(Religion and Society in Asia_ 9) Walid Jumblatt Abdullah - Islam in a Secular State_ Muslim Activism in Singapore-Amsterdam University Press (2021)

Islam in a Secular State
Religion and Society in Asia
This series contributes cutting-edge and cross-disciplinary academic research on

various forms and levels of engagement between religion and society that have
developed in the regions of South Asia, East Asia, and South East Asia, in the
modern period, that is, from the early 19th century until the present.
The publications in this series should reflect studies of both religion in society
and society in religion. This opens up a discursive horizon for a wide range of
themes and phenomena: the politics of local, national and transnational religion;
tension between private conviction and the institutional structures of religion;
economical dimensions of religion as well as religious motives in business
endeavours; issues of religion, law and legality; gender relations in religious
thought and practice; representation of religion in popular culture, including
the mediatisation of religion; the spatialisation and temporalisation of religion;
religion, secularity, and secularism; colonial and post-colonial construction of
religious identities; the politics of ritual; the sociological study of religion and
the arts. Engaging these themes will involve explorations of the concepts of
modernity and modernisation as well as analyses of how local traditions have
been reshaped on the basis of both rejecting and accepting Western religious,
philosophical, and political ideas.
Series Editor
Martin Ramstedt, Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle
Islam in a Secular State
Muslim Activism in Singapore
Walid Jumblatt Abdullah
Amsterdam University Press

Cover illustration: Sultan Mosque and its surroundings at Muscat Street in Singapore
Source: Wengang Zhai/Unsplash
Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden

Typesetting: Crius Group, Hulshout
isbn 978 94 6372 401 2

e-isbn 978 90 4854 441 7 (pdf)
doi 10.5117/9789463724012
nur 717
© Walid Jumblatt Abdullah / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2021
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part of
this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted,
in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise)
without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author of the book.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction: The State, Islam, and Muslim Activism in Singapore 7

1.1 Background of Project and Wider Relevance 7
1.2 Singapore’s Political Context 12
1.3 Islam in Singapore 16
1.4 Arguments in Brief 24
1.5 Case Selection and Methodology 26
1.6 Outline of Book 30
2 Muslim Activism: A Survey across the World 37

2.1 Muslim Activism: Theological Positions 38
2.2 Brief Literature Review 44
2.3 Moving Forward: Understanding Activism in Singapore 61
3 Argument: Political Opportunities and Muslim Strategies 69

3.1 Ulama, Liberals and Conservatives 70
3.2 Agent versus Structure 77
3.3 Political Opportunities and Agency 83
3.4 Main Arguments 90
4 The Ulama: Pragmatism and Political Acquiescence 103

4.1 The Ulama: Roles and Responsibilities 104
4.2 Different Groups of Ulama in Singapore 109
4.3 Political Acquiescence of the Ulama: Between Cooperation
and Ambivalence 120
4.4 Case Studies 134
4.4.1 Pre RRG: The Hijab Issue and the Madrasah Controversy 134
4.4.2 Post RRG: Moving towards Greater Cooperation with
the State 137
4.4.3 The Ruptures 151
4.5 Conclusion 154
5 Liberal Activists: Playing by the System and Making Gains 161

5.1 ‘Liberal’ Muslims: Complexities of the Category 162
5.2 Liberal-Conservative Divide amongst Muslims 172
5.3 Choosing the Battles to Fight: Playing by the Rules of the Game 180
5.4 Gains Made in the Public Domain 203
5.5 Conclusion 207
6 The Conservative Dilemma: To Challenge or Accept State
Proclamations? 213
6.1 Conservative Muslims: Understanding the Category 214
6.2 (Potential) Areas of Clashes with the State 222
6.3 Strategic Advance and Retreat of Conservatives: Pragmatism
in Practice 233
6.4 Ceding the Public Space to Liberals 254
6.5 Conclusion 258
7 Conclusion 263
7.1 Revisiting the Argument 264
7.2 Relevance of Study beyond Singapore 269
7.3 Implications for Civil Society 271
7.4 Future Areas for Research 273
Combined Bibliography 277
Index 302
1 Introduction: The State, Islam, and
Muslim Activism in Singapore
Abstract
This chapter introduces the research questions the book tries to answer, its
main arguments, and the scope of discussion. These questions include the
following. How do Muslim activists navigate their way through politics in
a secular, authoritarian state to maximize their influence? What are the
different methods by which the varied categories of activists work to further
their causes? What accounts for the differences in these approaches? Briefly,
I postulate that many activists attempt to strategically align themselves with
the state, and call upon the state to be an arbiter in their disagreements with
other factions. Though there are activists who challenge the state, these are
by far in the minority, and are typically unable to assert their influence in a
sustained manner. The dominating nature of the state has largely resulted
in activists refusing to defy the state on fundamental issues, regardless of
their orientations. The chapter discusses Singapore’s political context, and
how Islam is managed. I further outline the case selection and methodology.
Keywords: Introduction, Islam, Muslims in Singapore, activists, People’s

Action Party, secular state
1.1 Background of Project and Wider Relevance
Every community, when it presses for its own concerns, must bear in
mind how that affects other communities and how others might see it.
That is the reality of living in a multi-racial, multi-religious society that
we all have to internalise.1
1 Kok Xing Hui, “Hijab Issue: Govt Must Balance Community Requirements,” Today, 6 Novem-
ber 2013. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/hijab-issue-govt-must-balance-community-
requirements. Accessed 29 August 2018.
Abdullah, Walid Jumblatt, Islam in a Secular State: Muslim Activism in Singapore. Amsterdam,
Amsterdam University Press 2021
doi: 10.5117/9789463724012_ch01
8 Isl am in a Secul ar State
Such was Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean’s response to Muslim
activists who requested that the People’s Action Party (PAP) government
in Singapore reconsider its stance on disallowing the hijab or tudung (head-
scarves for female Muslims) in certain frontline positions. Teo’s refrain was
neither unexpected nor unfamiliar; it has been a recurrent trope for the
government to invoke the importance of maintaining racial and religious
harmony (Sinha, 2005) – and the possibility of upsetting the delicate amity
which had painstakingly been achieved – when dealing with activism from
religious groups. The subtle message which was communicated was that if
Muslims were to press for their rights, not only would other communities do
the same, and thus, national interests might be jeopardized at the expense
of particular groups, but they would also be perceived less favourably by
other communities for being too demanding.
The hijab issue is then emblematic of the conundrum facing Muslim activ-
ists in Singapore. The secular, competitive authoritarian state in Singapore
jealously protects its rule; while it is wary of any perceived challenges to its
authority, it is particularly attentive to the potential of religion to be a source
of mobilization. The self-avowed secular state does not take incursions into
the public sphere by any religion lightly; but for historical, geo-political and
practical reasons which will be elucidated later, the Muslim community
and Islam is given special focus. Religious activists then have to make
calculations on navigating the political system. On one hand, if Muslim
activists make vociferous demands in the public arena, they are unlikely to
induce the state to change course on a particular policy. The paternalistic
state does not wish to be seen as capitulating to the demands of a particular
community. On the other hand, if there is not enough public emphasis
on the matter, there would be no incentive for the state to embark on a
different path. An important point which needs to be emphasized is that
this is a dilemma facing all activists in Singapore, regardless of their faiths
or the causes they wish to pursue. Nevertheless, Muslims face additional
complexities, due to the securitization of Muslim expressions of religiosity.
This is a point which will be returned to later.
The hijab issue in Singapore, though much discussed in academic writ-
ings and public discourse (Nasir, Pereira, & Turner, 2009; Abdullah, 2016c;
Zainal & Wong, 2017; Osman, 2018), is only one facet of variegated Muslim
activism. Though the issue was most visible and pronounced, it is by no
means the only, or even most important, form of activism in Singapore. In
fact, the hijab was championed by a particular group of Muslim activists,
which I refer to as the conservatives. Other groups within the community
exist. For instance, liberal Muslims assign greater importance to other
Introduc tion: The State, Isl am, and Muslim Ac tivism in Singapore 9
causes. They are more interested in challenging existing norms within

the Muslim community which they deem to be outdated, regressive and
responsible for the community’s lack of progress. There is another group of
actors which I deem to be extremely crucial in any endeavour to understand
Muslim societies: the ulama (Islamic religious scholars or clerics). By virtue
of their self-understanding as the ‘heirs of the Prophets’ (Chittick, 2005),2
and general deference to the authority of the ulama in interpreting scripture
by Muslims – though it must be stated that this authority is by no means
unchallenged – the ulama constitute a vital bloc in Muslim communities.
The ulama are traditionally expected to act in the religion’s best interests,
and in accordance with Prophetic duty, provide guidance to Muslims and
at the same time, mount robust defences against threats to the integrity
of Islam, regardless of whether the pressures exist from within or outside
the faith (Zaman, 2002).
Given the multi-faceted nature of Muslim activism, and the nature of the
constricted political system in Singapore, this study attempts to provide
answers to the following questions. How do Muslim activists navigate their
way through politics in a secular, authoritarian state to maximize their
influence? What are the different methods which the varied categories of
activists undertake to further their causes? What accounts for the differ-
ences in these approaches? Briefly, I postulate that many activists attempt
to strategically align themselves with the state, and call upon the state
to be an arbiter in their disagreements with other factions. Though there
are activists who challenge the state, these are by far in the minority, and
are typically unable to assert their influence in a sustained manner. The
dominant nature of the state has largely resulted in activists refusing to defy
the state on fundamental issues, regardless of their orientations.
A few points should be made clear from the outset. First, while this
is a study about Singapore, the book draws on theories of comparative
politics and sociology to make this project relevant to a broader audience.
Scholars, students, and observers interested in authoritarian politics, the
nature of civil society movements, and religious actors should find this
book useful, even if they do not study Singapore. The book does not adopt
a ‘Singapore exceptionalism’ approach whereby explanations which are
2 This understanding comes from a Prophetic tradition which states that ‘The ulama are the
heirs of the Prophets.’ This saying is recorded in Tirmidhi and Ibn Majah, two of the six most
authoritative books on hadith. See Sunnah.com, https://sunnah.com/search/?q=ulama+are+h
eirs+of+the+prophet. Accessed 31 August 2018. Indeed, many of the ulama interviewed repeat
this phrase when speaking on what the responsibilities of the ulama are.
given are wholly Singapore-centric; it has been a common theme amongst

observers of Singapore to attribute seemingly idiosyncratic occurrences in
the country to its exceptionalism (Pei, 1994; Thompson, 2006). While there
are obviously particularities in the Singapore case which will be explained
throughout, the claim made here is that lessons from the Singapore example
are applicable to the broader studies on Muslim activism, and to civil society
movements in other competitive authoritarian regimes. Second, this is
a study on politics. It is a central assumption – and claim – of this book
that (almost) every phenomenon is ‘political’ in nature. Religion – and
concomitantly, its interpretation, manifestation, contestation and applica-
tion – are most definitely ‘political’. Thus, actions by religious actors (and
others such as the state) are analyzed through the lens of politics. Politics
is, at its core, about power and the distribution of resources. Power here,
as Sartori argues, must be understood in a broad, encompassing sense,
which includes military, coercive, economic, religious and other capacities
(Sartori, 1973, p. 19). As a corollary, politics is also about the ‘making of
collective decisions’ (Parsons, 2017, p. 3). The process of making collective
decisions involves some form of bargaining between those who govern and
the governed (Dahl, 1961). The decisions made by actors within a polity are
ultimately to further the goals which they have, and pertain directly to
how power is distributed in a system. Religious actors are no different in
this regard. In attempting to maximize their influence (or power) within
a polity, they would have to make decisions to pursue certain actions, and
prioritize specific causes over others (Zald & Ash, 1966). Third, Muslims
and activists can be categorized in an innumerable number of ways. They
could be classified along ideological (Sufi-Salafi, Sunni-Shia), partisan
(pro-government/anti-government), educational (school/place of study),
socio-economic (lower-upper class), and many other lines. Any choice of
classification would involve some arbitrariness. This book has decided to
categorize Muslim activists under three groups: the ulama, conservatives,
and liberals. The reasons behind this choice will be explained in Section 1.5.
For now, it is important to note a few matters about these groups. The groups
themselves are not monolithic; for instance, not all conservatives, liberals
or ulama align themselves with the state, and some are in fact vehement
critics of the state. Moreover, similar actors could behave differently under
dissimilar circumstances: an activist who is largely associated with the
state may still display disagreements with it on some issues. This book
calls for an extremely nuanced understanding of these categories, and the
actions of various sets of actors within those groupings. Finally, this study
focuses on the actions of the Muslim activists themselves. There has been
a tendency in political science to adopt statist approaches in explaining

political phenomena (Almond, 1988; Geddes, 1990; Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1995;
Doner, Ritchie, & Slater, 2005; Stepan, 2015). In Southeast Asia especially,
where states are typically authoritarian and try to dictate outcomes in their
favour as much as possible, this tendency is amplified (Slater, 2003; George,
2012; Rajah, 2012). Previous studies on Muslims in Singapore too have given
much emphasis to the state (Rahim, 1998; Mutalib, 2012a). To be sure, this
is not an invalid approach: the state indeed does have significant authority
and influence in affecting political outcomes, especially in countries with
(competitive) authoritarian regimes like Singapore. Yet, this study chooses
to highlight the role of other actors. It is important to treat Muslim activ-
ists – as is the case with other non-state entities – as actors with agency.
Migdal critiques the propensity of scholars to excessively concentrate on the
state: not only is the ‘state’ itself not monolithic, but it is not always possible
for state elites to execute their will and impose their beliefs on the people
(Migdal, 2001). Similarly, Scott argues that even seemingly unimportant and
disenfranchised actors like peasants display agency and resist a powerful
state via minute acts of resistance such as foot-dragging, in what he terms
as the ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985). Bratton’s study of sub-Saharan
Africa led him to conclude that the scholarly preoccupation with the state
obfuscates more than it illuminates, since civil society actually plays a vital
role in effecting political change (Bratton, 1989). This is not to say that the
state is unimportant, or in the case of Singapore, the least important actor.
Indeed, the reach of the state is far and wide in the small city-state, but
the point to be made here is that no state, no matter how authoritarian, is
completely insulated from society. Even if agents decide to cooperate with the
state, that is still a conscious choice by those agents, since other alternatives,
however costly, are still available (Abdullah, 2013). The very fact that there
are divergent paths taken by the activists in Singapore demonstrates that
these actors do possess agency.
More broadly, this study can provide useful insights into the politics of
Muslim societies, and the politics of civil society groups in general. Many of
these Muslim activists proclaim theological motivations, if not justifications,
behind their actions. Yet, in spite of claiming inspiration from the same
(Islamic) sources, they act in a myriad of ways. It is thus abundantly clear
that ‘Islam’ itself cannot account for these divergent outcomes. The quietist
activist may invoke Prophetic traditions (hadith) which call for obedience to
the ruler, and passages from the Quran which point toward the importance
of maintaining public order above all else. A liberal Muslim could discuss
the need for reform and interpret the same scripture in a radically different
way from how a conservative would understand that very passage. As such,
the practice and manifestation of Islam are dependent on a particular
individual’s orientation and inclination (Waardenburg, 1985). Scripture by
itself is not always uncontentious or explicit, and its interpretation depends
on who is doing the interpreting. This is a straightforward, uncontroversial
proposition. What is more interesting is the following claim: I postulate that
the practice of Islam itself is dependent on political realities. Theology and
jurisprudence do not exist, and have never existed, in a vacuum, separate
from realpolitik. Political realities do affect theological positions. Actors
often take into account the socio-political situation before embarking on a
course which considers, if not appropriates, religion. This is not to say that
every single religious actor adopts a Machiavellian approach toward faith,
and uses it insofar as it achieves a particular goal. That is not the claim
here. Rather, what is being put forth is that theological understandings are
themselves affected by politics. Political opportunities could determine
how a religion is manifested in the real world, as will be discussed later.
1.2 Singapore’s Political Context
Singapore can best be described as a ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime.

Competitive authoritarian regimes are not fully authoritarian, yet at the
same time, they fall short of the standard requirements to be classified as
democracies. In such regimes, violations of democratic standards such as
free and fair elections and the guarantee of individual freedoms such as
freedom of speech occur so often to the point that they create an ‘uneven
playing field between government and opposition’ (Levitsky & Way, 2002,
p. 53). At the same time, there exist opportunities for the presence of genuine
contestations for power by the opposition, such that even if the playing field
is not level, the opposition can and does win in certain electoral contests.
Levitsky and Way classified Singapore as a fully authoritarian regime, even
though they admitted that it is a borderline case which could have been
included in the sample of competitive authoritarian regimes (Levitsky &
Way, 2010, p. 34). Such a view is not uncommon amongst Western scholars
who study the city-state. Singapore has been referred to as a ‘dictator-
ship’ which has remained wealthy by other scholars (Przeworski, Alvarez,
Cheibub, & Limongi, 2000, p. 94; Slater, 2012, p. 19). To be sure, the views
of these scholars are not without any basis: there exist severe restrictions
to individual freedoms in Singapore. Singapore has only been governed
by one party in its history. The state has maintained an interventionist
approach toward managing affairs in the country, and personal liberties are
required to be sacrificed in the pursuit of the greater good (Chua, 2017). The
justification given by PAP leaders is that Singapore is a small country with
a diverse, multiracial population, and if freedoms of speech and assembly
were not curbed, communal tensions or even riots could ensue from the
insensitivities of one’s careless remarks, or from the sinister intentions
of political entrepreneurs (Thio, 2017). Furthermore, even though elec-
tions are free, regular and not fraudulent, they are not entirely fair either.
Numerous obstacles exist to impede opposition growth. These include the
introduction of the Party Block Vote or Group Representation Constituency
(GRC) system – ostensibly created to ensure ethnic minority representa-
tion – which increases the barriers to entry for the opposition since the
system favours parties with enormous resources (Tan & Grofman, 2018), the
implementation of electoral engineering measures such as the Nominated
Member of Parliament (NMP) and Non-Constituency Member of Parliament
(NCMP) which could produce the effect of discouraging voters from electing
opposition Members of Parliament (MPs) (Rodan, 2009; Abdullah, 2016b),
short campaigning periods, gerrymandering (which is made possible by the
placement of the Electoral Department of Singapore under the purview of
the Prime Minister’s Office), the absence of a free press and hence the lack of
positive coverage given to opposition candidates (Mutalib, 2003), defamation
suits against opposition politicians such as JB Jeyaretnam and Chee Soon
Juan in the past which have resulted in their bankruptcy (Rodan, 2003), the
public chiding of intellectuals who challenge the state (Tan K. P., 2009), and
so on. The first Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, who practically
shaped Singapore in his image, was forthright in this regard. He declared that
there ‘is no level playing-field of any government helping opposition to win
votes.’3 Thus, the opposition is severely disadvantaged in Singapore. At the
same time, it would not be true to suggest that the opposition does not have
any space to operate in Singapore. For almost two decades, two opposition
MPs, Low Thia Khiang and Chiam See Tong, defeated PAP candidates in the
Hougang and Potong Pasir electoral wards in successive elections, proving
that opposition candidates do stand a chance to win. Criticisms of the state
are tolerated as long as they do not cross the Out-of-Bounds (OB) markers set
by the state. These include criticisms towards the integrity of PAP leaders,
especially on allegations of corruption; racial and religious matters; and
questioning the independence of the judiciary. For the government, these
3 “Late Singapore Leader Lee Kuan Yew Had Opinions on Everything,” Time, 22 March 2015.
http://time.com/3748654/singapore-lee-kuan-yews-opinions/. Accessed 6 September 2018.
are matters which would affect the very functioning of key institutions
and the societal fabric upon which the country is built. Elections, as stated
earlier, are free and not fraudulent. Singapore is definitely not the Soviet
Union, and when it is characterized as a dictatorship together with other
autocratic regimes, one may lose sight of these realities. Hussin Mutalib, a
reputable political scientist in Singapore, regards Singapore as an ‘illiberal
democracy’ (Mutalib, 2000). Ortmann argues that following the 2011 elec-
tions, during which PAP’s vote share reduced to 60% and it lost a GRC to the
opposition Workers’ Party (WP) team led by Low Thia Khiang, Singapore
could be regarded as a competitive authoritarian state (Ortmann, 2011). I
concur with such an assessment. Understanding Singapore as a competitive
authoritarian regime is vital toward comprehending the argument I make
about Muslim activism in Singapore. Activists have far more space to operate
under a competitive authoritarian regime than a dictatorship, even though
that room is still constricted as compared to a democracy. Additionally,
in competitive authoritarian regimes, not all forms of opposition are met
with the full force of the law: the state employs a defter array of strategies,
ranging from persuasion to co-optation – without fully dispensing with
draconian measures of course – to achieve its goals.
Singapore achieved independence under unceremonious circumstances.
After having been a British colony since 1819, Singapore merged with Malaya
(to become Malaysia) in 1963. The union was short-lived as ideological and
personal differences became too magnified to be ignored, and Singapore
was asked to leave the Malaysian Federation in 1965 (Lau, 1998). Apart from
Lee Kuan Yew’s personal clashes with Tunku Abdul Rahman, the then-Prime
Minister of Malaysia, the two entities disagreed on a fundamental ideological
basis. Malaysia practised Malay-led multiracialism, whereby Malays were
given preferential treatment in certain areas whereas Lee wanted a form of
multiracialism which did not discriminate between the different ethnicities,
or in Lee’s words, a ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ (Josey, 2012, p. 84). Upon separa-
tion, Lee became the first Prime Minister of independent Singapore and
quickly moved to consolidate his party’s power. The powers of trade unions
and students’ associations were curbed, strikes were banned, the Internal
Security Act (ISA) – a law which allows detention without trial – was used
on individuals who were deemed to be threats to national security, and
intra-party dissent was stifled (Barr, 2000). Lee and the PAP managed to
facilitate remarkable levels of economic growth, turning Singapore into
one of the Asian tigers whose success was admired by developing countries
(Low, 2001). When Lee stepped down in 1990, his successor Goh Chok Tong
promised a more consultative approach toward governance where the
voices of citizens were heard more. Lee Hsien Loong, son of Kuan Yew,
succeeded Goh in 2004, and promised even more openness, and is still the
premier today. Modern Singapore is one of the most remarkable stories of
financial and material success, and this spectacular growth has been one
of the main reasons for the durability of PAP rule (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2006). In 2017, Singapore’s GDP per capita stood at US$57 714.30, easily
falling under the World Bank’s classification of a high-income country.4 The
PAP has capitalized on this success and has perpetuated a narrative that it
was the PAP – and its ruling style and foundational ideologies – which led
Singapore from the ‘third world to first’ (Lee, 2000).
While it is true that both Goh and Hsien Loong did adopt more open
attitudes toward criticisms, in general, the core ideologies and mode of
governance remained the same for PAP throughout the tenures of the
three Prime Ministers. The PAP still considers its core ideologies – sur-
vival, meritocracy, multiracialism, and (economic) pragmatism – sacred
and immutable. Survival is the defining feature of the PAP psyche: in the
eyes of PAP leaders, Singapore is a vulnerable city-state whose existence
is never secure. Externally, its existence is threatened by its geo-political
environment. Being a ‘Chinese nut in a Malay nutcracker’, which means
that it is a Chinese-majority nation surrounded by its larger Malay-Muslim
neighbours, Indonesia and Malaysia, connotes a perennial sense of insecurity
(Chan, 1971). Internally, its racial make-up is potentially problematic since
in the event of communal tensions, the social fabric of the nation may be
hurt beyond repair (Chua, 2009). No other theme dominates Singapore
politics more than survival and vulnerability, encapsulated in the maxim
‘no one owes us a living’ (Abdullah, 2018c). Meritocracy, multiracialism
and economic pragmatism are core ideologies precisely because they are
attendant with the ideology of survival. Meritocracy, where every individual
is able to succeed as long as he/she works hard, is necessary because the
best talents would be the ones leading the country, ensuring that leaders
are not mediocre; while multiracialism, where no one is given different
treatment because of his/her race, is the only feasible ideology that would
ensure racial harmony (Moore, 2000; Tan K. P., 2008). Economically, a small
country cannot afford to be ideological if it wishes to survive, and should
do ‘what works’ (Kausikan, 1997). The PAP also adopts a paternalistic and
technocratic approach to governance, believing that the state knows best:
a good government is one which does not bow down to populist appeals,
and is willing to do the ‘right’ thing (Mauzy & Milne, 2002).
4 World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd. Accessed 7 September 2018.

