the words “Iran” and “Khomeini” among the most dominant words in Husayn
al-Huthi’s lectures. Correspondingly, both words disappeared from the list of
dominant words in Abdulmalik’s speech, at the time when international reports
show direct interference in supporting the Huthi movement in reality.
Notes
1 Christopher Boucek, Yemen: On the Brink War in Saada from Local Insurrection to
National Challenge (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
2010), 5–8.
2 Bakil Ghundol and Abdulghani Muthanna, “Conflict and International Education:
Experiences of Yemeni International Students,” Compare: A Journal of Comparative
and International Education (2020), https://doi.org/10.1080/03057925.2020.1846119
3 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Huthi Conflict (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017, 2).
4 Peter Salisbury, “Yemen and the Saudi–Iranian ‘Cold War’,” research paper, Middle
East and North Africa Programme: Chatham House, February 2015, https://www.
chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20150218YemenIranSaudi.
pdf.
5 Abdulrahman al-Ahnumi, “al-Shahid al-Qa’id Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi.
Min-al-Sarkha ila al-Muwajaha al-Kubra (The Martyr Leader Husayn Badr Al-Din
Al-Huthi . . . from the Cry to the Great Confrontation),” Ansar Allah, March 22, 2020,
https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/326891.
6 In Yemen, Malazim is a group of notes, lectures, or lectures that are put in copied
papers, and they are often written in a nonacademic way, which may contain
linguistic errors and show a lack of arrangement.
7 Yeḥya Qassem Abo Awaẓah, one of Husain al-Huthi’s most ideologically close
associates who has published several books promoting the movement and its ideas,
including al-Masirah al-Quraaniah Fi al-Yaman [Quranic Path in Yemen]; and Safaḥat
Moshreqah Min Ḥayat al-Shahied al-Qaed Husain Badr al-Din al-Huthi [Bright Pages
of the Life of Hussein Badr al-Din al-Huthi].
8 Hamad H. Albloshi, “Ideological Roots of the Ḥūthī Movement in Yemen,” Journal of
Arabian Studies 6, no. 2 (November 2016).
9 United Nation Security Council, Abdulmalik Al-Huthi, April 14, 2015, https://www.
un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/materials/summaries/individual/abdulmalik-
al-houthi.
10 Sama’a Al-Hamdani, “What Is Needed in Yemen’s Post Conflict Phase?” The Fourth
Conference on National Dialogues and Non-Formal Dialogue Processes, June 11–12,
2019.
11 al-Batati, Saeed, “Analysis: What Is Yemen’s Al-Huthi Really Saying?” Middle East Eye,
February 13, 2015, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-what-yemens-al-
houthi-really-saying-0.
12 Paul Gee James, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis, Theory and Method, 4th ed.
(London: Routedge, 2014), 17–19.
13 Albloshi, “Ideological Roots,” 150.
14 Abdulmohsen al-Thubaity et al., “New Language Resources for Arabic: Corpus
Containing More Than Two Million Words and a Corpus Processing Tool,”
International Conference on Asian Language Processing, Urumqi, August 17–19, 2013,
https://doi.org/10.1109/IALP.2013.21
15 al-Mojaiwel, Sultan. “al-Muᶜalajah al-ᵓᾹlĪah Lelsuḥuf al-ᶜArabih, TaḥlĪl al-ᵓAnmᾱṭ
al-Khetᾱbyah bi-Manāhij BCU [Digital Processing of Arab Newspapers: An Analysis
of Discourse Patterns Using BCU Approach],” in Lughawiyyāt al-Mudawanah al-
Ḥassūbiyya, Taṭbīqāt Taḥlīliyya ʿAlā al-ʿArabiyya al-Ṭabīʿiyya [Corpus Linguistic . . .
Applied Analysis on the Natural Arabic], ed. Sultan al-Mojaiwel et al. (Riyadh: King
Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Center for the Arabic Language, 2016), 17–19.
16 Husayn al-Huthi, “al-Malazim [Lectures],” Huda al-Qur’an, https://www.huda.live/
malazem (accessed August 2, 2020).
17 Abdulmalik al-Huthi, “al-Kheṭabat [Speeches],” Huda al-Qur’an, https://www.huda.
live/speech (accessed August 10, 2020).
18 Robert Entman, “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” Journal of
Communication 43, 4 (1993): 52.
19 Gibreel Alaghbary, “Identity and National Belonging in Ansaruallah’s Political
Rhetoric: A Transitivity Analysis,” International Journal of English Linguisticsm 7, no.
4 (2017): 247.
20 Imam terms may refer to several political and ideological significances as in (1) Al-
Imama system, (2) Al-Imama belief (as in the Imama of Ali, or of the Imama of Ahl
al-Bayt), and (3) Imam as a title (Imam Ali, or Imam Khomeini).
21 Although the word “Wilayah” has spiritual, political, and theological meanings, it
can be considered as the central tenet in the Shiʿa belief system, which is based on
the understanding that Imam Ali is more entitled to Wilayah (authority) and after
him the imams from the descendants of Ali bin Abi Talib. The ideal way in such a
state of matter, for the imams, was to keep the concept of Wilayah to themselves
and their close companions: Raziq Hussain, “The Centrality of ‘Wilayah’ in Shiʿa
Political Thought,” Quarterly Noor-e-Marfat, https://nmtisb.com/wp-content/
uploads/2021/01/The-Centalityt-of-Wilayah-in-Shia-Political-Thought.pdf.
An analysis of al-Huthi ’s discourse showed its use in the context of this theoretical
conception of Shiʿa thought.
23 See, for example, Adnan al-Nahawi, Letkon Kalemat Allah Hya Alʿulya [Allah’s Word
Should Be the Highest] (Riyadh: Dār al-Nahawi, 2009).
25 Christopher B. Chapp, Religious Rhetoric and American Politics: The Endurance of
Civil Religion in Electoral Campaigns (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012).
26 Norman Cigar, “Islam and the State in South Yemen: The Uneasy Coexistence,”
Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1990): 186.
27 Vinod Saighal, “Jihad and Crusades: Concepts, Meanings and Adherence,” World
Affairs: The Journal of International 19, no. 1 (2015): 24.
28 Husain al-Huthi, “al-Waḥda al-ʾImāniyya [Faith Unity],” al-Malazim.
29 Abdulmalik al-Huthi, “Bi-monāsabat Ikhtitām al-Marakiz al-Ṣayfyah [On the
Occasion of the Conclusion of the Summer Centers],” al-Khiṭābāt.
30 Noor Mohammad, “The Doctrine of Jihad: An Introduction,” Journal of Law and
Religion 3, no. 2 (1985): 385.
32 Hannah Porter, “Screaming in the Face of the Arrogant: Understanding the Logic
and Symbolism of Yemen’s Huthi Movement,” Masters thesis, University of Chicago,
Master of Arts in Middle Eastern Studies (2018): 28.
33 Abbas al-Daylami, “ʿan al-Ṣarkhah Wa Shiʿār Anṣar Allah [About the Scream
and Ansar Allah Slogan],” Althawrah, April 22, 2018, http://althawrah.ye/
archives/519168.
34 Seth J. Frantzman, “‘Curse the Jews,’ Yemen’s Huthi Rebel Slogan Handed Out at
University,” The Jerusalem Post, October 10, 2018. https://www.jpost.com/middle-
east/curse-the-jews-yemens-houthi-rebel-slogan-handed-out-at-university-569074.
35 Husain al-Huthi, “Dūrūs Min Hady al-Qurān al-Karīm [Lessons from Guidance of
the Holy Qur’an],” al-Malazim.
36 Husain al-Huthi, “Masʾūliyyat Āl al-Bayt [Responsibility of Ahl Albait],” al-Malazim.
37 Husain al-Huthi, “al-ʾIrhāb Wa-Assalām [Terrorism and Peace],” al-Malazim.
38 Husain al-Huthi, “al-Muwālāt Wal-Muʿādat [Loyalty and Hostility],” al-Malazim.
39 Husain al-Huthi, “Lessons from Guidance of the Holy Qur’an.”
41 Abdulmalik al-Huthi, “ʿAshyat Yawam al-Quds al-’ᾱlamy [On the Eve of
International Quds Day],” al-Ketabat.
42 Mostafa Shehata, “Supportive, Transformative and Reverse Effects of Media on
Tunisian Diaspora’s Political Identity,” Journal of Arab and Muslim Media Research 13,
no. 1 (2020): 85.
43 Robert Saunders, “The Ummah as Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the ‘Cartoons
Affair’,” Nation and Nationalism 14, no. 2 (2008): 303.
44 Husain al-Huthi, “Terrorism and Peace.”
45 See, for example, Ted G. Carpenter, A Search for Enemies: America’s Alliances After
the Cold War (Washington: Cato Institute, 1992); Shoon Kathleen Murray and Jason
Meyers, “Do People Need Foreign Enemies? American Leaders’ Beliefs after the
Soviet Demise,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 5 (1999): 555–6.
46 Nadia Urbinati, “Political Theory of Populism,” Annual Review of Political Science 22
(2019).
47 Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the
Search for Ontological Security,” Political Psychology 25, no. 5 (2004): 754.
48 Husain al-Huthi, “Ḥadīth al-Wilāya: ʿīd al-Ghadyr [Hadith of Guardianship: ʿīd al-
GhadĪr Occasion],” al-Malazim.
49 Mohammed Almahfali and James Root, “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does, and
Does Not, Influence Huthi Rule in Northern Yemen,” Sanaa Center for Strategic
Studies, February 13, 2020, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/9050.
50 Almahfali and Root, “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does, and Does Not, Influence
Huthi Rule.”
53 Husain al-Huthi, “Lā Taḥdhawna Ḥathw Banī ʾIsrāʾīl [To translates the Example of
the Israelite],” al-Malazim.
55 He means Imam: “‘Ali Ibn Abi Ṭaleb (599–661 CE) he was the first cousin and son-
in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, the fourth of the four Rightly Guided Caliphs (al-
khulafāʾ al-rāshidūn), and the first of the Imams deemed by all Shiʿa Muslims to be
appointed by divine mandate”: Reza Shah-Kazemi, “‘Ali ibn Abi Ṭaleb,” The Institute of
Ismaili Studies (n.d.), https://www.iis.ac.uk/academic-article/ali-ibn-abi-talib.
56 Abdulmalik al-Huthi, “Baʿd 24 Yawman mina al ʿudwᾱn [After 24 Days of
Aggression],” al-Khetabat.
57 al-Huthi, “Ba‘d 24 Yawman Men al-’Udwᾱn.”
58 See Security Council, Letter dated 25 January 2019 from the Panel of Experts on
Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council, Security Council, January 25,
2019, and Letter dated 26 January 2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen mandated
by Security Council Resolution 2342 (2017), Security Council, January 26, 2018,
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1639536?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header.
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1664359?ln=en and Letter Dated 26 January
2018 from the Panel of Experts on Yemen Mandated by Security Council Resolution
2342 (2017), Security Council, January 26, 2018, https://digitallibrary.un.org/
record/1639536?ln=en#record-files-collapse-header.
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56
3
T H E “S O F T WA R” A N D T H E PA ST: T H E H U T H I
M OV E M E N T ’ S U SE O F H I ST O R IC A L NA R R AT I V E S
A S S OU R C E O F L E G I T I M AC Y
Alexander Weissenburger
In his introduction to Gabriele vom Bruck’s Islam, Memory, and Morality in

Yemen, Fred Halliday observed that Yemen, like only a handful of other countries,
has a continuous historical and cultural heritage dating back 3,000 years.1 Perhaps
not surprising for a country with such a long history, Yemen has a rich tradition
of historical writing. From the beginning, however, this tradition served to shape
opinions at least as much as to satisfy the desire to merely record and preserve:
parts of al-Hamdani’s al-Iklil have an anti-Zaydi subtext,2 the biographies of
various imams were clearly written in order to legitimize imamic rule,3 and Imam
Yahya encouraged historical writing in order to foster Yemeni nationalism.4 With
regard to the last example it is therefore no wonder that ʿAbd al-Wāsiʿ al-Wasiʿi’s
Tarikh al-Yaman begins with the birth of Muhammad, thereby omitting Yemen’s
pre-Islamic history, of which Imam Yahya as a sayyid, a descendant of Muhammad,
could not claim to be a part of, as will be shown later in more detail. Furthermore,
al-Wasiʿi’s history, first published in 1928, at a time of heightened tensions
between the imamate and the Saudi Kingdom, mentions details of Yemeni history
in relation to Saudi Arabia, which were conveniently eradicated from the second
edition published around the volatile time of Imam Yahya’s assassination in 1948.5
Historic events, eras, and persons are strategically selected, mentioned, portrayed
in a certain light, or omitted. This tendency, while being neither surprising nor
unique to Yemen, took on a special political relevance in the context of the current
conflict in the country.
The Huthi movement uses historic narratives in a calculated manner in order
to solidify its rule over the north of the country. It conceptualizes these efforts as
part of its fight against the so-called “soft war” (al-harb al-naʿima), which it claims
I would like to thank Marieke Brandt, Abdullah Hamidaddin, and Shaker Lashuel for
reading and commenting on this chapter. The research for this chapter was supported by
the Austrian Nationalstiftung FTE and the Institute for Social Anthropology at the Austrian
Academy of Sciences.
the West wages against Yemen. This war, the movement argues, is fought by the
Western “imperialists” by projecting soft power al-quwwa al-naʿima in order to
corrupt society and distort the truth, thus ultimately trying to sway the Yemeni
population to their side. Citing Joseph Nye, who introduced the concept of soft
power in the 1990s, the Huthis argue that the West, and specifically the United
States and Israel, tries to undermine Muslim states in order to be able to rule them
in accordance with their own interests. The fact that Nye served in several official
capacities during the Clinton administration is taken as proof by the movement
that the concept is now official state policy of the United States in its efforts to
extend its rule over the Middle East.6 As one of the articles states: “Basis of the Soft
War is the substitution of tanks with the media, of armies with lackeys, of material
occupation with an occupation of ideas and ideologies, of the occupation of bodies
with the occupation of souls and minds.”7 Or, as ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi put it:
e war that we call the Soft War, is a war of misguidance and corruption. It is a
Th
war that the enemies wage upon our entire Islamic world and on all our Arabic
and Islamic peoples. Part of this of course targets our Yemeni people. . . . It has
two sides. The first is the intellectual side, it seeks to influence the mind. It seeks
to influence the general outlook and to generate ideas, orientations and visions
that support the enemies and implement their goals and ambitions. The other
side is the moral side. It seeks to impact morals and values.8
One of the most important aspects of the fight against the Saudi-led coalition
is therefore, as ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi stated in a speech commemorating the
second anniversary of the start of the intervention, to actively engage in this war of
ideas.9 While it is highly interesting how the Huthi movement conceptualizes and
legitimizes the necessity of its propagandistic efforts, it would be naïve to think
that the movement’s vast media network’s sole purpose was to ward off enemy
disinformation.
Looking at the narratives the Huthis use, they clearly also serve the need of
the movement to increase its own legitimacy. The movement quite obviously
understands that coercion does not suffice to legitimate and normalize its rule over
the country. What it wants to achieve is true hegemony in a Gramscian fashion.
“State = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the
armour of coercion,”10 as Gramsci put it. Without going into a closer examination
of his interpretation of the concept of civil society,11 Gramsci argued that power
ultimately resides in the consensus about its legitimacy. To rule, one must therefore
win the battle for the hearts and minds of the population.
This is where the movement’s pragmatic use of Yemeni and Islamic history
comes in. History for the movement is a reservoir of
“lectures and lessons that give us better understanding and vision. Our history
of revolutions and jihad, standing up to the raids, is filled with stations in which
our forefathers laid out beautiful lessons of freedom, dignity and honor befitting
their Yemeniness, their faith, manliness, freedom and dignity.”12
3. The “Soft War” and the Past 59
As in the case of the examples given above, historic narratives serve the
movement as vast reservoir of ideological resources, which it can draw from at will
and portray in a manner conducive to its intentions. These efforts are apparent in
every aspect of the movement’s current ideological output. While Husayn al-Huthi
seldom referred to Yemen’s past, primarily using Quranic accounts to underline
his arguments, the movement became more specific in its references after 2015.
Most important events are now contextualized and explained with reference to
past events. The takeover of the movement in Sanaa in September 2014, known
as the revolution of the 21st of September, is now frequently associated with the
revolution of 1962, and the unification of 1990;13 the role assigned to women is
legitimized by likening it to the biography of Fāṭima al-Zahrāʾ;14 and Wahhabism
is said to find its antecedent in the Kharijites.15
The list goes on, and any attempt to give a comprehensive account would
inevitably lack in analytic depth. This chapter thus focuses on three distinct
narratives, relating to events situated in different timeframes. The first is the
attempt to tie the ahl al-bayt’s lineage to the Yemeni genealogical heritage. The
second narrative is the movement’s frequent recourse to the early days of the Zaydi
imamate, and the last revolves around a massacre in 1923, when several hundred
Yemeni pilgrims were killed by Ibn Saʿud’s Ikhwan militia. These narratives are
chosen specifically for the frequency and vehemence with which they are spread.
Due to the current lack of personal access to Yemen as well as the strong personal
opinions on the ground, it would be unjustifiable to try to make assumptions about
the impact of the chosen examples. The examples will, however, give a valuable
insight into the movement’s strategy to normalize its rule over wide parts of Yemen
by giving historic legitimacy to its authority and actions.
Making the Huthis Part of Yemeni Genealogic Heritage16
The al-Huthi family is one of the Yemeni families tracing their descendance back to
Muhammad through Fatima and Ali. The ahl al-bayt are consequently descendants
of the Meccan tribe Quraysh and thus belong to the north Arabian, ʿAdnānī, tribal
confederation. Most of the ancestors of today’s ahl al-bayt, commonly referred to
in Yemen as sāda (sing. sayyid) or ʾashrāf (sing. sharīf), arrived together with Imam
al-Hadi ila al-Haqq in the end of the ninth century CE.17 That means that the ahl
al-bayt are neither part of the Yemeni tribal society, which traces its ancestry back
to Qahtan, nor of Yemen’s pre-Islamic history.18
While constituting an undoubtedly heterogeneous group, with members of the
ahl al-bayt present in all socioeconomic strata of society, the ahl al-bayt made up
most of the intellectual and political elite of the country. The ahl al-bayt held the
highest scholarly, religious, and administrative offices in the country and provided
the imam, who, according to Zaydi political theory, had to be from among the ahl
al-bayt.19 With the fall of the imamate and the establishment of the republic in
1962, the role of Zaydi Islam as well as the ahl al-bayt declined. At the same time
the republican state began to foster a sense of Yemeni nationhood based on Yemen’s
Qahtani genealogic heritage and, related to this, with Yemen’s pre-Islamic history.20
The strong resentment caused by the exclusionary nature of these narratives is
one of the key factors for the appearance of the Zaydi revivalist movement in the
1990s, out of which the Huthi movement emerged in the early 2000s.21
The fact that the Huthi movement is primarily led by members of the ahl al-
bayt means that it is difficult for the movement to portray itself as truly indigenous.
This problem was already addressed by Husayn al-Huthi, who clearly separated
between the “true” Yemenis and the ahl al-bayt:
In their history, the people of Yemen (ʾAhl al-Yaman) always fought under
the banner of the ahl al-bayt. They abandoned the indigenous rulers (sulṭānāt
ʾukhrā qāiʾma ʿalā turāb al-waṭan). . . They did not say: “These are the sons of
our homeland and those are intruders”, they stood with the ahl al-bayt.22
specially since the Huthis’ rise to power in 2014, the movement has come under
E
sharp criticism on the basis of its “foreignness.” The Huthis are now frequently
accused of trying to reinstate the ahl al-bayt to their former leading societal position,
a claim that under the expression “sulala”23 is now frequently substantiated by long
lists of Huthi-appointed members of the ahl al-bayt in high administrative offices
spread on social media24 and books about the allegedly negative influence of the
Zaydi imamate25 and of the ahl al-bayt, which in this context are often also referred
to as Hashimites.26
In order to counter such accusations, the Huthis now try to bridge that gap
and portray themselves as quintessentially Yemeni by proclaiming a special
bond between the Yemenis and Ali and his descendants. It was this bond, the
movement claims, that instilled an enduring revolutionary spirit in the Yemeni
population:
The bond of the Yemenis with Ali and his sons—ʿalayhim al-salām—explains
the constant uprising against the authority of the tyrannous Umayyads and
Abbasids . . . This is because Ali—ʿalayhi al-salām—and his descendants
are bearers of the banner of revolution against the tyrants and spearheads of
change. . . . Their loyalty as the Umayyad and ʿAbbasid caliphs waged rabid
campaigns against their country in order to divert them from their love for Ali—
ʿalayhi al-salām—and to quell the revolutions that these Yemeni inspired by Ali
and his sons led, brought forth a spirit of proud refusal, bravery and sacrifice,
that returns today for the same reasons as the House of Saʿūd commits daily
massacres against the rights of the Yemenis.27
This bond, however, was not forged as Ali was sent to Yemen by Muhammad but
before that, with ʾIsmāʾīl the son of the prophet Ibrahim/Abraham. According
to Islamic tradition, Ismaʿil and his mother Hagar settled in Mecca after being
abandoned there by Ibrahim, who was a forefather of ʾAdnānī and therefore of
Muhammad and the ahl al-bayt. Later, Ismaʿil married a woman from the Banu
Jurhum, a Meccan tribe of South Arabian, provenance.28 In 2018, the pro-Huthi
Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami published a book called al-Yaman wa-ahl al-bayt fī ṣadr
al-ʾIslām (Yemen and the Ahl al-Bayt in the Beginning of Islam), which recounts
this bond and its importance.
In Noble Mecca were the Amalekites, which were vanquished by the Qahtani
Jurhum after a while. The prophet of Allah, Ismaʿil—ʿalayhi al-salām—married
into Jurhum and begat many children. This familial relationship constituted
the first intimate encounter between the Yemeni Jurhum and the children of
Ismaʿil—ʿalayhi al-salām—that influenced the later strengthening of the historic
relationship between the two sides.29
Over time this relationship grew stronger, and as the Kingdom of Sabaʾ declined
in the third century CE, the Banū al-Aws and Banu al-Khazraj moved north and
settled in Medina, where both Muhammad’s great-grandfather, Hashim b. ʿAbd al-
Manaf, and grandfather, ʿAbd al-Mutallib, married women from Banu al-Khazraj.30
Muhammad was thus of south and north Arabian background, which is interpreted
by the movement as contributing to the strong affection between the ahl al-bayt
and the people of Yemen. Yemen was in fact so important to Muhammad that he
sent Ali there several times, where he converted the tribal confederation Hamadan
to Islam.31 From this time onward, Yemen was not only an Islamic country, the
author argues, but its way toward Shiʿism was inescapable.32 The book, which was
consequently made into a documentary movie, shown on the movement’s news
outlet, al-Masira in 2018,33 thus tries to establish a historical connection between
Yemen and the ahl al-bayt that precedes the establishment of the first imamate in
897 and the consequent permanent settlement of larger numbers of ahl al-bayt in
Yemen. In the Huthi movement’s interpretation of Yemeni pre-Zaydi history, the
bond between the ahl al-bayt and the Yemenis is the product of a quasi-primordial,
genealogical, and religious link, dating back to pre-Islamic times. In order to bridge
the gap between the descendants of the prophet and the rest of the population, the
Huthis therefore portray the ahl al-bayt, and by extension themselves, as a distinct,
yet integral, part of Yemeni society. Being Yemeni is thus not merely a question
of being of Qahtani descent but also to be affiliated with the descendants of the
prophet and thus with Shiʿism and ultimately Zaydism. This bond, however, is
more than a historical fact; it imbues the Yemeni people with a revolutionary drive
to seek justice in the face of tyrannical adversaries, the movement argues.
The Biographies of Early Zaydi Imams as Analogies for the Current

Situation
Thematically related to the place of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemeni society, the Huthi
movement also uses the concept of the Zaydi imamate for its own purposes.
While not openly calling for the re-establishment of the imamate, the Huthis use
the example of the first imams, mainly Zayd and al-Hadi ila al-Haqq, in order to
draw parallels to today’s situation. While topically related to the first subchapter,
the movement’s employment of the imamate does not serve to normalize its rule
per se but to explain and legitimize its actions and in fact the conflict in general.
Zayd b. Ali was the grandson of Husayn b. Ali b. Abi Talib and fifth imam of the
Zaydiyya. In 740 CE, Zayd led a revolt in Kufa against the Umayyads. Abandoned
by his followers, he was eventually killed by the forces of caliph Hisham. Zayd’s
revolt and martyrdom are commemorated by the Huthis in several publications34
and online articles.35 Perhaps more importantly, however, the revolt is remembered
annually in a speech by ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi commemorating the martyrdom
(istishhād) of Imam Zayd. In his 2017 speech, al-Huthi links Imam Zayd’s revolt to
the uprising of al-Husayn at Kerbala sixty years earlier:
The Umayyad tyranny is a black and unjust episode in the history of the umma
and its negative prolongations have not ceased until today. If we go back into
history in order to understand the truth of this tyranny and what it did to
the umma and what it did in the umma, we find nothing but tragedy and the
legitimacy of this great act of Imam Zayd—ʿalayhi al-salām—becomes apparent
to us. [It is] just like the actions of al-Husayn, his grandfather and the grandson
of the Prophet of Allah—ʿalayhi al-salām.36
Al-Huthi then continues to accuse the Umayyads of committing a list of crimes:

the Umayyads conquered Medina, burned the Kaʿba, and killed many of the ahl
al-bayt, of the muhājirīn, and the ʾanṣār. Perhaps worse, however, Caliph Hisham
confessed to not fearing God and, in a narrative reflecting the movement's
aversion for Judaism, reprimanded Zayd for admonishing a Jew who had talked
ill of Muhammad. For the movement “the tyranny of the Umayyads was from the
beginning a project to overthrow Islam’s basic principles, its true values, its sincere
morals. An overthrowal in every sense of the word. The religion of Allah became
corrupted.”37 Feeling the responsibility to save the umma, Imam Zayd led his revolt
against the Umayyads but failed. Consequently, the umma deviated from the right
path and succumbed to tyranny:
The history of the umma today, and the periods of past generations is filled with
injustices. A well-known history, the period of the Umayyads, the period of the
ʿAbbasids and all the following periods, a history filled with injustices, filled
with tragedies and a condition of deception (taḍlīl) and distortion of Islamic and
religious concepts. . . . Today in our situation, we see in our dear Yemeni, Muslim
people that what the American-Saudi aggression did to our country is modelled
after this tyranny which is always similar.38
Or, as it is put in a book on Imam Zayd:
What the Saudi regime does in various regions of the Islamic world, be it
directly or through their intermediaries (ʿabr ʾadawātihi), is nothing but a
continuation . . . of the hypocritical movement we see in every age of Islam, in
all of the history of the Islamic umma. Yet today, its possibilities are greater
on account of its greater power and larger fortune. Today it possesses satellite
channels and modern weaponry. . . . The actions of the Saudi regime are truly
hypocritical in every sense of the word.39
In order to fight and change this miserable situation, the umma should heed the
example of another imam, of Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq, who actually built an
Islamic state in Yemen: “What distinguishes Imam al-Hadi Yayha b. Husayn from
the two great imams al-Husayn b. Ali and his grandson Zayd b. Ali—ʿalayhima al-
salām—is that Allah paved the way for al-Hadi—ʿalayhi al-salām—and prepared . . .
the establishment of a state.”40 His biography, the movement states in a collective
volume on al-Hadi, was “far from the racism (ʿUnṣuriyya), doctrinarianism
(madhhabiyya) and sectarianism (ṭāʾifiyya) that was nourished in the past by the
Wahhabiyya.”41 It was therefore upon the movement to “take him as a good example
in our situation as rulers and ruled.”42 In his contribution to the collective volume,
Hamud al-Ahnumi, one of the most prolific writers associated with the movement,
builds explicitly on the biography of al-ʿAlawī, the main historic source on the life
of al-Hadi, and develops the concept of a “social jihad” (al-jihad al-ijtimaʿi) that
guided the actions of al-Hadi. This “social jihad” is an “effort to improve society
and elevate its condition from a standpoint of society. It is a jihadi project derived
from the correct understanding of the Quran and the sunna of the prophet.”43
The “social jihad” is based on a feeling of responsibility that al-Hadi had for
Yemen. In this narrative, al-Hadi united the fragmented Yemeni society by settling
longstanding feuds between the tribes and laid out the responsibilities of the ruler
and the ruled in a “social contract” (al-ʿaqd al-ijtimāʿī). This social contract stated
that it was upon the ruler to rule in accordance with Quran and sunna, to give
precedence to the ruled when receiving offerings and to be the first to stand against
the enemies. The ruled on the other hand had to support the ruler with advice and
to follow him as he follows Allah. Clearly, the book states, al-Hadi introduced this
contract in order to control himself as well as the people. “[The contract] decreed:
‘I command you and me to command what is right and do it and to forbid evil and
leave it.’”44
The book then continues to lay out al-Hadi’s fairness toward women, Christians,
and Jews as well as his efforts to form a “resisting economy” (al-iqtiṣṣād al-
muqāwim) to strengthen society in times of war. This economy mainly relied
on the zakat and the imam instructed his governors to collect it and explain its
importance. The money should help to support the poorest and the orphans,
especially those of the martyrs. According to the author, al-Hadi instructed his
governors to lead by example and to abstain from burdening the population
unnecessarily. All economic measures should strike a balance between the needs
of the state and the preservation of popular support. As long as people understood
the need to pay to the state, they would be willing to do so, as was exemplified by
the readiness of the people of Sanaa to pay additional taxes in order to compensate
for the expenses of defeating the Qarmatians, the book argues.45
Al-Hadi’s life is therefore quite clearly laid out in a way beneficial to the
movement’s interests. At a time that the Saudi-led coalition is also employing
economic means in its war efforts, specific examples from al-Hadi’s life, like
the resisting economy, acquire special relevance in order to legitimize concrete
political measures. Indeed, the book states in another chapter:
It is obligatory for the leaders and politicians to provide alternatives and

solutions, even if only partly, to alleviate this crisis and suffering. It is also
necessary to explain to every stratum of society with complete understanding
and to point the finger on the primarily culprit of this ongoing crisis, and he
is the Saudi-American enemy and the fugitive [ʿAbd Rabbuh Manṣūr] Hadi.
Everybody has to implement and support the idea of the resisting economy and
improve the sources of state income.46
The book, briefly summarized here, is the outcome of a conference held by the
Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami in 2016. In 2017, the movement, again through the
Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, released a second, more extensive book on the issue. The
anniversary of the arrival of Imam al-Hadi is celebrated every year and reported
by the main media outlets of the movement, including al-Masira. Similar to Imam
Zayd, who was the first imam exclusive to the strand of Shiʿism that carries his
name, Imam al-Hadi is arguably also an untouchable point of reference for every
Zaydi. It is hard to imagine an adherent of Zaydism denouncing the very persons
on which his or her faith is founded. The implementation of concrete actions and
concepts based on al-Hadi’s example is therefore hard to oppose for any Zaydi.
Imam al-Hadi serves the movement with the perfect historic precedence to draw
parallels for its rule over the north of the country.
Having now outlined how the Huthi movement tries to accord its ahl al-bayt
pedigree with Yemeni nationhood and how the movement uses the examples of
early Zaydi imams in order to, on the one hand, disparage their enemies and give
a positive counterexample of just and correct leadership on the other, the last
subchapter will now address a narrative that in its function is quite similar to the
account of Imam Zayd’s revolt against the Umayyads. Unlike in the case of the
latter, however, the massacre of Wadi Tanuma does not have to be related to Saudi
Arabia by analogy.
The Massacre of Wadi Tanuma
In 1923, a caravan of pilgrims from northern Yemen was attacked by Saudi forces
in the Valley (wādī) of Tanuma in the ʿAsir region in Saudi territory. The massacre
is well attested in British diplomatic cables, the contemporary international media,
as well as Saudi and Yemeni historiographic sources alike.47 One of the earliest
accounts of the massacre is found in ʿAbd al-Wasiʿi’s Tarikh al-Yaman, which,
published in 1928, is among the most important examples of modern Yemeni
historiographic writing:
In this year, the great misfortune and momentous suffering befell the pilgrims
of Yemen on their Hajj. When they came to Tanuma, they were obstructed by
followers of King Ibn Saʿud. They killed them when they were in a protected
state (wa-hum aminun). They did not have weapons and were not prepared to
fight. The number of Yemeni pilgrims coming this way—via the land route—was
3,000 men. Their animals and goods were taken. Only five people survived. They
were at the end of the caravan and saved themselves fleeing.48
While most sources agree on this core narrative, with regard to certain controversial
aspects, however, the different narratives betray the different interests of the
involved actors. In general, the Saudi side tries to blame the killing on a mistake on
the side of its forces, mistaking the pilgrims for soldiers, while the Yemeni accounts
mainly lay the blame on the Saudi side. These two narratives of the incident
crystallized immediately after the event itself and can be observed in Yemeni and
Saudi historiographic writing until this day; accusations of Saudi guilt, however,
became far more vitriolic after the beginning of the Saudi-led intervention.49
Around two months after the start of the intervention, former president and
then-Huthi ally Ali ʿAbd Allah Ṣāliḥ stated in an interview that the rift between
Yemen and Saudi Arabia was old, going back to the massacre at Wadi Tanuma. In
2016 he repeated that idea, stating that “[t]his unjust war that started on March 26,
2015 is not the first, but was preceded by earlier wars from the side of the Saudi
regime. They started with the killing and robbing of the pilgrims at Tanuma.”50 The
same year, the Huthi movement started an extensive campaign, in the course of
which practically every major media outlet affiliated with the movement reported
on the incident. Interestingly, also the Lebanese Hizb Allah’s al-Manar51 and
Iran’s al-Alam52 news networks ran basically the same report about the massacre
on September 15, 2016. After attention decreased significantly after 2018, the
campaign was stepped up again in 2020 in order to commemorate the 100th
anniversary of the incident according to the Islamic calendar.53
Following the aforementioned general tendency of Yemeni sources of the event,
the Huthis accuse the Saudi state and its leader Ibn Saʿud of intentionally causing
the massacre, thus laying the groundwork for a century of enmity. As an article
of the homepage ansarollah.com puts it:
The massacre of Wadi Tanuma is a historic product of the criminal Saudi-

Zionist-American aggression against Yemen and the ideas of the Wahhabiyya
and of DAʿISH are the reason behind it. The same ideas are present today, they
are responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of Yemenis in cold blood.54
While the framing of the massacre in terms of religion is already evident in

earlier accounts, with the Huthis that tendency strongly increased. Connecting
the massacre not only to the Saudi state but to its religious, Wahhabi-Salafi
underpinning goes beyond merely giving an example of Saudi anti-Yemeni
activity unrelated to the movement, but puts forth a deeper lying explanation for
the enmity of the Saudi state toward Yemen.55
To further underline the point that the massacre was only one example for
a wider tendency of the Saudi state to split, weaken, and ultimately destroy the
umma, the movement explicitly relates the massacre to the Hadith of the Horn of
Satan (Qarn al-Shayṭān). According to the hadith by al-Bukhari, Muhammad said
in a sermon:
“O Allah bestow your blessings on our Sham. O Allah bestow your blessings
on our Yemen.” The people said, “O Messenger of Allah, and our Najd.” The
Prophet—ṣalla Allahu ʿalayhi wa-sallam—said, “There will occur earthquakes,
trials and tribulations, and from there arises the Horn of Satan (Qarn al-
Shaytan).”56
The propagandistic use of this hadith in order to set Yemen apart for the north of
the peninsula goes back at least to the thirteenth century CE.57 By now regularly
referring to Saudi Arabia as the “Mamlakat Qarn al-Shaytan” (Kingdom of the Horn
of Satan), the Huthis tie the massacre of Wadi Tanuma and the current war in Yemen
to far older narratives of an essential struggle between the forces of “good and evil,”
on which the whole future of the umma, and by extension the whole world, rests.
Just as in the case of the other narratives surrounding the ahl al-bayt’s genealogical
heritage and the early Zaydi imams, the massacre of Wadi Tanuma becomes
complementary to the movement’s wider ideological claims, thereby helping the
movement to gain legitimacy through recourse to Yemen’s rich historic heritage.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the Huthi movement’s use of historical narratives as a

weapon against what it calls the “soft war.” From its inception, but perhaps even
more so after taking power in 2015, the movement perceives itself as engaged
in a war of ideas with its enemies, struggling for the hearts and minds of the
population. The Huthis understand that coercion does not suffice to secure the
regime it installed. In the long term, the movement has to legitimize and then
normalize its rule in the eyes of the population. One of the strategies employed by
the movement in this struggle for hegemony in a Gramscian sense is its frequent
recourse to history.
While only three examples have been analyzed here in more detail, hardly any
major historic epoch or event is not related to the current war in the country. One
major exception is Yemen’s pre-Islamic history. The Huthi family, as ahl al-bayt, do
not share the same lineage as the Yemeni tribes. As descendants of Muhammad,
they only arrived from the end of the ninth century CE onward. As Yemeni
national identity after the fall of the imamate in 1962 became increasingly defined
in terms of South Arabian tribal lineage and an assumed national continuity from
the days of the old South Arabian kingdoms to the present day, the ahl al-bayt
became, conceptually speaking, outsiders. By trying to establish a genealogical
as well as emotional connection between the family of Muhammad and Yemen’s
Qahtani lineage that goes back to the mythical time of Ibrahim, the movement not
only makes itself part of Yemen’s pre-Islamic history, but at the same time tries to
establish a deep rooted, almost primordial Yemeni affinity toward Shiʿism, which
according to the movement, does not only manifest itself in affection for the ahl
al-bayt but also in a defiant spirit inculcated in the Yemeni nation through their
relationship with the ahl al-bayt.
By defining Shiʿism as well as defiance as integral part of “Yemeniness,” the
foundational figures of the Shiʿism, and more specifically in the case of Yemen,
Zaydism, can be credibly portrayed as authoritative points of reference. This is
exemplified in the second set of historical narratives analyzed here. The Huthi
movement uses the struggles of the early imams of Zaydism to draw historical
analogies to today’s situation in Yemen. Imam Zayd b. Ali’s defeat in Kufa in 740
is depicted as the event ultimately drawing the umma away from the leadership
of the ahl al-bayt, leading it into tyranny. Saudi Arabia’s actions in Yemen and
the wider Islamic world thus become an extension of the despotism of the
Umayyads. Only in the geographic periphery of the Islamic world, like in Yemen,
did people not stray and stand with the ahl al-bayt, as the narrative around
Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq wants to have Yemenis believe. Imam al-Hadi was
invited to Yemen, united it, and established a just state, which, according to the
movement, should serve as a model for contemporary Yemen. Due to the pivotal
importance of both Imam Zayd and Imam al-Hadi for Zaydism, as well as the
reliance—however selective—on respected historical sources, these narratives
give the movement’s claims credibility, which would be hard to achieve without
this recourse to history.
The potency of these historical narratives perhaps becomes most palpable with
regard to the massacre of Wadi Tanuma. The incidence is not merely presented
as a historical example of Saudi transgressions against Yemen that pre-date the
appearance of the Huthi movement but as part of a wider dualistic struggle between
the forces of “evil,” manifested in Wahhabi Saudi Arabia, and the partisans of
Allah, with whom the movement identifies itself as well as the Yemeni population
in general.
These three different narratives serve the same purpose: to normalize Huthi
rule. In making Zaydism and the ahl al-bayt integral parts of Yemeni nationhood,
drawing on analogies between today’s war and the struggles of earlier imams, and,
finally, by pointing to atrocities Saudi Arabia committed before the appearance
of the movement as part of its fight against Yemen, the umma, and the forces of
“good” in general, the Huthis use well-established historic events and developments
and connect them to their own interests. The movement thus portrays itself not
only as an indigenous as well as legitimate religious and political actor but in the
last consequence as the inevitable and indisputable manifestation of the nation’s
resolution in its fight against tyranny, which is dictated not by the movement
per se but instead from a sense of national and religious belonging as well as a
revolutionary spirit, which the movement claims is residing in all “true” Yemenis.
While the recourse to historical narratives is only one of several strategies the
Huthis use to counter their enemies’ “soft war,” it is clearly one to which they pay
a lot of attention and which, as a method of political argumentation, finds ample
precedence in Yemeni historiographic writing.
Notes
1 Fred Halliday, “Foreword,” in Islam, Memory, and Morality: Ruling Families in

Transition, ed. Gabriele vom Bruck (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), xv.
2 Daniel Mahoney, “Cultural Heritage and Identity Politics in Early Medieval South
Arabia,” in Southwest Arabia across History: Essays to the Memory of Walter Dostal, ed.
Andre Gingrich and Siegfried Haas (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie
der Wissenschaften, 2014), 67–78.
3 Johann Heiss and Eirik Hovden, “Zaydī Theology Popularised: A Hailstorm
Hitting the Heterodox,” in Cultures of Eschatology Volume 1: Empires and Scriptural
Authorities in Medieval Christian, Islamic and Buddhist Communities, ed. Veronika
Wieser, Vincent Eltschinger, and Johann Heiss (Oldenburg: De Gruyter, 2020),
418–19.
4 Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim
Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 123–31.
5 For this, see Alexander Weissenburger, “The Massacre of Wadi Tanuma and the
Politics of its Remembrance,” currently in peer review with ARABICA.
6 “Al-Harb al-Nāʿma . . . al-maʿraka al-ʾashad khuṭūra,” Ansarollah, September 1, 2019,
https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/144879 (accessed March 27, 2021).
7 Loc cit.
8 ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi, “Naṣ ḥiwār al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī maʿa Qanāt
al-Masīra”, Ansarollah, April 23, 2019, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/244815
9 ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi, ʿNaṣ + Vīdyū: Kalimat al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik al-Ḥūthī fī
Dhikr Murūr ʿĀmayn min al-ʿUdwān ʿAlā al-Yaman’, Saadah News, n.d., http://www.
saadahnews.com/?p=38235 (accessed March 27, 2021).
10 Antonio Gramsci, Selection from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quintin Hoare
Geoffrey Nowell Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 358.
11 For this, see John Schwarzmantel, The Routledge Guidebook to Gramsci’s Prison
Notebooks (London: Routledge, 2015), 199–204.
12 Hamud al-Ahnumi, “al-Tārīkh Yaṣnaʿu Waʿyanā,” Althawrah, June 20, 2018, http://
althawrah.ye/archives/528471 (accessed March 27, 2021).
13 Al-Ruʾya al-Waṭaniyya: li-Bināʾ al-Dawla al-Yamaniyya al-ḥadītha (Majlis al-Siyāsī
al-ʾAʿlā, 2019), 15.
14 Hamud al-Ahnumi, Tilka hiyya Fāṭimah al-Zahrāʾ—ʿalayhā al-salām (Sanaa: Majlis
al-Zaydī al-ʾIslāmī, 2017).
15 “al-Wahhābīyūn . . . khawārij al-ʿasr,” al-Shahra 7 (2016): 12–14.
16 For a more intricate account of some of the arguments made in this subchapter as well
as the general implications of the ahl al-bayt’s rule in a tribal society, see Alexander
Weissenburger, “al-Mawaddah al-Khālidah? The Ḥūthī Movement and the Idea of
the Rule of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen’s Tribal Society,” in Tribes in Modern Yemen: An
Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, 2021).
17 Johann Heiss and Eirik Hovden, “Competing Visions of Community in Medieval
Zaydī Yemen,” Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 59 (2016): 375n26.
18 On the ʿAdnani-Qahtani split, see Eva Orthmann, Stamm und Macht: Die Arabischen
Stämme im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert der Hijra (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag,
2002), 210–11. On Yemen’s tribal society, see Paul Dresch, Tribes, Government and
History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
19 See Dresch, Tribes, Government, 140–5, 160–1. On the imamate, see also Rudolf
Strothmann, Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen (Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trübner,
1912).
20 Daniel Varisco, “Yemen’s Tribal Idiom: An Ethno-Historical Survey of Genealogical
Models,” Journal of Semitic Studies 62, no. 1 (2017): 241; Robert W. Stookey, Yemen:
The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 24.
21 On Zaydi revivalism, see Gabriele vom Bruck, “Regimes of Piety Revisited: Zaydī
Political Moralities in Republican Yemen,” Die Welt des Islams 50, no. 2 (2010): 185–
223 and James R. King, “Zaydī Revival in a Hostile Republic: Competing Identities,
Loyalties and Visions of State in Republican Yemen.” Arabica 59, no. 3 (2012): 404–45.
On the emergence of the Huthi movement, see François Burgat, “The Ṣa‘da War in
Yemen: Between Politics and Sectarianism,” The Muslim World 101, no. 2 (2011):
182–201.
22 Husayn al-Huthi, Masʾuliyyat Ahl al-Bayt, 2002.
23 The term denotes the claim to the supremacy of the ahl al-bayt. At least since the
1950s, the term is used in a derogatory manner. For an example, see Muhammad
al-Zubayri, Al-ʾImāma wa-khuṭūratuhā ʿalā wiḥdat al-Yaman (Sanaa: Wizārat al-
Thaqāfa w-Assiyāḥa), 26–8.
24 For a list of alleged Huthi affiliates in the health sector, see “Bil-ʾAsmāʾ: Sayṭara
Ḥūthiyya Shāmila ʿAlā Jamīʿ manāṣib wa-Waẓaʾif Wizārat al-Ṣiḥḥa,” Bawabatii,
March 6, 2019, https://bawabatii.net/news237900.html (accessed March 27, 2021).
25 See, for example, Ahmad b. Daghr, al-Yaman Taḥt Ḥukm al-ʾImām ʾAḥmad: 1948–
1962 (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūlī, 2004).
26 Sam al-Ghubari, al-Qabīla al-Hāshimiyya: ʾAlf ʿĀm min al-Dam (Cairo: Markaz
Rawiyya li-l-Dirasāt, 2019). “Hashimiyya” is a term often used interchangeably
with ahl al-bayt. Specifically, however, a Hashimi is a descendant of Muhammad’s
great-grand father. The term “ahl al-bayt” is therefore significantly narrower than
Hashemite, and whereas every member of the ahl al-bayt is a Hashemite, the opposite
is not true.
27 Ali al-Sharafi, “Wāqiʿ al-Yaman Qabla Qudūm al-ʾImām al-Hādī’,” in al-Imam
al-Hadi (ʿalayhi al-salām): ʾAnmūdhaj al-dawla al-ʿĀdila: Majmūʿa min al-Kitābāt
al-mukhtāra, ed. Rābiṭat ʿUlamāʾ al-Yaman (n.p.: Rabita ʿulmāʾ al-Yaman, 2019),
14–15.
28 Ibn Ishaq, The Life of Muhammad: A Translation of Isḥāq’s Sīrat Rasūl Allāh, trans.
Alfred Guillaume (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967), 45–6.
29 Hamud al-Ahnumi, al-Yaman wa-ahl al-bayt fī ṣadr al-ʾIslām (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi
al-Islami, 2018), 10.
30 Ibid., 11–12.
31 Ibid., 20–1.
32 Ibid., 28.
33 The movie was presented with a large conference at Iqraʾ University in Sanaa:
“Faʿāliyya thaqāfiyya li-l-Majlis al-Zaydī bi-Ṣanʿaʾ bi-Munāsabat al-Intihāʾ min
.... al-Fīlm al-Mawwadda al-Khālida’,” al-Masirah, April 05, 2018, https://www.
almasirah.net/post/21873/%D9%81%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D8
%A9-%D8%AB%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%81%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%84%D9
%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8-
A%D8%AF%D9%8A-%D8%A8%D8%B5%D9%86%D8%B9%D8%A7%
D8%A1-%D8%A8%D9%85%D9%86%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A8%D8
%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%A7%D
8%A1-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%A3%D8%B9%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D9%85-%26quot%3B%D8%A7%D9%84%D9
%85%D9%88%D8%AF%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D8%A7%D9%84%D
8%AF%D8%A9%26quot%3B (accessed March 27, 2021).
34 See, for example, Yaḥyā ʾAbū, ʿAwwada. Thawrat al-ʾImām al-Shahīd Zayd bin ʿAly
(Dārʾira al-Thaqafa al-Qurʾaniyya, 2017).
35 See, for example, ʿAbd al-Rahman Hamid al-Din, “Al-Imam Zayd b. Ali . . . qudwat
al-thāʾrīn,” al-Masirah, September 29, 2019, http://www.almasirahnews.com/45776/
36 ʿAbd al-Malik Al-Huthi, “Nass Khitab al-Sayyid ʿAbd al-Malik Badr al-Din al-Huthi
fi Dhikra Istishhad al-Imam Zayd b. ʿAli ʿalayhi al-salām 1438 AH,” Ansarollah,
October 15, 2017, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/116616 (accessed March 27,
2021).
37 Ibid.
38 Loc. cit.
39 Abu ʿAwwada, Thawrat al-Imam al-Shahid, 76.
40 Khalid al-Qaruty, Malāmiḥ al-Dawla al-ʿĀdila: Dawlat al-ʾImām al-Hādī
Namūdhajan (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2018), 22–3.
41 Muqqadima in al-ʾImām al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaq Yaḥyā bin al-Ḥusayn: Qiyādat al-jihād
al-fāʿila wa-riyādat al-dawla al-ʿādila, ed, Majlis al-Zaydī al-ʾIslāmī (Sanaa: Majlis al-
Zaydi al-Islami, 2017), 5.
42 Loc. cit.
43 Hamud al-Ahnumi, “Thāniyan: al-Jihād al-ijtimāʿī fī ḥarakat al-ʾImām al-Hādī ilā al-
Ḥaq,” in al-ʾImām al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaq Yaḥyā bin al-Ḥusayn: Qiyādat al-jihād al-fāʿila
wa-riyādat al-dawla al-ʿādila, ed. Majlis al-Zaydi Al-islami (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi
al-Islami, 2017), 19.
44 Ibid., 29.
45 Ibid., 35–52.
46 Ali Muhammad al-Sharafi, “Thālithan: ʿAhd al-ʾImām al-Hādī li-wilāyatihi..naẓra
wa-taḥlīl,” in al-ʾImām al-Hādī ilā al-Ḥaq Yaḥyā bin al-Ḥusayn: Qiyādat al-jihād
al-fāʿila wa-riyādat al-dawla al-ʿādila, ed. Majlis al-Zaydi Al-islami (Sanaa: Majlis
al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2017), 54–5.
47 Weissenburger, “The Massacre of Wadi Tanuma”.
48 ʿAbd al-Wasiʿ al-Wasiʿi, Tārīkh al-Yaman: al-Musamma Furjat al-hummūm wa-l-
ḥazan fī ḥawādith wa-tārīkh al-Yaman (Cairo: al-Matbaʿat al-Salafiyya, 1928), 264.
49 For a comprehensive account of the different narratives, see Weissenburger, “The
Massacre of Wadi Tanuma”.
50 Ali ʿAbd Allah Salih, “Fī khiṭāb tārīkhī..al-zaʿīm Ṣāliḥ sanuqāḍī Ḥukkām ʾĀl Saʿūd
ʾammāma al-maḥākim al-duwaliyya wa-yudhakkiru bi-majzarat Tanūma,” Lahj News,
September 25, 2016, http://www.lahjnews.net/ar/news-34932.htm (accessed March
27, 2021).
51 ‘Dhikrā Majzarat Tanūma al-murawiʿa al-latī irtakabahā jaysh ʾAl-Saʿūd bi-ḥaqq
al-ḥajīj al-Yamaniyyīn, al-Manar, September 15, 2016, https://almanar.com.lb/704482
52 ‘Dhikra Majzarat “Tanuma” al-maruʿa allati irtakabaha jaysh Al Saʿud bi-Haqq al-hujaj
al-Yaman’, al-Alam, September 15, 2016, https://www.alalamtv.net/news/1862006/%D
8%B0%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9-
%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B
1%D9%88%D8%B9%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D8
%B1%D8%AA%D9%83%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7-%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-
%D8%A2%D9%84-%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF-
%D8%A8%D8%AD%D9%82-%D8%AD%D8%AC%D8%A7%D8%AC-%D8%A7%D
9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86 (accessed March 27, 2021).
53 See, for example, “Rābiṭat ʿUlamāʾ al-Yaman: Maʿa murūr 100 ʿām ʿalā majzarat Tanūma
al-niẓām al-Saʿūdī lā yazāl yaṣṣubu ghaḍabahu wa-ḥiqdahu ʿalā al-shaʿb al-Yamanī ʾilā
al-yawm,” al-Masira, July 8, 2020, https://www.almasirah.net/post/161700/%D8%B1%
D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-%D9%
85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1-100-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%
B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%
D9%86%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%
A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%D8%AF%D9%8A-
%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84-%D9%8A%D8%
B5%D8%A8 (accessed March 27, 2021).
54 “Majzarat Tanūma: Imtidād tārīkhī li-l-ʿudwān al-ʾijrāmī ʿalā al-Yaman,” Ansarollah,
July 08, 2020, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/354800 (accessed March 27,
2021).
55 “Tanuma: Dimāʾ mansiyya...fīlm wathāʾiqī ʿan majzarat Tanūma 1923,” Majlis al-
Zaydi al-Islami, n.d., http://www.zaidiah.com/video/6392 (accessed March 27, 2021).
56 Zitiert in Hamud al-Ahnumi, Majzarat al-ḥujāj al-kubrā: Madhbaḥat ḥujāj al-Yaman
fī Tanūma wa-Sadwān ʿalā yad ʿiṣābat Ibn Saʿūd ʿām 1923AD, 51–2.
57 Ettore Rossi, “Il Diritto Consuetudinario delle Tribù Arabe del Yemen,” Rivista degli
Studi Orientali 23 (1948): 11.
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al-Qaruty, Khalid. Malamih al-dawla al-ʿadila: Dawla al-Imam al-Hadi “ʿ” namudhijan
(Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami, 2018).
“Rabita ʿUlamaʾ al-Yaman: Maʿa murur 100 ʿam ʿala majzara Tanuma al-nizam al-
Saʿudi la yazala yasubb ghadabahu wa-huqdahu ʿala al-shaʿb al-Yamani ila al-Yawm.”
al-Masira, July 8, 2020. https://www.almasirah.net/post/161700/%D8%B1%D8%
A7%D8%A8%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%A1-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%B9-
%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B1-100-%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%
B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%B2%D8%B1%D8%A9-
%D8%AA%D9%86%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86
%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B9%D9%88%
D8%AF%D9%8A-%D9%84%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D8%B2%D8%A7%D9%84-
%D9%8A%D8%B5%D8%A8 (accessed March 27, 2021).
Rossi, Ettore. “Il Diritto Consuetudinario delle Tribù Arabe del Yemen.” Rivista degli Studi
Orientali 23 (1948): 1–36.
al-Ruʾiya al-Wataniyya: li-binaʾ al-dawla al-Yamaniyya al-haditha (Majlis al-Siyasi al-
ʿAla, 2019).
Salih, Ali ʿAbd Allah. “Fi khitab tarikhi . . . al-zaʿim Salih sanuqadi hukam Al Saʿud amama
al-mahakim al-duwaliyya wa-yadhkuru bi-majzara Tanuma.” Lahj News, September 25,
2016. http://www.lahjnews.net/ar/news-34932.htm (accessed March 27, 2021).
Schwarzmantel, John. The Routledge Guidebook to Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks (London:
Routledge, 2015).
al-Sharafi, Ali. “Thalithan: ʿAhd al-Imam al-Hadi li-wulatihi . . . nahtra wa-tahlil.” In al-
Imam al-Hadi ila al-Haqq Yahya b. al-Husayn: Qiyadat al-jihad al-faʿila wa-riyadat
al-dawla al-ʿadila, ed. Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami (Sanaa: Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami,
2017), 42–55.
al-Sharafi, Ali. “Waqiʿ al-Yaman qabla qudum al-Imam al-Hadi ‘ʿ’.” In al-Imam al-Hadi
(ʿalayhi al-salam): Anmudhij al-dawla al-ʿadila: Magmuʿa min al-kitabat al-mukhtara,
ed. Rabita ʿUlamaʾ al-Yaman (n.p. Rabita ʿulmāʾ al-Yaman, 2019), 7–21.
Stookey, Robert W. Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1978).
Strothmann, Rudolf. Das Staatsrecht der Zaiditen (Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trübner,
1912).
“Tanuma: Dimaʾ mansiya . . . film wathaʾiqi ʿan majzara Tanuma 1923.” Majlis al-Zaydi al-
Islami, n.d. http://www.zaidiah.com/video/6392 (accessed March 27, 2021).
Varisco, Daniel. “Yemen’s Tribal Idiom: An Ethno-Historical Survey of Genealogical
Models.” Journal of Semitic Studies 62, no. 1 (2017): 217–41.
“al-Wahhabiyun . . . Khawarij al-ʿasr.” al-Shahra 7 (2016): 12–14.
al-Wasiʿi, ʿAbd al-Wasiʿ. Tarikh al-Yaman: al-Musamma al-furja al-humum wa-l-hazn fi
hawadith wa-tarikh al-Yaman (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Salafiyya, 1928).
Weissenburger, Alexander. “al-Mawaddah al-Khālidah? The Ḥūthī Movement and the Idea
of the Rule of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen’s Tribal Society.” In Tribes in Modern Yemen:
An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften, 2021), 121–36.
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Remembrance.” Currently in peer-review with Arabica.
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al-Thaqafa wa-l-Siyaha).
Section II
RECONFIGURING YEMEN’S SOCIETY

76
4
T R I B E S A N D RU L E R S , 3 . 0 — D OM I NA N C E A N D T H E
“SU BA LT E R N ” I N H U T H I Y E M E N
Marieke Brandt
This chapter examines changes in the relationship between tribes and rulers in
northern highland Yemen through three case studies: the imamate, the republic,
and the Huthi state. Throughout history, in one way or another, the tribes of
northern highland Yemen formed the power base of any government based in
their realm. For this reason, rulers strove to exert and maintain their influence
among the tribes, to gain and retain their allegiances, and to mobilize and rally
them for their causes. The relation between tribes and rulers was always, and
still is, a complex and changeful bargain, in which relatively weak rulers had
to “persuade” (in Caton’s phrase) the strong tribes to support them.1 Given the
situation that the northern tribes were almost always more numerous and better
armed than their respective overlords, power has been exercised much more
efficiently through persuasion than through coercion, and over the centuries,
rulers of different political systems employed different approaches and arguments
in order to persuade the tribes of the need to cooperate with them. With the
ascent to power of the Huthis, the war-related tribal mass mobilizations, and the
recalibration of power relations in the republican state, the relationship of tribes
and rulers again undergoes a process of transformation that in some, but not all,
respects shows parallels to imamic times.
The issue of rule and dominance can be viewed from different angles, and
“persuasion” is just one of many possible aspects. In this chapter, I would like
to address a further aspect that is certainly more perceptible and evident for the
Yemeni people than for the external observer: the aspect of the “subaltern.” I enclose
this term in quotation marks because the debate revolving around the concept of
subalternity can only be transferred to the North Yemeni context with due caution.
The term “subaltern” was coined in the 1930s by Gramsci, who used it to explain
the cultural hegemony of colonial groups that excludes native groups from the
socioeconomic institutions of society, in order to deny their agency and voices
in colonial contexts. The term was taken up again in the 1980s by the Subaltern
Studies Group, a group of South Asian historians who defined subalternity as a
social construct, the result of hegemonic discourses brought about by the practice
of social exclusion of colonial or native populations from the hierarchy of power.2
Yemen’s northern highlands have never been colonialized in this sense; yet
we encounter a similar relationship between rulers and the subaltern in the
relationship of the native Yemeni tribes with the descent group of the ahl al-
bayt or sada (sing. sayyid), whose members constitute a considerable part of the
religious, social, and administrative elite in imamic and, again, in Huthi times. It is
evidently problematic to describe the group of the sada, which has been based in
Yemen for more than 1100 years and forms an important part of the social fabric,
as an external hegemonic power. Given the often extreme differences in education,
social status, wealth, and authority among the sada, they cannot even be spoken
of as a monolithic group. And, not to forget, also the “native” Yemeni tribes are
in some cases the result of processes of fusion and fission with immigrant, non-
Yemeni tribal groups. Yet while immigrant tribal groups have been completely
absorbed into the Yemeni context, the sada have been working since their arrival
in Yemen a millennium ago to position and maintain themselves as an external
descent group and governing elite. Much of the criticism of the tribal (and non-
tribal non-sayyid) population of Yemen directed at the sada-dominated Huthi
leadership therefore revolves around their claim for “sayyid supremacy” (locally
called sulaliyya)—a delicate, emotionally charged discussion that inflames the
passions of the Yemenis across the nation. This chapter aims to review the main
stages of tribe-ruler relationship in Yemen, and to discuss them against the
background of the concepts of “persuasion” and the “subaltern.”
Imamic Rule
It is almost impossible to provide a brief but comprehensive picture of the relation

of tribes and rulers during the more than 1000 years of imamate history in
Yemen’s northern highlands. The imamate has neither been a homogeneous nor
a monolithic institution, with each imam and each dynasty pursuing more or less
distinctive policies with the tribes.3 The first Zaydi imam, Yahya b. al-Husayn (d.
911), came to the northern town of Saada in 897 CE, when the Saada region and
large parts of the northern highlands were ravaged by protracted tribal conflict.
Since the involved tribes found themselves unable to resolve this conflict, they
invited Yahya b. al-Husayn, a descendant of the Prophet and follower of the Zaydi
branch of Islam, from Medina to Saada, where he managed to solve the conflict
through mediation and arbitration according to Islamic law.4 After this, Yahya b.
al-Husayn remained in Saada, where he worked toward the foundation of a kind
of Zaydi state—a political entity that in the centuries to come turned out to be of
wildly varying influence and often intermittent authority and that existed until
the September Revolution of 1962, when the last imam was ousted and the Zaydi
imamate replaced by the republic.
The legal teachings and judgments of Yahya b. al-Husayn are the basis for the so-
called Zaydi Hadawi school of law. One main emphasis of Zaydi Hadawi teaching
is its insistence on righteous rule through a member of the ahl al-bayt, in Yemen
called sada (“lords”): the descendants of Ali b. Abi Talib through the line of either
4. Tribes and Rulers, 3.0 79
al-Hasan or al-Husayn. According to Zaydi Hadawi doctrine, the imamate has to

continue in the Prophet’s lineage, and being a sayyid is one of several conditions
for leadership.5 Sada henceforth occupied the position of the imam (the leader of
the Zaydi community) as well as—together with members of the quḍāt6 estate—
leading positions in government administration and the military apparatus. In
effect, these leaders from the ranks of the sada were mostly the scions of a few great
families; many other sada, if not to say their larger part, lived a rather unprivileged
life.7 However, due to the sada’s “foreign” origin, the Yemeni tribes still consider
them as an immigrant community of putative ʿAdnani (northern Arab) descent
living among the tribal communities of putative Qahtani (southern Arab) descent,
and the sada’s restrictive marriage policy proved an appropriate strategy to survive
as a coherent group clearly distinguished from the other strata of Yemeni society.8
Over the centuries, the imams encountered support, but also hostility and
opposition among the tribes. Their reign often resembled one of constant warfare
to restore discipline over rebellious tribes, to halt intertribal conflicts, and to
extend Zaydi influence. Imamic rule over the tribes has been based on three main
pillars. First, the imams framed their calls on the tribes to support them in religious
terms, and those tribes that opposed their calls were depicted as jāhil (pagan) and
enemies of Islam.9 Also, faith was one of the principal motivations in fighting
foreign aggressors: during the first (1538–1636) and second (1849–1918) Ottoman
occupation, the imamic struggle against the foreign occupiers was framed in
religious terms, and the imamate served as the religio-political institution to unite
and mobilize the Zaydi highland tribes against the common enemy, who was seen
as un-Islamic and corrupt.10 Likewise, also the mobilizations of the 1960s civil war
bore an element of faith. In his memoirs, Shaykh ʿAbdallah al-ʾAḥmar (who was
leading the republican tribes) described the openly denominational nature of the
civil war, saying that
It was a fight about faith, belief and conviction, and the princes of the House
of Hamid al-Din [the royal family] sent us letters which intimidated us and
discouraged us from supporting the “pharaonic colonists and their slaves”, as
they said, and which pointed out the royalist role in the resistance against the
infidels, and called us to support them and to fight for the sake of Allah.11
A further pillar of imamic rule was the taking of hostages from shaykhly
families in order to keep the tribes, who were its ultimate mainstay, under control.
In the hostage system, the conduct of the shaykhs and their tribes determined
if the hostage lived in comfort and received an education or if he was thrown in
a dungeon or even executed. The hostage system met its heyday in the first half
of the twentieth century, when the Hamid al-Din imams, inspired by Ottoman
practice, began to take tribal hostages in great numbers.12 Trustworthy shaykhs,
however, were rewarded; one of the principal ways the imams also managed
and co-opted the tribes was by giving the shaykhs from the northern highlands
fiefs or landed estates in Lower Yemen. The agricultural surplus of Lower Yemen
meant that tribal shaykhly families from the north could extract revenues from
the south. There was a constant circulation of northern tribal families into the
southern lands: those areas south of Yarim and down to Hujariyya—regions that
are considered Sunni-Shafiʿi and in which the tribes were relatively less powerful
and not organized as martial forces. In other words, this aspect of imamic rule was
not merely denominational or coercive but rather resembled a political economy.13
A further pillar of imamic rule was a relatively bold approach toward the tribes;
albeit most imams were so prudent to reward (and remunerate) their allies and
faithful followers (and some shaykhly families of the Zaydi highlands would, as
champions of the Zaydi cause, literally write the word “fidelity” on their banners),
they did not shy away from direct interference in the affairs of disobedient tribes,
by way of punitive campaigns, as well as attempts at the steering of shaykhly
succession and the replacement of shaykhly lineages.14 In case of success, this
approach gave the imams immense influence and power, as they were able to divest
authority from shaykhs who were less loyal and to appoint “trustworthy” tribal
leaders instead. The tribes were violently opposed to this policy of interference
that also met its heyday in the first decades of the twentieth century during the
reign of Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din and his successor, Imam Ahmad. Their policy
of interference and (at times treacherous) coercion, which was regarded as a
blunder by many tribes, became one of the principal reasons for the protracted
tribal insurrections that in the 1950s fused with the nationalist Free Yemeni
Movement, and eventually ushered in the September Revolution and overthrow
of the imamate in 1962.
Republican Rule
The revolution of 1962 led to a fundamental change in the relationship between