The state has always been interventionist, and unapologetically so.

Consider the following quote by Lee Kuan Yew:
I say without the slightest remorse that we would not be here, would
not have made the economic progress, if we had not intervened on very
personal matters – who your neighbour is, how you live, the noise you
make, how you spit (or where you spit), or what language you use. It was
fundamental social and cultural changes that brought us here. (Lee Kuan
Yew, as quoted in (Mutalib, 2000, p. 321).
In spite of the apparent varying styles of leadership of the three Prime

Ministers, the PAP has not been significantly altered. In the midst of clamour
from certain quarters of society to allow greater individual freedoms, and
global pressures for more democratization, the party has held firmly to its
belief that Singapore cannot afford to leave societal affairs to market forces,
and that the state needs to actively and perpetually intervene, even at the
expense of personal liberties, to ensure a functioning and cohesive society.
Nowhere, however, is the state’s interventionist streak as stark as in the
realm of race and religion, as will be detailed in the following section.
1.3 Islam in Singapore
The government will not interfere in doctrinal matters within each

religion, but the Government has to step in to protect our racial, religious
harmony. We cannot allow someone to preach values which are contrary
to our multiracial, multi-ethnic harmony. We take a firm, clear stand on
that and make no apologies.5
Those were the words of Minister of Home Affairs and Law, K. Shanmugam.
The senior leader captured the essence of the PAP’s philosophy in managing
race and religion in the above-quoted paragraph. While the state professes
to be secular, its brand of secularism needs to be unpacked. Secularism does
not entail a complete separation of church and state; rather, consistent with
the PAP’s paternalistic governance style, secularism means that the state will
intervene as and when necessary to prod, alter or even discourage certain
5 K. Shanmugam, “Religion, Terrorism and Threats to Singapore, the Region,” The Straits
Times, 20 January 2016. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/religion-terrorism-and-threats-
to-singapore-the-region. Accessed 7 September 2018.
outcomes. The PAP has no qualms interfering in the religious affairs of a

community, if it is deemed to be of national interest to do so. Thus, while
the state in Singapore is supposed to be free of religious influences, religion
is not exempt from state intrusion.
Although Muslims comprise a minority of the population – in 2010,
Muslims constituted 14.7% of the population6 – politically, it is not an
insignificant bloc. History accounts for this salience. The experience Sin-
gapore, and Lee Kuan Yew, had during the merger with Malaysia, though
ephemeral, was formative for the nation. For Lee, Malaysia’s insistence on
maintaining a Malay-dominated system, and the racial riots which occurred
in 1964 between the Malays and Chinese against the backdrop of strains
between the PAP and the Malaysian leadership, cemented his beliefs about
the dangers of diversity (Milne, 1966). Tensions were rife between the ethnic
Malays and Chinese during the period of merger, as the issue of race became
a sore point of contention between Malaysian leaders and Lee Kuan Yew.
Undoubtedly, sentiments were stoked on both sides of the aisle. Leaders
in the ruling United Malays National Organization (UMNO) vilified Lee
for undermining the social contract between the various ethnic groups in
Malaysia, while Lee’s ‘Malaysian Malaysia’ rhetoric was not well-received
by some quarters in the Malay community (Milne, 1966). Violence broke out
between Malays and Chinese in the Peninsula, and on 21st July 1964, during
a procession commemorating the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, the riots
spread to Singapore (Low A. H., 2001). Race and religion, therefore, had to
be consciously and consistently managed, since they were potential sources
of conflict, as the Malaysian experience had shown. More importantly,
religious fervour could lead to split loyalties for citizens: when an individual
identifies with his/her faith more than with citizens of other religious beliefs,
it can be a major cause for concern. The riots further exposed the realities of
Singaporeans being affected by developments in the region, which is why the
state devotes particular attention to the phenomenon of rising conservatism
or Islamization in Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei. Minister Shanmugam
warned in 2015 that Islamization in Malaysia had ‘gone beyond the tipping
point’, and that Singapore would be affected by trends in Malaysia and
Indonesia.7 Prime Minister Lee has warned of a similar danger, expressing
6 98.7% of Malays and 21.7% of Indians are Muslims. See Singapore Department of Statistics,
Census of Population 2010, https://www.singstat.gov.sg/-/media/f iles/publications/cop2010/
census_2010_release1/cop2010sr1.pdf., p. 11.
7 Charissa Yong, “Singapore Cannot Exist in a Cocoon: Minister,” The Straits Times, 28 Au-
gust 2015. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-cannot-exist-in-a-cocoon-minister.
Accessed 10 September 2018.
concerns over the politicization of Islam in the region.8 The wariness over
split loyalties has been present since independence, and is a recurring
theme in the relationship between the state and Singapore Malays. Lee
Kuan Yew once candidly remarked that it would be a ‘tricky business for
the SAF (Singapore Armed Forces) to put a Malay officer who was very
religious and who had family ties in Malaysia, in charge of a machine-gun
unit’ (Chua, 2003, p. 65). Here, the senior Lee draws an explicit link between
a Malay-Muslim’s religiosity and the potential lack of loyalty to the nation.
This is a point which will be returned to later.
As discussed in the previous section, the state maintains a paternalistic
approach to governance, especially in the realm of race and religion. The
PAP has been categorical about its apprehension at the influence of any
faith in politics. PM Lee Hsien Loong said:
In such an environment, to maintain harmony in our multiracial and

multi-religious society, the Government must take a watchful, prudent and
hands-on approach. It has got to be neutral, secular in its approach, and
pragmatic in solving problems. We cannot afford to take purist positions
on freedom of expression, or the right to be offensive to others. We will
not hesitate to act firmly when necessary, because if conflict erupts, it
will cause grave damage to our social fabric. Our limits may be stricter
than some other societies, but we make no apology for that […] We should
not change fundamental policies that have served Singapore well in our
unique situation.9
Indeed, firm action has been taken against individuals who purport to act
in the name of faith. On 21 May 1987, sixteen people were arrested under the
ISA for an alleged ‘Marxist Conspiracy’. These individuals were activists and
workers from the Catholic Church. The charge from the PAP government
was that these individuals were using the Church to engage in subversive
activities against the state. Although there was some initial pushback from
the Archbishop, he conceded the validity of the arrests after a meeting with
8 Prime Minister’s Off ice, “Opening Remarks by PM Lee Hsien Loong at a Dialogue with
Community and Religious Leaders on 24 July 2017,” 24 July 2017. https://www.pmo.gov.sg/
newsroom/pm-lee-hsien-loongs-opening-remarks-dialogue-community-and-religious-leaders.
9 Prime Minister’s Office, “Transcript of Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at 66th
Anniversary of Inter-Religious Organisation on 12th May 2015 at Istana,” 12 May 2015. https://www.
pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/transcript-speech-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-66th-anniversary-
inter-religious. Accessed 10 September 2018.
Lee Kuan Yew (Goh, 2010, pp. 69-70). The arrests emphasized a few things:
one, the state was willing to utilize the draconian laws at its disposal when
deemed necessary; and two, no faith is spared from the state’s monitoring.
The Marxist Conspiracy arrests (otherwise known as Operation Spectrum)
precipitated the introduction of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act
(MRHA), a law designed to ensure that religion is kept separate from politics
(Tey, 2008). Apart from the ISA and MRHA, the Penal Code further gives
the state authority to strengthen its grip on religious matters: Section 298
of the Penal Code criminalizes the act of ‘uttering words with deliberate
intent to wound the religious or racial feelings of any person’, an offence
which is punishable with imprisonment.10
While the state is suspicious toward any forays by religion into the public
sphere, greater caution is applied in the case of Islam. This is for a number
of reasons. Firstly, as already explicated, historical and geo-political factors
matter considerably. Singapore’s history with the merger and racial riots,
coupled with its location in the middle of Muslim Southeast Asia, imme-
diately casts attention on Islam. Secondly, Malays, the majority of whom
are Muslim, are constitutionally acknowledged as the indigenous people
of Singapore, and it is the duty of the government of the day to ‘protect,
safeguard, support, foster and promote their political, educational, religious,
economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay language.’11 Islam too
is given special provisions in the constitution as parliament is mandated to
‘make provisions for regulating Muslim affairs and for constituting a Council
to advise the President in matters relating to the Muslim religion.’12 Third,
Islam, like Christianity, is a religion with a comprehensive worldview and
value-system, and makes certain exclusive claims about itself. Islam purports
to be more than a religion and is ad-din or a complete way of life (Al-Attas,
1978). This is something which the nation-state may find problematic and
has to contend with. Finally, the threat of terrorism and its links with Islam
and religiosity have heightened the state’s circumspection when it comes
to dealing with the faith. In a particularly revealing interview with Tom
Plate, Lee Kuan Yew recalled a conversation he had with Samuel Huntington
on the ‘Clash of Civilizations’ thesis. Lee told Huntington that the Eastern
10 Singapore Statutes Online, https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/PC1871?ValidDate=20171001&ProvId

s=pr298-. Accessed 10 September 2018.
11 Article 152, Constitution of Singapore. https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CONS1963. Accessed
10 September 2018.
12 Article 153, Constitution of Singapore. https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/CONS1963. Accessed
10 September 2018.
religions were mostly ‘secular’ and posed no existential threat to the West.
On Islam though, he remarked:
But the Muslims believe that if they mastered the Quran and they are
prepared to do all that Muhammad has prescribed, they will succeed. So,
we can expect trouble from them and so, it happened (Plate, 2010, p. 118).
Lee’s comments may have reflected his personal opinions and not that of
the current PAP leadership. Nevertheless, it is evident that the terrorist
menace has contributed to the state exercising even more caution when it
comes to Islam. The government has repeated the mantra ‘not if, but when’,
highlighting the inevitability, and perhaps imminence, of a terrorist attack.
The state has attempted to manage Islam in a variety of ways. Islam has
been bureaucratized in Singapore, as is the case in many other former British
colonies. The Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (Majlis Ugama Islam
Singapura, MUIS), was established as a manifestation of the constitutional
guarantee that the state would regulate Muslim affairs. The organization is
formally an arm of the state, under the purview of the Ministry of Culture,
Community and Youth (MCCY). Since its inception, MUIS has acquired
tremendous importance in the daily lives of Muslims. It is responsible
for managing the most basic and salient aspects of Islamic practice in
Singapore, including regulating hajj services,13 issuing halal certificates
for food outlets,14 calculating and determining the timings for the daily
prayers in Singapore, writing the sermons for Friday prayers,15 and collecting
and distributing zakat, inter alia. Perhaps most significantly, MUIS is the
only body in Singapore which issues fatwas or religious edicts. A fatwa is
an answer to a query by Muslims on matters pertaining to the faith. In
Singapore, fatwas are issued by the fatwa committee of MUIS, which is
headed by the Mufti, the highest religious authority in the land, who is
appointed by the President of Singapore (Abdullah, 2013). Since MUIS and
the Mufti are officially working for the state, there have been suggestions
that the fatwas or religious opinions issued in certain cases, such as the
hijab saga which will be discussed later, are politically expedient. Former
Mufti, Shaykh Isa Semait, who served in the role for 38 years from 1972-2010,
13 Hajj is the pilgrimage to Mecca which is obligatory for every Muslim who can afford it. It is
the fifth pillar of Islam after the declaration that God is one and Muhammad is His Messenger,
prayers, zakat (alms-giving) and fasting in the month of Ramadhan.
14 Halal refers to anything (not limited to food) which is Islamically permissible.
15 All Muslim males are required to attend weekly Friday prayers in congregation. This is
usually done at the mosques, though it does not have to be limited to mosques.
wrote in his memoirs that he was often accused of being a stooge of the
government, though he obviously rebuffed the claim (Hussain, 2012). Semait
has repeatedly declared that there has never been government interference
in his official duties (Nasir, Pereira, & Turner, 2009). Nevertheless, in spite
of his denials, many members of the Muslim community have expressed
their apprehensions toward the institution of the Mufti, and concomitantly,
the fatwas issued (Abdullah, 2013). A respondent notes:
It cannot be coincidental that fatwas issued by MUIS are always either

in favour of, or do not oppose, the government.16
The perception some Muslims have toward MUIS being an instrument

of the state proves to be a recurring theme in the history of state-Islam
relations in Singapore. For some Muslims, religious institutions should be
independent of political interference. For others though, MUIS has done a
tremendous job in catering to the spiritual needs of the community, and it is
precisely because of its relationship with the state that it is able to perform
its duties – such as the issuance of halal certificates for food outlets and
the management of mosques – diligently.17 Thus, while the authority of
MUIS has been questioned by members of the community, this criticism
is by no means universal, and many Muslims, in fact, do display a lot of
trust in the organization. The former Mufti, Dr. Fatris Bakaram, has been a
rather popular figure within the community since he replaced Isa Semait,
even though he too has not escaped accusations of pandering to the state.
Fatris has been particularly adroit at utilizing social media to connect with
Muslims. The positions the ulama in MUIS have taken will be discussed in
Chapter 4, together with other ulama.
The establishment of MUIS was part of the PAP’s ‘politics of survival’
necessitated by the circumstances of separation from Malaysia (Chan,
1971). Being a small Chinese-majority nation in the middle of the Malay
Archipelago, the PAP saw it as crucial to assure its Malay neighbours that
the Malay minority would not be side-lined in Singapore. The Administra-
tion of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) was enshrined in the constitution, as a
manifestation of the government’s guarantee to ensure provisions for the
regulation of Muslim affairs required by Article 153. Apart from MUIS, the
other institution explicitly recognized under AMLA is the Syariah court.
It is common for former British colonies to have dual legal systems for the
16 Interview with conservative activist, 15 September 2019.

17 This sentiment was communicated to me by some respondents.
Muslims in their countries, inheriting such a system from their colonial

masters (Kugle, 2001). The case is similar in Singapore. The Syariah court
has limited jurisdiction, and its authority is limited to matters pertaining
to family law, marriage and divorce (Steiner, 2015).
The state has further relied on co-optation as a strategy to manage the
Muslim community. Organizations such as the Singapore Islamic Scholars
and Religious Teachers Association (Persatuan Ulama dan Guru-guru Agama
Singapura, Pergas) have been informally co-opted, a point which will be
investigated further in Chapter 4. Prominent Muslims such as Zainul Abidin
Rasheed, former Associate Editor of The Straits Times, Alami Musa and
Ahmad Magad, two of the founding members of the Association of Muslim
Professionals (AMP) – an organization which was at its formation critical
of the state – have been recruited to either join the PAP or the civil service.
The PAP is quick to bring Muslims who are successful in their respective
fields into the party machinery: a cursory look at the list of current Malay/
Muslim MPs would demonstrate this. Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim, a former Minister,
was an Associate Professor at the National University of Singapore, and
had attained his Ph.D. in Engineering from Stanford University; Masagos
Zulkifli, the current Minister in-charge of Muslim Affairs, was the Chief
Executive Officer of Global Officers for Singapore Telecommunications, the
country’s largest telco; Fatimah Lateef, is an Associate Professor in medicine
and senior consultant at the Singapore General Hospital; the other MPs
boast similar credentials.18 Co-optation represents a deft stratagem of the
state, via which it is able to give persons who may otherwise be critical of
the government, a stake in the system.
Recently, the state has added another powerful tool to its repertoire, the
Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS). Under Section 87 of AMLA which is
the statute concerning ARS, any religious teacher or provider of Islamic
education must be registered and regulated. Any person who was not certi-
fied by the Asatizah Recognition Board (ARB), a committee under the
jurisdiction of MUIS, was not allowed to teach Islam in the country. Thus,
Islam became even more regulated. Though the ARS was introduced in 2004,
it was only made compulsory in January 2017. To qualify for certification,
a person must not only have the requisite educational training and/or
qualif ications, but he/she must also be deemed to be a ‘f it and proper’
individual. To be considered ‘fit and proper’, one must ‘meet the standard
of behaviour generally expected of a teacher’ at an Islamic institution.
18 See the list of MPs and their profiles at the Parliament of Singapore website, https://www.
parliament.gov.sg/mps/list-of-current-mps. Accessed 19 September 2018.
The ambiguity of the clause is apparent: what does ‘fit and proper’ entail?
Indeed, this amorphousness could very well contribute to Muslim ulama
withholding their opinions on socio-political matters, or even religious
issues, out of fear of censure. Cherian George, a prominent Singaporean
academic, writes that many in the media industry self-censor themselves,
even when there is no official directive to do so. This is due to the presence
of OB markers, and the occasional chastisement which critics of the state
receive; in order to avoid such precarious situations, journalists end up
practising self-censorship (George, 2012). In the same vein, ARS could have
deterrent effects for the ulama, as the state’s disapproval could result in
their livelihoods being affected (Abdullah, 2018a). It must be noted that
the government does not directly administer the ARS; however, the very
presence of the scheme, and the fact that it is managed by MUIS, an organ
of the state, can and does have restraining effects on the ulama, as will be
discussed in Chapter 3. The ARS is similar to the MRHA, ISA and Section 298
of the Penal Code in this regard; all of these legal instruments are designed to
not only punish behaviour deemed to be detrimental to the multi-religious
social fabric, but to prevent it in the first place. Interestingly, in Malaysia, a
similar scheme known as tauliah exists, but has at times been overtly used
in politically partisan ways, especially under the previously ruling Barisan
Nasional (National Front) regime (Liow, 2009b). In Singapore, the ARS has
not been invoked in a similarly political way: the point here is that its mere
existence may cause the ulama to be extra cautious in speaking, and may
even result in self-censorship.
At present, there are only 2 opposition Muslim MPs, Faisal Manap and
Raeesah Khan, who are from the WP, while the other Muslim parliamentar-
ians belong to the PAP. Faisal has raised issues of interest to the Muslims in
parliament on a few occasions. More often than not, the reception by PAP
leaders has been confrontational. Two incidents are most relevant. The first
occurred in 2016 when Faisal called for the navy to be more inclusive and
have halal kitchens on ships to ensure that Muslims would not be deterred
from joining the organization. PAP leaders took issue with Faisal: Dr. Maliki
Osman reminded Faisal that Singapore is a ‘secular state’, stating that the
navy’s ‘operational priorities come before individual needs’ while Defence
Minister Dr. Ng Eng Hen claimed that Faisal was “only championing” for
Muslims.19 Both insinuated that Faisal was not upholding the values of
19 Adrian Lim, “Halal Ship Kitchens Difficult but SAF Offers Food Options,” The Straits Times,
8 April 2016. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/halal-ship-kitchens-difficult-but-saf-offers-
food-options. Accessed 20 September 2018.
multiracialism and secularism, which Singapore considers sacrosanct. The

second incident was even starker. In 2017, Faisal raised the aforementioned
hijab issue and called for women to be allowed to don the hijab in professions
such as nursing and the uniformed groups. Minister Masagos chided Faisal in
no uncertain terms, arguing that Faisal had a propensity to raise ‘discordant’
issues in parliament which were meant to ‘injure or hurt the feelings of
the community rather than inspire them.’20 The revulsion displayed by
Masagos, Maliki and Ng seemed rather bizarre. Faisal was elected via the
GRC precisely because the system guaranteed minority representation: if
minority MPs could not raise matters which were pertinent to their respec-
tive communities, the GRC system would not serve much purpose then.
Moreover, if Parliament is not the appropriate avenue for the enunciation of
such concerns, which other platforms would be appropriate? Nevertheless,
these incidents are instructive in underlining the PAP’s approach toward
Islam in Singapore. As far as possible, ‘sensitive’ issues are not to be discussed
or championed publicly. Rather, a ‘behind-closed-doors’ approach is what is
preferred by the government. Such is the conundrum facing activists as well.
The management of Islam can thus be described as interventionist,
paternalistic, and intrusive, consistent with the state’s overall approach
toward governance.
1.4 Arguments in Brief
This book draws upon the concept of political opportunity structures to

explicate the argument on Muslim activism in Singapore. I argue that
political opportunity structures are limited for Muslims actors to influence
political outcomes. The constricting political opportunities are due to the
nature of the political system (competitive authoritarian state) and the
state’s approach toward religion and Islam especially. Therefore, Muslim
activists carefully navigate the travails of political activism. Nevertheless,
limited political opportunities do not mean no political opportunities. It
is important to not discount the agency of Muslim actors. Essentially, they
have the following options: 1) cooperate with the state as much as possible;
2) conduct activism in the spheres which the state is ambivalent toward or is
20 Charissa Yong, “Parliament: Masagos Questions Faisal Manap’s Motives for Raising
Divisive Issues,” The Straits Times, 4 April 2017. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/
parliament-masagos-questions-faisal-manaps-motives-for-raising-divisive-issues. Accessed
20 September 2018.
willing to tolerate dissent; and 3) challenge the state in fundamental areas

and risk reprisal from the state. Not surprisingly, most activists, regardless
of their orientations, choose options 1 or 2. While there are some who do
embark on the more perilous third option, these are by far in the minority,
and their cases will be discussed later too. For the majority of activists who
choose 1 or 2, they have to be content with not fully pursuing causes which
are in line with their ideological orientations: liberals and conservatives may
not champion liberal/conservative causes when the political opportunities
are not in their favour. Activists presciently navigate the political system
to maximize their benefits within this framework. As a result, the activists
who make the most gains in the system are those who align themselves with
the state, even when such an alliance would cost them some credibility.
These activists are able to push specific agendas which they find germane
when they have accepted the state’s rules and do not challenge the state
publicly. However, in the process, these activists may have to accept that
by not challenging the state, they end up strengthening authoritarianism.
Two points need to be emphasized. In spite of having limited options, due
to Singapore being a competitive authoritarian state, choices still do exist.
Activists still have some room to manoeuvre, even if the space is far more
limited than in liberal democracies. Secondly, these activists are ‘rational’.
They attempt to maximize benefits and minimize costs via their activism.
However, these benefits and costs are not necessarily material. Ideological
considerations matter for a person too. The concept of rationality will be
problematized and explained further in Chapter 3, when the argument
will be developed.
A note on the term ‘activists’ is due. An activist can be defined as a person
who is involved in efforts for political and/or social reform. While an activist
is typically understood as someone who does advocacy work, I call for a
more holistic understanding of the term. Activists do not necessarily have
to be part of social movements, or partake in overt political action. At times,
activists could choose to be ‘apolitical’, if it serves the ultimate purpose of
effecting social reform. The point to be made here is that in realpolitik, often,
difficult choices have to be made. Some of these choices include not being
directly involved in politics or political discourse, so as to be able to embark
on particular courses which the actor finds to be beneficial for his/her
constituents. I contend that activism should be understood in broader terms,
to comprise such ‘apolitical’ action as well. It should be noted that being
apolitical is a political choice itself (Mostarom, 2014). This understanding
of activism differs from other definitions. Baumgardner and Richards aver
that activism refers to engaging in ‘everyday acts of defiance’ (Baumgardner
& Richards, 2000, p. 283). Their definition, however, is restrictive as it limits

activism to acts of opposition against the establishment. Such an understand-
ing of activism is not useful, as it ignores the multi-faceted manner in which
activism can take place, especially under authoritarian regimes. The actions
of societal actors who desire reform are far more multi-faceted than just
resistance. Saba Mahmood’s seminal work on female grassroots movements
in Egypt is instructive here. Not all actions should be viewed via the binary
lens of resistance and subordination. Often, the actions of actors are more
complex and nuanced (Mahmood, 2011). Other scholars of social movements
and collective action have tied activism to identities (Taylor & Raeburn, 1995;
Rupp & Taylor, 1999; Bobel, 2007). According to these scholars, activism is
not only reflective of one’s identity, but contributes toward shaping it as
well. When an actor contributes to social movements, his/her identity is
affected by the very act of participation. This line of analysis proves to be
useful for my study: self-understood identities play a role in determining a
person’s course of action, as I will show later.
Activists thus decide on a specif ic action based on his/her rational
calculations, deciding to maximize benef its and minimize costs. The
decision-making calculus includes one’s ideological preferences or identity.
More often than not, these actors are cognizant of the benefits to be derived
and the potentially pernicious consequences of respective options.
1.5 Case Selection and Methodology
Singapore has been chosen for this study for a number of reasons. First,
Singapore has been described as one of the most conspicuous anomalies
when it comes to modernization theory and democratization: in spite of at-
taining high levels of economic development, Singapore has not experienced
agitations for democratic reform at the same levels as other countries (Ged-
des, 1999, p. 119; Tan K. P., 2018). As such, the city-state has been the subject
of much analysis by scholars. Various explanations have been put forth for
PAP’s longevity, from those focusing on Singapore’s economic and material
success, to the regime’s ability to institute authoritarian features which quell
dissent and discourage political participation (Mutalib, 2003; Acemoglu &
Robinson, 2006; George, 2012; Slater, 2012; Ortmann & Thompson, 2014).
These explanations are all valid, and this book builds on them. Singapore
continues to be a fascinating case study in the field of ‘transitology’, which
attempts to understand why and when authoritarian regimes democratize
(Moller, 2009). Thus, in spite of its small size, Singapore is a potentially
useful case study in comparative politics and sociology. Second, in spite of

the academic focus devoted to Singapore, much of the research has centred
on statist explanations. Many of these writings will be discussed in later
chapters. For now, it suffices to say that because of the state’s dominating
nature, studies on Singapore have tended to be state-centric. To be sure,
there is much justification in focusing on the state: the state in Singapore has
been overwhelmingly powerful, and as documented already, has adopted
an interventionist stance in virtually every sphere of life. However, this
study chooses to investigate the role of non-state actors since it will bring a
different dimension to debates on state authority, religion, and civil society.
The dearth of studies on other actors in Singapore leaves some room for
academic innovation in this regard. The actions, and even inactions, of non-
state actors could prove instructive in putting forth a particular postulation.
Understanding the stratagem of civil society activists in Singapore could
assist in comprehending social movements under authoritarian regimes.
Third, Singapore is a secular state with a Muslim minority, and its experience
with Islam could be relevant for other states. In his book entitled Western
Muslims and the Future of Islam, Tariq Ramadan considers Singapore to be a
country with ‘very Western circumstances’ when it comes to the position of
Muslims (Ramadan, 2004, p. 3). While Singapore has its unique geo-political
and historical conditions which set it apart from its Western counterparts,
Ramadan does have a point in recognizing that Singapore mirrors the West
in some areas. Lessons from the city-state therefore have relevance beyond
Southeast Asia.
Three categories of activists have been identified: liberals, conserva-
tives, and the ulama. As already mentioned, Muslims can be categorized
in a number of ways, and the choice of classification would involve some
discretionary decision-making on the part of the author. I have chosen
to typecast activists into these three groups for the following reasons.
For the ulama, they are arguably the most important collection of actors
in any Muslim society. In spite of the absence of a centralized religious
authority equivalent to the papacy in Islam, the diffusion of authority
does not result in the absolute absence of hierarchy. Wael Hallaq points
out that since the early days of Islam, religious authority has resided in the
ulama, and not among the political elites: this authority does not belong
to a particular jurist, but rather, in the entire scholarly enterprise (Hallaq,
2004). Both authoritarian and democratic states have had to contend with
the religious scholars in modern times. In the Middle East, successive secular
and authoritarian regimes have had to devise a multitude of ways to interact
with the religious scholars, ranging from outright repression to co-optation
(Ayubi, 1995; Hafez, 2003). In societies where Islam plays a paramount role
in the personal lives of citizens, even the most secular of regimes cannot
ignore its potential to influence outcomes in the public sphere. President
Soeharto of Indonesia, who ruled with an iron fist from 1966 to1998, had
to appease the ulama and occasionally pay lip service to Islam, in spite
of his aversion to religious influence in policy-making (Hefner, 2000). In
Malaysia, the Malay-nationalist and previously secular United Malays
National Organization (UMNO) – which was the main ruling party in the
coalition which governed Malaysia from its independence in 1957 right up
to 2018 – began embarking on a state-initiated Islamization project from
1982 onwards, enlisting the help of the ulama; this was in a bid to ensure
that Islam was an important partner in the state-building agenda, and to
out-Islamize the main Islamist opposition party (Nasr, 2001; Wain, 2009).
Even democratic states have had to solicit the assistance of the ulama: after
9-11, the Bush regime worked in tandem with Sufi ulama such as Hisham
Kabbani, in an attempt to soften its image and demonstrate that the war
on terror was not a war on Islam (Leonard, 2005). Politicians in Western
Europe regularly engage with the ulama for practical and electoral purposes
(Fetzer & Soper, 2005). The ulama is a bloc which simply cannot be ignored.
As ‘custodians of the faith’, Muslims do look to the ulama for guidance, and
for better or for worse, the actions of the ulama have been consequential. For
instance, fatwas issued by ulama in the Indian sub-continent and elsewhere
have contributed to the oppression faced by religious minorities such as the
Ahmadis (Rahman, 2014). Simultaneously, the ulama have also been crucial
allies in the campaigns against terrorism; delivering sermons, issuing edicts
and publishing writings which condemn extremism from the theological
and jurisprudential viewpoints (Ansary, 2008; Febrica, 2010; Abdullah, 2017c).
Whether the influence of the ulama has been pernicious or constructive, it
cannot be denied that they are an important group which warrants serious
investigation. It must be noted that the ulama are not a monolithic group.
The ulama differ along political, theological and jurisprudential lines. The
heterogeneity of the ulama is another salient matter that will be explored.
The other two categories are perhaps more contentious. The terms
‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’ are highly disputed, and their usage is often
accompanied by polemical intent: the term ‘liberal Muslim’ for instance is
often used in a pejorative manner by its detractors.21 Nevertheless, I postulate
that the terms do have utility and should be employed, albeit with a few
caveats. Firstly, they are employed in this book in a value-neutral manner;
21 This will be explained further in Chapter 5.

it is neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ to be liberal or conservative. Secondly, they are

to describe a particular orientation towards religious and socio-political
stances. Liberals refer to individuals who are more comfortable with chal-
lenging established norms and standards held by the Muslim community,
whereas conservatives tend to adhere to these values more stringently.
Liberal Muslims tend to be on the left side of the political spectrum, cherish-
ing individual freedoms and personal liberties; conservative Muslims, on
the other hand, value societal stability over those individual rights. More
thorough definitions will be provided in Chapters 5 and 6. Thirdly, it must
be acknowledged that the lines delineating ‘liberals’ and ‘conservatives’
are not always acerbic. There will always be individuals who do not fit
neatly into either category. Nevertheless, as general categories, the terms
are still useful. This is because, I postulate, the fault-line between ‘liberals’
and ‘conservatives’ has not been adequately examined in the literature on
modern Muslim societies. Much of the research on cleavages within Islam
has revolved around ideological divisions – between Sunnis and Shias
(Nasr, 2006; Abdo, 2017), and Sufis/traditionalists and Salafis/Wahhabis
(Knysh, 2007; Brown, 2011; Khemissi, Laremont, & Eddine, 2012) –, or political
differences, between those who are pro-state and those who are against the
establishment (Sakallioğlu, 1996; Wiktorowicz, 2001; Zollner, 2008). These
ideological and political differences, though useful, are not reflective of
the entire picture. Furthermore, conservatives are often conflated with
extremists, when in reality, the nexus between the two is spurious at best
(Abdullah, 2017b). It thus becomes imperative to properly identify and
investigate ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ Muslims.
This study utilizes a qualitative approach. Around 100 activists, profes-
sionals and ordinary Muslims were interviewed or talked to throughout
the course of this research.22 The views and thoughts of these individuals
were crucial in developing and honing the arguments made in this book.
The interviews provide first-hand material, as activists outline the methods
via which they navigate the political terrain. The empirical findings further
provide originality to this book, as there has not been a monograph which
has utilized ethnographic data from Muslim activists in this manner. The
statements, publications, actions and inactions of these activists were also
studied as much as possible, in addition to academic works which have
been written on the subject. Local newspapers, especially The Straits Times
and Berita Harian, the only Malay-language daily in Singapore, proved to
22 Considering the religious and political sensitivities associated with the topic, many inter-
viewees wish to remain anonymous, though some were willing to be identified.
be valuable. Perhaps more importantly, social media postings were looked

at: online material is especially pertinent in the context of a competitive
authoritarian state like Singapore where self-censorship is prevalent. To
complement these, the actions and speeches of state elites too were investi-
gated: even if the state is not the main protagonist in this study, its ubiquity
in the Singapore context prohibits it from being ignored. Interviews were
also conducted with observers of Singapore politics in general, and civil
society activists who are not from the Muslim community. The thoughts
of these individuals were used to triangulate the findings and arguments
made in the book.
1.6 Outline of Book
This book will now proceed as follows. Chapter 2 provides a literature review
of Muslim activism throughout the world. The purpose of this chapter is
to tease out the various strategies and responses of Muslim activists in
different political systems and under various regime types, and thus situate
this book within the larger body of literature. Chapter 3 lays out the main
arguments made in this book. Essentially, the actions of Muslim activists are
based on political opportunities. The main theoretical framework will be
expounded, and the concomitant arguments, explained. Chapters 4, 5 and
6 detail the empirical findings based on the interview data and research.
Chapter 4 will be on the ulama, and argues that by and large, the ulama
ostensibly promote a quietist position, when in actuality, they are politically
acquiescent. Although there are some ulama who disagree with the state on
occasion, two points are noteworthy: first, these ulama are in the minority;
and second, their criticisms are rarely overtly robust or sustained. These
dissenting scholars too will be discussed. Chapter 5 investigates liberal
Muslim activists, and contends that liberals have largely been astute in
manoeuvring within the system, and have managed to make some gains in
the political system. Chapter 6 discusses conservative activists, and avers
that unlike liberals, they have not made too much gain in the public sphere,
and much of conservative activism is relegated to the online space. In most
cases, their activism does not result in substantive outcomes. I will then
conclude with Chapter 7 detailing the over-arching themes discussed in
the book, their relevance to the wider Muslim world, and some suggestions
for areas for future research that would be relevant for scholars of politics
and Islam.
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2 Muslim Activism: A Survey across the
World
Abstract
The second chapter is a literature review. The first section tackles the
different theological positions Muslim scholars have posited with regard
to activism. This is important as we find that some of these stances guide,
or are used to justify, the various forms of activism. I further discuss the
types of Muslim activists, and the social movement literature, in order to
ground the findings of this book within a field of study. The idea is that
the book should be relevant beyond Singapore or even Islamic studies,
and locating the book within the literature of social movements serves
this purpose.
Keywords: Theological justif ications, social movements, activism,

co-optation.
As protesters were gathering in Tahrir Square in Egypt in early 2011, the

calls for the resignation of the autocrat, Hosni Mubarak, gradually displayed
religious undertones. Placards with Quranic phrases were commonplace,
for instance, the verse which states ‘Now such were their houses – in utter
ruin – because they practised wrongdoing’ (Aboelezz, 2014, p. 606). That
scripture and faith are invoked should not be surprising; Egypt is a deeply
spiritual society, and furthermore, Islam confers a form of legitimacy to
a cause in a way which few other notions could. Equally unsurprisingly,
defenders of the Mubarak regime were appealing to faith to discredit the
mass uprising (Lee, 2018). Anwar Ibrahim, one of the most prominent
modern Muslim politicians and thinkers of Islam in Malaysia, described
the fatwas issued by the ulama in Malaysia against demonstrations led by
the opposition in the country as imitating the tactics of Mubarak’s Egypt,
doi: 10.5117/9789463724012_ch02
where edicts were issued in support of his rule.1 The dialectic between
proponents and opponents of activism against state repression has been
a recurring theme in the history of Islam. Soon after the death of Prophet
Muhammad, Muslim scholars and theologians attempted to grapple with
the idea of the permissibility of disobeying tyrannical rulers. Companions
of the Prophet held different positions on the matter. Abdullah ibn Umar,
son of the second Caliph Umar ibn Al-Khattab, was willing to accept the
authority of the despotic Umayyad Caliph Yazid ibn Muawiyah (d. 683) since
he prioritized the preservation of the unity of the Muslim community and
social stability; others such as Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the Prophet,
and Abdullah ibn Zubayr, son of the cousin of the Prophet, revolted against
Yazid as they deemed him to be morally unfit to be the vanguard of the
faith (Madelung, 1981; Hakim, 2016). Since then, Muslim scholars have had
variegated opinions on appropriate forms of activism.
This chapter serves two purposes. First, I appraise the various theological po-
sitions held by Muslims on activism. Much of the scholarly debate has revolved
around the acceptability of peaceful activism. I do this to set the foundations
for understanding the actions of various Muslim activists in Singapore, who
raise similar theological justifications for their political posturing. Second,
the chapter reviews the literature on social movements and activism in the
Muslim world. This is done to situate this book within this broader literature,
to extrapolate lessons that can be useful for grasping the situation in Singapore.
2.1 Muslim Activism: Theological Positions
Classical Muslim scholars have tended to favour a cautious approach toward

Muslim activism. Scarred by the Muslim civil wars which happened in the
early years after the demise of the Prophet, namely the Battle of the Camel,
which occurred 26 years after the Prophet’s death and the Battle of Siffin,
which took place barely a year after that, traditional Muslim ulama have
prioritized order and stability of the Islamic polity above all else. These two
wars were particularly jarring for a couple of reasons: first, they happened
just a few years after the Prophet’s passing; and second, the battles transpired
between Companions of the Prophet, who were regarded as belonging to
1 “Fatwa haramkan demo ikut buku Umno, ulangi taktik Hosni Mubarak (Fatwa Prohibiting
Demonstration is Out of Umno’s Playbook, Imitating Hosni Mubarak’s Tactics),” Keadilan Daily,
8 May 2012. http://www.keadilandaily.com/fatwa-haramkan-perhimpunan-ikut-buku-umno-
ulangi-taktik-hosni-mubarak/. Accessed 28 September 2018.
Muslim Ac tivism: A Survey across the World 39
the best generation of Islam (Graham, 1993; Waines, 1995). The knowledge-
able men and women who lived through those times were extremely keen
to ensure that the Muslim ummah, or community of believers, was not
to undergo such tumult again. Hence, almost from the outset, Muslim
scholars interpreted religious texts in a way which promoted pacifistic
attitudes toward Muslim rulers. The justification given was that order under
repression would be better than disorder accompanied with freedom, as
encapsulated in the adage ‘a day of anarchy is worse than a hundred years
of tyranny.’ (Warburg, 2003, p. 25) These scholars gave various theological
rationalizations for their quietist position, for instance, the following hadith:
It is obligatory for you to listen to the ruler and obey him in adversity and
prosperity, in pleasure and displeasure, and even when another person
is given preference over you.2
The justification for this theological stance thus seems clear: even when
the ruler may not act in accordance with the principles espoused by Islam
such as justice and equality, obedience to the ruler is required. Even more
explicit traditions are quoted to vindicate quietist positions.
Salama b. Yazid al-ju’afi asked the Messenger of Allah: Prophet of Allah,

what do you think if we have rulers who rule over us and demand that
we discharge our obligations towards them, but they (themselves) do not
discharge their own responsibilities towards us? What do you order us
to do? The Messenger of Allah avoided giving any answer. Salama asked
him again. He (again) avoided giving any answer. Then he asked again – it
was the second time or the third time – when Ash’ath b. Qais (finding
that the Prophet was unnecessarily being pressed for answer) pulled him
aside and said: Listen to them and obey them, for on them shall be their
burden and on you shall be your burden.3
In this hadith, the context is apparent. Citizens are obliged to remain patient
in the face of perceived unfairness, and God will eventually hold the rulers
accountable for their behaviour. Many other similar hadith are present in
the corpus of Islamic literature.
2 Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4524. https://sunnah.com/muslim/33/52. Accessed