tribes and rulers. We recall that before 1962 political power and leadership were
mainly ascribed to the social stratum of the sada (even if by far not all of them
were effectively leaders) and the support of the tribes for the imams was framed
in religious terms. The September Revolution led to the overthrow of the imamate
and pledged to the Yemeni people the abolition of social inequality and birthright
privilege, and a more equitable distribution of political participation, economic
resources, and development. Sayyid authority was downgraded to that of local
religious leaders, in contrast to the elevated positions as the religious, political, and
administrative leaders many sada had occupied during the imamate. Republican
discourse identified the sada with reactionary backwardness and oppression,
sometimes despised in a fashion somewhat akin to the French Republican aversion
for aristocracy and royalty.15
The newly established Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) worked toward creating a
new national identity based on non-sectarian state Islam and historic and tribal
heritage. It delegitimized the sada’s claim to leadership not only for political and
religious but also for genealogical considerations.16 Combining the belief that
Yemenis are the “original Arabs” (al-ʿarab al-ʿāriba) with the genealogical construct
that “true Yemenis” were descendants of Qahtan, the eponym and symbol of unity
of the South Arabian tribes, in republican Yemen “the tribe” and Qahtanism
became invoked as the basis of North Yemeni society. Public representations of
the sada as an “immigrant” community and “strangers in the house,” as well as the
refusal to recognize them as ʾawlād al-balad (“genuine Yemenis”), were based on
their putative foreign, ʿAdnani origin.17 At the same time, the tribes, which claim
descent from Qahtan, were depicted as rooted in remotest antiquity and being the
indigenous inhabitants of Yemen. This was a very old line of reasoning against the
sada, which is already evident in the historical writings of al-Hasan al-Hamdani
(tenth century CE) and Nashwan al-Himyari (twelfth century CE).18 Since the
1962 revolution and the abolition of the imamate, republican ideologues evoked a
tradition which was both Qahtani and Islamic as an alternative to the taqlid ahl al-
bayt (the judicial opinions and practices of the scholars who belong to the House
of the Prophet) and Zaydi-Hadawi history. It is noteworthy that a community that
has lived in Yemen for a millennium and forms a central part of the Yemeni social
fabric is still viewed as “immigrant,” but on the other hand the sada themselves
have always energetically worked toward maintaining this genealogical distinction
between them and the other strata of Yemeni society.
With regard to the tribes, republican rule was based on three pillars, (1) the
empowerment of (selected) shaykhs; (2) an enormous increase in efforts to
purchase tribal (or, better yet, shaykhly) loyalties; and (3) the politics of divide
and rule. This system of governance became a hallmark of ex-president Ali
ʿAbdullah Salih’s reign, who entered into a political “truce” with the shaykhs after
his predecessors (notably ʿAbdul Raḥmān Yaḥā Al-ʾIryānī and Ibrahim al-Hamdi)
had pursued a more confrontational course towards the shaykh, but ultimately
failed to prevail against their resistance.19
The tribal shaykhs, notably those who had fought on the side of the republic in the
1960s civil war (many of them from the ranks of the Hashid tribal confederation),
had never been more powerful than in the republican era. In Yemen’s northern
highlands, sayyid hegemony was more or less substituted by a hegemony of the
major shaykhs. The shaykhs had shaken off their former sayyid overlords and
many of them now became part of the government themselves, highly patronized
and paid by the state, and holders of parliamentary seats, which they practically
inherited within their families.20 Little did change for the rural tribal masses, either
in terms of political participation or in terms of their economic situation and living
conditions. The situation of the ordinary tribespeople often remained as dire as it
had been during imamic times, and stood now in glaring contrast to that of their
own shaykhs. It was precisely this discontent of the tribal masses, together with
that of the sada who were generally “othered” and ostracized regardless of their
former role, that would later play into the hands of the Huthis and serve them well
in recruiting them.
Certainly all rulers who sought to superimpose their rule on the template of
tribalism have occasionally resorted to the strategy of divide and rule. During the
Salih era, in particular, this strategy became the method of choice for keeping the
tribes under control. Until 2001, Salih shirked from openly challenging unruly
tribes (exceptions exist, such as the suppression of the protracted Bakil riots
in ʿAmran and Arhab in the 1980s during and after the war against the Aden-
sponsored NDF, and the “Maʾrib Revolution” of 1989).21 By causing rivalries
and fomenting discord among dissident tribes, Salih aimed at breaking up larger
concentrations of tribal power into pieces and prevent smaller tribes from linking
up against him. His “soft approach” was no less harmful than open intervention.
Among the tribes of Bakil, in particular, conflict, infighting, and feuding became
endemic. Power had passed into local, “indigenous” hands, but inequality and
discontent among many tribes remained.
Huthi Rule
Huthi rule in Yemen again brought about changes to the relation between tribes
and rulers. Before we proceed, however, we should define how the terms “Huthis”
and “tribes” relate to one another and what social groups these terms denote. Media
reports often suggest a dichotomy between “Huthis” and “tribes,” which actually
does not exist because the Huthi group itself is largely composed of tribes. On the
other hand, it is possible (mostly, but not always) to draw a distinction between
the Huthi supporters—the masses at the grassroots level that also form the Huthi
“armed forces”—and the Huthi leadership, since most of the former are Qahtani
Arabs, whereas the latter largely (but not exclusively) belong to the social stratum
of the sada. When siding with the Huthis, tribes do not cease to be tribes. Moreover,
we should not forget that the tribes of Yemen take very different positions toward
the Huthi movement; some of them as supporters, others as opponents, and yet
others as an indifferent, “neutral” mass that has been drawn into the conflict by
chance and often against its will. Many of those fighting along the Huthis do not
support their ideology but joined them for tactical and strategic reasons.22 Huthi
supporters can mainly be found in Zaydi-majority highland Yemen, while many
Sunni tribes in Lower and Eastern Yemen have positioned themselves as a bulwark
against Huthi expansionism. And, not to forget, a considerable part of Yemen’s
people belongs neither to the social stratum of the sada nor to that of the tribes.
After they had successfully navigated the ordeals of the six “Saada wars”
(2004–10) and captured the capital in 2014, the Huthis have started to recalibrate
power relations according to their vision.23 At the domestic level, three main
characteristics of Huthi rule vis-à-vis the tribes have become visible: Huthi rule
rests on (1) the re-activation of sayyid leadership, (2) the re-activation of religious
rallying calls, and (3) a policy of interference in tribal affairs.
The al-Huthi family, which gave the movement its name, is of sayyid origin,
and ever since the Huthi movement came into being in the early 2000s, sada
have played an important role in its leadership. In the first few years, this claim to
leadership was not overtly obvious, but since about 2014, when the Huthis held the
reins of power in their hands and gained access to the apparatus of the state, they
began openly working toward the institutionalization of a sayyid elite in important
state posts, reflecting the key tenet of Hadawi Zaydism that believes in the innate
right to rule of descendants of the Prophet. Albeit the presidents of the Supreme
Political Council24 (Salih al-Samad, succeeded by Mahdi al-Mashat) were/are

of non-sayyid origin, the Huthi leaders placed a large number of sada in senior
positions—often called “supervisors” (mushrifūn)—in government, military, and
administration. The core of them seems directly connected with the al-Huthi
family by kinship and marriage relations.25
By installing sada in positions of privilege and political dominance in the Huthi
regime, the Huthi leaders are also ensuring that they benefit economically; the
new regulations in taxation that impose a khums tax, whose income in this case
predominantly seems to be used for the benefit of sada, might also be viewed in
this light.26 Weissenburger has observed that, interestingly, Huthi propagandists
are working toward highlighting pre-Islamic genealogical connections between
the ʿAdnani sada and the Qahtani tribes of Yemen, undoubtedly in order to
rectify their stigma as “foreigners” and “strangers in the house.” In order to avoid
falling into the trap of the dominance-subaltern dilemma, Huthi propaganda
energetically works toward portraying sayyid rule as a form of indigenous rule fit
to be emulated in today’s struggle.27
The purchase of tribal loyalties is not confined to republican times but has
always been a more or less effective instrument to garner tribal support. The
republic, however, and especially ex-president Salih, excelled in “buying” tribal
loyalties by financial and political patronage of the major shaykhs. In Huthi Yemen,
in contrast, the mobilization of the tribes—and the populace at large—takes place
again through religious campaigns and, to a certain degree, rallying calls of an
anti-Western, anti-imperialist hue. ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi’s public speeches are a
combination of religiously enshrined sermons and third-worldist political slogans
that remind the audiences first and foremost of their religious duties in the fight
against the imperialist and corrupt West and its regional and local allies (i.e., the
Coalition partners). Religion (of a pan-Islamic rather than a specifically Zaydi
hue) has once again taken the role as a means of motivating and mobilizing the
masses against the common enemy, plus a political element that revolves around
anti-Americanism and anti-Imperialism.
A third main pillar of Huthi rule over the tribes is their inclination to interfere
directly in tribal affairs. The republic, and especially ex-president Salih, we recall,
preferred an indirect style of government that, in addition to the “soft approaches”
of co-optation and patronage, also included the politics of divide and rule, with
the aim of weakening rebellious tribes in internal conflicts and preventing them
from “ganging up” against the government. On the other hand, the Huthi leaders
(at this point in time, at least) need and want strong tribes that stand united
behind them, serve as a bulwark against foreign military advances, and protect
the borders. However, the actual extent of the tribes’ commitment for the Huthi
visions seems to vary. It is true that the Huthis pursue a strategy of persecution and
brutal repression toward their critics that resembles, if not surpasses, that of the
House Hamid al-Din pre-1962. There are disturbing reports of Huthi squadrons
intimidating and killing critical shaykhs and forcefully subjugating tribes who
refuse to submit to Huthi rule or send their sons to the fronts.28 On the other
hand, the sheer military strength and manpower of the Huthi movement is an
indication that a large portion of the northern highland tribes is cooperating

with the Huthis. Those Bakil tribes, in particular, who had felt sidelined ever
since Salih came to power (Salih himself being a Hashid tribesman and mainly
promoting his Hashid brethren), seem to work more or less smoothly with the
Huthi leaders and administer the recruitment of their tribesmen for the Huthi
forces in their common war against the Coalition. Their loyalty and fidelity are
rewarded accordingly; they receive attention and visits from the Huthi leaders,
and the martyrs of their shaykhly families receive huge, televised funerals at which
high-ranking representatives of the Huthi leadership show up. In other words, the
management of relations between the Huthi leaders and the shaykhs is intimate
and personal and needs to be constantly tended to. Particularly important tribal
loyalists are elevated in Huthi Yemen; the former governor of al-Maḥwīt (in 2021
he was appointed governor of al-Jawf), for example, is shaykh of a strategically
important Bakil tribe from ʿAmran, whose father supported the Hamid al-Din
in the 1960s civil war and whose family was in particularly acrimonious conflict
with ex-president Salih and Abdullah al-Ahmar. By and large, however, the role of
the shaykhs remains limited to the representation of their tribes and mediation in
their conflicts (their core tasks according to tribal custom), bereft of grand political
ambitions and excessive financial patronage that had become the trademark of the
republic.
In his evaluation of Huthi speeches and publications, Weissenburger found that
after 2014 the Huthis hardly address tribalism as such, but refer to the tribes as
mere descent-based entities, avoiding references to tribal law or self-governance.
Tribes are portrayed as conceptually equal to other strata within Yemeni society,
undercutting notions of a specific tribal quality of Yemeni society.29 This is not
surprising, for the Huthis’ aim at gaining the support of an audience that is much
broader and also includes the large nontribal parts of the Yemeni populace.
Nevertheless, the Huthi leaders know that they need the tribes and that they can
only win their cooperation through appreciation. Asked about the role of tribes
in an al-Masirah TV interview of 2019, ʿAbd al-Malik al-Huthi replied that “we
are proud of the role of the Yemeni tribes in all historical periods. In the past, the
tribes have sacrificed. Today and in the present, they are continuing this great and
positive role,” referring to the major contributions of the “faithful tribes” in the
army and at the front, where they, despite the difficult humanitarian situation,
support the Huthis’ war with men, money, weapons, and materiel from their own
arsenals.30
Huthi leaders work toward developing personalized relationships with loyal
shaykhs (while punishing those whom they deem disloyal). In addition, and
along the same lines, the Huthi leaders set out to establish relationships with
the tribes and enter into a new social contract with them on the basis of certain
grand documents. For this purpose, in late 2018 the Huthi leadership has drawn
up a “Tribal Document of Honour” (Wathiqat al-Sharaf al-Qabīliyya), a kind
of declaration of commitment by the tribes, and submitted it to the shaykhs
for signature.31 The Wathiqat al-Sharaf corresponds to the “National Vision”
that serves to legitimate Huthi political dominance.32 Moreover, the Wathiqat
al-Sharaf is vaguely reminiscent of the National Charter (al-Mīthāq al-Waṭanī)

of 1980, which served ex-president Salih to establish patronage relations with
shaykhs and other social and political stakeholders after the “War of the Central
Areas” with the Aden-sponsored National Democratic Front (NDF); the Mithaq
was the first step toward consolidating Salih’s rule and turning old enemies into
(dubious) friends.33 Likewise, in the agreement between the Huthi leadership and
the shaykhs, the latter undertake to recognize the Huthi leadership’s supremacy
over tribal leadership, to act against the poison of sedition, and to close their ranks
and unite with their new Huthi suzerains against the “true enemy.” This social
contract serves many purposes: it serves to sort the wheat from the chaff, to
establish and cement hierarchies, and to mobilize the tribes against the common
enemy. The invocation of tribal honor in the title of the contract (which rarely
misses its purpose) is interesting, as is the flattering invocation of the merits of the
tribes and the “original qualities that characterize the populace (shaʿb) of Yemen
since ancient times, such as courage, fraternity, and rejection of oppression and
enslavement.”34
The social contract formulated in the Wathiqat al-Sharaf finds its embodiment
in the Tribal Cohesion Council (Majlis al-Talāḥum al-Qabīlī) with branches in the
governorates that cooperate closely with the Supreme Political Council. The name
Majlis al-Talahum borrows from the Talahum initiative of the early 1990s, the
tribal grassroots movement after Yemeni unity whose main concern was to pacify
and unite the northern tribes and to recalibrate the relation between the tribes
and the government of united Yemen.35 The new Majlis al-Talahum has similar
high-pitched goals: it serves the “fortification of the tribe,” the “preservation of
the social fabric and national constants,” and the “declaration of a general peace
by postponing all disputes and conflicts . . . in coordination with official bodies.”36
Yet, in contrast to the original Talahum initiative of the 1990s, the Huthi Majlis
al-Talahum is not a broad tribal grassroots initiative working through bottom-
up approach, but rather steered and controlled from “above,” through the Huthi
leaders.
Conclusion
This chapter enquired into the specific characteristics of tribe-ruler relation in

northern highland Yemen in three epochs: pre-1962 imamate, post-1962 republic,
and post-2014 Huthi Yemen. It goes without saying that only with due caution can
the complexities of tribe-ruler relation be reduced to a few features, in particular
where they concern the 1100 years of the Zaydi imamate, but also the manifold
varieties of tribe-ruler relation in republican times. Existing evidence should
nevertheless make it possible to deduce the following aspects.
Imamic rule over the tribes was largely based on sayyid leadership, religiously
framed rallying calls, hostage taking, and a policy of interference in tribal affairs,
with the last two features particularly coming to the fore during the Hamid al-
Din period that preceded the revolution of 1962, and that was characterized by
stronger state centralization than the previous periods. After 1962 the republic,
based on an ideology of Qahtanism, pursued a strategy of empowerment and
financial patronage of (selected) shaykhs and a policy of “divide and rule” vis-à-vis
the tribes: a two-pronged strategy that aimed at securing the loyalty of influential
tribal leaders while simultaneously preventing unity and concentrations of power
among the tribes. After 2014, Huthi leaders seem to resort again to religious rallying
calls and interference in tribal affairs—approaches that show certain analogies with
tribe-ruler relations in pre-1962 Yemen. Another similarity between pre-1962 and
Huthi Yemen is the prominent role of the sada, since both the Zaydi imamate and
the Huthis believe in the innate right to leadership of descendants of the Prophet,
a key tenet of Hadawi Zaydism. Nevertheless, the Huthi leaders do not seem to
pursue a re-installation of the imamate. Rather, they superimposed their rule on
the template of the republican state, minus the post-1990 democratic element.
It is, above all, the concentration of sada in the higher echelons of Huthi power
that engenders concern and unrest among the population—not only among
many Qahtani Zaydis but also, beyond the northern highlands, in the vast Sunni-
dominated parts of Yemen. After 1962, republican discourse had identified the
sada with reactionary backwardness; the republic pledged to the Yemeni people
the abolition of social inequality and birthright privilege, and a more equitable
distribution of political participation, economic resources, and development.
However imperfect the implementation of this promise had been (for new
inequalities soon arose), over the fifty years of republican rule, the ideology of
equality and Qahtanism has sunk deep into the minds of the citizens and has
shaped the thinking of entire generations. Against the backdrop of this conflict
of belief and ideology, it becomes understandable why the putative “indigenous,”
Qahtani part of the population sees itself increasingly excluded from the
hierarchy of power and being degraded to a “subaltern” social class by the putative
“immigrant,” ʿAdnani/sayyid community. This unease prevailing among many
people is reinforced by the reign of terror and fear that characterizes Huthi rule
in Yemen.
The discussion about sulaliyya, that is the question of the pros and cons of
the sadas’ claim to leadership, is not just an academic debate but the expression
of an epic struggle for the future configuration of Yemeni society at large. The
fundamental question is whether the Huthis are willing and able to achieve a
balance between the various strata of Yemeni society, or whether (as it seems)
they disregard the opinions of the others and cement new inequalities. It is also
about the question of whether, after five decades of more or less equal citizenship,
the Yemeni populace will be inclined or disinclined to bow again reverently
before a new-old “nobility.” In this dispute, both sides feel misunderstood and
unjustly treated: while the tribes and other non-sayyid strata of Yemeni society
see themselves as having again been degraded and “subaltern-ed,” the sada feel
unjustly “other-ed” and excluded from the fabric of Yemeni society of which they,
regardless of their origin, indeed form an important part.
The continuation or cancellation of Huthi rule through the highland tribes
will eventually depend on the outcome of this immensely important dispute. Let
me conclude by quoting a shaykh of the tribe of Waʾilah: “To control the tribes
you need to control their hearts first. The important thing: Lest you incite their
savagery, be careful with regard to blood, dignity, and honour. Only after this come
the material things. You can turn them into savages, or you can turn them into
angels, all according to your leadership.”37
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Nadwa al-Dawsari, Abdullah Hamidaddin, Bernard Haykel,

Charles Schmitz, Ewa Strzelecka, and Alexander Weissenburger, all of whom
kindly read the draft chapter and offered, from their often profoundly different
vantage points and situations of personal involvement, numerous valuable remarks
and suggestions. The Austrian Nationalstiftung FTE and the Institute for Social
Anthropology at the Austrian Academy of Sciences supported this research.
Notes
1 Steven Caton, “Power, Persuasion, and Language: A Critique of the Segmentary

Model in the Middle East.” IJMES 19 (1987): 77–102.
2 See, for example, Ranajit Guha, Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986–1995 (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1997) and Dipesh Chakrabarty, Habitations of
Modernity: Essays in the Wake of Subaltern Studies (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2002).
3 See, for example, R.B. Serjeant, “The Interplay between Tribal Affinities and Religious
(Zaydi) Authority in the Yemen,” in al-Abhath 30 (1982): 11–50; and Paul Dresch,
Tribes, Government, and History in Yemen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 158–235.
4 Ali b. Muhammad al-ʿAlawi, Sirat al-Hadi ila al-Haqq Yahya b. al-Husayn b. al-Qasim
(Beirut: Dar al-fikr li-l-tibaʿa wa l-nashr wa l-tawziʿ, 1981). On the relationship
between al-Hadi and the tribes of Saada, tribal societies, and tribal self-governance
at the time of al-Hadi, see Johann Heiss, “War and Mediation for Peace in a Tribal
Society (Yemen, 9th Century),” in Kinship, Social Change and Evolution: Proceedings
of a Symposium Held in Honour of W. Dostal, ed. Andre Gingrich, Sylvia Haas, and
Gabriele Paleczek (Horn: Berger, 1989), 63–74.
5 See ʿAbd Allah Ibn Miftah, Kitab al-muntazaʿ al-mukhtar min al-ghayth al-midrar al-
maʿruf bi-Sharh al-Azhar, Vol. 10 (Sanaa: Maktab al-Turāth al-ʾIslāmī, 2004), 414–20.
Serjeant summarizes Ibn Miftah’s list of qualifications of eligibility for the office
of the imam as follows: “In facing the task of government an Imam must combine
the qualities of a courageous and resolute warrior with those of a scholar, diplomat
and administrator. He must be an arbiter of upright character, and he must have an
almost encyclopaedic knowledge of people, especially of the tribes and families with
intricacies of their relationships.” See R.B. Serjeant, “The Post Medieval and Modern
History of Ṣanʿaʾ and the Yemen, ca. 853–1382/1515–1962,” in Sanʿaʾ: An Arabian
Islamic City, ed. R.B. Serjeant and Ronald Lewcock (London: World of Islam Festival
Trust, 1983), 78.
6 The quḍāt (sing. qāḍī) are hereditary jurist-administrators, who are considered of
tribal stock. Among the tribes, they are given special esteem and status because
of their education; see R.B. Serjeant, “South Arabia,” in Commoners, Climbers
and Notables, ed. C. van Nieuwenhuijze (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 237; Dresch, Tribes,
Government, and History in Yemen, 136–40; Shelagh Weir, A Tribal Order: Politics and
Law in the Mountains of Yemen (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 52.
7 See Gabriele vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen: Ruling Families in
Transition (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Dresch, Tribes, Government, and
History in Yemen, 141.
8 Although the sada did intermarry with women of Qahtani (here: tribal) descent, they
maintained their difference through marriage practices that prevented sayyid women
from marrying out of their descent group. On marriage patterns of Yemeni sada and
the question of suitability in marriageā, see Gabriele vom Bruck, “Enacting Tradition:
The Legitimation of Marriage Practices amongst Yemeni Sadah,” Cambridge
Anthropology 16, no. 2 (1992): 54–68.
9 David Thomas Gochenour, The Penetration of Zaydi Islam into Early Medieval
Yemen, Dissertation Thesis (Harvard University, 1984) and Johann Heiss, Tribale
Selbstorganisation und Konfliktregelung: Der Norden des Jemen zur Zeit des ersten
Imams (10. Jahrhundert), Dissertation Thesis (University of Vienna, 1998), 7, 10.
10 See, for example, Abdol Rauh Yaccob, “Yemeni Opposition to Ottoman Rule: An
Overview,” Proceedings of the Seminar for Arabian Studies, 42 (2012): 411–19.
11 ʿAbd Allah al-Ahmar, Qaḍāyā wa-Mawāqif, Vol. 3 (Sanaa: al-ʾAfāq li-l-Ṭibāʿa wa
l-nashr, 2008), 85.
12 On the hostage system in Yemen, see Manfred Wenner, Modern Yemen 1918–1966
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 78–80; Weir, A Tribal Order, 273–5;
and Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict
(London/New York, Hurst, 2017), 40–2.
13 See, for example, Husayn al-Sayaghi, Ṣafḥāt majhūla min tārīkh (Sanaa: Markaz al-
Dirāsāt al-Yamaniyya, 1978), 125–6.
14 Wenner, Modern Yemen, 65; Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 42.
15 vom Bruck, Islam, Memory and Morality in Yemen, 199–202.
16 After national reconciliation in 1970, some sada managed to recover economic
and social influence and gain high positions in the government for qualifications
rather than for noble birth; see Robert W. Stookey, “Social Structure and Politics in
the Yemen Arab Republic.” Middle East Journal 28, no. 3 (1974): 248–60 (accessed
February 23, 2021), p. 250.
17 On the emergence of this discussion in the 1950s, see vom Bruck 2005, Islam,
Memory and Morality in Yemen, 52–63.
18 See, for example, ʾIsmāʿīl al-Akwaʿ, “Nashwan Ibn Saʿid al-Himyari and the
Spiritual, Religious and Political Conflicts of His Era,” in Yemen: 3000 Years of Art
and Civilization in Arabia Felix, ed. Werner Daum (Frankfurt am Main: Frankfurt am
Main, Umschau-Verlag, 1987), 212–31.
19 I refer here to ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Iryani’s resistance against excessive patronage
payments. Ibrahim al-Hamdi’s “Revolutionary Correction Movement” of the mid-
1970s that aimed to get rid of a “legacy of decadence,” to calm tribal feuds, and to put
an end to favoritism and bribery. Al-Hamdi’s Correction Movement, which is highly
regarded by many tribes to this day, was not directed against tribes and tribalism per
se (as it was later purported by al-Hamdi’s enemies), but against the excesses of power
of a handful of senior (Hashid) shaykhs.
20 The funding for the shaykhs was mainly distributed through the Tribal Affairs
Authority (maṣlaḥat shuʾūn al-qabāʾl). On the inheritance of parliamentary seats, see
Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 129, 213.
21 On the conflicts between tribes and the government in the second half of the 1980s,
see Muḥammad al-ʿAbbasī, Shāwyish al-Baʿth: ʿAly ʿAbdallah Ṣāliḥ (Cairo: Al-
Zahrāʾ li-l-ʾIʿlām, 1990), 134–41; Sinnn Abu Lahum, Al-Yaman: Ḥaqāʾq wa-Wathāʾiq
ʿIshtuhā, Vol. 3 (Sanaa: Muʾssassat al-ʿAffīfī, 2004), 342–4.
22 Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 199–202 and passim.
23 On statehood as envisioned by the Huthis, see the chapters of Schmitz and Rogers
in this volume. On the six Saada, wars, see Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen,
153–342.
24 The Supreme Political Council is the highest political authority in the Huthi-
controlled territories.
25 For further details, see ACAPS, “The Houthi Supervisory System: The Interplay
of Formal State Institutions and Informal Political Structures,” ACAPS Thematic
Report, June 17, 2020, and Helen Lackner (forthcoming), “Tribes in the Neo-Liberal
Era: Transformation of Yemen’s Social Structure,” in Tribes in Modern Yemen: An
Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der
Wissenschaften) and Joshua Roger’s chapter in this volume.
26 “Tax and Rule: Houthis Move to Institutionalize Hashemite Elite with ‘One-fifth’ Levy,”
The Sanaa Center, https://sanaacenter.org/files/Houthis_Move_to_Institutionalize_
Hashemite_Elite_with_One-Fifth_Levy_en.pdf (accessed February 4, 2021).
27 Alexander Weissenburger (forthcoming), “Al-Mawaddah al-Khalidah? The Huthi
Movement and the Idea of the Rule of the Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen’s Tribal Society,”
in Tribes in Modern Yemen: An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna: Verlag der
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften).
28 Nadwa Al-Dawsari, “Analysis: Tribal Shaykhs and the War in Yemen,” https://al-
masdaronline.net/national/345 (accessed February 4, 2021).
29 Alexander Weissenburger (forthcoming), “Al-Mawaddah al-Khālidah?”
30 Yemen Extra, “Full Text of Sayyed Abdulmalik First TV Interview with Almasirah
TV,” https://www.yemenextra.net/2019/05/05/36349/ (accessed February 4, 2021).
31 Yemenipress, “Taʿarraf ʿalā ʾaham bunūd wathīqat al-sharaf al-qabīliyya,” https://
www.yemenipress.net/archives/137188 (accessed February 4, 2021).
32 On the National Vision, see Charles Schmitz’ chapter in this volume.
33 On the National Charter and the NDC of the 1980s, see Robert D. Burrowes, The
Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962–1986 (New York, Routledge,
1987), 111–13.
34 Yemenipress, “Taʿrraf ʿala ahammi bunud wathiqat al-sharaf al-qabiliyya,” https://
www.yemenipress.net/archives/137188 (accessed February 4, 2021).
35 For the Talahum initiative of the early 1990s, see Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in
Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 163–5 and Paul Dresch, “The Tribal Factor in the Yemeni
Crisis,” in The Yemeni War of 1994: Causes and Consequences, ed. Jamal al-Suwaidi
(London: Saqi, 1995), 47–52.
36 “Al-raʾīs al-Mashāṭ yuddashin al-ʾijrāʾāt al-tanfīdhiyya li-wathīqat al-sharaf
al-qabaliyya,” https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/227285, (accessed February 4,
2021).
37 Online interview with a shaykh from Wāʾilah in January 2018, with whom I discussed
the leadership styles of Imam Aḥmad, ʿAlī ʿAbd Allah Ṣāliḥ, and the Huthis.
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bi-Sharḥ al-ʾAzhār, Vol. 10 (Sanaa: Matktab al-Turath al-Islami, 2004), 414–20.
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Structure.” In Tribes in Modern Yemen: An Anthology, ed. Marieke Brandt (Vienna:
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92
5
WOM E N U N D E R T H E H U T H I R E G I M E : G E N D E R ,
NAT IO NA L I SM , A N D I SL A M
Ewa K. Strzelecka
Introduction
This chapter discusses the ways in which gender dynamics in Yemen have shaped
and have been shaped by the Huthis (Ansar Allah) since 2011. It has a particular
focus on gender implications of the Huthis’ transition from a movement to a
state-in-the-making, and how within that move the woman question became an
important matter of the Huthis’ politics and public discourse. It provides answers
on the importance of women’s mobilization by the Huthi-led authoritarian
regime. What kind of women’s participation has been incentivized by the Huthi
authorities? And what type of women have been discouraged from political
engagement? Looking at women’s participation allows us to understand how the
Huthis have built alliances with certain groups of women to extend their political
authority in the northern provinces of Yemen, implement new gender-related
policies, and reshape the Yemeni society according to their precepts and interests.
It also provides insights into the emergence of resistance against the Huthis’
conceptualization of state and nation-building.
The research hypothesis is that the nature and extent of women’s roles in the
Huthi regime have been gradually changing over the past years to better respond
to new challenges and needs related to war and state-building enterprises. The
Huthis’ transformation from a sociopolitical movement to a powerful political actor
in state formation is fundamental to explain why women and sexuality became
central to the Huthis’ politics. Since the Huthis’ takeover of the government in
Sanaa in 2015, gender-state alliances shifted. Women have been widely mobilized
through all-female institutions like zaynabeyat to enforce gender segregation
policies and play more proactive roles in the Huthi-led state projects. Women
have played a significant role in the legitimation and support of the regime in
a war-torn country. At the same time, the dissident women opposing the Huthi
regime have been systematically silenced through repressive campaigns aimed at
restricting their sociopolitical influence.
The significance of women for the success and legitimation of the Huthi-led
regime includes also an Islamic revival that reinforced social identification with
moral values constructed around a virtuous Muslimah (Muslim woman) as the
marker of cultural difference and authenticity.1 Through a symbol of woman,
the Huthi regime expressed its anti-Western, anti-Semitic, and anti-Saudi stance
and reclaimed its Islamic Zaydi heritage for the renewal of national identity.
Contextualizing these experiences within the situated context of Yemen allows us
to understand that the Huthis’ state-in-the-making is not only about the creation
of new institutions and controlling apparatus of the state. Attention must be paid
to the reinvention of cultural identity, which is a necessary component of nation-
building.
Women, Nationalism, and War: General Considerations
Women as a signifier of nationalism have been documented worldwide.2 The

existing studies have shown that the mobilization of women for political support has
been most prominent in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, when a
new regime needed greater popular support for its legitimation and state-building.3
Gender analysis of revolutions and national liberation struggles has also produced
a notable body of knowledge on previously overlooked ways in which nationalist
projects rely on and reproduce patriarchy.4 It has been recorded that women played
an extensive role in nationalist movements and revolutions across the world.
However, their significant participation did not provide them equality with men
once victory was achieved and a new state was built.5 The Huthi state movement
is not an exception in this regard. Women’s roles and rights under the Huthi-led
regime have been subjugated to what Valentine Moghadam called a “woman-in-
the-family model of revolution.”6 This type of revolution, in contrast to the “women’s
emancipation model of revolution,” “excludes or marginalizes women from
definitions and constructions of independence, liberation, and liberty. It frequently
constructs an ideological linkage between patriarchal values, nationalism, and the
religious order. It assigns women the role of wife and mother, and associates women
not only with family but also with tradition, culture, and religion.”7
The Huthi revolution is based on ideological confluences between patriarchal
values, Shia Islam, and nationalism.8 It considers women’s mobilization for political
support, but not a transformation of a male-dominated structure of politics and
decision-making. Women loyal to the Huthis have been recently drawn into certain
areas of public life and new professions, but gender imbalances persisted in the
distribution of power and decision-making positions. Women’s mobilization for
political support has been a significant step in the pursuit of nation-building. Yet,
the participation of women in the Huthi-led regime is a complex phenomenon. An
analysis of the Huthis’ discourses and actions shows a notable divergence between
rhetoric and practice with respect to gender equality. The existence of differences
in the Huthis’ view on women’s rights is due to the variances of interests and the
fact that the Huthis are not a homogeneous group.
5. Women under the Huthi Regime 95
In general, the dominance of men in leadership positions has been an enduring

feature of Yemen’s politics, having significant consequences on gender-based
policies. Yemen has been already one of the lowest-ranking countries in all global
indices related to gender equality and women’s rights for decades.9 The current
war has affected this even more, with a gender gap estimated today of 90 percent
or more.10 Six months after the eruption of the conflict in 2015, incidents of
sexual and gender-based violence have increased in Yemen by over 60 percent.11
Human rights violations and the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war have
been reportedly used by both sides of the conflict, the forces loyal to the Saudi-
led Coalition and President Hadi, and the pro-Huthi groups.12 However, there is
something particular with the Huthi perpetuation of violence and discrimination
against women. Often it has been done in the name of Islam. For example,
testimonies of victims provide insights into how the Huthi perpetrators enshrine a
“theology of rape.” There are documented cases of two women who were asked to
recite a prayer before they got raped in Huthi detention.13 Rape has been justified
by the perpetrators as a purification from sin. Thus, violence has become an act
of religious devotion. It was used particularly against politically active women
who dared to disagree with the Huthis’ policies and practices.14 Authoritarian
regimes often use repression as a means to maintain political power, extend social
control, and close down the opposition. In this particular case, Islamically justified
coercion against “rebel” women may be a source of regime legitimacy in the eyes
of certain parts of the population.15
Women and the Yemeni Revolution: From the 2011 Uprising to

the Huthi-Led Government
Yemeni women of different social, tribal, and ethnic backgrounds, and educational
levels, have widely participated in the “peaceful and popular youth revolution” (al-
thawra al-shabābiyya al-sha’biyya al-silmiyya) of 2011. The Huthi women were one
of them. According to some authors, like Raima Al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner,
the Huthis used their participation in the wide national revolutionary movement
to spread their political and ideological beliefs, as well as to gain experience in
civil society activism.16 In 2012, they joined the transitional process in Yemen
in accordance with the Implementation Mechanism for the Gulf Cooperation
Council Initiative. Eight women (22.8%) were included in the Huthis’ 35-member
representation at the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), held in Sanaa from
March 2012 to January 2014.17 In total, 565 delegates representing different social
and political parties and groupings worked together to reach a consensus on the
NDC recommendations for a new constitution of Yemen.18 Women were granted
a record representation of 28 percent out of the 565 delegates at the NDC. As
members of the NDC, female leaders and activists seized the opportunity to push
for women’s rights and strategic interests to be officially approved as conference
outcomes. As a result, the draft constitution of 2015, following the NDC
recommendations, endorsed the child marriage ban and established a minimum
age for marriage at eighteen years for both sexes, introduced a 30 percent quota
for women to boost their political representation, and ensured protection laws
against all forms of discrimination and gender-based violence.19 Nevertheless, the
draft constitution has never been ratified and implemented. Its presentation to the
public on January 17, 2015, triggered a renewal of conflict.
The Huthis’ initial objection to the draft constitution of 2015 was mainly related
to the division of Yemen into six federal regions. They did not formally oppose
gender equality issues at that time. In the NDC, six Huthi representatives (two
women and four men) were part of the Rights and Freedoms working group that
focused specifically on debating human rights and women’s discrimination in
Yemen. The committee consisted of seventy-nine members, of whom 48 percent
were women. The Huthis delegates did not stand against reform proposals related
to women’s rights discussed within that group, causing a positive impression among
women and progressive NDC members. The findings from the interviews that
Nadia al Sakkaf 20 conducted with Amani Al-Makhadhi, an NDC member from
the women’s list, and Mohammed Al-Bukhayti, an NDC member from the Ansar
Allah’s list, in November 2013, suggested that the Huthis did not consider women’s
issues as a priority to them, and thus did not have any problem with accepting the
NDC liberal outcomes in this regard.21 The Huthi delegates were more absorbed
by the outcomes of the “Saada issue” working group that aimed at addressing their
core grievances at the NDC. Nabila Al-Zubayr, a women’s rights activist and writer,
elected to the NDC from the women’s list, became a chairwoman of the Saada
committee, despite opposition from conservative Islahi and tribal leaders.
The Huthi NDC delegates chose to put their collective efforts into lobbying
and defending their solution for the Sa’ada and Yemeni crisis. By accepting the
NDC gender-related outcomes, the Huthis gained sympathy and support for their
cause from other, more progressive NDC factions.22 A similar strategy for gaining
support for the Huthi agenda was pursued during the 2011 uprisings or even
earlier. According to the Huthi male and female militants, I interviewed in Sanaa in
2010 and in 2011, issues related to the 2004–10 conflict in Saada should be sorted
out first before addressing women-specific problems. Nevertheless, leaders such as
Hassan Zaid, former secretary-general of the Al-Haq Party and later the Minister
of Youth in the Huthi-led National Salvation Government, declared support for
the advancement of women’s rights, their political participation, and professional
development.23 Furthermore, the Huthis did not object to any initiative carried
out by women’s rights activists in revolutionary squares during the 2011 uprising.
For example, on March 8, 2011, female leaders organized a celebration for
International Women’s Day at Change Square in Sanaa. During the event, female
activists publicly announced their demands for a civil state that would guarantee
women’s human rights and freedoms.24 As a result, they received positive feedback
and declarations of support from other anti-government protesters, including
the Huthis.25 Later on, when the goals and politics of the Yemeni uprising were
officially defined, women activists realized that their demands for gender justice
were not really heard or seriously taken into consideration by the revolutionary
leaders. For example, calls for women’s rights were not included as a specific goal
in the Declaration of the Youth Revolution Demands announced at Change Square

on April 12, 2011.26 Progressive sociopolitical changes for women’s empowerment
and gender justice, however, were enshrined in the NDC outcome document and
in Yemen’s draft constitution of 2015.
Despite the initial engagement in the national dialogue, the Huthis’ violent
power grab unsettled the transition to democracy and created an additional
concern about the future of Yemeni women and gender equality.27 Since the
Huthis’ takeover of the government in Sanaa at the beginning of 2015, a more
conservative approach to women’s rights, gender hierarchies, and civil liberties
was adopted. There were significant changes in women-state alliances to better fit
the Huthis’ interests of power and their concept of social and tribal stratification.
The new policies aimed at remodeling gender relations and reinforcing a sectarian
and caste-like dynamic in Yemen.28 An interplay of gender, caste, religion, and
class became a critical determinant to women’s access to political power.29 While
women and girls from previously disenfranchised groups30 have been largely
mobilized for political support of the Huthi regime, most of them have been
relegated to the secondary, subordinate positions. Only a small number of elite
women loyal to the Huthis came to occupy positions of certain relevance in the
new administration. Moreover, women working for the new regime became part
of a repressive and confrontational form of political engagement established to
discourage other women from opposing the Huthi leaders and their regressive
policies.
Women’s Political Representation in the Huthi-Led Regime
On February 6, 2015, the Huthis issued the Constitutional Declaration and officially
announced the government takeover.31 A so-called Supreme Revolutionary
Committee (SRC) was established as the representative of the Huthi revolution.
It included two women out of fifteen members (13.33%). Both were coming from
a political elite allied with the Huthis: Ibtisam Muhammad Al-Hamdi and Alia
Faisal Abdullatif Al-Shaabi.32 There are no women in the ten-member Supreme
Political Council (SPC) to which the SRC partially handed power on August 15,
2016.33 The ten seats in SPC are divided among the Huthis and their allies from the
General People’s Congress (GPC), the former president Saleh’s party. In November
2016, the Huthis and their allies established the National Salvation Government
(NSG), appointing three women out of forty-two ministries (7%). Faiqah al-Sayed
Baalawy was appointed as Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, Alia Faisal
Abdullatif al-Shaabi as Minister of Human Rights, and Radhiyah Mohammad
Abdullah as Minister of State.34 In January 2020, ministerial posts were exchanged
between Alia Faisal Abdullatif Al-Shaabi, who became Minister of State,35 and
Radhiyah Mohammed, who was appointed as Minister of Human Rights.36
The presence of women from the well-known Yemeni families in the National
Salvation Government and in the SRC became an important aspect of the Huthis’
state-building and a legitimacy-seeking strategy. This alliance of convenience with
the political and tribal elites contributed to consolidating and extending the Huthis’
power and control over a large part of Yemen’s territory. In addition, the inclusion
of women has been seen as an indispensable prerequisite for credible claims to
political legitimacy in a pro-democratic world. Therefore, women’s presence in the
Huthi-led government provides a visible reminder of what the Huthi leaders have
declared as their support for a “united and democratic” Yemen.37 For instance, Alia
Faisal Abdullatif al-Shaabi, former NDC delegate of the Yemeni Socialist Party and
the daughter of Faisal al-Shaabi—prime minister of the People’s Republic of South
Yemen in 1969—embodies the link between the north and the south of Yemen.
It is important to mention that the National Salvation Government is an
executive body, but its political role is regarded as subservient to the SPC and the
SRC.38 Moreover, the unequal distribution of power between the Huthis and their
allies persists. For example, the SPC leadership has remained until now with the
Huthis, despite a rotation agreement between them and the GPC. In addition,
the Huthis established a supervisory system that operates as a direct link between
the inner circle of the Huthi leadership and the local governance system.39 A
number of ministers from the GPC even complained about the Huthis interfering
in their work.40 In 2017 several ministers, including the mentioned Minister of
Human Rights—Alia Faisal Abdullatif al-Shaabi, threatened resignation from
their posts after being assaulted by the Huthi militia gunmen.41
As mentioned earlier, the political mobilization of women plays a role in
the Huthis’ state-in-the-making and their power consolidation strategy. The
Huthis’ alliance with the elite and certain class of women has been needed for
political support and legitimization. Women’s presence in the National Salvation
Government became instrumental in the quest for regime legitimacy. Despite the
fact that their power is dependent rather than autonomous, it is worth noting that
the representation of women in the Huthi-led government is currently higher than
in the all-men government of Hadi.42 Hadi’s new cabinet, formed on December
16, 2020, included delegates from the Southern Transitional Council, but left out
women for the first time in two decades. The Yemeni female activists organized a
campaign #NoWomenNoGovernment, reminding President Hadi that democracy
cannot be built without women.43
Noncompliance with the NDC outcomes concerning human rights and a quota
system of 30 percent for women have been observed on both sides of the conflict.
Women have gained new roles, but have not broken away from male-controlled
social and political structures. They have remained largely marginalized in
decision-making and peace processes. Since 2015, five rounds of UN-brokered
peace talks have been held between Hadi’s government and the Huthi authorities.44
In total, four women politicians sat at negotiation tables: three in peace talks
in Kuwait in 2016 and one in Sweden in 2018.45 The Huthi delegation has not
included any women among their members so far.46 This happened despite the fact
that in 2019 the Huthis published their National Vision for building a “modern,
democratic, stable and united” state and committed themselves to protecting
and strengthening women’s rights and freedoms.47 The strategy includes twenty-
five objectives to be pursued by 2030. It sets specific goals for women’s economic
empowerment, their access to justice, participation in labor force, prevention of

gender-based violence, and the creation of an independent National Commission
for Women.48 It also aims at increasing women’s participation in family and public
life, and in public health jobs, security, and police.49
New All-female Institutions in Non-inclusive State-building: Turning

Women against Other Women
Women’s participation in the Huthis’ politics is not a sign of empowerment for

gender equality but rather is related to particular power interests. Since the Huthi
takeover of the capital of Sanaa in 2014, all-female institutions like Zaynabeyat were
established to recruit new women members and to participate in security forces
and moral policing.50 Mostly drawn from Hashemite families, the zaynabeyat form
an intelligence apparatus directed at women.51 The name refers to the Prophet’s
granddaughter Zaynab, the daughter of Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth caliph, and his
wife Fatima. The institution shares significant similarities with the female Basijis,
a paramilitary militia established by Ayatollah Khomeini in Post-Revolutionary
Iran in 1980. Some of the female Basijis were organized into Zaynab Sisters units
(Khaharan-e-Zaynab) to serve as morality police to interrogate and intimidate
other women.52 Comparably, the Huthi zaynabeyat became infamous among
human rights activists and the opposition for suppressing women’s protests and
enforcing gender segregation policies and the ultraconservative rules of dressing
and public behavior.53 The United Nations Security Council’s Panel of Experts on
Yemen documented the cases of zaynabeyat used to perpetrate violence, injustice,
and abuse against other women.54 According to the UN reports, the Huthi female
militia actively participated in ideological indoctrination, order maintenance in
female prisons, searching women and houses, arbitrary arrest and detention of
women, looting, sexual assault, beatings, torture, and facilitating rape in the Huthis’
detention centers.55 A significant number of victims of intensified intimidation,
harassment, threats, torture, imprisonment, abduction, and surveillance were
political activists and women who dared to protest against the Huthi policies and
practices.56
The “divide and rule” principle was successfully applied by the Huthi leaders
to segregate and keep patriarchal control over women. It attempted to undermine
the longstanding efforts of Yemeni female activists who tried to unite women and
build solidarity across political, religious, cultural, and socioeconomic divisions.57
During the 2011 uprising and the short-lived democratic transition, women from
different political and social backgrounds made significant progress in getting
together to consolidate, protect, and defend their own agenda and address what
Maxine Molyneux called “strategic gender interests.”58 In the current context of an
armed conflict, divisions in Yemeni society have become increasingly irreconcilable
and contentious. New institutions like zaynabeyat drew on the exploitation of
the ideological differences between women. Women loyal to the Huthis were set
against women representing a potential threat to a new regime. It is evident that the
right of women activists to occupy the streets and taking a leading part in politics
was the subject of ideological battles. Scaring the activists away from the political
public sphere facilitated the implementation of gender-discriminatory policies in
the areas remaining under the Huthis’ control. However, the resistance against
gender-related injustice has not disappeared but rather turned to online activism.
At the beginning of 2021, Yemeni human rights defenders launched a social media
campaign using the hashtag #IWantMyRights to condemn the Huthis’ restrictions
on women’s rights and freedoms, and call on the international community to take
action against the violation of human rights in the country.59
Within the Huthis’ transition from a movement to a state-in-the-making,
gender and sexuality became central to Huthi politics. Along with the traditional
roles of wives, sisters, and mothers, women loyal to the Huthis have been granted
more proactive roles in state formation and on the battlefield against the opposition
fractions. According to the UN-backed investigators, the Huthi recruited also
nearly three dozen teenage girls, some of them survivors of sexual violence, as
spies, medics, guards, and members of zaynabeyat.60 Women and girls have played
a significant role in disseminating and implementing the Huthi ideology in media,
education, health, defense, and security sectors. Female agents have been required
to properly enforce the new laws and policies in a gender-segregated context
of Yemen. The Huthi female militias and mothers of martyrs have been praised
by the supporters as national heroines. Motherhood and womanhood became
politicized and militarized, and thus highly significant for nationalism. Women
who engaged in the Huthi call for jihad were often symbolically portrayed in the
media and propaganda campaigns with a child in one arm and a weapon in the
other. Massive all-female rallies, organized by the Huthis in Sanaa since 2016,
show fully veiled women and teenage girls holding rifles and heavy artillery and
pledging to protect their country and fight the enemies.61 That show of force by
zaynabeyat became a symbol of the national liberation struggle almost as powerful
as the Huthi slogan: “God is great, death to the US, death to Israel, curse the Jews,
and victory for Islam.”
Nation-building: Women, Islam, and Body Politics
In the aftermath of the government takeover in Sanaa, the Huthis have been
seeking to remodel Yemeni society according to their precepts and revolutionary
ethos. They started updating the already conservative Yemen’s gender policies
with stricter rules. An extremist interpretation of Islam has been used to impose
stricter codes of dressing, moral order, segregation between men and women
(ikhṭilāt), banning women from certain jobs, and limiting family planning access
and utilization.62 Beauty centers, fitness clubs, clothing stores, and coffee places
for women have been raided, and many eventually were closed by the Huthi
authorities. Since 2015 women in Amran and other places under the Huthis’
control have been banned from having parties and celebrations after the Maghrib
prayer, bringing cameras to wedding halls, and hiring male bands and singers at
their women-only celebrations.63 Gender-based regulations have been announced
through circulates, edicts, fatwas (religious verdicts), Friday prayer sermons,
ministerial directives, cultural programs, educational curriculum, and employment
directives. Institutions like zaynabeyat were created to ensure proper enforcement
of new regulations. Noncompliance with rules and obligations was sanctioned
with fines and other punishments such as intimidation, arrest, interrogation,
torture, humiliation, kidnapping, and sometimes imprisonment of defiant women.
Repressive measures related to the moral and dress code campaigns affected all
people living in the areas under the Huthis’ control. However, the gravest sanctions,
such as accusations or formal charges of prostitution, have been frequently used to
justify politically motivated cases to scare women’s activists and their families away
from further opposition attempts.64
New rules addressed women’s bodies and sexuality. In the context of an armed
conflict, demographic race and reproduction have been highly significant to ensure
the survival of a nation. Mothers of heroes and martyrs have been cherished in the
national discourses for producing the next generation of children needed to protect
the country. The Huthis’ control of women’s bodies and reproduction focused not
only on hindering women’s access to abortion and the use of contraceptives.65
Physical violence against women was used to reshape their political and community
participation and marriage relationships. In October 2018, for example, the Huthi
militia detained two brides at Abu Hashim checkpoint in the district of Rada’a, in
Baida province, shaved their heads, and forced them to turn back from their way
to their weddings with men from Marib, which is a government-controlled area.66
Shams Al Deen Bin Sharaf, the Huthis’ Mufti, justified the incident by issuing a
fatwa that prohibits people living in the areas under the Huthis’ control to marry
off their daughters or sisters to enemy nationals.67
Stricter regulation on dress code targeted mainly women and the youth
who choose to dress differently. The Huthis’ authorities issued orders to ensure
compliance with strict codes of Islamic conduct and dress modesty at universities.
Female students in Sanaa were banned from wearing narrow, shorter, and
transparent abayas, showing any hair in public, wearing hijab scrunchie volumizers
and high buns, and using makeup and perfumes. Students were also ordered not
to mix with the opposite sex at university and graduation parties, among others.68
The Huthi militia’s policing women’s clothing has included raids on women’s
fashion stores to confiscate and destroy Western-style attire.69 Female mannequins
were identified as symbols of nudity and immorality and were taken down from
women’s stores. On January 20, 2021, the Huthi authorities closed the Rainbow
restaurant in Sanaa, because its colorful pictures and rainbow logo presumably
alluded to a symbol for LGBT pride.70 According to the Huthis, such images violate
Yemen’s religious identity. In February 2021, after the restaurant owner changed
paintings and colors in the shop’s decor, he was allowed to reopen the business.71
The Huthi regime aims at re-educating society through exemplary sanctions
and banning of everything they associate with the “Western decadence” and
“Jewish amorality.” The symbolic representation of the Islamic veil, gender

segregation, and moral order has been juxtaposed against the egalitarian models
of gender, human rights, and women’s freedoms, labeled as Western influences in
the Huthis’ eyes. The representation of a fully veiled Muslim woman as a marker
of cultural difference became important for the triumph of Huthis’ nationalism.
Re-Islamization and anti-Westernization have been strategically vital for the
Huthis’ power consolidation and legitimation. During the ongoing war of 2015,
a number of Yemenis sided with the Huthis not because they were supportive of
them but rather because they resonated with their nationalist populism. In the
context in which Yemen’s exiled president Hadi was seen as a traitor and a puppet
in the foreign hands, the Huthis claimed to defend Yemen from internal and
external threats.72 They mobilized supporters by using fear of “outsiders,” such as
Saudi Arabia-led coalition, the United States, the Jews, and the Wahhabi and Salafi
movements.
In the process of “othering,” gender, Islam, and public morality became central
to the discursive construction of national identity.73 For example, on January
29, 2021, Huthis’ Islamic scholar Muhammad Al-Mu’ayyad delivered a Friday
sermon in Dhamar, and blamed the Western culture, the Jews, and Wahhabis for
causing moral degradation, corruption, and exploitation of women in Yemen.74
He said:
A woman cannot be freed from the system of Islam in order to join the system
of the West. Haven’t we seen what the Jews have done to women all over the
world? Haven’t these women become immodest and morally depraved? Haven’t
women in many countries in the world abandoned all morals and principles
and begun traveling unaccompanied? Haven’t we seen a rise in the number of
fatherless children? In many Western countries, the percentage has risen to 20%.
Haven’t the Jews been working on destroying the family and breaking social
ties? For that purpose, they have exploited women and turned them into means
of corruption. . . . The Jews, by means of the Wahhabis, strive to wipe out every
[Islamic] symbol.75
Al-Mu’ayyad’s speech is a good example of a strategic building of the national

identity by warning against the loss of Yemen’s autonomy and authenticity, by
highlighting Islamic difference and superiority, and by preserving and defending
nationhood. An idealized Muslimah, constructed within the Huthis’ political and
religious narratives, is an important aspect of national identity and a signifier of
cultural difference. The Huthis’ views on femininity and masculinity and women’s
rights in Islam became a marker of identity in the rhetoric: “us versus them.” A
woman in the Huthis’ revolution acquired new responsibilities: she became the
guardian of religion, state, and society. Thus, women loyal to the Huthis epitomized
nationalism and anti-Western ethos by embracing the ultraconservative rules of
veiling, moral code, and gender segregation. They have been encouraged to create
a closer bond with a Huthi-led state through the institution of zaynabeyat to
defend Islam and the country against the enemies.
Conclusion
Over the past years, the Huthi leaders have cast themselves as great patriots and
defenders of “Yemen’s authentic revolution.” Their political attempts to reshape
Yemeni society after their takeover of the government in Sanaa at the beginning of
2015 have been often seen through the influence of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah.76
As a matter of fact, the Huthis’ state-in-the-making seems to represent more
accurately an Islamic Revolution for the time being rather than a constitutional
imperative based on the NDC consensual outcomes negotiated within the context
of Yemen’s uprising. The Huthi leaders applied an ultraconservative interpretation
of Islam to justify gender inequalities and the subjugation of women in similar ways
in which Daesh, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other radical Islamic fundamentalist
groups did to perpetuate oppressive practices against women.77 At the same time,
the Huthis opened up new spaces for the participation of women in public affairs,
increasing their multifaceted roles in the movement and state-building.
Gender relations are diverse and changing over time as a consequence of the
complexity of social, political, and economic factors that determine a culture-
specific construction of patriarchal ideologies. This study has demonstrated that
women’s roles in the Huthi-led Yemen have been shaped and transformed by the
context of war and state formation. The Huthis’ support for women’s rights has
been selective and conditional, and related to a strategy to attain regime stability,
legitimacy, and survival. During the war, the main Huthis’ expectation for men has
been to defend the country against the enemies, while women’s role has been to
perpetuate the nation. Women have been needed to produce and reproduce both
the particular ideology of nation and national identity and the children for the
nation’s survival. That is why the control of women’s bodies and sexuality became
central to the Huthis’ politics in the state-in-the-making.
Women’s participation in support of the Huthi populist nationalism and
authoritarian state has also been about their role in reproducing patriarchy, political
divisions, and other social stratification in Yemen’s society—the very hierarchies
that human rights activists seek to challenge to create an inclusive and peaceful
society based on equality, justice, and human dignity, in which all people would
feel safe and represented, and where exclusive nationalism is no longer appealing.
Notes
1 See Hamideh Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran: Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
2 Deniz Kandiyoti, “Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation,” Millennium
20, no. 3 (1991): 429–43. Margot Badran, Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and
the Making of Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Beth
Baron, Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2004). Anne McClintock, “‘No Longer in a Future Heaven’: Women
and Nationalism in South Africa,” Transition no. 51 (1991): 104–23. Nira Yval-Davis,
Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997). Valentine Moghadam, ed.,
Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies (London:
Zed Books, 1994). Theresa O’Keefe, Feminist Identity Development and Activism in
Revolutionary Movements (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
3 Valentine Moghadam, “Gender and Revolutions,” in Theorizing Revolutions, ed. John
Foran (London: Routledge, 1997). Verta Taylor, “Gender and Social Movements,” Gender
& Society 13, no. 1 (1999): 8–33. Jack Goldstone, “Revolution,” in The Sage Handbook of
Comparative Politics, ed. Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (London: Sage Publications,
2009), 319–47. Ewa Strzelecka, Mujeres en la Primavera Árabe: Construcción de una
Cultura Política de Resistencia Feminista en Yemen (Madrid: CSIC, 2017).
4 Theresa O’Keefe, Feminist Identity Development and Activism in Revolutionary
Movements (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Nira Yval-Davis, Gender and Nation
(London: Sage Publications, 1997). Hamideh Sedghi, Women and Politics in Iran:
Veiling, Unveiling, and Reveiling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
199–220.
5 Maxine Molyneux, “Women and Revolution in the People’s Democratic Republic
of Yemen,” Feminist Review 1, no. 1 (1979): 4–20. Moghadam, “Gender and
Revolutions.” Victoria Bernal, “From Warriors to Wives: Contradictions of Liberation
and Development in Eritrea,” Northeast African Studies 8, no. 3 (2001): 129–54.
Julia Denise Shayne, “Gendered Revolutionary Bridges: Women in the Salvadoran
Resistance Movement (1979–1992),” Latin American Perspectives 26, no. 3 (1999):
85–102.
6 Valentine Moghadam, “Gender and Revolutionary Transformation: Iran 1979 and
East Central Europe 1989,” Gender & Society 9, no. 3 (1995): 328–58.
7 Moghadam, “Gender and Revolutions,” op. cit., 139.
8 In the Huthi-led state, there is almost no room for teaching Islamic thought that is
not aligned with the Huthis’ cultural manifesto and their interpretation of religion.
See Houthi’s Intellectual and Cultural Manifesto, 2012, https://karmanysa.com/houthi-
manifesto/. “Houthi militia closes a women’s center to teach the Quran in Sana’a,”
News Yemen, October 29, 2019, https://www.newsyemen.net/new/47372.
9 Yemen has consistently ranked the lowest on the World Economic Forum’s Global
Gender Gap Index since 2002. See World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap
Report, 2020, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf
10 World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report 2018, 9, http://www3.
weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf.
11 UNSC, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-related Sexual Violence,
S/2018/250, March 23, 2018, 24, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_250.pdf/.
12 UNSG, Conflict-related Sexual Violence: Report of the United Nations Secretary-
General, July 17, 2020, 35, https://www.un.org/sexualviolenceinconflict/wp-content/
uploads/2020/07/report/conflict-related-sexual-violence-report-of-the-united-
nations-secretary-general/2019-SG-Report.pdf. UNSC, Final report of the Panel
of Experts, S/2021/79, January 22, 2021, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/GEN/N20/372/40/PDF/N2037240.pdf?OpenElement. UNSC, Final Report
of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, January 27, 2020, https://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/106/86/PDF/N2010686.pdf?OpenElement.
UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations
and Abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/45/6, September 28, 2020, https://www.
ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/2020-09-09-report.pdf.
13 UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, April 28, 2020,
op. cit., 61.
14 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including
Violations and Abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/42/CRP.1, September 3,
2019, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/GEE-Yemen/A_
HRC_42_CRP_1.PDF.
15 See Mirjam Edel and Maria Josua, How Authoritarian Rulers Seek to Legitimise
Repression: Framing Mass Killings in Egypt and Uzbekistan. GIGA Working Papers, no.
299 (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2017), 5.
16 Raiman Al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner, Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans Can
Promote Peace in Yemen, European Council on Foreign Relations, October 14, 2020,
https://ecfr.eu/publication/talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_
peace_in_yemen/.
17 The following women represented the Huthis in the NDC: Akhlaq Abd al-Rahman
Ali al-Shami, Ummat al-Quddus Abd al-Bari Muhammad al-Gharabani, Ummat
al-Mujeeb Hammoud Naji al-Qahoum, Amal Muhammad Ali Al-Mukhdi, Amal
Muhammad Abbas Ishaq, Bushra Ahmed Abdullah Al-Dharafi; Halima Abdullah
Nasser Jahaf, and Rudaina Muhammad Ahmad Jahaf. See ʾAsmāʾ mummathilī
jamāʿat al-Ḥūthiyyīn fī muʾtamar al-ḥiwār al-waṭanī al-shāmil Al Masdar Online,
February 5, 2013, https://almasdaronline.com/article/41311.
18 National Dialogue Conference Outcomes Document (Sanaa: NDC, 2014), https://
uploads-ssl.webflow.com/5b54ded3eadb58942db8e365/5fad75a5ac09a94bceb760
8b_NDC%20Doc%20Eng%20V1.pdf.
19 Yemen’s Draft Constitution of January 15, 2015, https://www.constituteproject.org/
constitution/Yemen_2015D.pdf?lang=en.
20 Later on, the Huthis considered Nadia Al-Sakkaf, who became the Minister of
Information in Hadi’s government, as an enemy. Her assents in Yemen have been
confiscated. A Huthi-run court in Sanaa sentenced her to death on charges of treason.
See UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2021/79, January 22,
2021, op. cit., 218.
21 Nadia Al Sakkaf, “Negotiating Women’s Empowerment in the NDC,” in Yemen and
the Search for Stability: Power, Politics and Society after the Arab Spring, ed. Marie
Christine Heinze (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 154.
22 Ibid., 154.
23 Interview with Hassan Zaid, Sanaa, October 2010.
24 Wameedh Shakir, Mia Marzouk, and Saleem Haddad, Strong Voices: Yemeni Women’s
Political Participation from Protest to Transition (London: Safeworld, 2012), 12–13.
25 Interviews with women’s rights activists and the Huthi youth leaders conducted
during my fieldwork in Sanaa in March and April of 2011.
26 The Coordination Council of the Youth Revolution of Change (CCYRC), The
Declaration of Youth Revolution Demands, 2011, https://www.facebook.com/media/se
t/?set=a.170147653034903.34939.169040416478960.
27 Ewa Strzelecka, “A Political Culture of Feminist Resistance: Exploring Women’s
Agency and Gender Dynamics in Yemen’s Uprising (2011–2015),” in Yemen and the
Search for Stability, ed. Marie‐Christine Heinze (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018), 47–70.
28 For an example of the Huthi-led policy that institutionalized social inequality in favor
of the Hashemite elite, see Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, Tax and Rule: Houthis
Move to Institutionalize Hashemite Elite with “One-Fifth” Levy, October 6, 2020,
https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11628.
29 On social hierarchies in North Yemen, and how they have been changing, see
Gabriele vom Bruck, “Being Worthy of Protection: The Dialectics of Gender
Attributes in Yemen,” Social Anthropology 4, no. 2 (1996): 145–62. Gabriele vom
Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen. Ruling Families in Transition (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A
History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst and Company, 2017).
30 See Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Yemen: Relationship and Treatment of
Hashemites by Authorities and Other Groups, Including Houthis and Extremist Groups
(2012–August 2015), YEM105277.E, September 9, 2015, https://www.refworld.org/
docid/56a775a94.html.
31 Constitutional Declaration (Sanaa: Revolutionary Committee of the 21 September
Revolution, February 6, 2015), https://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/
constitutional_declaration_of_houthis_6_feb_2015_-_english.pdf.
32 List of Supreme Revolutionary Committee members, February 16, 2015, https://
hournews.net/news-39130.htm.
33 “Political Council Formed,” Saba Net, August 6, 2016, https://www.saba.ye/en/
news435947.htm.
34 “President Issues Decree to form National Salvation Government,” Saba Net,
November 29, 2016, https://www.saba.ye/en/news448091.htm.
35 “President al-Mashat Appoints Alia Faisal as Minister of State,” Saba Net, January 18,
2020, https://www.saba.ye/en/news3085187.htm.
36 “Republican Decree Issued to Appoint Minister of Human Rights,” Al Thawra,
January 19, 2020, http://en.althawranews.net/2020/01/republican-decree-issued-to-
appoint-minister-of-human-rights/.
37 Naser Shaker and Faisal Edroos, “Mohammed al-Houthi: We Want a United and
Democratic Yemen,” Al Jazeera, December 25, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/
features/2018/12/25/mohammed-al-houthi-we-want-a-united-and-democratic-
yemen.
38 Al-Hamdani and Lackner, Talking to the Houthis, op. cit.
39 ACAPS, Yemen: The Houthi Supervisory System, June 17, 2020, 1, https://www.acaps.
org/special-report/yemen-houthi-supervisory-system.
40 “Bin Habtour Resigns as Head of National Salvation Government in Yemen,” Middle
East Monitor, April 6, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170406-bin-
habtour-resigns-as-head-of-national-salvation-government-in-yemen/.
41 Al Matari, Kamel, “Houthi Minister Quits after She was ‘Beaten up by Militias’,” Al
Arabiya, May 10, 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2017/05/10/
Houthi-minister-quits-after-she-was-beaten-up-by-militias-. “Bin Habtour Resigns
as Head of National Salvation Government in Yemen,” Middle East Monitor, April 6,
2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170406-bin-habtour-resigns-as-head-
of-national-salvation-government-in-yemen/.
42 According to some analysts, the National Salvation Government is currently having
greater legitimacy on the ground than the internationally recognized government
of President Hadi. See Ahmed, Omar, “It’s Time for the International Community
to Stop Recognizing Hadi’s Government,” Middle East Monitor, December 14, 2019,
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191214-its-time-for-the-international-
community-to-stop-recognising-hadis-government/.
43 Shaima Bin Othman, “Does this Government Deserve Our Participation?,” Yemen
Policy Center, January 2021, https://www.yemenpolicy.org/does-this-government-
deserve-our-participation/. “Yemen: Anger as Newly Sworn-in Cabinet Excludes
Women for First Time in 20 Years,” Middle East Eye, December 27, 2020, https://www.
middleeasteye.net/news/yemen-cabinet-excludes-women-anger.
44 UN does not recognize the Huthis’ self-proclaimed National Salvation Government.
Iran and North Korea are reported to be the only countries that recognize the Huthi
state administration.
45 Naraghi Anderlini, Sanam Rasha Jarhum, Rana Allam, and Devin Cowick, Bringing
Peace to Yemen by Having Women at the Table, U.S. CSWG Policy Brief, 2017, 5,
https://icanpeacework.org/2017/10/11/bringing-peace-yemen-women-table/.pdf.
Nasser, Afrah, “Yemen’s Women Confront War’s Marginalization,” MERIP 289, 2018,
https://merip.org/2019/03/yemens-women-confront-wars-marginalization/.
46 Abdulkarim Qassim, Loay Amin, Mareike Transfeld, and Ewa Strzelecka, The Role of
Civil Society in Peacebuilding in Yemen, CARPO Brief 18, 2020, https://carpo-bonn.
org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/carpo_brief_18_04-05-20_EN.pdf.
47 Supreme Political Council of the Republic of Yemen, National Vision for the Modern
Yemeni State, March 26, 2019, 8 and 38, http://yemenvision.gov.ye/en/upload/
National%20Vision%20For%20The%20Modern%20Yemeni%20State.pdf.
48 Ibid., 32, 38, 40, 43, 45, 48, 60, 72.
49 Ibid., 43, 68, 72.
50 “Yemeni Activists Blast Houthi Recruitment of All-Female Militias,” Asharq Al-Awsat,
April 24, 2019, https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1692801/yemeni-activists-
blast-houthi-recruitment-all-female-militias.
51 UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, April 28, 2020,
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/106/86/PDF/N2010686.
pdf?OpenElement, p. 10.
52 Golkar, Saeid, “The Feminization of Control: Female Militia and Social Order in Iran,”
Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 11 (2013): 19.
53 “Zaynabeyat: Houthi Female Police Hunting Yemeni Women,” MENA- Studies, May
5, 2020, https://mena-studies.org/zaynabiyat-houthi-female-police-hunting-yemeni-
women/. Saeed Al-Batati, “Yemeni Activist Who Endured and Challenged Houthi
Repression,” Arab News, March 11, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1639776/
middle-east.
54 UNSC, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/326, April 28, 2020, 9,
10, 44 and 62, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/106/86/
PDF/N2010686.pdf?OpenElement.
55 Ibid., 10 and 62.
56 Ibid., 21–3 and 60.
57 Strzelecka, “Political Culture of Feminist Resistance,” op. cit. Strzelecka, Mujeres
en la Primavera Árabe, op. cit. Shakir et al. Strong Voices, op. cit. Al-Sakkaf, Nadia,
“Negotiating Women’s Empowerment in the NDC,” op. cit.
58 Maxine Molyneux, “Mobilization without Emancipation? Women’s Interests, the
State, and Revolution in Nicaragua,” Feminist Studies 11, no. 2 (1985): 227–54.
59 Tamara Abueish, “ISIS-like Behavior: Iran-backed Houthis Implement Extreme
Measures against Women,” Al Arabiya English, February 3, 2021, https://english.
alarabiya.net/features/2021/02/03/-ISIS-like-behavior-Iran-backed-Houthis-
implement-extreme-measures-against-women.
60 “Iran-backed Houthis Recruited Teenage Girls in Yemen, Says New UN Report,” The
National, September 9, 2020, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/iran-
backed-houthis-recruited-teenage-girls-in-yemen-says-new-un-report-1.1075297.
61 See Rua’a Alameri, “Houthis Recruiting Women to Fight in Yemen War,” Al