12 October 2018.
3 Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4551. https://sunnah.com/muslim/33/79. Accessed
12 October 2018.
Muhammad Haniff Hassan’s study on Islamic attitudes toward civil

disobedience is instructive here. Hassan outlines the various arguments
put forth by both proponents and opponents of civil disobedience amongst
the Islamic scholarly community. He details that intellectual giants such as
Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), Al-Bukhari (d. 870), An-Nawawi (d. 1277) and
Ibn Taimiyyah (d. 1328) propound the impermissibility of disobeying the
legitimately elected leaders (Hassan, 2017, pp. 29-30). 4 Many contemporary
scholars too agree with such an approach toward political activism. Many
establishment-linked ulama in the Middle East, rather unsurprisingly,
have openly advocated such a stance. Saudi ulama have been upfront about
their support for the Saudi regime, for instance, arguing that even speaking
against the government could result in catastrophic consequences. Sheikh
Salih Al-Fawzan, a notable alim in Saudi Arabia, says:
Khuruj (the act of breaking away from rulers) is not restricted to carrying
arms. Speaking against, or insulting a ruler, is considered khuruj […]
instigating against ruler also […] Indeed, a word can lead to a devastating
war. Khuruj can involve arms, speech or beliefs. (Hassan, 2017, p. 26)
Fawzan’s exposition, hyperbole aside, points toward an extremely constrict-

ing approach toward activism. Any word of dissent toward the state is
eschewed, as it has the potential to lead to something more detrimental.
Sheikh Ali Gomaa, the former Mufti of Egypt, openly declared his support
for the autocratic Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, invoking similar theological justi-
fications.5 Beyond the Middle East, the American scholar, Sheikh Hamza
Yusuf, who has a worldwide following including in Southeast Asia, urged
Malaysians to be grateful to the then-Barisan Nasional government in spite
of the shortcomings of the coalition, because it is ‘still better than anarchy’.6
Hamza’s plea bore a resemblance to the ulama who were aligned to the
Malaysian state: the Mufti of Perak, Dato’ Harussani Zakaria, who stated
4 Ahmad ibn Hanbal is the founder of one of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, the
Hanbali school; Al-Bukhari is the compiler of what is accepted as the most authentic book of
hadith; An-Nawawi is a medieval scholar who is the most important within Shaf ii thought,
another school of jurisprudence within the Sunni school; whereas Ibn Taimiyyah is an important
Hanbali medieval jurist who is respected by many modern Salafis.
5 David D. Kirkpatrick and Mayy El Sheikh, “Egypt Military Enlists Religion to Quell Ranks,”
The New York Times, 25 August 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/world/middleeast/
egypt.html. Accessed 12 October 2018.
6 See the interview Hamza Yusuf did with the Radio Channel, IKIM FM, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=_MHPc5wIE48&t=2573s, Accessed 12 October 2018.
that it is impermissible to overthrow the government.7 The overwhelming

concern of these ulama is that order must be the paramount, overriding
objective for any society. Civil disobedience not only harms the stability
of the polity, but has the potential to escalate into something worse, and
therefore must be avoided. The example of the aforementioned Abdullah
ibn Umar sheds further light toward this approach: ibn Umar was a far more
pious Muslim than Yazid, yet he was willing to accept Yazid’s authority as
the political leader, not because he believed in Yazid’s Islamic credentials,
but because he desired order; that is, he was willing to accept tyranny to
avoid the risk of anarchy.
There exists another strand of thought within the Islamic tradition which
argues for civil disobedience, in the face of injustice and oppression. These
ulama accept the soundness of the above-quoted hadiths, but provide
qualifications to them. Furthermore, they argue that those hadiths must
be understood in light of other traditions, and the fundamental principles
which Islam espouses, promotes and seeks to protect. When the rulers are not
able to enact justice, the legitimacy of their rule is adversely affected. Civil
disobedience thus becomes permissible, and at times, even recommended.
These scholars draw upon the following hadith, amongst others:
The best of jihad (struggle) is a just word spoken to an unjust ruler.8
This hadith has been cited by many scholars to justify their actions in
disobeying the state. Jihad, which is considered obligatory for Muslims, is
invoked in this following hadith; but instead of the conventional understand-
ing of jihad as armed struggle or the internal battle to subdue one’s soul
in obedience to God, the narration speaks of the importance of speaking
truth to power. Another hadith that is used to justify this stance concerns
an incident in which the Prophet chided members of an army for not defy-
ing their commander when he was committing oppression. Consider the
following narration:
The Prophet sent an army unit (for some campaign) and appointed a man
from the Ansar as its commander and ordered them (the soldiers) to obey
7 “Tindakan guling kerajaan haram – Mufti Perak (Act of Overthrowing Government is

Impermissible – Perak Mufti),” Berita Harian Online, 20 August 2015. https://www.bharian.com.
my/node/76106. Accessed 12 October 2018.
8 Sunan Ibn Majah, Book 36, Hadith 86. https://sunnah.com/ibnmajah/36/86. Accessed
12 October 2018.
him. (During the campaign) he became angry with them and said, “Didn’t
the Prophet order you to obey me?” They said, “Yes.” He said, “I order you
to collect wood and make a fire and then throw yourselves into it.” So
they collected wood and made a fire, but when they were about to throw
themselves into it, they started looking at each other, and some of them
said, “We followed the Prophet to escape from the fire. How should we
enter it now?” So while they were in that state, the fire extinguished and
their commander’s anger abated. The event was mentioned to the Prophet
and he said, “If they had entered it (the fire) they would never have come
out of it, for obedience is required only in what is good.”9
Here, the Prophet explicitly mentioned that obedience is not required in

matters which are unjust. Abu Hanifah (d. 767), another founder of one of
the Sunni schools of jurisprudence, opined that it was permissible to go
against rulers who were overtly oppressive, as did Malik ibn Anas (d. 795),
the founder of the Maliki school (Hassan, 2017, pp. 55-56). Tariq Ramadan,
an influential thinker in contemporary Islam, advocates that Muslims
should openly disagree and challenge rulers when they engage in despotic
and authoritarian practices. Ramadan invoked the hadith quoted above on
the best jihad being a word of truth.10 Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi, an Egyptian
cleric who has been critical of the Hosni Mubarak and Sisi regimes for their
human rights violations and repressive rule, openly supported many of the
Arab revolutions which occurred in 2011 (Nakissa, 2015). Qaradawi’s opinions
are particularly salient, as he is one of the leading ulama in the Muslim
world today who has a worldwide appeal (Warren & Gilmore, 2014)11. As
much as the anti-activism ulama draw upon early Muslim history to make
their case, so too does this group of scholars. In arguing for activism and
civil disobedience, these ulama referred to the examples of Companions
of the Prophets such as Talha ibn Ubaidillah and Zubayr ibn Al-Awwam,
and the Prophet’s beloved wife, Aisha bint Abu Bakr, who challenged the
fourth Caliph, Ali, resulting in the Battle of the Camel (Hassan, 2017). The
examples of Zubayr’s son, Abdullah, and the Prophet’s grandson, Husayn
ibn Ali, in attempting to revolt against Yazid ibn Muawiyah are further used
to bolster the case for the permissibility of civil disobedience. In Southeast
Asia, ulama such as Dr. Asri, the current Mufti of Perlis, a state in Northern
9 Sahih Al-Bukhari, Book 93, Hadith 9. https://sunnah.com/bukhari/93/9. Accessed

12 October 2018.
10 Interview with Tariq Ramadan, 9 February 2016.
11 Qaradawi has been described as the ‘Global Mufti’ due to his international appeal.
Malaysia, stated that it becomes the duty of citizens to advise the govern-
ment when they behave in ways that are un-Islamic, such as engaging in
corrupt practices, and lent their support to demonstrations against the
then-Malaysian government.12
Evidently, as in many matters pertaining to Islamic jurisprudence, there
is a myriad of views concerning civil disobedience. On one hand, there are
scholars who favour a Hobbesian approach, and in preferring to shut the
door on any potential of civil unrest, they declare civil disobedience to
be unlawful and frowned upon in the religion. On the other, there exists
a group of ulama who permit, if not actively promote, civil disobedience
in the pursuit of justice and goodness. Two points must be noted. First,
there are different types of civil disobedience which have been discussed
by even the scholars who have made it permissible. Some of these ulama
allow non-violent civil disobedience but do not permit taking up arms
against the rulers, while others do not make such distinctions between
violent and non-violent forms of activism. Second, most of these scholars,
especially the classical ones, were speaking in the context of Muslim rulers
and empires. No doubt, the justifications for these arguments have been
used by modern ulama living in the era of nation-states, even those who
operate within secular and Muslim-minority states such as Singapore, but
it is important to understand the genesis of the theological debate. Modern
scholars such as Abdullah Saeed and Tariq Ramadan have dealt with this
subject at great length. Ramadan, for instance argues that European Muslims
should participate in the democratic processes in their own countries as full
citizens, and are entitled to rights accorded to other citizens in a democratic
polity (Ramadan, 1999). These rights form the basis for which Muslim activ-
ism should be understood, if not developed. Similarly, Saeed contends that
many Muslim scholars today have accepted the permissibility of living
and participating in polities under non-Muslim rule (Saeed, 2007). At the
same time, other contemporary scholars such as Hamza Yusuf have been
critical of some forms of activism which, according to them, have resulted
in greater harms such as the Syrian refugee crisis.13
12 “For Speaking Up on Najib, Rosmah? Now Perlis Mufti Probed for Sedition over Bersih 4
Comment,” Malaysia Chronicle, 18 September 2015.
http://www.malaysia-chronicle.com/index.php?option%3Dcom_k2%26view%3Ditem%26i
d%3D597392:for-speaking-up-on-najib-rosmah?-now-perlis-mufti-probed-for-sedition-over-
bersih-4-comment%26Itemid%3D2#axzz48puLpRHX. Accessed 12 October 2016.
13 See the interview Hamza Yusuf did with the Radio Channel IKIM FM, https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=_MHPc5wIE48&t=2573s, Accessed 12 October 2018.
Considering the theological differences of opinion on the matter, it is not

at all surprising that states have attempted to exploit this chasm. Some states
have actively courted the support of ulama, not only to legitimize their rule,
but to pre-empt opposition which may arise from religious grounds. The
Assad regime in Syria has been particularly adept at this. Ulama such as the
conservative Sheikh Ramadan Al-Bouti, a highly respected figure within the
Muslim world, lent their support to Assad during the wave of protests against
his regime and the subsequent civil war; in return, these ulama were given
free rein to propagate their beliefs as long as state authority was not directly
challenged (Pierret, 2013). This is an important exposition which is relevant
to the Singapore context and will be returned to in subsequent chapters.
2.2 Brief Literature Review
Types of Muslim Activists
Now that the various theological and jurisprudential positions on Muslim

activism have been elucidated, it is timely to survey the literature on Mus-
lim social movements and activism. The different understandings of the
permissibility of activism have resulted in practical differences in Muslim
social movements. The Jama’at Tabligh (Organization for Proselytization),
for instance, abjure any direct involvement in political affairs, preferring
its members to focus on individual piety and direct their concerns on the
hereafter (Noor, 2012; Janson, 2014). The organization, which has its roots
in the Indian sub-continent, has been successful in the Muslim world, and
is estimated to have 70-80 million followers and/or members (Janson, 2014,
p. 4). Yet, it bears repeating that being apolitical is a political stance in
itself: by choosing to not participate in politics or overt forms of activism,
the Jama’at has essentially made a political choice to leave the matters of
governance and administration to others. It is natural then that in some
cases, for instance in Southern Thailand, the state has a symbiotic relation-
ship with the Jama’at, since if Muslims are apolitical, there would be one
less potential threat to its authority (Liow, 2009a). Individual expressions of
religiosity are tolerated as long as they do not threaten the overall stability
of society, or the authority of the ruling elites.
Other groups, however, have differed markedly with the Jama’at. Perhaps
the most conspicuous Muslim activist group of the modern era is the Muslim
Brotherhood or Ikhwanul Muslimin. Founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan
Al-Banna, the organization was critical of imperial rule and the secular
governments which succeeded colonial administrators (Kramer, 2010).

For the Ikhwan, the humiliation Muslim countries faced from the West,
as embodied in colonialism, was due to the decadence of Muslim societies
themselves; the solution was thus to not only purify individual selves, as
the Jama’at would advocate, but rather, to ensure that Islamic values and
ethics would be practised at all levels of society, including and especially
government. In Al-Banna’s own words:
Our duty as Muslim Brothers is to work for the reform of selves (nufus),
of hearts and souls by joining them to God the all-high; then to organize
our society to be fit for the virtuous community which commands the
good and forbids evil-doing, then from the community will arise the good
state. (Zubaida, 2009, p. xvii)
Here, one can witness a palpable difference between the approaches of

the Ikhwan and the Tabligh; the latter would agree with the first part of
Al-Banna’s exhortation, but the second half, which involves the organization
of society via commanding good and forbidding evil, would invariably
involve some level of political participation. The concept of ‘commanding
good, forbidding evil’ (amr maaruf nahi munkar) is generally accepted by
Muslims to be an important maxim in the faith; however, the interpretation
of what precisely constitutes it and what are the limits of the axiom differ
across Muslim communities (Cook, 2001).
Inevitably, the Ikhwan embarked on a collision course with the Egyptian
state, and successive presidents, up until today, have had to contend with the
organization. In 2012, after the Arab revolutions which shook the foundations
of Middle Eastern politics and challenged the dictatorships, a leader of the
Ikhwan, Mohamed Morsi, became the country’s democratically elected
President. Barely a year later, however, the military staged a coup and
overthrew Morsi (Tabaar, 2013). Even though the Ikhwan has only helmed
the political leadership in the country for a year in its entire history, its
significance cannot be understated. In spite of attempts by presidents such
as Hosni Mubarak, whose rule ended after mass protests in 2011 as part of the
Arab Revolutions, to ban and dismantle the organization, the Ikhwan has
proven to be remarkably resilient. Its grassroots activities have penetrated
many aspects of Egyptian society; many of its members are part of the ulama,
and some work at the prestigious Al-Azhar University, which is generally
considered to be the bastion of Sunni thought; and it has been supported by
influential figures such as Yusuf Qaradawi (Wickham, 2013). Moreover, the
organization’s influence is not limited to Egyptian shores. Offshoots of the
organization exist in many countries in the Middle East and North African
region, and even in Southeast Asia, many Muslims have been influenced
by the activities, ideas and organizational structure of the Brotherhood. In
Indonesia, for example, the Islamist group Masyumi was clearly influenced
by the writings and teaching materials of the Ikhwan (Van Bruinessen,
2002). Within the myriad of organizations which have their origins in the
Ikhwan, there exists a great diversity in approaches and methodologies.
Some, such as Hamas in Palestine, have no qualms resorting to violence to
fulfil their political and religious goals; whereas others, such as the branch
in Jordan, participate in local elections and champion democratic reform
(Lust-Okar, 2006). Often, jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda frown upon the
Ikhwan for the latter’s participation in a ‘secular’ system such as democracy
(Leiken & Brooke, 2007). For the terrorists, the only acceptable form of
activism should entail jihad and violence. Thus, in spite of the Ikhwan’s
problems with the secular Egyptian state and authoritarian rule, it did not
make them natural allies with groups like Al-Qaeda or Daesh. In fact, one
could make the argument that the Ikhwan and terrorist groups are natural
competitors, since they vie for the same crowd: Muslims who are frustrated
with the status quo. Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh represent
the most extreme form of activism in the Muslim world: one which not only
condones violence, but makes it obligatory upon every Muslim. This form of
activism is undoubtedly the recourse of a small minority of activists: most
prefer to either work within the confines of their particular states, or when
they challenge their respective governments, do not resort to violence; or like
the Tabligh, prefer to shun political involvement and just focus on bettering
their individual conditions. Nevertheless, violent activism is a reality in the
modern world. In Singapore, even though there have been cases of terrorist
plots being uncovered and individuals being arrested for extremism, these
cases are few and far between, and thus will not be the subject of inquiry
in this monograph. The peculiar case of terrorism further warrants studies
by themselves, and there is no shortage of authors who have endeavoured
to elucidate the causes and impact of terrorism in the city-state (Tan, 2002;
Abuza, 2003; Hassan & Pereire, 2006; Febrica, 2010; Low, 2013; Gunaratna,
2017). Hence, this study will focus on non-violent forms of Muslim activism.
Muslim activists can further be understood in terms of their choices
to partake in social movements or to act as individuals. Many activists
form networks, formal or informal, to propagate certain ideas or champion
particular causes. The social movement literature is replete with examples
of Muslim activists being part of formal organizations and networks, and
these will be discussed in a while. Apart from Islamist organizations like
the Ikhwan, many Non-Governmental Organizations exist throughout

Muslim societies. These NGOs serve a myriad of purposes. Some like Perkasa
in Malaysia and the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI)
in Indonesia display more extreme tendencies and are forceful in their
opposition to the influence of non-Muslims in the public arena (Jones, 2011;
Milner, 2018). Others, such as IKRAM in Malaysia, the Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU) in Indonesia, and AK-Der in Turkey promote a more inclusive version
of an Islamic vision of politics, which includes democratic reform, gender
parity and anti-discrimination measures (Kadioglu, 2005; Bush, 2009; Malik,
2017). Organizations which are ostensibly apolitical, such as charity groups,
are also prevalent. Groups such as Islamic Relief, which is based in the UK,
draw upon their worldwide appeal cultivated through the internet, to collect
funds for Muslims in distress throughout the world; Islamic Relief’s website
solicits funds for Muslims in troubled areas or facing calamities such as
natural disasters in Gaza (Palestine), Myanmar (Rohingyas), Yemen, Syria,
Indonesia, inter alia.14
Muslims have also formed political parties to contest elections and
participate in democratic processes. In Turkey, the now Erdogan-led Justice
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, AKP) has been the
most prominent example of Islamists attaining power through legitimate
democratic means, such that Turkey has become a ‘model’ for other aspiring
democratic movements in the Muslim world (Marks, 2017). In Tunisia, the
Ennahdah party has undergone an evolution from a party with exclusivist
leanings to one which is more moderate, even if it is conservative (Cavatorta
& Merone, 2013). The Islamic Party of Malaysia (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia, PAS)
has been a crucial player in the Malaysian electoral scene, and its political
leanings have oscillated between conservativism and openness depending
on the political opportunities available (Abdullah, 2018b). The participation
of Islamist political parties in democratic systems has sparked a fresh debate
on the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, with scholars debating whether
the mere act of participating in such processes would result in these parties
moving to the centre (Schwedler, 2011; Driessen, 2012; Buehler, 2013; Cavatorta
& Merone, 2013; Gurses, 2014). Regardless, it is increasingly common to see
Muslims banding together under the banner of Islam – as interpreted by
their respective constituents – and exercising their activism through formal
electoral participation.
Muslim activism, however, must not be understood purely in terms of
involvement in formal organizations, or as part of groups. It is this book’s
14 See Islamic Relief, https://www.islamic-relief.org.uk/. Accessed 17 October 2018.

contention that Muslim individuals are often activists in their own right.
When a Muslim attempts to influence socio-political outcomes via writing
letters to their Members of Parliament, posting their political opinions on
social media, or urging others, directly or indirectly, to support particular
political parties, entities, or causes, he/she should be considered to be engag-
ing in activism too. In countries like Singapore, where formalized groupings
based on ethnicity and religion are either discouraged or overtly prohibited,
it becomes even more imperative to study and understand individual modes
of activism. Even a simple act of putting on the veil can at times be an act
of activism, although it must be noted that it does not necessarily have to
be and could just be an expression of individual piety.
We can thus see Muslim activism manifesting itself in various forms:
some activists choose to attempt to enact change via being part of and/
or forming groups, whereas others work individually; some choose to be
apparently apolitical, while others view political involvement as not only
vital, but necessary for their cause; some operate outside the ambit of the
formal electoral arena and prefer to be NGOs or lobbyists, while others
participate in political contests through parties.
Ideological Slants of Activists
One of the most salient fault-lines between Muslims today, or so it has

been argued, is the division along ideological parameters. Specifically, two
major divisions have become the focus of scholars and observers alike: the
Sunni-Shia and Salafi-traditionalist/Sufi divides. The Sunni-Shia fault-line
has existed almost from the inception of Islam itself, and is the major division
within the Muslim ummah. After the death of the Prophet, some Muslims
disagreed on the appointment of Abu Bakr, Umar and Uthman – who were
his senior Companions – as the first three Caliphs, and felt that Ali – his
cousin, son-in-law and another prominent Companion – should have as-
sumed the mantle of leadership of the polity (Rogerson, 2006). What was
initially a political divide over the Caliphate slowly transformed into a
theological divide: the group which accepted the validity of the Caliphate
of the first three Companions came to be known as the Ahlussunnah wal
Jamaah (The People of the Sunnah and Community), or Sunnis, while those
who believed in special status derived from being part of the Prophet’s
family and affirmed Ali’s right to the Caliphate were known as Shias (or
partisans, short for partisans of Ali). This divide became a central feature
in the political realities of Muslim societies, from the Umayyad Empire to
this day. Wars and smaller-scale conflicts have erupted between Sunnis
and Shias. No doubt, these battles are rarely solely theological: political
motivations are always intertwined with theological considerations, and
these two can never be decoupled. Nevertheless, theology does matter too.
Today, in the Middle East, especially since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003,
the lines between Sunnis and Shias have hardened, and more incidences of
sectarian violence have been reported throughout the region. Even before
the invasion, however, Sunni-Shia sectarianism has always existed. As
asserted by Vali Nasr, conflicts within Islam, specifically the Sunni-Shia
divide, has the potential to shape international affairs and the future of the
world (Nasr, 2006). Outside the Middle East too, polemics between Sunnis
and Shias are not infrequent. In Pakistan, mob attacks against Shias have
become increasingly routine (Zaman, 1998; Murphy, 2019); in Malaysia and
Indonesia, there have been campaigns to ban Shias or at the very least,
restrict their influence in the public sphere (Musa & Tan, 2017).
Although some Sunni activists have sought to curtail the rights of Shias,
others have promoted a more inclusive approach toward comprehending
Islamic theology, jurisprudence and civilization. In Malaysia, groups such
as Sisters in Islam, which is considered to be more ‘liberal’, argue for a
more all-encompassing view of Islam which does not denigrate non-Sunni
expressions of faith, including Shi’ism.15 Syed Farid Alatas, a prominent
Malaysian sociologist who is based in Singapore, similarly champions for the
acceptance of Shiism as ‘valid creed’ within Islam.16 Jaringan Islam Liberal
(Islamic Liberal Network) in Indonesia too adopts such a position (Hashim,
2015). Thus, the Sunni-Shia cleavage, while pertinent, should not be seen as
a catch-all explanation for all types of Muslim activism: evidently, there are
cross-cutting cleavages, as evinced by Sunnis who promote the inclusion
Shi’ism in the wider Muslim identity, and in fact, activities which completely
fall outside this ideological divide, as will be expounded later. Issues of
poverty, freedoms of expression, and gender, often do not correspond to
the Sunni-Shia divide.
The other major ideological chasm between Muslims, which lately has
become increasingly significant, is the Salafi-traditionalist/Sufi divide. This
divide, which is an intra-Sunni divide, has dominated much of the recent
discourse on Islam, especially in the post-September 11 era. Salafism, often
15 “State Religion Status Leaves Many ‘Outside the Box’,” Free Malaysia Today, 29 December 2017.
https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2017/12/29/state-religion-status-leaves-
many-outside-the-box/. Accessed 24 October 2018.
16 Syed Farid Alatas, “Singapore Muslim Leaders Must Tackle Rise of Anti-Shi’ism Hate Speech,”
The Straits Times, 26 August 2017. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/spore-muslim-leaders-
must-tackle-rise-of-anti-shiism-hate-speech. Accessed 24 October 2018.
derogatorily referred to as Wahhabism by its detractors, has been described

as the ‘driving force behind global terrorism’.17 Salafism is a broad-based
ideology within Islam which implores Muslims to go back to the roots of the
original teachings of the faith, utilizing the slogan ‘Go back to the Quran
and Sunnah’, in a bid to urge Muslims to not place too much emphasis on
the jurisprudential and theological opinions of the ulama, and instead, take
knowledge from the original sources of Islam. This is not to say that Salafis
do not assign any importance to the ulama; indeed, the idea that the ulama
are most qualified to interpret scripture is one that is consistent amongst
Sufis/traditionalists and Salafis. Comparatively, however, Salafis tend to
be more accepting of criticisms toward the ulama and do not staunchly
adhere to any of the schools of jurisprudence. Salafis also favour a more
literal approach to scripture, especially in the field of theology. A subset of
Salafism is Wahhabism, a puritanical version of Islam which appeared in
Central Arabia in the 18th century. Wahhabism rejected the allegedly corrupt
Islamic practices of the Arabs at the time, claiming that they betrayed
the purity of the Prophet’s teachings (DeLong-Bas, 2004; Valentine, 2015).
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab (d. 1792) founded this ultra-conservative
movement, which still defines the religious orientation of Saudi Arabia
today (Al-Rasheed, 2015). A key facet of Salafism and Wahhabism is their
opposition to innovations or bida’ah in Islamic practice. The multi-faceted
types of Salafism will be further expounded in Chapter 4.
The Salafis/Wahhabis are often at odds with their traditionalist/Sufi
counterparts. Traditionalists refer to Muslims who follow one of the four
Sunni schools of jurisprudence, practices rituals such as the Mawlid (celebra-
tion of the Prophet’s birthday) which were not introduced by the Prophet but
are considered to be beneficial for one’s spirituality, and in theology, do not
accept literal interpretations of the Quran which anthropomorphize God
(Brown, 2014b; Lauzière, 2016). Sufis, who are also traditionalists, consider
the mystical aspects of Islam as essential, and often belong to Sufi orders
known as tareqahs (Knysh, 2016). Naturally, Salafis are often at odds with
traditionalists/Sufis as the former deem many of the latters’ practices to
be innovations, while the latter consider the Salafis to be disrespectful of
centuries of Islamic tradition (Hamid, 2016). In recent years, the divide has
gained more attention as Salafism/Wahhabism has been blamed for the
rise of terrorism amongst Muslim societies; and some traditionalists/Sufis
17 Simon Ross Valentine, “What is Wahhabism? The Puritanical Code of Islam Thought to be
a Driving Force behind Global Terrorism,” The Mirror, 5 June 2017. https://www.mirror.co.uk/
news/uk-news/what-wahhabism-puritanical-code-islam-10564342. Accessed 25 October 2018.
have chosen to portray their ideology as the only bastion against Muslim
extremism (Abdullah, 2017c). While it is true that many modern Muslim
terrorists subscribe to some form of Wahhabi ideology, not all of them do
(and most Wahhabis are in fact, not terrorists or extremists, even if they
are ultra-conservative) (Wagemakers, 2016; Abdullah, 2017c). Regardless,
the equivalence between Salafism-Wahhabism and terrorism has been
assumed far too often (Rakic & Juricic, 2012).
A couple of points need to be emphasized. First, the excessive focus on
the Salafi-traditionalist divide obscures some other pertinent cleavages. In
the first place, both Salafis and traditionalists draw upon the same corpus
of Sunni sources and knowledge to come to their respective jurisprudential
and theological positions; in many matters, their positions converge and
are indistinguishable from each other’s. While the cleavage is important,
other schisms such as the liberal-conservative divide are also salient,
and could better elucidate certain trends within the Muslim world than
conventional, simplistic Salafi-traditionalist explanations. Secondly, even
though Salafis and traditionalists hold many similar positions, ultimately,
the self-identities of these categories do matter to their adherents; often,
Salafis and traditionalists clash over the minutiae.
Tariq Ramadan offers a useful typology of major tendencies within the
ummah: the six major categories he identifies are 1) Scholastic Traditionalism,
2) Salafi Literalism, 3) Salafi Reformism, 4) Political Literalist Salafism,
5) ‘Liberal’ or ‘Rationalist’ Reformism and 6) Sufism (Ramadan, Western
Muslims and the Future of Islam, 2004). Of course, these categories are not
always mutually exclusive; many ‘liberal’ reformers, for instance, claim
some relationship with Sufism as well. Broadly, however, this typology is
useful since it provides a more nuanced view of reality than the simplistic
Salafi-traditionalist/Sufi binary. Salafism itself is multi-faceted: some Salafis
are reform-minded and wish to uplift the ummah via returning to the
original sources; others are literal and apolitical; additionally, some Salafis
participate in politics by adopting exclusionary and/or confrontational
stances. Moreover, the typology includes ‘liberal’ Muslims, a category which
deserves more investigation. Ramadan’s categorization provides a platform
upon which this study builds; categories of Muslim activism are often more
nuanced, and needs to be properly explored.
Social Movement Literature
As emphatically asserted by Wiktorowicz, for a great length of time not

much attention was devoted to Islamic activism by scholars studying social
movements: in his opinion, this was to the detriment of the field as a whole,
since studying Muslim activism could help shed crucial light on important
issues (Wiktorowicz, 2004). In his opinion, by focusing on the West, the
social movement theory has ‘been heavily contextualized by liberal demo-
cratic politics and Western societies, thus narrowing the generalizability
of findings and conclusions’ (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 4). His observation is
supported by Saba Mahmood’s findings in Egypt: Mahmood argues that
the liberal (and/or feminist) tendency to view every action of actors in the
non-Western world in binary terms – that is, to see an act as either evidence
of resistance or subordination – is not helpful in illuminating realities on
the ground (Mahmood, 2005). Very often, other factors such as personal
notions of piety matter more in the individuals’ decision-making calculus,
as is the case, for instance, for modern Egyptian women who voluntarily
wear the veil, citing reasons of modesty (Mahmood, 2005, p. 16).
That notwithstanding, the social movement literature has been helpful in
understanding collective action and activism in general. Social movements
can be defined as attempts to further a cause by a collection of individuals,
through collective action and outside the purview of established institutions
(Giddens, 1997, p. 511). The social movement literature is replete with ways
of overcoming the collective action dilemma, best described by Olson is
his seminal work, The Logic of Collective Action: if everyone is rational,
it becomes irrational for a person to partake in collective action since
the benefits of successful action are non-excludable, while the costs are
specific to participants, and thus, collective action does not take place
even if it would be beneficial for many (Olson, 1965). Scholars working on
resource mobilization have identified the presence of leaders, or political
entrepreneurs, as being vital to overcoming this problem (McCarthy & Zald,
1977); others have argued that the role of inter-personal relationships and
the creation and/or appropriation of identities matter too (Oberschall, 1973;
Goldstone, 2001). Essentially, one of the primary themes within the literature
is to address the conditions under which collective action can take place.
In a thoughtful piece, Ondrej Cisar identifies four main views of social
movements in the political science literature: Marxist, Weberian, Polanyian,
and Tocquevillean. The Marxist perspective identifies socially excluded
groups as the actors behind social movements; these movements protest
against the excesses of the capitalist system, and are typically anti-systemic.
The Weberian view – which is prevalent in analyses of non-Western societies
as Mahmood acknowledges – places the state as the primary mover in
society, and concomitantly, social movements as challengers to the state
who participate in collective action because they have been excluded from
decision-making. Scholars who adopt the Polanyian perspective believe

social movements are occupational groups which seek reform in a corporatist
system. Finally, for those who favour the Tocquevillean view, civil society is
the arena within which collective action in the form of social movements
manifest, and these movements represent a wide range of social interests
(Cisar, 2015). Cisar’s typology is useful: in Singapore, social movements and
individual activists can be studied from either the Weberian or Tocquevillean
perspectives; indeed, these two approaches are not mutually exclusive.
There could very well be activists who are challenging the state, as much
as there could be individuals or groups who work with the state and other
social movements to expand the common space. Both can, and do, exist
simultaneously.
Political psychologists have highlighted three main motivations for
individuals to take part in collective action: instrumentality, identifica-
tion, and expressiveness. Instrumental participants partake in activism
in order to affect socio-political outcomes; identification refers to the idea
that participating would confer on these individuals a sense of solidarity
with the organizers and other participants; expressiveness means that
individuals participate in order to air their concerns (Klandermans, 2015).
At the core of collective action is the concept of ‘grievances’, which can be
defined as ‘outrage about the way authorities are treating a social problem’
(Klandermans, 1997, p. 38); individuals are motivated to address, if not correct
these grievances via collective action. Deprivation, whether absolute or
relative, is an efficacious stimulus for protest against established institutions.
Put differently, grievances ensure that there is a demand for protest; the
supply-side of protest depends on the availability of political entrepreneurs,
the cohesiveness of the demonstrations/collective action, and the sense of
identification that it can offer (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Ruef, 2010; Corrigall-
Brown, 2012). However, social movements are not just a simple matter of
demand and supply: at times, identities are created and manipulated, as are
perceptions of grievance (Finkel, Muller, & Opp, 1989; Kelly, 1993; Tucker,
2007). The focus on social movements has typically been on the mobilization
of individuals, rather than the demand and supply aspects of collective
action (Klandermans, 2015). Insights into these factors thus become valuable
in understanding not only social movements, but the psyches of activists
as well. When motivations are understood in terms of identification and
expressiveness too, in addition to instrumentality, the studies move beyond
material costs and benefits – which although important, should not be the
only dimension of analysis – toward investigating concerns which are based
on considerations of ‘morality’, emotions, and social obligations (Elster,
1985b; Marwell & Oliver, 1993; Shilling & Mellor, 1998; Yang, 2000; Polletta
& Jasper, 2001; Klandermans, 2015).
The social movement literature has also been preoccupied with the con-
cept of political opportunity structures. Sidney Tarrow, one of the proponents
of the notion, initially defined political opportunity structures as comprising
four elements: the openness of the political process, the stability of political
alignments, the availability of allies, and the existence of conflicts between
the political elites (Tarrow, 2011). The concept has undergone significant
modifications since then and has been the subject of much inquiry and
critique, partly because it has been used as a catch-all idea to explain all
outcomes associated with social movements and collective action (Goodwin
& Jasper, 1999). The idea of political opportunity will be developed in the
next chapter; even though it may have been used amorphously by some
scholars, I posit that it is nonetheless a useful concept to help illuminate
activism in Singapore. I utilize the concept of political opportunities to help
understand the seemingly variegated and multi-faceted nature of Muslim
activism in Singapore.
An important facet of the literature on social movements deals with
co-optation. Co-optation can be defined as the tying of ‘strategically-relevant
actors (or a group of actors) to the ruling elite’ (Gerschewski, 2013, p. 22).
Co-optation can be formal or informal: formal co-optation refers to bringing
in actors into institutional state mechanisms, whereas informal co-optation
entails the altering of end-goals of non-state actors, such that they align
with the state’s objectives (Abdullah W. J., 2013, p. 1189). Social movement
actors or NGOs have been susceptible to overtures by the state, as the latter
bids to bolster its control and/or legitimacy via co-opting dissent. Whether
a government is democratic or authoritarian, the strategy of co-optation
is utilized quite frequently. It has already been mentioned earlier that
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East have had complicated relationships
with the ulama and Muslim activists: amongst the repertoire of stratagems
deployed by these states is co-optation of the religious establishment. In
Saudi Arabia, the royal family has conceded many aspects of religious
governance to the ultra-conservative ulama, in exchange for their political
loyalties (Al-Rasheed, 2007). Al-Azhar University in Egypt, which is widely
regarded by Muslims to be the best tertiary institution in the Muslim world,
and the most popular destination for undergraduates from Southeast Asia
who are interested in pursuing Islamic education at the higher levels, has
had to contend with state interference, and is argued to have been co-opted
by the Egyptian state (Barraclough S., 1998). For Malaysia, beginning with
Mahathir Mohamad’s first tenure as Prime Minister (1981-2003), the state
has aggressively courted the assistance of the ulama, and has institutionally
co-opted them into the formal state machinery (Liow, 2009b). Mahathir of
course, desired to ‘out-Islamize’ PAS, the Islamist opposition party, in addi-
tion to harnessing the potential of the ulama for nation-building purposes
(Wain, 2009). A similar situation has ensued in Indonesia where both the
authoritarian regime of Soeharto and subsequent democratically elected
governments have attempted to co-opt the ulama. Of course, the success
of these regimes’ efforts is never absolute: there is always a group of ulama
within these countries which not only resist the state’s advances, but oppose
it as well (Barter, 2011; Abdullah W. J., 2016). The ulama, for reasons already
described in the earlier chapter, form a vital bloc in any Muslim community,
and states have to work out a way to engage with this group as they could
potentially mobilize people against it. Naturally, co-optation becomes
a recurring theme within state-ulama relations. The ulama, just as any
other social movement, are a rational group, who decide to work with, or
resist the state, based on their own cost-benefit analyses. These costs and
benefits are not necessarily material, however, as will be developed later.
Moreover, it must be emphasized that to be co-opted itself is a conscious
political choice; actors who are co-opted by the state should not be assumed
to be devoid of agency. Whether the choices are constrained or liberating,
actors still nonetheless have a choice as to how to operate within a political
system: actors who are co-opted choose to be co-opted (Abdullah, 2013).
Social movements, especially NGOs, have been particularly prone to
co-option by the state. This is not a particularly surprising phenomenon:
states would view social movements as potential competitors in the public
space, and co-opting them would simultaneously boost a state’s legitimacy
while quelling a source of dissent. While repression and exclusion of such
groups are other possible alternatives for the state, they tend to be more
costly and even authoritarian states which wield the stick in response
to confrontational activism prefer not to do so, and would rather utilize
co-optation, wherever possible (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Gerschewski
describes co-optation as one of the ‘three pillars’ of authoritarian rule,
alongside legitimation and repression (Gerschewski, 2013). There are many
modes of co-optation available, from the perspective of the state. For one,
a state could choose to co-opt the language and goals of a particular social
movement, without actually bringing in the members of the social movement
into the fold. By doing this, the state can exclude the social movements while
incorporating their language, and by extension, their support base. The
far-right in Germany, for instance, has penetrated German society not via
electoral victories per se, but by forcing the centrist parties to adopt aspects
of its discourses and proposed policies (Bale, 2003). The Republican Party
in the United States, like many other centre-right parties in Europe, has
co-opted the language of the far-right, and is increasingly moving further
to the right as well.
More conventionally, though, states institutionally co-opt dissenters,
activists or social movements. By giving these actors a stake in the system,
the presumption is that they would have an incentive to ensure the system
remains intact, while at the same time, they would be more inclined to chan-
nel their opposition through more peaceful and ‘constructive’ ways such as
discussing with state elites in closed-door settings, rather than challenge
them in the public arena: the state decreases the ‘probability of upheaval’
via co-optation (Bertocchi & Spagat, 2001). Co-opting individuals and
groups has been the primary strategy adopted by many states, democratic
or authoritarian. In 1982, a year after Dr. Mahathir Mohamad assumed
premiership of Malaysia for the first time, he brought Anwar Ibrahim – a
firebrand Islamist leader who was critical of the state at the time – into the
ruling party, in an obvious bid to appease the substantial following Anwar
had with the conservative segments of the Muslim electorate, especially
his ties to influential grassroots organizations such as the Angkatan Belia
Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, ABIM) and other
activists (Barraclough S., 1985; Abdullah K., 1999). Community mediation
groups in the United States – which were formed to be alternatives to the
formal justice and legal system – have increasingly become co-opted,
albeit to differing degrees, within the court system (Coy & Hedeen, 2005).
The longevity of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is at least partially
attributable to its adaptability and ability to co-opt different segments
of civil society into its machinery (Dickson, 2000). The challenge for co-
opted entities though, is understanding what are the costs associated with
being aligned with the state, and assessing whether the possible benefits
outweigh the costs. While there are obvious trade-offs, especially in terms
of losing credibility with the social movement’s supporters – since being
associated with the state could be detrimental for an actor’s image amongst
its constituents – there is also a possibility of the social movement being
better-positioned to advance at least part of its agenda (Campbell, 2001).
Najam outlines the dilemma faced by social movements when he asks the
question whether NGOs which cooperate with, and/or are co-opted by, the
state, can be said to have a ‘beautiful friendship’ with the authorities, or if
they are ‘too close for comfort’ (Najam, 2000). Especially in authoritarian
states, where the costs of confronting the state are high, and there is less
room for civil society to operate, social movements and activists frequently
end up being co-opted. Social movements have to confront the realities

of functioning within systems whereby the political opportunities are
more restricted: in democratic systems, these actors can act as pressure
groups, work together with the opposition, or just attempt to influence
the electorate via raising issues and putting them on the political agenda
(Foweraker, 1995).
Saward’s three-part typology of formal co-optation may provide valuable
insights here. He argues that there are three types of institutional co-option:
value co-option is when the state relies on the co-opted entities’ religious,
cultural or social values; expertise co-option is when the co-optees are
prized for their knowledge on particular matters; and producer co-option
is when entities with economic production resources are brought into the
state mechanism (Saward, 1990). The first two types of co-optation are
most relevant for the purposes of this book. On the part of the state, the
motivations are clear. Via co-optation, a state is able to stifle potential dissent
and/or expand its support base. For the co-opted entities, being co-opted
provides them with more opportunities to influence state decisions, as
(authoritarian) states may be more averse to be perceived to compromise
with confrontational actors; it also drastically reduces the probability of
their being targets of state repression (Saward, 1992).
Co-optation has been used adroitly by the PAP government in Singapore. A
wide range of groups and individuals has been co-opted by the state in order
for the purposes that have already been highlighted in the literature. Both
formal and informal co-optation have been utilized. While it is commonly
described in the literature that the Singapore government relies heavily
on repression and fear to maintain its rule (Tremewan, 1994; George, 2007;
Barr, 2010; Slater, 2012; Morgenbesser, 2017), one facet to the PAP’s political
acumen that is often overlooked is its success in co-optation. To be sure, the
PAP does rely on heavy-handed tactics to stifle dissent in Singapore. These
have already been detailed earlier: opposition leaders such as Chee Soon Juan
and JB Jeyaratnam have faced the full force of the law, the growth of civil
society has been curbed, and various other methods have been employed
to sustain the PAP’s rule. Nevertheless, in tandem with such draconian
measures, the PAP adopts a ‘calibrated’ approach toward politics, and argu-
ably, relies on co-optation more than repression (Abdullah W. J., 2013). Right
from independence, the state has sought to co-opt trade unions, student
movements and the mass media: three potential sources of dissent. Trade
unions not only have a symbiotic relationship with the state, but via the
National Trades Union Congress (NTUC), an umbrella body of trade unions in
the country, is directly linked to the PAP, since it is typically led by a sitting
member of cabinet.18 The mainstream media is not only heavily regulated