Arabiya English, September 7, 2016, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-
east/2016/09/07/Houthi-militias-recruiting-women-to-fight-. “Yemen Houthi
Women Hold a Parade in Sana’a,” Middle East Monitor, January 19, 2017, https://www.
middleeastmonitor.com/20170119-yemen-houthi-women-hold-a-parade-in-sanaa/.
62 Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, “What a Houthi-controlled Yemen Means for Women,” Al
Monitor, March 18, 2015, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/
yemen-women-activists-revolution-houthis-saleh.html. “Amnesty Slams Houthi Ban
on Yemeni Women,” January 30, 2021, http://independentpress.cc/amnesty-slams-
houthi-ban-on-yemeni-women/2021/01/31/.
63 Ibid., op. cit.
64 UN Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations
and Abuses since September 2014, A/HRC/42/CRP.1, September 3, 2019, op. cit.
Mina Aldroubi and Ali Mahmood, “Dozens of Yemeni girls and women face secret
Houthi trials on false prostitution charges,” The National, May 2, 2019, https://www.
thenationalnews.com/world/mena/dozens-of-yemeni-girls-and-women-face-secret-
houthi-trials-on-false-prostitution-charges-1.856588. Samia al-Aghbari, “Abduction,
Torture, Ransom, Stigma: How Female Houthi Militias Silence Women in Yemen’s
War,” Almasdar Online, December 29, 2019, https://al-masdaronline.net/national/221.
65 “Women Banned from contraceptive,” Aden Press, February 3, 2021, http://
en.adenpress.news/news/32132.
66 “Houthis Stop Wedding Procession in Abu Hashim Point,” Aden News, October 15,
2018, https://adennews.net/en/50263.
67 Fatima Abo Alasrar, “Houthis’ Disregard for Yemeni Customs Leaves Women at Risk,”
Arab News, March 11, 2020, https://www.arabnews.com/node/1640106.
68 Mwatana for Human Rights, Another Year of Impunity in Yemen. Press Briefing
on Human Rights Situation in Yemen 2020, January 5, 2021, https://mwatana.org/
en/2020-press-briefing/.
69 Ali Mahmood, “Houthi Militia Raid Women’s Clothing Shops and Cafes in Sanaa,”
The National, January 27, 2021, https://www.thenationalnews.com/gulf-news/houthi-
militia-raid-women-s-clothing-shops-and-cafes-in-sanaa-1.1154125.
70 The Yemen Review: Houthis at the Gates of Marib (Sanaa: Sanaa Center for Strategic
Studies, 2021), 11, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/the-yemen-review/13365
71 See Rainbow restaurant in Sanaa, https://www.facebook.com/rainbo11.
72 In 2017, a pro-Huthi court in Sanaa sentenced President Hadi and his six government
officials for high treason, convicting them of “incitement and assistance to the
aggressor state of Saudi Arabia and its allies.” See “Pro-Houthi Court Sentences
Yemen President to Death for Treason,” Reuters, March 25, 2017, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-yemen-security-court-idUSKBN16W0UF.
73 See Helen Ting, “Social Construction of Nation: A Theoretical Exploration,”
Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 14, no. 3 (2008): 453–82.
74 “Houthi Friday Sermon by Yemeni Islamic Scholar Muhammad Al-Mu’ayyad,” video
clip from Huthi-run Al-Eman TV, January 30, 2021, https://www.memri.org/tv/
houthi-yemen-sermon-muhammad-muayyad-jews-exploit-muslim-women-break-
down-family-society-corruption-fatherless-babies-america.
75 Ibid.
76 See Mohammed Al Mahfali and James Root, “How Iran’s Islamic Revolution Does,
and Does Not, Influence Houthi Rule in Northern Yemen,” Sanaa Center for Strategic
Studies, February 12, 2020, https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/9050. Lockie,
Alex, “Why the US Confronted Iranian-backed Militants in Yemen, and the Risks
That Lie Ahead,” Business Insider, October 13, 2016, https://www.businessinsider.com/
us-yemen-strike-houthi-iran-saudi-arabia-2016-10.
77 See Tamara Abueish, “ISIS-like Behavior: Iran-Backed Houthis Implement Extreme
Measures against Women,” Al Arabiya English, February 3, 2021, https://english.
alarabiya.net/features/2021/02/03/-ISIS-like-behavior-Iran-backed-Houthis-
implement-extreme-measures-against-women.
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112
6
H U T H I I N F LU E N C E O N E D U C AT IO N : A N
I N V E S T IG AT IO N O F I N T E RV E N T IO N S A N D P O L IC I E S
Shaker Lashuel
Introduction
The rise of the Huthi militant group, and their takeover of the government in
2014, has given them access to and control over all aspects of Yemeni livelihoods,
institutions, and resources. Since then, the Huthis have taken many steps to
solidify their power and control over governmental and societal institutions by
spreading their ideology to deepen loyalty among Yemenis to their cause. Despite
their engagement in a fierce war across Yemen, the Huthis have not wasted time
in implementing their vision of governance by shaping policies that support
their ideology and helping them to expand their power. As part of their quest to
control societal institutions, Huthis undertook the management of all institutions
of learning through the appointment of Huthi followers and sympathizers,
implementation of policies advancing their cause, and alterations of educational
curriculum for the introduction and popularization of their ideology.
This chapter will investigate how the Huthi movement influences education,
and assess the extent to which education is used to further their ideology and
promote their cause and aspirations. The artifacts examined for this chapter include
a selection of speeches and lectures by the late leader of the al-Huthi movement,
Hussein al-Huthi as well as his brother, the current leader, Abdulmalik al-Huthi
(malazim), educational policies implemented since 2015, along with educational
textbooks modified and published by Huthis after 2015.
Our discussion begins with a historical background defining the Huthi movement
identity, and a brief historical background on the state of education in Yemen,
a country where formal education was nonexistent and the form of schooling
that existed was a privilege for the elite. This historical context is followed by a
discourse analysis of the words of Hussein al-Huthi as they are found in malazim
and the speeches of his brother Abdulmalik al-Huthi. Huthis’ interventions in the
sphere of formal education are presented through the strategies, and utilization of
educational institutions like the use of schools as hubs for recruitment. A special
section is devoted also to assess the extent to which Huthis have implemented
curriculum changes. The chapter goes on to explore Huthi educational and cultural
efforts beyond the boundaries of the formal educational system. Huthi summer
centers, and educational publications for children and other cultural trainings are
presented as additional tools in the process of Huthification.
This chapter represents an attempt to contextualize the interventions and
explore the motivation and goals behind the actions and policies pursued by
Huthis in the education sector. The evaluation of educational policies and
curriculum interventions mandated by the Huthi Ministries of Education and
higher education will help us understand their views on education, its value for
them, and the extent to which they are using education to further support their
movement’s aspirations locally and regionally.
Huthi Identity and Source of Guidance
On September 21, 2014, the Huthis, a militant group opposed to the Yemeni
central government since 2004, seized the capital of the country and declared
their revolution. Until that date, Huthis were regarded by Yemenis as a mountain
guerrilla group seeking greater autonomy in the northern region of Sa’ada. The
Huthi is the name of a family from the Marran mountains in Sa’ada province, but
today, the term represents an alliance along tribal and sectarian lines dominating
the most populated parts of Northern Yemen.1 The Huthi family, who are
Hashimites (descendants of the Prophet), command the most prominent influence
on the movement. At present, Abdulmalik al-Huthi is the religious and political
leader of the Huthi movement. He inherited the leadership of the group from his
brother, the late Hussein al-Huthi and their late father, the religious scholar Badr
al-Din al-Huthi. Their sermons and printed lectures, malazim, which represent
their voice and vision for their followers, are revered and referenced by the group
to guide their policies and actions. The malazim2 serve as a source of guidance and
provide the Huthi militia with a stream of ideas and quotes to fuel their propaganda
machine which set the tone for the decision-making and policies of the Huthi
era. As we begin this exploration of their influence on education in Yemen, it is
important to consider some of the recent history as well as the inspirational words
and voices of their leaders in order to understand the motivation behind their
policies and practices.
History of Education in Yemen
As we begin our investigation of Huthi influences on education in Yemen, it is

of great importance to review some of Yemen’s recent education history relating
to education. This historical background is relevant and significant as it can help
us appreciate not only the transformation and progress that was achieved in the
field of education but also the risk and the magnitude of loss that can result from
interventions that target universal access, quality of education, and the values of
citizenship, equality, tolerance, and coexistence.
6. Huthi Influence on Education 115
Northern Yemen was ruled by a Zaydi imamate from 897 CE until 1962 CE.
While nations across the globe advanced through cross-boundary exchanges,
Yemenis were kept isolated from the rest of the world. Until 1962, education in
the northern part of Yemen and much of the south was mostly a community
effort that took place under a tree or on mosque grounds. Except for a few formal
schools that existed in Sanaa, Taiz,3 and Aden,4 Yemeni children (the majority
of them for only a brief period of their childhood) attended religious schools
known as ma’alamah,5 where they learned to read and memorize Quranic text.
Some would manage to learn to read and write, but the majority would eventually
stop attending and begin helping their families in their farms or by performing
chores like collecting water, or herding livestock to graze. Education in Sanaa,
Taiz, and Aden for the most part was regarded as an elite pursuit reserved for
sons of affluent individuals.6 For most families in the North Yemen, the purpose of
education was to read the Quran, but for the affluent, it was key in enabling them
to serve the imam in governance or in maintaining status in their communities.
The southern part of Yemen differed only in that a few British-sponsored schools
existed exclusively in Aden with limited numbers of students in attendance.7
Education after 1962
The 1962 revolution overthrew the monarchy that controlled North Yemen for
centuries and replaced it with a constitutional republic that set a precedent as
it viewed most Yemenis as citizens of equal rights and responsibilities. It also
inspired the revolution for independence from Britain in South Yemen. The six
main goals of the revolution in the north entailed the uplifting of Yemenis socially,
economically, and culturally. The significance of the 1962 revolution comes from its
transformational impact and its call for social justice and economic development.8
It brought Yemen into the footsteps of the twentieth century. Education was both
a product of the revolution and a catalyst for Yemen’s forthcoming transformation.
The new Yemeni republic in the North made education a priority by building
schools and instituting an education curriculum that focused on secular
subjects like geography, math, history, and science. The Yemeni government also
sponsored the scientific institutes as schools with greater religious focus. Despite
their low numbers, these institutes provided religious teachings informed by
Sunni interpretations and triggered opposition from different quarters including
Huthis, who viewed them as a threat to Zaydism. The republic that was born out of
the 1962 revolution called for equal citizenship and opportunities, and promoted
universal access to schools as a means to social and economic empowerment. By
2014, the number of schools in Yemen had reached 16,912.9
The revolution against the imamate in the north and the British in the
south opened the doors for freedom, a sense of dignity, equality, and rights to
opportunities for a better life, for all Yemenis. North Yemen and South Yemen were
transforming into republics with growing cities and institutions, in addition to
engaging in greater interactions with a globalized world. Education was relocated
from under the shadows of trees to specially designed buildings and classrooms
as formal schools were built, and a secular curriculum was introduced in both
the north and the south of the country. In North Yemen, teachers from Egypt,
Sudan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia were recruited to teach in the schools, but after the
unification of Yemen in 1990, the country became self-sufficient in deploying its
own educational workforce. By 2007–8, the number of teachers in primary and
secondary schools was approaching 200,000 in the country.10 The move to educate
the population and push them to their highest potential was a revolution in and of
itself in a country that had, until then, reserved education for the lucky few.
Huthi Constitutional Declaration
Yemen had been a republic for fifty-two years when the Huthis, also known as
Ansarallah (as they began calling themselves since 2011),11 overran Sanaa in 2014.
Many Yemenis today fear that it was an undoing of the republican revolution
and a return of Yemen to the Zaydi imamate. After their takeover of Sanaa in
2014, Yemenis waited in anticipation for the Huthis to make some kind of official
declaration to shed light on where they wanted to take the country. It took five
months for the Huthis to issue a constitutional declaration on February 6, 2015. Out
of fifteen articles, only one article referred to public rights and freedoms. Article
No. 312 of the declaration guaranteed public rights and freedoms and asserted
the state’s commitment to protecting them. The declaration failed to address the
economic plight of Yemenis and neglected to include the uplifting of Yemenis
socially, economically, and educationally in their articles as the 1962 revolution
had done. In the sections below, we will explore Huthi ideology, as informed by
the malazim, and reflect on how their policies and practices are shaping education
in Yemen.
Huthi Vision for Education
In February 2019, the Huthis released their vision for building a modern Yemen.
In the field of education, the stated purpose in the vision was to provide “A high-
quality education for all members of society based on imparting knowledge and
skills, instilling values and ethics, meeting development needs and keeping pace
with scientific and technological progress.”13 The initiatives in this area include
increasing access to education for children aged three to five years old, lowering
the illiteracy rate to below 10 percent, increasing the number of students enrolling
in secondary school for youth aged fifteen to seventeen, improving the quality of
primary and secondary education, activating electronic education, and providing
salaries for teachers. In the area of higher education, their initiatives include
increasing the number of students (ages 19–23) enrolling in higher education,
ensuring equity between genders and urban and rural areas, and improving the
quality of higher education and its institutions.
Education through the Eyes of Huthi Leaders
The Malazim represent an important source of guidance for Huthi followers;

therefore, it is essential to examine Huthi thinking around education through their
own words. Hussein al-Huthi, the late leader of the movement, emphasized that the
curricula14 taught in schools have to be based on the Quran because the Quran is a
complete educational curriculum with important purpose. In his sermon al-ʾislām
wa-thaqāfat al-ittibāʿ wa thaqafat al-ittiba’a (Islam and the culture of following),15
Hussein al-Huthi declared that the extent to which people engage with religious
schools is a reflection of their “awareness of the importance, significance, blessing,
and attractiveness of the faith and our need for it.” He alluded to the supreme and
error-free constitution of the Quranic curriculum in contrast to the error-filled
curricula that the Yemeni Ministry of Education had been experimenting with for
forty years. He argued that a sign of the curriculum’s weakness was its continuous
amendment, which could be attributed to the fact that it was man-made. His
message in the sermon was clear: if you don’t follow the Quran as the basis for
your curriculum, in educating people, in addressing people in mosques, and while
you write and research, you will err. Therefore, he believed that building oneself,
and forming a unified nation, was contingent on using the Quran as a foundation
for curriculum, for the Quran is the guide that needs to be followed.
Hussein al-Huthi’s definition of illiteracy had nothing to do with literacy or
numeracy. Regardless of the ability to read and write, he asserted that Arab-Muslim
populations could not escape illiteracy and distinguish themselves from others
on the basis of their culture, stands, or vision, without the Quran. Education, to
him, was learning the Quran, and culture had to be a Quranic culture, guiding
people’s actions, their self-assessment, and their evaluations of everything around
them, according to its principles.16 In fact, Quranic education is cited as a tool
for resistance, empowering people to be rid of their fears and emerge as soldiers
of Allah. Accordingly, pursuing a different kind of education yields cowardly
individuals who fear the allies of Satan in Hussein al-Huthi’s framework.17
In another sermon, titled min waḥy ʿāshūra,18 al-Huthi called for connecting
with the Quran and teaching it so that people could experience its holiness, status,
and significance, in their own hearts, because no other book in this world would
reveal truth as it did. In his seventh lesson about the comprehensive Quran,19
he asked “aren’t there theorists in education? In psychology? In the economy?
In politics? . . . Everything that preoccupies people now, the holy Quran offers a
better alternative to its guidance.”20 Al-Huthi quotes a verse from Surat Anaḥl
“We have sent down to thee the Book explaining all things, a Guide, a Mercy, and
Glad Tidings to Muslims” (Alnahl, 89). He built on that argument to maintain
that Allah had revealed everything education needed in the Quran, including the
nature of the enemy one might face.
Hussein al-Huthi viewed the Quran as a foundation for unity and guidance
in the struggle against those targeting Islam. In his second lesson on Madīḥ
al-Qurʾān (Praise of the Quran),21 he asserted that Muslims need to educate
themselves through the Quran in order to fight the war waged against Islam and
Muslims, in Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi, and Yemen, which he considered as occupied

lands. For him, Jihad was also a path to knowledge. In the third lesson on Praise
of the Quran, he explains that Jihad involves engaging in problem solving and as a
result, leads to increasing one’s knowledge.
The late leader was also suspicious of the goals of a Western-inspired education
system. In his malzamah titled man naḥnu wa man hum22 (who are we and who
are they), he held that the education available to us today renders Muslims and
their women “as the West wishes.” He also claimed, “the [enemies] do not want
Muslims to be a strong nation, and they want women to be unable to give birth
to an Arab Muslim hero. Instead, he argued that as a result of western influenced
education and media, women would give birth to zionist soldiers and generations
who will become servants to [zionists].”23 He equated knowledge gained from
formal schools with ignorance when he contended that men and women will
become educated and, in the end, they will not know anything, and they will not
know [the enemy]. “Isn’t that the epitome of ignorance?,” he asked. Hussein al-
Huthi viewed conventional education as the enemy’s way of controlling Muslims,
hence only a curriculum based on the Quran would be able to provide Muslims
with the ability to understand the forces they were up against so they could face
their enemies without fear.
Speeches by Abdulamalik al-Huthi, the current leader of the movement,
reflect a different view of the meaning of education and what it encompasses.
Like his late brother, he asserts that ignorance stems from “dark concepts’’ and
misunderstandings which are imagined to be valid thoughts and ideas, while
they prevent one from recognizing the truth.24 He also believes that true and
beneficial knowledge can be found in the Quran and in the guidance of Prophet
Muhammad. While he recognizes that humans need science and knowledge, he
believes that divine knowledge provides humans with the vision and approach to
guide their lives in the correct manner. He also defines illiteracy as the illiteracy
of understandings, remedied by returning to the true and clear source of science
and divine knowledge: the Holy Quran. He argues that the Quran holds the key
to building a great civilization that cultivates livelihoods with noble values and
morals. Abdulmalik asserts that for the Muslim Umma, the purpose of teaching
and learning has to be for Allah’s sake first and foremost, preceding other
worldly pursuits. For Abdulmalik, the Quran is the ultimate curriculum for the
Muslim Umma by virtue of the knowledge it holds, which is unattainable except
from Allah through his Holy Book. He also suggests that harmful knowledge is
delivered to people under the guise of science and knowledge, and that he is keen
on encouraging Yemenis to pursue all human knowledge, provided that it is in
alignment with the values of God. He added that the Quran has what it takes to
prepare the Islamic nation to become the “true leader for the most distinguished
civilization in the history of human beings.”25
Both Hussein and Abdulmalik al-Huthi emphasized the necessity of the
Quran to serve as the foundation of any curriculum or educational process since
it contained all that is imperative to know. Their speeches, lectures, and printed
malazim provided the pretext under which the education curriculum was to
be changed, educational efforts and initiatives in Yemeni society shaped, and

education of Yemenis shifted, toward Huthis’ own goals and aspirations.
Huthification of Society
After September 21, 2014, the Huthis promoted their educational programs by
targeting all segments of society through the media and directly through mosque
sermons, lectures, and organized rallies and celebrations. While many focus on
what Huthis have changed in the educational curriculum, a great deal of their
efforts to spread their message extended beyond schools and colleges. The group
uses mosques also to advance their ideas, and, in the process, institutionalize
Huthism.26
To control governmental agencies, departments, offices, and bureaus, Huthis
appointed their own loyal representatives to supervise operations and manage
their educational campaigns within these entities. Huthis developed mandatory
programs to be carried out by the organizations in special camps where government
employees were sent for weeks. These programs, also dubbed “cultural training,”27
take place in specially prepared houses and villas in Huthi controlled areas. The
trainees, usually employees seeking to gain the group’s trust and secure their
salaries and jobs, attend these training sessions in secret. They disappear from
their families for up to four weeks. At these sites, they live with about twenty other
training candidates and follow a strict routine that begins with waking up early
in the morning to perform the early morning prayer, performing some exercises,
having breakfast, and commencing their daily dose of lectures and presentations.
After lunch, they sit for a qat (mild stimulant) session, where they spend time
learning about Huthi ideas, and the conspiracy against Yemen and the Ahl alBayt’s
entitlement to rule. It is estimated that tens of thousands of Yemenis have attended
these cultural trainings and have been influenced by them.28
The education sector is an understandable field for Huthis to focus on to
promote their identity, attain their vision, and recruit fighters for their battles.
Education allows access to thousands of institutions and educators, and millions
of youths, who can potentially support their cause or join their ranks. In the
sections below, we will explore how the Huthis sought to manage and influence
the education sector in the country in their quest to Huthinize the Yemeni society
and promote their agenda.
Huthi Management and Use of Education
Adāʾra Atarbawiyya (Educational Department of Ansarallah)

e Educational Department of Huthis (Ansarallah) (Alda’airah Alterboyah)
Th
is a Huthi agency that operates in coordination with the Huthi Ministry of
Education. As shown on their website, the goal of this division is to “develop
a Quranic educational community that seeks to develop generations immune

to intellectual invasion and fake cultures in order to build an independent
and strong nation capable of facing challenges and creating changes to serve
Islam.”29 Their website reports on Huthi educational activities in public schools,
community colleges, and universities. It contains links to K–12 textbooks, as well
as the speeches and lectures of Hussein and Abdulmalik al-Huthi. The image on
the top left of their website with the words “Resilience and Victory” along with a
smaller text underneath “The Public Campaign for Jihad Mobilization’’ suggests
they are promoting Jihad as part of a Quranic educational agenda. Although the
website seems informational, the visibility and engagement of the director of the
department reflect the agency’s significant role. News reports of the director’s visit
to provinces like Ibb and Al-Jouf,30 and the department’s honoring of the Yemeni
youth national soccer team, confirm the overarching capacity of the Educational
Department of Ansarallah.31
Actually, the Education Department of Ansarallah (Huthis) is a replica of a
Hezbollah educational institution called “Education Mobilization.” Ansarallah's
Education Department aims to promote support for Huthis and manage the
programs that propagate Huthi ideology and Shi’ite sectarian values, while
Hezbollah’s Education Mobilization department engages in indoctrinating youth,
strengthening Shi’ite Islam, and promoting support for Hezbollah, and Iran.32
Alda’irah Altarbawiyyah does not specify through its website how it functions and
what it does but appears to be a participating entity in the education sphere of
the Huthi movement. It is certainly less sophisticated than Hezbollah’s Education
Mobilization, which organizes lectures, workshops, courses, visits, ceremonies,
trips, contests, and exhibitions.33 The stated goal for both organizations is to
prepare youth to join their struggles as operatives who can march to the battle
fronts or join the ranks of the movement to promote its vision and serve its agenda.
Leadership and Vision

Education and schools are important for Huthis. The significance was brought to
light when Abdulmalik al-Huthi appointed his brother Yahya Badr al-Din al-Huthi
as a Minister of Education. Yahya al-Huthi was educated at the hands of his late
father and only completed his religious studies. He is not a career educator nor a
college graduate, yet the assignment of a close relative as the Minister of Education
implies the relevance of education to the Huthi movement.34 Hussein Hazib, the
current Minister of Higher Education, completed only his undergraduate studies
in Sanaa University. He held posts as a manager in the Ministry of Education in
several educational districts before becoming a governor of Almahwit province.35
The ministers’ lack of experience and credentials for the post must be considered
as we explore and evaluate the Huthi policies toward education in Yemen. The
selection of those individuals to lead the Ministry of Education and the Ministry
of Higher Education reflects a strategy to control education institutions to serve
the Huthi agenda and purposes.
Controlling Educational Institutions
Huthis have systematically sought to replace the authorities of all institutions

in their controlled areas with Hashimites and loyalists, and the Ministries of
Education and Higher education were no exception. In commenting on new
Huthi appointments, a member of the teachers’ union was quoted saying, “the
disaster is the militia’s introduced replacements who lack experience and are
not qualified, and many of them are just high school graduates.”36 A review of
administrative decrees for appointing school principals revealed that Huthis
have replaced existing principals with new ones loyal to them. Specifically, in
2018, they replaced thirty-six principals with loyalists in two districts in Sanaa.37
According to a source familiar with the structure of the ministry, Huthis
have also replaced the managers and supervisors of major departments, like
Assessment and Curriculum, with their appointees.38 In 2019, the Ministry of
Education reclaimed all the responsibilities of hiring and managing schools
from the local authorities, giving itself total control over the management of
schools, appointment of principals, transfer of employees, and the creation of
new positions.39 Placing strategic management and hiring decisions in the hands
of the Ministries of Education and Higher Education reflect intentional and
controlling moves to facilitate and support a specific agenda or to protect against
perceived threats during the period of their takeover.
Schools as Hubs for Recruitment and Indoctrination
Early Zaidy Schools in Sa’dah

Education has been a critical component in the development of the Huthi
movement. The entirety of the movement grew out of the teachings of Badr al-
Din al-Huthi and Sayyid al-Muaayyidi, both prominent Zaydi scholars. Their
efforts, and those of their students, culminated in the establishment of educational
centers that used their writings, along with that of others in the realm, as a
curriculum. The Believing Youth, the organization responsible for coordinating
the education of early followers, established summer camps which focused on
providing a networking space for Hashemite and non-Hashemite youth to blur
their tribal and regional differences and revive their sense of Zaydi identity. By
1994–5, it is estimated that between 10,000 and 15,000 students from governorates
as far south as Taiz had attended the Believing Youth camps.40 The curriculum
of these camps concentrated on providing religious studies fixated on Quranic
and Zaydi teachings, while afternoons were spent on extracurricular activities
like sports and drama. Muhammad Izzan, a key figure in the development of
the Huthi movement, also established theological schools known as Scientific
Schools (madāris ʿilmiyya). These schools helped to provide associational space,
a sense of belonging, and a framed Zaydi group identity.41 This history has surely
contributed to contemporary Huthi understanding of the role of organized schools
and camps—an understanding that lends itself to propagating their ideology and
values and inspiring their followers to fight on their side.
Huthi Policies in Public Schools
Huthis felt threatened by public schools because of their Salafi-influenced curricula

which served to “dilute Zaydi culture and identity.”42 After their 2011 takeover of
the Sa’dah governorate, Huthis installed loyal principals and teachers in the schools
to teach their curriculum and support their programs.43 In 2015, Huthis took over
the Ministries of Education and Higher Education, and their offices, in provinces
of the northern part of Yemen and began to implement similar strategies. They
replaced the management for the various sectors within the ministries, that is,
the Curriculum and Textbook, the Assessment sector, etc.44 At the school level,
they moved to remove existing principals and assign Huthis or their supporters in
their place.45 Loyal principals could assist Huthis by removing unwanted teachers,
implementing Huthi programs and activities, and supporting propaganda and
recruitment efforts that can take place in schools. Huthis also moved to change the
names of schools from those of national Yemeni heroes to those of Huthi leaders,
Shi’ite figures with a sectarian connotation and significance.46 They have also used
the schools to stage their events and activities—sometimes for the public—and to
address the students, who are often a captive audience. Government schools are
important institutions for Huthis to promote their ideas and institutionalize them.
Though most households no longer possess a source of income, monthly fees
have been imposed on families, leaving many to seek employment on the streets
or in some cases by joining Huthi militia in the battlefield. The monthly fees range
from 500 Riyals for elementary students to 1500 Riyals for high school students.
These payments help compensate teachers but fall short of replacing their official
salaries.47 Thousands of teachers have left schools as a result of displacement, lack
of salaries, and Huthi interventions in the school system.
School Morning Assembly

School morning assembly routines have been scripted by Huthi officials. A
special guide on the subject was issued to schools to highlight the importance
of the assembly as an educational period for informing students about “national
and religious commemorations.”48 The guide asserts that the activities and topics
are intended to build the Yemeni nation and reinforce their resilience against
the “Saudi-American aggression targeting the country and its people.” The guide
contains forty suggested programs prepared carefully to cover four areas:
ggression against Yemen and its consequences

A
Diverse cultural topics
National holidays
Religious holidays
The list of topics under the first two areas is derived from sermons and lectures
by Hussein and Abdulmalik al-Huthi. The topics under the first area (Aggression
against Yemen and its consequences) include: “The goals of aggression in Yemen,”
“The history of aggression in Yemen,” and, among other related topics, “The crimes
of American-Saudi aggression.” Some of the subjects listed under Diverse cultural
topics are: “Quran: a book of guidance,” “Who are we, and who are they?,” “Jihad
for Allah’s sake,” “The danger of Wahhabism,” and “Palestine: the destination of
the free.” In the area of national holidays, the guide lists the anniversaries of the
“Saudi-American aggression against Yemen,” the commemoration of “the Chant
and the Boycott,” a remembrance of their former leader (Hussein al-Huthi), and
the international day of Jerusalem. In the list of religious holidays, they added
seven Shi’ite holidays besides the two traditionally recognized by Yemenis; their
tenth item on the list of religious commemoration is “The danger of the people of
the book.”
The topics indicated above represent a mandatory menu for students to choose
from according to their timeliness, but students are given some freedom to
organize other small electives like poetry, or other creative productions, such as
the performance of national and religious songs or sketches.
The Role of Summer Centers
Since the late 1990s, summer centers have served as effective indoctrination and
training hubs for the movement that gave rise to Huthis. Summer centers have
evolved since then. Today, thousands of youths who attend these centers learn
from a Huthi curriculum and are inspired by Huthi leaders to glorify Jihad and
martyrdom against the enemies identified in the Huthis’ slogan. The Huthi
chant they repeat in unison represents a collective acceptance of the movement’s
ideology. Furthermore, it also represents an affirmation of the Huthis’ call to
action: “Death to America, Death to Israel, Cursed be the Jews, Victory to Islam.”
In an article published in 2019, Deputy Minister of Human Rights Nabil Abdul-
Hafeez indicated that there were about 250,000 boys and girls attending 3,672
summer centers in Huthi-controlled areas in 2019.49 Under the theme “Knowledge
& Jihad,” the summer centers admit boys and girls and place them in one of four
levels.50 While younger children start their learning of the Huthi curricula, older
youth are trained in fighting and the use of weapons.
These days, Huthis organize and finance the summer centers as well compared
to the government schools they oversee.51 While Huthis have not paid the salaries
of teachers in government schools, they make sure to compensate the organizers
and employees of these summer centers. Huthi leaders and officials make a point
of paying visits to the centers and motivating students with messages to “resist
aggression” and follow the “Quranic” path and the words of Hussein al-Huthi,
whose malazim and words represent an important component of the summer
centers’ curriculum. Their investment in supporting the summer centers stems
from their total control over their content and programs. These centers play
a major role in educating youth and instilling in them all the values that the
Huthis want the young generation to accept and believe in. They also provide
an environment where educational experiences are able to influence the youths’
thinking, direction, and loyalty.
Huthi Educational Publications
Huthis have also produced their own educational publications in the form of
textbooks for summer centers, among others. Their publications now extend to
include governmental newspapers they control in Sanaa like Althawra, the most
prominent newspaper in the country. The textbooks used in summer camps
reflect ideological intent to instill Huthi values and inspiration in the youth. A
passage in one textbook used in the summer centers of 2019, titled “Jihad for
Allah’s Sake” highlights Jihad as “one of the gates to Paradise which Allah has
opened for the most beloved,” and that “Allah has ordered us to fight for his
cause and has promised us victory.” The passage goes on to say that “with Jihad,
the faithful will vanquish their enemies [America, Israel, and their agents] and
liberate their homelands from the tyrants and criminals, so truth shall reign,
and falsehood shall vanish.” The paragraph ends with “let us embark on Jihad,
so we can be Allah supporters [the arabic term for Allah’s supporters is Ansar
Allah which is the Huthis’ favorite descriptor].” In essence, the last sentence
equates supporting Allah with joining the Huthis and becoming part of the
Ansar Allah group.52
The comprehension questions that follow emphasize the goal of the exercise.
Questions like: Did Allah command us to embark on Jihad for his sake? What did
Allah promise us if we embark on Jihad for him? What do martyrs for Allah’s sake
receive? In just one text, we see the emphasis on Jihad and martyrdom, as well as
on defining the enemies as America, Israel, and their agents, with a call to action
concluding the passage.
Part of the literature offered to youth at summer centers includes a magazine
called Jihad. The magazine was created for children. Its topics, colorful pages, and
pictorial tales exhibit religious stories, celebrations of Shi’ite heroes and holidays,
Quranic studies, and fictional plots like “Jihad teaches the enemies a lesson” to
inspire youth. In their issue number 7, published in 2017, the cover showcases an
image of the Aqsa mosque and a child carrying the Huthi flag with their famous
chant followed by the headline “The generation of the chant, the generation of
Al-Aqsa liberation.”53 In issue number 24 of Jihad, published in 2019, one story
was titled “Jihad challenges the Zionists.”54 The magazine’s educational mission is
to promote Huthi ideas and values and to plant the seed of Jihad and battling the
“enemies” into the minds of young readers. Jihad, the magazine, is an example of
just one approach utilized to spread and reinforce Huthi ideology in the minds of
youth.
Curriculum Changes and Their Significance
Discourse on curriculum is dominated by textbooks, but there is more to a

curriculum. Ronald C. Doll (1988) defined curriculum as the “formal and informal
content and process by which learners gain knowledge and understanding,
develop skills, and alter attitudes, appreciations, and values under the auspices of
that school.” Therefore, when Huthis introduce recorded lectures into the school
program, they are in fact changing the curriculum, and when they hold educational
events to promote their ideology, they are also introducing experiences that
become part of the curriculum. Students in Huthi controlled areas are exposed to
recorded lectures by the late Hussein al-Huthi and their current leader Abdulmalik
al-Huthi. A high school student reported having to listen to these recorded lectures
for more than an hour on a daily basis. Schools are also visited often by Huthi
leaders and officials who address students with speeches that echo the group’s
values and address current issues. In our discussion of curriculum changes, we
will devote our attention mostly to changes in textbooks, but it is important to
note that a curriculum encompasses all the experiences that influence students
and shape their thinking and understanding in school.55
The spokesperson for the Yemeni Teachers’ union, Yaḥā al-Yanāʿī, has made
repeated claims about curriculum changes introduced by Huthis. Alyan’ai was
recently quoted saying that Huthis had made 187 changes in the year 2020, and 234
between 2015 and 2019.56 It is reported that Yahya Al-Huthi, Minister of Education
in the Huthi government, organized a curriculum committee made up of 50
academics loyal to his group and charged them with modifying the curriculum.57
For the 2020–1 school year, the Huthis have published completely new
“experimental” textbooks for Quran, Islamic studies, and social studies for grades
1–6. Huthis have attempted to justify their interventions in the curriculum, in the
words of Yahya al-Huthi, Minister of Education, using the following arguments58:
The old religious curriculum had ideas that belonged to the Wahhabism
which plant the seeds of terrorist ideology.
The curriculum is based on fabricated Islamic history from the time of the
Mamluk Dynasty’s governance of Yemen.
The curriculum contained sayings of the Prophet, his biography, and Fiqh,
that were manipulated and exaggerated.
The interventions implemented were intended to fix typographical mistakes.
Emphasizing Reverence for Ahl al-Bayt
A review of some of the changes implemented can illustrate the direction and
motivation behind such interventions. One of the changes introduced throughout
all the textbooks modified is the introduction of the word “family” following the
phrase mentioning of Prophet Muhammad. Usually, the name of the Prophet is
accompanied by “blessings and peace be upon him,” but Huthis have added the word
“family” so in every textbook the phrase reads, “blessings and peace be upon him
and his family.” This change holds religious significance since it bolsters Hashemites
as beneficiaries of praise alongside the Prophet himself. The connotation sets the
stage for a special class of individuals with rights and entitlements negating the
sense of equality in citizenship and rights within Yemeni society.59
This is further reinforced by a lesson on the “necessity of loving the family of
the Prophet and their followers’’ that was added to the ninth grade Islamic studies
textbook. Huthis have gradually introduced changes that reflect their sectarian
ideology. In one case, this was done by removing the name Omar Ibn Al Khattab,
the second Caliph to rule the Muslims after the death of Prophet Muhammad who
is despised by Shi’ites and replacing it with Mahmoud. In another case, the name
Saleh was replaced with Hussein.60 Changing the names of historical figures in an
educational curriculum is a tool for changing the identity of a people and Huthis
are not shying away from efforts to popularize Shi’ite identity and values.
Preparing Students for War
In a first-grade book, a picture of Israeli soldiers is presented at the top of the page
as a conversation starter.61 On another page, a picture of children and their teacher
learning outdoors is surrounded by a collage of images rendering destroyed
buildings.62 Images of soldiers and their description as Mujahideen are followed
by an image of a fighter Jet flying over flames and clouds of black smoke. In a fifth
grade Social Studies textbook, there is a passage referring to Yemen as a grave for
invaders,63 and that the truth in this statement can be understood from when “the
American-Zionist alliance tried to invade Yemen, but they were killed in great
numbers.”64 Examples of curriculum interventions also include added biographies
of Huthi and Shi’ite figures, like Saleh Alsamad, the former president of the Huthi
Political Council killed by a drone attack, and Imam al-Hadi Yahya bin Hussein,
the imam responsible for introducing Zaydism in Yemen.
New Quranic Studies Textbooks
Over the past five years, Huthis added, removed, and modified, textbooks by adding
words and phrases, removing others, or introducing new lessons; but in the 2020–
1 school year, they printed their own version of the Quranic studies textbooks
for grades 1–6. At first glance, it appears little was altered, but as one begins to
read through the pages, one discovers the intentional and strategic interventions
that have been introduced. I reviewed the Quranic Studies textbook for the fourth
grade and compared it to the MoE edition published in 2014, in addition to the
newly published textbook released by the Huthi Ministry of Education for the
school year 2020–1. The table of contents of both textbooks are the same, which
can be misleading if one reads no further. Both textbooks present the first ten
verses of Surat Al-Muddathir preceded by a brief introduction. In the 2014 MoE

version, the introduction gives the background of the ten verses, describing how
Prophet Muhammad returned to Mecca trembling and fearful after receiving his
first message in the cave. In the Huthi version, the introduction focuses on the
message of the verses and explains that the chapter began with Allah calling his
prophet to prepare himself and to deliver God’s message. The Huthi textbook
contains an additional passage which can be described as a commentary. The
passage reads, “Despite the disbelievers’ harm to the Messenger of God and
their claim that he was a magician, the Messenger of God moved to convey the
message with all courage and strength, with the help of God, and equipped with
the great inspiration of the verses of the Holy Qur’an.”65 In this commentary, there
is intentional and strategic use of language to emphasize the disbelievers as the
enemy, and the Prophet as reliant on the courage and strength bestowed upon him
by God and the power of the Quran.
In the following pages, within the section of “Lessons Learned from the verses,”
the 2014 MoE textbook lists three lessons, while the Huthi version lists five.
Three in the Huthi text bear close resemblance in meaning to their equivalent in
the government textbook; however, the two newly introduced “lessons” call for
following the steps of the Prophet in spreading the faith and resisting the influence
and propaganda of the kāfirs (disbelievers) and the “people of falsehood.”66 Huthis
also installed into the next lesson a Shi’ite interpretation of Quranic verses. To be
specific, the explanation of verses 5–12 of Surat Al-Insān relates the verses to the
members of the Prophet’s family.67 In the lessons learned from verses 23–31, the
Huthi textbook lists two additional statements and they are (1) the faithful doesn’t
fear disbelievers and tyrants because Allah can destroy them, (2) the faithful seeks
the path of guidance to be among those who Allah desired to be guided. Table 6.1
Table 6.1 Differences between Newly Released Huthi Textbook and the Old MoE Textbook
from 2014
Textbook Element/ 2014 Government Textbooks 2020 Huthi Textbook

Content
Table of Content Same Same
Introduction of Introduction describes how Introduction focuses on the message of
Surat Al-Muddathir Prophet Muhammad returned the verses and explains that the Sura began
verses 1–10 to Mecca trembling and fearful with Allah calling his prophet to prepare
after receiving his first message himself and to deliver God’s message.
in the Hera cave. The introduction contains an additional
passage which can be described as a
commentary. The passage reads, “Despite
the disbelievers’ harm to the Messenger
of God and their claim that he was a
magician, the Messenger of God moved
to convey the message with all courage
and strength, with the help of God, and
equipped with the great inspiration of the
verses of the Holy Qur’an.”
Explanation of the It describes how the Prophet was Here again, the explanation of the verses
verses 1–0 frightened after his experience, is followed by commentary emphasizing
and how Allah commanded him that the Prophet’s action, and the power of
to stand up and deliver God’s Quran left a great impact among people.
message.
Lessons learned Spreading Islam is a challenging The Prophet is a role model for preaching
from verses 1–10 task. the message of Islam.
The weapon of Muslim To not be influenced by the stands, and
preachers (faith, patience, moral propaganda of Kafirs and the people of
character). falsehood.
The day of judgment is a difficult Patience and tolerance of difficulties for
one for Kafirs and easier for true Allah’s sake.
faithfuls. Commitment to Islamic values like faith,
(page 10) trust in Allah, cleanliness, patience.
The day of judgment is a difficult one for
Kafirs.
Page (12)
Lessons learned A Muslim uses what Allah gave We have to use what Allah gave us in
from verses him to please Allah and worship money and children in his worship.
11–30 (Surat Al- him. We warned against vanity, arrogance, and
Muddathir) Arrogant people are destined ingratitude.
for hell. We have to believe in the Holy Quran,
A Muslim fears Allah only. because it is the word of Allah sent to his
prophet.
Explanation of Surat Talks about the reward for the The verses are attributed to the Prophet’s
Al-Insan verses 5–12 faithful and does not link these family and explain that the verses
verses to the Prophet’s family as describe how Ali and Fatima had
the Huthi version does. promised to fast as an offering for al-
Hassan and al-Hussein’s recovery from
an illness, and that they fulfilled their
promise of fasting and were feeding the
poor at the same time.
Lessons learned A Muslim works for life and the Glorifying the Holy Quran verses, because
from verses 23–31 hereafter. it’s a book from Allah.
Allah can destroy those who Patience in delivering Allah’s message and
disbelieve in him and bring not obeying tyrants and Kafirs.
those who do. Praising Allah day and night.
Kafirs work for this life and not A Muslim doesn’t just love life and forget
the hereafter. the hereafter but uses his life for the
The Holy Quran is a book of hereafter.
guidance for those who Allah The faithful don’t fear Kafirs and tyrants
wishes to guide. because Allah can destroy them.
The faithful seek the path of guidance to
be among those who Allah desires to be
guided.
highlight these differences and show that, while interventions may be considered
minor, they are intentional and in alignment with the Huthi’s goal of instilling
their values into the hearts and minds of students.
Huthi Policies in Higher Education
Higher education in Yemen has been disrupted by the current war since its onset
in 2015. The Saudi-led coalition forces attacked educational buildings and facilities
from the exterior, while the Huthis focused on reshaping them from the interior.
The coalition launched 133 airstrikes against universities, colleges, and other post-
secondary institutions. Huthis, on the other hand, have sought to manage higher
education institutions in alignment with their own agenda. They have taken over
the administration of some universities through new appointees and supervisors,
such as in Sanaa University, and the University of Science and Technology. New
Huthi-inspired curricula in Islamic studies and history have been introduced
to promote Huthi religious and political ideology.68 Huthis have also sought to
control academic freedom on campuses, in some cases, arresting students who
opposed their ideas.
Their stronghold on higher education institutions includes the use of their
facilities for military purposes. In one case, the facilities of the Community College
in Thamar province have been used to interrogate and house prisoners. As a way of
imposing their brand over the universities, Huthis have replaced the names lining
the halls of educational institutions with those of their martyrs and leaders. In
one case, the president of Thamar University changed the titles of twenty halls.
Hussein Hazib, the Minister of Higher Education, sent a letter to all public and
private universities in December of 2020 urging them to name colleges, centers,
and halls after Huthi martyrs, and to implement research studies glorifying
martyrs and martyrdom. In addition to the rising cost of living, Huthis’ refusal to
pay academics their salaries has negatively impacted the higher education sector
in Huthi-controlled areas.69 The greatest effect, however, comes from the group’s
determination to control and influence institutions to promote their values and
agenda.
Government universities in Yemen have always been influenced by the ruling
political parties, and many university professors typically held political affiliations,
while those who opposed the ruling powers were ostracized or punished.70
University professors know that any opposition threatens their jobs. This has gone
further in the Huthi administration. In one instance, Huthi officials have dismissed
university professors who went on a strike to demand their wages. It continues to
be clear that there is zero tolerance for opposition on public university campuses,
and the same can now be said for private universities.71 The Huthis’ takeover of
the University of Science and Technology and their current attempts to disrupt
education in the Lebanese University in Sanaa point to a targeted effort to take
control of two primary private universities in the country. The quest to take over
these universities reflects their intent to bring all universities under their complete
control, including private ones. As a result, the academic freedom of professors is

curtailed by the culture of fear and intimidation that exists in university campuses
in Huthi controlled areas.72
New universities supported by Huthis have also been established. The new
universities, “Iqra’a for Science and Technology,” “Alma’arifah for Modern Science,”
and “21 September for Medical Sciences,” were heavily promoted in Huthi-
controlled media.73 Huthis’ actions toward public and private universities reveal
intentional and strategic moves to use and manage higher education to strengthen
their control over universities’ processes and outcomes.
Conclusion
A preliminary review of Huthi education policies demonstrates a strategic use

of education and schools to instill Huthi values and mobilize youth to join the
fight against the coalition forces. We can infer that the definition and purpose of
education for Huthis are different from that of the previous Yemeni government.
Huthis are using education and schools to emphasize their identity, spread their
philosophy, and raise a generation of fighters to echo their slogan and fight their
battles.
Education is very important for Huthis and all of their actions and decision-
making around education are targeted to promote their agenda and win them the
hearts and minds of Yemenis to support their cause. In fact, the Huthis’ evolution
from a Guerrilla movement fighting in the mountains of Sa’ada north of Yemen
to a powerful entity in control of half of the country owes its rise to the teachings
of the late Badr al-Din al-Huthi and his son Hussein. It is no wonder, then, that
Huthis’ management of education is strategic and intentional. One might question
the wisdom of Huthi educational decisions when their outcomes deter from access
to universal education, improvement in the learning environment necessary for
quality education, rise in the standards of education, and improvement of the
conditions for education sector employees. However, Huthi actions and policies
are strategically and purposefully set in place to support their own struggle.
Huthis’ actions and policies in education may not be consistent with human
development goals for conventional nation-building efforts, but they are in
alignment with the group’s state of struggle and their quest to expand and grow.
They appoint powerful yet unqualified individuals to lead the Ministries of
Education and Higher Education and they ensure that their loyalists are in control
of important educational sectors. In addition, their control of educational sectors
and entities creates a culture of fear and intimidation that, in turn, suppresses
academic freedom. Huthis also gradually change the religious, Arabic, and social
studies curricula for students in the areas they control, and they print their own
educational material to promote values emphasizing Jihad and the state of struggle
against their enemies. Furthermore, they run their own indoctrination programs
in schools, summer centers, and through various organized events and workshops.
It seems that Huthi actions in the realm of education are defined by their
struggle to stand against their enemies and their quest to promote their cause in a
Sunni-dominated society. Both of these goals are open-ended and stand to justify
sustaining an education system that produces followers and soldiers prepared for
an ongoing struggle.
Notes
1 Michael Knights, 2018. “The Huthi War Machine: From Guerrilla War to State
Capture,” CTC Sentinel. West Point, New York: Combating Terrorism Center. no. 8
(2018): 15–23, https://ctc.usma.edu/Huthi-war-machine-guerrilla-war-state-capture/.
2 Lux, Abdullah, “Yemen’s Last Zaydī Imām: The Shabāb Al-Muʾmin, the Malāzim, and
‘ḥizb Allāh’ in the Thought of Ḥusayn Badr Al-Dīn Al-Ḥūthī,” Contemporary Arab
Affairs 2, no. 3 (2009): 369–434, https://doi.org/10.1080/17550910903106084.
3 Imam Yahya had established an Orphans’ School, to teach clerical skills; a Scientific
School, to teach clerks for the judicial system; a teachers’ college; and a military
school.
4 Sadiq Mohmad Alsafwani, 2019. “‫تأسيس البعثات الطالبية اليمنية في مصر في ثالثينيات القرن العشرين‬
[The Establishment of Yemeni Student Missions in Egypt in the 1930s],” Arabian
Humanities. Revue internationale d’archéologie et de sciences sociales sur la péninsule
Arabique/International Journal of Archaeology and Social Sciences in the Arabian
Peninsula. Chroniques Yéménites, no. 12.
5 Ma’alamah or kuttab represented the community’s effort to educate young kids to read
and memorize the Quran. This education typically took place in a mosque or in an
open area under the shades of a tree.
6 “Yemen—Educational System-Overview,” StateUniversity.com, https://education.
stateuniversity.com/pages/1687/Yemen-EDUCATIONAL-SYSTEM-OVERVIEW.
html (accessed March 27, 2021).
7 Aden College, 2009. “A Short History of Education in Aden 1839–1967” (2009). Aden
College. Retrieved December 22, 2020, http://adencollege.info/html/body_education.html
8 Asher Aviad Orkaby, 2014. “The International History of the Yemen Civil War,
1962–1968,” Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, https://dash.harvard.edu/
bitstream/handle/1/12269828/Orkaby_gsas.harvard_0084L_11420.pdf?sequence=4
9 Abdullatif Haider, et al. Forthcoming. The Cost of War on Education in Yemen.
10 World Bank, 2010. “Republic of Yemen Education Status Report: Challenges and
Opportunities,” Washington, DC. © World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.
org/handle/10986/18516 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”
11 Cameron Glenn, 2015. “Who Are Yemen’s Houthis?” Wilson Center, April 29, 2015,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/who-are-yemens-Huthis.
12 “Yemen: Constitutional Declaration by the Huthis, February 2015,” https://al-bab.
com/yemen-constitutional-declaration-Huthis-february-2015.
13 High Social Committee of Yemen. 2019. “‫[ الرؤية الوطنية لبناء الدولة اليمنية الحديثة‬The
National Vision: To Build the Modern Yemeni State],” March 26, 2019, http://
yemenvision.gov.ye/upload/Yemen%20Vision%20-%20ar.pdf.
14 Hussein al-Huthi did not elaborate on how the science or geography curriculum
has to be based on the Quran, but he did emphasize that the Quran has to be the
foundation of all learning in schools.
15 Hussein Al Huthi, 2002. “‫[ اإلسالم وثقافة االتبّاع‬Islam and the Culture of Following],”
September 2, 2002, https://www.huda.live/node/45.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Hussein Al Huthi, 2002. “‫[ دروس من وحي عاشوراء‬Lessons from the Inspiration of
Ashura],” March 23, 2002, https://www.huda.live/node/73.
19 ‫[ الدرس السابع في كمال القرآن‬The Seventh Lesson in the Perfection of the Quran].
20 ‫الدرس السابع القرآن الواسع‬، ‫[ القرآن كتاب الهداية‬The Qur’an is the book of guidance, the
seventh lesson, the broad Qur’an].
21 Hussein Al Huthi, 2003. “‫[ الدرس الثاني في مديح القرآن‬The Second Lesson in Praise of the
Quran]” May 29, 2003, https://www.huda.live/node/77.
22 Hussein al-Huthi, Who are We and Who are they? (malzama).
23 Ibid.
24 Hussein Al Huthi, 2019. “‫هـ‬1440 ‫ ذكرى اختتام المراكز الصيفية‬4-8-2019‫[ م‬The Occasion of
the Conclusion of the Summer Centers 1440 AH 4-8-2019 AD 2019-08-04],” April 8,
2019, https://www.huda.live/node/321.
25 Hussein Al Huthi. 2019. “‫هـ‬1440 ‫[ للمشاركين في إقامة المراكز الصيفية‬For the Participants in
the Establishment of the Summer Centers 1440 A.H.],” March 7, 2019, https://www.
huda.live/node/320.
26 Al Mashhad Al Arabiya, 2019. “‫ درس الحوثي الوحيد الذي تلقنه لطالبها في المدارس‬.‫هيا بنا نقتل‬
[Let’s Kill . . . the Only Huthi Lesson Taught to Its Students in Schools],” April 1, 2019,
https://almashhadalaraby.com/news/81382#.
27 Huthis call these trainings cultural training ‫دورات ثقافية‬.
28 Asharq Al-Awsat, 2020. “‫ وضغوط على آالف الموظفين الحكوميين‬. . . ‫دورات التعبئة الحوثية تستنزف الموارد‬
‫[ لاللتحاق بها‬The Huthi Mobilization Courses are Draining Resources . . . and Pressures
on Thousands of Government Employees to Join Them],” July 12, 2020, https://aawsat.
com/home/article/2384311/-‫آالف‬-‫على‬-‫وضغوط‬-‫الموارد‬-‫تستنزف‬-‫الحوثية‬-‫التعبئة‬-‫دورات‬
‫لاللتحاق‬-‫الحكوميين‬-‫الموظفين‬
29 Educational Department of Ansarallah. ‫الدائرة التربوية ألنصار هللا‬, http://www.altarbawy.
net/.
30 “‫ بقيادة مسؤول الدائرة التربوية ألنصار هلل هادي عمار وفد تربوي يزور المحافظة‬:‫الجوف‬
Educational Department of Ansarallah, 2020. “[Al-Jawf: An Educational
Delegation Is Led by the Head of the Educational Department of Ansar Allah,
Hadi Ammar, Who Visits the Governorate],” March 21, 2020, http://www.
altarbawy.net/2020/03/21/25624/.
31 Sahafah 24 “‫[ الدائرة التربوية تكرم المنتخب الوطني لناشئي كرة القدم‬The Educational Department
Honors the National Junior Football Team . . . Sports News],” September 30, 2017,
https://sahafah24.com/article/1128848.
32 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center. (2019). Hezbollah’s
“Education Mobilization”: An institution engaged in the indoctrination of Shiite students
in Lebanon’s state and private educational systems, in preparation for their joining
Hezbollah upon graduation. Retrieved from https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/app/
uploads/2019/07/E_144_19.pdf.
33 Ibid.
34 Yemen Government Gateway, Ministry of Higher Education. 2019. “‫—الحكومة اليمنية‬
‫ الوزير‬،‫[ وزارة التعليم العالي‬Yemeni government—Ministry of Higher Education.
Minister],” http://www.yemen.gov.ye/portal/mohe/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8
%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1/tabid/585/Default.aspx.
35 Ibid.
36 A Alaqbi, 2019. “”.)‫ حوثنة الوظائف في المحويت وتعيينات ساللية وإقصاء للمخالفين (تفاصيل‬..‫باألرقام واألسماء‬
‫[ ”موقع إقليم تهامة‬In Numbers and Names . . . Huthinization of jobs in Mahwit, Dynastic
Appointments, and Exclusion of Violators (Details)],” Iqleem Tehama. July 18, 2019,
http://mtehama.com/?p=58076.
37 Yemen Shabab, 2018. “(‫ مدرسة بأشخاص مواليين لها (اسما‬36 ‫ مليشيا الحوثي تغير مدراء‬:‫صنعاء‬
[Sanaa: Al-Huthi Militia Changes the Principals of 36 Schools with People Loyal to
Them (Names)],” September 8, 2018, https://yemen-shabab.com/locales/38963
38 Abdullah Almikhlafy (telephone interview with the author) September 9, 2020.
39 Yemen Today, 2019. “ ‫تعميم إلبقاء تغيير واستبدال مدراء مكاتب التربية والمدارس حصرا على يحيى الحوثي‬
[A Circular to Keep the Change and Replacement of Directors of Education Offices and
Schools Exclusively on Yahya Al-Houthi],” October 10, 2019, https://www.yementdy.tv/
news2651.html.
40 Barak Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in Northern
Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG962.html. Also available in print form.
41 Ibid.
42 Christopher Boucek, 2010. “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National
Challenge,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.
org/files/war_in_saada.pdf.
43 Yemen Shabab, 2018. “‫[ تغيير مدراء المدارس في صنعاء يثير مخاوف اليمنيين‬Changing school
principals in Sanaa raises Yemeni fears],” Yemen Shabab, September 11, 2018, https://
yemenshabab.net/news/39077.
44 Abdullah Almikhlafy.
45 Akhbar Alyoum, 2018. “ ‫[ الحوثيون يستكملون حوثنة التعليم إدارة ومعلمين ومناهج‬The Houthis
Complete the Huthization Education Administration, Teachers and Curricula],”
September 9, 2018, https://akhbaralyom-ye.net/news_details.php?sid=104082.
46 Bawabaty, 2020. “ ‫مليشيا الحوثي تستبدل أسماء عددا من المدارس الحكومية في صنعاء بأسماء طائفية‬
[Huthi Militia Changes the Names of Public Schools in Sanaa with Sectarian Names],”
April 5, 2020, https://sahafaa.net/show6808799.html.
47 Yemen Shabab, 2018. “‫ ”التعليم في عرين الميليشيات‬.. ‫أول تقرير خاص يرصد انتهاكات الحوثي للتعليم‬
(2018 ‫ أبريل‬-‫“[ )بصنعاء يناير‬Education in the den of the Militias”. . . the First Special
Report that Monitors Houthi Violations of Education in Sanaa (January–April
2018)],” May 1, 2018, https://yemen-shabab.com/hot%20files/34965.
48 Almasdar Online, 2019. “‫الحوثيون يفرضون دليالً إذاعيا ً يحول المدارس إلى محاضن طائفية ومعسكرات تجنيد‬
[The Houthis Are Imposing a Radio Guide That Turns Schools into Sectarian
Incubators and Recruitment Camps],” October 20, 2019, https://almasdaronline.com/
articles/172985.
49 The Riyadh, 2019. “‫ التحالف العربي دعم الشرعية وأحبط االنقالب‬:»‫وكيل وزارة حقوق اإلنسان باليمن لـ «الرياض‬
[Undersecretary of the Ministry of Human Rights in Yemen to “Al-Riyadh”: The Arab
Coalition Supported Legitimacy and Thwarted the Coup],” August 8, 2019, https://
www.alriyadh.com/1770507.
50 Ansarollah, 2019. “‫ عملية تحصين واكتساب العلم والمعرفة من مصادرها‬..‫المراكز الصيفية الصحيحة‬
[The Correct Summer Centers . . . the Process of Fortifying and Acquiring Knowledge
from Its Sources],” July 6, 2019, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/263724.
51 Huthis’ spending on Summer centers.
52 B. Chernitsky, 2019. “Huthi Schools, Summer Camps, and Children’s Magazine Instill
Hatred of U.S., Israel, and Jews, Glorify Martyrdom and Jihad,” Middle East Media
Research Institute. August 8, 2019, https://www.memri.org/reports/Huthi-schools-
summer-camps-and-childrens-magazine-instill-hatred-us-israel-and-jews-glorify.
53 The image of the cover of the children magazine Jihad issue number 7 can be found at
this link: https://www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/img/MY/1/108436.jpg.
54 The image of the cover of Jihad children magazine issue number 24 can be found at
this link: http://alforgan.net/nacimg/nac/1082.
55 Irfaa Sawtak, 2020. “‫[ الحوثيون يصبغون المناهج الدراسية بصبغة طائفية‬The Huthis Dye
The School Curriculum with a Sectarian Tint],” February 25, 2020, https://www.
irfaasawtak.com/world/2020/02/25/‫طائفية‬-‫بصبغة‬-‫الدراسية‬-‫المناهج‬-‫يصبغون‬-‫الحوثيون‬
56 Saleh, Salah. 2019. “. . . ‫ تعديالً طائفيا ً على المناهج‬234‫ كتب منعدمة و‬.‫[ العبث الحوثي‬Al-
Huthi’s Tampering . . . Non-existent Books and 234 Sectarian Amendments to
the Curricula],” Al Bayan. October 19, 2019, https://www.albayan.ae/one-world/
arabs/2019-10-19-1.3678093.
57 Dr. Mokhtar Almshwshy, telephone interview with the author.
58 Yemen Monitor, 2017. “‫ تجريف للتعليم واعتراف بتحريف المناهج ومستقبل أطفال اليمن مجهول‬..‫جماعة الحوثي‬
[The Houthi Group . . . Razing Education and Recognition of Distorting Curricula,
and the Future of Yemeni Children is Unknown],” October 15, 2017, https://www.
yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/20921.
59 Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, 2017. “‫ معركة مع الجميع‬. . .‫[ تعديل الحوثيين مناهج التعليم في اليمن‬The
Houthis Amendment of the Educational Curricula in Yemen . . . a Battle with
Everyone],” July 23, 2017, http://shorturl.at/mGIS2.
60 Mosnad, 2017. “‫ كيف حول الحوثيين اسم (صالح) إلى (حسين‬.‫[؟ )عبث بالمنهج التعليمي‬Tampered with
with the Educational Curriculum.. How Did the Huthis Convert the Name (Saleh) to
(Hussein)?],” March 13, 2017, https://www.mosnad.com/news/21141.
61 Huthi textbook 2020–2021 first grade Islamic studies, p. 24.
62 Ibid., 40.
63 Ibid., 116.
64 Huthi textbook 2020–2021 5th grade Social Studies, p. 8.
65 Huthi textbook 2020–2021 Islamic Studies 4th grade, p. 10.
66 Ibid., 12.
67 Ibid., 85.
68 Edward Fox, 2018. “Yemen’s War Reaches Into Public-University Classrooms—
Al-Fanar Media,” Al-Fanar Media, June 13, 2018, https://www.al-fanarmedia.
org/2018/06/yemens-war-reaches-into-public-university-classrooms/.
69 Muthanna, Abdulghani, and Guoyuan Sang. “Brain Drain in Higher Education:
Critical Voices on Teacher Education in Yemen,” London Review of Education 16, no.
2 (2018): 296–307.
70 Ibid.
71 Edward Fox, 2018. “Yemen’s War Reaches Into Public-University Classrooms—
Al-Fanar Media,” Al-Fanar Media, June 13, 2018, https://www.al-fanarmedia.
org/2018/06/yemens-war-reaches-into-public-university-classrooms/.
72 Al-Fanar Media quoted Dr. Walid Mahdi, an associate professor at the University
of Oklahoma “aside from the alleged administrative abuses regarding faculty hires,
it is clear that the culture of fear produced through the Huthis’ strict rule would
naturally lead many faculty [members] to self-sensor the content of their courses.”
https://www.al-fanarmedia.org/2018/06/yemens-war-reaches-into-public-university-
classrooms/.
73 Erem News, 2017. “‫ إستراتيجية حوثية جديدة لغزو عقول الشباب‬..‫[ من السالح إلى الجامعات‬From
Arms to Universities . . . a New Houthi Strategy to Conquer the Minds of Young
People],” January 5, 2017, https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/
gcc/673578.
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[The Huthi Mobilization Courses are Draining Resources . . . and
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Changes the Names of Public Schools in Sanaa with Sectarian Names].” April 5, 2020.
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Educational Curriculum . . . How Did the Huthis Convert the Name (Saleh) to
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Division of Humanities, US, 2018.
Sahafah “‫ الدائرة التربوية تكرم المنتخب الوطني لناشئي كرة القدم‬24 [The Educational Department
Honors the National Junior Football Team . . . Sports News].” September 30, 2017.
https://sahafah24.com/article/1128848.
Saleh, Salah. “. . . ‫ تعديالً طائفيا ً على المناهج‬234‫ كتب منعدمة و‬.‫[ العبث الحوثي‬Al-Huthi’s Tampering . . .
Non-existent Books and 234 Sectarian Amendments to the Curricula].” Al Bayan,
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[Undersecretary of the Ministry of Human Rights in Yemen to ‘Al-Riyadh’: The Arab
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[The Houthi Group . . . Razing Education and Recognition of Distorting Curricula,
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yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/20921
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)2018 ‫ أبريل‬-‫‘[ (يناير‬Education in the den of the Militias’. . . the First Special Report that
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https://yemen-shabab.com/hot%20files/34965
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Al-Huthi Militia Changes the Principals of 36 Schools with People Loyal to Them
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net/news/39077
Yemen Today. “ ‫[ تعميم البقاء تغيير واستبدال مدراء مكاتب التربية والمدارس حصرا على يحيى الحوثي‬A
Circular to Keep the Change and Replacement of Directors of Education Offices and
Schools Exclusively on Yahya Al-Houthi]. October 10, 2019. https://www.yementdy.tv/
news2651.html
7
P R O PAG A N DA , C R E AT I V I T Y, A N D D I P L OM AC Y: T H E
H U T H I S’ A DA P T I V E A P P R OAC H T O M E D IA A N D
P U B L IC M E S S AG I N G
Hannah Porter
Introduction
When the Covid-19 pandemic reached northern Yemen in April 2020, local
officials and medical professionals were ill-equipped to respond effectively.1 Masks,
hospital beds, and ventilators were scarce and social distancing guidelines all but
impossible to enforce. As the coronavirus quietly spread unchecked through some
of Yemen’s most populous cities, the Sanaa-based Huthi government was unable—
and perhaps unwilling—to provide necessary relief.
One branch of the Huthis, however, was well situated to address the pandemic
and seize on the fear and uncertainty that accompanied the disease: the group’s
media apparatus identified the Covid-19 information vacuum early on as an
opportunity to promote politically expedient conspiracy theories and scapegoat
rivals. Huthi officials went on air to accuse the Saudi-led coalition of spreading the
virus in Yemen, and artists working for Huthi production teams released poems
and cartoons echoing these claims.2 Huthi-affiliated social media channels accused
the United States of using the coronavirus as a form of biological warfare and
warned citizens not to come in contact with foreign aid that might be deliberately
contaminated.3
With the knowledge that an effective and medically sound response to
Covid-19 was out of their reach, Huthi leadership did its best to downplay the
pandemic by issuing a series of evasive statements and optimistic but baseless
claims. In May, the head of the Huthi-run Health Ministry, Taha al-Mutawakkel,
asserted that Yemen was making progress in developing a cure for Covid-19.4 At
the same time, officials declined to release any data on the number of infections
with the justification that this would only incite panic, and instead emphasized the
high rate of recovery from the coronavirus. By late summer 2020, when reliable
information on the pandemic’s origins and means of preventing infection became
more widely available for Yemenis and the global population, the Huthis’ media
apparatus had largely moved away from this topic and refocused its efforts on
messaging campaigns related to military developments and the blockade.
The Huthis’ response to the pandemic is emblematic of their broader approach