by legislation, but is required to act as a partner in the nation-building
agenda and galvanizes citizens behind government policies, rather than as a
confrontational actor which calls state elites to account. In the words of Lee
Kuan Yew, the function of the media is to present to the people ‘Singapore’s
problems simply and clearly and then explain how if they support certain
programmes and policies, these problems can be solved’ (Bokhorst-Heng,
2002). Student unions, which used to be a thorn in the PAP’s side before
independence, were curtailed early on, and subsequently became apolitical
movements increasingly averse to being critical of the establishment (Jianli,
2006). It has been noted earlier that religion has been a preoccupation of
the PAP. One of the ways it has managed religion is by co-opting religious
organizations. Thio Li-Ann describes the state’s approach toward religion
as ‘pragmatic’ and ‘accommodative’ secularism: describing it in a positive
light, she characterizes Singapore’s religious management as reflective of
the government’s commitment toward nurturing religious harmony and
ensuring the protection of religious minorities (Thio, 2017). Secularism in
Singapore, embodied by the institutionalization of MUIS as an arm of the
state, is not ideological, but rather pragmatic, and can aptly be understood
as ‘secularism with a soul’ (Thio, 2012). Lily Zubaidah Rahim views the
state’s management of religion in a more critical light, arguing that the
PAP intermeshes religion with politics as it deems fit, while simultaneously
advocating their separation: she terms this as ‘strategic’ secularism (Rahim,
2012). Apart from MUIS, the state has managed to informally co-opt other
religious organizations and leaders such as Pergas, Habib Hasan Alatas
(the influential imam of Baalwie Mosque), Ustaz Ali Mohamed (the imam
of Khadijah Mosque) and others (Mutalib, 2012, pp. 76-77; Abdullah W. J.,
2016). The ulama’s relationship with the state will be explicated in Chapter 4.
Apart from organizations and the ulama, the state has also courted the
intelligentsia with some success. Rodan considers the Nominated Member
of Parliament (NMP) scheme as the archetypical mode of co-opting dissent
without conceding political power (Rodan, 2009). The NMP is an electoral
innovation whereby nine seats in Parliament are reserved for non-elected
members representing various sectors (arts, culture, the sciences, business,
industry, social or community service, and the labour movement) (Abdullah
W. J., 2016). When a person is selected to be an NMP, he/she is given an outlet
to formally participate in the system, and is thus less likely to air their
18 The current Secretary-General of NTUC is Ng Chee Meng, A Minister in the Prime Minister’s
Office. His predecessor was Chan Chun Sing, Minister for Trade and Industry.
grievances through other means. Since the debate takes place in Parliament,
the terms of engagement are set within the parameters outlined by the PAP.
Cherian George highlights an entire list of outstanding individuals who
have succeeded in their various fields – the ‘who’s who’ of Singapore intel-
ligentsia – who were eventually co-opted by the state. These include David
Marshall, founder of the opposition Workers’ Party, who became Ambassador
to France in 1978; Tommy Koh, an ‘independent-minded law faculty dean’,
who served as Ambassador to the United Nations and the US; Chan Heng
Chee, a political scientist who was eventually given similar ambassadorial
positions to Tommy Koh; Ho Kwon Ping, who was arrested under the Internal
Security Act in 1977 for his student activism, and was subsequently made
chairman of Singapore Power and Singapore Management University; and
others such as Walter Woon, Chua Beng Huat and Philip Jeyaretnam (son
of JB Jeyaretnam) who sit on various boards which are connected to the
government (George, 2000, pp. 116-118). Then Deputy Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong admitted in 1994 that co-opting such individuals into the
state machinery was a deliberate, conscious strategy by the PAP. He said:
If we have good people, we will try to co-opt them into the PAP and
make them part of the system […] If good people are forced to join the
opposition, then I think we have already failed […] We’ve done the wrong
thing. Why aren’t they able to join us? What are we doing wrong? So I’m
not sure we want to go in that direction. (Rodan, 1996, p. 86)
The PAP evidently does not shy away from admitting that co-optation is an
overt strategy to ensure that there is less dissent in society against its rule.
Lee Hsien Loong’s admission is not surprising: co-opting dissent has always
been the less costly strategy for not just the PAP, but any authoritarian
regime. Repression cannot be used indiscriminately, as doing so would
only motivate more dissent. Thus, the sparing utilization of repression is
accompanied by the deft usage of co-optation. The PAP’s co-optation strategy
is multi-faceted; the party does not just co-opt large organizations, but small
ones and even individuals as well. It does not just formally co-opt these
entities, but does so through informal means as well. This is a point which
will be revisited later; often, activists are given enough incentives – and
sufficient deterrents – to work within the system.
The state of civil society in Singapore thus needs to be assessed. In 1991,
then-Minister for Information and the Arts, George Yeo, who is generally
regarded as an intellectual within the ranks of the PAP, gave a seminal speech
in which he ostensibly championed for expanding civil society. The speech
was not groundbreaking in the sense that it called for PAP’s diminished role
in society; indeed, Yeo emphasized that the country still needed to have
a ‘strong centre’, and that too much pluralism could ‘destroy’ Singapore.
Nevertheless, he advocated a ‘judicious’ pruning of the Banyan Tree in order
to allow more space for (regulated) dissent (Jones & Brown, 1994, p. 81).
Yeo’s call seemed to be congruent with the greater openness promised by
Goh Chok Tong’s premiership; Goh had openly declared that he wished to
have a more consultative approach in governance, in an apparent bid to
distinguish himself from his larger-than-life predecessor. Interestingly,
Yeo used the term civic society instead of civil society: the former refers
to societal entities performing functions which complement the state,
whereas the latter is a broader concept which entails the space between the
individual and the state (Lee T., 2002, pp. 97-98). Hence, even in the speech
which supposedly was a defining moment for the state of civil society in
Singapore, the parameters were still set in such a way that the core ideologies
and fundamentals of the nation were not to be changed, nor challenged; in
other words, instead of uprooting the tree, what is promoted is just some
pruning. Some authors have therefore questioned the state’s approach
toward civil society; Rodan argues that the state has actively suppressed
civil society since Yeo’s speech, (Rodan, 2003) while Terence Lee refers to the
state’s proclamations as merely ‘gestural politics’ (Lee T., 2005). Others have
provided more optimistic analyses. Lynette Chua details the success of the
gay lobby in Singapore, arguing that LGBT (Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and
Transsexuals) activists have been successful in pushing their cause in the
public arena. Crucially though, she attributes this success to the fact that the
gay activists have played by the rules of the state, and have not attempted
to circumvent, let alone trespass the boundaries (Chua, 2014). Another area
in which civil society can claim some achievement is in migrant workers’
rights: the issue has been successfully pushed into the public domain via
civil society movements and activists (Yeoh, Huang, & Devasahayam, 2004).
Both streams of thought can be true at the same time: it is possible that
civil society has both been stifled in some aspects and allowed to grow in
others. The space for civil society must not be understood as monolithic
and consistent across issues. The state jealously guards its core ideologies,
and sets certain Out-of-Bounds (OB) markers which cannot be crossed.
Singaporeans too, by and large, have accepted these ideologies – survival,
meritocracy, multiracialism, as the premises upon which Singapore society
should be built. The fact that the Workers’ Party (WP), the party which is
closest to the PAP in its ideologies, is the best performing opposition party,
and not the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP), which challenges the PAP’s
fundamentals unlike the WP, underscores the point that Singaporeans have
internalized these ideologies (Abdullah W. J., 2017). On these matters, the
state does not allow too much contestation from civil society. When the
narrative of survival was questioned by dissident-scholar PJ Thum, senior
state elites reacted vociferously to his revisionism, casting Thum in a negative
light and questioning his loyalties to the country (Abdullah W. J., 2018). On
the other hand, when the LGBT activists question the state’s handling of the
gay community, the state actively engages with them, and does not castigate
these individuals (Abdullah W. J., 2019). Two points are pertinent. First, the
method of the activists are directly commensurate with the state’s reaction
to them: for civil society leaders or movements who do not challenge the
integrity of state leaders but rather, work constructively with them, they are
given more leeway to operate within the system. Second, the issue at hand
matters as well: the state is more willing to consider dissenting opinions
in matters which are not integral to its overall governance. The LGBT issue
is one such matter. Questioning the state’s narrative on its vulnerability
would therefore be unacceptable; but challenging the state’s position on
the criminalization of sexual acts between males is tolerated. Civil society
is regulated in this particular manner. Activists who violate the acceptable
boundaries – either in terms of subject matter or approach – are met with
harsh criticism, and at times, punitive action. Actors then learn from the past
experiences of other activists, and formulate their own strategies, bearing
in mind the nature of activism that the state is willing to put up with.
The state’s co-optation tactics must be comprehended within the context
of the Singapore state’s aversion to challenges to core aspects of its govern-
ance, within the broader ambit of authoritarian strategies of maintaining
power, and even more generally, the fates of social movements.
2.3 Moving Forward: Understanding Activism in Singapore
This chapter has outlined 1) the theological arguments put forth and used
by Muslims in regard to activism, and 2) the literature associated with social
movements and co-optation. By expounding the religious justifications
for and against activism, a better picture of Muslim activism in Singapore
can be painted. Indeed, many Muslim activists use the exact justifications
propounded by Muslim scholars, which have been explicated in the first part
of this chapter. It is useful to appreciate that these justifications have been
used by other activists – albeit in differing contexts and to varying degrees –
elsewhere. The second part of the chapter deals with the literature on social
movements. Activism usually, though not exclusively, comes in the form of

social movements. It is therefore important to understand the literature on
social movements, the motivations for actors to get involved in activism, the
reactions of states to social movements – which include co-optation – and the
impact of social movements on public policy. By analyzing social movements in
general, especially the writings on co-optation, the actions of Muslim activists
in Singapore can be placed within the broader literature and can be better
understood. An analysis of the Singapore state’s approach toward activism,
and its co-optation strategies, has also been provided, in order to better
appreciate the socio-political context within which these activists operate.
The following chapter will explain the theoretical framework used in
this study.
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3 Argument: Political Opportunities and
Muslim Strategies
Abstract
This chapter lays out my argument. Firstly, I define and problematize the
contentious categories used in the book: ulama, liberals, and conservatives.
Subsequently, I delve into the agent-structure debate that pervades much
of political science, and postulate a way of thinking of the problem, and
then apply it to Muslim activists in Singapore. This is done through an
application of the concept of political opportunities. The argument is
explicated in detail.
Keywords: def initions, liberals, conservatives, ulama, political

opportunities
In the precarious times Muslims find themselves in since 9-11, culminating

perhaps in the election of President Donald Trump amid a rise in right-wing
populism globally, Islam has consistently been under the spotlight. Muslims
have been asked to distance themselves from the actions of a small minority
of Muslims who commit acts of terror. At other times, the religion itself
has been the subject of much discussion. Islam has to be ‘reformed’, the
common assertion goes, such that there is a perpetual search for the Muslim
Martin Luther.1 These advocates often compare Islam with Christianity
and the trajectory the latter has taken; the Christian faith has managed to
break away from its violent, misogynistic and abhorrent past because of
the Reformation, and in the same vein, Islam needs to undergo a similar
process in order for it to adapt to the modern world. It is not the objective
of this book to delve into the merits and paradoxes of the growing calls
1 Roula Khalaf, “The Search for a Muslim Martin Luther,” The Financial Times, 14 January 2015.
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/56682e1e-9bd7-11e4-b6cc-00144feabdc0.html#axzz43YFHzXZv.
Accessed 18 July 2019.
doi: 10.5117/9789463724012_ch03
for an Islamic Reformation (apart from the observation that it does seem
bizarre to hold all Muslims, and Islam itself, accountable for the actions
of a miniscule minority amongst them), but it is instructive to recognise
that much of the discourse surrounding Islam has largely revolved around
security. The threat of Muslim terrorism has generated many responses.
States have tried to promote the idea of the ‘moderate Muslim’; others have
proposed a Reformation of Islam, as already mentioned; and some enlist the
help of the ulama to disavow and counter the propaganda of the terrorists
(Hassan and Pereire 2006). Often, the state has to engage with various
groups of Muslims in order to build a broad-based coalition. Yet, states
also exclude some categories of Muslims in order to define what types of
‘Islam’ are acceptable. The process of defining and delineating acceptable
versions of Islam is inherently political. In choosing to prescribe certain
‘Islams’ while excluding others, states often have to work together with some
groups within Muslim communities, and at times, have to disregard others.
This chapter attempts to tease out the different dynamics between
states and Muslim communities. Specifically, this chapter will outline
the theoretical framework that is used to understand how Muslim groups
operate within a political system. I postulate that political opportunities
largely determine the tactics, and successes, of Muslim groups in navigating
the political terrain in Singapore. What happens in reality is that Muslim
groups are not as ideological as they claim to be: ‘liberal’ Muslims are liberal
insofar as the political opportunities allow them to be, and so is the case with
conservatives too. The ulama too are selective in the causes they pursue,
the strategies they adopt, and the statements they issue.
3.1 Ulama, Liberals and Conservatives
To be sure, problems of definition arise in ascertaining these contentious,

and often politically-charged categories, as they always do in the social
sciences. Nevertheless, it is necessary to at least broadly outline the contours
of these categories.
Liberals and Conservatives
The liberal-conservative divide is particularly controversial because it plays

out in politics in the real world in a significant manner. In recent years, the
importance of understanding these categories has been accentuated with the
rise of extremist political parties and populist leaders in the Western world.
Argument: Political Opportunities and Muslim Str ategies 71
Even without the rise in far-right parties, the liberal-conservative divide was
manifesting itself in the ‘culture wars’ involving matters such as LGBT rights,
and abortion. Typically, identifying as liberal or conservative implies adopting
certain stances on both social and economic issues: the liberal left is associated
with advocating more state intervention in the economy while emphasizing
individual rights, whereas the conservative right champions a free market
economy and prioritizes societal order and norms (Hutter 2014). Conservatives
typically adhere to traditions of the ‘ingroup’, argue for respect for conventional
authority figures, and uphold standards of purity, usually based on religious
understandings (Kugler, Jost and Noorbaloochi 2014, 416). Liberals, on the
other hand, value fairness, justice and care for others more (Haidt and Graham
2007). Conservatives emphasize the salience of hierarchy, while liberals assert
the value of equality. In the West, the right is often associated with adherence
to Christianity. This is not to say that the beliefs of liberals and conservatives
are mutually exclusive: to say that conservatives do not bother about equality
would be fallacious, for instance, but their emphasis on equality must be
understood in light of their preference for order and hierarchy. The desire to
protect tradition is essential to the conservative worldview, while the impetus
to change the world for the better is a crucial facet of being liberal.
A few things, however, need to be pointed out. First, not all individuals
think along multiple dimensions: a person who identifies as a liberal may
be doing so solely based on his social position, not economic predisposi-
tions, and vice-versa (Conover and Feldman 1981). Secondly, this book does
not make a normative judgment on whether the liberal or conservative
position is more ‘correct’ or ‘moral’. Indeed, it is not uncommon to see
the liberal worldview being presented as the only plausible and humane
alternative: conservatism is often argued to correspond to authoritarian
values, whereas liberalism is understood as commensurate with democratic
ideals (Suziedelis and Lorr 1973). Prominent conservative figures in the West
have argued that in the media and academia – which are deemed as sites
of liberalism – conservative views are typically dismissed as bigoted and
regressive. However, such assessments are beyond the scope of this study.
The only thing which needs stating in this regard is that both liberals and
conservatives, in actuality, believe that their respective ideologies are the
‘right’ ones, and possess differing standards, precepts and conceptions of
morality. Additionally, self-identifications can be opposed to more objective
evaluations of whether one is liberal or conservative: a person may well be
against gay marriage, abortion, and favour the free market, yet see him/
herself as a ‘liberal’. Thus, it is important to understand self-perceptions
and doing so requires in-depth interviews with the subjects in question.
When applied to Muslims, the terms liberal and conservative become even
more controversial. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there have
been numerous calls for an Islamic Reformation akin to the one Christianity
underwent a few centuries ago. Public intellectuals such as Richard Dawkins
(a world-renowned evolutionary biologist whose stated mission is to ensure
that the God of Abraham disappear from the pages of history as the gods of
Rome and Greece have), Tom Holland (a British historian who argues that
Islam did not begin in Mecca but in southern Israel),2 Thomas L. Friedman
(the three-time Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist), and even politicians
such as the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the 44th American
President Barack Obama,3 have all articulated on different occasions that
Islam needs to be ‘reformed’. The argument put forth by these individuals
is that Islam is at a stage similar to Christianity prior to the Reformation:
in its present form, Islam is either violent, misogynistic, homophobic, or
unsuitable to be practised in the modern world, or any combination of these
attributes. Christianity too, they posit, was at one point in time susceptible
to those dark forces, and the Reformation made it possible for Europe and
Christians to escape the shackles of regressive religion and propel itself
into modernity. Thus, only when Islam undergoes a Reformation would it
be possible for the faith to be fully adjusted to the modern era.
This claim is problematic for a few reasons. For one, the assumption by
these proponents is that Islam and Christianity share similar historical
circumstances and future paths, which is more presumptuous than evidence-
based. Islam and Christianity have had major differences from the outset,
not least of which is the nature of religious authority in the two faiths. While
Christianity had a papal system which centralized power in one or a few
religious-political elites, religious and political authority had largely been
kept separate after the death of the Prophet and the first five Caliphs of
Islam, which meant that political and spiritual authority was combined for
only forty years of Islamic history.4 Essentially, for the bulk of the existence
of the Muslim ummah, spiritual authority resided in the ulama, or the men
(and women) of knowledge, not in the ruling elites (Hallaq 2004). This is not
2 Thomas L. Friedman, “An Islamic Reformation,” The New York Times, 4 December 2002. https://
www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/opinion/an-islamic-reformation.html. Accessed 18 July 2019.
3 Glen Owen, “Tony Blair Says Murder of Lee Rigby PROVES ‘There is a Problem within
Islam’,” The Daily Mail, 1 June 2013. Accessed 21 March 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2334451/Tony-Blair-says-murder-Lee-Rigby-PROVES-problem-Islam.html.
4 They are Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman Ali and Al-Hasan, who are regarded as pious Companions
and/or family members of the Prophet by Sunnis. Shi’ites, however, dispute the spiritual authority
of the first three since they were not blood relatives of the Prophet.
to say that politicians did not seek to utilize Islam out of expediency, and in
fact, more often than not, they did attempt to do so. However, the Muslim
community had long accepted that the custodians of the faith should be
the people who understood the word of God and the Prophetic traditions
best, and not those in charge of governance. Moreover, the postulation by
the advocates of an Islamic Reformation seems to ignore the fact that the
event was accompanied by many years of violence, repression, oppression
and injustice. It does seem like a whitewashing of history when one portrays
the Christian Reformation as a bloodless and completely constructive
occurrence.
The problems with a call for a Reformation in Islam notwithstanding,
such advocacy is not limited to Western personalities. Some Muslims or
ex-Muslims have vociferously championed for a similar paradigm shift.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a former Muslim of Somali origin who became a Dutch
politician, argues for a wholesale reform of Islam to the point of abandoning
core theological beliefs, as does Irshad Manji, a Canadian Muslim who is
openly lesbian (Manji 2003, Ali 2015). These personalities often invoke the
language of liberalism and individual liberty.
The core thrusts of these arguments resemble those of the ‘liberal Mus-
lims’, even if Manji and Ali are not regarded as serious intellectuals by liberal
Muslims. These Muslims tend to challenge established hierarchies within
the faith; prioritize individual liberty; question classical interpretations of
the Quran and commentaries on hadith, and on occasion, even contest the
authenticity of hadith which are accepted by the general Muslim populace or
the entire hadith corpus itself; and further seek to ‘reform’ Islam by discard-
ing patriarchal views espoused by Muslim ulama. The sites of contestation
for these liberals often involve women and LGBT rights: for instance, they
question the fairness of traditional Islamic inheritance laws which endow
men with more portions of the wealth than women, and champion the
acceptance of LGBT Muslims. Liberals are also referred to as ‘Progressive
Muslims.’ An example of a liberal or progressive group which is not regarded
as heretical (but is still considered to be deviant by some Muslims) is the
Sisters in Islam (SIS) civil society organization in Malaysia, which champions
gender equality. More examples of notable liberal/progressive Muslims will
be given later.
Conservatives, on the other hand, are those who ‘adhere to traditional
understandings of jurisprudence, accept the authority of the Quran and the
Sunnah of the Prophet, and abide by the religious authority of the ulama
as authoritative interpreters of religious scripture’ (Abdullah 2017b, 346).
These could include Muslims who are generally referred to as ‘traditionalists’
in the literature, who generally adhere to one of the four Sunni schools of
jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafii and Hanbali), and the Salafis, who ad-
vocate a return to the ‘purity’ of the teachings of the Quran and the Prophet,
and who typically do not adhere to one single school of jurisprudence.5 It
is not true that Salafis do not subscribe to the authority of the ulama, as is
commonly assumed. Rather, the Salafis would argue that Muslims should
not put any single alim on the same level as the Prophet, such that he needs
to be followed unconditionally; although some of them may very well be
guilty of the same and put different ulama – such as Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328)
and Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyya – on a pedestal. Nevertheless, Salafis draw
upon the same corpus of knowledge as Sunnis, although the class of ulama
they regard as authoritative is much narrower than Sunnis.6
The category ‘conservatives’ may encompass any theological inclination,
as does the term ‘liberal’. That is to say, there may be conservative or liberal
Sunnis and Shias.
The examples of Manji and Hirsi were given, in tandem with the Western
supporters of Islamic Reformation, to highlight the difficulties involved
when defining liberals and conservatives: there are political points at stake.
The champions of Islamic Reformation are typically treated with contempt
by Muslim communities, as they would see the former as outsiders trying
to meddle with the Islamic faith. By extension, Muslims who postulate the
same would then be seen as ‘tools’ of the West.7 Liberal Muslims face similar
accusations, even when they do not go as far as Hirsi Ali and Manji who
call for the discarding of traditional, core Islamic beliefs. It is not uncom-
mon to see the term ‘Liberal Muslim’ being bandied about to discredit
one’s intellectual adversary. Some refuse to identify themselves as ‘Liberal
Muslim’ despite their obvious proclivities precisely because of the negative
connotations associated with the term, though others embrace it.
Other definitional difficulties arise. As is the case with the left-right
division, some people do not neatly fall into one category. Tariq Ramadan
is a classic example. He has been an advocate of ‘reform’ in the Islamic
world, arguing that Muslims need to reinterpret certain texts in fresh ways.
However, unlike Hirsi Ali or Manji, Ramadan does so by drawing upon
5 Salafis also typically abide by the Hanbali school of theology which is characterized by its
literalist approach toward understanding God and His attributes.
6 For instance, the influential philosopher Al-Ghazali (d. 1111) is largely revered by Sunnis,
but criticized by many Salafis.
7 A conservative activist interviewed said that he considers liberal Muslims to be at best, a
‘useful idiot’ for the West, or someone who is unwittingly used by Western forces to propagate
its ideologies and values, and at worse, a sell-out.
classical sources, and most definitely does not attempt to disavow theological
tenets of the faith: in his words, he intends to reform the Muslim mind, and
not Islam itself (Ramadan 2004). Incidentally, Ramadan is accepted by many
mainstream Muslims as an authority on the subject matter, unlike Hirsi
Ali or Manji. Furthermore, some Muslims may be conservative on certain
issues yet liberal on others. Even the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are
not monolithic: within the liberal category, some may be more liberal than
others, and likewise for the conservatives. Undoubtedly, these problems
make the categories more arduous to define, which is why greater care needs
to be exercised. Nevertheless, broadly, the terms liberals and conservatives
may be useful in understanding the power dynamics within Muslim societies
and in ascertaining state-Muslim relations.
The two categories of Muslims – ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ – compete for
political influence as much as they do for ideological supremacy. By political
influence, I do not mean to say that they necessarily wish to enter partisan
politics and contest in elections (though some do). Rather, I contend that
these groups wish that their ideas of what ‘Islam’ is about, and is meant to
be, become dominant in the psyches of Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
At times, they jostle for the mantle of who ‘speaks for Islam’, and in doing
so, may attempt to court the attention of political elites. This competition
for access to power will be one of the core topics of discussion in the later
parts of this book.
The Ulama
The ulama refer to Islamic religious scholars. Literally, the term refers to
people of knowledge. The ulama are inheritors or heirs of the Prophets, as
a hadith of the Prophet goes.8 The ulama believe staunchly in this task of
theirs: as the people who understand God’s and the Prophet’s words the
most, they have taken it upon themselves to be the ‘custodians of the faith’
and the guardians of authentic Islamic teachings (Esposito and Voll 2001,
Zaman 2002). Assuming the mantle of becoming the ultimate arbiters
in what is ‘Islamic’ or otherwise is of course not merely a theological or
jurisprudential matter; the process is an inherently political one as well.
As such, power dynamics should not be neglected in any analysis on the
ulama, a point which will be returned to later. Continuing the Prophetic
8 From my interviews with the ulama, not just for this project, but for other works of mine
dealing with ulama in other countries, they invariably mention this hadith when explicating
their roles and responsibilities.
mission entails clarifying what scripture means, interpreting scriptural texts

in accordance with the contexts in which they are revealed, defending the
faith from distortions, and commanding good while forbidding evil (Cook
2001 ). Ibn Rajab Al-Hanbali, a classical scholar who wrote a treatise on the
ulama, writes that the ulama ‘succeed the Prophets in their communities
in the sense of calling people to Allah and to His obedience, prohibiting
rebellion against Allah and defending His religion’ (Al-Hanbali 2001, 49).
As with any category, delineating the parameters of who is an alim
(singular of ulama) involves exclusion: denoting who is an alim also means
defining who is not. Naturally, there are competing claims as to who deserves
the title of heirship to the Prophet, as the process is inevitably linked with
political and personal imperatives. Those difficulties notwithstanding, an
alim can be defined as someone who has received religious training with a
proper chain of learning that reaches the Prophet – be it in the madrasahs
(Islamic schools), pondoks (traditional Islamic centres of learning in the
Malay world), or in modern Islamic universities –, and is recognized as one
by other ulama (Reichmuth 2004). There are two facets to this definition:
the first is an objective criteria which can be easily discerned by a person’s
religious education and training; the second is more subjective as it requires
the validation of other ulama. One may find similarities between this and
the peer-review system in academia: an academic article will be published
if it is deemed to be worthy of a scholarly contribution, by other experts
working in the field. As with the peer-review system, the process of being
recognized by your peers, though robust, is not without its flaws. Personal,
not professional, considerations, may cloud judgments on whether a person
should be considered as part of the ulama community. Moreover, it is com-
mon for the ulama to encounter detractors from amongst their peers. The
famous medieval scholar, Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 1240), for instance, is lauded by his
followers as a great jurist and saint, yet is considered to be heretical by
some ulama (Knysh 1999).
In Singapore, there is an attempt to institutionalize and bureaucratize
the process of defining and identifying ulama. As mentioned in Chapter 1,
the Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS) was set up in 2004, and made
compulsory in 2017, whereby religious teachers are regulated. In fact, the
Asatizah Recognition Board (ARB) gets to decide who is worthy enough to
be a religious teacher in Singapore. The ARB is under the purview of MUIS,
which is an arm of the state. Essentially, the ARB – a panel which comprises
senior ulama – is able to define who is an alim or otherwise. There have been
notable omissions. Noor Deros, an independent alim who is known for his
critical views on the conventional banking system and modern capitalism,
was not certified by the ARB, not because he was lacking in credentials,
but because his religious views were deemed to be not suitable for the
Singapore context (Abdullah 2018a). Murad Said, a formerly accredited
religious teacher, had his name removed from the ARS list as he was alleged
to have propagated extremist views.9 Murad was subsequently placed on a
Restriction Order under the Internal Security Act.
In spite of the contestations surrounding the definitions of the ulama,
generally, the ulama are accepted as authorities on Islam, and at times,
the arbiters between truth and falsehood. Of course, this does not mean
that the authority of the ulama is not challenged; indeed, this study will
document specific instances in which the ulama are criticized and their
decisions are put under the spotlight. The former Mufti of Singapore, Syed
Isa Semait, mentioned that he was labelled as a ‘lackey of the government’
for some of his stances: at times, this criticism even came from within the
ulama community (Hussain 2012, 61). Yet, it must be noted that the authority
of the ulama did not reside in one single figure or group, but rather, in the
juristic enterprise (Hallaq 2004). Hence, while their authority has never
been unbridled, significant respect is accorded to the ulama class, and what
they represent, by Muslim communities.
The ulama in Singapore generally adhere to the Shafi’i school of thought
and tend to be more conservative, though some are Salafi in orientation.
However, there is a small group of ulama who are more liberal in their
outlook, and this will be discussed further in the next chapter.
3.2 Agent versus Structure
In the fields of political science, sociology and economics, the agent-structure

debate has been one of the perennial points of contention. The debate on
whether ‘agents’ or ‘structures’ matter more has methodological, ontological
and epistemological implications for how scholars choose to approach
these various disciplines. As articulated by Alexander Wendt, the agent-
structure problem is the direct consequence of two simultaneous truisms
about social life: ‘1) human beings and their organizations are purposeful
actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which
they live; and 2) society is made up of social relationships, which structure
9 Faris Mokhtar, “Former Ustaz Was Spreading Extremist Ideas on Facebook,” Today, 16 Janu-
ary 2019. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/former-ustaz-spreading-extremist-ideas-
facebook. Accessed 30 April 2019.
the interactions between these purposeful actors’ (Wendt 1987, 337-338).

While Wendt was discussing the problem in the context of international
relations theorizing, the analysis can be applied to any social phenomenon.
Do agents or structures matter more? Are the two related, and if yes, how
so? Are they mutually constitutive, or does one cause or shape the other
more significantly? Are the answers to these questions consistent over
space and time?
One may look at two seminal studies on revolutions and social change,
which is directly related to this book, to see how the agent-structure de-
bate pans out. Theda Skocpol’s influential book on revolutions argues for
a structural approach to understanding why revolutions occur; whereas
Samuel Popkin’s The Rational Peasant investigates revolutionary action
by peasants via the lens of individual agency (Skocpol 1979, Popkin 1979).
Skocpol views revolutions as a result of challenges to and a break-down in
existing state structures, due to international conditions and class struggle.
Popkin, on the other hand, adopts the rational choice method, and asserts
that peasants are extremely rational and calculative individuals, who base
their actions on cost-benefit analyses. The former largely discounts agency
of individuals through her single-minded focus on structure, while the latter
does not see structures as insurmountable or as less important than agency.
For the purposes of this book, this is why the debate is relevant. It is
vital to assess how and whether agents, in this case, the ulama, liberals and
conservatives, are responsible for social change; how individual activists
react to given structures; how structures are formed and understood in the
first place; and what are the structures that matter in Singapore. To do that,
a further exposition of ‘agent’ and ‘structure’ is due.
Agency can be defined as ‘the ability to choose among different courses
of action, to learn from previous experience, and the effect change’ (O’Neill,
Balsiger and VanDeveer 2004, 155). The homo economicus (economic man)
encapsulates the emphasis of agency given by some scholars, especially in
the realm of economics, sociology and political science: humans are as-
sumed to be fully rational, have close to perfect information, and make their
decisions on cost-benefit analyses (Cramer 2002). Thus, action occurs when
individuals, or agents, decide that the benefits of undertaking a particular
course outweigh its costs, and vice-versa. Methodological individualism, the
approach that places the agent as the focus of analyses on social phenomena,
has its roots in the Enlightenment (Hodgson 2007). Post-enlightenment,
individuals were assumed to possess far more autonomy than they ever did,
and were at the mercy of their own decisions, and not others’. Concomitantly,
the elementary unit of social life becomes the ‘individual human action.’
(Elster 1989, 13) Elster is one of the most vigorous defenders of methodologi-
cal individualism: in his critique of Marxist thought, which he deems to
excessively concentrate on class to the point of dismissing agency, he states
that social phenomena ‘are in principle explicable in ways that only involve
individuals – their properties, their goals, their beliefs, and their actions’
(Elster, 1985a, 5). Apart from Elster, Karl Popper and Watkins were two other
notable scholars who advocated this approach (Miller 1978). Popper described
methodological individualism as the ‘unassailable doctrine’ to make sense of
all social phenomena, essentially rendering the other approaches defective
(Popper 1957). Watkins was even more pointed. Consider the following quote:
Every complex social situation, institution or event is the result of a

particular configuration of individuals, their dispositions, situations,
beliefs, and physical resources and environment. There may be unfinished
or half-way explanations of large-scale social phenomena (say, inflation)
in terms of other large-scale social phenomena (say, full unemployment);
but we have not arrived at rock-bottom explanations of such large-scale
phenomena until we have deduced an account of them from statements
about the dispositions, beliefs, resources, and interrelations of individuals.
(Watkins 1957, 106)
Proponents of structuralism, on the other hand, maintain that structures

are what should be studied, for the simple reason that they are better
independent or explanatory variables. Structures can be understood as
‘patterns of social life that are not reducible to individuals and are durable
enough to withstand the whims of individuals who would change them’
(Hays 1994, 60-61). In essence, structures exist independently of the agents
who occupy them (Clark 1998, 250). This means that structures shape and
constrain individuals, more so than the other way round. Emile Durkheim
writes that structures, or what he refers to as ‘social facts’, are ways ‘of acting,
whether fixed or not, capable of exerting over the individual an external
constraint; or: which is general over the whole of a given society whilst
having an existence of its own, independent of its individual manifestations’
(Durkheim 1982, 59). The implication is clear: agents, no matter how much
they wish to, cannot easily transform structures and instead, have to work
within those confines. In a similar vein, Douglass North points out that
institutions are ‘sticky’: once formed, institutions gain a life of their own
and produce their own language, norms and modes of functioning, and it
becomes difficult for institutional change to occur (North 1990). For North,
institutions, once put in place, would likely remain for a long time, making
them more worthwhile to be studied than other elements. The structural

approach is favoured by Marxists, who view class as the most important
structural condition, and by many international relations theorists who
perceive the international system as a given and a superstructure, and states
as black boxes which do not need unpacking (Doty 1997).
Building on the works of authors who have been critical of the ‘false
dichotomy’ presented in the agent-structure debate (Clark 1998, 247), I
argue that ‘agents’ and ‘structures’ should be understood in relation to
each other. The concept of political opportunity structures, which is used
in this book and will be expounded in the next section, will be utilized in
a similar vein. Like Sharon Hays, who asserts that the proponents of the
‘agency’ and ‘structural’ arguments are ‘talking past each other’ (Clark 1998,
247), I combine aspects from both sides of the debate. Hays postulates a
fresh way of looking at structures, based on three features. First, structures
are indeed created by agents. Therefore, these structures should not be
perceived as eternal or immortal, since the very act of creating means that
they can be un-created or reversed. Agents are perpetually recreating these
structures. Immediately, such an understanding of structures requires one
to seriously consider and explore the role of agents and agency. Second,
she posits that structures should not just be seen as constraining human
behaviour, but also as liberating human action. Structures could constitute
the fundamental way in which humans think, behave and make decisions.
She uses Durkheim to illustrate her argument: ‘Through the practice of moral
rules we develop the capacity to govern and regulate ourselves, which is the
whole reality of liberty’ (Hays 1994, 61). Third, she proposes a straightforward
and uncontroversial, yet nuanced, point that structures should not all be
put on the same level: some structures are stronger than others. In practice,
this observation translates to some structures being more malleable than
others, and in those circumstances, agency needs to be looked at seriously.
Understanding Hays’ analysis is instructive for comprehending this book.
Structures are indeed the creation of agents, and therefore, agents will
recreate, or at least attempt to, those structures. Various structures apply in
the case of Muslim activists in Singapore. The state, and its attendant ideolo-
gies, is one-party dominant and adopts an interventionist attitude toward
secularism. Ultimately though, it is Singaporeans themselves who have
voted in the ruling party consistently, and as already described previously,
while the electoral playing field is slanted against the opposition, elections
are never fraudulent in Singapore. This means that Singaporeans, or agents,
choose to live under the structure of a dominant one-party system, with its
ideologies. To be sure, some of these activists may not have voted for the
PAP, though some do. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the structures of
the state are a result of the approval of its citizens, whether overt or tacit.
At the same time, some structures are far more formidable and resistant
to change than others. Again, the political system is relevant here. As a
dominant one-party state which has received the lion’s share of the votes in
every single election – in the latest 2020 election, the PAP attained around
61.2% of the valid votes – the ruling party is extremely powerful and is
able to shape Singapore society in its own image (Tan 2013). No doubt, no
state, however dominant, is fully insulated from public pressures, but some
states are still more insulated than others. The PAP is one such ruling party.
How this translates in real life is that often, the PAP sets the rules of the
game, and actors respond to it. Some actors push the boundaries, and in
the process widen them; others challenge these boundaries and come at
the receiving end of punitive state retribution; and most work within the
confines of what the state deems acceptable. Even when actors choose to
play by the rules, the important thing to recognize is that it is a choice they
exercise: thus, even in the extreme case of constricting political opportunity
structures, agency must still be studied. Ultimately, actors can choose to
go against the PAP in an overt manner through their activism, and if they
do not, that decision must be recognized as a wilful act.
Another structure that is germane is the religion of ‘Islam’ itself. As with
any definition, the term ‘Islam’ excludes certain understandings. That is
to say, when one defines what Islam is, one is also making judgments on
what it is not. As with all faith traditions, Islam comes with its own sets of
theological beliefs, norms, and practices, conferring certain expectations
on what it means to be Muslim. And just as with other religions, what
constitutes ‘correct’ theology or jurisprudence differs across Muslim com-
munities: Muslims have long held various opinions on different matters.
Theologically, Sunnis and Shias disagree on the issue of rightful heirship
to the Prophet, but on other jurisprudential matters as well: for instance,
while both groups affirm the obligation of the five daily prayers, Shias
believe it is permissible to combine the noon and afternoon, and the evening
and night prayers every single day, while Sunnis are allowed to do so only
under certain conditions, such as travel and sickness. Even within the
Sunni corpus of knowledge, the ulama have held vastly diverse opinions
on numerous matters: the Shaf i’i school, for instance, states that one’s
ablution is nullified when one has physical contact with a member of the
opposite sex, while the other three schools of jurisprudence disagree (Jackson
2000). Salafis are against the celebration of the birthday of the Prophet, the
mawlid, while Sufis-traditionalists consider it a momentous occasion in the
Islamic calendar (Sedgwick 1997). However, in spite of these multitudes of

differences, there are certain beliefs and practices which are considered
orthodox and mainstream, and others which are not. The process of defining
‘orthodoxy’ is, of course, one which is not just theological, but political as
well: various factions jostle for the right to define what the ‘true’ Islam is.
Nonetheless, there is still a sense of what ‘orthodoxy’ means in Muslim
societies. Typically, it entails belief in the core tenets of the faith, especially
the Oneness of God and Prophet Muhammad as His Messenger, the Prophets,
the Books (especially the Quran as the unadulterated word of God), the
Angels, and the Day of Judgment; and affirming the fundamental practices
such as prayer, zakat (compulsory alms-giving), fasting in Ramadhan, and
performing the hajj at least once in a lifetime for those who can afford
to do so (Esposito 2002). More controversially in today’s era, orthodox or
mainstream Islam recognizes marriage as a union between a man and a
woman, and does not accept gay relationships as permissible within the
faith. There is a point to be noted here: what is considered orthodoxy may
differ across space and time, and ‘orthodoxy’ may evolve. At point in time,
for instance, celebrating Nisfu Shaaban (the middle of the month of Shaaban
which precedes Ramadhan in the Islamic calendar) was considered to be
a deviant activity by the ulama of Syria; however, now, the event is pretty
much a staple of mainstream Sunni Islam (Talmon-Heller 2007, 244-245).10
There are always individuals and groups who challenge and seek to redefine
‘orthodoxy’, and they adopt various strategies in their quest. The liberal
activists in Singapore are amongst those who attempt to do so, as will be
discussed later. Some of the liberals propagate mores which other Muslims
find objectionable, for example, the discarding of classical inheritance
laws. As Talal Asad perceptively notes, while not discounting the concept
altogether, orthodoxy must be understood in relation to power. ‘Wherever
Muslims have the power to regulate, uphold, require, or adjust correct
practices, and to condemn, exclude, undermine, or replace incorrect ones,
there is the domain of orthodoxy’ (Asad 2009, 22). What is orthodox is thus
subject to contestation at times.
Islam itself is a structure which can constrain and liberate agents.
When activists profess to be Muslim, they are bound by certain creeds
and must champion their causes without undermining those doctrines
10 In fact, the Nisfu Shaaban, much like the Mawlid, has become the archetypical symbol of
traditionalist Islam, so much so that traditionalists would use it as the yardstick by which a
person is considered to be of the ‘mainstream’. This is in order to distinguish themselves from
the Salafis.
(or at least without being seen to do so). At the same time, as individuals
who subscribe to the faith, they are involved in the process of defining, and
redefining, it. As agents, even if the ‘structure’ of Islam limits them in some
ways, they engage in attempts to reshape the structure by redrawing its
boundaries. Again, some boundaries are much harder to contest than others:
for instance, the oneness of God and the Prophet-hood of Muhammad are
quintessential Muslim beliefs that Muslims are uncompromising on, and
are thus less malleable. Others, such as the position of women in society,
are more amenable to change. Thus, activists have ‘the ability to choose
among different courses of action’, as O’Neill, Balsiger and VanDeveer
(2004) defines agency, even if they must exercise their choices within the
structures they operate in.
3.3 Political Opportunities and Agency
The modern nation-state is an institution which attempts to monopolize

authority: loyalty to the nation-state is paramount and all other allegiances
are expected to come after. The phrase ‘love it or leave it’ encapsulates the
level of devotion a citizen is supposed to display toward the nation-state.
Often, criticisms toward one’s nation are used by political opponents to
question the critic’s sense of belonging, and in fact, citizenship status
as well. While this is true of all nations, the situation is accentuated in
countries where the ruling party is the state. In Singapore, where there
has been only one ruling entity, party ideologies are national ideologies:
criticism toward the party’s fundamental approaches to government
may be construed, or misconstrued, as critiquing the ‘country’ as well.
Responding to dissident historian PJ Thum’s claims that Operation Cold
Store, an operation prior to merger with Malaysia in 1963 in which the PAP
arrested over 100 opposition leaders and activists under charges of being
communist, was a political hatchet job and that the threat of communism
was exaggerated, Bilahari Kausikan – a former top diplomat and staunch
ally of the ruling party – said:
The key challenge is internal: that a new generation of Singaporeans will

take the achievements of Mr. Lee and his comrades for granted and be
persuaded that Singapore was no longer vulnerable. Some opposition
politicians and their fellow travelers among the intelligentsia have tried to
do just that. They either do not understand their own country and region
or place their personal ambition above the national interest. Fortunately,
as the results of our recent General Election have demonstrated, the

majority of my compatriots do not believe them.11
For Kausikan and others aligned to the state, when one questions official nar-
ratives regarding the vulnerability of the nation-state, one is not particularly
concerned about the national interest. The same can be extended to the PAP’s
other core ideologies, the most relevant of which here are multiracialism
and interventionist secularism. That is to say, when one challenges the
state’s approach to religious management, one runs the risk of being at the
receiving end of harsh criticisms, at the very least, as the example of MP
Faisal Manap, which was raised in Chapter 1, shows.
This means that the political opportunities may be more limited for
agents in a competitive authoritarian state like Singapore, especially as
the ruling regime has a propensity toward treating religion as a potential
source of conflict, and anyone who goes beyond the bounds of the acceptable
ideologies can be subject to much criticism, if not outright censure.
To further understand the concept of political opportunities, I introduce
the work of McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001), in their study of social move-
ments. They argue that the greater the political opportunity structures, the
higher the possibility of the claims of these movements being materialized.
Six features of political opportunity structures were posited:
a. the multiplicity of independent centres of power within the regime

b. the regime’s openness to new actors
c. instability of current political alignments
d. availability of influential allies or supporters for challengers
e. the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim
making
f. decisive changes in items a. to e. (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2009,
263)
Tarrow later argued that political opportunity structures comprise four

elements: the openness of the political process, the stability of political
alignments, the availability of allies, and the existence of conflicts between
the political elites (Tarrow, 2011).
11 “Bilahari Kausikan on ‘The Legacy of LKY’,” Channel NewsAsia, 3 November 2015. Available
at: http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/bilahari-kausikan-on-the/2235302.html.
Retrieved 3 October 2017. The recent GE he was talking about was the 2015 election.
While this is a useful starting point, their work ignores several points.
First, the analysis does not suff iciently consider the agents, be it their
motivations or their ability to challenge structures. The regime’s openness
to new actors, for instance, should not be assumed to just be a function of
the ideologies of state elites, but rather, political exigencies as well, which
would involve how activists are able to push certain boundaries. The case is
similar for the level of repression used by the regime. What the authors do
astutely point out is that political opportunity structure differs from ‘actor
to actor and situation to situation’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2009, 264).
The Singapore case would amply demonstrate this observation: the state is
more open to the involvement of new actors in issues which do not concern
their fundamental principles of governance, such as in the LGBT rights arena,
and therefore exercises less repression. With regard to other matters, such
as the hijab for example, it is less open to the involvement of activists. The
situation is similar for the availability of influential allies: on the matter of
LGBT rights, since it is something the ruling party allows dissent for, there
are members of the ruling elite who both support and oppose the repeal of
Section 377A (a law which criminalizes male homosexual activities), which
means that activists on both sides could draw upon their support for the
cause. In others, however, the state maintains a unified front, such that
there are few allies available. Elite unity has been a remarkable feature
of the PAP; since independence, the party has never experienced a major
split. This is due to the cadre structure of the party, whereby there are
no leadership contests for the top post, and where each cadre is carefully
chosen by senior party leaders. Therefore, the party is able to remain largely
united, since the possibility of fissures is drastically reduced with such a
watertight inception process (Abdullah 2019b).
As with many broad concepts, the notion of political opportunity
structures runs the risk of becoming an all-encompassing term which is a
‘sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment’,
and worse still, if it is used to ‘explain so much, it may ultimately explain
nothing at all’ (Gamson and Meyer 1996, 275). This is why I seek to define
the term political opportunity structures, which I argue, comprises four
aspects. First, the state’s ideological predispositions toward governance in
general, and in this case, religion and Islam specifically. The PAP’s under-
standings of where the OB markers lie basically define what is acceptable
activism. Second, the availability of allies and supporters outside the state.
This is where elite unity matters. The more cohesive the elites are, the
narrower political opportunities are. Third, particular electoral contexts.
In Singapore’s case, as a dominant one-party or hegemonic party system,
the structures are more constricting for activists as compared to countries