to media and public messaging, which consists of two key strategies: the
promotion of real and fake news stories that align with their political agenda, and
the obfuscation of those that contradict it. For years, the Huthis have invested in
media productions as a means of advancing the movement’s immediate and long-
term goals, including attracting followers and fighters, signaling to their allies and
enemies, promoting their narratives about domestic and international events, and
performing legitimacy. To help them achieve these aims, Huthi media productions
weave together themes of national pride and self-reliance, armed resistance,
divine legitimacy, praise of martyrs, and a wealth of Yemeni cultural and social
themes. What characterizes Huthi media is not simply biased news coverage and
propaganda but a continuously expanding network of entertainment programs,
social media pages, and artistic and poetic productions.5
The Huthis sometimes refer to these messaging efforts as a form of “soft war”
(harb na’imah) or “psychological war” (ḥarb nafsiyya), which they consider to be
both a key component of their political and military efforts and a weapon that is
regularly deployed against them by their enemies—primarily the United States,
Saudi Arabia, and their supporters.6 A 2017 op-ed penned by pro-Huthi analyst
Zayd Baouh emphasizes the importance of the media and its role in “psychological
warfare.”7 A three-part documentary aired by the Huthi flagship network Al-
Masirah outlines how the United States uses media and disinformation to
undermine Arab and Islamic societies.8
The Huthis understand that populations living under their control in northern
Yemen are hardly insulated from outside perspectives, which are readily available
via social media, messaging platforms, and international satellite channels. This
reality creates a kind of competition for the Huthis that pushes them to be on the
cutting edge of creative media productions and technical expertise. Just like the
“hard war” that Huthi soldiers are engaged in, soft war through media demands
investment, constant maneuvering, and offensive and defensive strategies to
respond to similar efforts made by their enemies.
A robust media mechanism that can adapt and respond to events is essential
to Huthi survival. Content disseminated across their platforms helps them
shape public discourse, reinforce their own national vision, and allows them to
communicate with outsiders. Contemporary analysis often incorrectly portrays
the Huthis’ primary goal as the reanimation of Yemen’s Zaydi imamate, which
collapsed in the 1960s.9 But the group is, in fact, a distinctly modern movement,
and their approach to public messaging and media is a prime example of this.
Evolution of the Huthi Media Landscape
The history of the Huthi movement—and indeed the dynamics of the ongoing
conflict—is inextricably linked to the group’s relationship with media. In the
early days of the Believing Youth10 in the 1990s, the movement quickly learned
that it would need to curate an appealing public image while reacting to adverse
. Propaganda, Creativity, and Diplomacy 141
messaging from elements it sought to oppose—primarily Salafis proselytizing and

promoting anti-Zaydi messages in Saada.11 The Believing Youth countered these
campaigns by distributing Zaydi educational materials, books, and cassette tapes.12
Beyond Zaydi religious teachings, the group embraced a variety of social issues
and activities that enhanced their message’s appeal and supported their efforts to
promote social cohesion and boost their popularity.13
In the early 2000s, in-person lectures delivered by Hussein al-Huthi pushed
the group in a new direction and laid the foundation for many of the core beliefs
of the Huthi movement that we know today. These lectures focused on Islamic
teachings, self-improvement, personal responsibility, and increased awareness
surrounding the current state of Muslims worldwide, especially in relation to the
United States and Israel. In his first lecture, al-Huthi touched on the insidious
role played by the global media in subjugating Muslim countries and promoting
Western dominance.14
Hussein al-Huthi delivered these lessons in lecture halls, mosques, and private
homes.15 Seated in front of a camcorder and an audience of a few hundred followers,
he spoke authoritatively and at length without a script. “What is to be done?” he
would ask his followers, alluding to outside threats posed to Yemenis and Muslims,
occasionally taking brief pauses to scan the room for emphasis. These lectures, as
simple as they were in production quality, proved to be immensely influential in
shaping Huthi doctrine and contemporary media and messaging.
Hussein al-Huthi’s assassination at the onset of the six Saada Wars (2004–
10) by Ali Abdullah Saleh’s security forces helped canonize his messages. Many
of the arguments made by al-Huthi, including his views on the regional role
of the United States and its relationship with Gulf monarchies, were seen to be
reinforced during the Saada Wars and the current conflict. In both instances,
the United States was portrayed as the puppet master of the Huthis’ enemies and
to be instigating conflict in an attempt to guide Yemen’s domestic affairs. Much
of current Huthi propaganda efforts paint the United States as Yemen’s greatest
adversary, retroactively strengthening al-Huthi’s worldview.
Israel, considered by the Huthis to be an appendage of the United States, is a
frequent target of much of Huthi propaganda since the early 2000s. The Huthis’
notorious slogan, “God is great, Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse on the
Jews, Victory to Islam,” was said to be first uttered by Hussein al-Huthi upon
seeing footage of twelve-year-old Palestinian Muhammad al-Durra being shot
and killed by the Israeli Defense Forces during the Second Intifada in 2000.16 The
slogan, or sarkha, is now ubiquitous in cities under Huthi control, posted on walls
and billboards, and chanted by troops on the frontlines. It has become a lasting
symbol of the movement despite, or perhaps because of, its controversial and
blatantly anti-Semitic nature. The sarkha was an attack not only on the United
States and Israel but also on Saleh’s regime, who the Huthis accused of being a
puppet for the West. The slogan was cited by Saleh throughout the Saada Wars as
evidence that the United States should assist him in his conflict with the Huthis.17
As years of war in the 2000s dragged on, the Huthis updated their messaging
strategies to focus on battlefield gains and counter enemy propaganda. They
launched the outlets Saada Online and Al-Menbar, which have since ceased
publication.18 Saleh’s regime was likewise preoccupied with guiding the media
narrative on the conflict, both by disseminating pro-government propaganda
against the Huthis and by stifling coverage of events in Saada.19 Saleh banned
journalists from reporting from conflict zones and cut lines of communication
in an effort to control the narratives surfacing from the war.20 These experiences
likely helped inform similar Huthi media tactics that we see today, including the
crackdown on independent journalism and their tactic of periodically cutting off
telecommunications systems near battlefronts.21
Years before their rise to power, the Huthis excelled at media productions
and outpaced even the central government in this regard.22 In 2012, the Huthis
established their official media outlet, Al-Masirah, in southern Beirut with
technical assistance from Hezbollah’s Al-Manar.23 Al-Masirah’s Lebanese and
Yemeni presenters began covering national and regional news stories, and some
of the earliest programs on the channel focused on religious, cultural, and social
topics, including a show titled Al-Qināʿ (The Mask), which provided critical
analysis of foreign films, and another program still on air called Al-Haql (The
Field), which features drone footage of Yemen’s agricultural lands and includes
interviews with farmers discussing their daily struggles and successes.
Even as the Huthis became increasingly adept at media production, they were
relegated to the margins of Yemeni and regional news outlets, unable to guide
narratives on national events and instead reacting to them. This impediment was
reversed when the Huthis seized Sanaa in 2014 and one of their first acts was to
reshape local media. Huthi forces took control of newsrooms belonging to the
same outlets that disseminated anti-Huthi propaganda under the Saleh regime,
and wiped online archives that included anti-Huthi news coverage. They shuttered
outlets that they believed to be disposable and co-opted others that could help build
authority and legitimacy, including Al-Thawra newspaper, the state news agency
SABA, and local radio stations.24 The Huthis indicated early on that dissenting
voices would not be tolerated.25 Since 2014, journalists in northern Yemen have
faced the threat of imprisonment or death sentences handed down by Huthi courts
and are often charged with “aiding the Saudi aggression.”26
The capture of state institutions and news outlets offered obvious benefits to
the Huthis, not least of which was a newfound power in Yemen’s capital that gave
them the breathing room and resources to build a proactive media apparatus made
up of traditional news outlets, social media pages, and artistic productions. Years
of experience in creating propaganda and diverse messaging helped the Huthis
assemble an advanced media mechanism poised to react to events and generate
narratives. By the time the Saudi-led coalition announced Operation Decisive
Storm in March 2015, Sanaa-based authorities were prepared to respond—both
militarily and rhetorically.
The operation led by Saudi Arabia and a coalition of Sunni states, and backed
by the United States and the United Kingdom, immediately provided the Huthis
with a wealth of propaganda that drew on their founder’s early condemnations
of Western powers and their role in guiding and manipulating Gulf monarchies.
Footage of civilians killed and maimed by Saudi airstrikes and interviews with
mothers whose emaciated children starve as a result of a coalition-enforced
blockade continue to serve as powerful messages for pro-Huthi media. Such
content not only highlights the destruction wrought by years of war but also boosts
the group’s portrayal of themselves as humble defenders of the homeland and the
sole resistance to some of the world’s most well-equipped militaries.27
The Importance of Diverse Content
Huthi media productions continue to expand and adapt to the current conflict.
The group and its backers invest heavily in TV channels, including Al-Masirah
(established in 2012), Al-Sahat (established in 2013), Al-Hawya, and Al-Lahza
(both established in 2017). These outlets broadcast local and international news
reports as well as documentary films exposing American misdeeds in Yemen and
interviews with former soldiers.28 Beyond coverage of the conflict, each channel
airs entertainment programs including Ramadan series, children’s shows, and
talk shows discussing women’s issues or matters of Islamic jurisprudence.29
Other forms of traditional media, including newspapers and magazines, are
employed by the Huthis to a lesser extent. Major radio stations operating in
governorates under their control promote Huthi messaging through poetry and
radio dramas.30
By the late 2000s, the Huthis had embraced social media as a means of
reaching diverse audiences worldwide. They now utilize, to varying degrees, all
major platforms, including Telegram, Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, Instagram,
WhatsApp, Soundcloud, and TikTok, with each platform offering its own set of
benefits and drawbacks.31 Facebook, for example, is the most popular platform in
Yemen, but the company is increasingly cracking down on unauthorized or violent
content, which results in the suspension of some Huthi-affiliated accounts. At the
other end of the spectrum is Telegram—a favorite of the Huthis (likely because
of its lack of oversight) but also a platform that is not especially popular among
Yemeni audiences.
These social media pages facilitate the rapid dissemination of all forms of
content. In the space of an hour, a single Houthi Telegram channel might share
an infographic illustrating the success of their latest missile attack on Saudi oil
facilities and selections of battlefield footage overlaid with speeches from Abdul-
Malik al-Huthi.32 Pictures of recently martyred soldiers are shared alongside
news alerts and cartoons, but one of the most common pieces of content on these
platforms comes in the form of poetry.
Poems and songs are released almost every day on Huthi platforms, often with
the aim of promoting excitement about the movement, encouraging followers to
take up arms, and extolling the virtues of Huthi leaders. These poems come in
different forms, with the most popular among the Huthis being zawāmil (sing.
zāmil). These are commonly described as war poems, but many zawāmil discuss
specific social issues or Yemeni communities. To address the issue of food shortages
and the blockade, the Huthis have produced a number of zawāmil performances
focused on agriculture and sustainability.33 Other poems aim to praise and win the
support of certain tribes or populations.34
A few characteristics of zawāmil make them uniquely suitable for Huthi
propaganda efforts.35 The act of composing and reciting poetry is valued across
Yemen as a means of conducting diplomacy and resolving disputes.36 An eloquent
poem has the potential to persuade, and the Huthis (as well as many other political
movements) use this art form to promote their own image and agenda.37 zawāmil
are catchy and their messages stick with audiences for days if not months, or
longer. The ease with which zawāmil are memorized also gives them an advantage:
once they are committed to memory or become part of an oral tradition, they can
never be blocked or censored, unlike articles or videos.38 In areas with low literacy
rates, the spoken word can potentially reach a larger audience.
Poems are also uniquely scalable and can be released as simple MP3s, shared
through word of mouth, or filmed and auto-tuned depending on the capabilities
of the producing entity and the needs of the audience. The same Huthi zamil, for
example, can often be found in text form, on Soundcloud, and as an elaborate,
highly produced performance resembling a music video.39 A cadre of dozens of
poets, musicians, and producers from not only Yemen but also Iraq, Palestine,
Iran, and Syria collaborate to create powerful propaganda videos and recitations
that are at once culturally relevant and visually striking.40
The Huthis themselves make no secret of the importance of poetry in their
“soft war” efforts. One article from Al-Masirah opens by saying that “the zamil is
a leader on the front lines of all battles for Yemen’s salvation, throughout history
and until today.”41 The Huthis believe that poetry has a psychological impact on
the enemy, and the same article analyzing zawāmil explains that “most wars are
waged not only to defeat the enemy, but to entirely break the will of resistance or
defiance, and it is well-known that psychological victories are the most impactful.”
The depth and breadth of Huthi media productions points to the fact that
the group relies on their outlets and platforms for more than just recruitment or
popular support. Messages communicated through their media repertoire are
designed to create specific, coordinated narratives on events and actors that are
deployed at certain times across mediums. When Huthi leadership grew especially
frustrated with the role of the UN and its Special Envoy Martin Griffiths in
2020, media channels under their control and their officials released concurrent
statements, cartoons, and poems attacking the UN’s work in Yemen and accused
the body of promoting American and Saudi interests.42
Investments in diverse media allow the group to craft narratives about
themselves for specific audiences. One zamil released in 2020 praised the role of
the muhammashīn (a marginalized community in Yemen whose members are
typically dark-skinned) in fighting against coalition forces, and paid tribute to
muhammashīn martyred in the war.43 The poem was released in conjunction with
a speech by Abdul-Malik al-Huthi on the same topic, as well as criticisms in major
Huthi outlets of the response by police forces in the United States to Black Lives
Matter protests.44 The coordinated campaign was apparently intended to highlight
racial inclusivity in Huthi-controlled territory and contrast it with the injustices

faced by African Americans in the United States.
Huthi messaging also extends beyond that which is produced by the group’s own
media. Fan accounts supporting the movement are numerous, and regional and
international outlets—especially Hezbollah-leaning channels like Al-Mayadeen
and Al-Manar, Iran’s Al-Alam, and Russia’s RT Arabic45—regularly provide
platforms for Huthi leaders and representatives to argue their cause and launch
accusations against their enemies. News stories that are reported by Russian,
Iranian, and Lebanese outlets are often picked up by Huthi outlets, and vice versa.
News platforms are frequently used to threaten and intimidate enemies by
highlighting the Huthis’ advanced military capabilities and instances when
Huthi missiles and armed drones have penetrated Saudi or Emirati defenses.
Their messaging campaigns sometimes put their opponents on the defensive by
requiring them to counter Huthi narratives and push back against torrents of
propaganda or disinformation, including false or exaggerated claims about Huthi
victories on the frontlines, or fake news stories about the conduct of international
organizations or foreign militaries in Yemen.46 It is worth noting, however, that
Huthi-affiliated outlets often report accurately on local and international news.
The majority of stories that one encounters on Huthi platforms, especially in major
outlets like Al-Masirah, are factual, but are selected and framed to reflect a specific
worldview—one that emphasizes the failure or corruption of entities that oppose
them and highlights their own successes or virtues, or those of their allies.
Adaptability and Diplomacy in Huthi Media
But cross-border messaging campaigns cannot be neatly divided between those

that praise allies and those that threaten enemies. On a number of occasions
throughout the past two decades, the Huthis have made a point of making
diplomatic overtures via popular media. One of the well-known early examples was
in 2004, when Hussein al-Huthi penned a letter to Ali Abdullah Saleh, lamenting
the president’s “displeasure” with him and proposing a kind of partnership. “I do
not work against you,” he wrote. “I appreciate you and what you do tremendously,
but what I do is my solemn national duty against the enemy of Islam and the
community . . . America and Israel.”47 This letter not only allowed al-Huthi to
present himself as a peacemaker but also helped reassert that the movement’s
primary enemies are the United States and Israel, and not Yemen’s government.
Similar messages have been communicated since the beginning of the Saudi-
led coalition’s intervention in Yemen, where Huthi leadership and media channels
signal to Riyadh that they are looking to improve relations and end the conflict.
The Huthis have consistently highlighted that the primary bad actors in Yemen
are the United States and Israel, not Saudi Arabia, which is merely a puppet to
Western powers. This depiction of the Saudi-American-Zionist aggression in
Yemen, as the Huthis often label it, leaves the door open for future negotiations,
with the understanding that the Huthis’ animosity toward Saudi Arabia lies in
its dependence on the United States, and not with the Kingdom itself.48 In 2017,
following the purge by Mohammed bin Salman of major figures in the royal
family, the Huthis said that they were “ready to offer sanctuary to any member
of the Al Saud family or any Saudi national that wants to flee oppression and
persecution.”49 In December 2020, when an oil tanker in Jeddah port came under
attack, Mohammed Ali al-Huthi said that the group would consider providing
protection to Saudi ports, considering “the apparent failure of America and Britain
[in doing so].”50 Whether these overtures are sincere or not, they indicate that the
Huthis use public messaging to enhance their legitimacy and communicate with
allies and rivals.51
In their ongoing effort to assert legitimacy, the Huthis employ state symbols
and rhetoric in their public messages.52 Like other rebel movements worldwide,
the Huthis have created a set of “parallel hierarchies” to attempt to destroy
the legitimacy of the internationally recognized government and secure the
establishment of a rival regime.53 For the purposes of media analysis, these parallel
hierarchies may include the cooptation of official state outlets under Huthi control,
the publication and promotion of national visions and economic plans, and
speeches delivered by Huthi officials wearing uniforms, badges, or other trappings
of state and military power.54
Some expressions of legitimacy in Huthi messaging demonstrate a dual public
image—that of a recognized authority and a supposed grassroots social justice
movement. The group’s media paints them as competent and legitimate political
leaders while harkening back to their humble origins in Saada and the guiding
vision of their founder, Hussein al-Huthi. While the Huthis certainly project an air
of authority and legitimacy, their rhetoric frequently highlights their perceived role
as an underdog in Yemen’s ongoing war. It is clear from their media productions
that the conflict itself—and the images and messages that accompany it—helps
sustain Huthi media productions and their propaganda machine.
Another notable linkage between Huthi messaging and statecraft is the role
that individual journalists and media personalities continue to play in Huthi
diplomacy. In 2019, the former head of Al-Masirah network, Ibrahim al-Dailami,
was appointed as the Sanaa government’s ambassador to Iran.55 In November 2020,
the journalist Abdullah Sabri was named as their latest ambassador to Syria.56
Remaining Dominant in the Modern Media Landscape
In territories under their control, the Huthis ensure that their messages are the
dominant ones by cracking down on opposition media within their grasp and
competing with outlets over which they have no control. Despite their efforts to
suppress independent media in northern Yemen, modern technology ensures that
the Huthis’ grip is not absolute, since all platforms and sources of information
cannot be blocked or censored. Internet proxies, though sometimes difficult to
use in Yemen due to poor connectivity, allow some access to restricted websites,
while platforms like WhatsApp and Signal can be used even with a weak internet
connection. Alternative and sometimes adversarial narratives emanating from
these outside networks create competition for the Huthis and compel them to
adapt and refine their media strategies.
One strategy employed by the Huthis is the circulation of various forms of
disinformation to promote their own narratives. Examples of disinformation
range from falsified videos released by high-level Huthi leadership to intentionally
misleading claims and obfuscation of important news stories. Huthi disinformation
is not always disseminated by the group’s leaders or official media outlets, but it
is frequently shared by supporting media personalities and Telegram channels.
Where each disinformation campaign originates is unclear, but many demonstrate
a degree of coordination between outlets and leadership.
Although the group relies on disinformation as a propaganda tool, the majority
of their output, especially on the most prominent Huthi channels, cannot be
classified as “fake news.” Outlets instead choose to report on stories that reinforce
their key narratives while omitting unfavorable news events, nuanced coverage,
or contextual analysis. For example, Huthi outlets and media personalities closely
tracked and shared developments related to the 2020 US elections and the siege on
the Capitol on January 6, 2021, and while the events they described did indeed take
place, Huthi media spun the stories to reflect the weakness of Western democracy
and the illegitimacy of American elections.57
An equally important component of the Huthis’ media strategy is the sheer
volume and diversity of content that the group produces on a daily basis, which may
help ensure that target audiences in Yemen’s north need not look elsewhere for any
form of media. The group seems to believe that providing audiences with content
beyond news reporting or official statements is an effective means of competition
in the media industry. New poems, infographics, radio dramas, and speeches are
circulated across platforms and channels so that their narratives inevitably become
the dominant ones in the territories they control. This strategy works in concert
with the spread of disinformation, as studies evaluating the so-called illusory truth
effect found that people tend to believe the pieces of information that they hear
most frequently, regardless of their veracity.58 Even the most media-savvy and
skeptical Yemenis are frequently exposed to Huthi narratives, and likely to accept
at least some of them as fact.
Many Huthi outlets boast an unapologetic Yemeni identity that gives them
a distinct advantage among local audiences. Most entertainment programs are
delivered in northern Yemeni dialects and many interviewers on channels like
Al-Hawya and Al-Eman don traditional outfits.59 Every facet of Huthi media is
imbued with Yemeni architectural and environmental motifs, and cultural and
historical references surface in most of their poetry. Huthi media prides itself on
being distinctly Yemeni by refusing to acquiesce to Western norms or attire.60 This
local character may give them an advantage among Yemeni audiences, who would
not be able to find similar programming within the more popular regional outlets
like Al Arabiya or Al Jazeera.
Even with their multifaceted strategy of disinformation, obfuscation, inundation,

and Yemeni-specific themes, the Huthis must contend with the pressure that
comes from the population under their control knowing that freedom of speech
and unfettered press coverage is largely absent. Possibly in an attempt to account
for this, and to give the appearance of permittivity, pro-Huthi outlets like Al-
Hawya are increasingly airing dissenting voices on their shows, within limits. One
example of this was seen in December 2020 when Al-Hawya aired an interview with
Yemeni journalist “Muḥaḍarat aṣ-ṣrkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn lis-sayyid Ḥusayn
Badr al-Dīn al-juzʾ al-Awwal”, in Sanaa, in which she condemned the Huthi coup
of 2014 and defended her use of the term “Huthi” rather than “Ansar Allah.”61 Al-
Masirah’s agricultural program, Al-Haql, also allows a space for farmers to vent
their frustrations with local officials and their lack of support. Popular Sanaa-based
YouTuber Mustafa al-Momari frequently and harshly criticizes Huthi leadership.
In May 2021, he was arrested by Huthi authorities but quickly released following a
request from Mohammed Ali al-Huthi and has since continued to produce videos.62
This degree of strategic flexibility, no matter how superficial, might indicate that
the Huthis are adapting to an ever-changing media environment and responding
to challenges that have accompanied their rise to power.
Still, censorship remains an essential tool that the Huthis utilize to maintain
control over local narratives. This tool is also used against the Huthis, as the group’s
most prominent media personalities find themselves subjected to restrictions on
their social media accounts, which are often suspended or blocked for suspicious
or violent content.63 To evade these restrictions, users will create substitute
accounts to which they quickly redirect their followers.64 This leads to a cycle of
duplication, detection, and suspension for many of these accounts on Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube.65 This is a distinct disadvantage for Huthi affiliates because
of the popularity of these platforms.
Other voices in Yemen’s conflict—including the government of Abdrabbuh
Mansour Hadi, the UAE-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council,
and even independent journalists—grapple with some of the same challenges
presented by the modern media landscape. Regardless of affiliation, those who
want to amplify their messages and attract followers must navigate barriers
posed by Yemen’s oversaturated and highly politicized media environment. Often
their strategies are informed by, and directly mimic, those of their rivals. As the
dominant political entity in Yemen’s north, the Huthis inform and react to the
messaging strategies of their adversaries.
What remains to be seen is how the Huthis will adapt their rhetoric and
public image to future stages of Yemen’s conflict and, eventually, peacetime. If
the group hopes to remain relevant in the long term, they will need to find new
ways of engaging domestic and international audiences and competing with rivals.
Depending on the trajectory of the movement and the conflict itself, this may mean
abandoning some of the more extreme elements of their messaging, such as the
sarkha, or doubling down on provocative and divisive rhetoric in order to appease
hardliners or foreign backers. Other political parties, independent journalists, and
even average citizens will be forced to contend with the media practices and public
messaging strategies that the Huthis have put in place in recent years. Regardless of
the outcome for the Huthis, the movement has likely enacted changes to Yemen’s
media environment that will remain for years to come.
Notes
1 IOM Yemen: COVID-19 Response Update, April 19–May 2, 2020, https://reliefweb.

int/report/yemen/iom-yemen-covid-19-response-update-19-april-02-may-2020
2 “Interview with Mohamed al Houthi.” BBC Arabic. June 14, 2020, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=ic_V8BcQbHc (accessed March 26, 2021).
3 “Houthi: Corona Is an American Invention.” Al-Alam. March 24, 2020, https://
www.alalamtv.net/news/4815296/‫أمريكية‬-‫صناعة‬-‫كورونا‬-‫( الحوثي‬accessed March 28,
2021); Raiman al-Hamdani and Robert Wilson. “Yemen’s Response to Covid-19:
Part I.” Political Settlements Research Programme. August 24, 2020, https://www.
politicalsettlements.org/2020/07/27/yemens-response-to-covid-19-part-i/ (accessed
March 28, 2021).
4 “Coronavirus Vaccine ‘Will Come from Yemen’, Houthi Health Minister Claims.” Al-
Araby, May 31, 2020, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/5/31/yemens-
houthis-claim-they-are-developing-a-coronavirus-vaccine (accessed March 28, 2021).
5 For the purposes of this chapter, “Houthi media” will include the outlets, channels,
and social media pages that are either operated by Houthi-owned entities or those
that are operated by the Houthis’ allies and prominent supporters.
6 “Soft War: Part I,” YouTube, August 11, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Z0tY_wP3-cs&list=WL&index=43&t=18s.
7 Zayd Baouh, “The Role of the Media in Countering Psychological Warfare,”
Ansarollah, March 19, 2017, https://www.ansarollah.com/archives/82906.
8 “Women and Soft War,” Telegram channel, established December 24, 2020. Accessed
March 26, 2021, https://t.me/joinchat/Twrq838Wg7ZtDGri.
9 Nadwa al-Dawsari, “The Houthis’ Endgame in Yemen”, Al Jazeera, December 21,
2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2017/12/21/the-houthis-endgame-in-
yemen/.
10 The Believing Youth was a social movement that sought to strengthen Zaydi identity
through religious training and youth activities. It arose in Sa'ada in the 1990s as a
result of domestic and political events.
11 Marieke Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, A History of the Houthi Conflict (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 37, 117, 135.
12 Barak A. Salmoni, Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells, Regime and Periphery in
Northern Yemen the Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 90–100.
13 Brandt 116.
14 “Muḥaḍarat aṣ-ṣrkha fī wajh al-mustakbirīn lis-sayyid Ḥusayn Badr al-Dīn al-juzʾ al-
Awwal,” Thaqafaqurania, YouTube, published January 20, 2014, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=U-SgKYLcEYs&t=456s.
15 Salmoni 115.
16 Brandt 133.
17 Ellen Knickmeyer, “Yemen’s Double Game,” Foreign Policy. December 7, 2010,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/07/yemens-double-game-2/ (accessed March 28,
2021).
18 Brandt 5.
19 Christopher Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to National Challenge,”
Carnegie Endowment, Middle East Program, Number 110, April 2010. 3, 5.
20 Robert F. Worth, “In Yemen, War Centers on Authority, Not Terrain,” The New
York Times. October 24, 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/world/
middleeast/25yemen.html (accessed March 28, 2021).
21 Casey Coombs, “In the Battles for Al-Jawf and Marib, Houthis Weaponizes
Sana’a-based Telecom Companies,” Al-Masdar Online. April 29, 2020, https://al-
masdaronline.net/national/716 (accessed March 28, 2021).
22 “As a nonstate entity, the Huthi organism has been able to astutely utilize both time-
tested and cutting-edge mechanisms and modes of ideological dissemination in a
much more effective and quickly evolving manner than the GoY [Government of
Yemen] itself.” Salmoni 217.
23 Johnny Fakhry, “ʾʿlām al-al-Ḥūthī fī Ḥiṣn Ḥizbu-allāh Daʿm wa- Tadrīb”
[“Houthi Media in the Lap of Hezbollah . . . Support and Training from
Beirut”], Al-Arabiya. June 10, 2020, https://www.alarabiya.net/arab-
and-world/yemen/2019/06/10/%D8%A7%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7
%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A-
%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85-
%D9%88%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AA.
24 Afrah Nasser, “The Yemen War, Media, and Propaganda,” Atlantic Council. May 3,
2017, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-yemen-war-media-and-
propaganda/.
25 Raiman Al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner. “Talking to the Houthis: How Europeans
Can Promote Peace in Yemen,” ECFR. October 14, 2020, https://ecfr.eu/publication/
talking_to_the_houthis_how_europeans_can_promote_peace_in_yemen/ (accessed
March 28, 2021).
26 “Who Are the Four Yemeni Journalists under Houthi Death Sentence?” Reporters
Without Borders (RSF). May 14, 2020, https://rsf.org/en/news/who-are-four-yemeni-
journalists-under-houthi-death-sentence (accessed March 28, 2021). It is worth
noting that although a number of journalists have been sentenced to death by Houthi
special courts, these sentences have not yet resulted in executions taking place.
27 Despite the Saudis’ access to advanced military capabilities, the Houthis attempt to
show that the righteousness of their cause always wins out in the end. One example of
these symbols is Abdul-Malik al-Huthi’s lighter, which he spoke of in a 2017 speech to
illustrate how the Huthis will defeat the world’s greatest armies with the simplest and
cheapest of tools. Lighters often show up in Huthi propaganda videos, accompanying
footage of burned Saudi tanks. See: “Mā Huwwa Sir al-Wallāʿa Al-Lattī Rafaʿhā Zaʿīm
Ḥarakat ʾAnṣār Allāh fī Wajh al-Suʿūdiyya” [“What Is the Secret of the Lighter that
the Leader of Ansar Allah Movement Raised in the Face of Saudi Arabia?”] Al-Alam,
February 11, 2017, https://www.alalamtv.net/news/1923623/-‫زعيم‬-‫رفعها‬-‫الوالعة‬-‫سر‬-‫ماهو‬
‫السعودية‬-‫وجه‬-‫في‬-‫هللا‬-‫أنصار‬-‫حركة‬-‫( التي‬accessed March 28, 2021).
28 “Al-Ḥarb ʿAlā As-silāḥ,” Al-ʾIʿlām al-Ḥarbī al-ʿAskrī, YouTube, March 19, 2021,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-o8GAd8Z9mI (accessed March 28, 2021) and
“Ḥakāyāt Ḥarb,” Al-Masirah, https://www.almasirah.net/category/175/102/%D8%
AD%D9%83%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B1%D8%A8 (accessed
March 28, 2021).
29 “Thāʾrāt.” Al-Masirah. https://www.almasirah.net/category/154/102/‫( ثائرات‬accessed

March 28, 2021). and “Masāʾl Fiqhiyya,” Al-Masirah, https://www.almasirah.net/
category/140/102/‫فقهية‬-‫( مسائل‬accessed March 28, 2021).
30 Sanaa Radio, http://www.sanaaradio.net/Default.aspx (accessed March 28, 2021).
31 Many pro-Huthi accounts on YouTube and Telegram have tens of thousands or
hundreds of thousands of followers. Some of the most popular pages are those that
post Huthi poetry, including Fatā Saʿda al-Thāʾr, which has 289,000 followers on
YouTube. See: Fata Sa’adah al-Tha’ir, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/channel/
UCz6PEKTwix_KGjicjH3ih-g (accessed March 28, 2021).
32 Al-Masirah Satellite Channel, Telegram, https://t.me/almasirah2 (accessed March 28,
2021).
33 “Frontlines of Self-Reliance,” zawāmil wa Anasheed, YouTube, October 31, 2020,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HzQF8JMt3uM&t=1s (accessed March 28,
2021).
34 “New Issa al-Layth Zamil for the Tribes of Haraz,” zawāmil wa Anasheed, YouTube.
June 16, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZsHaUtAHKY (accessed March
28, 2021).
35 Hassan Al-Mortatha, “The Yemeni Zamil from a Local Weapon to an Intercontinental
Weapon,” Al-Masirah. March 20, 2021, https://www.almasirah.net/post/148043/
36 Steven Charles Caton, Peaks of Yemen I Summon: Poetry as Cultural Practice in a
North Yemeni Tribe (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990).
37 Elisabeth Kendall and E. Stein, “Yemen’s al-Qa’ida and Poetry as a Weapon of Jihad,”
Twenty-First Century Jihad: Law, Society and Military Action (London: IB Tauris,
2015), 247–69.
38 “Elisabeth Kendall: Jihadi Poetry in Yemen,” Babel, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, March 24, 2020, https://www.csis.org/podcasts/babel-
translating-middle-east/elisabeth-kendall-jihadi-poetry-yemen (accessed March 28,
2021).
39 Houthi Telegram channels often publish the same zamil videos in three different
qualities: low, medium, and high. This allows even those with weak internet
connections to view the performances.
40 “Khandaq Waḥīd,” Zawaml, YouTube, October 9, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=pIIIUNWTSrE (accessed March 28, 2021) and “Qawm Qamāsa” Wiḥdat al-
ʾIntāj al-Fannī- al-ʾIʿlām al-H̱arbī al-ʿAskkarī, YouTube, November 11, 2020, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=_QFOxCDynbk (accessed March 28, 2021).
41 Al-Masirah, Al-Mortatha, al-Zāmil al-Yamanī min Silāḥ Maḥlī ilā Silāḥ ʿĀbir li-l-Qārāt,
https://www.almasirah.net/post/148043/‫للقارات‬-‫عابر‬-‫سالح‬-‫إلى‬-‫محلي‬-‫سالح‬-‫من‬-‫اليمني‬-‫الزامل‬
42 “The UN is an Official Partner in the Aggression and Blockade in Yemen,” Al-Sahat
Reports, YouTube, July 9, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V9DW5Hi2IVI
(accessed March 28, 2021) and “The One Who Controls the Nations,” Artistic
Productions Unit—Yemen War Media, YouTube, July 18, 2020, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=6JMv1atJHyg (accessed March 28, 2021).
43 “Aḥfād Bilāl,” zawāmil wa Anasheed, YouTube, July 1, 2020, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=ckbFaEjRaAo&t=18s (accessed March 28, 2021).
44 Al-Masirah Satellite Channel, Telegram, June 14, 2020, https://t.me/almasirah2/54934
(accessed March 28, 2021) and “Leader of the Revolution: I Call on the Official
Authorities to Launch a Long-term National Program to Take Care of Bilal’s
Descendants,” Al-Majlis Al-Zaydi Al-Islami, June 18, 2020, http://www.zaidiah.com/
news/8074 (accessed March 28, 2021).
45 Qatari and Turkish outlets, such as Al Jazeera and TRT often host Huthi spokesmen.
CNN Arabic and other channels have also featured interviews with some leaders,
including Mohammed Ali al-Huthi. “With Mohammed Ali al-Houthi,” CNN Arabic,
YouTube, March 13, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cSxCzj7MLRM
46 For a few examples of fake news in Huthi-affiliated media, see “The Truth of
USAID’s Military Activities in Yemen,” Yemen Press Agency, July 8, 2020, http://
www.ypagency.net/274581 (accessed March 28, 2021) and “See Pictures of Sana’a
Forces Raising the National Flag above Marib Dam,” Yemen Press Agency, March 7,
2021, http://www.ypagency.net/344480 (accessed March 28, 2021).
47 Published in Yemen Times, June 28, 2004 and quoted in Wedeen, Lisa, Peripheral
Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2008), 155.
48 Hannah Porter, “What an End to Yemen’s Conflict Will Mean for the Houthis,”
LobeLog, September 4, 2019, https://lobelog.com/what-an-end-to-yemens-conflict-
will-mean-for-the-houthis/ (accessed March 28, 2021).
49 Faisal Edroos, “Houthis Offer Saudi Princes Political Asylum in Yemen,” Al-Jazeera,
November 7, 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/7/houthis-offer-saudi-
princes-political-asylum-in-yemen (accessed March 28, 2021).
50 Mohammed Ali al-Huthi, Twitter post, December 14, 2020, https://twitter.com/Moh_
Alhouthi/status/1338598031470579714?s=20.
51 One pro-Huthi entertainment channel on YouTube with almost 700,000 followers
released a short fictional clip of two Huthi soldiers risking their lives to provide
Saudi soldiers with food and water. Messages like these are an attempt to depict the
inherent morality of Huthi troops while also asserting that peace can exist between
the two sides. “A Yemeni Surprises His Saudi Opponent with Food,” Abu Ali Channel,
YouTube, May 10, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=whv_aGtr6SE (accessed
March 28, 2021).
52 “Rebels often seek to bolster their authority by borrowing ruling practices developed
by the nation-state, most directly by setting up governments that mimic the form and
practices of the national governments they seek to replace.” Mampilly, Zachariah,
Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life During War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2015), 82, 89.
53 Eqbal Ahmad, “Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency,” Guerrilla Strategies:
An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gerard Chaliand
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 241–62. Quoted in Mampilly in Rebel
Rulers, 2015. 13.
54 After their arrival in Sanaa, Huthi forces seized or shuttered most news outlets in the
capital, including Al-Thawra newspaper and Yemen TV, among many others. For
some of these outlets, Hadi’s government has set up mirror sites, effectively creating
multiple news entities under the same name that represent opposing sides. See
Huthi-run SABA Net (https://www.saba.ye/ar) and the Hadi government-operated
site (https://www.sabanew.net/). For political visions, see “Text of the Document
Presented by ‘Ansar Allah’ for a Comprehensive Solution to the War in Yemen,” Al-
Alam, April 8, 2020, https://bit.ly/3ie6JTf.
55 “Ibrahim al-Dailami, ambassador of the Republic of Yemen to Iran,” Al-Ahed News,
August 17, 2019, https://www.alahednews.com.lb/article.php?id=9836&cid=123
56 “Republican Decision to Appoint Abdullah Sabry as Yemen’s Ambassador to

Syria.” SABA News Agency, Sanaa. November 11, 2020, https://www.saba.ye/ar/
news3115773.htm.
57 “‘Demagoguery’ of Trump Reveals the Shame of Fake American Democracy . . .!”
Al-Masirah, January 9, 2021, http://www.almasirahnews.com/59846/ (accessed March
28, 2021).
58 Lisa K. Fazio, et al. “Knowledge Does Not Protect against Illusory Truth,” Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General 144, no. 5 (2015): 993–1002.
59 “Nine-thirty,” Al-Hawya, YouTube, March 28, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jNu2GTSmtLc (accessed March 28, 2021) and “Be Aware,” Kun Wāʿiyyan
Al-Eman, http://www.alemantv.net/VideoGalleary/5/ً ‫واعيا‬20%‫كن‬20%‫( برنامج‬accessed
March 28, 2021).
60 Abdul-Malik al-Huthi spoke about the West’s attempts to impose their clothing styles
on Yemenis in a speech on the anniversary of Hussein al-Huthi’s death. “Text of the
Leader of the Revolution’s Speech on the Anniversary of the Martyr Leader,” Saba
Net, March 10, 2021, https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3132041.htm (accessed March 28,
2021).
61 “Special interview with Yemeni media figure Mona Safwan,” Al-Hawya Channel,
YouTube, December 24, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YR6dA4RH0-I.
Another example of dissent being make public is the Huthi-run channels that air
parliamentary sessions, where members criticize the Sanaa government’s policies.
See al-Barlamānī ʿAbdu Bashar Yafḍaḥu Jamāʿat al-Ḥūthī fī Mudākhaltihi Khilāl
Jalsat Majlis an-Nuwwāb bi-Ṣanʿāʾ [“Parliamentarian Abdo Bashir Shames the
Houthi Group in His Comments during the House of Representatives Session in
Sana’a”], Al-Yemen Al-Jumhuri, YouTube, July 28, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=2rmEp8yFFJc (accessed March 28, 2021).
62 Shāhidū Limādhā Tamma Iḥtijāzī fi-l Maḥkama wa Kayfa Kharajtu wa Kayfa kān
al-Taḥqīq maʿī Muṣṭafā al-Mūmrī [“See Why I Was Detained and How I Was
Released”], Mustafa al-Momari, YouTube. May 31, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=NlCdrLBMI94
63 Following the US government’s short-lived designation of the Huthis as a foreign
terrorist organization, many social media pages associated with the group were
blocked or suspended, including on YouTube and Facebook. Throughout the conflict,
Huthi accounts on Facebook have been blocked.
64 Dhaifula Shami, Twitter account, https://twitter.com/DhaifulahShami (accessed
March 28, 2021).
65 Huthi spokesman Muhammad Abdelsalam warns his followers in his pinned tweet to
not fall for fake duplicate accounts, explaining that this page is his “certified account.”
Huthi members usually cannot get their accounts certified by Twitter, which leaves
them vulnerable to copycats. See Muhammad Abdelsalam, Twitter post, March
31, 2018, https://twitter.com/abdusalamsalah/status/979953011651956737?s=20
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politicalsettlements.org/2020/07/27/yemens-response-to-covid-19-part-i/ (accessed
March 28, 2021).
Al-Huthi, Mohammed Ali, Twitter post, December 14, 2020. https://twitter.com/Moh_
Alhouthi/status/1338598031470579714?s=20 (accessed March 28, 2021).
Kendall, Elisabeth, and E. Stein. “Yemen’s al-Qa’ida and Poetry as a Weapon of Jihad.”
Twenty-first Century Jihad: Law, Society and Military Action (London: I.B. Tauris,
2015), 247–69.
Knickmeyer, Ellen. “Yemen’s Double Game.” Foreign Policy. December 7, 2010. https://
foreignpolicy.com/2010/12/07/yemens-double-game–2/
Mampilly, Zachariah. Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).
Masāʾl Fiqhiyya, Al-Masirah, And “Masa’il Fiqhyah.” Al-Masirah. https://www.almasirah.
net/category/140/102/‫فقهية‬-‫( مسائل‬accessed March 28, 2021).
Nasser, Afrah. “The Yemen War, Media, and Propaganda.” Atlantic Council. May 03,
2017. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/the-yemen-war-media-and-
propaganda/
Porter, Hannah. “What an End to Yemen’s Conflict Will Mean for the Houthis.” LobeLog.
September 4, 2019. https://lobelog.com/what-an-end-to-yemens-conflict-will-mean-
for-the-houthis/ (accessed March 28, 2021).
Salmoni, Barak A., Bryce Loidolt, and Madeleine Wells. Regime and Periphery in Northern
Yemen the Huthi Phenomenon (Santa Monica, CA: R and, 2010).
Sanaa Radio. http://www.sanaaradio.net/Default.aspx (accessed March 28, 2021).
Shami, Dhaifullah. Twitter account. https://twitter.com/DhaifulahShami (accessed March
28, 2021).
Wedeen, Lisa. Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2008).
Worth, Robert F. “In Yemen, War Centers on Authority, Not Terrain.” The New York Times.
October 24, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/world/middleeast/25yemen.
html (March 28, 2021).
158
8
T H E H U T H I Z A M I L : F O L K L I T E R AT U R E O R
P R O PAG A N DA ?
Emily J. Sumner
1. I said “in the name of God” at the gates of Najran

We tear out the enemy’s forts from their roots
2. The victory is like the sun, clear to see:
I imagined its lightning shining in Nahuqa
3. We’ve tasted their crimes in shapes and colors
And today what we’ve tasted they must taste
4. Oh, whoever wants greatness moves now
Over the Saudi, oh men, over him!
5. We continue our mission to Salman’s palace
And whoever has a right takes his rights!
6. I swear I won’t be humiliated by America
Everyone’s desire is stirred to plunge into battle!
7. If they gather Pharaoh, Qarun and Haman
In our sea their sins must drive them
8. If with arms march the humans and jinn
[We are] confident in the victory of God, completely confident
9. And the battle has witnesses and proof
And nothing holds back the power of the Most Merciful
10. Ring the bell, oh every marksman and swordsman!
And this victory we passionately desire—its lightning gleams
11. Oh God! This oppressor tyrannized aggressively
Guide our aim, we shut them upi
i
1. ‫سميت باسم هللا على أبواب نجران‬
‫نقلع حصون المعتدي من عروقه‬
2. ‫والنصر مثل الشمس واضح لال عيان‬
‫خيلت براقه لمع في نهوقة‬
3. ‫ذقنا جرايمهم على أشكال وألوان‬
‫واليوم ما ذقناه الزم يذوقه‬
Introduction
The poem above is a Huthi zamil (plural, zawāmil).1 The zamil is a genre of oral
poetry embedded in Yemen’s social fabric.2 As occasional poems that emerged
from tribal areas, they give shape to events of communal importance, from the
joy of weddings to the upheaval of war. Zawāmil proliferate in Yemen’s transitional
moments,3 and the current civil war is no exception. In the areas under Huthi
control, zawāmil particular to their cause are omnipresent. They blare at military
checkpoints, official political events, and workplaces; they are chanted among
children at play and enjoyed in private homes. They can also be found at local
cultural circles that the Huthis have set up in neighborhoods. As one interlocutor
told me, “Yemenis live on zawāmil.”4 Furthermore, on social media, Huthi
zawāmil spread rapidly. Reactions on sites such as YouTube demonstrate they
are appreciated in Yemen and beyond. Elsewhere, I analyze how a Yemeni family
experiences the Huthi zamil and the practices with which they perceive the poems
to be enmeshed.5 In this chapter, I turn to the continuities and tensions that erupt
when considering the zamil as folk literature with potent historical precedence, on
the one hand, and a media tool of the Huthis, on the other. First, I review scholars’
definitions of the genre and its social role—not because I believe scholars enjoy
ultimate authority in how to define the zamil (they do not)—but because these
definitions offer a background upon which to draw comparisons between poems
that carry the name zamil. Then, I contrast two Huthi poems with another pair
composed in the early to mid-twentieth century, as the imamate was crumbling.
In so doing, I identify sites of tension in the genre; hypothesize how and why the
Huthis find them useful; and call for future research.
Consistent with many zawāmil that have come before it and continue to be
composed today, the Huthi zawāmil are composed in dialect; rely on shared
4. ‫يامن يريد العز يتحرك اآلن‬

‫فوق السعودي يا الرجاجيل فوقه‬
5. ‫نواصل المشوار لقصرسلمان‬
‫وكل من له حق ياخذ حقوقه‬
6. ‫أقسم قسم ما أنا لألمريكي مهتان‬
‫كلن لخوض المعركة هز شوقه‬
7. ‫لو يجمعوا فرعون قارون هامان‬
‫في بحرنا الزم ذنوبه تسوقه‬
8. ‫لو بالمدرع يزحف اإلنس والجان‬
‫واثق بنصر هللا كامل وثوقه‬
9. ‫والمعركة فيها شواهد وبرهان‬
‫وقوة الرحمن ما شي يعوقه‬
10. ‫دق الجرس يا كل رامي وطعان‬
‫والنصر ذي نهواه الحت بروقه‬
11. ‫يا هللا ذا الظالم طغى ظلم عدوان‬
‫سدد مرامينا نسدد حلوقه‬
. The Huthi Zamil 161
lexicon and imagery; draw upon tribal, religious, and nationalist discourses;
and constitute groups and their positions on social issues. In contrast to the folk
zamil, Huthi zawāmil contain more verses, feature electronic instrumentation, and
integrate melodies from other genres of poetry. Furthermore, the poems I analyze
here suggest that the Huthis shift the crux of the poetry’s message to hinge upon
religious ideology. Taken together, these changes signal that the Huthi zawāmil do
not function as a dialogic form of public discourse among local groups; the Huthis
do not aim to contribute to public discourse but to dictate it. By entrenching their
religious ideology within language typical of the zamil and disseminating their
poems far and wide, the Huthis create a finely tuned media and recruitment tool.
The Zamil: Origin, Classification(s), Definition(s)
Scholars agree that zawāmil are historically rich, communal, chanted poems
associated with tribes.6 One manner in which Yemenis occasionally illustrate the
historical potency and social power of the genre is through an origin story. In the
tale, Yemeni tribesmen cower from Roman warriors in a cave. While in hiding,
they hear the chanting of poetry, and then see clouds of dust, indications of jinn
waging war. The poetry compels the tribesmen to emerge and resume their fight.
Yemenis have composed and performed zawāmil ever since.7 Regardless of the
truth of this story, it positions the zamil as a centuries-old practice. Yemeni literary
scholars categorize the zamil as one of Yemen’s folk arts (funūn shaʿbiyya) or a
folk literature (ʾAdab Shaʿbī), thereby associating it with the common man.8 Al-
Baradduni concludes that the zamil is a product of “the details of life” (ʾItqān al-
Ḥaya) and the “intuition of the ordinary person” (badihat al-Insān al-ʿĀdī).9 This
may be a romanticization of the zamil, as most Yemenis do not consider themselves
tribal,10 and many did not grow up with the zamil in their communities. However,
the perception that the zamil connects with the average Yemeni is worth noting,
as the Huthis appear to be aware of that view. This, perhaps, contributes to their
decision to invest in the form as a backbone to their media campaign.
When scholars discuss the zamil, several recurring characteristics surface.
Zawāmil are performed in groups and include a rhymed poem chanted to a
melody. They also engage with a specific social issue.11 The relationship between
the zamil and the group is a defining one, both in terms of the group’s performance
and their connection to the subject matter. One Yemeni scholar notes the two
essential characteristics of the zamil are “a group of chanters and the expression of
the group, not the individual” (jamāʿat al-ʾInshād wa-l-taʿbīr ‘an al-kull lā ‘an al-
fard).12 The syntactic root of the zamil is consistent with this observation. It carries
the meaning of a clamor of voices in one derivation (azamil) and a troop in another
(zumla). During the performance, chanters often march toward their audience;
the bar‘a, a tribal dance, is also sometimes featured.13 For example, in 2019 a dance
troop performed the bar‘a for a large crowd to the zamil, “Maghāzī al-Layl” (night
raids) in Sanaa, as part of the events on the National Day of Steadfastness, meant to
commemorate four years of withstanding the Gulf coalition’s air campaign against
the Huthis.14 Zawāmil are not only performed for war; they are also performed
at other significant events, such as weddings, political rallies, tribal conferences,
and religious festivals.15 Unsurprisingly, it is common for the poems’ discourse
to reference tribal values and customary law, thereby participating in the cultural
context from which it came.16
The Zamil as Performance
The zamil does not merely express perspectives; the genre creates and
maintains groups along with their positions. To discuss the zamil’s social role
is to consider the performance of identities as well as their position in public
discourse. Zawāmil, along with other forms of poetry, were indispensable to the
creation of Yemeni national identity, particularly because of their prevalence on
the radio and circulation via audio cassettes.17 Some nationalists of the 1950s
attribute their initial conceptualization of Yemen as a nation (waṭan) to zawāmil
they heard performed by the imam’s poets in their villages as young boys.18
‘ʿAly ʿAbdallah Ṣāliḥ’s regime capitalized on the zamil to construct tribal and
national identity.19 This is not only true for Yemen. Zawāmil were performed
at key moments, such as national day, to celebrate Sultan Qaboos’ reign in
Oman and are now being composed in honor of his successor.20 Strategic use
of a cultural practice for the production of a specific identity or ideology, such
as nationalism, is well known in the Middle East and elsewhere, known as
invented traditions.21 The work of the Huthi zamil should be understood in
relation to other invented traditions and cultural practices, not as operating by
an entirely separate logic.
The link between the zamil and identity formation is consistent with Caton’s
case study of the zamil among tribesmen in the Yemeni highlands, in which he
theorizes the poems as persuasive rhetoric.22 His argument rests upon language’s
ability to index specific identities (in this case, the honorable tribesman) in
mutually understood social worlds. In his study, the zamil provides a medium
for debate and negotiation between two conflicting tribes. The parties build
their perspectives through the poems, create their own honorable identities, and
situate them in the social context in such a way that makes it possible to imagine
a solution. The more aesthetically pleasing the poem and the more adeptly the
language indexes and situates identities, the more persuasive the zamil.
As is often the case with Huthi zawāmil, zawāmil motivate warriors and instill
fear in adversaries when used as weapons of “psychological war that precedes
physical war” (ḥarb nafsiyya tasbiq al-ḥarb al-fi‘liyya).23 The relationship between
the zamil as performance and waging war is quite evident. Zawāmil provide morale
for fighters prior to battle, a form of ḥamāsa (excitement) poetry. The symbols of
the Huthi media campaign and the lyrics to their zawāmil provide evidence for
its role in waging war. For example, the YouTube channel Zawāmil wa-anashid
features a gun with notes emerging from its snout.24 Furthermore, consider verse
three of the popular zamil “Armies of God in Ma’rib”:
Allah is great! Its echo blazes inside [of them].

My rifle in the conflict performs its songs.25ii
In the second hemistich of the zamil above, the rifle is likened to a musical
instrument, hence it “performs its songs,” thereby constructing an analogy between
the art of the zamil and that of war. The verse opens with invocations of “God is
great,” resounding within the self, just as the zamil’s chants echo through the air,
activating the emotions of those who hear it. Similarly, another zamil that appears
later in this chapter declares, “‘God is Great!’ raises the morale,” invoking the very
effect the zamil aims to realize.
The Zamil in Yemen’s History
Because zawāmil express public opinion, they are often integrated into Arabic and
English narrations of Yemen’s history and politics.26 Zawāmil offer insights into how
groups experienced pivotal events, and bear upon the present. For example, in 2020
the Huthis launched a fresh offensive against the tribes of al-Bayda’, and amid his
analysis of the developing situation, one analyst notes that zawāmil “immortalized”
the Zaydi imam’s attacks on the Sunni tribes of al-Bayda’ in the early and mid-
nineteenth century, implying the zawāmil preserve animosity and impact how the
tribes perceive the Huthis.27 The zawāmil’s citation in historical, political, and literary
texts is indicative of their role in transmitting history; in the words of Diane Taylor,
the zamil is part of the Yemeni repertoire that makes its way into the archive.28 If
written poetry belongs in the archive and oral poetry belongs in the repertoire, the
zamil is a prime example of how the oral and written are co-implicated.
ii
1. ‫استنفري يا جيوش هللا في مأرب‬
‫وقت النقا حان ويل المعتدي ويله‬
2. ‫جنود ربي حماة الدار تتأهب‬
‫والجن واإلنس واالمالك تصغي له‬
3. ‫هللا أكبر صداها في الحشا يلهب‬
‫وبندقي في الخصم يدي مواويله‬
4. ‫صنعاء بعيدة قولو له الرياض أقرب‬
‫يا بندقي ال هنت سامرني الليلة‬
5. ‫القوم شبت نكفها للقاء ترغب‬
‫كال حزم عدته وأسرج على خيله‬ ً
6. ‫قولو لسلمان ماله مننا مهرب‬
‫حتى ولو في بطون األرض نأتي له‬
‫هذا اليمن من تجاهلنا فقد جرب‬
‫المعتدي يالغبي يبشر بتنكيله‬
Zawāmil from the Archive: Lexicon and Imagery
Zawāmil composed by both republicans and royalists in the 1960s continue to

resonate within Yemeni discourse today. Below is a zamil exchange from the civil
war following the 1962 revolution. The poems are from a series that circulated
widely and are quoted in several texts on Yemen, in Arabic and English, with
slight discrepancies from source to source.29 The initial zamil expresses the view of
those from the tribes of Khawlan who supported the royalists, attributed to either
Shaykh Nājī bin ʿAly al-Ghadīr or Nasir Ahmad al-Faqih:
Tiyal Peak announced and every mountain in Yemen answered:

We won’t become Republicans ever, even if we vanish from the Earth,
Even if yesterday comes after today or the sun sets in the South [Aden]
And the Earth blazes fire and the rain clouds rain bullets.iii
And here is the response attributed to either al-Shaykh Salih Bin Naji al-Ruwayshan
or Ahmad Muhammad al-Qiri:
We said please excuse us [we] track and pursue those who are fickle
With Migs and Ilyushins, with helicopters, especially black ones.
The battle of rifles and MIs won’t strike planes.
Oh Naji, tell al-Hasan and al-Badr, silver has become copper.iv
The zawāmil above are not unusual in their form, lexicon, and imagery. As
expected with poetic sparring, they carry the same meter and rhyme. This
creates a dialogic structure; in other words, a process of mutual meaning-
making occurs. My interpretation is generally consistent with those of other
scholars, with some variance in translation and subsequent reading that may
be due to relying on different Arabic sources. In my translation of the first line,
the mountain itself announces, and the other peaks respond, capturing nature’s
personification. The mountains are a metaphor for the speaker’s tribe and the
other tribes of Yemen (the word shāmikh carries the double meaning of a proud,
notable person and a mountain). Tiyal Peak is a mountain in northern Yemen
where the tribes of Khawlan live. Mountains are often addressed in the first
line, a worn-in metaphor for the tribesman.30 The second hemistich of the first
iii
1. ‫الطيال أعلن وجاوب كل شامِ خ في اليمن‬ ّ ِ ‫َحي ِد‬
‫ما با نجمهر قط لو نفنى من الدنيا خالص‬
2. ‫لو يعقب أمس اليوم واال الشمس تغرب من عدن‬
‫واألرض تشعل نار وأمزان السماء تمطر رصاص‬
iv
1. ‫قُلنا اسمحوا عفوا ً قَفا ما قد تليون والتون‬
‫بالميج واليوشن مع بو مروحة والسود خاص‬
2. ‫ما يقرع الطيار حرب الشرف وال ميم ون‬
‫قُـل للحسن والبدر يا ناجي قد الفضة نحاس‬
verse names the group’s position: in opposition to republicans. The initial poem
is “a logic built entirely out of paradoxes.”31 Depictions of nature illustrate the
impossibility of embracing republicanism.32 Zawāmil often depend upon similar
analogies between nature and society.33 In this case, nature participates in the
war itself. Notice that in the second verse clouds rain bullets and the earth burns.
No matter how violent the earth may seem, or how out of the ordinary (such as
the sun setting from the south), Yemen will never be a republic. The imagery
effectively communicates the steadfastness and bravery of the royalists who
refuse to succumb.
The first hemistich of the response begins playfully, even cheekily: “please
excuse us.” The syntactic field associated with the Arabic term “fickle” in the
same hemistich carries the meaning of changing color. Hence, the tribesmen
from the previous poem are the exact opposite of what they claim—not steadfast,
but as variable as shifting hues. In the next two lines, the royalists are chased
by large weapons that dwarf their own outdated, futile guns.34 Finally, in the
last hemistich, the poet tells the composer of the first poem to return to the
imam, al-Badr, and al-Hasan (al-Badr’s uncle) to inform them that silver has
become brass. This is in itself clever, as it returns us to “fickle” by connoting
changing color. There are multiple interpretations for the last line.35 One scholar
suggests support for the Hamid al-Din dynasty is akin to owning a single silver;
its value has been reduced to that of copper because of the royal family’s greed
and corruption.36 Another reads the line as meaning Hamid al-Din’s allies are
not sincere but merely bought.37 An additional interpretation is that while it
seemed previously impossible for Yemenis to form a republic, circumstances
have changed. Similarly, while we may think silver can never become copper, it
in fact already has.38
This exchange provides a model for historical zawāmil. They are short and
clever; personify nature and make special mention of Yemeni land, especially
mountains; mention weaponry; and glorify a certain masculinity, one associated
with the honor of a tribesman and his steadfastness and bravery. These zawāmil
also offer two opposing perspectives in a moment of tumult in Yemen’s history, in
conversation with one another. Now, let us turn to the Huthi zamil.
The Huthi Zamil
In the following, I draw attention to the shared lexicon, language register, and
imagery between the Huthi zamil and its predecessors. I then observe a number
of differences before focusing on a select few to hypothesize the zamil’s utility
for the Huthis. By this I am not suggesting that the Huthis do not also use
traditional folk zawāmil, nor that communities have stopped composing their
own zawāmil, but that concurrently, the Huthis have also invested themselves in
proliferating a divergent mass-media form that shares the same name. Among
the key differences between the traditional and Huthi zamil are the longer-
length and monologic structure alongside an increased emphasis on religious
rhetoric signaling a Huthi ideology. Based on these observations, the Huthis aim
to dictate public discourse instead of contributing to it, to constitute followers
out of their listeners and inspire Yemenis to take up arms for them. Instead of
dialogic, mutual meaning-making, the Huthis attempt to saturate the public
sphere with their narrative.
Examples
The zawāmil I take up below are performed by ʿIssā al-Layth, the most popular
zamil performer for the Huthis and regularly featured on their media network.39
Many of his zawāmil enjoy hundreds of thousands, even millions, of views on
YouTube and many comments.40 Zawāmil are shared on multiple social media
outlets, including Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram. The tweets, chats, comments,
and number of views reveal the zawāmil are vastly popular, with commenters
claiming they come from all over the Arab world. Some comments simply contain
greetings, while others, among other things, praise the quwwa (strength)41 of the
zamil, and call for God to bring the Huthis victory.42
First, I turn to the zamil “‘God is Great!’ raises the morale”:43
1. “God is Great!” raises the morale.

God is Great! Repeat, oh squadrons!
2. We mobilized for the Lord of the Heavens.
Squadrons of the Leader [assembled] for plunging to their deaths!
3. When the sky rains smart bombs,
And the earth shatters in shards,
4. Fire blazing from every galaxy,
And the army surrounds me from every corner—
5. God witnesses us at all times.
We attack making them swallow death’s chalices
6. There’s no way we would submit. There’s no way,
there’s no way!
7. We sold ourselves to the Creator with honest intentions.v
v
1. ‫هللا أكبر ترفع المعنويات‬
‫هللا أكبر رددي يا سرايا‬
2. ‫حنا تجندنا لرب السماوات‬
‫كتايب القائد لخوض المنايا‬
3. ‫لو السماء تمطر قنابل ذكيات‬
‫ شظايا‬..‫واألرض تتفجر شظايا‬
4. ‫والنار تشعل من جميع المجرات‬
‫والزحف حولي من جميع الزوايا‬
5. ‫يشهد علينا هللا في كل األوقات‬
‫نغزي نجرعهم كؤوس المنايا‬
‫هيهات منا الذل هيهات هيهات‬
‫بعنا من الخالق بصدق النوايا‬
This poem shares some of the folk zamil’s common features, such as an opening
line which hails the audience, constituting a subject and demanding a response.
Hence, the second hemistich orders the group: “Repeat, oh squadrons!” The
remaining verses describe the squadrons’ actions. Like most zawāmil, the poem is
in dialect. The poem is short for a Huthi zamil, but on the longer side for the genre
as a whole. Like many zawāmil, the poem references weapons—in this case, smart
bombs in verse three. In terms of imagery, nature is intimately involved in the war
being waged. Finally, the poem emphasizes the steadfastness of the army in the
face of violence and calamity. Despite the cosmos (every galaxy in verse four) and
the earth breaking apart from the raining “smart bombs,” the army never backs
down, as noted in verse six. Courage in war is implied in the actions of the soldiers,
a common theme in zawāmil.
Not only does this poem fit into the zamil tradition but it actually bears striking
similarities to the zamil “Tiyal Peak announced and every mountain in Yemen
answered”; at the very least this indicates that there are certain conventions that
Huthi zawāmil share with their predecessors. Verses three, four, and the first
hemistich of verse six create similar subjects, brave and steadfast fighters who will
never back down, and use the same imagery to do so. For example, both use the
verb tushʿil for blazes and the verb tumṭir (rains) to portray weapons falling from
the sky and Creation aflame. Nature turns against the subjects, but the fighters
remain defiant in the face of it. Furthermore, both poems express loyalty to ahl al-
bayt, the family of the Prophet. The earlier zamil implies support for the imamate,
while “‘God is Great!’ raises the morale” declares allegiance to the sayyid ʿAbdul
Malik al-Ḥūthī (“the leader” in verse two).
However, there are differences between the poems. The dialect, melody, and
instrumentation in the Huthi zamil resemble another form of oral poetry, the Gulf ’s
shayla. One indication of this is that the dialect is not distinctly Yemeni as opposed
to that of the Gulf.44 In addition to the language, Huthis have integrated melodies
from the shayla into their zawāmil, diverging from the traditional melodies
associated with specific regions and tribes of Yemen.45 Furthermore, folk zawāmil
are not typically performed with musical instruments, with the exception of the
drum, and are not considered songs (ʾaghānī) but chants.46 However, in the zamil
above, there is electronic instrumentation. The use of technology to manipulate
the voice and add sound effects is similar to what is sometimes found in both the
shaylat and religious anashid; for both genres, many listeners and composers claim
the production is not music, despite the musical quality.47
Monologic Discourse
The Huthi zamil is also longer than the folk zamil. Zawāmil are usually short,
often only two verses, and not usually more than eight.48 Shorter length is in
keeping with the poems’ social function: a conversation between two sides about
a communal issue. Like most conversations, zawāmil are often improvised. They
are also performed by a large group. Hence, it is logical for the poem to be short
in order to facilitate turn-taking, improvisation, and live performance. Of course,

recordings and social media do not require improvisation and offer opportunities
to record more than once for accuracy and quality of performance. However, the
length of Huthi zawāmil suggests that the social function differs from that of the
traditional zamil; the zamil is not a conversation but rather monologic discourse
to create Huthi supporters.
Yemen’s decentralized recording industry historically facilitated public dialogue
on audiocassettes; this polyvocality contributed to multiple conceptualisms of
solidarity beyond state-driven nationalism.49 Bid‘ wa-jawāb (call-and-response)
poetry, such as zawāmil, created discursive spaces for public exchanges of
opinion.50 In contrast, one dimension of the Huthi zamil is that, at the very least
on social media, it is not a conduit for sustained poetic dialogue. While responses
to Huthi zawāmil on social media in the tradition of call-and-response are not
absent, they are not the norm; when there are responses, the message of the poems
reflects a polarization of views.51 The Huthis commission poets to write zawāmil
and a single performer records them, after which they are spread widely on social
media. Instead of one community engaging with another in an exchange of views,
the Huthi zawāmil are composed, produced, and disseminated from a nexus of
power. The Huthis built a resilient media that strategically embeds Huthi ideology
within a form that is held dear in Yemen, considered “the expression of the people
directly,” to return to al-Baradduni. In the Huthi zamil above, al-Layth is the single
performer, but his voice is manipulated on the recording to mimic a group. Even
though the zamil is meant to express the opinions of a group, the Huthi zawāmil
use technology to create the illusion of group performance. The poetic voice calls
upon fighters to take heart and remain steadfast in their commitment to fighting
for God. The Huthis present their ideology as truth, and the zamil is one method
to spread that truth to the populace through a cultural form that, deceivingly in
this case, is known for lively debate.
Religious Discourse
This brings me to a striking characteristic of a large body of the Huthi zawāmil:

religious discourse that increasingly signals Huthi ideology. While the zamil
emerged from tribes and prioritizes vocabulary indexing honor, many Huthi
zawāmil, the one above among them, frame acts of violence for their cause as
synonymous with religious duty. The Huthi zawāmil do not abandon tribal
vocabulary nor do they ignore honor, but honor is at the service of piety. Piety,
in turn, entails taking up arms for God, which often corresponds with fighting
for Huthi leadership. Notice that despite both “Tiyal Peak announced and every
mountain in Yemen answered” and “‘God is great!’ raises the morale” advocate for
the continued rule of the Prophet’s family, the latter explicitly ties religious duty
to the fighter’s mobilization and bravery in battle. While verses three and four
capture the violence the fighters face, the surrounding verses frame the fighters’
bravery and steadfastness as animated by faithfulness to God. Furthermore, verse
two equates “mobilizing” for God with dying for al-qāʾd (leader), who is most
certainly ‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi.
By bringing attention to the religious discourse in Huthi zawāmil, I am not
suggesting that piety did not surface in zawāmil previously. Consider the following
poetic exchange, in which royalists accuse the republicans of abandoning their
religion to Egypt (who was supporting the republicans at the time), and emphasize
their loyalty to al-Badr, the last imam of Yemen:52
1. My mighty peace to you from an army that hasn’t become Republican,

That doesn’t want Egypt’s apostasy or religion.
2. Our imam is al-Badr as long as rain falls from the sky,
“Allah is Great!” upon all his enemies.vi
The republicans responded:
1. Egypt didn’t say “apostatize,” she said “liberate!”

You didn’t understand the speech’s correct meaning.
2. It is the will of destiny and fate for al-Badr to disappear.
By God, those you’re waiting for have already gone.vii
The Huthi zawāmil are not charting a completely new trajectory but expanding
upon a discourse that already exists, and at certain junctures becomes pronounced.
It is not a question of whether or not piety appears in zawāmil but shifts in
emphasis and degree that occur in relation to other tribal values, especially honor,
in specific socio-historical moments. In contrast to the civil war in the 1960s,
after the establishment of the republic, the imamate was usually framed in terms
of darkness and backwardness, while the republic stood for development and
modernity.53 Writing several decades after the September 26 Revolution, Caton
argues that the zamil constructs an honorable person, not necessarily a pious
one. The distinction between honor and piety, and the emphasis on one or the
other in performative constructions of the self, depends upon context and the
social work a given performance aims to do. In keeping with his conclusion,
during the years leading up to the 1994 civil war, when the zawāmil enjoyed a
resurgence and featured prominently in the tribal conferences, Paul Dresch and
Bernard Haykel note that “an Islamist zamil is so far a contradiction in terms.”54
vi
1. ‫جيش ما جمهر‬ ِ ‫يا سالمي َجبَ ْر مِ ْن‬
‫ما يبى َمص َْر ال ُك ْفر ْه والدِينِه‬
2. ‫طر‬ ُ ‫در ما دام السماء تُم‬ ِ َ‫إمامنا الب‬
‫وأكبر هللا على منهم معادينه‬
vii
1. ‫اتحرر‬
َّ ‫َمصْر ما قالت اكفُر قالت‬
‫ما فهمت الحكا ويش انت من عينه‬
2. ‫القضا والقدر شاء البدر يتزفَّر‬
‫وهللا انه سرح ياذي مراعينه‬
Tribes, while valuing Islam, have a rhetoric of their own.55 Dresch and Haykel were
discussing a very different Islamic group (Islah), but the implication holds: the
zamil was perceived by many tribesmen at the time as a genre specific to them
which privileged tribal discourse, thereby prioritizing honor without disregarding
piety. It was not primarily a vehicle for religious ideology, which is precisely how
the Huthis now use it. Religious discourse is central to Huthi zawāmil. In fact,
they contain explicit phrases that signal their ideology. The use of certain terms
such as ʾaʿlām, the way of guidance, and explicit references to Huthi leadership are
common in zawāmil as the years of the conflict lengthen and the Huthis reinforce
their hold over parts of Yemen. I now turn to another zamil as an example of how
the Huthi religious ideology intertwines with tribal and nationalist discourse to
interpellate the Huthi fighter.
The following poem, performed by al-Layth, was published on social media in
May 2020:56
1. Tribes of al-Mahwit oh soldiers of Islam,
They plant their noble deeds and harvest their fresh dates.
2. I bear witness that they are Yemen’s armor and [safety] belt,
And if they [the tribes] boast in their lineage, they are the origin of Arabs.
3. Men who walk in the way of guidance, behind al-ʾaʿlām,
Allah gave the tribes of Mahwit the honor of supporting His religion
4. And the tribes of Milhan and al-Rujum and Shibam came,
The earth shakes with the strength of their clamor.
5. And the tribes of al-Khabt in the face of the enemy are a mighty sword,
they burn the armies of the enemy with their flame.
6. And from al-Tawila is a people far be it from them to accept tyranny,
If they want glory they will get it.
7. And the tribes of Hufash, if the battle erupts and death hovers
Throw at the heads of the enemies their shooting stars.
8. And every honorable person from the tribes of Bani Sa‘d, if they rise up,
Oh woe, woe to whoever ignores their wrath.
9. After the son of Badr al-Din, in obedience and with bravery, walk
Soldiers of the Path and declaration of war is in their holster
10. Their constitution is al-Qurān, their law and order
They take the reason for dignity and sacrifice for the sake of it
11. Their history has risen for al-naqāʾ,
The best and brightest of the country.viii
viii
1. ‫قبائل المحويت يا جند اإلسالم‬
َ ‫تزرع مكارمها وتحصد ُر‬
‫طبها‬
2. ‫وأنا أشهد أنهم لليمن درع وحزام‬
‫وأصل العرب ال اتفاخرت في نسبها‬
3. ‫رجال ت َمضي بالهدى خلف األعالم‬
‫هللا بتأييده لدينه وهبها‬
ْ
Before providing a brief analysis of the zamil, I touch upon two genealogies
that come to bear upon this poem. Real or imagined, they remain pertinent to
Zaydi Islam (from which the Huthis emerge) and Yemeni tribes: the Adnanis and
Qahtanis. The Adnanis are from northern Arabia, while the Qahtanis hail from the
south.57 The sada, as descendants of the Prophet, belong to the Adnanis. The sada’s
time in Yemen began in the ninth century when the first Zaydi imam was invited
to Sa‘da to act as a mediator between the tribes.58 Beginning in the 1950s and
especially after the revolution, public discourse drew from these two genealogies
to position the sada as intruders, even colonizers, who were not truly Yemenis.59
In this view, an authentic Yemeni is Qahtani.
Despite the ambivalent relationship between Qahtanis and sada, vom Bruck
claims tribesmen and sada value kinship and bloodlines.60 Particularly for the
northern areas of Yemen, she draws a connection between Zaydi theology and
tribal concepts of authority and morality. For both, “the idiom of knowledge and
pre-eminent heredity”61 played an essential role in determining who was fit to rule,
within the Zaydi imamate and tribal leadership; embodying the moral potential
that your heritage bestows upon you is paramount. In Zaydi Islam, the imam
can err; furthermore, legitimate leadership, while from within ahl al-bayt, is not
necessarily passed from father to son. Instead, being a descendant of the Prophet
means to share Muhammad’s ṣulb or substance.62 This substance is a potentiality
that must be developed by the individual as he seeks knowledge (‘ilm).
To return to the poem: the first hemistich hails the subjects as both tribesmen
and soldiers of Islam, signaling the tribal and religious discourses that animate
the entire poem. The second hemistich of the verse names the actions that index
both identities: noble deeds.63 In the second verse, the poem lauds the tribes of al-
Mahwit as “the origin of the Arabs,” a reference to the tribes of Qahtan. To boast
of their lineage is to boast of their moral standing and valor as well as to activate
4. ‫وان اقبَلت ملحان والرجم وشبام‬

‫تزلزل الدنيا بقوة لَ َجبها‬
5. ‫صمصام‬ ِ ‫سيف‬ َ ‫وال َخبْت في وجه ال ِعدَى‬
‫تحرق ُحشُود ال ُمعتدِي مِ ن لهبها‬
ِ
6. ‫ومن الطويلة قوم هيهات ت َنضام‬
‫ال ش َّم َرت للعز تلحق طلبها‬
7. ‫و ُحفاش ال ثار الوغى والفنا حام‬
‫ترمي على روس االعادي شهبها‬
8. ‫وكل نَشمي من بني سعد ال قام‬
‫يا ويل ويله من تجاهل غضبها‬
9. ‫بعد ابن بدر الدين تسليم وإقدام‬
‫جند المسيرة والنَقا في جعبها‬
10. ‫دستورها القرآن مشروع ونظام‬
‫تاخذ وتعطي للكرامة سببها‬
11. ‫على النقا والعز تاريخها قام‬
‫من صفوة أخيار البالد ونخبها‬
a sense of unity among the tribesmen. It reinforces their indigeneity to Yemen

and therefore authenticity. Activating Yemeni nationalism and tribal genealogy
in a single line, the poem positions the tribesmen as warriors of glorious heritage,
united against those who would threaten Yemen.
Verses four to eight name specific tribes in al-Mahwit, such as Milham, Khabt, and
al-Tawila. The language in these verses is reminiscent of an apocalyptic judgment,
with the tribes burning the enemy with “flames,” and “shooting stars” while “the
earth shakes.” This imagery and set of metaphors are not out of place for the zamil
genre: nature and weapons intermingle, with galaxies, jinn, rain, and mountains all
taking part in war. In this case, nature wages war alongside the tribesmen; God’s
creation brings judgment upon those who abuse power. Hence, in verse six the al-
Tawila tribes do not “accept tyranny,” a reference to those who go beyond the limits
that God has set. The poet is galvanizing the tribes by way of flattery, boasting of the
tribesmen’s honorable deeds and praising their prowess in war.
Verse three and verse ten justify the tribesmen fighting for the Huthis on the
basis of genealogy and religious knowledge, thereby capitalizing on the affinity
between Zaydism and tribalism to maximize the poem’s persuasive power. The
tribesmen are those who walk “in the way of Guidance behind al-ʾaʿlām.” “The
way of guidance” is a common phrase used by the Huthis. The term means notable
figures, but for the Huthis, it is linked to the leadership of ahl al-bayt, and ‘Abd
al-Malik al-Huthi in particular. The term for knowledge, ‘ilm, shares a lexical
root with ‘alam. Although the term does not necessitate a religious affiliation or
leadership, in the context of this poem the term connotes both. In conjunction
with “the way of guidance,” al-ʾaʿlām serve as signposts for the tribesmen as they
seek God’s path; they are the rightful religious leaders by virtue of their genealogy
(that of the Prophet), religious knowledge, and embodiment of values such as piety,
humility, generosity, and courage.64 The second hemistich of verse three makes
honor subject to piety—to follow the path of the Quran behind the Prophet’s
family is itself an honorable deed, an honor granted by God Himself.
Then, verse ten specifies who of the Prophet’s family is leading them: the son
of Badr al-Din al-Huthi (‘Abd al-Malik al-Huthi). In case it was not clear that “the
path of guidance” refers to Huthi ideology specifically, verse nine references al-
masira, short here for al-masīra al-Qurʾāniyya, a term for the Huthi movement,
specifically embodying the teachings of Husayn al-Huthi and adhering to the
Quran through direct action; it is also the name of the Huthis’ official media
outlet. Obedience and bravery animate the soldiers, framing submission to Huthi
leadership as a glorious deed. In short, these verses attempt to reconcile Huthi
ideology with tribal ethos by interpellating honorable fighters of glorious heritage
who recognize the role of the Prophet’s family in leading them; the call to action is
justified in general terms to the tribes of Mahwit in the first three verses, and then
calls upon specific tribes and names Huthi leadership in verses four through nine.
Finally, verses nine and eleven contain a single word that carries two distinct
meanings: al-naqāʾ. Generally, the word means purity. In tribal code, however, the
term means a state of warfare in which killing the enemy is not shameful.65 Both
meanings carry weight in these verses: in verse nine, al-naqāʾ is in the tribesmen’s
holster as they submit to Abd al-Malik al-Huthi, referring to the purity they
embody by following the righteous path. Verse eleven closes the poem by praising
the tribesmen as those making history for “war (naqa) and glory,” signaling the
second meaning. In short, fighting for the Huthis is a pure act, justifiable under
tribal law, and a glorious deed.
This zamil works to persuade the tribesmen that rallying behind the Huthis is
akin to pledging allegiance to God and is inextricably linked to their identities as
honorable tribesmen, pious Muslims, and Yemeni citizens.
Conclusion
My interlocutors describe the Huthi zawāmil as quite persuasive and part of a

larger campaign to recruit Yemenis to the Huthi cause. Beyond Yemen, regional
audiences enjoy the zawāmil, as is clear from the viral zawāmil on social media.
The Huthi zamil deserves further attention from a variety of analytical angles, some
of which I engage in here and others that surface tangentially and require further
study, such as elucidating the Huthi zamil’s relationship to the Gulf shayla and
religious anashid.66 This chapter investigates the Huthi zamil in relationship to the
genre broadly understood; it details the primary discourses, imagery, and lexicon
on which the poetry relies, and then observes the genre’s transformation into a
media tool for the Huthis. As the Huthis have tightened their grip on northern
Yemen, their ideology has made its way into the poems, first by shifting the focus
to more greatly emphasize piety, and now by explicitly invoking Huthi leadership
as the rightful leaders. The Huthis do not break from folk zawāmil completely;
they rely on historically used lexicon and imagery. This, of course, only serves to
reinforce Huthi legitimacy and position the Huthi zamil as distinctly Yemeni. The
Huthis take a dynamic cultural form that continues to play an important role in
Yemeni life, transforming into a cog in their expansive media campaign, a strategic
rendering of a well-loved folk art.
Notes
1 ‘Isa al-Layth, “Zāmil: Samayt bi-smi-llah ʿalā ʾAbwāb Najrān,” YouTube video, 3:46,
posted by “Zawamil Ansar Allah,” December 2, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=lVkLbzSQGK8. Translation my own.
2 Salih bin Ahmad bin Nasir al-Harithi, al-Zāmil fi-l-ḥarb wa-l-munāsābāt (Sanaa: al-
Jumhūriyya al-Yamaniyya, Wizārat al-Thaqāfa wa-Siyāḥa, 2004), 61.
3 Marieke Brandt, e-mail to the author, September 16, 2020.
4 Sanaa resident, phone conversation with author, March 2019; Emily J. Sumner,
“Experiencing the Huthi Zamil,” Arabia Felix Center for Studies, April 29, 2021,
https://arabiafelixstudies.com/experiencing-the-huthi-zamil.
5 Ibid.
6 ʿAbdallah al-Baradūnī, Funūn al-ʾAdab al-Shaʿbī fi-l-Yaman (Bayrūt: Tanfīdh
Dār al-Bārūdī, 1998); Steven Charles Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon” Poetry as
Cultural Practice in a North Yemeni Tribe (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1990); al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat; Flagg Miller, The Moral
Resonance of Arab Media: Audiocassette Poetry and Culture in Yemen (Cambridge,
MA: Distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of Harvard University by
Harvard University Press, 2007), 101; Ahmad Muhammad al-Shami, Qissat al-ʾAdab
fi-l-Yaman (Sanaa: Maktabat al-ʾIrshād, 2007).
7 Al-Baradduni, Funun al-adab al-shaʻbi, 136–7.
8 Al-Shami, Qissat al-adab, 161–3; al-Baradduni, Funun al-adab al-shaʻbi, 147–9;
Sumner, “Experiencing the Huthi Zamil.”
9 Al-Baradduni, Funun al-adab al-shaʻbi, 149.
10 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 198.
11 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb, 123–9; Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 130.
12 ʿAbdal ʿAzzīz Al-Maqāliḥ, “al-Taqdīm,” in al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, ed.
al-Harithi, Salih bin Ahmad bin Nasir (Sanaa: al-Jumhuriyya al-Yamaniyya, Wizarat
al-Thaqafa wa-l-Siyaha, 2004), 11.
13 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 130.
14 Firqat ʾAshbāl Ṣaʿda, “Raqṣat Barʿ min firqat ʾAshbāl Ṣaʿda fī maydān al-sabʿīn
bi-l-ʿāṣṣima”’, ” YouTube video, 7:09, filmed on March 26, 2019, posted by “Maktabat al-
Yaman li-l-Marʾiyyat,” March 27, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yen0aaky-
YQ.
15 Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 8.
16 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb, 44–54.
17 Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen (Chicago
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 44; Miller, The Moral Resonance
of Arab Media, 24–9.
18 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 44–5.
19 Najwa Adra, “Dance and Glance: Visualizing Tribal Identity in Highland Yemen,”
Visual Anthropology (Journal) 11, no. 1–2 (1998): 55–102. https://doi.org/10.1080/089
49468.1998.9966746.
20 For examples of zawamil in Oman, see Quwwāt al-Firāq, Mahrajān al-ʿīd al-Waṭanī
al-ʾArbaʿīn al-Majīd 29-11- 2010 Salṭanat ʿUmān “Opening of Oman’s 40th National
Day Festival,” YouTube video, 2:00:36, filmed on November 29, 2010, by OmanTV,
posted by “Nibrās ʿUmān-Marʾiyyāt ʿUmān,” https://youtu.be/gUaU3-Whoc0;
Ahmad Diqal, “Zāmil Dhifārī li-l-Shāʿir Aḥmad Dagal ʾIhdāʾ ilā al-Sulṭān Haytham
bin Tāriq āl-Saʿīd al-Muʿaẓẓam Ḥafiẓahu Allāh,” YouTube video, 3:19, posted by Said
Alawaid for Heritage, September 4, 2020, https://youtu.be/mbXbwnzKy9w.
21 E J Hobsbawm (Eric J) and T. O. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); for discussions surrounding the Arabian
Peninsula and invented traditions, see Adra, “Dance and Glance”; Karen Exell and
Trinidad Rico, “‘There Is No Heritage in Qatar’: Orientalism, Colonialism and Other
Problematic Histories,” World Archaeology 45, no. 4 (October 1, 2013): 670–85,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00438243.2013.852069; Sulayman Khalaf, “Poetics and
Politics of Newly Invented Traditions in the Gulf: Camel Racing in the United Arab
Emirates,” Ethnology 39, no. 3 (2000): 243–61, https://doi.org/10.2307/3774109.
22 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 155–79.
23 Al-Baradduni, Funun al-adab al-shaʻbi, 142.
24 “Zawamil wa-anashid,” YouTube channel, published April 17, 2016, https://youtube.
com/Zawamel.
25 ‘Isa al-Layth, “Zāmil Ṣanʿāʾ Baʿīda Qūlū Lahu al-Riyāḍ ʾAqrab,” YouTube video,
5:36, posted by “Sana’a boy fata San’a’ al-tha’ir,” December 31, 2015, https://youtu.
be/3tRFJdzQwZw. Translation mine.
26 For examples of zawāmil referenced within texts, see Dresch, A History of Modern
Yemen, 95, 135–6; Zayd Muṭīʿ Dammāj, Al-Rahīna (Bayrūt: Dār al-ʾAdāb, 1984),
19, 152; Maged al-Madhaji, “Al-Bayda Governorate: Too Strategic to Be Forgotten,”
Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies, June 4, 2020. https://sanaacenter.org/publications/
analysis/10137
27 al-Madhaji, “Al-Bayda Governorate.”
28 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the
Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003).
29 Caton and al-Harithi analyze this poetic exchange: Caton, Peaks of Yemen I Summon.
150–3; al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-al-munasabat, 292–3; See also Dresch, A
History of Modern Yemen, 95; Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 46–7.
30 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 142–3.
31 Ibid., 151.
32 Ibid.; al-Harithi, 292–3.
33 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 145–6, 151.
34 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 150–3; al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-al-
munasabat, 292–3.
35 Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 152.
36 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-al-munasabat, 292–3.
37 Al-Harithi, A History of Modern Yemen, 95.
38 phone conversation with author, January 9, 2021.
39 See his YouTube page, where he enjoys 366,000 subscribers at the time of writing. ‘Issa
al-Layth, “‘ʿIssā al-Layth—Issa Allaith,” YouTube channel, published May 25, 2017,
https://www.youtube.com/c/IssaAllaith/featured (accessed March 27, 2021).
40 Ibid.
41 Husayn al-Faqih (@ntw8C26eerXuzX4), “quwa al-quwa,” Twitter, March 9, 2021,
12:51pm, https://twitter.com/ntw8C26eerXuzX4/status/1369360086469128193?s=20.
42 Ibid. Examples of comments on a zamil video: (Mohamed Aziz Amazighi), “May
God protect you oh heroes of beloved Yemen, greetings from the heart of Tunis the
Green”; comment on Issa Allaith, “Zamil: the decisive path, Issa al-Laith, words by Abd
al-Rahman al-Khatib,” https://youtu.be/oZq2e3AWvWI; (Mohamad Faroukh), “Our
warmest greetings to Yemen from Syria glory to Happy Yemen,” February, 2021, ibid.;
(Lemine Moosa), “My greetings to you from Libya,” February, 2021, ibid.; (Leader Sino),
“May God bring you victory, my greetings to the brave Houthis from Iraq,” February,
2021, ibid.; (Hussaini Al-Hawa), “May God preserve you and make you victorious, our
Yemeni brothers, your Iraqi brother,” February 2021, ibid. Translations mine.
43 ‘Isa al-Layth, “Zāmil Yamanī Allāhu ʾAkbar Tarfaʿu al-Maʿnawiyyāt” YouTube video,
3:33, posted by “Ibrahim al-Maghrabi zawamil Yemeniyya,” November 4, 2015,
https://youtu.be/3TTLDR3mnQA.
44 Mohammed al-Mahfali, written communication to the author, January 27, 2021.
45 Ibid.
46 Adra, “Dance and Glance,” 76; Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 105.
47 Nelly Lahoud, “A Cappella Songs (Anashid) in Jihadi Culture,” in Jihadi Culture:
The Art and Social Practices of Militant Islamists, ed. Thomas Hegghammer
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 42–62, https://doi.
org/10.1017/9781139086141.003
48 Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 101; Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,” 127.
49 Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 389, 104, 403, 428–9.
50 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, 27; Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 46.
51 Emily Sumner, “The Righteousness of the Houthi Zamil” (Working paper, Middle
East Studies Association Annual Conference, San Antonio, Texas, 2018).
52 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, 177. Translation mine.
53 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 144.
54 Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel, “Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and
Tribesfolk in Yemen,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 4 (1995):
418. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020743800062486
55 Dresch and Haykel, “Stereotypes and Political Styles,” 418.
56 ‘Isa al-Layth, “Zāmil Qabāʾl al-Maḥwīṭ,” YouTube video, posted by “Isa al-Layth—
Issa Allaith,” May 30, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mhQZLIjLD_M.
Translation mine.
57 Wedeen, Peripheral Vision, 171; Gabriele vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in
Yemen: Ruling Families in Transition, Contemporary Anthropology of Religion (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 10.
58 vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen, 36–7.
59 Ibid., 53–6.
60 Ibid., 203.
61 Ibid.
62 vom Bruck, Islam, Memory, and Morality in Yemen, 103–4; cited in Sumner,
“Experiencing the Huthi zamil.”
63 Miller, The Moral Resonance of Arab Media, 448; Caton, “Peaks of Yemen I Summon,”
29–49; 112.
64 Abdullah Hamidaddin, e-mail to the author, March 14, 2021.
65 Al-Harithi, al-Zamil fi al-harb wa-l-munasabat, 46.
66 Sumner, “Experiencing the Huthi Zamil.”
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17, 2016.
Section III
RE-ENGINEERING THE STATE

180
9
“S TAT E” A N D C O E R C I V E P OW E R I N Y E M E N : T H E
H U T H I S A N D T H E T R I BA L - SE C TA R IA N F I E L D
Anthony Chimente
Introduction
Neo-patrimoinalism largely characterizes how the late Yemeni President Ali

Abdullah Saleh managed the machinery of the state and solidified power in
North Yemen and subsequently the Republic of Yemen for nearly thirty-four
years. President Saleh accomplished this by establishing robust and overlapping
patron-client networks within this system to cull opponents and secure the
subservience of important social, political, economic, tribal, and military elites.
More significantly, the very nature of the system meant that no single entity could
accumulate power sufficient to pose a threat to the regime. The distribution of
patronage and patrimonial affiliations allowed the president to cohere much of
society around a central authority and maintain the subservience of the officer
corps, and as head patron, President Saleh was able to capture the monopoly over
the coercive instruments of violence.
This environment produced a patrimonial army, whereby the distribution of
patronage linked the institution’s survival to the president. In this regard, the neo-
patrimonial system established by President Saleh arguably constituted a Weberian
state construct; “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of
the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Weber 1946, 4).
However, following 2011 and the collapse of the regime, the nature of state
power and civil-military relations in Yemen fragmented, whereby power dissipated
away from the central authority and settled around sub-state actors. The collapse
of the neo-patrimonial state and dissolution of coercive power gave birth to a
nascent political field in Yemen. As a result, the new realities of this political field
demonstrate the “state is not always ontologically distinct from non-state actors”
and the conflict taking hold in Yemen “is better understood as a struggle over
who controls the state, rather than as a conflict between the state and a non-state
actor” (Claussen 2018, 561). Indeed, numerous non-state actors are now vying
to control the economic landscape and assert dominance over the monopolies of
violence across Yemen. The “state” remains fractured into three main competing
political-military entities claiming legitimacy: the internationally recognized

government relocated in Aden, the “quasi-state” of the Huthi insurgents based in
the capital Sanaá, and the self-proclaimed and secessionist Southern Transitional
Council (STC) in Aden and the immediate surroundings. In the eastern part of
Yemen, local authorities remain formally under the internationally recognized
government (as seen in the Mahra governorate).
Indeed, the political and military fragmentation of Yemen is also recognized
by the Yemeni populace, with half the population affirming no single actor holds
the political dispensation nor a monopoly of violence according to a survey by the
Yemeni Polling Center (Transfeld 2019, npn). In particular, the Huthi rebellion
and its ability to capture the dispensation of power across much of the country
emerged from the decline in state capacities and dissolution of coercive power
away from the center and into the periphery.
To be sure, the institutional erosion of the Weberian state necessitates the sub-
communalization of violence and unfolds the dispensation of power around sub-
state actors. A new structure of “civil”-military relations is therefore emerging in
fragmented states across the region to include Yemen. Accordingly, this chapter will
evaluate the nature of civil-military relations in future Huthi-controlled areas by
applying the conceptual approach of the tribal-sectarian field—a novel framework
to understand the dispensation of power when the Weberian state construct has
collapsed and non-state actors are now the focal point of power. A brief discussion
of the conceptual approach will be conducted, followed by an application of
the three frames—tribalism and communalism, patrimonial economy, and
external actors—to understand the predominance of the Huthi movement and
to theoretically situate the nature of civil-military relations in Huthi-dominated
territories. It is unlikely that the previous centralization of political power will
be tenable in post-conflict Yemen, and equally unlikely that the monopolies of
violence will be centralized under the central authority as experienced under the
rule of President Saleh. The chapter will conclude by reviewing the likely nature of
“civil”-military relations in Huthi-governed areas based on the application of the
conceptual approach and proceed to highlight that, for historical and theoretical
reasons, a coherent, national military subservient to the state will fail to emerge in
Yemen over the medium term, even following the cessation of hostilities. Therefore,
a fragmented monopoly of violence is likely to persist where multiple non-state
actors continually strive to build and expand coercive power to centralize control.
Conceptual Approach
While this chapter focuses on civil-military relations, the conceptual approach

of the tribal-sectarian field is a novel way to conceptualize the “state” or “civil”
component in the military nexus across the Middle East given the fragmentation
of the central authority and sub-communalization of violence. In this vein, the
dispensation of power is settling in the hands of non-state actors, as evidenced in
Syria, Libya, Iraq, and Yemen. To be sure, the ongoing crisis in Yemen epitomizes
. “State” and Coercive Power in Yemen 183
the dissipation of power dissipating away from the Weberian state construct and
around armed, non-state actors. The sub-communalization of the monopoly of
violence and dissipation of power away from the central authority underscores
the collapse of the Weberian state construct as a given referent object of analysis
in the study of civil-military relations in fragmented states such as Yemen. This
actuality necessitates the need for a new conceptual approach to understand this
nascent environment of civil-military relations whereby non-state actors are
increasingly emerging as the purveyors of force while equally accumulating the
political power necessary to challenge the feeble position of the central authority.
Consequently, this section will introduce the conceptual framework of the tribal-
sectarian field by discussing key theoretical assumptions, while also highlighting
how the framework will assist in elucidating the nature of civil-military relations
in Huthi-controlled areas specifically and across Yemen more generally.
Conceptually, the nature of warfare within the tribal-sectarian field is
characterized as a battlefield of “varying combinations of networks of state and
non-state actors” (Kaldor 1990, 2). Within this milieu of “new wars,” “ethnic,
religious, or tribal” considerations are the motivation for societal segments vying
in war (ibid.). In line with Susser, Kaldor argues the saliency of sub-state identities
results from “the erosion of more inclusive (often state-based) political ideologies
like socialism or post-colonial nationalism” (ibid.). The “state,” in accordance with
the “new” contours of the battlefield, illustrates a devolution of state capabilities,
institutional strength, and cohesion at the hands of sub-state actors and solidarities.
The conceptual approach of the tribal-sectarian field is underpinned by and
developed from the works of Uzi Rabi: The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society:
Oman under Saʻid Bin Taymur, Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States, and
Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. Based on his
examination of the development of the Omani state, Rabi determined that “[t]he
state should not be seen as an independent political actor but rather as a ‘political
field,’ i.e., an arena in which diverse actors compete for influence and resources.
Political landscapes in this context should not be seen in a fully-fledged ‘Weberian’
manner, dominated by a rational bureaucratic model” (Rabi 2006, 3). Rabi noted
that the “state” within this political field ebbs and flows between “weakness and
strength, and between losing or acquiring state attributes, or ‘stateness’” (ibid.).
As such, the ability of the central authority to exercise a monopoly of violence
is unequivocally a fundamental attribute of “stateness” and a measure of state
capacity.
Similarly, Migdal demonstrates how the state is conceptualized as “a mélange
of social organizations,” with ethnic sectarian, cultural, and state-based
institutions denoting these societal clusters (Migdal 1988, 14), and “the state is
one organization among many” (ibid., 28). The focal point of Migdal’s model is the
ever-present rivalry between the “state” and social organizations for social control
and the dispensation of power. In this political field, innumerable societal actors
compete for resources and power in a political environment, whereby “the state
is one organization among many” (Migdal 1988, 28). Accordingly, the state and
actors within the polity shouldn’t necessarily be held a priori; that is to say, there is
a constant interplay among the forces whereby “[s]tates may help mould, but they
are also continually molded by, the societies within which they are embedded”
(Migdal et al. 1994, 2).
Charles Tilly holds that the use of force and monopolies of violence are
inextricably linked to the notion of legitimacy and the process of state formation.
Tilly interprets legitimacy as “the probability that other authorities will act to
confirm the decisions of a given authority” (Tilly 1985, 171). Tilly argues that war-
making, state-making, protection, and extraction are on a continuum leading to
statehood, with all four components mutually reinforcing and contingent “on the
state’s tendency to monopolise the concentrated means of coercion” (Tilly 1985,
181). All four aspects are mutually reinforcing and depend “on the state’s tendency
to monopolise the concentrated means of coercion” (ibid.). Thus, the preservation
of force and the consistent monopoly of violence establish and prolong legitimacy.
This understanding will allow the chapter to demonstrate the inherent connection
between state legitimacy and the monopolies of violence.
Invariably, a state’s failure to control the organized means of violence indicates
a regression along the continuum of state formation. Within the tribal-sectarian
nexus, the sub-communalization of violence away from the central authority
and armed forces captures the process of state degradation. More broadly, the
incorporation of Tilly’s work with the tribal-sectarian nexus points to the crisis
of legitimacy now faced in fragmented states that stem from the inability of
weak central authorities to fully control the monopolies of violence. The three
frames of the conceptual approach are communalism, patrimonial economy, and
external actors which assist in providing an understanding of state cohesion and
in determining the dispensation of power.
Overall, the chapter will examine the role and impact of the three conceptual
frames on the dispensation of power and civil-military relations in territories under
Huthi control. Thus, the model will highlight where the “Weberian” construct of
the state has fragmented, and tribal identity, confessional loyalty, external actors
and patrimonial economy might come to determine the role that coercive actors
could presently play, and illuminate the factors informing the dispensation of
power within the “state.”
Tribes
Across the Middle East, tribal forces can have a direct impact on military cohesion
and the nature of power in the tribal-sectarian nexus. In this regard, military
disintegration and the decline of the central authority provide the space for armed,
non-state actors and sub-state solidarities to gain power. The rising prominence of
these actors and associated loyalties “call into the question the political authority of
states and their continuing monopoly on legitimate violence” (Berzins and Cullen
2003, 11). Indeed, this problem becomes pronounced within fragmented states,
where the sub-communalization of violence has often eclipsed state-sanctioned
monopolies of violence.
In certain cases, tribal fidelity serves as a stronger sense of deferential respect

and consciousness which supplants and surpasses that of national identity of the
territorial state. In this regard, while the tribe as a social organization is waning,
Tibi argues that “the tribe as a referent for social identity and loyalty has persisted”
(Tibi 128, 1990). Furthermore, the steadfast nature of tribal identity and fidelity
proved problematic as a competing form of identity against the state, and as such,
tribal affiliations and loyalty can erode the cohesiveness of the state (Kostiner 2008,
22–3). However, tribes are not fundamentally opposed to the central authority, nor
are they organizationally structured in a hierarchical manner. As such, “[t]ribal
leaders, or Shaykhs, do not have unconditional authority over their tribes or their
members,” and consequently, a “Shaykh’s legitimacy and authority depend on his
ability to provide for his constituents” (al-Dawsari 2018, 19).
Because the term “tribe” has been used to characterize a number of social
organizations or groups, a precise “all-encompassing definition is virtually
impossible to produce” (Khoury and Kostiner 1990, 15). However, tribal solidarity
and the ability of the tribe to act as a unified organization are two aspects this
chapter will incorporate into the model of the tribal-sectarian field. The notion of
kinship, in conjunction with the cohesive power of solidarity, results in the tribe
best understood as a polity. Indeed, as Tibi argues, “the tribe as a referent for social
identity and loyalty has persisted” despite the advent of the modern “state” and
state-orchestrated forms of allegiances (Tibi 128, 1990).
Patrimonial Economy
The patrimonial economy approach within the framework is “concerned with

the interaction of political and economic processes in a society. It focuses on
the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals,
and on the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships
over time” (Collinson 2003, 10). Pointedly, the frame examines the level of
corruption, criminality, and patronage that underpins the modes and means of
exchange between elites and militia, or armed, non-state actors. Based on this
understanding, patronage, or the distribution of material incentives in exchange
for loyalty is a focal aspect in understanding the patrimonial economy of the sub-
communalization of violence. In this regard, patrimonial economy is utilized to
illustrate how the “state” organizes and distributes the nation’s wealth, along with
how this wealth can also be manipulated by non-state actors to secure loyalties and
fortify their own power. In such environments, “[t]he system as a whole is held
together by the oath of loyalty, or by kinship ties (often symbolic and fictitious)
rather than by a hierarchy of administrative grades and functions” (Clapham 1985,
48). In this system, a specific relationship of mutual exchange can be described
as either patronage, clientelism, or patron-clientelism (Lemarchand and Legg
1972, 151–2). During times of state coherence, this system entails the regime
“distributing jobs and money in exchange for loyalty from its citizens” (Bank and
Schlumberger 2004, 51). Consequently, loyalty and political acquiescence in this
environment are established through the distribution of resources or through acts

of corruption and criminality.
Warlordism is an integral component of the sub-communalization of violence
and the dissolution of state power. In such an environment, warlords are one of the
myriad non-state actors (Kaldor 2013, 2). The nature of warlordism is characterized
by a leader who both exercises considerable economic and military strength and
can mobilize manpower for combat. This is important because the theoretical
approach holds the “state” to be on an equal playing field relative to other societal
actors, and Warlords in this sense exercise “civil” power and command large militia
that often eclipse the militia of the “state.” This leader will also have a great amount
of autonomy relative to the central authority (Freeman 2015, 179).
Warlords can often be former regime elites, who utilize their wealth and
networks of patronage to maintain armed militia in the wake of state fragmentation.
Consequently, patronage is useful when discerning patterns of solidarity. The
model holds the advent of warlordism to be more pronounced following the
elite fragmentation of a patrimonial state, or one in which patrimonialism and
patron-client relations heavily influence the nature of power and authority. Part of
this has to do with how the regime and the army fragmented in Yemen, and the
role of patronage and according nature of loyalties in this process. Under these
circumstances, the political authority and military power of the state dissolve into
the periphery and around sub-groups of former regime elites.
Role of External Actors
External actors can impact military cohesion and the fragmentation of state power
based on the feeble nature of loyalties and cohesion in the “tribal-sectarian” field.
External actors are positioned to influence and impact military cohesion and the
dispensation of power in several ways. In this regard, the research will examine
the role and impact of the foreign actors in altering the overall civil-military
relationship and enabling the Huthi rebellion to remain fixtures within the Yemeni
political and military landscape. Primarily, external actors impact the civil-military
relationship by implementing policies of direct military intervention, alongside
the process of political development and distribution of rents and resources.
Moreover, foreign powers can directly impact tribal solidarity in ways which have
positively or adversely impacted the basis of civil-military relations in Yemen. In
this regard, external powers can introduce societal realignment, or a shift in the
structures of power, by fundamentally altering the centers of power and those who
access the levers of power.
The Rebels and Tribes
At various times, tribes played an important role in shaping the modern history
of Yemen and the nature of civil-military relations, although this trend is more
pronounced in the north and middle of Yemen as opposed to the south. More
broadly, the tribes in the north have played an important role within Yemen,
spanning military offices, political leaders, social elite, and businessmen, while
tribal governance, legal traditions, and conflict mediation are returning to being
more prominent in the wake of state collapse and the fragmentation of violence
(al-Dawsari 2012, 3–4).
Yemen observer Abdul-Ghani al-Iryani describes the pronounced role that the
tribes have increasingly come to play across the armed forces: “[i]n Yemen we
don’t really have a military as an institution, we have tribal factions in uniform,
many of whom can be bought over to the other side” (Finn 2011, npn). The tribal
army reflected the tribal-sectarian nexus and nature of the state. Furthermore, the
tribes have both supported and countered the military and political ambitions of
the Huthi movement. Furthermore, much of the relations “between tribes and
state institutions in the Arab world are expressed, mainly, through relationships
of patronage and clientism between influential tribal Shaykhs and political
elites” (Fattah 2011, npn). This patron-client relationship manifests because
of the significant role tribes perform in the political, social, and military order
within Yemen, with patron-client relations with the tribes prominent during the
presidency of Ali Abdullah Saleh.
Accordingly, tribal support determines the longevity of power and the ability of
the central authority or other organizations to achieve a monopoly of violence in
Yemen. To be sure, Yemeni Colonel Abdul Basit Al-Baher affirmed that “[t]he tribes
have played a great role in supporting the national army. The tribes reinforced the
army with fighters, logistics and intelligence, and hosted army troops” (al-Batati
2020, npn). Moreover, the vast majority of fighters on the front-line are tribesmen.
Pointedly, this section will demonstrate how Huthi officials sought to establish
“tribal and military loyalties through a combination of financial inducements, fear,
and personal relationship building” (Longley Alley 2018, 3), in an effort to cement
their hold on the monopolies of violence in strongholds across Northern Yemen.
Similar to other state and non-state coercive centers in Yemen, the tribes are a
main artery of manpower for the Huthi military apparatus.
Tribal recruitment into military formations and acceptance of the political order
are fundamentally important when understanding the nature of civil-military
relations and the dispensation of power in Yemen. Indeed, tribal support and/or
resistance to the Huthi rebellion remain a determining factor in the movement’s
ability to control large swathes of territory. Huthi military commanders and
officials require tribal loyalty to win and retain power, while tribal support
historically determined longevity of the country’s political rulers.
Huthi personnel continue to demonstrate an acute understanding of the tribal
balance within Yemen and appreciate the importance of working by, with, and
through the tribes to expand political power and consolidate coercive power.
Brandt (2014) succinctly depicts this reality when commenting on Huthi relations
with the tribes:
The Huthi rebellion works through carefully developed plans and brilliant
moves on the chessboard. They rely on alliances, both secret and openly visible. The
Huthi strategy is based on a precise knowledge of the local tribes and on widespread
social presence in their areas; they set up a tight network of checkpoints and patrol
in the hamlets in operations that local sources describe as Huthi operations to feel
the tribe’s pulse.
Accordingly, the initial military success that enabled the Huthi insurgents to
capture Sa’ana on September 21, 2014, emanated from Huthi relations with Ali
Abdullah Saleh and access into his vast network of patronage and tribal connections.
In this vein, Huthi expansion from its northern stronghold of Sa’ada across
territories within Yemen was based on its ability to exploit “the alliance with former
President Saleh to access the tribal, military, and political networks associated with
his family and his political party, the General People’s Congress (GPC).”1 Huthi
and Saleh forces amalgamated into a formidable force during the early stages of the
internecine conflict, with a substantial portion of Huthi officers and Hashid soldiers
rallied from tribes loyal to the former Yemeni strongman. However, tensions
between the Huthis and the tribes in the North have worsened since Ali Abdullah
Saleh was killed on December 3, 2017. The former Yemeni president represented
the most powerful tribal wing of the alliance between the Huthis and the tribes. The
death of Saleh generated tensions between the Huthi rebels and tribes.
For example, while tribal leadership is integral in the mobilization of fighters
for the Huthi rebels, the motivation in doing so varies based on the circumstances.
In the north, where Huthis have established a system akin to a totalitarian police
state, recruited tribal fighters are used to help the Huthis solidify their power (al-
Dawsari 2020b, npn). Further, in the North, the Huthis have historically “‘pushed
to disrupt the traditional tribal political system “by appointing supervisors from
the Bani Hashim class to tribe-related positions of authority inside and outside
the government’” (Dashela 2020, npn). To be sure, the Huthis have developed a
new and powerful relationship with the tribes that enables them to establish a
modicum of political power and capture the monopolies of violence over the areas
in which they control.
Moreover, the Huthi leadership seeks to systematically recalibrate the nature
of tribal dynamics in an effort to weaken the political, social, and military power
of tribes. According to Amnesty International, Huthi officials impose recruiting
quotas in the areas it controls and harshly disciplines tribes who fail to supply
the demanded manpower. In this regard, “a mixture of indoctrination, machismo,
material sustenance, punishment and threats have kept the Huthi movement
well-supplied with new fighters across nearly a dozen major battlefields in Yemen
for over three years of war” (Knights 2018, npn). Notably, this approach to tribal
relations is distinctly similar to the tactics deployed by the Islamic State in Iraq in
Anbar and other provinces.
Huthi takeover of territory causes the decline in power of local elites. For example,
the Huthi leadership elevates “fourth-class” tribal Shaykhs into positions of power
to establish parallel tribal structures such as the “tribal cohesion councils,” which are
located in each Huthi territory under control. The tribal cohesion councils are staffed
by Huthi-appointed tribal leaders and play an important role in the recruitment
of tribal kin into the ranks of the Huthi forces.2 Under this arrangement, Huthi
officials prop up loyalist tribal figures with patronage and diminish the influence of
uncooperative tribal leaders who fail to comply (al-Dawsari 2020b, npn).
Broadly, Huthi consolidation of political and military power is focused

on expanding the influence of the Hashemite tribes in the north who proved
instrumental during the Sa’ada Wars, in conjunction with the mutaḥawwithīn
Huthi loyalists outside of Sa’ada who are in effect Huthizied, yet joined the
movement for pragmatic as opposed to ideological reasons.3 Indeed, one evident
reconfiguration of power is the placement of loyal Hashemite tribesmen into
positions of power within the security apparatus, based on the Huthi strategy of
co-option and control in relation to the tribes. In Ibb, for example, Huthi officials
installed Hashemite loyalists into the positions of governorate security director
and first deputy governor.4 A similar trend is noticeable in the governorates of
Sanaa, Amran, al-Mahwit, Dhamar, and western Marib.
The structuring of the Huthi security sector is focused on replacing local security
and military officials with Huthi loyalists from Sa’ada and Hajjah to establish
loyalty using patrimony and tribal kinship. This particular form of subverting the
security and military institutions to a group or individual is similar to the practice
of President Saleh placing tribesmen from his village of Sanhan into prominent
positions within the military. Indeed, this method of securing the institutional
fidelity of the military remains underpinned by patrimonial considerations.
Moreover, Huthi officials are gradually removing prominent tribal leaders who
had close relations to President Saleh or are supportive of the Islah political party.
In terms of security, “the central pattern of security governance organized by
the Huthis has managed to undermine and divide the local tribal structure, leaving
the tribes with insufficient space to exercise some form of autonomy” (Nagi et al.
2020, npn). As a whole, Yemeni tribes inherently desire to preserve their social,
economic, security, and political standing to remain a cohesive organization. This
mentality of preserving the security of the tribe largely characterizes how the
tribes interact with the state and other entities within Yemen.
Importantly, Huthi-tribal relations are reminiscent of the co-option and patron-
client relations under President Saleh, in that Huthi officials absorb tribal centers
into high-level positions in the structures of the “state” as a form of patronage.
This is evident with regard to Shaykh Muhammad Hussein al-Maqdashi, whom
the Huthis appointed as governor of Dhamar Governorate, Shaykh Abd al-Wahid
Salah, whom the Huthis elevated to governor of the Ibb Governorate, and Shaykh
Faris al-Habbari, who was put in charge of the Raymah Governorate. In turn,
the elevated Shaykhs promote lower Shaykhs, sons, and tribal kin to other roles
within the government, thereby bonding the tribe to the benevolence of the Huthi
organization similar to the nature of patron-client relations under President Saleh.
Conversely, and similar to the experiences of the Islamic State in Iraq, tribal
cohesion has stymied the Huthi takeover of certain territory. While the Huthi
rebels managed to quell the tribes situated in the north, the organization failed
to achieve military victory in Al Bayda, Marib, and Al Jawf precisely because the
tribes proved more cohesive and able to act as a unit (al-Dawsari 2020a, npn). As of
now, the Huthi machinery has managed to garner influence over tribes in territory
under their control by directly appointing new leadership to prominent northern
tribal confederations to include the Hashid, Bakil, Lahum, Khawlan, and Raymah.
This type of relationship enables the Huthi movement to nominally secure tribal
subservience and easily recruit military-aged males to fight against the Coalition
Forces. At the same time, the nature of influence and relationship witnessed with the
northern tribes is oftentimes repressive depending on whether the tribe acquiesces
to Huthi demands. As noted, Huthi relations with the tribes center on co-option
and exclusionary tactics, which have resulted in tribal resistance to Huthi rule in
governorates such as Ibb or Hajjah. Therefore, the Huthi leadership has failed to
generate a sustainable loyalty among these tribesmen who are coerced into the
fighting against the Coalition Forces. Conversely, the same tactics of co-opting
loyal tribesmen and excluding uncooperative Shaykhs has been instrumental
concerning the Huthi consolidation of power in Western Marib, Sanaa, Dhamar,
al-Mahwit, and Amran.
Importantly, “the loyalty of the tribes is not a given, and Huthi methods of
tribal control may ultimately backfire, leaving the Huthi movement friendless in
a hostile environment” (Dashela 2020, npn). Ostensibly, this assessment of how
the Huthi movement interacts with the tribes is important given the historical
role and impact of the Yemeni tribes on the civil-military relationship. Moving
forward, it remains to be seen as to whether the organization is able to solidify
tribal support in the north and thereby monopolize violence or lose tribal support
and witness the mobilization of tribal fighters similar to the Anbar Awakening.
Patrimonial Economy
Yemen has largely been the antithesis of Western-idealized notion of the “state”
construct because much of the economic interactions remain beholden by
patrimonial rule, patron-client relations, and endemic corruption. The collapse of
the neo-patrimonial system necessitates a competition between non-state actors
over the resources and modes of economic exchange within the political field.
This new environment is characterized by the formation of informal economic
networks, such as the pervasive “war economy” flourishing across Yemen, whereby
corruption and criminality are utilized as methods of enrichment and state
capture. Indeed, the Yemen war economy necessitated and reinforced practices of
corruption to finance political and military ambitions across all parties involved.
All parties involved in the civil war strive to gain political dominance and
establish a monopoly of violence to achieve legitimacy. Securing access to illicit
streams of income, avenues of corruption, for example, provide the various factions
with the ability to form patron-client relationships in a patrimonial economy.
To be sure, the pervasive networks of patronage defining the war economy
transcend “the conflict, seamlessly crossing [front-lines] and regional borders,
with perceived adversaries cooperating for the sake of maximizing profits” (Sanaá
Center for Strategic Studies 2018, 26). Based on this understanding, patronage, or
the distribution of material incentives in exchange for loyalty is a focal aspect in
understanding the patrimonial economy of the sub-communalization of violence.
The Huthis have asserted dominance over the informal and formal modes of
economic exchanges under their control through the import, distribution, and
sale of fuel, while the Huthi rebels diverted money away from the Central Bank
of Yemen to finance military operations, pay the salaries of soldiers, and procure
weaponry (Sanaá Center for Strategic Studies 2020, npn).
Furthermore, Huthi officials collected income based on the organization’s
relationship with Saleh and access to the networks of patronage he erected during
his tenure as President. For example, Saleh loyalists afforded the Huthis access to
lucrative black-market opportunities in the trades of narcotics, weapons, and other
nefarious activities, who relied upon these important streams of illicit income to
finance military and political objectives.
Huthi influence also permeated into the Yemeni Economic Corporation
(YECO)—a historically important institution connecting the military with the
economic and financial segments of the Yemeni state and transforming it into an
epicenter of patronage under the Presidency of the late Ali Abdullah Saleh. YECO,
under the Ministry of Defense, has been subject to rampant corruption in Huthi-
controlled governorates. Further, Huthi officials commandeered transportation
and logistical assets nominally under ownership of the YECO to fund military
campaigns and engage in combat. Importantly, Huthi leaders are known to extend
assets of the YECO to influential Yemenis in return for loyalty as a patron-client
relationship.
While the nature of “state capture” described above is one aspect of the patron-
client relationship in Huthi territories, the Huthi rebels also work to distribute
financial incentives to tribal leaders in an effort to recruit additional fighters.
For example, local sources stated that Huthi military officials reportedly “pay
50 million riyals to any clan leader who can enlist 50 fighters to their ranks. The
reward is doubled if the chief manages to recruit more individuals” (Nasser 2021,
npn). Similarly, sources confirmed that Huthi leadership instructs local supervisors
and military officials to recruit manpower and support, by “coaxing the tribes to
joint insurgent ranks by offering them cash incentives, weapons and positions”
within the Huthi government.5 This practice of distributing patronage in return
for loyalty is longstanding in Yemen and characterized the neo-patrimonial rule of
President Saleh. Consequently, Huthi officials are largely replicating the structure
and nature of patron-client relations with the tribes experienced under President
Saleh. This is particularly evident in the realm of distributing patronage to tribal
chiefs in exchange for political and military support. Huthi commanders have
replicated this patrimonial system, whereby access to resources and the dispersion
of patronage in return for loyalty is an integral component of the tribal-sectarian
field and thereby the dispensation of power.
External Actors
The collapse of the Weberian state construct provides an opening which enables
foreign powers to directly fund, train, and so on. To be sure, KSA, the UAE, the
USA, and Iran are all actively vying to manipulate and empower local actors
to achieve discursive objectives on the ground. To be sure, the role of external

actors is perhaps the most influential in exacerbating the conflict and the sub-
communalization of violence in Yemen (Transfeld 2019, npn). The UAE, KSA,
and the IRI are the most pronounced foreign powers involved in the internecine
conflict and hold the most responsibility for fundamentally exaggerating the
dispensation of power and nature of civil-military relations across the fragmented
state. However, the IRI is the most likely external actor to influence the nature of
civil-military relations in Huthi-controlled areas in the future.
The absence of state coherence and strong Weberian state construct with the
monopoly of violence enables external actors to directly impact the internal power
dynamics within Yemen and thereby manipulate the nature of civil-military
relations through the empowerment of armed, non-state actors. Consequently, the
dissipation of power away from the central authority and sub-communalization of
violence allow external actors to directly work by, with, and through armed, non-
state actors to achieve foreign policy and geopolitical objectives.
Indeed, Yemeni analyst Abdulghani Al-Iryani highlighted the profound role of
external actors when noting that “Huthi successes should be primarily attributed
to the incompetence, corruption, and pettiness of its Yemeni enemies, the duplicity
and scheming of their regional allies, and the indifference of the international
community” (al-Iryani 2020, npn).
Operation Red Dawn positioned the Huthi rebels into the role as defender of
the nation against the external aggression of Saudi Arabia and resulted in Riyadh
equating “to the Huthis what Israel has long been to Hezbollah” (ibid.). The lack
of Coalition strategic thinking and the inability to develop a coherent military
campaign further weaken relations with Yemeni tribesmen, fail to generate a
fighting spirit among the tribes, and precipitously support toward the Huthi
militants. For example, a tribal leader in Marib stated that “the coalition wants us
to fight without planning or sufficient support” (al-Dawsari 2020a, npn).
The Saudi-led coalition and action of its partners enabled the Huthis to
gain undue power and influence. The KSA legitimized Huthi rebels fighting.
Furthermore, the lack of success of Riyadh and absence of any overall strategic
vision to reach a political settlement ultimately “ended up facilitating the Huthis’
assertion of military dominance in the north, a process that was largely completed
by 2017, shortly before the Huthis murdered the former president” (al-Iryani
2020, npn). Moreover, as the former head of the Moral Guidance Department in
the Yemeni Ministry of Defense Major General Mohsin Khosroof explained, “we
don’t know who is the decision-maker anymore. The Yemeni army has become
paralyzed. No unified leadership. The command-and-control concept is absent.
There are different heads with different allegiances inside the Yemeni army” (al-
Dawsari 2020b, npn). Thus, opposed to helping the tribes, coalition incompetence
is pushing the tribesmen into the wings of the Huthi military apparatus (ibid.).
Ultimately today, the Huthi following encapsulates a spectrum of groups—an
unruly quasi-coalition spanning religious, geographic, and political spaces and
hierarchies allied in their opposition to the Saudi-led intervention (al-Hamdani
2019, npn). Accordingly, KSA provides a flag for Huthi followers to rally around.
On the other hand, Iranian support toward the Huthi rebellion is more attuned
around sewing the seeds of chaos as opposed to representing any larger or coherent
foreign policy strategy. Iran is involved and this is well documented even before
the revolution. From 2004 to 2010, Iran’s role increased in Yemen remarkably by
supporting the Huthis in their military conflict with the Yemeni government.
By 2012, the United States began to observe Iranian weapons shipments going
to the Huthis, alongside members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) operating within Sa’ada during the same period, while Iranian support has
measurably increased since 2015.
Around this time, Iran began to apply its model that worked for Hezbollah in
Lebanon and the Shi’a militia in Iraq. This focused on the provision of weapons to
the Huthi fighters and training them to conduct unconventional warfare. IRGC-
QF personnel have been deployed to Yemen in order to coordinate these activities,
advise on military matters, and facilitate the movement of Hezbollah fighters into
Yemen to help train Huthi insurgents. Furthermore, a significant number of Huthi
fighters were “invited” to travel to Iran to receive religious education and military
training.6
Iranian cooperation with the Huthi rebels increased following the removal of
Saleh from power and ensuing disorder. In fragmented states—Iraq, Yemen, Syria,
and Lebanon—state weakness and lack of cohesive institutions facilitate Iranian
influence over domestic political and military dynamics. The military support Iran
has provided to the Huthis since at least 2011 has largely been limited to training
and mostly channeled through Lebanese Hezbollah. According to Hezbollah
sources, hundreds of Lebanese and Iranian advisors have provided training to
Huthi fighters in Yemen. It is not clear, however, whether and how this training
translates into military strength on the ground (Transfeld 2017, npn).
Importantly, while “the Iranian role in Yemen is not absolute,” it is severely
limited in terms of replicating a situation similar to Hezbollah or the Popular
Mobilization Forces in Iraq because of “the internal conditions in Yemen, while
others are related to Iran’s own capabilities.” The Iranians are not in a position to
establish a Hezbollah-like entity in Yemen for a number of reasons. The political
landscape in Yemen is not a confessional system similar to Lebanon but also Iran
lacks the financial means to establish a durable and loyal patronage network in
Yemen.7
However, at the same time, Iran is gradually establishing relations with the
Huthi rebels that will potentially alter the nature of coercive power in the north.
In October 2020, Iranian “diplomat” and IRGC-QF officer Hassan Eyrlou entered
Sa’ana as Tehran’s first ambassador to the Huthi government since 2015. The
placement of such a high-ranking IRGC officer signified Tehran’s confidence in
prolonged Huthi military control of the north, while also suggesting how Tehran
will seek to bolster support for the Huthi rebels. These steps will enable Iran to
further develop the Huthi militia under the command and control of IRGC.
Indeed Eyrlou, according to the US State Department, is “an IRGC member tied
to Lebanese Hezbollah, into Yemen under the guise of ‘ambassador’ to the Huthi
militia” (al-Batati 2020, npn).
Iranian ambassadors posted to Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus are all career
IRGC and often IRGC-QF officers who work by, with, and through local proxies
to advance the regional policy goals of Iran. Therefore, the implication of Iranian
involvement in domestic Yemeni politics is concerning given the success of Iran
in nurturing non-state actors into formidable economic, political, and military
forces. It stands to reason that the Huthi rebels will enjoy similar power following
the conclusion of any peace settlement, given the organizations domination of the
north, aside from Marib.
Therefore, Iranian support toward the Huthi movement in the aftermath of a
peace agreement will witness the organization gradually grow into a formidable
force displaying similar characteristics and attributes to Lebanese Hezbollah
or the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq. Accordingly, Iranian involvement
in conjunction with the failed operations conducted by the Coalition Forces to
defeat the Huthis has only served to increase the influence and power of non-state
actors; this is particularly evident for example with regard to the STC and affiliated
Security Belt Forces as well as the Huthi rebellion.
Conclusion
The sub-communalization of violence and dissipation of power away from the

central authority since the Arab Spring have fundamentally altered the nature of
the state and coercive power in Yemen. What has manifested is an environment
of “of mini-states at varying degrees of war with one another and beset by a
complex range of internal politics and conflicts, than a single state engaged in
a binary conflict” (Salisbury 2017, 2). This new reality of warfare and power
fundamentally alters the nature of civil-military relations in Yemen, considering
the collapse of the Weberian state construct, and the sub-communalization of
violence. Accordingly, this chapter sought to understand the nature of civil-
military relations and the dispensation of power in Yemen generally, and the
Huthi rebellion specifically. In doing so, this chapter applied the conceptual
approach of tribal-sectarian field by evaluating how the three frames—sub-state
solidarities, patrimonial economy, and external actors—impact the dispensation
power and the civil-military nexus.
To recall, the nature of warfare within the tribal-sectarian nexus that coincides
with state formation is characterized as a battlefield containing “varying
combinations of networks of state and non-state actors” (Kaldor 2013, 2). In Yemen,
armies and militias are drawn from “ethnic, religious or tribal” communities
(ibid.). The tribal-sectarian nexus in this regard illustrates a devolution of state
capabilities, institutional strength, and cohesion at the hands of sub-state actors and
solidarities. Particularly, this chapter demonstrated how coercive power in Yemen
is dissipating around armed, non-state actors with a focus on Huthi insurgents
based in the capital Sa’ana, although others are important to acknowledge to
include the secessionist Southern Transitional Council in Aden, and the forces
that are nominally controlled by the internationally recognized government of
Yemen. In all instances, the operational forces are not appendages of a Weberian
state and are largely formed around tribal, religious, or political loyalties.
More broadly, the incorporation of Tilly’s work with the tribal-sectarian nexus
points to the crisis of legitimacy now faced in fragmented states that stems from
the inability of weak central authorities to fully control the monopolies of violence.
Non-state actors attempting to establish a “state” will make war to neutralize
foreign rivals, eliminate internal rivals to consolidate power, protect clients with
the territory, and, lastly, develop the means to conduct all three activities (Tilly
1985, 181). While the Huthi rebels are currently engaging in the process of state
formation within the tribal-sectarian field, all four activities described by Tilly
require the movement “to monopolize the concentrated means of coercion” (ibid.).
In this regard, the Huthi rebels are going along this continuum of state-building.
Moreover, the rise of the Huthi rebellion reflects the erosion of “state” legitimacy
and weakness of the central authority in Yemen, while the sub-communalization
of violence has led to the emergence of the tribal-sectarian field. In this case, the
Huthi rebels exercise considerable military and political power relative to the
central authority—the internationally recognized government.
Accordingly, an application of the conceptual approach based on the above
theoretical underpinnings demonstrates how tribal identity, confessional loyalty,
patrimonial economy, and external actors might come to determine the role
and nature of civil-military relations in areas under Huthi control, while also
illuminating how the above frames inform the dispensation of power within
the “state.” In the north, the tribes continue to exert considerable influence in
the political, security, and social realms, and the Huthis are acutely aware of this
fact. Huthi officials rely on a mix of patronage, co-option, patrimonialism, and
repression to maintain the acquiescence of the tribal Shaykhs residing in areas
under their control. In certain instances, Huthi military commanders pay Shaykhs
for providing fighters, while other tribes are elevated to important security
or military roles in exchange for loyalty. At the center of these actions are the
concerted efforts by the Huthi rebellion to ensure the Hashemites effectively
capture the “state” similar to President Saleh’s centralization of power around his
Sanhan tribe following the decline in peak oil.
The deterioration of state cohesion and fragmentation of the Weberian state
construct in Yemen expose the contours of power, and underlying networks of
patronage are vulnerable to external actors. For example, Ginny Hill argues that
“Yemen’s donors established their own patronage structure, competing with
indigenous patronage structures in a contentious political environment where no
paymaster had overall control” (Hill 2017, 261). This same phenomenon remains
poignant in Yemen, where external powers continue to manipulate internal power
dynamics by controlling networks of patronage. For example, the UAE provided
patronage to the security and political structures of the south, while KSA finances
the internationally recognized government. At the same time, Iran has gradually
increased the distribution of patronage to the Huthi movement and recently
appointed an IRGC-QF officer as ambassador to the Huthis. In these instances,
foreign states manipulate the dispensation of power and alter the civil-military
relationship by empowering non-state actors. While Iranian support has thus

far remained limited, an exerted effort to bolster the Huthi military and political
structures following a cessation of hostilities could potentially mirror the role and
impact of the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, or Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Notes
1 https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_
analysis_hub_the_houthi_supervisory_system.pdf
2 https://abaadstudies.org/news-59852.html
3 https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20200617_acaps_yemen_
4 https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:FHXP49VfuRwJ:https://
www.almashhad-alyemeni.com/118592+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=it
5 https://english.aawsat.com//home/article/1356766/houthis-try-cash-positions-lure-
tribal-chiefs-recruitment
6 Researcher’s Interview with Colonel (Ret.) Randy Rosin. May 25, 2017.
7 Researcher’s Interview with Yemeni diplomat.
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10
H U T H I V I SIO N S O F T H E STAT E : A H U T H I R E P U B L IC
W I T H A N U N O F F IC IA L I M A M
Charles Schmitz
This chapter assesses Huthi understanding of a future state. Contrary to widespread

perception, the Huthi appear not to strive toward re-establishment of the Zaydi
imamate but to imposition of a revolutionary model of republican government
guided from the outside by the leader of a revolutionary movement. The model
has similarities to the Iranian government but lacks the formal role for religious
leaders. This chapter tries to make sense of Huthi thinking behind such an odd
combination of republican ideals and adherence to Zaydi tenets. The chapter
makes no claim about the viability or credibility of Huthi visions of governance
but only traces Huthi thinking on the topic.
The Huthi movement is a political movement rooted in religion. The Huthi
claim a heritage in early Hadawi Zaydism that adheres to the idea of the imamate,
a just state ruled by descendants of the Prophet, and reject later developments in
Yemeni Zaydism that backed away from the requirement that the ruler be from the
family of the Prophet (al-Huthi 2012; King 2012). The Huthi are firmly in power
in northern Yemen, and they have been working to rebuild the state and society in
accordance with their worldview. But no imam has appeared. Instead, Abd al-Malik
al-Huthi is called a revolutionary leader and guided notable (Almasdaronline
2020). Reading the National Vision document, Huthi ideology in the Malāzim,
and the Peace and National Inclusion agreement, and examining Huthi behavior
during the interim government period as well as its wartime political institutions,
it seems clear that the Huthi adheres to both the idea of the republican state and
some form of the Zaydi principle that the Ahl al-Bayt are models or leaders of the
Muslim community. While these appear contradictory, that is, republican equality
and Ahl al-Bayt’s preference, the Huthi seem to straddle the fence between the
two by pretending that the Huthi organization represents the will of the people
separate from and outside of state institutions. The Huthi argue that they are
guardians of the people’s will but not necessarily at the head of the state. Huthi
wartime political institutions do have Huthi leaders, but significantly no one has
declared themselves imam and the head of state has not been of Sāda stock since
Mohammed al-Huthi relinquished power to the Supreme Political Council in the
summer of 2016. The real Huthi leader, Abd al-Malik al-Huthi, has no official role
in the state, yet he addresses the nation on national holidays as if he were the
head of state. The Huthi appear to understand the relationship between the Huthi
movement and the state in a manner not unlike the National Front and the Yemeni
Socialist Party during the days of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen—the
party makes decisions that the state implements.
Contradictory Huthi Ideas
The movement seems to propose both a religious leader with secular authority,
a Zaydi imam, and a secular state based upon the republican ideal dominant in
Yemen over the last half century. Though the Huthi leadership repeatedly disavows
any intention to reestablish the Zaydi imamate that ruled northern Yemen before
the republican coup in 1962 and no one has declared themselves imam as would
be expected following Zaydi tradition, the lectures by Husayn and Abd al-Malik
al-Huthi reaffirm the Zaydi arguments for a religious leader with secular power.
And the reality of Huthi power is that a small circle of people close to the Huthi
leader control decision making, a reality born of years of military struggle against
difficult odds. Huthi policies are clearly designed to root the Huthi version of
political Zaydism in society through revising educational programs (see Lashual,
in this volume), public holidays and events, and mandatory educational programs
for state employees. The Huthi relentlessly attacked their perceived enemies the
Islah Party and the Salafis, destroying mosques and schools and imprisoning
leaders. At the same time, the movement produced a blueprint for a future state
in 2019 called the “National Vision” that builds upon the republican experience
of the last fifty years. It calls for equal citizenship, elections, political competition,
political parties, and limited government. The National Vision claims to implement
more effectively the goals of the republican state: economic development, social
justice, rule of law, political freedom, education, etc. The Huthi movement’s
interim government in Sanaa is also secular in style, drawing as much as possible
on continuities with the republican past—the use of Parliament, a prime minister
and ministers, an attempt to hold Parliamentary elections, and a ruling council
whose leader is not Ṣāda.
Opponents of the Huthi argue that Huthi allegiance to the republican ideal is
simply deceit or a temporary tactic. The Huthi only pretend to adhere to republican
ideals of government because the republican government is popular in Yemen and
the imamate, associated with Zaydism and often with the Sāda, the descendants
of the Prophet through Hassan and Husayn, is hated. The Huthi retain republican
government to gain legitimacy and deflect the charge that they aim to restore the
hated Zaydi imamate from prior to the republican coup in 1962. There is plenty of
evidence to support Huthi disingenuousness. The Huthi claim to defend religious
freedom, yet they repress religious currents they oppose. The military agreement
with President Hadi that ended the fighting in Amran in the summer of 2014
the Huthi violated before the ink was dry on the paper. When the Huthi entered
1. Huthi Visions of the State 201
Sanaa in September 2014 and signed the Peace and National Inclusion agreement
ostensibly to reform the interim government, they effectively overthrew the very
government they facilitated by installing “supervisors” to control all government
agencies. It was a slow coup, Huthi style, a call to reform the government that
ended with Huthi control of government through the back door. The Huthi
demanded upon their entrance into Sanaa that the government revoke its decision
to withdraw subsidies to domestic petroleum products that was the source of
popular discontent on the street. Upon taking power, however, the Huthi forgot
their demand because domestic petroleum supplies became a source of revenue
for the movement, so instead of subsidizing the public, they raised prices to gain
revenue. Finally, though the Huthi retain as much as possible the institutions of
the Republic of Yemen, creating only the Supreme Revolutionary Council and then
the Supreme Political Council to replace the presidency temporarily, in fact the
country is run by a small group of people associated with Abd al-Malik al-Huthi
from the beginning. Mahdi Mushat, president of the High Political Council and
ostensibly head of state, is significantly not a member of the Sāda signaling Huthi
adherence to republican ideals, but he is a close childhood friend of Abd al-Malik,
suggesting the Huthi want the appearance of republican government without the
content—deceit. The Huthi National Vision is nothing more than ink on paper, as
they say in Yemen.
However, since the Huthi are secure in their role as the de facto government in
Sanaa, why have they not re-established the imamate? The Huthi have no need for
deception, they are the de facto power. The Huthi have spent considerable energy
normalizing their rule in the areas under their control, looking ahead to a postwar
era when people will hold the Huthi responsible for their everyday conditions. This
suggests that while the National Vision document may well be only ink on paper
for those who expect equality, rule of law, peaceful political transfer of power, etc.,
the ink the Huthi did produce might tell us something important about Huthi self-
perception. The Huthi may in fact adhere to their version of a republic not only out
of political expediency but also because of their own perceptions of government
and self-understanding. A Zaydi republic is not unprecedented. The 1980s and
1990s saw many alternate visions of government proposed by Zaydi scholars that
remain within the realm of traditional Zaydi precepts but that support republican
government and reject the restriction of leadership to Ahl al-Bayt, some form of
Zaydi republicanism (Ghulays 1997; King 2012). The Huthi vision of the state may
be a new proposal of government that retains the requirement of a Sāda leader in
a novel, non-institutionalized form, as a model of behavior rather than a formal
role in government.
The Huthi are guided by religion, by Zaydi ideas, but their relationship
to traditional Zaydi scholarship is ambiguous. Huthi ideology is politically
revolutionary. It argues that religion should transform people’s lives in this world.
Muslims are weak and poor because their reading of the Quran fails to inspire
them to transform their conditions in this world. A new engagement with the
Quran, a “Quranic March” (al-Masīra al-Qurʾāniyya), is required to inspire
people to change, to improve their conditions, resolve their problems. Following
this logic, the Huthi National Vision is an improved republic that builds upon the
republican experience over the last fifty years rather than overthrows it. The Huthi
movement sees itself as a revolutionary movement, overcoming corruption and
improving people’s lives. The republican National Vision is an improved form of
republican government.
That the National Vision does not include the restriction of leadership to
the Sāda, as required in Zaydi principle, may stem from the Huthi innovation
of an informal deference to Ṣāda leadership, an imam-like figure, in non-
institutionalized form. The Huthi leader Abd al-Malik is the real source of power,
but not in a formal position of government. He is the guided notable that everyone
is religiously obliged to follow in religious and secular affairs, but he does not
occupy a formal position in government. The principle that there is a religious
political authority is interpreted as a model, an example to be emulated, rather
than a claim to official state leadership.
The Huthi relationship with Iran also may lend legitimacy to republican
government within Huthi circles. Huthi are inspired by Khomeini and Iran, as
we will see below. Retention of republican government could follow from the
example of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, the Huthi National Vision does
not include the formal institutionalization of religious guidance that the Iranian
Wilāyat al-Faqīh represents. The Huthi proposal is a republic without formal role
for Zaydi religious authority. The Huthi seem to propose a model more akin to the
Yemeni Socialist Party’s (YSP) relationship to the state in the People’s Democratic
Republic of Yemen: the state implements party decisions (Ismael 1986, 53). In
both cases, the YSP and the Huthi are the will of the people, and the state should
naturally follow the movement because it is the people’s will.
On the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the Huthi entrance into Sanaa, Abd
al-Malik outlined his vision of the relationship between the Huthi revolutionary
state and religion:
We reaffirm the continuance of our liberatory revolutionary project through

which we strive to achieve the legitimate and rightful hopes of our dear people in
the complete liberation of our country, total independence in its decision making,
in order to build a state on the basis of justice and legitimacy in harmony with
its identity in religious faith and focusing on national inclusion and preventing
oppression in all its forms whether individual, racial, class, or regional.
(A. al-Huthi 2020, emphasis added)
The Political Revolutionary Husayn al-Huthi
Husayn al-Huthi’s ideas are primarily political but constructed in religious

terms. His view of the world is very simple. Muslims are in a difficult situation;
they are poor and weak. Jews and Christians of the Quran, Israel and the United
States today, are the cause of Muslim poverty and weakness; in this the Quran is
clear, says Husayn: Christians and Jews are enemies of Islam. “The holy Quran
affirms that they [the Jews and the Christians] are the historical enemies of the
Muslim people from that time and perhaps until the last days of the world and
it gave us much guidance on how to confront them” (al-Huthi, H. 2002e). In the
contemporary world, the Muslims are losing the battle. Jews and Christians have
divided Muslims, exploited Muslim resources, and dominated Muslim culture
such that Muslims willingly subjugate themselves to Jewish and Christian designs.
Husayn sees urbanization as a Jewish conspiracy because it caused Muslims to lose
their bonds to one another in city life (ʿAwaḍah 2019a, 60); he sees education in
Yemen as an American plot, and the American war on terror is simply an America
excuse to occupy Muslim lands (102).
But the cause of Muslim weakness is not only the conspiracies of the Jews and
Christians: Muslims are weak because they have lost the spirit of Islam, he argues.
To regain the spirit of Islam, Husayn argues for a Quranic culture to invigorate
Muslims, to empower Muslims to be able to take their rightful place in the world,
stand up to American and Israeli conspiracies, and expel Jewish and Christian
influence from Muslim lands. His is a Quranic politics of the Middle East that
locates evil in American and Israeli dominance and good in Muslim ability to
resist and overcome American and Israeli dominance.
His Quranic project is a radical return to a direct reading of the Quran as the
source of religious knowledge, eschewing the corpuses of traditional Muslim
scholarship and the religious divisions they embody. “None of Shawāfiya say that
they are only Shāfiʿī, none of the Ḥanābila say they are only Ḥanbalī. We want to
examine, we want to return everyone as Muslims to the Holy Quran and that is
what will guide us” (al-Huthi, H. n.d.).
I do not want to anger him, I don’t want to make him mad from the perspective
that I am one school of Islam and he is from another, not like that. We will resolve
the issue by realizing that we are all Muslims. That is one of our problems, that I
attack another because he is Sunni and I am Zaydi.
(al-Huthi, H. n.d.)
His Quranic project appears pan-Islamic, and indeed he strives to lead the
entire Muslim world (but as we will see below, his return to the Quran has a
distinctly sectarian bent).
Husayn’s real focus, though, is not so much on a pan-Islamic reading of the
Quran but a political reading that produces a project of Muslim unity in opposition
to the United States and Israel. It is political animation that Husayn wants. He
criticizes those who study religion but whose study does not lead them to change
the world, as he sees it, to fight in the name of God against the Christians and
Jews. Religion is dead unless it animates political activity in opposition to the
conspiracies that bring evil to the Muslim world.
In the end we find that we spend our days with books, and they are all misleading
from the first to the last such as the book Origins of Jurisprudence (ʾUṣūl al-
Fiqh). It is behind all the delusions we are in, behind the passivity of Zaydism,
behind the battering of Zaydism, behind that diminished spirit of Zaydism,

which is completely contrary to that of the ancestors of the Ahl al-Bayt and their
faction. These that we stay up late studying their lessons and carrying into the
mosque and which distance us from the reality of the mosque, and suddenly
we reap onto ourselves, reap onto our mosques from these books that we saw
ourselves worshiping God in reading them, suddenly they are what ruin our
mosques, and we do not have that spirit of the mosque of the Prophet, and we
lost the spirit of the Ahl al-Bayt and its faction.
(al-Huthi, H. 2002d)
His focus on political animation explains his puzzling stance toward Iran.
Husayn admires Iran because of its obstinate opposition to American and Israeli
dominance of the Middle East. “Imam Khomeini is a person that is known for
his seriousness in confronting all Islam’s enemies, in confronting American
calling it the Great Satan and considering it behind all the humiliation and insult
that afflicts Muslims” (al-Huthi, H. 2001). But Husayn mocks Iranian Twelver
doctrine and warns the youth against Iranians pushing Jaʿfrī ideas. He makes
fun of core concepts of Jaʿfrī Shiʿim such as the hidden imam, the khums, and
the mutaʿa, temporary marriage. He alleges that Khomeini does not follow
Twelver doctrine. “We do not pay attention to their [Twelver] doctrine because,
as I’ve said before, if their doctrine influenced me, I would find their doctrine
is not them, that their doctrine imposes upon them that they be not as they are.
Wilayat al-Fiqh is not in their doctrine nor is [political] movement or Islamic
government” (al-Daghshī 2010, 80; see also al-Huthi, H. 2003). Husayn admires
Khomeini precisely because he stirs people out of their quietism, a quietism
that Husayn considers a central tenet of Twelver doctrine. Khomeini’s Islamic
government and political activism are innovations beyond the confines of
Twelver doctrine, he seems to imply; precisely what he admires about Khomeini
is his politics.
[The name] Imam Husayn was repeated many times on Ashura and other
times amongst the Jaʿfrī Shiʿa and they cried and beat themselves, but it is all
was emotional. Imam Khomeini was able to make it effective, revive Ashura.
That name [Hussayn] was repeated hundreds of years in a purely emotional
atmosphere, not connected to jihad, not connected to taking a stance, not
connected to lifting the spirits of the Muslim community, to taking a stance
against the enemies of the Muslim community and the enemies of religion, until
someone came that could revive it in the souls of the people.
(al-Huthi, H. 2002c; see also Haidar 2014)
Husayn is similarly skeptical of the view of traditional Zaydi scholarship. He argued

that traditional arts of religious scholarship were the very thing that brought
Zaydis to the miserable situation they live today (al-ʾAḥmadī 253). He would say,
“I sense from my reading of the Quran and through my understanding of reality,
and I could be wrong in many things, that Zaydism is living its worst period
of humiliation, worse than that which struck the people of Israel” (al-ʾAḥmadī
253). The reason for this deterioration according to Husayn is that the traditional
approach to religion is deadening: “Aren’t we trying now to rid ourselves of the
sciences that we read, arts we want to get rid of completely, throw them against
the wall, that which is called theology, foundations of religion, that specializes in
knowing God and that does not take us to knowledge of God, but stops us from
knowing God” (al-Huthi, H. n.d.).
Husayn’s critique of traditional Zaydi scholarship might suggest that his
Quranic culture is pan-Islamic and does not adhere to any established school of
Islamic thought. Not so, however. Husayn argues that though he is not making a
sectarian argument, a clear reading of the Quran establishes the truth of Zaydism.
First that Ali bin abi Talib was the successor to the Prophet and that there is a
political authority appointed by the Prophet to whom Muslims owe allegiance, and
then that the Prophet’s family have been selected by God to carry the tradition of
the Prophet.
When we recall the occasion of the announcement of the authority of Ali (peace
be upon him), we declare that religion, according to our understanding, our
view, and our doctrine, that it is religion and a state, that the Prophet (peace be
upon him and his family), did not leave this life until he announced to his people
who would succeed him.
(al-Huthi, H. 2002a)
Ali (and by extension, his family) was selected to lead the Muslim community
in this world, in political affairs. Husayn mentions many times that the goal of
jihad currently is to establish an Islamic state. He admires Imam al-Hadi and
Imam Khomeini for doing so. And while criticizing bin Laden, Husayn affirms
that only the family of the Prophet can save the Muslim community.
One day ʾUssāma appeared, and we saw many people who thought that he
would be the one to save the Muslim community. But we said, no, it will not
ever be achieved by him. The Prophet (peace be upon him and his family) said:
I leave to you that if to which you adhere, you will not go astray ever, God’ book
and my family. So, liberation from the delusion that we live in will not be except
by the family of the Prophet who are the companions (quranāʾ) of the Qurʾān.
(al-Huthi, H. 2002)
While Husayn may argue he is not sectarian and wants all Muslims to unite in a
return to the Quran, his Islam is Zaydi.
e noticeable thing in the history of the Muslim community is that all those
Th
that ruled the Muslims beginning from Abū Bakr, those that rule the Muslims
except the ʾImam ʿAli (peace be upon him) and except the Ahl al-Bayt are outside
the requirements of faith, they are the ones that lost the faith of the Muslim
community, while we find that in the hands of the Ahl al-Bayt like ʾImām ʿAlī
and those after him from the Ahl al-Bayt, they are the ones that educate the
Muslim community with an education that lifts them to the level of complete
faith.
(al-Huthi, H. n.d.)
These days do we hear anyone calling the Muslim community to return to the
Qurʾān? To return to the Qurʾān and not to the interpreters from the Sunni,
to know the Qurʾān in the way of the companions of the Qurʾān [a reference
to Shīʾa] and the heirs of the Qurʾān, and not to Tabari and Ibn Kathir and
other interpreters that give documents to the Jews saying that the land that
God promised you is the Levant and not Palestine. The Levant includes Syria,
Lebanon, and Palestine!
(al-Huthi, H. 2001)
However, Husayn’s Zaydism is political, just as his Islam is. Husayn argues Zaydism
today is lost and the descendants of the Prophet, Ahl al-Bayt, are ineffective.
ʾImām al-Hādī went to Yemen by himself and created an Islamic state in Yemen,
and his blessings remain today, and many others like him went to the Maghreb
and to Iran and to other places in the world. Just one of them [Ahl al-Bayt] would
reform a whole community, but now thousands have almost melted, almost
become nothing, they forgot their honor, they forgot the great responsibility on
their shoulders, even in this dangerous situation that we see and live, we find
a lack of the spirit of the previous Ahl al-Bayt, gone from amongst this large
number of Ahl al-Bayt.
(al-Huthi, H. 2002)
Husayn’s political Zaydism will save the Muslim world, not the traditional corpus
of Zaydi thought.
Ahl al-Bayt must be most vigilant to mark the guided path and that their culture
is a Qurʾānic culture far from any foreign errors, because they strive to guide
others, and because if their culture is corrupted they won’t be able to receive
God’s guidance for them, it will reflect the influence of their false, errant culture
that is foreign to them, it will be reflected in the form of passivity, inattention,
shortcoming, and neglect as happens with us now. Isn’t someone from the Ahl
al-Bayt going to move the Muslim community? They are tens of scholars of the
Ahl al-Bayt that do nothing, just sit quietly. Isn’t that clear? Tens of scholars
of Ahl al-Bayt in Yemen sit quietly, where did that come from? The rules of
jurisprudence (ʾUsūl al-Fiqh) and of theology (ʿIlm al-Kalām), rules they’ve
leaned upon to make them sit quietly.
(al-Huthi, H. 2002)
This is articulated clearly in a document of principles signed by Abd al-Malik

in 2012:
The criticisms of the scholars are not directed against the scholars of Ahl al-Bayt
of God’s Prophet and their faction and not their scholarship but against those
that do not see the necessity of jihad for the oppressed and that do not require
enjoining the good and ending evil but that are quiet and obey those that are not
to be allowed to be obeyed.
(al-Huthi 2012)
In Husayn al-Huthi’s view, there are particular people, the guided notables (al-
ʾAʿlām al-Hudā), that are guided by God. They are primarily Zaydi but not only
Zaydi who animate a political project and fight Islam’s enemies as defined by the
Huthi. Husayn mentioned as guided notables in his reading of ʿAshūrāʾ “Ali, Zayd,
Husayn, Hassan, and their likes” (al-Huthi, H. 2002f). But the guided notables also
included Khomeini who is outside Zaydi circles and outside his own doctrine’s
circles, as Husayn sees it. The criterion of being guided is a political one; the guided
ones animate people to join the movement to fight Islam’s enemies, that is, Israel
and the United States, according to the Huthi.
In the end, Husayn al-Huthi’s message is political. The criterion for determining
those “guided” by the Qurʾān today is an agreement with the political analysis
of the Huthi that Christians and Jews are eternal enemies of Islam, that today
the United States and Israel are the source of Muslims’ problems, and that jihad
defined as military struggle against these enemies is the highest duty of Muslims
today. The Huthi relationship with traditional Zaydism is ambiguous. The Huthi
include Zaydis only in as much as Zaydis support their political program. The
diversity of views that characterizes any school of thought is absent in Huthi
Zaydism and the traditional style of argument among the Zaydi scholars is also
absent (see Haykel, this volume). The style of even a traditional scholar such as
Badr al-Din al-Huthi, father of Husayn and Abd al-Malik, is quite different from
the style of his sons. Badr al-Din’s books remain with longstanding traditions in
Zaydi and Muslim scholarship and are not political treatise like his sons (Badr
al-Din al-Huthi 2016).
The Huthi break with the traditional scholarly community and styles leaves
room for innovation in styles of government. Husayn reaffirms many times the
necessity of an Islamic state, that religion and the state are not separate, but his
main message is a revolutionary one. The Quranic path is one that animates,
stimulates, invigorates, and motivates Muslims for political action in this world
to better the lives of Muslims and fight against God’s enemies which are Huthi
enemies—a political project. Such revolutionary fervor might well accord with a
republican state such as outlined in the National Vision, so long as the people are
guided, somehow, by Ahl al-Bayt, but perhaps through a revolutionary movement
rather than the head of state.
The Emergence of a Modern Insurgency
The Huthi movement of Husayn al-Huthi is not the Huthi movement today.
In the early 2000s, Husayn al-Huthi politicized what had been a Zaydi cultural
revival movement, but it was his brother, Abd al-Malik, who built an effective
political military organization to fight an insurgency against Saleh’s government
(al-Daghashī 2010, 10). The conflict originated in the reverberations of Husayn’s
famous slogan that remains the slogan of the organization today. In the context
of the American war on terror and the buildup to the invasion of Iraq, Husayn
launched, in a famous talk in January 2002 entitled “Scream in the Face of the
Arrogant,” the call “Death to America, Death to Israel, Curse the Jews, Long Live
Islam” (al-Huthi, H. 2002b). The Saleh regime feared the Huthi slogan would cause
(further) tensions with Washington over terrorism policy and that it would be
used against the regime itself (al-Daghashī 2010, 108). The regime’s heavy-handed
security response in effect consolidated Huthi leadership over an insurgency
born less of Zaydi revivalism than self-defense and hatred of the Saleh regime’s
military. The victory of the Huthi insurgency guaranteed the organization a
significant place in Yemen’s future, but also transformed what had been a religious
cultural movement into a political military organization. Huthi success resulted
from political and military manipulation of cleavages within Yemeni society in
the north rather that popular appeal of its political vision or doctrinal positions
(Brandt 2017, 133; al-Daghashī 2013, 31). By the end of the six wars between 2004
and 2010, the Huthi established themselves as the de facto power in Saada.
The military strategy of the Huthi organization during the interim period
2012–2014 focused on expanding its control over the north, expelling its enemies
in Islah and the Salafis (al-Daghashī 2013, 56), and moving its sphere of control
southward toward Sanaa. The Huthi military strategy included an alliance with
former enemy Ali Abdallah Saleh, who saw in the Huthi a chance to exact revenge
upon those that turned on him in 2011, particularly the Islah Party and Ali
Muhsin. The Huthi alliance with Saleh was a tactical, strategic alliance to further
political military goals. The Huthi organization at this point behaves as a political/
military organization within a larger context, making strategic alliances that have
no religious or doctrinal content, merely political.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Agreement allowed the Huthi to
participate in peaceful political activities within Yemeni institutions (though the
NDC was an ad hoc arrangement). When the peaceful demonstrations against the
Saleh regime erupted in early 2011, the Huthi organization participated actively,
making political alliances with other Yemeni groups opposed to Saleh. The Huthi,
and much of Yemen, saw the Huthi movement as another victim of Saleh’s regime
(without realizing, obviously, that Saleh would ally with the Huthi). And when
the GCC agreement created the National Dialogue, the Huthi movement was an
active participant. One of the nine issues on the table of the National Dialogue
was the trouble in Saada. In the National Dialogue, the Huthi acted as part, and
only a part, of a larger community of Yemenis formulating a common foundation
for a future state. And the Huthi fell squarely behind the republican ideals of
the National Dialogue. Along with the majority, the Huthi representatives voted
against the proposed clause (existing in the current constitution) that Islam was
the state religion and that Islamic law was the sole source of legislation (though
this may have been simply a tactical vote against the interests of Islah Party). The
first recommendation of the NDC committee on Saada was to guarantee religious
freedom, the right to chant slogans, and to guarantee the neutrality of the state
in religious affairs (Republic of Yemen 2014). Participation of the Huthi in the
NDC showed that the Huthi had interest in formal political participation and that
there were liberal thinkers among the Huthi leadership. The Huthi organization
was thinking about political ideology and institutions, but the NDC was preparing
for a new constitution and elections that never took place, and the Huthi did not
propose their own model of government in the conference since they were not in
a position to do so.
The transformation of Husayn al-Huthi’s movement into a military insurgency
over 2004–10, under Abd al-Malik from 2005, transformed the Huthi movement
from an educational movement to a military organization. As a military
organization, its interests are in survival first, whether through military tactics and
alliances or political ones, such as Huthi participation in the Arab Spring uprising
and the National Dialogue Conference following it. Following the Huthi entrance
into Sanaa in September 2014, the movement shifts again from a regional power to
de facto state power. The transformation is clear in Abd al-Malik’s rhetoric that is
more strategic, addressing the Yemeni people, whereas Husayn al-Huthi addresses
broader concerns of Muslims in general or Zaydis in Yemen (see al-Mahfali in this
volume). Under Abd al-Malik, the Huthi begin to imagine the Huthi movement’s
relationship with a future Yemeni state.
The Peace and National Inclusion Document and the National Vision:
Huthi Dominance within Republican Institutions
The Huthi movement’s political behavior during its coup in Sanaa and later in its
proposed political blueprint both indicate that the Huthi want to continue the
legacy of the republic, not overthrow it. In September 2014 when Huthi militia
overran Sanaa, the Huthi did not overthrow the government. Instead, the Huthi
suggested reforms of the current interim government, and the rest of Yemen’s
political leaders agreed along with the UN. The thrust of the Huthi reforms was to
make government more representative and more responsible (and under control
of the Huthi). Abd al-Malik spoke shortly before the entrance of Huthi forces into
Sanaa saying, “We are not in a political reality that embodies the will of the Yemeni
people, a reality that addresses the worries of the people, their concerns and pain,
no!” (al-ʿAwāḍa 299). “The state must adapt to the people and not be in one valley
while the people are in another, it should embody the will of the people, its choices,
and its directions” (p. 303, italics added). It becomes clear later that the Huthi
claim to determine the will of the people, and the fulfillment of the will of the
people means Huthi power, not an effective democratic state.
In the Peace and National Inclusion document signed by the UN’s Jamal
Benomar and Abd Rabo Hadi after the Huthi overran Sanaa, the Huthi suggested
instituting a presidential advisor from each of the Southern Movement and
the Huthi movement since these were left out of the GCC brokered interim
government that was divided between Saleh’s GPC and the opposition coalition,
the Joint Meeting Party (JMP). And the ministers of the new government were
to be chosen based on competencies and not politics. The later measure was
widely popular since the government instead of governing and addressing the
immediate concerns of the country the ministers were positioning themselves and
their parties for the post-interim government. A new government was chosen,
one not dominated by the Huthi, that was indeed much more competent than
the previous government. It was a technocratic rather than political government
and was in fact well positioned to address many of the pressing economic and
security issues facing the country. The Huthi call for wider participation was also
widely welcomed because the parties that sat in the National Dialogue Conference
represented a much wider swath of Yemeni society than the interim government
that was restricted to Saleh’s GPC and the formal coalition of opposition parties,
the JMP.
The Huthi-inspired Agreement for Peace and National Inclusion was rooted
firmly in the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, reiterates a
commitment to equal citizenship, and focuses on building an effective state.
Double employment and “ghost” employees were to be eliminated; taxation was
to be applied to all, but especially large owners; and tax revenues were to go to the
appropriate state agencies. State employees were to be identified with secure IDs.
Markets were to be freed for private competition from state monopolies. Pricing
of basic commodities was to alleviate some of the economic pinch people were
feeling, and the government’s social welfare programs were given special emphasis
(Yaman Saʿīd). It was a well-designed populist position that was carefully tailored
to the political moment.
Significantly, the military amendment of the document calls for all militias to
disband, all heavy weaponry to be returned to the state, and for the military to gain
control over all Yemeni territory, under UN supervision. (This clause is repeated in
UNSC resolution 2216.) The Huthi seemed not to fear the Yemeni military because
they see themselves as the state. The Huthi supported the state’s monopoly over the
means of coercion, the heavy weaponry of the state, because they controlled the
state, not as political commanders of the state but as the personnel of the state,
though Huthi control of the state was not consolidated at this point and there were
still significant divisions within the military.
The new government formed by the Peace and National Participation Agreement
lasted only a short while. The Huthi interpreted the agreement to say that Huthi
supervisors would enter the halls of government to prevent fraud and oversee
the work of the government, but Huthi intervention became intolerable and the
government resigned. Huthi behavior during the Peace and National Inclusion
period suggests that the Huthi want an effective, modern, republican government
that the rest of Yemen accepts, but a government that the Huthi control from
within. In effect, the Huthi are the state, and in time, the Huthi supervisors did
indeed become the state functionaries (see Rogers, this volume). The Huthi did
not want to put themselves into official positions of the government, there were no
Huthi appointees in the Peace and National Participation government (except for
the advisor to the president), but the Huthi effectively melted into the government
bureaucracy and became the state apparatus. And Huthi militias slowly became
the military, though it took time because Ali Abdallah Saleh retained significant
influence, especially in the military. Meanwhile, Huthi militias and Huthified
Yemeni military units rushed to secure as much territory as possible. The Huthi
seem to say that the Huthi are the people, they will ensure that government follows
the will of the people, but the government is the same republican government that
the people of Yemen put into place in 1962.
The resignation of the government in January 2015 forced the Huthi to take
leadership of the state directly, not by restoring the imamate but by continuing, as
much as possible, the republican government. The Huthi first created the Supreme
Revolutionary Council headed by Abd al-Malik’s cousin, Mohammad al-Huthi,
that itself immediately called for the replacement of parliament with a new interim
national council made up of 551 members who would choose a presidential council
that would lead the government over a two-year period. The interim government’s
mission was the same as Hadi’s interim government: complete the rewriting of
the constitution according to the outcomes of the National Dialogue, hold a
referendum on the new constitutions, then hold elections for a new government
under the new constitution (al-Jazeera 2015).
However, political considerations led the Huthi to reverse their decision to
dissolve parliament. Parliament in Sanaa was dominated by allies of Ali Abdallah
Saleh, whose support the Huthi clearly valued. Thus, in the summer of 2016, a
new Supreme Political Council was created whose members were “chosen” by
parliament. Council members were sworn into their positions before parliament.
The council was divided between Saleh supporters and Huthi supporters;
the president of the council was to rotate between Saleh supporters and Huthi
supporters. In practice, the Huthi retained the position of head of the council
(and government), perhaps reflecting the real balance of power between the two
erstwhile allies. The Huthi were clearly concerned about political legitimacy: their
consistent demand in international negotiations is recognition as the de facto
government in Sanaa, and their charades in Parliament were designed to legitimize
their new institutions within the republican context (Sanaa Center 2019).
Although Mohammad al-Huthi, a cousin of Abd al-Malik and a sayyid, led
the Supreme Revolutionary Council from February 2015 until the creation of the
Supreme Political Council in summer of 2016, the Huthi leaders of the Supreme
Political Council, the Huthi heads of state, were not Sāda. The presidents of
the council, Saleh al-Samad and Mahdi al-Mushat, were not Hashemite, Sāda.
Though Husayn and Abd al-Malik emphasize Yawm al-Ghadīr, the Hadith of
Wilāya, and the Hadith of the Thaqalayn, and though the Sāda are an important
constituency of the Huthi movement, the head of government, Mahdi al-Mushat,
and the prime minister, Abd al-Aziz bin Haptour, are not Sāda, not Hashemite.
The symbolism appears intentional and significant: the Huthi do not require the
head of state, the top secular authority, to be Sāda, as the Zaydi tradition of the
imamate would require.
National Vision for Building the Modern Yemeni State
Following Ali Abdallah Saleh’s poorly calculated rebellion in December 2017,

the Huthi leadership appeared concerned that Saleh’s supporters may desert
the Huthi after his demise. The important military commander and the former
president’s nephew Tareq Saleh fled to Aden with many of the former Republican
Guard members he commanded. In this context, Huthi president Samad initiated
the creation of a new national vision designed in part, judging by the timing,
to shore up support from the ranks of those Saleh supporters whose vision of
Yemen is republican and secular but also against the background of growing
Huthi confidence in their military capabilities (though the document insists it is
not a “political strategy but a national demand and property of all future Yemeni
generations” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 17)). Samad’s initiative was
completed only in 2019 after Samad was killed in a Saudi air raid, but the slogan
of “a hand protects, and a hand builds” captures the Huthi desire to shift some of
the focus from military defense to consolidation of domestic political gains. In the
document, the Huthi are thinking ahead to a postwar Yemen, and the document
might be taken as an opening gambit in a domestic political settlement with those
fighting on the Hadi side. Huthi president al-Mushat wrote, “the initiation of the
state building project was as a basis of interaction for all those sincere among the
Yemeni people and political forces to build a modern Yemeni state” (Supreme
Political Committee 2019, 12). “Hoping to strengthen the legitimacy of our
agenda and hoping to unite the hands of Yemenis, we call on all political forces
to a national reconciliation” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 14). The desire
for the document to serve as an opening to a political solution is clear: “There are
political issues the Vision does not determine their final form because they are
related to the outcome of the reconciliation and political settlement” (Supreme
Political Committee 2019, 18). The first period of the timeline for implementation
of the National Vision is a two-year period, 2019–20, that is titled “Reconciliation
and Forgiveness,” referencing the initial period of national political reconciliation
that the document calls for (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 25).
In the National Vision document is a list of impediments to achieving the goals
of the document that read as a comprehensive list of the ills of Ali Abdallah Saleh’s
regime over the last three decades. Significantly, Husayn al-Huthi’s analysis of the
weaknesses of Islam and Zaydism is absent. There is nothing about passive Muslims
and the subjugation of Islam and Muslims to Israeli and American conspiracies.
The significant challenges are the weakness of supervision mechanisms for the
state’s bureaucracy and their subjugation to political agendas, loyalty to individuals
rather than the national state, and lack of social justice and equality of opportunity
(Supreme Political Committee 2019, 26). Islam is included in the document, but the
National Vision’s roots are in the National Dialogue Conference and the experience
of the half century of republican rule, not the Quran or Husayn’s Malazim. In the
general principles of the National Vision, at the top of the list are the “principles of
Islam and the precepts of Sharia are the foundation of the National Vision to build
a modern Yemeni state” (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 20), but Islam plays
almost no role elsewhere in the document. Among the other six basic principles
are the “republican system and adhering to the constitution and laws,” “peaceful
transfer of power through free and transparent elections that are the working
embodiment of democracy,” and “achieving social justice and equal citizenship”
(Supreme Political Committee 2019, 20). These principles do not align easily with
Hashemite dominance or a traditional Zaydi imamate.
The National Vision claims roots and sources in Yemeni experience over the last
fifty years. The sources for the document are the Yemeni Constitution, the agreed-
upon outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference, the basic laws and legislation,
the sectoral strategic plans of the previous government, the International Program
for Sustainable Development (2016–30), successful international experiences,
suggestions and views of the government institutions, and the visions of political
parties (Supreme Political Committee 2019, 21). By claiming roots in republican
Yemen and its existing political parties, the Huthi movement argues that it
introduces nothing significantly new but reforms what exists. The Huthi National
Vision proposes a reformed Yemeni republic, not a return to the imamate.
The National Vision document is the Huthi organization’s most significant
proposal for a post-settlement government, and it, along with Huthi retention of
parliament, shows that the Huthi want to claim at least the mantle of the Yemeni
republicanism despite their actions that belie a lack of adherence to the substance
of the ideals of Yemeni republican government.
Conclusion
The Huthi movement began as a religious and political renaissance movement

among Zaydi youth and scholars that blossomed after the political liberalization
of Yemeni unification in 1990. After 2000, Husayn al-Huthi took the rhetoric of
renaissance and refashioned it into a politically revolutionary Islam outlined in
the Malazim. He defined the world in terms of the struggle between Muslims and
Christians and Jews, expressed today as the United States and Israel. Husayn’s
renaissance is a political one—a re-reading of religion to say that religion should
support political resistance against non-Muslim involvement in Muslim world
affairs, specifically expel the United States and Israel from the Middle East.
Husayn is not interested in reviving traditional religious scholarship; his is not a
renaissance of religious tradition but of political action. He attacks scholars who
disagree with him, who do not share his reading of politics. Husayn does not say
much about a state except to say that Islam and the state are inseparable.
Abd al-Malik oversees the transformation of the Huthi movement from an

educational, inspirational movement into a military organization that fights a long,
difficult insurgency and finally into a power that becomes the de facto government
in Sanaa. Abd al-Malik’s language is more concrete, strategic, and focused on the
Yemeni people, nation, and state. Huthi participation under Abd al-Malik in the
National Dialogue Conference, its Peace and National Inclusion document after its
entrance into Sanaa, and the National Vision Document of 2019 all point toward
a desire to stay within the tradition of the Yemeni Republic, in appearance at least.
The Huthi also desire to remain within the framework of Zaydism. Abd al-
Malik cites traditional sources of Zaydi religious interpretation that support a
religious authority in this world. The Huthi seem to reconcile Zaydi authority with
republican authority through a non-institutionalized form of leadership. Abd al-
Malik is clearly the leader of the Huthi, yet he does not have an official role in
government. Abd al-Malik addresses the nation on national and religious holidays
as the head of state would, but he is not the head of state. The relationship between
Abd al-Malik and the Huthi government is similar to the relationship between the
party and state in socialist governments such as the People’s Democratic Republic
of Yemen. Ansar Allah is the Yemeni Socialist Party, the source of power outside
of state institutions.
The problem for the Huthi is that Abd al-Malik’s power outside state institutions
destroys the integrity of state institutions. If state institutions are directed by
an authority that lies outside the framework of the state, a revolutionary leader,
then the state has no integrity and people cannot trust the political process the
institutions represent. Sovereignty lies with Abd al-Malik rather than the republic.
While the Huthi may see themselves implementing the rule of law, and in many
ways Huthi bureaucracy is effective, the Huthi supervision of the government and
Huthi behavior during the war show that while it claims republican legitimacy, its
actions demonstrate that they want to be the arbitrators of republican law rather
than subject to it. Such an arrangement is unacceptable to political foes of the
Huthi and does not portend well for a long-term settlement in Yemen.
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11
B E C OM I N G T H E STAT E : HOW A N S A R A L L A H T O O K
OV E R A N D A DA P T E D F O R M A L I N ST I T U T IO N S
AT T H E L O C A L L EV E L
Joshua Rogers
Introduction
Past wars in Yemen have driven local, everyday changes that left enduring legacies
for the shape of the state.1 There is every reason to believe that this is happening
again.
Drawing on the move toward the “micro-level” in thinking about the effects
of conflict (Justino et al. 2013), on work on state formation, and on the political
economy of conflict (Wennmann 2019), this chapter investigates how war and
Huthi policy have combined to reconfigure the Yemeni state2 by focusing on
changes to the local authorities and practices of administration. Pursuing political
economy concerns, the chapter focuses in particular on who controls formal
and informal institutions at the local level, on changes to how local and central
institutions are financed, and on how these local institutions provide or fail to
provide services and otherwise enact state functions.
In keeping with this volume’s focus on the Huthi Movement,3 the chapter focuses
on the changes in the areas of Yemen under de facto control of the authorities in
Sana‘a. It is based on a review of the published literature, unpublished reports, and
a series of interviews conducted with experts on the ground and internationally.
Due to the extreme sensitivity of data collection in the areas under the control of
the Huthi Movement at present, no identifying information for interviewees could
be provided and information gathered from interviews is not attributed where this
would have allowed inferences about the identity of the interviewee.
Since the end of 2014, the Huthi Movement has wrested control of local
institutions in a multi-phase takeover, replacing former formal and informal
networks of control and patronage with its own. Alongside changes to who
controls formal institutions at the local level, Ansar Allah has also overseen moves
toward ever greater centralization, central oversight, and control, especially over
taxation and spending—local institutions now have far less autonomy from
ministries in Sana‘a. At the same time, and in a context of collapsing salaries
and earnings, falling remittances, inflation, fuel shortages, a blockade on the

Huthi-controlled areas, airstrikes, and shelling, local budgets have been slashed
and salary payments suspended, prompting a de facto transfer of responsibilities
for local services to international aid organizations. Increased centralization
of revenues and decision-making about local security and strategic resources
has made the state more visible and intrusive on the local level, while services
remain uneven at best. Even as the Huthi Movement has taken control of local
institutions and sought to increase their ability to tax the population and collect
revenue, war, Huthi policy, and international aid have combined to hollow
out the existing local authority structures and to shift historical patterns of
central-local relations toward levels of centralization unprecedented in Yemen’s
republican history.4
These changes matter, not only for how they are reshaping the current lived
reality of the state in Yemen but because they are likely to cast a long shadow. The
system remains in flux, but as patterns become more established, they will become
facts on the ground that constrain options for the post-war period.
A Multi-phase Takeover
The GPC-centered formal institutions and networks of patronage that defined

local governance across Yemen between unification and the current war no longer
exist. In their place, the Huthi Movement and new networks of loyalty centered on
Abd al-Malik al-Huthi and his closest confidants now define local governance in
much of the former Yemen Arab Republic.
This takeover at the level of local governance occurred in three distinct but
overlapping phases.5 The first was a period of GPC-Ansar Allah partnership,
during which the wide deployment of supervisors created a presence for the
Huthi Movement in local institutions, while supervisors’ roles remained limited.
The second phase, from the beginning of 2018 until approximately mid-2019,
witnessed an expansion of supervisors’ remit that brought them increasingly
into direct conflict with governors and other local officials. Most recently, a third
phase is apparent, as Ansar Allah increasingly formally appoints supporters as
governors and district directors. This amounts to a re-formalization of the de facto
operations of the local authority system, accompanied by attempts to increase
central oversight and control and, less systematically, to improve services and the
functioning of formal institutions.
GPC-Ansar Allah Partnership 2014–17

After the Peace and National Partnership Agreement (PNPA) of September
2014—and in cooperation with the GPC and especially former President Saleh—
Ansar Allah began placing “supervisors” (mushrifīn) in the governor’s office, the
executive offices, and in the district administrations of governorates under control
of the Huthi-Saleh alliance. As their forces advanced in the course of 2015, the
1. Becoming the State 219
supervisor system expanded to most of the territory that the Huthi Movement
continues to hold now.
Generally, the governors in these governorates were GPC members—even
where pro-Hadi governors were ousted—while supervisors were from Ansar
Allah. Most of the top-level “general supervisors” shared direct family or close
biographical links to the al-Huthi family (Nevola 2019). Similarly, at the district
level, the secretary general of the district tended to be from the GPC, while the
district supervisor was from Ansar Allah. District supervisors were drawn from a
broader pool of long-term Huthi loyalists than the general supervisors. Generally
from Sa‘dah or Hajjah governorates, they tended to have been part of the Huthi
movement during the (six) Sa‘da wars (Nagi et al. 2020).
At this point, Ansar Allah relied upon the support of the GPC to establish an
accepted presence in local institutions in areas where they previously had no power
base. Reflecting this partnership, the general supervisor and governor had a clear
division of responsibilities: the governor was responsible for questions of service
delivery and local administration, while matters relating to the war effort—from
recruitment, gas and petrol, military deployments, to checkpoints—fell under the
responsibility of the supervisor.6
The role of supervisors at lower levels of the hierarchy was less clearly delineated,
but during this initial period, most did not directly affect the functioning of the
local administration, but rather observed and shadowed officials. Most local
decision-making initially did not change as a result of the supervisors, although it
was disrupted by the war and especially by the loss of central revenues and salary
payments.
Ansar Allah Takeover 2018–19

Following the killing of Ali Abdallah Saleh in December 2017, the power dynamics
in the GPC-Ansar Allah relationship at the center shifted dramatically (Longley
Alley 2018; Nevola and Shiban 2019), but this filtered through to the local level
more gradually.
The break with Saleh did not constitute a full dissolution of the partnership
between GPC and Ansar Allah. The Huthi movement needed to keep institutions
functioning and local constituencies on the side. This meant, at least initially,
keeping in place the expertise of senior officials, many of whom were members
of Saleh’s party, and maintaining access to its networks of tribal leaders and local
notables. Yet, over time, supervisors began to assert themselves more forcefully
at all levels. Thanks to their relationships to the apex of the Huthi hierarchy,
supervisors held the ultimate trump card in contests with local rivals: influence
on the allocation of resources from Sana‘a and on the deployment of the Huthi
Movement’s military machine. Increasingly, they also wielded direct influence
locally and came to be able to withhold official seals, control budgets and
revenues, frustrate the work of figures opposed to their influence, and advance the
careers of those who supported their agenda. Supervisors came “to possess real
authority at the neighborhood, district and governorate levels” (Transfeld et al.
2020, 10) across much of the areas under the control of the de facto authorities.
Secretary generals, governors, and office directors who sought to overrule
supervisors’ decisions found themselves sidelined and increasingly replaced by
former subordinates more willing to accept the new rules of the game, or by the
supervisors themselves.
An example may help to illustrate how this gradual shift played out. In Dhamar,
then president of Yemen’s Supreme Political Council, Saleh Al-Sammad, appointed
Muhammad Al-Maqdashi as governor in December 2017. A long-time GPC
member and tribal shaykh with an alleged role in the killing of a Huthi leader,
Al-Maqdashi was hardly an obvious choice for Ansar Allah. His appointment
highlights the extent to which the movement at this point was seeking to repair
its fractured alliance with the GPC and its concern for local demands and
sensitivities. However, by June 2019, a series of increasingly public disagreements
with the governorate supervisor, Fadil Al-Mashriqi, culminated in Al-Maqdashi’s
resignation. In his resignation letter (posted on Facebook, subsequently deleted),
he complained that he had become “utterly unable to perform his duties,” blaming
an unnamed “lobby” seeking to control governorate officials. He was replaced by
an acting governor and then, in July 2020, by Muhammad al-Bukhayti, a long-
time Ansar Allah activist, formalizing Ansar Allah’s dominant position in local
decision-making.7
Some weeks after his resignation, Al-Maqdashi was appointed deputy minister
for Social Affairs and Labor in Sana‘a, highlighting the extent to which patronage
remains a tool for Ansar Allah to repair frayed alliances. At the same time,
wresting control of local institutions has often been highly coercive. A recent study
on Ibb, which also notes that Ansar Allah co-opted local notables by offering them
high-ranking military positions, focuses primarily on the ways in which Ansar
Allah punished perceived opponents and blacklisted those in the governorate who
refused to cooperate, stripping them of their ability to use their connections in
government to get things done or access state resources—a central source of their
local influence (Transfeld et al. 2020, 13). In the course of its multi-phase local
takeover, Ansar Allah has successfully sidelined many formerly influential figures
at the apex of local tribes, in the local administration, and in the security forces.
Localization and formalization 2019–?

Most recently, there appears to be a move underway toward greater formalization,
localization, and professionalization in the Huthi Movement’s control of local
governance. Ansar Allah is increasingly formally appointing its members, and new
governors have re-assumed some of the powers previously seized by supervisors.
Newly appointed officials, be they supervisors, deputy governors, or secretary
generals, are increasingly likely to be from the governorates in which they serve,
especially at the district level, and to have the formal prerequisites for a civil
service career.
Since about early 2019, some of the original cadre of supervisors from the
movement’s heartlands of Sa‘dah, Hajjah, and Amran has gradually been recalled
after loyal local officials were identified. Many of these new officials are new recruits
to the Huthi Movement, often young, educated figures from within the local public
administration itself.8 This change has primarily taken place below the level of the
“general supervisor” for the governorate and outside the security sector—where
supervisors continue to be very carefully selected (ACAPS 2020; Nevola 2019).
Across governorates in the areas under the control of the de facto authorities,
new district secretary generals and new deputy governors are being appointed,
ensuring that key portfolios like services, finance, and administration are now
formally in the hands of Ansar Allah. Most new appointees are Ansar Allah
members, are from the governorates in which they serve, and hold the formal
qualifications for their posts. In a related development, the “old guard” of
supervisors has been brought into the formal state structure in a number of
governorates. In Raymah and Sana‘a, for instance, the former general supervisors
have been appointed as governors (ACAPS 2020, 6), formalizing their role and
restoring formal responsibilities and lines of reporting. Overall, as the Huthi
Movement establishes local organizational structures and gains confidence in
the political loyalty of the formal administrative apparatus, the parallel system
of supervisors appears to be retreating from day-to-day administration and
responsibilities that were blurred for a time, are now clearer.
At the same time, in most governorates, the majority of former (GPC)9 district
secretary generals and deputy governors remain in place—and there is no apparent
rush to replace them. This suggests that the ongoing changes aim to formalize Huthi
influence in key positions, reduce open power struggles, and ensure that Ansar
Allah can set the terms of its tacit alliance with technocrats and local elites—not to
wholly replace all (senior) officials. This continuity in less politically sensitive posts
and the continuity implied by former GPC members and civil servants without
party affiliations joining Ansar Allah helps inflect the charge that Ansar Allah
is packing the civil service with its supporters and replacing technocrats with
inexperienced loyalists. This may be based on too wide a generalization from the
experience of the central government in Sana‘a, where clientelist hiring has been
widespread. Anecdotal evidence from other governorates and districts appears
to confirm recent attempts to quantify changes in Hajjah, which found rates of
personnel turnover in the district and governorate offices since 2015 to be in line
with normal fluctuations (UNDP 2019b). That is, recent changes have not involved
the large-scale removal of previous staff or mass hiring on clientelist grounds but
rather the systematic positioning of allies in key decision-making and oversight
roles and a concerted attempt to recruit existing officials into Ansar Allah and to
fast-track their careers.10
Even this more limited change in personnel requires a significant cadre of
new supporters. This plethora of “new Huthis” is the result of a systematic effort
at recruitment, training, and organizing in the governorates that has resulted
in local branches of Ansar Allah and the recruitment of local officials and
notables, predominantly claiming sayyid descent, to the movement (Interview 6,
Interview 7). These local branches engage in political mobilizing, charity, spreading
the movement’s teachings, and organizing cultural events (Interview 11).
In the governorates, local officials increasingly perceive Ansar Allah

membership as a normal and accepted option to help fast-track a civil service
career, and former GPC members and civil servants without party affiliation have
become members of Ansar Allah (Interview 1). Ansar Allah now appears to be a
national-level network that is increasingly eclipsing, though not wholly replacing,
the former ruling party, the GPC, in terms of its local branches and membership,
its presence in key institutions, its ability to dispense patronage, and its ability to
observe and police the actions of officials and ordinary Yemenis throughout the
areas under its control. Whether this organization—which has been very explicit
that it does not see itself as a political party—would also be a powerful electoral
machine remains to be seen.
A word on intra-Huthi bargaining and conflict: the movement is not
monolithic, and conflicts, especially between the old guard and more recent
recruits—coinciding outside the Huthi’s heartlands of Sa‘dah, and perhaps Hajjah
and Amran, with divisions between outsiders and natives of the governorates—
are not uncommon. ACAPS has traced how in 2018 and 2019, moves to bring
Huthi supervisors from Sa‘dah into Ibb’s and Hodeidah’s security sectors sparked
infighting between local supporters of the movement and the old guard brought in
at their expense (ACAPS 2020). Other recent research suggests that such conflicts
increased further in 2020, sparked by disputes over land, control of checkpoints,
and over taxation (Carboni 2021). Divisions of region, class, and education often
coincide with those between an old guard that fought with the movement during
the Sa‘dah wars and new recruits within the civil service or from local sayyid
families. These divisions are amply on display in the everyday bureaucratic politics
of local governance.
Centralization and Taxation
There has been a marked increase in taxation and other revenue collection at
the local level, coupled with increasing central control over how these revenues
are spent. After a brief period of relative local autonomy in 2017 and 2018, local
authorities have grown more dependent on central allocations, lost control over
their budgets, and become more dependent on central connections, approvals,
and priorities.
Throughout 2017, local efforts to raise more funds were ad hoc and driven by
necessity. When the internationally recognized government of Yemen stopped
central salary payments and other funding to the Huthi-controlled areas in late
2016, governorates sought ways to make up the shortfall. Making up for this
funding was always going to be a tall order, given that most governorates received
well over 90 percent of their annual budget from central allocations and were
trying to raise funds under conditions of war and economic collapse. Although
local authorities appear to have redoubled their efforts to collect the revenues they
were in theory due, and paying off collectors or paying only token fees and taxes
has become much harder (Interview 3), fixed permit fees, utility taxes, and zakat
did not amount to a viable revenue base in most governorates (al-Awlaqi and al-
Madhaji 2018, 5).
For example, Hajjah reported a decrease of more than 75 percent in local district
revenues between 2015 and 2018, with local revenues in the governorate per capita
in 2018 in the range of hundreds of YR per capita per year (<$2) (UNDP 2019a,
23). Similar, though slightly higher, total revenues appear to have been collected
in Amran (Interview 1). While individual governorates had more success, this
was achieved largely by tapping new sources of revenue. In Dhamar, the local
authorities appear to have succeeded for a time to raise an order of magnitude
more money than in Hajjah, with a budget of ca. 150 million Yemeni riyals per
month in 2018, or ca. $10 per capita per year. This relative abundance of funds
was due to the fact that, with fighting in Taiz and the Tihama, Dhamar for a time
became the main conduit for trade between Aden and the north and was able
to generate significant local revenues from taxing trade and levying customs fees
(Rogers 2019b, 19).
During this period, from 2016 to approximately 2018, governors arguably
gained unprecedented room for maneuver, and the gaps between wealthier and
poorer governorates and urban and rural district budgets grew (UNDP 2019a,
7). While tapping new sources of income and making stronger efforts to collect
local income from customs duties, market taxes, and zakat, they enjoyed wide
latitude to spend the (limited) funds that they raised locally (Salisbury 2017;
Rogers 2019b, 18).
By contrast, during the second and third phases of Ansar Allah’s takeover of
local institutions, local discretion to spend locally generated revenue steadily
decreased while some central allocations from the de facto authorities in Sana‘a
have been reinstated at significantly lower levels. Budget lines for investment
and discretionary spending have been cut entirely, and running budgets have
been limited to restricted funding for health and education services and—in the
absence of salary payments—minimal and irregular stipends for government
employees.11 At the same time, locally collected revenues that would have stayed
in the governorates must now be passed on to Sana‘a: most governorates have
become net contributors to the central government budget (Interview 3).
The first major step toward greater centralization was a little-remarked
administrative change in 2017 that required governorates to deposit all locally
collected revenue in a central bank account in Sana‘a, rather than with the
governorate branch of the central bank, as had previously been the case (Interview
5). In a related change, the finance ministry in Sana‘a also moved zakat proceeds
from local authority accounts to a special account at the Central Bank of Yemen
(CBY) in Sana‘a (Sana‘a Center Economic Unit 2020).
What initially appeared to be only a change in accounting facilitated the
centralization of zakat when the General Authority for Zakat (GAZ) was created
under the Presidential Office in 2018. Zakat revenue, which had been one of
the most important sources of locally collected came under the control of the
GAZ after 2018, and the GAZ further stepped up efforts to collect zakat across
all governorates under control of the Huthi Movement. The same local officials
continued to collect zakat, but all collected funds were now deposited into an
account controlled and administered by the GAZ and the GAZ actively monitored
collection and pressured local authorities to generate additional income. Whereas
zakat collection in many governorates had been quasi-voluntary in practice, and
collectors accepted receipts or accounts of charitable giving in lieu of collecting
zakat, it is now treated as a compulsory tax, and businesses and individuals fear
fines and imprisonment in case of noncompliance. Some businesses perceive
verification and compliance measures undertaken by the Huthi authorities as
shading into extortion (Interview 5).
Alongside the changes to zakat, central authorities have expanded control over
other locally collected taxes and fees. Until 2018, the income from all fees and taxes
designated as local revenues under law 4/2000 remained in the governorates and
could be utilized directly by the local authorities in agreement with the governorate
executive offices.12 Now, half of these funds are fully ceded to the center, while the
remainder is centrally pooled in a fund administered by the Ministry of Finance
in Sana‘a, reserved for roads, dams, fisheries, and agriculture, to which districts
and governorates must apply (Interview 5). The more lucrative sources of funding
defined as “shared governorate revenues” and “shared public revenues” under Law
4/2000, including fees on petroleum products and taxes on qat, now only fund
the center (Interview 5). Even fees for street cleaning and other local services are
now pooled in Sana‘a (Interview 1). These more centralized revenues are also now
being collected more assiduously. As in the case of zakat, taxes on qat are more
consistently levied, taxes on rental income collected at the district level are now
actively and consistently pursued, and paying off tax collectors or paying only
token fees and taxes has become much harder (Interview 7, Interview 3).
Ansar Allah insists that these measures combat corruption and ensure the
fair distribution of limited resources between governorates. Moreover, they help
deliver on the “National Vision,” the official political program of the de facto
authorities in Sana‘a. The national vision highlights the importance of central
oversight and reapportionment of locally raised funds for the “fair and balanced
distribution of resources under a strong unified state” and identifies the amount
of taxes collected as a key performance indicator (Supreme Political Council 2019,
39). Similarly, it identifies building and strengthening the “central . . . control and
accountability capacities on the local government districts,” alongside local and
societal accountability, as a priority (ibid.).
By contrast, governorate and district authorities now see themselves as having
“much less autonomy” vis-à-vis Sana‘a than they previously enjoyed (UNDP 2019a,
15). Recent changes may also have undermined community coping mechanisms
and the link between fees and services. Whereas, for instance, during 2018
communities in several governorates agreed to pay higher fees for local cleaning
services in order to cover the actual costs and continue service delivery, now, such
ad hoc local solutions have become far more difficult to implement (Interview 1).
Centralization is also, predictably, creating challenges in procurement and project
selection, with bureaucrats in Sana‘a, under pressure to deliver on the “National
Vision,” purchasing equipment and implementing projects according to centrally
defined priorities with limited local consultation or sensitivity to local priorities

and needs.13
Alongside its role in increasing central control and oversight, this centralization
of local revenues forms part of broader attempts to shore up the finances of the
Sana‘a authorities. Until 2015, an estimated 60 percent of government revenues
(World Bank 2014) came from oil and gas sales; none of this income now accrues
to Sana‘a. In their attempt to make up the shortfall and fund an expensive war,
the de facto authorities have centralized control over revenue streams formerly
under control of the governorates and districts; and they have created new central
revenues. These include an emergency 5 percent levy on all mobile calls and data,
control of public companies and seizure of companies affiliated with political
opponents, control of fuel import companies, new fees in education, for sanitation,
and other basic services, tapping the revenue streams of hospitals and other
potentially profit-making service providers,14 and seizure of property and assets.
In 2020, the de facto authorities in Sana‘a levied an additional 20 percent tax on
profits derived from natural resources, notably water, oil, gas, minerals, and fish.15
In the beginning of 2021, they introduced additional income taxes and payroll fees.
In Search of a Role: Local Authorities between Central Control

and Parallel Service Providers
Regular salary payments to civil servants at all levels of the administration in

Huthi-controlled areas ended in 2016, when the internationally recognized
government stopped transferring salary payments to areas outside its control.
Since then, a system of significantly reduced payments has been instituted.
Initially minimal and improvised, these payments have become more regularized
and institutionalized over the years.16 Most public servants working for the de
facto authorities can now expect to receive roughly 10–25 percent of their previous
salary—between 5 and 10 percent in dollar terms.17
Despite this fall in salaries, absenteeism remains low by some metrics. A recent
UNDP assessment in Hajjah, for instance, identified that more than 80 percent
of district staff and nearly 70 percent of governorate staff continue to show up
for work at least once a week (UNDP 2019b, 22). At the same time, anecdotal
evidence suggests that public employees, from teachers over sanitation workers to
local functionaries, have had to find additional sources of income to cope, mostly
by taking up additional jobs in the informal sector.
The loss of salaries has combined with the loss of budgets for investments and
services and growing central control over how the minimal remaining funds may
be used, to leave local governance hollowed out: formal structures continue to
exist and their staff continues to show up for work on at least a semi-regular basis,
but their ability to set priorities, allocate funds, and implement projects has been
severely curtailed. Local authorities continue to create strategic plans for the next
several years and to update existing plans, drawing on local council members and
their networks to identify needs and local priorities—or at least those perceived
by local leaders (Interview 5). Yet, without funds and the authority to spend them,
they serve largely as wish lists.
Enter international aid, whose dwindling support was keeping many of the
basic frontline services functioning at a minimal level—though recent cuts put
even this minimal functioning in question. Most of the local offices and authorities
tasked with service delivery—like the water authority, the health office, the
education office, etc.—are sustained by funding from international organizations,
who provide the necessary equipment, and, through project funds, provide what
infrastructure investment exists to repair conflict damage, open new facilities, or
maintain and refurbish existing ones (Interview 10).
Local authorities’ role now consists in important measures of attempts to
market their plans and identified needs to donors and to implementing partners
administering donor funds. Local authorities act as brokers and try to coordinate
between different actors while having little formal authority. Yet, international
organizations and INGOs are generally reluctant to work with local authorities
in Yemen. Moreover, the new aid coordination mechanisms created by the de
facto authorities have further centralized and securitized the process of gaining
approvals for any local-level work.
This dynamic continues. Already in 2019, a UNDP assessment found that donor
focus on water, health, and education meant that other services, like agriculture,
sanitation, or road construction and maintenance, were being systematically
neglected (UNPD 2019a, 6). Local authorities often do not know about and have
no ability to influence or monitor development projects funded by international
donors or the central government as part of its implementation of the national
vision18—yet these have been the only sources of investment for years.
Donor reluctance to work directly with the local administration has long
meant that infrastructure projects and investments at the local level were
handled by bodies like the Social Fund for Development (SFD) and the Public
Works Project (PWP). Both are established and generally well-functioning
parallel structures with which local authorities have developed coordination
and cooperation mechanisms. By contrast, cooperation with other implementers
and humanitarian actors is often more fraught, while new parallel structures like
the implementing offices for the “national vision,” which have been proliferating
in central and local institutions, have often ignored and bypassed existing local
plans and structures (Interview 5).
Conclusion
Local governance in the areas of Yemen under Ansar Allah’s control has changed
since the outbreak of the current war. A mid-level local official transported from
2014 to the present would find that their salaries are no longer paid, their working
budget has been slashed, many of their superiors are no longer in place, and
permission must now be sought from new quarters, even as they face new pressures
to raise funds and must petition the central government for support of their pet
projects. This chapter has traced these changes in terms of Ansar Allah’s multi-
phase takeover of local institutions, growing centralization, central oversight and
control, renewed efforts to collect taxes and other local revenues, a collapse of local
budgets and salary payments, and a de facto transfer of related responsibilities to
international aid organizations.
From Ansar Allah’s perspective, these changes are similarly evident, but would
likely be framed differently: the National Vision speaks of increasing central
oversight and accountability of local authorities,19 dismantling Saleh-era networks
that contributed to Yemen’s underdevelopment, and increasing local revenue
generation as part of a broader project to increase local state capacities. This
project, Ansar Allah would point out, is occurring in a situation of active conflict,
in which military needs must trump civilian concerns and against the backdrop of
economic collapse brought on by war and a blockade of Hodeidah port.
These changes occurred rapidly over the past years. Yet, especially if the new
status quo persists for some time, it is unlikely that they will be readily undone.
Because institutions are sticky, how they govern civilians in times of war can—and
often does—affect how they will govern in times of peace (Huang 2016).
Just as the transition in 2011 and Ansar Allah’s subsequent “revolution” had to
contend with local institutions linked through the GPC party, patronage networks,
political loyalty, and force of habit to President Saleh and his inner circle, so a
transition now will have to take as its starting point the overlapping modes of
oversight and control put in place over the past years. Centralizing legal and
administrative changes to formal state structures are ongoing, with concomitant
changes to personnel, procedures, and practices that may make them difficult
to reverse. Moreover, they are flanked by informal changes: by the network of
supervisors Ansar Allah has put in place and by an expansion of Ansar Allah’s local
presence as an organization and of its membership, including from within local
authorities. Future attempts at federalism or serious decentralization in the areas
currently under the control of the Huthi movement, which many Yemenis and
outside observers continue to view as central to overcoming important underlying
causes of the conflict, will have to contend with these realities. The apparently
different trajectories of central-local relations in different parts of Yemen—and the
increasing centralization in the areas currently under Ansar Allah’s control—will
likely complicate deliberations about the desired shape of a postwar state or states.
The future of increased taxation is less certain. If, in the context of a peace
agreement, a however-constituted central government regains access to oil and gas
income, it will be tempting for incumbents to relax the intensive current efforts to
collect funds locally. Oil rents are far easier to collect than taxes and rarely engender
the resistance and political bargaining that seeking to part people from their money
involves. Certainly, resistance to taxation already appears to be one factor driving
unrest and tribal uprisings in the areas under the control of Ansar Allah (Carboni
2021). If taxes were reduced, citizens and especially business owners would likely
breathe a sigh of relief—current fee levels for basic services and some business
levies, in particular, appear unsustainable. Moreover, without the pressures of
active conflict, the overriding imperative to pay for mass-mobilization, fuel, and
weapons would lose its justification and demands to reduce the tax burden would
almost certainly gain currency.
On the other hand, wartime increases in taxation have proven remarkably
durable in other contexts—not just in the United States and Europe after the World
Wars but in many places where what has come to be called “rebel governance”
defined the postwar political economy and governance (Péclard and Mechoulan
2015). Central authorities are generally loath to part with increased revenues and
wartime tax increases are rarely fully reversed at the end of the conflict. In the
medium term, a central government in Yemen that is more dependent on local
taxation—as opposed to local authorities almost wholly dependent on central
support—may offer a chance to put local governance on a different footing.
Work over the past decade has underscored the potential for positive tax-
governance linkages through the effects of tax administration on general state
capacity and through the incentives for bargaining that taxation creates. Across
different contexts, citizens and especially organized groups in society (business
associations, labor unions, tribes) have a tendency to demand services and a
measure of influence over how they are administered in exchange for increased
tax payments (Prichard 2016). At the same time, taxes are extraordinarily difficult
to collect without at least the passive acquiescence of those paying them, making
it difficult for authorities to ignore such demands (Levi 1988). Through increased
demands, resistance to taxation, and the bargaining that ensues, more responsive
modes of governance can emerge. Similarly, the increased organizational capacity,
and sophistication required to administer and effectively collect taxes, has the
potential to create linkages to other aspects of public administration. Moreover,
if local authorities were able to generate a significant portion of their revenues
themselves, this may open up opportunities for bargaining not only between
interest groups and the state but between the central and local administrations. Yet,
while there is little doubt that these linkages often exist, they are not guaranteed:
bargaining can break down and lead to renewed violence, increased demands can
be successfully repressed, at least in the short term, and organizational capacity can
remain confined to small parts of the public administration (Moore 2007; Prichard
2016). Certainly, in Yemen’s history of local-central relations, centralization has
a mixed track record, while periods of greater decentralization have in the past
coincided with periods of positive and dynamic local development (Challand and
Rogers 2020).
Notes
1 See, for example, Day 2012; Rogers 2019b.

2 The chapter approaches the state through the prism of state formation as a concrete
and historically evolved set of institutions, whose goals, relationships, and practices
are defined in important measure by the specific groups that control it, its historical
antecedents, and the (often violent) processes that brought it into being (cf. Péclard
and Mechoulan 2015; Tilly 1992).
3 The chapter uses the movement’s official name “Ansar Allah” interchangeably with the
more widely used “Huthi Movement.”
4 On the history of local-central relations in Yemen, see Challand and Rogers (2020).
5 These phases echo those identified in previous research (Nevola and Shiban 2019,
Transfeld et al. 2020), but with sufficient variation and ongoing changes to warrant a
deeper discussion.
6 See Longley Alley (2018) on the general division of responsibilities inside what she
terms the “Huthi Saleh alliance.”
7 For an account of these events from pro-government publications, see 4 Mayu (2019)
and Al-Wafaq Nyuz (2019).
8 In addition to their advancement at the local level, dozens of new Ansar Allah
members have been appointed to the National Shura Council (ACAPS 2020).
9 In individual instances, members of the Islah Party also remain in position.
10 This mode of governance appears similar to that established in Sa‘dah following the
sixth war in 2010 (Garrigue 2010, 12; see also Brandt 2017, Salmoni et al. 2010).
11 For instance, according to UNDP figures (UNDP 2019b, 11), relative to 2013, the
2018 budget for Hajjah governorate and selected districts had seen investment cut by
100 percent and the operating budget fall by 67–80 percent.
12 On the law’s provisions and practices associated with taxation, see Hallaj 2015; Rogers
2019a; Romeo and El Mensi 2008.
13 What limited investment funding is available appears to be largely dedicated
to achieving the goals defined in the vision. Echoing the earlier deployment of
supervisors, Ansar Allah has created new executive units inside most ministries for
the implementation of the vision.
14 According to UNDP analysis, current fees amount to a de facto privatization of public
services (UNDP 2019a, 6, 8). On revenue streams controlled by the Huthi Movement,
see also Panel of Experts on Yemen (2021).
15 This tax, known as the khums (fifth), was originally proposed in mid-2018 but did not
pass the Sana‘a Parliament due to widespread GPC opposition. It was reintroduced by
decree. On criticism of the khums, see A Correspondent in Yemen (2020) and Sana‘a
Center Economic Unit (2020). As of February 2021, multiple sources in Yemen noted
that khums was not currently collected.
16 E.g. in Hajjah in 2018 staff received the equivalent of one month salary per year
(UNDP 2019b, 8).
17 Current de facto exchange rates available from, for example, Yemen Economist
(2020).
18 By contrast to the local authorities as an institution, specific people within the local
authorities with close ties to the Huthi Movement or other key power brokers in
Sana‘a may have the ability to influence such decisions.
19 It also speaks of increased local and community oversight, though in practice these
appear to be lesser priorities.
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Supervisors: Yemen’s Competing Security Providers.” Italian Institute for International
Political Studies and Carnegie Middle East Center, 2020. https://carnegie-mec.
org/2020/03/27/shuyyukh-policemen-and-supervisors-yemen-s-competing-security-
providers-pub-81385
Nevola, Luca. “From Periphery to the Core: A Social Network Analysis of the Ḥūthī
Local Governance System.” Paper presented at the workshop “Political Elites in
Yemen: Agency, Structures, Networks,” SOAS University of London, London, UK,
July 4, 2019.
Nevola, Luca and Shiban, Baraa. “The Role of ‘Coup Forces’ Saleh, and the Houthis.”
In Global, Regional, and Local Dynamics in the Yemen Crisis, ed. S. Day and N.
Brehony (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 233–52, https://library.oapen.org/
handle/20.500.12657/42795
Panel of Experts on Yemen “Letter Dated 22 January 2021 from the Panel of Experts on
Yemen Addressed to the President of the Security Council.” UN Document S/2021/79.
(2020). https://undocs.org/en/S/2021/79
Péclard, Didier and Delphine, Mechoulan. Working Paper: Rebel Governance and the
Politics of Civil War. Swisspeace, 2015.
Prichard, Wilson. “What Have We Learned About Taxation, Statebuilding and
Accountability?.” ICTD Summary Brief 4 (Brighton: International Centre for Tax and
Development, 2016). https://www.ictd.ac/publication/ictd-sb4/
Rogers, Joshua. Local Governance in Yemen: Theory, Practice, and Future Options (Berlin:
Berghof Foundation, 2019a). https://berghof-foundation.org/library/local-governance-
in-yemen-theory-practice-and-future-options
Rogers, Joshua. Violence and the (Trans)formation of the State in the Yemen Arab Republic
1962–1970. Ph.D. thesis, SOAS University of London, 2019b. https://eprints.soas.
ac.uk/30895/
Romeo, Leonardo and El-Mensi, Mohamed. “The Difficult Road to Local Autonomy in Yemen.
International Studies Working Paper 08-38.” Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2008.
Salisbury, Peter. Yemen: National Chaos, Local Order, (London: Chatham House, 2017).
Salmoni, Barak A., Loidolt, Bryce and Wells, Madeleine. Regime and Periphery in Northern
Yemen: The Huthi Phenomenon, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010).
Sana‘a Center Economic Unit “Yemen Economic Bulletin: Tax and Rule—Houthis Move
to Institutionalize Hashemite Elite with ‘One-Fifth’ Levy.” Sana‘a Center for Strategic
Studies, (2020). https://sanaacenter.org/publications/analysis/11628
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Protection and a Hand for Building, (2019). http://yemenvision.gov.ye/en/upload/
National%20Vision%20For%20The%20Modern%20Yemeni%20State.pdf
Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital and European States AD 1990–1992 (Cambridge, MA:
Blackwell, 1992).
Transfeld, Mareike, al-Deen, Maysaa Shuja and al-Hamdani, Raiman. “Seizing the State:
Ibb’s Security Arrangement after Ansarallah’s Takeover”. Policy Report, Yemen Polling
Center, 2020.
UNDP. Rapid Local Governance Diagnostic in Yemen: Main Findings Report (Sana‘a:
UNDP Yemen, 2019a).
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Governorate.” Sana‘a: UNDP Yemen, 2019b.
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Oxford Research Encyclopedia, International Studies (2020). https://doi.org/10.1093/
acrefore/9780190846626.013.370
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Conflict Yemen: Yemen Policy Note 2 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014). https://
openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28607
Yemen Economist “ʾAsʿār al-dūlār fī al-yaman al-yawm.” [The dollar exchange rates in
Yemen today] (2020). https://www.yemeneconomist.com/164595/yemen-currency-
prices-today#%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B1_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8
%B9%D9%85%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D
9%85_%D9%81%D9%8A_%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86
232
Section IV
REGIONAL IMPACT
234
12
H Y B R I D WA R FA R E — L E S S O N S F R OM T H E S AU D I - L E D
C OA L I T IO N ’ S I N T E RV E N T IO N I N Y E M E N 2 0 1 5 – 2 0 2 ?
James Spencer
‘No proposition Euclid wrote,

No formulae the text-books know,
Will turn the bullet from your coat,
Or ward the tulwar’s downward blow’1
Abstract
This chapter will examine asymmetric2 conventional conflict using the example
of the intervention by the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen. It will analyse how the
apparently weak Huthis were able to exploit their position well, and thus fight
the Coalition to a standstill. It will also examine non-kinetic vulnerabilities of a
conventional campaign which the Huthis strangely failed to exploit, thereby not
bringing the conflict to an earlier close.
While peer-on-peer/near-peer conflict remains the worst-case scenario for
war, unequal opponents are far more frequent, and thus conflicts involving them
are more likely. Despite the inequality in research and development (R&D) or
Defence budget, such encounters should not be treated lightly, for by harnessing
the principles of hybrid warfare, the apparently weaker side can inflict painful, if
not existential, damage on the more technologically advanced side.
As always, some aspects of the campaign are theatre-specific. However, many
of the lessons learned from the Coalition’s conflict in Yemen will be applicable
elsewhere, even in theatres beyond the Middle East where NATO forces are more
likely to fight, and as warfare evolves further.
Definitions
The Huthis (together with the General People’s Congress – Sanaà (GPC-S), etc.)
are one of several factions in a civil war. While proscribed as a terrorist group
by some states, for the purposes of this chapter they are regarded as a (de facto)
state, since they functionally satisfy the Montevideo Criteria,3 but in particular
due to their access to heavy weapons and advanced munitions in large quantity in
the ground they control. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are remotely piloted
aircraft; Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) are remotely piloted watercraft.
Drones are pre-programmed unmanned vehicles (in this case, mostly UAVs)
which complete a series of tasks without further commands.4
Introduction
This chapter will show that while highly refined military capability may provide
an edge against peer opponents, often it is ineffectual against sub-peer enemies.
An over-reliance on high technology – particularly at the cost of less sophisticated
capabilities – may not only fail to defeat the enemy, but even render the force
itself vulnerable to mission failure. This issue has been seen in Israeli operations
against Hizballah in Lebanon5 (2006) and the Saudi-led Coalition against the
Huthis.
At a time when three decades of low-intensity operations (peace-keeping,
counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism (CT)) are drawing to an end,
many Western armed forces are re-orienting and re-equipping for peer-on-peer
conflict. There is a widely held assumption among many of the military, defence
industry and think-tank communities that a force which is equipped and trained
to fight at the most rapid tempo and the highest level of technology will be able
to prevail against both a peer/near-peer enemy and a ‘lesser’ force, as well as
COIN/CT missions.
This assumption is flawed for two major reasons. The first reason is that many
planning and procurement assumptions are heavily shaped by operational analysis
(OA). This is, by its very definition, informed by past operational experience. The
experience of post–Second World War campaigns (and a change in doctrine) drove
the selection of the 5.56mm SS109 round. That round was found to be subpar for
the Global War on Terrorism campaigns. Similarly, OA quantified the gap crossing
requirement for Northwest Europe – the predicted peer-on-peer theatre – which
were duly procured. They were inadequate elsewhere.
The second reason is that most weapons systems are designed to be optimised
against the most advanced capability identified at the time of procurement,
whether that is offensive or defensive. Usually this capability is at the level of
peers (with the R&D and purchase budgets to acquire such equipment), rather
than third order countries, which usually rely on older equipment. But this older
equipment may be more effective in certain key aspects than its more modern
equivalent. Thus:
Shaping offers far fewer stealth advantages against low-frequency radar. If the
radar wavelength is roughly twice the size of the target, a half-wave resonance
effect can still generate a significant return.6
1. Hybrid Warfare 237
The most famous example of this discord was the shooting down of a US F-117A
NIGHTHAWK stealth aircraft over the former Yugoslavia in 1999 by an S-125
Neva/Pechora surface-to-air missile:
e F-117, which entered service with the U.S Air Force in 1983, was widely seen
Th
as one of the most advanced pieces of U.S. military equipment. At the same time,
Yugoslav air defenses were considered relatively obsolete.7
It is also noticeable that the entry cost (in financial and training terms) of some
formerly high-end technologies has fallen so greatly that even sub-peer enemies
have access to them. The Huthi use of UAVs, USVs and cruise missiles has been
particularly noticeable – and challenging to defend against.
Three specific areas of capability have been mentioned8 as key: artificial
intelligence (AI); cyberwarfare; and unmanned [domain] vehicles (U*Vs). This
chapter will examine these fields, as well with other pertinent asymmetric aspects,9
in detail in relation to the Huthis’ campaign, which saw ‘Chewhead sandals
wearing Houthi defeat . . . Saudi’.10
The chapter will also examine aspects of information operations11 – in particular
public relations and lawfare – which have increasingly become a vulnerability even
in conventional operations. Given the nature of the Huthi movement, this was
an aspect which was expected to be a major force-multiplier for them, but which
failed to materialise.
Ground and enemy

As the fifth century BC Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote, ‘the natural formation
of the country is the soldier’s best ally’.12 A detailed understanding of the terrain –
both geographical and human – and how it effects combat is key, and something
that some influential members of the Saudi-led Coalition seemed to lack, given
their expectation of a rapid victory. In particular, Yemen’s immensely complex
terrain, with its few manoeuvre corridors up to and on the central plateau, greatly
assisted the Huthis in defending against the Coalition’s armour.
Similarly, while often described in religious terms as Shià (or Zaydi
Revivalists), the Huthis astutely tapped into feelings of political and economic
disenfranchisement across core sectors of society, particularly the Bakil
confederation. With the ascent to power of Hadi’s southern zumra faction,
by the time the war started, the disenfranchisement also included much of the
Hashid confederation. The Coalition’s bombing campaign reinforced this sense
of victimhood: ‘In Saada, [. . .] a retired soldier who fought in the wars of the
last decade against the Houthis, said that everyone in the province, regardless of
affiliation, was fighting alongside the rebels now.’13
The Huthis are a Hashemite family (Sāda) who lead the Ansar Allah (Supporters
of God) Zaydi revivalist movement. Having begun in community organisation, the
Huthi family moved into political activity, and then into violent opposition against
the state, starting in 2004. Between 2005 and 2010, there were five further rounds
of conflict against the Yemeni state, tribal auxiliaries, and (in 2009/10) Saudi
forces, during which the Huthis showed increasing capability and proficiency.
While the Coalition may have had limited understanding of the theatre’s physical
and human geography, the Huthis (and the GPC-S) had intimate knowledge, and
used it to great effect. As with the similar campaign against Hizballah in 2006 (and
possibly with Hizballah training), the Huthis/GPC-S appear to have conducted a
thorough intelligence preparation of the battlespace/environment, and identified
likely Coalition avenues of advance and positions. Among other attacks, this
probably enabled the 4 September 2015 TOCHKA attack on the Coalition echelon
near Ma’rib which dealt such a blow to Emirati morale. Both GPC-S (particularly
under the ‘snake-dancing’ Ali Abdallah Salih) and the Huthis were adept at
negotiating with malleable tribes to remove them from the field politically.
Cutting-edge technology meets tribal fighters
Artificial intelligence
Artificial intelligence14 (AI) has been identified as a revolution in military affairs,
enabling commanders to increase the tempo of their decision cycle. This is
doubtless an effective concept when there are formal units and doctrine, thus
patterns which can be derived, processed and exploited.
However, the Huthis are less of an organisation and more a movement, with ad
hoc orders of battle, materiel and tactics. While parts of the core Huthi movement
are under increasingly firm control, many of their field commanders, particularly
in the early stages of the campaign, were extremely independent minded, much to
the frustration of various aid agencies15 which had made agreements for access and
so on with the Huthi leadership but found that these were not always recognised
on the ground. Identification of ORBAT hierarchies by traditional means thus
becomes difficult.
The Huthis were very surveillance aware – particularly of overhead surveillance –
and successfully took measures to counter target acquisition plans:
The Houthis are effective at reducing signatures that could betray their location.
Emissions control has become good since 2009, with limited use of electronic
communications other than low-power Motorola phones.16
Further to minimise their presence and their chains of command, they blended in
with the local population: ‘Another means of avoiding air attack is dispersion and
tactical movement that is indiscernible from civilian movement.’17 It is unlikely
that AI will be able to detect such deliberately signatureless movement any more
than were human intelligence analysts. As the use of militias – and mercenaries (cf
infra) – grows in many such conflicts, this nonconformist factor is likely to grow.
AI is unlikely to be able to identify patterns in such fickle forces.
AI may be difficult to apply even to those units of the regular Yemeni Armed
Forces which remained loyal to GPC-S. These were severely affected by corruption,
with swathes of ‘ghost soldiers’ hollowing out formations, and embezzled
maintenance budgets rendering various equipment – particularly signature
equipment – unserviceable. As a result, the capability of rolling out of the gate
bears little similarity to the paper template. AI may not discern patterns where
there are none.
Cyber and electronic warfare

Cyber operations by both state and non-state actors – whether for intelligence
gathering18 or offensive operations – have been of concern for decades. Indeed,
it has now been elevated to a formal domain of conflict. While the knowledge to
conduct cyber operations requires education, there is limited need for sophisticated
materials, tools and so on: indeed, there is a flourishing market on the internet –
particularly the dark net – in offensive cyber tools,19 vulnerabilities and so on.
Further, since there is no distance in cyber-space, cyber allows a physically remote
or confined enemy to reach into an attacker’s distant homeland.20 Cyber is thus a
domain of conflict where the asymmetry is potentially less pronounced.
Iran, which has clearly been providing some material21 and technical support
to the Huthis, is assessed to have a reasonably advanced cyber capability.22 Yet with
the exception of a brief – and fairly crude – hack by the ‘Yemeni Cyber Army’23
against civilian targets linked to Saudi Arabia, there has been no reported cyber
activity by the Huthis.
A Yemeni hacking group announced that it has hacked the website, servers and
archives of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign, Interior and Defense ministries and released
thousands of top secret documents from the identity and contact addresses of
the country’s spies to the most confidential correspondence of Riyadh officials
in the last several decades.24
This probably reflects a gap25 in the Huthi/GPC-S cyber capability. Interestingly,

however, Iran appears to have enabled Hizballah to develop a cyber capability.26
Any Huthi lack may thus reflect the arms-length relationship between the Islamic
Republic of Iran (IRI) and the Huthis. Similarly, while Iran worked hard with
Hizballah to track, decrypt, translate and disseminate Israeli Defence Force
communications27 in 2006, there are no reports of them doing likewise with
the Huthis against the Saudi Coalition’s communications, suggesting limited
technological transfer – or trust.
However, the same capability gap also makes the Huthis less vulnerable to
offensive cyber operations by their enemies. UAE is widely reported to have
developed an active offensive28 cyber capability,29 yet this seems to have had limited
impact on the conflict.
There have been few reports of other forms of electronic warfare (EW)
during the campaign, which is slightly surprising, given the heavy reliance the
Saudi-led Coalition places on technology. This may reflect another gap in the
IRI/Huthi capability set. One exception to this has been a few incidents of GPS
disruption: ‘there was one instance reported in Hodeidah, Yemen, one in the Strait
of Hormuz and two in the port of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia’.30
It is unclear whether this activity was Huthi/GPC-S related, or for another
reason (possibly criminal). Given the cheapness and ready availability of GPS
jammers on the open market, the lack of EW was another surprising omission.
Unmanned [*] Vehicles

Both (main) sides in the conflict have used UAVs31 extensively. Iran’s initial
provision32 and the Huthis’ subsequent adaptation, development and use of UAVs
has been reasonably well covered:
Since March 2015, when the current conflict in Yemen began, Houthi forces
have demonstrated an increasing ability to inflict damage through the use of
UAVs. They deploy a variety of reconnaissance and combat UAVs, which
they have assembled using imported parts, or a combination of imported and
domestically manufactured components. Their use of UAVs has evolved thanks
to growing domestic capabilities and to their acquisition of more sophisticated
material from external sources.
Having previously relied on un-weaponised UAVs to destroy Saudi-led Arab
Coalition weapon guidance systems-by crashing them into sensitive electronics,
such as radar units-Houthi forces now employ longer-range UAVs, which are
designed to deliver an explosive payload.33
The Huthis have used UAVs progressively for intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR), as manually guided missiles (both short and long range)
and to deliver ‘dumb’ bombs.34 In most cases, the UAV has been the weapon itself
(both impact and proximity). In the case of the ‘bomber’ UAV, while it has been a
weapons delivery platform, it has not been recovered, possibly due to range issues
(either fuel or command signal), and possibly due to pilot limitation. There have,
however, been no reported instances of a Huthi UAV being used as a platform to
launch guided missiles.
Despite the numerous scares reported at airports globally, and the canalisation
of flight paths in Yemen due to deep re-entrants, no UAVs seem to have been used
as anti-aircraft measures. A screen of small swarming UAVs – possibly trailing
chains, etc – would be difficult to detect either visually or technologically, and
would function as ‘flying FOD’, to dire potential consequences.
Two aspects in particular stand out. The first is the Huthis’ phased use of UAVs
against Saudi acquisition RADARs (similar to the AGM-88 HARM – High-speed
Anti-Radiation Missiles) in order to clear the route for SCUD ballistic, and other,
missile attacks into Saudi Arabia. It is also worth noting here the disproportionate
costs: as with HAMAS’s crude missiles defeated by DAVID’S SLING, the Saudis
have used PATRIOT missiles to counter cheap UAVs etc.,35 is an option which
would rapidly drain most countries’ treasuries. Possibly by copying IS’s attack
on Khmeimim Air Base, the Huthis also may have experimented with UAV
swarming36 to overload counter-measures. In addition to the disablement of the
PATRIOT missile defence systems, the Huthis’ and Iran’s ‘cruise missile’ UAVs
(and cruise missiles) have exposed a serious gap37 in civilian compatible low-level
air defence.38 However, given the use of Counter-Rocket Artillery and Mortars
(C-RAM)/Close-In Weapons Systems (CIWS) to protect Forward Operating
Bases, and the likely distance involved in expeditionary operations, this issue is
unlikely to have a major impact on future NATO operations.
The second aspect is the Huthis’ strategic use of missiles to strike key Saudi
and Emirati targets, such as airports, oil and gas infrastructure and reverse
osmosis39 plants. The demonstrations of the Coalition’s vulnerabilities – together
with Trump’s nonchalant response – appear to have caused a major reassessment
by the Coalition of the conflict’s cost: benefit analysis. Strangely, however, despite
targeting infrastructure in KSA and UAE, and threatening Sudan, the Huthis
appear not to have targeted Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, or the
Sudanese Hamedti (General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo), who supplied many of
the Darfuri mercenaries who formed much of the ‘Coalition’ ground forces. It is
unclear whether this lack was from scruples, tactics or inadequate information;
however, such long-range decapitation is clearly a capability which exists.
The UAE has Chinese supplied WANG LOON IIs, which it has used for ISR
and as a weapons delivery platform for ground attack using guided missiles,
most notably in killing Salih al-Samad, the Huthi ‘president’, on 19 April 2018
in Hodeidah.40 Turkish UAVs have been lauded as battle-winners for their anti-
armour roles in Libya (against the UAE) and Nagorno-Karabakh, while the use of
UAE’s UAVs has been given as one reason for the unexpectedly rapid conventional
defeat of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front in Tigray.41 Yet in Yemen, relatively
advanced UAE UAVs (as well as intelligence provided by tactical and strategic
US UAVs) seem to have had very little effect on the Huthis. There is yet little
published data to suggest why this should be, although the Huthis’ creative
dispersal and limited acquisition signatures – armored vehicles, command posts,
anti-aircraft batteries, etc. – may be a major reason.
None of the UAVs operated over Yemen is reported as being an unmanned
combat air vehicle, and the UAVs reported have shown themselves to be not
invulnerable, with several – including at least two US MQ-9 REAPER UAVs42 –
being shot down, either by (probably IRI-supplied) SAMs or by small arms fire.
While this is not a major strategic issue (indeed, one advantage of a UAV is that the
pilot is not killed or captured when his or her aircraft is brought down), there are
fewer of the larger airframes available, with longer lead-times to replace.
In some cases, the nature of the UAVs is of political interest. Thus although
the AeroVironment RQ-20 Puma drone shot down on Aug 20 had ‘masking tape
on its tail bore what appeared to be the palm-tree and crossed-swords logo of
Saudi Arabia’, the report continued that ‘the Saudi military . . . is not known to
operate this drone. . . . First used by U.S. special forces, other arms of the American
military now use the unarmed drone for surveillance work.’43 In the absence of US
conventional forces, and the apparent lack of the RQ-20 in the Saudi inventory, the
clear inference was that US Special Forces were involved in supporting the Saudis
at the tactical level without this being authorised by Congress.
The Yemeni Navy was negligible, despite which the Huthis initially used C-802
missiles to attack Coalition shipping, to some effect, including the destruction
of the HSV-2 SWIFT on 1 October 2016.44 This anti-ship missile capability
appears to have come as a surprise to the Coalition, although various anti-ship
missiles appear in open source catalogues – such as IISS’s Military Balance –
from at least 2000. It is likely that IRI technicians refurbished the systems, and
probably (re-)trained the operators; the IRI may also have supplied additional
C-802 missiles. The Huthis habitually deployed spotters in small fishing boats
to confirm that the ship was military (and to film the attacks for upload to their
al-Masirah satellite channel.45) However, the spotters’ identification appears
to have been limited and the Huthis twice launched missiles against the USS
MASONS and USS PONCE (which defeated the missiles with ECM.) As a result,
the USS NITZE fired three Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles which destroyed the
missiles’ targeting radars.46
Probably due to the destruction of the irreplaceable targeting system, but
possibly after exhausting their C-802 missile stocks, the Huthis seem to have
switched from shore-based anti-shipping missiles to USVs,47 which they have used
to good effect. (The Huthis may not be the only Yemeni grouping to do so: like the
mine attack off Bir Ali,48 the USV attack off Nishtun in March 202049 was hundreds
of miles from Huthi-held territory, and differed in design and in tactics.50 It may
have been a Southern Transitional Council operation; they are reported to have
been provided UAVs by UAE.51)
Initially, as with the anti-ship missiles, the Huthis used the USVs to target
Coalition military shipping. However, as the campaign drew into a stalemate (and
in particular as the Saudis declined the Huthis’ terms for disengagement52), the
Huthis switched their USV (and UAV) targeting to more economic targets, such
as civilian airports, and oil and gas infrastructure. Not only do such targets usually
attract foreign media coverage, but in a time of massively reduced revenues,
budget cuts and infrastructure investment demands, such financial attacks were
clearly designed to pressure53 MbS to increase his offer to the Huthis.
Although most of the Huthis’ attacks were in southern KSA (such as the attacks
on the Jizan refinery with missiles, UAVs and USVs), the Huthis increasingly
showed the capability to strike deep into Saudi territory, both on land and by sea.
The IRI – among others54 – have clearly been involved in supplying new designs
(and modification designs) as well as components, the Huthis now appear to have
a simple manufacturing capability for UAVs and USVs.
The 14 December 2020 USV attack against the BW Rhine berthed in Jeddah55
was interesting for a number of reasons. The first was the distance at which it was
deployed, far beyond the range of on-board fuel tanks. If it was a Huthi operation,
it is likely that the boat was ferried by a mother-ship within striking range and then
launched – something which can be replicated to other locations. Jeddah is also
the main point of entry for western Saudi Arabia; business interruption there is
likely to have a major impact on the economy. Reportedly, Jeddah is where Crown
Prince Muhammad bin Salman keeps and stays on his yacht.
Despite the history of water-borne explosives off Yemen, no counter measures
(such as booms or CIWS) nor protection (such as stand-off cages or armor) seem
to have been adopted for either civilian or military vessels.
However, it is also worth noting that such attacks – while causing considerable
damage (including puncturing the inner hulls of tankers) and sometimes fire
following – in themselves, cause limited damage below the waterline56 and thus
the ship is rarely at risk of sinking. The main exception to this was the USS COLE,
which probably resulted from the large NEQ involved.
The Huthis seem to prefer to launch their UAVs by night. It is unclear whether
this is in the belief that Coalition forces do not have 24-hour capability to detect
the launch, or (possibly) to deal with the impact. In the former case, their belief
is wrong as the published infrared image of ‘a Houthi drone being intercepted
and destroyed’ shows. Given the likely number of anti-Huthi personnel within the
northern highlands, it may be a simple measure to reduce HUMINT assets’ ability
to see what is happening/where the weapons come from.
Both UAVs and USVs are likely to be susceptible to some electronic counter-
measures (ECM), particularly jamming. However, satellite capability – which was
once the preserve of the super-powers – is now more widely available, even to
regional powers such as Iran.57 While they may not yet have developed satellite
communications for UAVs, it is a capability which they will be working on. Relying
on jamming or spoofing is thus not a long-term option. (It is also worth noting that
Iran has its own ECM awareness and capabilities, and claims to have used them
to spoof the RQ-170 SENTINEL.58 It may also have provided ECM capabilities to
Hizballah,59 although there is no report of ECM transfer to the Huthis.)
Long-range fires and missiles

Long-range fires – whether missiles or UAVs – are problematic in that they extend
the battle space further, and possibly involve civilian centres of gravity. This has
been the case with the campaign in Yemen, whence the Huthis have fired missiles
and UAVs against both military concentrations in the rear areas – most notably the
TOCHKA attack against Ma’rib on 4 September 2015 – and civilian targets. Some
ballistic weapons can be intercepted, if systems are available and appropriate to the
environment; low flying cruise missiles are far harder to intercept as the attacks on
Khurays and Abqaiq (14 September 2019) and Ra’s Tanura (7 March 2021) showed.
Long-range fires, when coupled to lethal autonomy, become a potential battle
winning capability. The New York Times reported on a ‘New Iranian Missiles Pose
Threat to U.S. Aircraft in Yemen’:
a military official familiar with the [. . .] 358 missiles, described them as cruise
missiles that are designed to avoid United States defensive measures and that
can down American military helicopters, as well as the tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey.
The missiles consist of three parts: two motors and an explosive warhead. The
weapon can be assembled after shipment and fired from a crude launcher on
the ground. Once the missile is fired and traveling fast enough, a solid-fuel
boost motor falls away and a cruise motor takes over; at that point, the weapon
flies in a figure-eight pattern and looks for targets. [. . .] A dozen infrared lenses
arranged in a ring around the missile are believed to be able to defeat heat-
seeking countermeasures that coalition helicopters typically use.60
Jane’s61 carried a similar report and supplied useful images, including a slide
from the CENTCOM briefing showing the components that the 358 missile
shares with UAVs that are either made in Iran or with Iranian components; and
one showing the detachable seeker, and ‘dozen infrared lenses arranged in a ring
around the missile’.
A missile that ‘can down American helicopters’ seems to have been widely
interpreted as being a surface-to-air missile (SAM). However, the rest of the
description suggests that this is a fire-and-forget, loitering cruise missile which
is able to detect and attack targets on – or just above – the surface, including
armoured vehicles, and low/slow flying aircraft, such as helicopters or propeller-
driven aircraft. The similar Israeli HARPY missile was used by the Azerbaijani
forces to great effect in similar situations in the Nagorno-Karabakh campaign.
Air breathing precision strike assets such as the Israeli HAROP loitering
munition have been utilised extensively by Azerbaijan. The most notable use
of the HAROP was its role in a strike against an Armenian S-300 surface-to-
air missile (SAM) site in Shuskakend. Loitering munitions such as the HARPY
and the HAROP are functionally similar to cruise missiles, with ranges from
500 to 1000 kilometres, but have different propulsion systems and carry smaller
payloads. Their payloads are nonetheless sufficient to target high value single
points of failure, such as the radar of SAM systems, using either anti-radiation
homing or a combination of infra-red and electro-optical sensors. While slower
than cruise missiles, they can loiter over the battlespace for longer to designate
their own targets.62
If the 358 is indeed a loitering weapon, it is likely to be a top-attack missile,
possibly with some anti-armour capability. Although designed for the battlefield,
there is little to stop an asymmetric attacker setting the targeting box over other
targets, such as commercial airports, ports, railway termini – or indeed maritime
chokepoints, such as Bab al-Mandab, the Straits of Hormuz, Malacca – or even
Dover.
The targeting system is not stated – indeed, it may be modular and variable –
but the ‘dozen infrared lenses arranged in a ring around the missile’ may be a day/
night detection system (rather than a system to bypass active counter-measures),
possibly to cue the main sensor. This suggests that it may be a motion (as opposed
to, for example, electronic/thermal emission) initiated system. Although IRI are
known to possess recognition systems, there is no mention of any identified friend
or foe system, so 358s may be intended for use in uncontested areas (concentration
areas, logistics areas, beyond the forward edge of the battle area) or where there
are no friendly vehicles.
While the complexity of the components means a 358 is probably beyond

home-made production, the simple requirements for launch make the 358 a
potent asymmetric weapon, including by terrorists.
If IRI have supplied the 358 to the Huthis, it is likely that they have also supplied
Hizballah (and possibly other clients) with 358s. Given Israel’s dependence on air and
armour, this could be a major challenge to them, even with IRON DOME. (There
is some analysis suggesting Hizballah efforts to defeat the TROPHY system in 2006
by massed volleys overloading the system’s recycle rate.) The IRI Armed Forces are
also likely to possess many of their own 358s, making any invasion of Iran – however
unlikely – even more risky to armour (given the nature of the terrain.) The IRI may
also – once any UN embargo is lifted/sunset – sell the 358 commercially.
Rather than disposing of the missiles, the US Justice Department applied to the
US District Court for the District of Columbia to forfeit the weapons, describing
them as ‘sensitive technology’:
The forfeiture action is part of a larger investigation of an Iranian weapon

smuggling network responsible for the arms shipments. The network was
involved in the illicit trafficking of advanced conventional weapons systems and
components.63
Also significant is the quantity supplied:
Three of the 358 missiles were captured in November by the Forrest Sherman, a
Navy destroyer, and five more were recovered this month in an operation by the
Normandy, a Navy cruiser.64
The IRI – whose Rahbar’s right arm was crippled by terrorists – are well aware
of the risks of ‘blowback’ from erstwhile fellow-travellers of game-changing
technology. The IRI usually manage these risks by limiting the quantity of such
technology, and (trying to) control its use tightly. The Coalition is understood not
to be taking adequate measures to prevent materiel outflow from the conflict in
Yemen, so any 358s not interdicted and remaining post-war may be exported by
one of Yemen’s five major arms dealers.
Given the limited bandwidth available for communication (wherever the pilot
may be) and the increasing number of platforms which may be unmanned – soon
to include massed armour65 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) – spectrum
management (and emission control) are likely to be major issues. Autonomy66 is
one means to reduce that load.
War by other means
Information operations
One aspect where there has long been more parity between belligerent parties is in
the information operations (IO) sphere, and particularly the public affairs aspect.
Despite their position as Sāda, with all the inherent legal, religious and rhetorical
education, the Huthis proved to be surprisingly poor in both their own IO, and in
pushing back against both Coalition offences, and maladroit Coalition IO. Indeed,
some of the most effective IO was carried out by groups not a party to the conflict
(such as human rights and NGOs), and often in the West, rather than in Yemen or
in the region. As with many campaigns since the 1960s, the Diaspora has played a
major role in the IO campaigns, and this is likely to increase. However, the main
focus of the Huthis’ IO campaign has been defensive – shoring up their ‘legitimacy’
in the eyes of those under their rule, and in the region – rather than conducting
offensive IO, in particular in the court of Western public opinion.
Public Relations
One key aspect to the Huthis’ advantage has been the possession of the al-Masirah
media platform: satellite TV, YouTube, website (and associated social media
channels, such as Twitter). This transmits in both Arabic67 and English68 with
a variety of local and regional stories, in particular videos of successful attacks
against the Coalition, especially ones raiding into Saudi Arabia. The channel was
set up in southern Beirut in October 2012 next to and with the backing of Hizballah
(and its al-Manar channel). Al-Masirah initially broadcast via the commercial
channel NileSat 102, but after Saudi pressure on NileSat, al-Masirah was dropped.
It migrated instead to the Russian AM44 channel which proved resilient to Saudi
pressure (and subsequently, al-Masirah returned to NileSat).
The Coalition were somewhat successful in their attempts to close down other
Huthi messaging, succeeding in pressuring Telegram to close the al-Masirah
channel in mid-April 2016,69 and Twitter in October 2020.70 Yet, as the Israelis –
also accustomed to draconian press censorship – found in Lebanon and in Gaza71
the multitude of channels and transmission media makes it almost impossible
to control the flow of information, and while telegenic spokespeople mimicking
Western briefings may play well in a ruler’s court, it is imagery that plays the best
in the court of public opinion:
“In the war of the pictures we lose, so you need to correct, explain or balance it
in other ways,” said Aviv Shir-On, foreign ministry deputy director-general for
public affairs.72
Despite the comparatively rudimentary Huthi IO campaign, the Saudis were

unable to counter the Huthi imagery effectively, and it was noticeable how rapidly
the leading political personalities initially associated with the campaign withdrew.
IO campaigns which NATO faces are likely to be more polished, more integrated
and more in globally accessible languages.
The Huthis were, however, swift to seize control of the official Saba channel.73
This resulted in the Hadi faction setting up their own similar and dueling account.
Both accounts were run as if the owners were the lawful governments, ignoring
the other, although the tenor, as well as the content, made it clear which belonged
to which faction.
Lawfare
Like cyber-warfare, lawfare74 is an aspect where the asymmetry of capability is

reduced. As a result – and enabled by the pervasiveness of social media – its use
is increasing. Together with many of Ansar Allah’s other leaders, the Al Huthi are
a family of Zaydi ʿulmāʾ,75 steeped in cannon law, as well as logic and rhetoric.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is ruled by jurisprudents. One would therefore have
expected that they would have been far more effective in using ‘Lawfare.’ Yet for the
most part, the Huthis have been surprisingly weak in this application. Again, the
main proponents of Lawfare – albeit from a non-partisan basis – have been anti-
war campaigners (such as the Campaign Against the Arms Trade) and Western
politicians who regard their own country’s backing for the Coalition’s campaign as
reflecting badly on their country.
Legitimate government
ARM Hadi was elected by a vote in which his was the only name on the
ballot paper. He was sworn into office on 12 February 2012 for a fixed, two-
year term on a transitional mandate. His term was rolled over by a vote of the
non-constitutional National Dialogue Conference for a further single year to
12 February 2015. Hadi appealed to Saudi Arabia and the UN on 24 March
2015 invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter – collective defence against external
attack. Almost every one of these aspects made Hadi legally vulnerable; it was
clearly an issue of which the ‘Coalition to Restore Legitimacy in Yemen’ was
very conscious. It was an issue that offered the jurisprudential Huthis (and allied
Zaydi ʿulmāʾ) the opportunity fatally to undermine the legitimacy of Hadi’s
position, and indeed the legality of the whole conflict. And yet the Huthis failed
to do so.
Mercenaries
The Huthis refer regularly to ‘mercenaries’,76 usually referring to Yemenis fighting
on the Coalition’s side. This appears to be solely a term of abuse, rather than a
lawfare attack. Yet the Coalition recruited Sudanese mercenaries whom they
trained and equipped in Saudi Arabia before sending them to fight in Yemen.
They did so despite the fact that Saudi Arabia has been a state party to the
‘International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training
of Mercenaries’77 since 14 April 1997.
The use of mercenaries – now euphemised as Private Military Companies –
has greatly increased, both by the government which cannot afford/do not want
a capable standing army, and by governments which wish to use them for geo
political purposes, while claiming (im)plausible deniability, such as the Russian
use of the Wagner Group. It is therefore an aspect which is likely to be encountered
during NATO expeditionary operations. Interestingly, despite the vulnerabilities
of a mercenary under the Geneva Conventions (Art 47, para 1: ‘1. A mercenary
shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war’78) the Huthis
(and the ICRC) appear to have treated mercenaries in the same way as any other
combatant rather than conducting a show-trial.
Call for genocide

After the death of 52 UAE service personnel in the TOCHKA missile strike in
Ma’rib, it was reported that ‘Muhammed bin Zayed also told local press that
the UAE would “purge Yemen of the scum in reference to the Houthis and Ali
Abdullah Saleh, the country’s ex-president who is allied to the Houthis”’.79
While the UAE reaction was perhaps understandable in light of the shock at so
many deaths, and although the action was not carried out, calls for genocide – such
as by the Rwandan Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines80 – have resulted
in convictions for incitement to genocide, contravening Article 6(d) of the Rome
Statute.81 Amazingly, the Huthis again made no attempt to exploit this statement
for Lawfare purposes.
Support for terrorists

Members of the Coalition have designated the Huthis as terrorists (and the Trump
administration proscribed the Huthis on 19 January 2021). Yet when it was widely
reported that members of al-Qa’ida were fighting with the Coalition, and indeed,
had been air-dropped material by the Coalition, the Huthis failed to exploit the
lawfare potential of these, despite the on-going legal issues in the United States
over the Saudis’ role in the attack on the World Trade Centre.
The Huthis failed surprisingly to exploit their opponents’ breaches in either a
court of law or the court of public opinion, although unconnected parties did so.
It is possible that this is because the Huthis are unaware of much international
law (as opposed to Zaydi jurisprudence), but the IRI is certainly well aware,
suggesting a less-close relationship. It is likely that future opponents of NATO will
be much more proficient in this, and that legal and IO functions will need to co-
ordinate closely, and with kinetic operations, in order to avoid offering potential
vulnerabilities to enemies.
Conclusion
While it should be acknowledged that the human and physical geography greatly
favoured the defenders, nevertheless, the Huthis were able to fight to a standstill a
Coalition of regional powers with high-grade equipment, unlimited budgets, and
the physical and political backing of three Permanent Members of the UN Security
Council.
The Huthis were able to manage this feat using predominately Cold War
equipment, with the addition of limited quantities of entry-level modern weapons
systems, provided by a Tier 2 regional power under grinding political, economic
and military sanctions and a blockade on Yemen.
The siren-song of the Defence Industrial Complex will commend to NATO

ministers ‘casualty avoiding’ high-technology capability in place of more traditional
fighting power. However, this campaign – like the 2006 Lebanon campaign – has
reminded military practitioners that war is quintessentially a contest of wills, that
high-technology has as many limitations as advantages, and that a full spectrum
capability requires the ability and suitable equipment to fight across the entire
spectrum of conflict, but especially in a (far more likely) asymmetric conventional
conflict.
The Huthis have shown themselves to be tenacious in defence of their homeland,
and possessing stocks of various weapon-systems which can evade most current
defence systems to hit targets accurately across most of the Arabian Peninsula,
Horn of Africa and their attendant global sea lanes. It is unclear whether the
Huthis will try to exploit their advantage further, and, indeed, how long their
relationship with Iran (and thus access to this capability) will last. However, the
Huthis have convincingly re-affirmed deterrence, both for themselves and for
aligned groupings in the region, whether against second order forces, or the most
expensive, high-technology equipment available.
‘Strike hard who cares – shoot straight who can –

The odds are on the cheaper man.’82
Notes
1 Rudyard Kipling, ‘Arithmetic on the Frontier‘, Departmental Ditties and Other Verses,
June 1886, https://www.poetryloverspage.com/poets/kipling/arithmetic_on_frontier.
html (accessed 22 November 2020).
2 In conventional conflict, the asymmetry is in combat power, rather than tactics.
While many aspects of Huthi conduct were irregular – such as their civilianised
logistics – their tactics in conflict were broadly conventional.
3 Anon, ‘Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States’,
26 December 1933, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Volume%20
165/v165.pdf, p. 25.
4 While this is usually an effete differentiation, U*Vs are vulnerable to most jamming
and spoofing, whereas drones are not, and must be interdicted kinetically or using
Directed Energy Weapons.
5 James Spencer, ‘Intelligence Lessons from Hizballah’s Ground Campaign 2006’, British
Army Review 148, Winter 2010, http://www.nick-lipscombe.net/Papers/Allied%20
Victory%20French%20Failure.pdf (accessed 22 November 2020).
6 Anon, ‘Stealth technology’, ND, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stealth_
technology#Low-frequency_radar (accessed 22 November 2020).
7 Anon, ‘1999 F-117A shootdown’, ND, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1999_F-117A_
shootdown (accessed 22 November 2020).
8 Emerging threats include ‘artificial intelligence, lethal autonomous weapons,
hypersonic weapons, directed energy weapons, biotechnology, and quantum
technology.’ Kelley M. Sayler‘Emerging Military Technologies: Background and Issues
for Congress’, CRS, 10 November 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R46458.pdf
9 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and
Arts Publishing House, February 1999), https://ia800201.us.archive.org/0/items/
Unrestricted_Warfare_Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui/Unrestricted_Warfare_
Qiao_Liang_and_Wang_Xiangsui.pdf.
10 Le Justicier, “Chewhead Sandals Wearing Houthi Defeated Saudi’, 29 September 2019,
https://www.somalinet.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=250&t=397377&sid=42ba9899e
dfe815e3b1a47451e38c7a9 (accessed 22 November 2020).
11 ‘The integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related
capabilities in concert with other lines of operation, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or
usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting
our own.’ ‘Information Operations’ JP3-13 DTIC, 27 November 2012, https://
defenseinnovationmarketplace.dtic.mil/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/12102012_io1.
pdf.
12 Tzu Sun, The Art of War, ed. J. Clavell (New York: Delacorte Press, 1983), 53.
13 Kareem Fahim, ‘Bitterness Abounds in Yemen’s North, a Houthi Stronghold’, NYT,
13 October 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/world/middleeast/bitterness-
abounds-in-yemens-north-a-houthi-stronghold.html (accessed 14 October 2015).
14 Taken here to be ‘a problem-solving application that makes decisions based on
complex rules’, https://www.ibm.com/cloud/learn/what-is-artificial-intelligence
15 Stephen Seche, ‘Who Are the Houthis, Part Two: How Are They Fighting?’,
DoS Cable 09SANAA2186, 9 December 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/09SANAA2186_a.html (accessed 19 May 2011).
16 Michael Knights, “The Houthi War Machine: From Guerilla War to State Capture.”
CTC Sentinel 11, no. 8 (September 2018): 18–19, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2018/09/CTC-SENTINEL-092018.pdf (accessed 10 September 2018).
17 Knights, The Houthi War Machine, op. cit.
18 IRAQ: Iraq Muhanned Sulaiman, ‘My Tongue Was Cut Off to Stop Me Talking’,
IRIN, 23 May 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=72320 (accessed
23 May 2007).
19 Nicole Perlroth and Scott Shane, ‘In Baltimore and Beyond, a Stolen N.S.A. Tool
Wreaks Havoc’, NYT, 25 May 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-
hacking-tool-baltimore.html (accessed 28 May 2019).
20 Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, ‘U.S. Suspects Iran Was behind a Wave of
Cyberattacks’, NYT, 13 October 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/world/
middleeast/us-suspects-iranians-were-behind-a-wave-of-cyberattacks.html (accessed
14 October 2012).
21 Materiel may flow from Iran both as clandestine IRI support; and as criminal activity
(quite possibly enabled by members of the deeply corrupt IRGC for private gain).
22 Anon, ‘Iranian Offensive Cyber Attack Capabilities’, Congressional Research Service,
13 January 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IF11406.pdf (accessed 15 February
2020).
23 The Yemeni Cyber Army is widely assessed to be an Iranian grouping, either
government or linked to the regime, e.g. Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, ‘There’s
Evidence the “Yemen Cyber Army” is Actually Iranian Vice’, 26 June 2015, http://
motherboard.vice.com/read/theres-evidence-the-yemen-cyber-army-is-actually-
iranian (accessed 30 January 2017).
24 Anon, ‘Saudileaks 1: Yemeni Group Hacks Saudi Gov’t, Releases Thousands of
Top Secret Documents’, Fars News Agency, 21 May 2015, http://en.farsnews.com/
newstext.aspx?nn=13940231000544 (accessed 29 April 2016).
25 Alternatively, it may be that communication out of the northern mountains is limited

and controlled by the Sa’udi-led Coalition, thus cyber-attacks are hard to mount from
Yemen.
26 Jeff Moskowitz, ‘Cyberattack Tied to Hezbollah Ups the Ante for Israel’s
Digital Defences’, CSM, 1 June 2015, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Passcode/2015/0601/Cyberattack-tied-to-Hezbollah-ups-the-ante-for-Israel-s-digital-
defenses (accessed 13 December 2020).
27 Spencer, 2010, op. cit.
28 Most MENA cyber capability is ‘internal security’, rather than military, oriented. A
possible exception is IRI, which claims to have spoofed a US RQ-170 UAV, although
this is disputed. (Axe, David Nah, ‘Iran Probably Didn’t Hack CIA’s Stealth Drone
Wired’, 24 April 2012, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/iran-drone-hack/
(accessed 26 April 2012.)
29 Bing, Christopher and Joel Schectman, ‘Project Raven – Inside the UAE’s Secret
Hacking Team of American Mercenaries’, Reuters, 30 January 2019, https://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-spying-raven/ (accessed 30 January
2019).
30 Malcolm Latarche, ‘Gard Calls for GPS Problems Reporting’, Ship Insight, 2 October
2020, https://shipinsight.com/articles/gard-calls-for-gps-problems-reporting
(accessed 4 October 2020).
31 A further distinction should be made between UAVs and UCAVs – Unmanned
Combat Air Vehicles. The former are mostly propeller-driven platforms of limited
maneuverability focused on the ground. UCAVs are – broadly – unmanned versions
of FGA jets: jet powered, much more manoeuvrable, with air-to-air capability.
32 Anon, ‘Iranian Technology Transfers to Yemen’, Conflict Armament Research,
17 March 2017, https://www.conflictarm.com/perspectives/iranian-technology-
transfers-to-yemen/ (accessed 20 March 2017).
33 Anon, ‘Evolution of UAVs Employed by Houthi Forces in Yemen’, Conflict Armament
Research, February 2020, https://www.conflictarm.com/dispatches/evolution-of-uavs-
employed-by-houthi-forces-in-yemen/ (accessed 19 February 2020).
34 Anon, Houthi Use of Attack UAVs (London: IHS Markit) (31 May 2019).
35 Hawkins Derek, ‘A US “ally” Fired a $3 million Patriot Missile at a $200 Drone’,
Washington Post, 17 March 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2017/03/17/a-u-s-ally-fired-a-3-million-patriot-missile-at-a-200-drone-
spoiler-the-missile-won/ (accessed 13 December 2020).
36 Clyde Hughes, ‘Houthis Say Drone Squadron Attacked Saudi Capital’, UPI,
26 August 2019, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2019/08/26/Houthis-
say-drone-squadron-attacked-Saudi-capital/3711566831177/ (accessed 26 August
2019).
37 Stephen Kalin and Sylvia Westall, ‘Costly Saudi Defenses Prove No Match for Drones,
Cruise Missiles’, Reuters, 17 September 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
saudi-aramco-security-idUSKBN1W22FR (accessed 17 September 2019).
38 Israels’ IRON DOME may be able to counter cruise missiles: Yoav Zitun, ‘Iron Dome
Successfully Intercepts Cruise Missile for 1st Time’, Ynet, 15 December 2020, https://
www.ynetnews.com/article/rke8dBLhv (accessed 18 December 2020).
39 Anon, ‘Coalition: Houthis Launched Projectile at Desalination Plant in Saudi’s Jizan’,
Al Arabiya, 20 June 2019, https://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/gulf/2019/06/20/
Arab-coalition-Houthis-launched-projectile-at-desalination-plant-in-Saudi-s-Jizan.
html (accessed 20 June 2019).
40 Rawan Shaif and Jack Watling, ‘How the UAE’s Chinese-Made Drone Is Changing the
War in Yemen’, Foreign Policy, 27 April 2018, http://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/27/
drone-wars-how-the-uaes-chinese-made-drone-is-changing-the-war-in-yemen/
(accessed 30 April 2018).
41 Wim Zwijnenburg, ‘Are Emirati Armed Drones Supporting Ethiopia from an
Eritrean Air Base?’, 19 November 2020, https://www.bellingcat.com/news/rest-of-
world/2020/11/19/are-emirati-armed-drones-supporting-ethiopia-from-an-eritrean-
air-base/ (accessed 20 November 2020).
42 Anon, ‘US Military Drone Shot Down Over Yemen’, Reuters, 21 August 2019, http://
www.theguardian.com/world/2019/aug/21/us-military-drone-shot-down-over-yemen
(accessed 22 August 2019).
43 Samy Magdy, ‘Yemen Houthi Rebels Claim Fighters Shot Down a US-made Drone’,
AP, 3 August 2020, https://apnews.com/161c5c3acf215841cf987a98416930d8
44 Jeremy Binnie, ‘UAE’s Swift Hit by Anti-ship Missile’, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly,
4 October 2016, http://www.janes.com/article/64274/uae-s-swift-hit-by-anti-ship-
missile (accessed 13 October 2016).
45 E.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A8vf9H7J5ww.
46 Mark Thompson, ‘U.S. Fires Missiles at Yemen and the “Axis of Evil” Persists’,
13 October 2016, http://time.com/4529590/u-s-fires-missiles-at-yemen-and-the-axis-
of-evil-persists/ (accessed 4 November 2016).
47 There is a two-decade long record of Water Borne (Suicide) Improvised Explosive
Devices (WBIEDs) off Yemen, starting with the failed attack on the USS THE
SULLIVANS on 3 January 2000, and the successful attacks on the USS COLE on
12 October 2000 and the MV LIMBURG on 6 October 2003. USVs are functionally
little different.
48 Sam Chambers, ‘Aframax Mine Blast off Yemen Puts Shipping on Alert’, Splash 24/7,
9 October 2020, https://splash247.com/aframax-mine-blast-off-yemen-puts-shipping-
on-alert/ (accessed 11 October 2020).
49 H. I. Sutton, ‘Disguised Explosive Boat May Be New Threat to Tankers Off Yemen’,
Forbes, 4 March 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2020/03/04/new-
disguised-explosive-boat-may-threaten-tankers-off-yemen/#49baf491ad2f (accessed
15 November 2020).
50 There appear to have been several inert decoy boats and one boat with a warhead.
51 Anon, ‘UAE Gave Yemen’s Separatists Unmanned Drones: Official’, 21 November
2020. The New Arab, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2020/11/21/uae-
gave-yemens-separatists-unmanned-drones-official (accessed 21 November 2020).
52 Strangely, the Huthis did not attack Riyadh while Sa’udi Arabia was hosting the
virtual G-20 meeting.
53 Such tactics are less likely to be applied to NATO expeditionary operations, since
the operations are remote from NATO homelands; and in a democracy, the centre of
gravity is the will of the people, not the ruler’s.
54 Damien McElroy, ‘Qatari Government ‘Funded Houthi Drones’’, The National,
17 December 2020, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/qatari-government-
funded-houthi-drones-1.1130722 (accessed 18 December 2020).
55 Summer Said and Stephen Kalin, ‘Oil Tanker Attacked at Saudi Port Amid Iran
Tensions’, WSJ, 14 December 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/explosion-hits-oil-
tanker-at-saudi-port-11607939815 (accessed 15 December 2020).
56 Rather than tamping the explosive force, the water appears partially to reflect it.
57 David Brennan, ‘Iran Uses First Military Satellite to Map, Publish U.S. Base in Qatar’,
Newsweek, 30 July 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/iran-uses-first-military-
satellite-map-publish-us-base-qatar-1521566 (accessed 31 July 2020).
58 Scott Peterson and Payam Faramarzi, ‘Iran Hijacked US Drone, Says Iranian
Engineer’, CSM, 15 December 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2011/1215/Exclusive-Iran-hijacked-US-drone-says-Iranian-engineer? (accessed
16 December 2011).
59 Scott Peterson, ‘Downed US Drone: How Iran Caught the “Beast”‘, CSM, 9 December
2011, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/1209/Downed-US-
drone-How-Iran-caught-the-beast (accessed 21 December 2011).
60 John Ismay and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘New Iranian Missiles Pose Threat to U.S.
Aircraft in Yemen, Pentagon Says’, NYT, 19 February 2020, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/02/19/us/iran-missiles-yemen.html (accessed 20 February 2020).
61 Jeremy Binnie, ‘New Iranian Missile Reported to be Loitering SAM’, Jane’s Defence
Weekly, 20 February 2020, https://www.janes.com/article/94432/new-iranian-missile-
reported-to-be-loitering-sam (accessed 21 February 2020).
62 Jack Watling and Sidharth Kaushal, ‘The Democratisation of Precision Strike in the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict’, RUSI, 22 October 2020, https://rusi.org/commentary/
democratisation-precision-strike-nagorno-karabakh-conflict (accessed 22 October 2020).
63 Anon, ‘US Files Complaint to Forfeit Iranian Missiles and Sells Previously Transferred
Iranian Petroleum’, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 30 October 2020, https://
www.ice.gov/news/releases/us-files-complaint-forfeit-iranian-missiles-and-sells-
previously-transferred-iranian (accessed 7 November 2020).
64 John Ismay and Thomas Gibbons-Neff, ‘New Iranian Missiles Pose Threat to U.S.
Aircraft in Yemen, Pentagon Says’, op. cit.
65 Ed Adamczyk, ‘U.S. Army, Clemson University Partner on Autonomous
Vehicle Project’, UPI, 18 December 2020, https://www.upi.com/Defense-
News/2020/12/18/US-Army-Clemson-University-partner-on-autonomous-vehicle-
project/2701608310868/ (accessed 22 December 2020).
66 An autonomous * vehicle – i.e., one which makes its own decisions based on internal
algorithms – will still be vulnerable to Directed Energy Weapons, as well as to kinetic
attack, but not to jamming or spoofing.
67 https://www.almasirah.net/
68 https://english.almasirah.net/
69 Anon, ‘Social Media App Telegram Deletes Yemen’s Houthi-backed Al-Masirah TV’,
Spacewatch, April 16, https://spacewatch.global/2016/04/social-media-app-telegram-
deletes-yemens-houthi-backed-al-masirah-tv/ (accessed 22 December 2020).
70 Lisa Barrington, ‘Twitter Suspends Account of Al Masirah TV Run by Yemen’s
Houthis’, Reuters, 8 October 2020, https://in.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-twitter-
houthis-idINKBN26T20P (accessed 22 December 2020).
71 D. Carey and James Spencer, ‘Operation Cast Lead: Old Tactics; New Media‘,
Unpublished paper (2010).
72 Rachel Shabi, ‘Special Spin Body Gets Media on Message, Says Israel’, Guardian,
2 January 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/02/israel-palestine-pr-
spin (accessed 10 January 2009).
73 https://www.saba.ye/en/
74 Defined here as the contemporary use/misuse of the enemy’s real or apparent breach
of Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC)/International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as a means
to constrain their current and future military and political course of action.
75 According to Zaydi fiqh, an Imam must be all of a competent general, jurist and
administrator.
76 The legal definition of a mercenary is more narrowly defined than the everyday
meaning. Essentially, a mercenary fight for personal profit during a conflict; a
foreigner – like the Latin Americans in the UAE ‘Foreign Legion’ – who serves on a
fixed length engagement for regular rates of pay is not a mercenary.
77 Anon, ‘International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries’, 4 December 1989, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-6&chapter=18&lang=en.
78 Anon, ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
8 June 1977’, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=open
Document&documentId=9EDC5096D2C036E9C12563CD0051DC30.
79 Abubakr al-Shamahi, ‘UAE Mourns Losses in Yemen’, al-Araby al-Jadeed,
14 September 2015, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/9/14/uae-
mourns-losses-in-yemen (accessed 12 July 2016).
80 Russell Smith, ‘The Impact of Hate Media in Rwanda’, BBC News Online, 3 December
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3257748.stm (accessed 12 July 2016).
81 Anon, ‘Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998.’
82 Kipling, ‘Arithmetic on the Frontier’, op. cit.
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13
T H E Y E M E N I - S AU D I B O R D E R : T H E H U T H I S A N D T H E
EVO LU T IO N O F H Y B R I D SE C U R I T Y G OV E R NA N C E
Eleonora Ardemagni
Introduction
The Yemeni-Saudi border is “a story in the story” of the Huthis’ political-military

evolution and of the multilayered conflict that started in 2015. Border grievances and
instability pre-date the formation of the Zaydi Shia revivalist movement. However,
the rise of the Huthis (whose political branch is called Ansar Allah, “partisans of
God”) has greatly contributed to reshape Yemeni and Saudi perceptions on border
security dynamics. Since 2016, the increasing launch of ballistic missiles and
armed drones by the Huthis against the Saudi territory, as a retaliatory measure for
the Saudi-led Coalition airstrikes in Yemen, which began in 2015, has contributed
to worsening Saudi national security, adding a new saliency to the border security
issue. From a security view, the Yemeni-Saudi frontier has become a case of triple
hybridity in security governance, since hybridity is present in (1) the overlapping of
tribal and military roles and loyalties, (2) the undefined boundaries between formal
and informal security actors, and (3) the vague delimitation between Yemeni and
Saudi border players in terms of belonging, chains of command and ownership. As
the Final Report of the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts on Yemen
notes, border security governance in wartimes has become a patchwork of forces
with unclear responsibility. Yemeni fighters are present on both sides of the border
“fighting under Saudi Arabian command but with different statuses depending on
their location”: some Yemeni fighters affiliated with the internationally recognized
government of Yemen fall under the Ministry of Defense (MoD),1 while others are
rallied in military units affiliated to Saudi Arabia.2 Instead, “those crossing into
Saudi Arabia seemed to be treated as contractors.”3 Instead, in most of the Yemeni
territory, only a process of double hybridization can be identified (the overlapping
of tribal and military roles and the undefined boundaries between formal and
informal security actors). The hybridization phenomenon is rooted in the liminality
of the borderland, which is an “in between space” dividing yet connecting two
worlds. However, triple hybridization represents the indirect border legacy of
the Huthis’ rise: the formation of a Huthi de facto state bordering Saudi Arabia
sheds light on the institutional crisis of the Yemeni state and, consequently, on
the rising Saudi role in securing also the Yemeni border side. In fact, according
to the Final Report of the United Nations Security Council Panel of Experts on
Yemen 2021, Saudi Arabia trains border forces and retains a supervisory role also
on the units deployed on the Yemeni side of the border.4 The Jeddah Treaty for
border demarcation, signed in 2000 by Yemen and Saudi Arabia to formalize the
Taif temporary settlement (1934), triggered a paradigm shift in border security
governance, then strengthened by the outbreak of the first Saada war (2004). In
fact, the paradigm moved from a borderland policy based on patronage, tribal ties,
and integrated security hybridization, to a border policy centered on securitization,
alienated security hybridization, and the incremental militarization of the frontier.
Since the first Saada war, the border security structures built by Yemeni and
Saudi players along the frontier were no more integrated examples of security
hybridization (for instance, the joint Yemeni-Saudi Border Guard bringing tribal
members into an institutional force). Conversely, border security governance has
become, since 2004, a matter of separate, alienated hybrid security structures
which pursue uncoordinated or even conflicting goals (for instance, the pro-Huthi
units of the Yemeni Border Guard stationed at the Saada border line and the pro-
government forces guarding the rest of the border line). Given this background,
the rise of the Huthis as political and military players, with the passage from peace-
time border relations (1934–2003) to war-time border relations (2004–onward),
represents a game changer for border security governance on the Yemeni-Saudi
frontier. Tribes/military and formal/informal cleavages are no more sufficient to
analyze the development of security dynamics at the border: the presence of the
Huthi de facto state and the security involvement of Saudi Arabia on the Yemeni
side redraw border dynamics. The transformation of the Yemeni-Saudi border
into a theater of conflict amplifies the regional dimension of the Yemeni-Saudi
contention, as well as the regional role of the Huthis. In this context, escalating
border warfare and attacks by the Huthis against Saudi Arabia’s soil are functional
to the achievement of four goals: (1) rally local consensus in Saada and in the social
fabric of the Northern highlands against Saudi interferences and then intervention
in Yemen; (2) rally national consensus by fueling Yemeni nationalist spirits vis-à-
vis the perceived Saudi aggression against Yemen, with an eye also to irredentist
claims (Great Yemen al-Yaman al-Kubra or Natural Yemen al-Yaman al-Ṭabīʿiyya)
still alive in the borderland and more generally in Yemen;5 (3) rally consensus from
Iran and pro-Iran militant groups abroad, such as Hezbollah (Lebanon), the Hashd
al-Shaabi (Iraq), and Hamas (Gaza) in order to increase external acknowledgment
and political leverage at a domestic level; and (4) strengthen their role in intra-
Yemeni political negotiations and with Saudi Arabia.
Studying the Border with Security Lenses

This chapter investigates in which way the rise of the Huthis as political and
military actors impacted border security dynamics, and in the evolution of border
security governance. Doing so, it briefly frames the recent history of Yemen’s
1. The Yemeni-Saudi Border 261
northern border and borderland, highlighting border demarcation phases (Taif

Treaty in 1934, Jeddah Treaty in 2000). Then, the chapter outlines the main
research question which drives the analysis (In which way border security players,
structure, and governance have evolved due to the rise of the Huthis as political and
military actors since the 2000s?), also introducing the concepts of triple hybridity
in security governance, integrated security hybridization, and alienated security
hybridization. With the purpose to trace the evolution of security governance on
the Yemeni-Saudi frontier, four chronological phases are identified and discussed,
outlining changes and continuities. In approaching the borderland, the chapter
adopts a security-focused angle of analysis as most of the contemporary studies
on the topic.6 In fact, it aims to be complementary to previous scholarly works on
the Huthis: the chapter draws upon the detailed and precious background mostly
provided by anthropologists, sociologists, and historians to dive into security
studies. But in this case, security actors, structures, and governance are the objects
of analysis. Beyond literature review and official documents, the methodology
includes the monitoring of news outlets, plus two interviews with experts working
on the issue. Choosing a security angle of study, the chapter opts for a hybrid
perspective on security, governance, and political orders7 as the most suitable
lens to frame the reordering of political-military relations in Yemen, and on the
Yemeni-Saudi border. In this way, the borderland is not intended here as a stateless
space—as for traditional security studies—but rather as a hybrid or alternative
political order taking into account the role of the tribes on the geographical
territory and that Islamic notions of sovereignty are first of all communal,8 and not
built on physical edges. In the borderland, political-military dynamics and power
relations cannot be grasped with a binary approach of investigation. Instead, the
borderland reality is much closer to a routine gray area,9 in which “frontiers” and
“identities” are nuanced and constantly reshaped on the ground. This explains why
the security hybridization lens would better orient the analytical effort.
The Yemeni-Saudi Borderland: Human Ecosystem and

Historical Trajectory
Since the 1980s, the Yemeni government and Saudi Arabia have supported Salafi
madāris and cultural centers in Saada governorate to counter the Huthis’ Zaydi
revivalism, advocated by Badr al-Din al-Huthi (cleric and father of Husayn al-
Huthi, the founder of the Huthis). At the same time, Ali Abdallah Saleh, president
of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) and since 1990 of unified Yemen, fostered
a “Sunnization” strategy in the Yemeni religious-political field to promote
identity convergence between Zaydism and Shafism, emphasizing the voices
of Zaydi scholars opened to the Sunni doctrine.10 The growth of the al-Huthi
family leadership in the 1990s under the umbrella of Hizb al-Haqq (founded
in 1990), and then, since 1997, of the Believing Youth (al-Shabāb al-Muʾmin),
provided a political, and then militant, framework to Zaydi revivalism. But the
troubled history of the Yemeni-Saudi border pre-dates the political-military rise
of the Huthis. In fact, the administrative frontier demarcates a physical separation

(first in 1934, then in 2000) which simply doesn’t exist from a cultural and tribal
perspective. The formal border encompasses a single ecosystem: the Yemeni-Saudi
borderland. This is inhabited mostly by tribes tied through marriage relations,
religious practices, and, above all, with the same kinship: in some cases, tribes
found themselves separate after border demarcations. The borderland ecosystem
comprises the agricultural areas neighboring the Red Sea (from Yemen’s Hajja to
Saudi Arabia’s Jizan), as well as the provinces with harsh mountains and eastward
the desert (from Yemen’s Saada and al-Jawf to Saudi Arabia’s Najran and Asir). In
Yemen’s northern highlands, the social fabric is a mix of tribal but also nontribal
communities such as the Sāda (sing. sayyid), the Zaydi religious elite. The al-
Huthi family, the founder of the eponym movement, is sāda, not tribal, and claims
direct descent from Muhammad’s lineage (Hashemite). Since 1970, shuyūkh have
gradually coalesced into a single ruling coalition supporting President Saleh: this
power bloc was able to marginalize the Sāda in post-revolutionary Yemen.11 In this
context, Yemen’s extreme north (Saada, northern Amran ex. Sufyan and al-Jawf),
the most impoverished and underdeveloped area of the country, is dominated by
tribal power and customs: most of South Arabian’s tribes consider Qahtan their
common ancestor, while the Sāda traces their genealogy from the Prophet.12
Between Formal Agreements and Informal Ties

The recent historical trajectory of the Yemeni-Saudi border stands in between
formal agreements and informal ties. After the end of the Saudi-Yemeni war
fought by the Saudi kingdom and the Yemeni Zaydi imamate (1934), the Saudi-
Yemeni Treaty of Islamic Friendship and Brotherhood was signed in Taif in 1934.
This treaty was a temporary settlement (to be renewed each twenty lunar years),
implemented through a border demarcation committee supervised by Harry St.
John Philby on the Saudi side. About 200 border markers were placed along the Taif
line (the boundary segment from the Red Sea to Jabal al-Tha’r in the Najran area):
mountainous parts of the central section were not defined.13 This institutional step
was complemented by an informal one: many Yemeni borderland shuyūkh were
integrated into the Saudi patronage system, as tribal chiefs played the guarantor
role vis-à-vis the Taif treaty. After 1970, Yemen’s border shuyūkh have received
both Yemeni and Saudi stipends to preserve security and loyalty. This represented
an embryonic shape of triple hybridization: post-revolutionary Yemen started to
co-opt border tribal chiefs too despite the Saudis were already doing the same.
In this way, the vague delimitation between Yemeni and Saudi border players
experienced today (in terms of belonging, chains of command, and ownership) was
forged in the 1970s, as the YAR was establishing itself as state institution willing
to exercise territorial control. On the ground, the creation of political boundaries
challenged the fluid, unlimited nature of the borderland. For instance, the tribal
confederation of the Khawlān bin ʿAmr was physically divided by the Taif treaty:
most of its tribes now belong to the Yemeni state, while others fall into the Saudi
territory (as Ismailis and Zaydis in Najran). Also, the Bakil tribal confederation
found itself divided due to the border demarcation. In 2000, the Yemeni-Saudi
frontier was definitely formalized by the Jeddah treaty, which incorporated the
provisions included in the Taif treaty: border tribes were not involved in political
negotiations. Through this final, permanent, and nonrenewable agreement, Yemen
renounced to claim the “lost territories” of Jizan, Asir, Najran (and implicitly
claimed ones as the Rubʿ al-Khālī borderline). A demilitarized zone along the
border was created and the right to cross the boundary within twenty kilometers
was confirmed for borderland tribes, involved in grazing activities: borderland
residents have the right to cross the border without restrictions through border
crossings. The building of a security fence along the frontier restarted in 2013
(a first attempt in 2003 was stopped due to borderland tribes’ opposition): the
decision to build a wall was triggered by the rise of border smuggling activities
(qat, drugs, weapons, migrants) and jihadi infiltrations by members of al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In 2011–13, armed clashes between the Huthis
and Yemen’s government forces intensified, reaching an apex with the Huthis’ siege
of the Dār al-Hadīth Salafi madrasa in Dammāj, founded by Muqbil al-Waadi. The
Yemeni domestic context rapidly changes. Capitalizing on the anti-government
uprising in Sanaa, the Huthis took control of the Saada governorate in 2011. The
Zaydi Shia insurgents expelled pro-Saudi shuyūkh living in the Yemeni border
area, who then found refuge in Saudi Arabia: some of them were part of the joint
Yemeni-Saudi Border Guard. The Huthi conflict has also reshaped balances within
tribal confederations: for instance, the majority of Khawlan bin ‘Amr leaders sided
with Yemen’s government, while many Khawlan tribal people started to fight for
the Huthi insurgents.14 As an indirect effect of the revolt against Saleh, long-time
border security mechanisms were put in crisis.
Hybrid Security Governance in Times of Peace and War: From

Integrated to Alienated
Since 2004, the Yemeni-Saudi border has entered a low-intensity war season:
this has impacted on how hybrid security governance has been outlined and
implemented. The Huthis’ growing role in Yemeni politics and security affairs
has contributed to informally divide the northern frontier of Yemen, separating
Huthi-controlled border areas from the rest of the frontier. As outlined by Al-
Maghafi, different sets of relationships have generated different boundary sections
throughout history, as border demarcation resulted from a sequence of steps.15
Adopting a bottom-up approach of social and cultural anthropology, Lenz
identifies four major phases in the Yemeni-Saudi border relationship: (1) the
establishment of the border’s boundaries, (2) Saudi Arabia’s patronage policy, (3)
the implementation of the boundary, and (4) the fortification of the border.16 At
time of writing, it is more accurate to refer to the “Yemeni borders” with regard
to the Yemeni-Saudi frontier (for instance, the Huthi-controlled segments of
Hajja, and most of Saada borderline, al Jawf borderline would be controlled by
the internationally recognized government as Mareb and Ḥaḍramawt borderlines
are), rather than to “the Yemeni northern border.” The political and military rise of
the Huthis was decisive in reshaping both Sanaa and Riyadh’s approaches to border
security governance. This resulted in the evolution of border security structures:
a multiplicity of loose, informal actors now play a stronger role in border security
governance with respect to institutionalized forces, and more than it was when
the first “Saada war” erupted in 2004. Both Yemeni and Saudi stances toward
the border issue have progressively evolved in the same direction: they shifted
from a borderland policy based on patronage and tribal ties to a border policy
centered on securitization and the incremental militarization of the frontier.17 In
this context, security hybridization has transformed from integrated to alienated:
building upon Martinez’s theory of borderland evolution,18 integrated security
hybridization refers here to hybrid security structures in which involved actors
cooperate to reach shared security goals: for instance, this was the case of the joint
Saudi-Yemeni Border Guard (2000). This policy approach is borderland-focused:
stressing integration between different players on the ground, it can foster bilateral
relations since security structures are built to work “with the others.” Conversely,
alienated security hybridization identifies hybrid security structures in which
involved actors act to separate one from the other, pursuing uncoordinated or
even conflicting goals. Such a phenomenon can be found, for instance, with pro-
Huthi units of the Yemeni Border Guard stationed at the Saada borderline and the
pro-government forces guarding the rest of the borderline. This policy approach
is border-focused: it contributes to eroding further national sovereignty as the
borderline reflects opposite political-military allegiances; security structures are
built to “counter the others.” From a security angle, Yemen’s defense structure
presents a persistent dynamic of double hybridization: hybridization due to the
overlapping of tribal and military roles and loyalties, and hybridization because of
the vague boundaries between formal and informal security actors.19 But on the
Yemeni-Saudi frontier, hybridization is a triple phenomenon, as the distinction
between Yemeni and Saudi security players becomes difficult to extricate.20
“Bordering-Ordering-Othering”
Although rooted in the borderland history, the triple hybridization phenomenon

represents the indirect border legacy of the Huthis’ rise: the formation of a
Huthi de facto state bordering Saudi Arabia sheds light on the institutional
crisis of the Yemeni state. In wartimes, neighboring Saudi Arabia has increased
the number of border players to secure the frontier. In the decade 2010–20, the
Huthis have transformed from local insurgents/rebels to de facto authorities and
border players. The Huthis are also increasingly perceived as border players due
to a combination of three factors: (1) since 2016, their militant activity regularly
crosses the border with ground raids and rocket/missile/drone attacks launched
from the Yemeni territory against Saudi Arabia threatening and, in some cases,
damaging directly the Saudi national security; (2) they would receive support
from Iran since an “increasing body of evidence suggests that individuals or
entities in the Islamic Republic of Iran supply significant volumes of weapons and
components to the Houthis,”21 although this support has systematically risen after
the start of the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen in 2015; and (3) they have
built the group’s mythology of “warriors” and “resistant” through two wars fought
against Saudi Arabia: the sixth Saada war (2009) and the conflict broke out in
2015. Acting like a border player results into a political advantage for the Huthis,
who exploit this to enhance their leverage in political negotiations, capitalizing
also on sympathetic feelings coming from other pro-Iran Middle Eastern groups.
Challenging Saudi Arabia directly, the Huthis cultivate their border players’ face
despite still claiming their local (Saada-based) and national (portraying themselves
as those who defend Yemen against the Saudi military intervention) identities.
From a security-military perspective, the growing phenomenon of alienated
security hybridization on the Yemeni-Saudi border is the final security product of
what sociologists and anthropologists define as the “bordering-ordering-othering”
process. As in a vicious cycle, the top-down choice of a security-oriented border
policy fosters a specific social construction of the border (“bordering”) which is
linked to the political dimension of space (“ordering”). This feeds the “othering”
process:22 the distinction between the Self (ingroup) and the Other (outgroup) also
builds a strengthened identification between the Other and the identity projected
on it by the outside. In the case of the Huthi movement, this is extremely salient
and affects border security: the border area has been framed in binary terms
(us-them; here-there) since the process of fortification has begun.23 The Huthis’
opponents in Yemen and Saudi Arabia have also stigmatized the movement as
Iranian proxy before the conflict broke out in 2015. However, only since 2016,
the northern Zaydi Shia group has started systematic attacks against the Saudi
territory, as well as increasing coordination with Iranian actors. In this way, the
“othering” process of the Huthis seems to have contributed to push them toward
Teheran, thus adding a regional dimension to the border instability issue.
The Huthis and Borderland Tribes: Framing Border Conflict(s)
The securitization-oriented approach on border governance was already in-the-

making before the Saada wars. For some authors, the Huthi conflict was provoked
by Saudi Arabia’s aim to formalize the border.24 However, this interpretation risks
overlapping the Huthis’ struggle and the revolt of borderland tribes against the
boundary fortification. Indeed, other authors argue that the violence of the Huthi
conflict and the armed confrontations erupting from the reject of the border
fortification were, in most of the cases, two distinct phenomena and “few of those
who protested against the Saudi mobility restrictions later became Houthis.”25
What is clear is that increased violence and threat perception along the frontier
have contributed to a reactive reordering of border security-military dynamics,
both by the Yemenis and the Saudis. From that moment on, disentangling Yemeni
border strategies, structures and actors from Saudi ones becomes extremely
difficult and, most of all, not useful to grasp the whole picture of Yemeni-Saudi
border security governance. Throughout the decades, security hybridization

between formal and informal actors appears as the norm, not the exception, in
dealing with Yemeni-Saudi border security. Since the beginning of the Saada
wars (2004), regular troops and non-state auxiliaries fought for the government;26
however, their military weight increased when the conflict spilled over, spreading
outside the Saada governorate. This fostered tribal feuds, turning the conflict into
a more violent, brutal confrontation since “at no time was the Houthi conflict a
purely tribal one” but a hybrid war “driven by an ever-changing blend of political,
ideological, military, economic, tribal, sectarian, and personal causes.”27 Most of the
troops deployed against the Huthis in the first Saada war (2004) were part of the
First Armoured Division led by General Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar, including the allied
310th Armoured Brigade stationed in Amran. Government forces were composed
by fighters from areas inhabited by the Ḥāshid tribal confederation28 and Salafi
mercenaries already deployed in the South, in occasion of the 1994 civil war.
The Evolution of Hybrid Security Governance in Peace and War Times:

From Borderland Policy to Border Policy
On the Yemeni-Saudi frontier, the primacy of the border has progressively replaced
that of the borderland, with implications for security governance. Since the 1970s,
four chronological phases of border security governance can be identified. These
stages reflect a changing approach regarding the frontier by both Yemeni and
Saudi central governments, moving from a borderland policy to a border policy.
The rise of the Huthis as political and military group was the game-changer
factor, although a number of security dynamics (such as local protests against
the boundary fortification, smuggling, jihadi infiltrations, and uncontrolled
migration) had already contributed in raising the threat perception level.
Phase 1. Peace-Time Border Governance. Informal Security with Borderland Tribes

(from the 1970s till 2000)
This strategy was enabled by both the Saudi and Yemeni governments: shuyūkh
often received double stipends. After 1934, Saudi Arabia started to co-opt loyalist
tribal chiefs living in the borderland. However, the establishment of the YAR since
the 1970s changed the equation, crafting triple hybridization in border security
governance: the post-revolutionary government of Yemen organized a selective
patronage politics too with respect to border shuyūkh, in exchange of the frontier’s
protection.
Phase 2. Peace-Time Border Governance. Trans-border Cooperation and Security

Formalization (2000, after the Jeddah Agreement)
This phase epitomizes integrated security hybridization. In fact, the joint Yemeni-
Saudi Border Guard institutionalized the tribal forces usually involved in guarding
the frontier; the joint force was “made up of locals.”29 It was deployed on each
side of the international border, especially along the Taif line. The tasks of the
Border Guard were guarding the frontier, fighting infiltration of illegal migrants
and terrorists, and tackling smuggling activities.
Phase 3. War-Time Border Governance. Frontier Militarization and “Foreign-

ization” of Security Players (since 2004 and the first Saada war)
In wartimes, border security structures start to downplay cooperative and
integrated goals, gradually entering the path of alienated security hybridization.
Moreover, border security structures are less reliant on local tribes and forces than
before, while increasingly involving guards and combatants who are foreigners
with respect to the borderland and its social fabric. On both sides, this mechanism
favors the process of “othering.” Since 2004, the joint Yemeni-Saudi Border Guard
has fractured due to the Saada wars, dividing into differently affiliated units.
The Saudi Border Guard, as the other units positioned in the area, relies less on
Ismaili and Zaydi borderland tribes in order to prevent potential dissent, while it
continues to recruit from Najran’s Sunni tribes.30 On the other side of the frontier,
the Yemeni Border Guard, which is mainly supported by Riyadh, is staffed with
Sunni recruits from out-of-borderland areas such as Taiz and Ibb.31 A process of
security “foreign-ization” starts, on the Yemeni pro-government side and Saudi
Arabia: “foreign-ization” means that border security governance is increasingly
devolved to out-of-borderland tribes, to people who are foreign with respect to
the Yemeni-Saudi border ecosystem. For instance, Qatar’s soldiers are deployed
in 2015 on the Yemeni-Saudi border to support the Saudi-led Coalition which
intervenes in Yemen. But they are later forced to withdraw from the military
operation due to the diplomatic rift with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates,
Bahrain, and Egypt in 2017; most of the Qatari soldiers are replaced by Sudanese
forces. Members of the US Special Forces are deployed since 2018 on the Saudi
border side to assist Saudi forces in targeting Huthis’ air attacks.32 Triple hybridity
in security governance is visible in this phase: the Yemeni fighters operating on
the Yemen’s border side are rallied in military units affiliated to Saudi Arabia,33
as “still a few military units of Yemeni fighters recruited by the Saudis” guard the
border.34 After 2015, most of the Saudi recruitment for the Yemeni Border Guard
is from Taiz, middle and South Yemen’s areas.35 In Taiz, fighters are recruited
“through a network of brokers.”36 Conversely, the Huthis recruit in Saada and
Hajja after 2015: they are “more effective” in local recruitment “due to their
institutional capacity.”37
Phase 4. War-Time Border Governance. Multiple Security Players on the Border

(since 2015)
In a context of alienated security hybridization, the Border Guard is increasingly
assisted by a variety of security players: security governance becomes a matter of
multiple actors. When the sixth Saada war erupted in 2009, the Huthis clashed
with the Saudi Border Guards when they crossed the border in the Razih area.
But from 2015 onward, the Border Guard is no more the first actor in border
security governance for both sides. When the Saudis intervened in Yemen in 2015,
special forces of the Royal Saudi Land Forces (the army) and especially of the
Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) were deployed at the frontier to support
the Border Guard.38 Saudi police forces were already deployed in 2011 after the
Huthis took control of the Saada governorate. Triple security hybridization can be
identified also in training. One unit deployed on the Yemeni side of the border was
previously part of the Border Guards and formed under the supervision of the Joint
Forces Command of the Coalition: for instance, units operating in the Yemen’s
Jawf command zone (under Yemen’s MoD and the General Staff of the National
Army) were trained as Border Guards by Saudi forces.39 New security providers
rise, both formal and informal. In the first case, the Saudi newly established Al
Afwaj regiment (under the Ministry of Interior and led by a General who is a
member of the Al Qahtani tribe) began security patrols in 2019 in mountainous
areas to fight intrusions, weapons, and drug smuggling.40 In the second case, local
tribes, mostly in Huthi-controlled areas, and out-of-borderland tribes and armed
groups have multiplied their presence on the territory.
Re-Building the Yemeni State. The Huthis, In-Between-Spaces,

and the Post-Conflict
Since the Huthis have stepped up attacks against the Saudi territory, the
stabilization of the Yemeni-Saudi border stands at the top of whatever ceasefire
agreement plan. Without a feasible deal for the border, a national ceasefire in
Yemen risks being constantly dragged into a regionalized conflict again. In fact, the
Huthis have learned how to exploit their border presence to gain political leverage
through persistent military threat, propaganda, and recurrent attacks against
Saudi Arabia’s civilian, oil, and military installations. As previously mentioned,
it is now more accurate to make reference to the “Yemeni borders,” with regard
to the Yemeni-Saudi frontier, rather than to “the Yemeni northern border.” In
fact, as of 2020, the internationally recognized government has a presence in
Haradh (Hajja), but the borderline in Hajja, Saada, is controlled by the Huthis; the
internationally recognized government nominally controls instead al Jawf, Mareb,
and Ḥaḍramawt borderlines.41 This highlights the reality of Yemen’s segmented
border(s) working through different and conflicting security mechanisms. During
the post-2011 institutional transition, Yemenis acknowledged the border issue as
one of the most pressing topics to cope with. In its outcome document (2014), the
National Dialogue Conference addressed the future role and organization of the
Border Guards units, stressing the need to restructure, reorganize, and redeploy
the Border Guards units. At the time of writing, the Yemeni Border Guard falls
under the Ministry of Defense, as stated by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s
presidential decrees (December 2012). But according to the National Dialogue
Outcome Document, the Border Guard should be transferred under the Ministry
of Interior.42 With regard to recruitment, “residents of border areas should be
hired to fill the gaps in the Border Guards Units which shall be restructured in
regiments and companies to facilitate control”; the “establishment of training
centres for the Border Guards”43 would contribute to enhance professionalization
and readiness. Therefore, the Yemeni Border Guard should return to be a mainly
local force, according to the National Dialogue Conference. After years of war,
border security players reflect new political balances in Yemen: the Huthis have
turned from rebels to de facto authorities in controlled areas, and this has an
impact on recruitment effectiveness. In fact, they are growingly perceived as state
players by a part of the Yemeni population, showing “institutional capacity.”44 They
lack institutional legitimacy but their de facto state can rely on a mix of coercion
and popular acceptance in northern highlands. Border security governance, and
the de-securitization of the border topic, is one of the most pressing issues that
Yemeni and Saudi actors have to deal with to envisage post-conflict Yemen. But
the Huthi variable in the borderland has greatly contributed to redraw political
and security balances which were already contested by the locals. As permanent
uncertainty becomes the rule, the phenomenon of triple hybridization on the
frontier and its implications for Yemen’s state sovereignty are going to last, thus
surviving the 2015 war.
Notes
1 UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2021/79, 12, note 17.

2 UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/70, January 27, 2020, 72.
3 UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2021/79, 12, note 17.
4 UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2021/79, 64.
5 As Paul Dresch wrote, “at an extent unusual in the Middle East Yemenis remains
convinced nationalists. In religious, tribal and regionalist discourse alike the national
idea is prominent.” Dresch, “A Daily Plebiscite: Nation and State in Yemen,” Revue des
mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 67, no. 1 (1993): 67–77, 67.
6 See the overview in Schofield, “Borderland Studies, Frontierization, and the Middle
East’s in-between Spaces,” Mediterranean Politics 25, no. 3 (2020): 394–411.
7 The hybrid model is made of “co-governance arrangements between state and non-
state authority.” Sedra, Security Sector Reform in Conflict-Affected Countries: The
Evolution of a Model (2016). In hybrid security orders “the state and its monopoly
of violence are contested and diverse state and non-state security actors coexist,
collaborate or compete.” Luckam and Kirk, “The Two Faces of Security in Hybrid
Political Orders: A Framework for Analysis and Research,” Stability: International
Journal of Security & Development 2, no. 2 (2013): 1–30. See also Boege, Brown,
Clements, and Nolan, “Hybrid Political Orders, Not Fragile States,” Peace Review 21,
no. 1 (2009).
8 Joffe, “Concepts of Sovereignty in the Gulf Region,” in Territorial Foundations of the
Gulf States, ed. Schofield. The SOAS/GRC Geopolitics Series, 1 (New York: St. Martin
Press, 1994), 78–93.
9 Foka, “Exploring the in-between in Nicosia’s Buffer Zone: Local Practices of de-
bordering,” Mediterranean Politics 25, no. 3 (2020): 310–31.
10 Bonnefoy, “Les identités religieuse contemporaines au Yémen: convergence, résistance
et instrumentalisations,” Revue de mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 121–2
(2008): 199–213.
11 Mundy, Domestic Government: Kinship, Community and Polity in North Yemen
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1995).
12 Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict (London: Hurst
& Co, 2017), 21.
13 al-Enazy, “The Long Road from Taif to Jeddah: Resolution of a Saudi-Yemeni
Boundary Dispute,” Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (2005).
14 See Seventh Framework Programme-European Commission, “Shifting Loyalties: The
Tribes of Khawlan b. Amir in the Huthi Conflict in North-West Yemen,” 2011–2013,
project coordinated by Oesterreichische Akademie Der Wissenschaften (Professor
Andre Gingrich), https://cordis.europa.eu/project/id/273978.
15 Al-Maghafi, More than Just a Boundary Dispute: The Regional Geopolitics of Saudi-
Yemeni Relations, PhD diss. (2012).
16 Lenz, “Transformation of Tribal Perceptions on the Yemeni-Saudi Border,” paper
presented at Brismes 2017.
17 Ardemagni, “The Saudi-Yemeni Militarized Borderland,” Carnegie Sāda, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, January 9, 2020.
18 According to the theory of borderland evolution, four-staged typologies of
transboundary cooperation can be identified: alienated borderlands, coexistent
borderlands, interdependent borderlands, and integrated borderlands. Each stage
can be reversed and, ultimately, integration can improve bilateral relations between
border states. Martinez, Border People: Life and Society in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands
(1994).
19 Ardemagni, “Yemen’s Defense Structure: Hybridity and Patronage after the State,”
Journal of Arabian Studies 10, no. 1 (2020): 72–89.
20 For instance, the Yemeni Border Guard receives training assistance by Saudi Arabia.
In 2018, the Yemeni Border Guard was trained by the United States in Saudi Arabia,
as part of a program started in 2015 and including also Saudi professionals.
22 Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, “Bordering, Ordering and Othering,” Tijdschrift voor
Economische en Sociale Geografie, 93, no. 2 (2002): 125–36.
23 Rossiter, “The Yemeni-Saudi Border: From Boundary to Security Barrier,” Yemen
and the Gulf States: The Making of a Crisis, ed. Lackner and Varisco (2018), 29–44;
previously presented at the Gulf Research Meeting, Workshop “Yemen and the GCC:
Future Relations” (2016).
24 Blumi, Chaos in Yemen: Societal Collapse and the New Authoritarianism (2011).
25 Brandt, Tribes and Politics in Yemen, 96.
26 Boucek affirms that “over the course of the six-year conflict, nearly every aspect of
the Yemeni military has seen combat in Saada,” included the Counter-Terrorism Unit
answering to the Central Security Forces. The Yemeni government also deployed the
Popular army, “an amalgam of tribal levies and informal fighters.” At the dawn of the
sixth Saada war (2009–10), President Saleh supported the formation of the “People’s
Army” or “Popular Army” (al-Jaysh al-Shaʿbī), which assembled tribal elements and
Sunni mercenaries commanded by Husayn al-Ahmar and under the operational control
of General ʿAly Muḥsin. After a series of bloody tribal feuds, Saleh downplayed his
support to the auxiliary formation fearing the military strengthening of the al-Ahmar
tribe and of Ali Mohsin. See Boucek, “War in Saada: From Local Insurrection to
National Challenge,” Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(2010), 57 and 54; Ardemagni, “Yemen’s Defense Structure.”
28 Salmoni, Loidolt and Wells, “Regime and Periphery in Northern Yemen: The Huthi
Phenomenon,” RAND National Defense Research Institute (2010).
30 Author interview with security expert A, September 2020.
31 Ibid.
32 Cooper, Gibbons-Neff and Schmitt, “Army Special Forces Secretly Help Saudis
Combat Threat from Yemen Rebels,” The New York Times, May 3, 2018.
33 UN Security Council, Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/70, January 27, 2020, 72.
34 Author interview with security expert B, October 2020.
35 Ibid.
38 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (2016).
40 Al-Ghalib, “New Saudi Security Force to Fight Drug and Weapons Smuggling across
Mountainous Southern Border,” Arab News, May 5, 2019.
42 National Dialogue Conference, Outcome Document, recommendation, 114, 2014.
43 National Dialogue Conference, Outcome Document, suggestion e, 116, 2014.
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of Khawlan b. Amir in the Huthi Conflict in North-West Yemen.” 2011–2013, project
coordinated by Oesterreichische Akademie Der Wissenschaften.
United Nations Security Council. Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2020/70.
United Nations Security Council. Panel of Experts on Yemen, S/2021/79.
van Houtum, Henk and Ton van Naerssen. “Bordering, Ordering and Othering.”
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 93, no. 2 (2002): 125–36.
14
M O R E T HA N A P R OX Y— T H E H U T H I S A S A N O N - STAT E
AC T O R W I T H A F O R E IG N P O L IC Y ?
Maria-Louise Clausen
Introduction
When the Huthis took control of Yemen’s capital Sanaa in September 2014, it was
the culmination of years of internal conflict and political contestation. The so-
called Sadaa wars, which took place between 2004 and 2010, pitted the Huthis
against the Yemeni central government and fundamentally shaped the Huthi
movement. But whereas the claims of then president of Yemen, Ali Abdullah
Saleh, that the Huthis were an Iranian proxy were largely dismissed, this narrative
has increasingly come to shape the current conflict in Yemen. The claim that Iran
is backing the Huthis became a key element in Saudi Arabia’s legitimation of the
military intervention that began in March 2015.
The Arab Uprisings and the subsequent weakening of states in the region, and
a deterioration of the relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran, along with the
increased US preference to delegate policy responsibilities to regional actors, and
Trump’s hard stance on Iran, changed how the international community viewed
the Huthis. This fed the narrative of the conflict in Yemen as a proxy war between
Iran and Saudi Arabia (Clausen 2015). Whereas the validity of this framing has
been discussed, the dominance of the narrative that the Houthis are an Iranian
proxy has led to a lack of interest in their regional policies. This chapter will take
its point of departure in a brief discussion of the proxy concept and whether it
fully captures the relationship between the Huthis and Iran. Subsequently, the
chapter argues that the Huthis have a foreign policy. This is underpinned by a
reading of the Huthis as defying the conventional distinction between state and
non-state actors. Building on an explication of the Huthis’ self-portrayal as the
true representatives of the Yemeni state which include a desire to represent the
Yemeni state externally, this chapter provides a preliminary discussion of how
the Huthis foreign policy is both a response to and a product of the regional rivalry
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter to
provide a full account of the Huthis foreign policy. Instead, the chapter places the
Huthis regional foreign policy in the context of the rivalry between Iran and Saudi
Arabia as it provides both opportunities and limitations for the development of

the Huthis foreign policy. The final part of the chapter provides some pointers
on how the Huthis navigate regionally outside its relations to Iran and Saudi
Arabia by focusing on Hezbollah and Iraq. This demonstrates that whereas the
Huthis are the de facto state in northern Yemen and are dealt with as such by the
international community, the absence of juridical recognition of Huthi statehood
makes it difficult for the Huthis to build formal relations to regional states that
continue to uphold international norms of dealing with international recognized
state actors.
Nuancing the Narrative of the Huthis as an Iranian Proxy
The Saudis refer to the Huthis as an “Iranian-backed militia” to indicate that the
movement should be understood as an Iranian proxy and an armed non-state
actor in opposition to the internationally recognized government that, according
to international law, is the only legitimate representative of the Yemeni state. This
distinction is seen in the literature on armed non-state actors which tends to focus
on non-state actors’ relationship to the state, whereas their external relations
are either absent or described in terms of proxy relations. This has also been the
case for the Huthis where their foreign policy has been given little independent
attention.
Whereas the claim that the Huthis are a proxy of Iran is not new, it gained
credence after the Huthi takeover of Sanaa in September 2014, and the subsequent
Saudi-led military intervention into Yemen (Clausen forthcoming). However, the
discussion of whether the Huthis constitute a proxy of Iran is hampered by the lack
of scholarly agreement on how to measure outside intervention, just as the proxy
concept itself continues to be contested (Rauta 2020). One of the more influential
definitions of proxy war defines it as “the indirect engagement in a conflict by
third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome” where a relationship exists
between a benefactor external to the conflict and a proxy that receives weapons,
training, and funding from the benefactor (Mumford 2013, 11). However, equating
proxy relations to what Karl Deutsch has referred to as the “measurable aspects of
outside intervention” such as manpower, money, material, and specialized services
in his classical work on external involvement in internal war simplifies the variety
of relations that exist (Deutsch 1964). A proxy relationship cannot be reduced to
the exchange of “measurable aspects,” as a proxy relationship entails a principal-
agent relationship where an outside actor, usually a state but not necessarily, seeks
to influence another state’s internal affairs through support to an actor that is
willing to act, to some degree, on the intervening state’s behalf. Moreover, as clients
and patrons often seek to conceal the details of their relationship, there is seldom
agreement on the level of material support. As Daniel Byman has found, primary
forms of support include trainings, financial assistance, arms, sanctuary, and
diplomatic backing (Byman 2005, 53–78). Other, less frequent, types of support
1. More than a Proxy 275
that have been present in the relationship between the Huthis and Iran include
ideological direction and organizational assistance.
Afshon Ostovar has pointed to three key conditions for strong Iranian-client
relationships, namely that the client shares Iran’s theocratic interpretation of
Shi’a Islam, that Iran is the sole patron, and that domestic goals are shared and
regional goals accepted (Ostovar 2018). As Ostovar underlines, the most dedicated
clients must support “both Tehran’s various political ambitions and activities in
the client’s country and its strategic activities across the region” (Ostovar 2018,
1239). In the case of the Huthis and Iran, the foundation of the relationship is an
ideological commonality and shared opposition to the regional order dominated
by the United States and its key allies, most notably Saudi Arabia and Israel (Shiban
2018). This is reflected in the importance of different types of support from Iran to
the Huthis. Organizational support, including media training, has been pointed to
as one of the most important aspects of the Iranian support to the Huthis (Kendall
2017; Salisbury 2015). But there is growing evidence that the Huthis have access to
Iranian-produced military hardware.1 Iran has consistently denied supplying the
Huthis with weapons, but has rhetorically supported the Huthis, and individuals
linked to the Iranian regime have occasionally boasted of Iran’s influence in Yemen
(Juneau 2016). It is not surprising that Iran denies supporting the Huthis with
weapons despite evidence to the contrary as this would be in direct violation of
UN resolution 2216 (2015) if Iran supplies or does not take all measures to prevent
supply of arms to the Huthis in Yemen.2 It is clear that the relationship between the
Huthis and Iran has become stronger since the commencement of the Saudi-led
military intervention into Yemen.
The Huthis have strong diplomatic relations with Iran and have regularly been
officially received in Tehran.3 In 2020, Iran dispatched an ambassador, Hassan Irloo,
to the Huthi-controlled capital, Sanaa, indicating recognition of Huthi authority.
This presents a break from diplomatic norms that dictate that ambassadors must
present their credentials to the internationally recognized President Hadi (Testot
2017). Whereas the Huthis have heralded the arrival of Hassan Irloo as a step
toward the normalization of diplomatic relations, the internationally recognized
Yemeni government has submitted an official complaint to the UN Security
Council and argued that the Iranian recognition of the Huthis as representing
the Yemeni state violates Yemeni sovereignty and established “a precedent for
rogue States to send representatives to insurrectionist and terrorist rebel groups.”4
Moreover, Irloo, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard commander, has been argued to
wield considerable influence in Sanaa. The different narratives surrounding the
arrival of the Iranian ambassador to Sanaa illustrates the ongoing rhetorical battle
around the definition of the Huthis.
The literature on state support to armed non-state actors suggests that diplomatic
backing might facilitate the recipient’s access to international fora and boost its
legitimacy, which can help the group attract more recruits and money (Byman
2005, 61).5 The Huthi representative in Tehran has, for example, been invited to
official meetings with other ambassadors.6 Thus, Iranian officials have been willing
to formally stand by the Huthis, stating that Iran would continue to “defend the
innocent Yemeni people at the international scene.”7 However, whereas Iran has
raised the question of Yemen in international fora, the Huthis’ relationship with
Iran has restricted the Huthis’ ability to define their own independent foreign
policy platform. The Huthis have few international (state) allies so while the group
has sought international recognition and presented the diplomatic links to Iran as
a step in that direction, the reality is that for the Huthis, a close relationship to Iran
comes with limitations. This is the case even though the relationship should not be
reduced to seeing the Huthis as a puppet of Iran or a Yemeni version of Hezbollah.
Whereas the Huthis, as described above, have a strong relationship, Iran does
not have absolute control over the Huthis political or military agenda (Knights
2018; Perkins 2019; Vatanka 2020). Instead, the relationship has been facilitated
by Iran’s limited interest in domestic Yemeni politics, while the linkage allows Iran
to project power on the Arabian Peninsula on a modest investment (Juneau 2016).
This chapter will now move to a brief discussion of how to define the Huthis
followed by an investigation on how the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia
affects the space of action for the Huthis.
The Huthis Frame Themselves as Representing the Yemeni State
Whereas the international community sees President Hadi and his government
as the legitimate representatives of the Yemeni state, the Huthis seek to frame
themselves as the true representatives of the Yemeni state. In the context of the
conflict in Yemen, the Huthis describe themselves as defenders of Yemen against
the illegitimate “war of aggression” perpetuated toward Yemen and spearheaded
by Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Huthis rhetorically underline that they
are only defending themselves in accordance with the international right to self-
defense. This directly challenges the authority of the Hadi-led government and
provides a counternarrative to the Saudi legitimation of the conflict as being on
the request of the internationally recognized and legitimate government to prevent
an armed non-state actor from taking control of the state.
The Huthis refer to “the ex-government” and the troops fighting them as
“Saudi-backed militants” or “invaders.”8 The Hadi government is called out for
being completely dependent on Saudi Arabia, underscoring its lack of internal
legitimacy or broad-based support. As opposed to this, the Huthis present
themselves as an autonomous and independent movement that is fighting to
protect Yemen. The Huthis refer to themselves as the “Yemeni army” and depict
themselves as speaking on behalf of the Yemeni people. Attacks on Saudi Arabia
are framed as acts of self-defense against “aggression” and the “siege” on Yemen.
The purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the merits of this narrative but to
indicate that the Huthis see themselves as the legitimate representatives of the
Yemeni state and as such reject the depiction of them as a non-state actor.
The Huthis took control over a substantial part of the state apparatus when
they entered Sanaa with the aid of former President Saleh in 2014. Since then,
the Huthis have used their control of the Yemeni capital to build a network of
institutions that mirrors that of a state. They have announced what they refer to
as a National Salvation Government, which includes a foreign minister, Hisham
Sharaf Abdullah, who speaks English which allows him access to mainstream
media where he can present the Huthi agenda to an international audience.9 The
foreign ministry has a homepage, where it adopts diplomatic language matching
what can be found by foreign ministries throughout the region. Another example
is the dispatching of an ambassador, Ibrahim Mohammed al-Dailami, to Iran in
2019. Whereas announcing ambassadors is typically reserved for internationally
recognized states, the Huthi envoy was received by Iranian foreign minister
Mohammad Javad Zarif in Tehran, where he formally handed over a copy of his
credentials. Whereas this is an indication of the close relationship between Iran
and the Huthis, it also provides the Huthis with an opportunity to challenge the
narrative of Hadi, a president that has hardly set foot in Yemen since 2015, as
representing the Yemeni people.
Hence, although the lack of international recognition provides some obstacles
for the implementation of a foreign policy, as will be further are discussed below,
the Huthis are the de facto authorities in northern Yemen, are dealt with as such by
the international community. Thus, the Huthis place themselves among a growing
group of armed non-state actors that challenge existing state-centric approaches
to international politics. Much research on armed non-state actors focuses on how
the presence of armed non-state actors impacts state policies, and less on how
the foreign policy of armed non-state actors can be understood. This is the case,
even though it is increasingly recognized that non-state actors impact regional
events. The most obvious regional example of this is Hezbollah. Hezbollah has
long been recognized as one of the most geopolitically significant non-state
actors (DeVore 2012). This role has only been further underscored by Hezbollah’s
involvement in the Syrian civil war, where Hezbollah chose to fight alongside the
Assad regime although this decision spurred some internal critique (Alami 2020;
Farida 2020). The Huthis are inspired by the asymmetric approach to foreign
policy that Hezbollah has perfected. The admiration for Hezbollah as a non-state
actor fighting against a militarily superior state actor has long been evident in
the Huthi movement.10 Consequently, in the regional context, the Huthis are
emulating some of Hezbollah’s strategies, including building a popular platform
based on resistance to Israel, and the US-led regional and international order as
tools to elevate their regional standing. It is less clear how successful this strategy
will ultimately be as the Huthis are not directly facing Israel nor is a match to
Hezbollah’s capacity. The Huthis’ credibility in a regional context largely depends
on their military confrontation with the Saudi-led coalition and Saudi Arabia in
particular.11
The Huthis are speaking to both internal and external audiences when seeking
to frame themselves as the true representatives of the Yemeni state. Internally, it
is part of the framing of the conflict as a war of aggression by external powers on
Yemen, and externally, it is used to build the Huthis’ profile as an actor that should
be taken seriously and not dismissed as an unrepresentative militia or Iranian
puppet. This is not the same as arguing that the Huthis are right in this framing,
but the continued opposition from the internationally recognized government,
and the fact that the Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen was legitimated
by reference to an invitation by the internationally recognized government,
demonstrates the importance of this rhetorical struggle over definitions.
The Huthis and the Rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia
Gregory Gause argued in 2014 that the best way to understand the regional
politics of the Middle East is as cold war between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Gause
2014). It is referred to as cold war because the contest for influence between Iran
and Saudi Arabia plays out in the weak states of the region. Yemen seems to fit this
pattern as it can be argued that the linkage of the Yemen conflict to the regional
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia not only exacerbated cleavages internally
in Yemen but structured the development of the Huthis foreign policy (Clausen
forthcoming).
This chapter emphasizes the importance of the regional rivalry between
Iran and Saudi Arabia as it shapes the space in which the Huthis can play out
their foreign policy. There has been a regionalization of the conflict in Yemen,
which gained momentum as it became part of a broader trend in the aftermath
of the 2011 uprisings to use sectarian narratives couched in anti-Iranian terms
(Mabon 2018). Saudi Arabia has especially sought to link the Huthis to a broader
securitization of an Iranian Shi’a threat. The current Saudi regime sees Iran as the
major enemy and has sought to play up the threat of Iran in the region. Finally,
the rivalry takes place in the context of shifting global politics, particularly the
perceived disengagement of the United States from the region. The signing of the
nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2015 further
exacerbated Saudi concerns that the United States was no longer willing to invest
in upholding regional order or countering Iran (Clausen 2019). Thus, the US
retrenchment has led to a greater sense of ownership among the Gulf States of
their over own security (Hokayem 2016).
Whereas this chapter argues that it is reasonable to speak of a Huthi foreign
policy, it sees the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia as substantially impacting
the space of action for the Huthis. Here I will focus on two aspects: first how the
rivalry and the Saudi effort to portray the Huthis as an Iranian proxy as part of
their legitimation for the military intervention in the conflict has unintentionally
had the effect of strengthening the tie between the Huthis and Iran (Clausen
forthcoming). A key element in the strengthened relationship between Iran and
the Huthis is a shared ideological principle of opposition to the perceived injustice
of the geopolitical regional status quo. The Huthis frame the conflict in Yemen as
an example of an indigenous movement fighting an external imperialist coalition.
The anti-imperialist narrative has been a core feature of the Huthi movement
since the 2000s (Nevola and Shiban 2020). The founder of the Huthi movement,
Hussein Badr al-Din al-Huthi, the late brother to the current leader of the Huthi
movement, Abdul Malik al-Huthi, frequently stated his admiration for Iran’s
Islamic revolution and Iran’s willingness to challenge the US-led order (Albloshi
2016). An example of how the Huthis have been inspired by Iran is the Huthi
chant, “the scream” (al-sarkha), that was adapted from the “Death to America”
chant of the Iranian revolution and reads: “Death to America, Death to Israel,
Damn the Jews, Victory to Islam.” In that sense, the Huthis align themselves with
Iran by presenting themselves as defenders of the marginalized and as challenging
the status quo. Whereas there are examples of the Huthis voicing support for global
anti-imperialist struggles, they are mainly focused on regional issues particularly
the issue of the Palestinians. Moreover, the Huthis are involved in asymmetric
warfare against Saudi Arabia that outweighs the Huthis in terms of military
capability through a strategy of combining strikes targeting Saudi Arabia using
missiles and drones with guerilla-inspired warfare inside Yemen (Tabatabai 2020,
267). These factors have been used to place the Huthis in the “Axis of Resistance”
that is considered a loose alliance brought together by shared regional aims,
including opposition to perceived US hegemony in the region (Stein 2017). This
has been supported by claims by high-ranking Huthi leaders.12
Second, the regionalization of the conflict in Yemen has elevated the Huthis’
regional standing. The Saudi-led military intervention and the linkage of the
Huthis to the Axis of Resistance elevated the Huthis from a movement perceived
as a Yemeni domestic movement to one with a regional and international audience.
The Huthis have since sought to use this platform to build regional visibility as
part of their battle to be recognized as a relevant political actor. Yet, whereas the
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the growing linkage between Iran
and the Huthis have provided the Huthis with a regional platform, it has also
limited the space of action available to the Huthis by creating a situation where
the Huthis’ actions are read up against and understood through the lens of the
rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This has limited the Huthis’ potential for
establishing external relations with different states and actors. Whereas the Huthis
are critical of the role played by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, the Huthis on a regular
basis argue that Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and other members of the
coalition are nothing but American-Zionist tools to divide and weaken the region
(Nevola and Shiban 2020). Still, the Huthis and Saudi Arabia have been involved in
bilateral negotiations during the conflict, and these talks have led to some positive
outcomes, indicating that behind the public aggressive rhetoric both parties can be
swayed, at least in principle, toward compromise.
The Huthis’ Relations with Hezbollah and Iraq
The main theme in the Huthis foreign policy is garnering support for their
ongoing struggle against what they depict as aggression on Yemen. To this end,
the Huthis present their foreign policy goals as developing mechanisms to activate
the diplomacy of Yemen to overcome international isolation, and to develop and
strengthen international and regional relations based on common interests.13 The
Huthi movement has sought to use its platform of opposition to Saudi Arabia
and the United States to present itself as a supporter of regional armed non-state
groups which share the anti-imperial US agenda, and resistance to Israel while
supporting the notion of Islamic unity. In this final part of the chapter, the Huthis
foreign policy, focusing on Hezbollah and Iraq, will be discussed.
The literature on the relationship between the Huthis and Hezbollah has
focused on deciphering the level of support from Hezbollah to the Huthis and
on either espousing or refuting narratives of the Huthis as “Yemen’s Hezbollah”
(Cafiero 2019). These approaches are too simplistic, but Hezbollah is a key source
of inspiration for the Huthis (Riedel 2021). Hezbollah has a reputation of not
only playing an important role in internal Lebanese politics but also having been
able and willing to stand up to Israeli infringements of Lebanese sovereignty
(DeVore and Stähli 2014). At the same time, Hezbollah has the capacity to act as a
patron, and there have been examples of what Daniel Byman refers to as “indirect
training” where Iran has used Hezbollah to train a range of Palestinian groups
(Byman 2005, 59).
Huthi delegations, usually led by Mohammed Abdul-Salam, spokesperson
and negotiator for the Huthis, have met with Hezbollah officials numerous times
including official meetings with Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.
Moreover, the Huthis operate their TV channel, al-Masirah, out of Beirut. The
Huthis articulate a great deal of admiration for Hezbollah and its practices, which
include its willingness to directly confront Israel (Albloshi 2016, 154). The Huthis
have scorned United Arab Emirates for normalizing ties with Israel, and effectively
used it in their propaganda as resistance to Israel is widespread in the Yemeni
population (Jalal 2020). The Huthis are well aligned to benefit from this agenda
as the lectures of Hussein al-Huthi, the founder of the Huthi movement, espouse
strong opposition to Israel and anti-Semitism, making it part of the ideological
foundation of the Huthi movement. The Huthis frame Israel as a threat to the
Islamic umma, whereas the Huthis present themselves as defenders of Islamic
unity (Albloshi 2016). However, in addition to learning from Hezbollah’s long-
time experience operating in the gray zone between militia, political party, and
grassroots movement, the Huthis may seek to elevate their own regional standing
by associating themselves with and presenting themselves as an organization on
par with the more well-known Hezbollah movement. This corresponds well with
the Huthis’ continued rhetoric that underscores their independent ability to carry
out strikes. The Huthis want to be taken serious as an actor with agency.
The Huthis have announced their willingness and ability to aid Hezbollah
militarily in its struggle with Israel. This includes promises made by Abdul Malik
al-Huthi, leader of the Huthi movement, that his forces would fight alongside
Hezbollah in a future conflict with Israel.14 Although this is a symbolic offer, the
fact that the Huthis have withstood the Saudi-led coalition for years elevates the
perception of their military capabilities. Another example of how the Huthis
seek to align itself with Hezbollah’s opposition to Israel is a fundraiser held by
a Huthi-affiliated radio station in Yemen which collected funds for Hezbollah
(Weiss 2019). The fact that a movement currently controlling a large part of the
Yemeni territory hit hardest by what the United Nations describes as the world’s
worst humanitarian disaster still chooses to support a money drive for Hezbollah
underlines how the Huthis seek to present themselves as a resourceful regional
actor. It also indicates that the Huthis are seeking to portray their relationship with
Hezbollah as one of reciprocity.
The Huthis have sought to build relations with state actors in the region such as
Iraq, which has a strong relationship with Iran. The Huthis have carried out official
visits to Iraq, including a 2015 meeting with Nuri al-Maliki and a 2018 meeting
with Haider al-Abadi (Nevola and Shiban 2020). These visits have sought to win
recognition for the Huthi-governing institutions, and to build formal ties with
Iraqi politicians. However, Iraqi politicians have been reluctant to recognize the
Huthis as formal representatives of the Yemeni state. This suggests that the Huthis
are still, overall, seen as an armed non-state actor that is dealt with cordially but
that outright support to the Huthis mainly stems from other non-state actors in the
Iranian orbit. This has not prevented the Huthis from commenting on Iraqi affairs.
The Huthis were vocal in condemning the US assassination of General Qassim
Soleimani, head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Quds Force
and the senior commander of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or
Hashd al-Shaabi, and head of Kata’ib Hezbollah, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, on
route from Baghdad Airport.15 They called for a swift and direct response, thus
adding to the pressure on Iran to respond. The Huthis have also condemned the
presence of US troops in Iraq, and voiced support for organizations such as Katai’b
Hezbollah, an influential member of the PMFs with strong links to Iran, that has
played a key role in the escalation between Iran and the United States playing
out in Iraq during 2020.16 At a time of political turmoil in Iraq, where Iraqis are
increasingly objecting to Iranian influence, Iran has sought to avoid that events
would escalate out of control.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the Huthis have a foreign policy, although one that
is closely aligned with that of Iran. This argument is based on a reading of the
relationship between Iran and the Huthis that goes beyond dismissing the Huthis
as an Iranian proxy. This argument is further linked to the Huthis as defying
the distinction between state and non-state actor, as they rhetorically seek to
present themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Yemeni state. However,
this narrative has had limited resonance among states, with Iran as the notable
exception. Consequently, the Huthis remain internationally dependent on Iran.
Whereas the chapter argues that the Huthis have a foreign policy, it points to
the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia as strongly affecting the Huthis
foreign policy space. The Huthis are seeking to “play” the regional game and have
displayed agency in how they navigate and utilize the opportunities given to them
by the regionalization of the conflict. Yet, they are at risk of becoming caught in
regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia that espouse competing visions of
regional order. Most notably, the fact the Huthis was placed in the “Iranian camp”
from the onset of the conflict has impacted how they were dealt with regionally
and internationally. Both Iran and the Huthis have denied that the Huthis are
a client of Iran but describe the relationship as one between equal friends. This
point to a recurring issue in seeking to disentangle the relationship between Iran
and the Huthis, namely the absence of non-biased sources, as all actors, including
Saudi Arabia, has an expressed interest in misrepresenting the relationship while
seeking to control public narratives of the conflict in Yemen. However, regardless
of whether one believes the Huthis to be most aptly described as a proxy, it
cannot be debated that international and regional policy-makers approach the
Huthis as Iran-aligned. This impacts how the Huthis are dealt with regionally and
internationally.
The Huthis have sought international recognition. But their regional importance
is shaped by their proven ability to hold their ground against the Saudi-led
military intervention in Yemen. Consequently, the content of the Huthi foreign
policy is influenced by the ongoing conflict. The strong military rhetoric might
have boosted their regional importance as an armed non-state actor but it might
simultaneously collide with and undermine the Huthis’ own diplomatic efforts
that seek to end the organization’s international isolation (Nevola and Shiban
2020, 245). This indicates that, despite worrying aspects of Huthi governance,
negotiations will have to, at least to some degree, focus on building the political
and diplomatic credentials of the movement. As argued here, whereas the Huthis
are dealt with as de facto authorities in northern Yemen, they have struggled to
build formal diplomatic ties with regional states. Simultaneously, the overt agenda
of opposition to Saudi Arabia, the United States, and Israel has restricted its
willingness to trust regional and international actors. In this context, Oman has
emerged as a regional state that has managed to remain fairly neutral throughout
the conflict. Consequently, Oman has played a role as a mediator and location for
peace discussions (al-Hamdani and Lackner 2020). This role should be utilized
for peace negotiations that could seek to support the notion that binding political
negotiations, and not a military victory, is the most viable end to the current
conflict and international recognition of the Huthis.
Notes
1 Final report of the Panel of Experts, in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution

2511 (2020), January 25, 2021, S/2021/79 ( accessed March 9, 2021).
2 Resolution 2216 (2015), United Nations Security Council, April 14, 2015, https://
www.undocs.org/S/RES/2216%20(2015) (accessed March 18, 2021).
3 This refer to formal visits that has been announced on the Iranian Foreign Ministry
homepage. See, for example, “FM Zarif, Ansarullah Spokesman Hold Talks in Tehran,”
August 08, 2019, https://en.mfa.ir/portal/NewsView/48379 (accessed March 22, 2021).
4 Letter dated October 19, 2020, from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the
United Nations addressed to the president of the Security Council, S/2020/1029.
5 An example of this was when the British foreign minister Jeremy Hunt met with
the Huthi spokesperson Mohammed Abdul Salam in Oman, and this was used as
evidence that the Huthis are recognized as more than a rebel group. https://iranpress.
com/content/9227 (accessed March 20, 2021).
6 Yemeni Envoy Meets with Latin American Counterparts in Tehran, October 16, 2019,
https://en.mfa.ir/portal/NewsView/546115 (accessed March 15, 2021).
7 Iranian Envoy Enters Yemen, Fars News Agency, October 17, 2020, https://www.
farsnews.ir/en/news/13990726000346/en/Arcive (accessed on March 10, 2021).
8 This is standard rhetoric used by Huthi-aligned media outlets.
9 The homepage of the Huthi foreign ministry can be found here: https://mofa.gov.ye/
10 Interviews, Yemen 2013–14.
11 It is standard rhetoric in Huthi-aligned media to underscore the Huthis’ ability to
strike Saudi Arabia, and their willingness to do so as long as Saudi Arabia continues
its military operations in Yemen. See, for example, https://english.almasirah.net/
post/18197/Ansarullah-Our-Ballistic-Missiles-a-Nightmare-for-Saudi-Regime
12 Final report of the Panel of Experts, in accordance with paragraph 8 of resolution
2511 (2020), January 25, 2021, S/2021/79, 12/283 (accessed March 9, 2021).
13 National Vision for the Modern Yemeni State. A hand for protection and a hand for
building, Huthi Supreme Political Council, March 26, 2019.
14 These statements were made by Abdul Malik al-Huthi in an interview with a Lebanese
publication in 2018. Huthi leader again promises to take part in any future conflict
between Hezbollah and Israel, Threat Matrix, https://www.longwarjournal.org/
archives/2018/03/Huthi-leader-again-promises-to-take-part-in-any-future-conflict-
between-hezbollah-and-israel.php (accessed March 20, 2021).
15 The attack in Iraq was reportedly followed by an unsuccessful attack in Yemen.
16 In January 2021, an attack claimed by an unknown Iraqi Shi’a militant group, possibly
a façade for Kata’ib Hezbollah, claimed responsibility for an attack targeting Riyadh
while arguing that it was part of the Huthis’ self-declared deterrence campaign against
Saudi Arabia (Lawlor 2021).
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8-2019‫اعالمالتي‬20182019-8-4‫م؟‬
INDEX
Abdelsalam, Muhammad 153 n.65 Believing Youth (al-Shabab al-Mu’min) 8,

Abdul-Hafeez, Nabil 123 20, 121, 140, 141, 149 n.10, 261
Aden 2, 115, 182, 223 Bid‘ wa-jawāb (call-and-response) 168
AeroVironment RQ-20 Puma drone 241 bigoted discourse 43–4
ahl al-bayt 22, 28, 29, 59–62, 64, 66, 67, bin Salman, Mohammed 146, 241, 243
68 n.16, 69 n.23, 69 n.26, 78, 81, bordering-ordering-othering 264–5
125–6, 171, 172, 199, 201, 204–7 Boucek, Christopher 270 n.26
al-Ahmar, Shaykh ʿAbdullah 2, 6, 79, 84 Brandt, Marieke 3, 9, 187
al-Ahnumi, Hamud 63 al-Bukhari, Muhammad 66
al-’a‘lam 172 Byman, Daniel 274
‘alam al-hudā 22, 25, 26
Albloshi, Hamad 38, 42 centralization 86, 182, 195, 217, 218, 222–8
Alda’airah Altarboyah (Educational Christians 43, 44, 46, 49, 50, 63, 202, 203,
Department of Ansarallah) 119–20 207, 213
alienated security hybridization 260, 261, civil-military relationship. See power and
264, 265, 267 civil-military relations
Allah (God) 1, 42, 43, 63, 79, 117, 118, coercive power 181, 182, 187, 193–4.
124, 127, 163 See also power and civil-military
all-female institutions 93, 99–100 relations
al-Masīra al-Qurʾāniyya (Quranic March) Constitutional Declaration 97, 116
172, 201–2 Counter-Rocket Artillery and Mortars
al-Qaeda 20, 21, 30, 263 (C-RAM)/Close-In Weapons
Alyan’ai, Yahya 125 Systems (CIWS) 241
Amnesty International 188 Covid-19 pandemic 10, 141
Ansarallah (Ansar Allah) 1, 17, 93, 96, Critical Discourse Analysis 39–40
116, 119–20, 124, 148, 214, 217–18, curriculum changes 113–19, 121–3, 125, 126
224, 226–7, 229 n.13, 237, 247, 259 cyber operations 239–40
centralization and taxation 222–5
GPC and 218–22 Dār al-Ḥadīth 19, 263
local authorities 225–6 al-Daylamī, Abū ’l-Fatḥ 20
supervisors, role of 218–19 al-Daylamī, Ḥusayn 30
anti-Hashimite/Zaydi rhetoric 4–6 Deutsch, Karl 274
Arab Spring 2, 6–7, 28, 38, 194, 209, 273 divide and rule principle 81, 83, 86, 99–100
artificial intelligence (AI) 238–9 Doll, Ronald C. 125
Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) 222 double hybridization 259, 264
’awlad al-balad (“genuine Yemenis”) 81 Dresch, Paul 169, 170, 269 n.5
Axis of Resistance 10, 279
early Zaydy schools (Sa’dah) 121–2
Al-Baher, Abdul Basit 187 education 113–14, 119, 130–1
Baouh, Zayd 140 after 1962 115–16
al-Bashir, Omar 20 Ansarallah 119–20
Index 287
control 121 Hazib, Hussein 120, 129

curriculum changes 125 Hezbollah 47, 120, 145, 193, 194, 274,
higher 114, 116, 120–2, 129–30 276–81
leadership and vision 120 Hill, Ginny 195
publications 124 Hizb al-Haqq 19, 24, 27, 33 n.23, 261
Quranic 117–19, 126–9 HSV-2 SWIFT 242
schools and 121–3 al-Husayn, Yahya ibn 20, 24, 26, 29, 62,
summer centers 123–4 63, 78, 79
vision for 116 “Huthi” 11 n.1
in Yemen 114–15 “al-Huthi” 11 n.3
electronic counter measures (ECM) 243 al-Huthi, Abdulmalik 2, 8, 11 n.3, 26,
electronic warfare (EW) 239–40 38–50, 58, 62, 83, 84, 113, 114, 118,
ex-government 276 120, 123, 125, 143, 144, 150 n.27,
external actors 186, 191–4 153 n.60, 167, 169, 172, 173, 200–2,
211, 214, 218, 279–80, 283 n.14
foreign-ization 267 Huthification 113–14, 119
fragmentation 182, 186, 187, 195 al-Huthi, Husayn 1, 2, 4, 8–9, 18–21, 32
n.8, 34 n.26, 59, 113, 114, 117–20,
al-Gaddafi, Muammar 18 123, 125, 131 n.14, 141, 145–6,
Gause, Gregory 278 207–9, 280
gender relations 97, 103 America and Israel 46
General Authority for Zakat (GAZ) 223–4 and his Malāzim 17–19, 21, 22, 25–30,
General People’s Congress (GPC) 97, 98, 38–9, 42–3, 48, 50, 51 n.6, 113–14,
188, 210, 218–22, 227 116–18, 123, 199, 213
General People’s Congress – San’a (GPC-S) illiteracy 117
235–6, 238–40 Khomeini’s influence 48
genocide 248 killing of 37, 38
Ghadir Khumm 25 Mu‘tazila, attack on the 28
Ghawwas application (“diver” in English) political and intellectual itinerary
39–41, 50 19–21
Gramsci, Antonio 58, 66, 77 political context 18–19
ground and enemy 237–8 political revolutionary 202–7
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 2, 7, Quran and 21–4
208, 210 al-Huthi, Mohammed Ali 146, 148
Gulf shayla 167, 173 Huthis 1–4, 199–200, 213–14, 273–4,
281–2
Hadi, Abdrabbuh Mansour 2, 95, 98, 102, dominance 209–12
200, 247, 275–7 Hezbollah and Iraq 279–81
al-Hadi, Imam Yahya ibn al-Husayn (al- history 4–10
Hadi ila al-Haqq) 5, 20, 24, 26, 29, ideas 200–2
59, 61, 63–4, 67, 87 n.4, 126, 205–6 identity 114
Halliday, Fred 57 insurgency 38, 208–9, 214
Hamid Al-Din 25, 79, 83–5, 165 Iranian proxy 274–6
Imam Ahmad bin Yahya 24, 80 representatives of the Yemeni state
Imam Yahya 57, 78, 80, 85–6 276–8
Hassan Zaid 96 revolution 94, 97, 202
Hashimism 8, 10 rule 67, 82–6, 190
Haykel, Bernard 9, 169, 170 traditional Zaydis vs. 26–30
288 Index
tribal relations 189–90 Khosroof, Major General Mohsin 192

and tribes 82 khums (fifth) 229 n.15
vision 212–13
al-Ḥuthi, Sayyid Badr al-Dīn 18 lawfare 247–8
Huthism 21, 31, 119 Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) /
al-Huthi, Yahya 120, 125 International Humanitarian Law
hybridization 259–62, 264–6, 268, 269 (IHL) 253 n.74
hybrid security governance 263–4 al-Layth, ‘Isa 166, 168, 170
legitimacy 5, 6, 8, 9, 58, 59, 62, 66, 95, 97,
identity determinators 44–5 98, 103, 106 n.42, 140, 146, 184,
al-‘Ijrī, ‘Abd al-Malik 23, 26, 33 n.15, 195, 202, 246, 247
33 n.22 legitimation 93, 94, 102, 273, 276, 278
illusory truth effect 147 Lenz, Lisa 263
Al-Imam al-Hādī 5, 63–4, 67, 87 n.4, 205, local authorities 225–6
206 long range fires 243–5
imamic rule 24, 57, 78–80, 85–6
information operations (IO) 245–6 ma’alamah (kuttab) 115, 131 n.5
insurgency 38, 208–9, 214 Majlis al-Zaydi al-Islami 61, 64
integrated security hybridization 260, 261, Al-Maqdashi, Muhammad 220
264, 266 Martinez Oscar, J. 264
intelligence, surveillance and Al-Mashriqi, Fadil 220
reconnaissance (ISR) 240 media 141–2
internal security 251 n.28 adaptabibility and diplomacy 145–6
Iran 193–4 diverse 143–5
dominance 49, 50 dominant ones 146–9
Huthis and 47–8, 202 evolution of 140–3
proxy of 274–6 media networks
and Saudi Arabia 273–4, 278–9 Al-Hawya 143, 147, 148
and Umma 47 Al-Lahza 143
al-Iryani, Abdul-Ghani 187, 192 Al-Masirah network 140, 142–6, 148,
Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) 47, 192, 202, 246
239–42, 244, 245, 247, 248, 265 Al-Thawra 124, 142
Islamic Revolution 47–9, 103, 279 mercenaries 247–8, 254 n.76
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Migdal, Joel 183
(IRGC) 193 Ministry of Defense (MoD) 37, 191, 192,
#IWantMyRights 100 259, 268
Ministry of Education 117, 119–21,
Jeddah port 146, 240, 242–3 126
Jeddah Treaty 260, 261, 263 missiles 237, 240, 243–5
Jews 43–4, 46, 49, 50, 62, 63, 102, 202–3 anti-ship 242
Jihad 21, 29, 30, 42, 43, 58, 63, 118, 120, C-802 242
123–4, 130, 204, 205, 207 HAROP and HARPY 244
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action PATRIOT 240–1
(JCPOA) 278 surface to air missile (SAM) 244
Moghadam, Valentine 94
Kaldor, M. 183 Molyneux, Maxine 99
Khomeini, Ayatollah 18, 20, 21, 27, 30, al-Momari, Mustafa 148
32 n.10, 47–50, 99, 202, 204, 205, monologic discourse 167–8
207 Al-Mu’ayyad, Muhammad 102
Index 289
muhammashīn 144 power and civil-military relations 9, 181–2,

Muhammad ibn Abdullah (Prophet 184, 186, 187, 190, 192, 194–6
Muhammad) 7, 19, 22, 24, 25, 27, conceptual approach 182–4
33 n.14, 53 n.55, 57, 78, 79, 86, 99, external actors 186, 191–4
114, 118, 125–8, 167, 168, 171–2, patrimonial economy 185–6, 190–1
199–200, 204–7, 262 rebels and tribes 186–90
al-Muhandis, Abu Mahdi 281 tribes 184–5
Muslim Brotherhood 8, 19–21, 30, 33 power consolidation 98, 102
n.13 proxy relationship 274–6
community 4, 19, 22, 25, 199, 204–6 public relations 246
weakness 203 public schools 122
Muslimah (Muslim woman) 94, 102 Public Works Project (PWP) 226
al-Mutawakkel, Taha 139
Qahtan/Qahtani/Qahtanis/Qahtanism 24,
National Dialogue Conference (NDC) 59–61, 66, 79–83, 86, 88 n.8, 171,
95–8, 103, 208–10, 213, 214, 247, 262
268, 269 qudaʾ 79, 88 n.6
National Salvation Government (NSG) Quran 1, 20, 23, 39, 42, 63
96–8, 106 n.42, 277 education 117–19
National Vision 84, 98, 140, 146, 199–202, guidance of the 21–2, 25
207, 209–14, 224, 226, 227 reliance on 22–4
nation-building 93, 94, 100–2, 130 “return to the Qur’an” 11 n.5
neo-patrimoinalism 181, 190, 191 textbooks 126–9
9/11 attacks 21
noncompliance 98, 101, 224 Rabi, Uzi 183
non-sayyid 5, 24, 30, 78, 83, 86 rape 95, 99
#NoWomenNoGovernment 98 rebel governance 228
Red Dawn (Operation) 192
operational analysis (OA) 236 religion 83
Ostovar, Afshon 275 discourse 42, 43, 168–73
massacre in 65
patrimonial economy 185–6, 190–1 and political discourse 41–3
Peace and National Inclusion document republican rule 80–2
199, 201, 209–12, 214 “resisting economy” (al-iqtiṣṣād al-
Peace and National Partnership muqāwim) 63, 64
Agreement (PNPA) 218
peace-time border governance 266–7 sada 4, 59, 78–83, 86, 88 n.8, 88 n.16, 171,
persuasion 77, 78, 144, 162, 172, 173 262, 273
political Salafism 19
context 18–19 Salafization policy 19
dominance 83, 84, 190 Salam, Mohammed Abdul 280
and intellectual itinerary 19–21 Saleh, Ali Abdullah 2, 6, 18–19, 21, 24,
mobilization 98 28, 65, 81–5, 97, 141, 142, 162, 181,
power 46, 80, 95, 97, 182, 183, 187, 182, 187–9, 191, 195, 218, 219, 227,
188, 195 261, 262, 270 n.26, 276
revolutionary 202–7 Saudi Arabia (KSA) 2, 10, 37, 46–8, 50,
support 19, 37, 94, 97, 98 57, 63–7, 142, 192–3, 195, 241, 242,
themes 38–40, 48–50 247, 259–68
words frequency 40, 41 Iran and 273–4, 278–9
290 Index
soil 260 Taif temporary settlement 260

Yemen and 65, 67 Taiz 115, 121, 223, 267
Saudi Arabia National Guard (SANG) Tarikh al-Yaman 57, 64
268 taxation 83, 210, 217, 222–5, 227, 228
Saudi-led Coalition 236–48, Tibi, Bassam 185
251 n.25 Tilly, Charles 183, 184, 195
sayyid 5–8, 19, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32 n.9, 57, TOCHKA attack 238, 243, 248
78–83, 85, 86 Tribal Cohesion Council (Majlis al-
Saada war 260, 264–7, 270 n.26 Talāḥum al-Qabīlī) 85
school morning assembly 122–3 “Tribal Document of Honour” (Wathiqat
sectarianism 7, 63 al-Sharaf al-Qabīliyya) 84–5
security hybridization 260, 261, 264–6 tribal fidelity 185
sensitive technology 245 tribalism 81, 84, 172, 182
September Revolution 25, 43, 78, 80 tribes 82–5, 184–5
al-Shaabi, Alia Faisal Abdullatif 98 in al-Mahwit 172
shamikh 164 borderland 265–6
Sharaf Abdullah, Hisham 277 rebels and 186–90
Shiʿa 38, 42, 46, 48, 52 n.21 and rulers 77–8, 80, 82
Shi’ism 7, 66–7 triple hybridization 259, 261, 262, 264,
“social contract” (al-ʿaqd al-ijitmaʿi) 63, 266, 268, 269
84, 85 al-Turabi, Hasan 20
Social Fund for Development (SFD) 226 Twelver Shiism 24, 26
“social jihad” (al-jihad al-ijtimaʿi) 63
“soft war” (al-harb al-naʿima) 57, 58, 66, UAE 148, 195, 239, 241, 248
67, 140, 144 ulmā 4, 8
Soleimani, Qasem 281 Umayyad dynasty 62
“Speaking Quran, The” 26 umma 1, 5, 19, 22, 29, 42, 44–7, 50, 62, 63,
state-building 93, 94, 97, 103, 195 65–7, 118, 280
state capture 190, 191 UNDP assessment 225, 226, 229 n.14
state cohesion 184, 195 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 236,
state formation 93, 100, 103, 184, 194, 240–4, 251 n.31
195, 217 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs)
state-in-the-making 93, 94, 98, 100, 103 245
state power 9, 181, 186, 194, 209. See also Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) 236,
power and civil-military relations 237, 242–3
strategic gender interests 99
students for war 126 violence 95, 96, 100, 101, 168, 181–8, 190,
subaltern 77–8, 86 192, 194, 195
Subaltern Studies Group 77 vom Bruck, Gabriele 57, 171
sulaliyya 60, 78, 86
summer centers 123–4 al-Wādi‘ī, Shaykh Muqbil 19
sunna 63 Wadi Tanuma, massacre of 64–7
Sunni 7, 19, 38, 44, 82, 115, 142, 163, 203, Wahhabism 46, 59, 125
206, 267 warlordism 186
Sunnization strategy 261 war-time border governance 267–8
Supreme Political Council (SPC) 85, al-Wasiʿi’s, ʿAbd al-Wāsiʿ 57, 64
89 n.24, 97, 98, 199, 201, 211, 220 Weber, M. 181–4, 191, 192, 194, 195
Supreme Revolutionary Committee (SRC) Weissenburger, A. 9, 83, 84
97, 98 “Wilayah” 52 n.21
Index 291
women 93–4, 103 Yemeni-Saudi Border Guard 260, 263,

all-female institutions 99–100 264, 266–9
islam and body politics 100–2 Yemeni Socialist Party’s (YSP) 202
men and 100
nationalism 94 Zaydism 115, 126
political representation 97–9 zakat 63, 222–4
war and 95 zamil (zawāmil, poetic tradition) 9, 143–4,
Yemeni 95–7 160–70, 173
definition 161–2
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) 80–1, 218, exchange 164–5
261, 262, 266 Huthi 165–7, 173
Yemeni 58, 67 and identity formation 162
genealogic heritage 59–61 monologic discourse 167–8
historiographic writing 64–5 origin 161
society 4, 9, 38, 42, 43, 61, 63, 79, 81, as performance 162–3
84, 86, 93, 99, 100, 103, 119, 208, religious discourse 168–73
210 in Yemen’s history 163
Yemeni Cyber Army 250 n.23 Zarif, Mohammad Javad 277
Yemeni Economic Corporation (YECO) 191 Zayd ibn Ali 62–4, 67
Yemeni-Saudi border 259–62, 268–9 Zaydis 5–8, 17, 19–22, 24–31, 32 n.8,
bordering-ordering-othering 264–5 34 n.33, 67, 82, 86, 172, 199, 200,
conflicts 265–6 203–7, 209, 212, 214, 261
formal agreements and informal ties fiqh 254 n.75
262–3 Hadawi teaching 78–9
peace-time border governance 266–7 imams, fighting of 61–4
relationship 263 revivalism 8, 208, 261
security governance 260–1, 263–4 zaynabiyyat 93, 99–102
war-time border governance 267–8 Al-Zubayr, Nabila 96
292
293
294
295
296
297
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THE HUTHI MOVEMENT IN YEMEN

Ideology, Ambition and Security

Edited by Abdullah Hamidaddin

First published in Great Britain 2022

Copyright © Leila Seurat, 2022

For legal purposes the Acknowledgments on p. xiv constitute an

Cover image: Hussein al-Houthi's funeral, Yemen, 2013.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted

ISBN: HB: 978-0-7556-4425-4

Typeset by Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd.

work concerning how art and media can be

Ewa K. S2_Chap5 Ewa K. Strzelecka is a research associate

East. He has published several books in

Anthony S3_Chap9 Dr. Anthony Chimente is a researcher

(ISPI), a teaching assistant (“History of

­ e Huthis1—who prefer to refer to themselves as Ansar Allah (supporters of

Republican Anti-Hashimite/Zaydi Rhetoric and Constructed, Exclusionary

Hashimite identity has been depicted as a transhistorical and static fact—a

­ eligious Revivalism, Mosque Politics, and Changes in the Meaning of Traditional

leader of a revolutionary movement. Joshua Rogers focuses on the impact of the

March 30, 2010, https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/30/dont-call-yemen-a-failed-

HUTHI IDEOLOGY AND BELIEF SYSTEM

The Political Context

Husayn al-Huthi’s Political and Intellectual Itinerary

Khomeini whose opinions—particularly those that pertain to Islam’s revolutionary

The Guidance of the Quran and that of the Prophet’s Family

The Exclusive Reliance on the Quran and the Denial of Tradition

Disagreement about the Quran prevents its implementation (iqāmat al-kitāb).

Al-Huthi appears to attribute to the entirety of the Quran an all-encompassing and

The critique continues beyond the science of Quranic commentary (tafsīr)

The Doctrine of the “Leaders of Guidance” or the Imamate

Huthis have officially remained committed to a republican form of government,

According to ‘Abd al-Malik al-‘Ijrī—the high-level official and intellectual in the

Traditional Zaydis versus the Huthis

revolutionary political ideology strongly inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideas

5 Based on an interview with a Yemeni religious scholar who wishes to remain

Dorlian, Samy. La mouvance zaydite dans le Yémen contemporain: une modernisation

Political Words Frequency

by religion and oppression, rather than by a nationalist bond.19 However, it may

­Religion and Political Discourse

The first observation on these themes is the domination of religious tendency,

“Umma” to address a wide range of people beyond modern national concepts

As for the word “people,” even if it appears in Husayn’s discourse, it is intended

Who Is the Enemy?

Iran, between Attendance and Absence

Transformation of Political Themes

Although approximately 50 percent of the themes are identical in the two

Table 2.2 Five Words That Are Dominant in

Husayn’s Non-dominant Political Themes

Table 2.3 Five Words That Are Dominant in Husayn’s

Abdulmalik’s Non-dominant Political Themes

al-Ahnumi, Abdulrahman. “al-Shahīd al-Qāʾd Husayn Badr al-Din al-Huthi. Min-al-

al-Huthi, Abdulmalik. “al-Khiṭābāt [Speeches].” Huda al-Qur’an https://www.huda.live/

In his introduction to Gabriele vom Bruck’s Islam, Memory, and Morality in

Making the Huthis Part of Yemeni Genealogic Heritage16

The Biographies of Early Zaydi Imams as Analogies for the Current

Al-Huthi then continues to accuse the Umayyads of committing a list of crimes:

Or, as it is put in a book on Imam Zayd:

It is obligatory for the leaders and politicians to provide alternatives and

e Huthis1—who prefer to refer to themselves as Ansar Allah (supporters of

eligious Revivalism, Mosque Politics, and Changes in the Meaning of Traditional

Religion and Political Discourse

Education through the Eyes of Huthi Leaders

ggression against Yemen and its consequences

Emphasizing Reverence for Ahl al-Bayt