with more competitive electoral arenas. Activists cannot readily approach
the opposition to champion its causes, since there is no significantly strong
opposition to begin with. Of course, if the electoral arena gets more competi-
tive, the opportunities for activists widen as well: not only would they be
able to generate more alliances, potentially with the opposition, the costs
for outright repression toward activists would substantially be higher as
well. What needs to be noted is that as things stand, the PAP has managed
to develop institutions which are sturdy, such as the legal and education
systems, and has control over the mass media, bureaucracy, grassroots
organizations, and trade unions. These institutions translate into the PAP’s
dominance being ubiquitous, as it can punish dissidents, socialize citizens
into accepting its ideologies, and prevent labour from organizing as a force.
The First-Past-The-Post and Party Block Vote/GRC (plurality) electoral system
further constricts political opportunities. Unlike Proportional Representa-
tion systems, plurality electoral systems substantially increase the barriers
to entry for opposition parties to make breakthroughs in elections, as more
resources are needed to be successful (Norris 1997, MacKerras 1999).
Finally, the capabilities – personal and social – of the activist in question
form part of the structure. Congruent with the preceding section, any
discussion on political opportunity structures must take into account
agency. Thus, the resources of individuals and groups must be investigated
(Odmalm and Lees 2006): an alim who has been teaching Islam for 40 years
in Singapore and has built a huge following, for instance, has more social
capital than one who is just starting out. Different groups have different
resources, and even individuals within the same group may possess them.
Political opportunity structures can ‘further or restrain the capacity of
social movements to engage in protest activity’ (Kitschelt 1986, 61), depend-
ing on the resources each individual has access to. It is worth mentioning
that political actors can over or under-estimate the political opportunity
structures; these actors may mistakenly perceive the structures to be more
liberating or constraining than they actually are (Oliveira and Carvalhais
2017). This is something which needs to be parsed out through the interviews.
Based on these four components, it is evident that political opportunity
structures for activists are not as wide as in other countries. Neighbour-
ing Malaysia provides a good contrast. Prior to 2018, when the Barisan
Nasional (BN) was in power, the country was a competitive authoritarian
regime similar to Singapore, so much so that Slater remarked that these
two regimes resembled no one else, except each other (Slater 2012, 19).
However, even though both BN and the PAP were dominant one-party
regimes, the political opportunity structures for activists in Malaysia were far
wider. For one, the opposition parties in Malaysia were far more formidable
than their counterparts in Singapore. In 2013, the opposition even won the
popular vote, although it did not manage to form a government due to the
disproportionality of vote share and parliamentary seats made possible
by the First-Past-the-Post electoral system (Ostwald 2013). Moreover, the
BN had experienced many internal splits. These meant that there were
opportunities for the opposition to seek allies from within and outside
the government, and they successfully made those alliances (Rodan 2014).
Both activists and opposition parties formed formal and informal alliances
with defectors from the BN, to the point that the strongest civil society
movements in Malaysia were usually aligned with the opposition. Similarly,
in Taiwan, student activists were able to capture the legislature because
they were able to take advantage of an internal split within the ruling party,
and because of the support they received from the opposition (Ho 2015).
In Singapore, however, the situation is different. There are no meaningful
fractures within the ruling party for activists to exploit. At the same time,
the political opportunities differ for each activist. An activist who has a more
theologically liberal approach toward Islam may find that the structures are
wider for him as compared to a conservative, since he espouses a version
of Islam that the state finds more palatable, and is hence more willing to
accommodate.
Koopmans and Olzak introduce the idea of discursive opportunities,
defined as ‘the aspects of the public discourse that determine a message’s
chances of diffusion in the public sphere’ (Koopmans and Olzak 2004,
202). For them, there are three elements of discursive opportunities: vis-
ibility, resonance, and legitimacy. Visibility refers to how an idea or cause
is given attention in the public space, usually via the media. Resonance is
about provoking reactions to a message, while legitimacy concerns public
reception to a message (Koopmans and Olzak 2004, 203-204). In the case
of Singapore, it is difficult to disentangle discursive opportunities from the
state or from political opportunities. The media is highly regulated by the
state via legislation, and journalists’ ability to put forth messages contrary
to state ideologies are highly limited. No doubt, social media has put a dent
in the state’s ability to have a monopoly over information dissemination, but
through various pieces of legislation described earlier, the PAP still retains
enormous control over the visibility of messages. However, there still remains
some room for activists to take advantage of ‘resonance’ and ‘legitimacy’.
Teo Yeo Yenn’s book, This is What Inequality Looks Like, received national
attention upon its release in 2018. In it, Teo, an Associate Professor and the
Head of Sociology Program at Nanyang Technological University (NTU)

in Singapore, described the plight of the low-income class in Singapore
through ethnographic work (Teo 2018). Teo vividly portrayed details of
living conditions in rental flats in Singapore, and the experiences of those
who dwell in them. The book obviously resonated with many Singaporeans
as it became a bestseller, which is a rarity for an academic book, especially
in Singapore.12 The resonance and legitimacy of the book can further be
seen from the fact that state elites refuted the book on multiple occasions,
sometimes challenging the author’s assertions directly and at other times
making oblique references to inequality and how the state has been success-
ful at tackling the problem.13 The very act of state leaders paying attention to
the book is a nod to how it was gaining traction amongst the public. What
is perhaps most important here is that the book challenged the state’s idea
of meritocracy being an equalizer, as different starting points mattered a
lot in determining outcomes. While one could imagine that the state would
not have been too pleased about the book, Teo did not incur the wrath of the
ruling party to the point that she suffered material consequences, such as a
loss of job or accusations of trying to undermine the stability of the country.
Here, Teo’s position as an Associate Professor at a prestigious university,
and the meticulous nature of her research both matter: the fact that she is
a person of some standing, and that her arguments were based on rigorous
study and not unsubstantiated critiques, meant that the state had to engage
with her at a serious level.14 The discussions on discursive opportunities and
an individual’s own position in determining how an issue is accepted into
the public discourse will be taken into consideration when outlining the
parameters of political opportunity structures, as will be explained later.
Chapter 2 has already described the politics of social movements and
how states deal with them. The politics of co-optation and resistance were
discussed at length, particularly in the Singapore case. Social movements
and individuals are tolerated as long as, firstly, the issue they champion
12 A commentary on the book in a mainstream outlet began with ‘It is not often that a book by
an academic makes the bestseller lists.’ See Bharati Jagdish, “Universal Welfare and Saying ‘No’
to Tuition: Teo Yeo Yenn Goes on the Record About Inequality,” Channel NewsAsia, 20 May 2018,
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/teo-you-yenn-this-is-what-inequality-
looks-like-on-the-record-10246872. Accessed 5 August 2019.
13 Dr. Maliki Osman, a Senior Minister of State, wrote an op-ed responding to Teo’s book.
See Mohamad Maliki Osman, “This is What Helping Families Looks Like,” The Straits Times,
27 June 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/this-is-what-helping-families-looks-like.
Accessed 8 November 2019.
14 The fact that Teo is not affiliated with any opposition party further ensures that she could
not be accused of trying to score political points.
is deemed acceptable by the state, and secondly, they do not adopt overly
confrontational tactics. Muslim activists who have made gains in the public
arena have by and large abided by these two guidelines. The discussion in
Chapter 2 on co-optation, and strategies and motivations of activists, will
be revisited throughout the next few chapters. The typology on Muslim
activists too will be used: as will be seen later, different activists invoke
various theological, and personal, interpretations of Islam, and how they
choose to implement the faith. Different activists quote various traditions
from the Islamic corpus of knowledge, and draw upon both classical and
modern understandings of Islam to justify their positions on activism,
vis-à-vis the state. Ideological slants of the activists do matter in shaping
their worldview on how to operate within the system, although it must be
noted that ideology is not the be-all, end-all factor. Just as ideologies affect an
activist’s demeanour toward politics, politics too could alter one’s ideologies.
After the Arab Revolutions in 2011, Egypt witnessed a shift in the political
stances of many Islamist groups and individuals: some previously quietist
Salafis modified their positions and advocated more active involvement
in the post-Arab Spring Egypt (Al-Anani 2012). The typologies of Muslims
will be discussed further in the following chapters: for now, it suffices to
note that theology matters, but it is not the paramount factor at all times.
Both deprivation, or the perception that one’s rights are lacking in certain
areas, and identity factors matter for activists. When an activist champions
a particular issue, almost by definition, he believes that there is a right that
has been ignored, or a cause that has been sidelined, and wishes to bring at-
tention to that matter. The idea of deprivation may not merely be something
which affects one personally: a liberal activist may argue for the acceptance
of LGBT relationships within Islam and not be gay himself/herself, but
rather, believes that the LGBT community has been abandoned by the larger
Muslim society.15 Similarly, a conservative male activist may be petitioning
for the hijab to be allowed in uniformed groups, even though males do not
wear the headscarf. The perception of deprivation is intrinsically linked to
one’s identity too. The aforementioned conservative male may view it as the
duty of men to be ‘protectors’ of women, and hence, find the hijab issue to
be of supreme significance. The heterosexual liberal may perceive the LGBT
cause as a matter of justice for the disadvantaged and downtrodden, and it
is a crucial part of the liberal identity to defend these groups. The decisions
these actors make are thus wholly ‘rational’. However, unlike assumptions
related to the economic man, the decisions of actors are not always based
15 Interviews with liberal activists will be documented later.

on material costs and benefits. At times, ideological considerations factor

into the decision-making calculus of individuals. Rationality here thus
refers to how agents are aware of the potential benefits and detriments of
their decisions, and thinking in a structured and ordered way to arrive to
that particular decision.
The politics of co-optation detailed at length in Chapter 2 is again use-
ful in helping us comprehend the nature of activism in Singapore. The
state’s motivations are clear: to suppress or prevent opposition or potential
opposition to its policies, co-optation is a far better tool than outright repres-
sion, since the former is less politically costly. The state may also co-opt
individuals and/or organizations if they genuinely align with the state’s
own predispositions, or if they wish to benefit from the latter’s technical
expertise (Saward 1992). For the activists, being co-opted is a choice which
they can exercise. In doing so, they make calculations on how they position
themselves vis-à-vis the government would impact themselves and the
causes they champion. The Weberian and Tocquevillean perspectives on
social movements thus become relevant (Cisar, 2015).
I therefore incorporate endogeneity into the concept of political op-
portunity structures, building on the works of the scholars mentioned, and
argue that an individual’s own abilities should form part of his or her own
structure. This is in line with the conclusion of McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly
that political opportunity structures vary across individuals.
3.4 Main Arguments
Based on the foregoing discussions on structures and agency, I make the

following arguments on Muslim activism in Singapore.
I posit that political opportunity structures, based on the above factors,
are limiting as far as the activists are concerned. The absence of competitive
elections under which the PAP is at genuine risk of losing power, and the
cohesion of political elites, coupled with the party’s aversion to any challenge
to it in the realm of religion, ensures that civil society in Singapore is highly
regulated. Muslim activists are no different. They therefore tread carefully
in their activist undertakings, which are often built in to their strategies
for the causes they pursue. At the same time, bearing in mind the agency
of activists, they still have options. As already mentioned in Chapter 1,
activists could do the following.
First, they could choose to cooperate with the state as much as possible.
This means that activists would have to work hand-in-glove with the state,
support its causes, and even at times, tacitly endorse state leaders and/or
ideologies. An example would be the Dadah itu Haram (Drugs are impermis-
sible) campaign launched by former Senior Parliamentary Secretary for
Ministry of Home Affairs and Ministry of Health Amrin Amin. The campaign
was designed to convince drug abusers, or potential drug abusers, that Islam
frowns upon and forbids the misuse of drugs.16 It was targeted toward Mus-
lims since the majority of drug offenders in Singapore are Malay-Muslims.
Putting aside the criticism that the campaign is redundant because most
Muslims already know that drug abuse is not allowed, and that it ignores
deeper root causes for drug abuse such as familial and socio-economic
problems (Rahim 1998), the government relied on Muslim clerics to support
the movement. Another example would the establishment of the Religious
Rehabilitation Group (RRG), an organization of ulama which assists in
counselling detained extremists in order to convince them that their violent
ideologies are warped and against the grain of Islam (Hassan and Pereire
2006, Abdullah 2017c). In both instances, the ulama’s assistance is required
since the state’s strategy was to channel positive Islamic teachings toward
tackling the problems at hand. When activists cooperate with the state,
they do not run the risk of any reproach, and additionally, may gain access
to certain benefits, which are not necessarily material. RRG, for instance,
is an entirely voluntary project, even if the body is endorsed by the state,
but RRG leaders regularly meet up with ministers and policymakers, and
hence have opportunities to ‘advise’ the government on Islamic matters.17
Many ulama throughout the world have echoed similar sentiments to
explain their cooperation with states, even when such actions prove to be
controversial with Muslim masses. Shaykh Hamza Yusuf was castigated by
many quarters of the American Muslim community when he decided to be a
member of the Trump Administration’s Commission for Unalienable Rights.
Hamza, an enormously popular figure in Western Muslim communities,
has previously been similarly derided for partaking in peace initiatives led
by the United Arab Emirates, to the point of praising the Emirati govern-
ment as ‘tolerant’.18 Many American Muslims were critical of Hamza as his
16 See “Dadah itu Haram Appreciation Lunch 2019 – Speech by Mr. K Shanmugam, Minister
for Home Affairs and Law,” Ministry of Home Affairs, 9 March 2019. https://www.mha.gov.
sg/newsroom/speeches/news/dadah-itu-haram-appreciation-lunch-2019-speech-by-mr-k-
shanmugam-minister-for-home-affairs-and-minister-for-law. Accessed 7 August 2020.
17 The following chapter will document some of the responses by some ulama.
18 Maha Hilal, “It’s Time for Muslim Americans to Condemn Hamza Yusuf,” Al Jazeera,
16 July 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/time-muslim-americans-condemn-
hamza-yusuf-190715130254222.html. Accessed 24 July 2019
agreeing to be part of any Trump Administration enterprises can be seen

as an endorsement of a government which regularly espouses xenophobic
and Islamophobic views. On Hamza’s part, he has been explicit that he
would take any opportunity to provide states with advice if he is given
the chance to do so.19 Ulama and activists who work with the Singapore
government articulate similar thoughts. Herein lies the conundrum facing
those who choose to cooperate with the state. Even if one has the noblest
of intentions and has made the calculation that cooperation would be
more beneficial, especially in causes which are in line with the teachings
of Islam anyway (such as Dadah itu Haram and RRG initiatives), one faces
the risk of being the subject of allegations of ‘selling out’ as Hamza does.
The example of former Mufti Isa Semait being criticized for being a tool of
the state mentioned in Chapter 1 further buttresses this point. The ulama
and activists have to consider the possibility that their credibility could be
tainted by their close association with the state.
The second option is for activists to conduct activism in areas which the
state allows for some contestation, or is simply ambivalent to. Activists could
be tactical and selectively champion causes which the state does not regard
as critical to its legitimacy. The LGBT cause is again relevant here as it is one
issue which does not encroach upon the fundamental underpinnings, and
hence, an area where some dissent is allowed. Both conservative (against)
and liberal (for) Muslim activists have exhibited vociferous tendencies in
their attitudes toward the LGBT cause, which manifests itself in the debate
over the repeal of Section 377A. The section, a statute which Singapore
inherited from its British colonial masters, criminalizes sexual intercourse
between men. The PAP has promised not to enforce the law, but yet choose
to retain it, in an obvious bid to appease both the liberal and conservative
factions of the electorate (Abdullah 2019a). The LGBT issue does not affect
the PAP’s credibility too much, since its legitimacy is neither built on be-
ing a moral bulwark of conservative values nor a champion of individual
liberty. Activists could also choose to be dynamic in fields which are deemed
as ‘apolitical’. For instance, many ulama prefer to teach Islam in solely
spiritual terms, and eschew discussing social affairs such as poverty, rights
of migrant workers, inequality and so on, which are issues which Islam – or
certain interpretations of the faith – may have something to say about. It is
19 He clearly expressed in an interview with the Malaysian TV channel Astro Awani TV

that if he was invited to advise the Chinese government with regard to its treatment of the
Muslim-majority Uyghur population in Xinjiang, he would do so. See https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=RBsHO8R3XZw. Accessed 24 July 2019.
increasingly commonplace to see seminars, talks and courses conducted by

the ulama on how to love oneself, how to improve one’s spiritual condition,
how to be the best version of oneself, inter alia. This is what I term as the
rise of ‘feel-good’ Islam, where the focus of Muslims is directed solely to
matters which may give one a ‘warm and fuzzy’ feeling, but shuns difficult
topics which may inadvertently earn the ire of the state. For these ulama,
and some activists adopt this tack too, they are merely being apolitical.
The ‘apolitical’ trope is used by many Muslim groups elsewhere too: the
case of the Jamaat Tabligh has already been explicated in the previous
chapter. However, as a political scientist would say, there is really no such
thing as being apolitical. Being apolitical is a political stance. When one is
being ‘apolitical’, in essence, one chooses to ignore certain issues which are
uncomfortable for the state, and which may result in a backlash for those
pursuing the cause.
There is a third, more perilous, option for activists, which is to challenge
the state in areas where its legitimacy may be questioned. Needless to
say, activists who embark on this path risk robust reprisals by the state.
Non-Muslim activists such as Jolovan Wham, Kirsten Han and PJ Thum
would probably be the quintessential examples of those who persistently
take on the state. All three have been critical of the state in spheres which
go beyond the OB markers. Han wrote in the New York Times that Singa-
pore was an ‘authoritarian paradise, where critics of the government are
squelched and drug traffickers are hanged,’ and that the PAP had ‘little
time for human rights civil liberties, or even openness and accountability
when there’s something they want to achieve.’20 Jolovan Wham has had
a history of running afoul of the law via his activism: he was charged in
court and convicted in October 2018 for ‘scandalizing the judiciary’ with a
post on Facebook.21 PJ Thum’s criticisms of the PAP’s treatment of leftists
in the 1960s has already been documented earlier. All three of them have
been on the receiving end of either the long arm of the law – as in Wham’s
case – or at the very least, some harsh rebuke by state elites. All three were
declared ‘not patriotic’ by Minister Shanmugam via his press secretary, after
Thum met with Dr. Mahathir and urged the latter to ‘spread democracy’ to
20 Kirsten Han, “What Trump is Learning from Singapore – and Vice-Versa,” The New York
Times, 28 March 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/28/opinion/trump-singapore.html.
21 Selina Lum, “$5000 Fine Each for Activist Jolovan Wham and SDP’s John Tan for Contempt
of Court,” The Straits Times, 29 April 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-
crime/5000-fine-each-for-activist-jolovan-wham-and-sdps-john-tan-for-contempt-of. Accessed
25 July 2019.
Southeast Asia.22 The sharp censure by PAP leaders was hardly surprising:
the PAP had always frowned upon foreign involvement in the domestic
political affairs of Singapore. To make matters worse, Mahathir has long
had a troubled history with Singapore, as he has criticized his neighbour on
numerous occasions, not least because of disputes over the price of water
between the two nations: Thum was therefore, to the PAP, not just asking
a foreign leader to meddle in Singapore’s politics, but he was requesting
a somewhat hostile foreign leader to do so.23 Singapore’s difficulties with
Mahathir were mentioned by Shanmugam’s press secretary in the very same
statement which chastised the three activists. The three individuals then
wrote a letter to PM Lee protesting the criticisms by his party members
on Thum’s visit. Whether Thum and his fellow activists should have been
deemed as almost traitorous is not the point of contention here; rather,
what I wish to highlight is that the three of them are clear examples of
Singaporean activists who challenge the state outright, even in the more
controversial spheres. However, Thum, Han and Wham are really in the
extremely small minority of activists who adopt such a defiant attitude.
The pool is even smaller when it comes to Muslim activists. Two cases are
worth mentioning. The first is Alfian Sa’at, a prominent playwright who
writes critical commentaries of the state’s policies especially on race; and
the second, Ustaz Noor Deros, someone who had his ARS revoked because
his teachings were deemed to be unsuitable to the Singapore context.
Noor Deros is a critic of capitalism and the entire modern banking system
which is based on interest or usury, something he considers to be a major
sin in Islam. The two personalities will be discussed further later; for now,
it is worth noting that Alfian can be considered a liberal, while Noor is a
conservative. Both liberals and conservatives can get into the state’s bad
books, if they so wish to pursue causes which the state finds problematic.24
Being a liberal or a conservative does not necessarily spare a person from
castigation.
22 The three sent a letter of complaint to the Prime Minister after Thum was criticized by
two PAP leaders, including Shanmugam, for the meeting with Mahathir. See “Shanmugam
Stands by Comments Made about Thum: Press Secretary Responds to Activists’ Letter to PM,”
Channel News Asia, 5 September 2018. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/
shanmugam-stands-by-comments-made-about-thum-press-secretary-10687056. Accessed
25 July 2019.
23 Mahathir claims that the 1962 water agreement between Singapore and Malaysia, which
is valid until 2061, shortchanges Malaysia since each gallon of water was sold to Singapore at
three cents.
24 Thum, Han and Wham can also be deemed liberals.
As might be expected, most activists in Singapore, including Muslims,

choose one of the first two options, whatever their orientations may be. That
is to say, both liberals and conservatives typically do not rock the boat, and
work within the acceptable boundaries drawn by the state. The political
opportunities for them are not as wide as in other countries, and activists
are well aware of this. They are not under any illusion that Singapore is a
liberal democracy where more forms of activism would be tolerated, if not
celebrated. If anything, their perceptions are often that the boundaries are
narrower than in reality, which is why they usually do not stray anywhere
near the OB markers. While there are some like Alfian and Noor who choose
the third option, these are by far in the minority. For the majority of activists
who choose the first or second options, they have to be at peace with the
fact that they may not be able to pursue causes which are completely in line
with their ideological predispositions. Liberals and conservatives may not
champion liberal/conservative causes when the political opportunities are
not in their favour. For liberal Muslims, the abolition of the Internal Security
Act (ISA), for instance, is not something which they actively pursue, even
though they believe in individual liberties and would normally be wary of
strong state intervention in the realm of individual rights. This is because
the ISA is framed as a necessary choice for the security and safety of the
nation-state which is obsessed with survival, and challenges to the ISA may
be viewed by political elites as an attempt to contest a core ideology of the
state. For conservatives, on the other hand, even though some of them are
uncomfortable with certain policies such as the equating of conservative
practices with extremism by some politicians, they do not mention so
in public, and choose to remain silent while privately disavowing those
statements. More examples and cases will be discussed in the upcoming
chapters.
Activists conscientiously navigate the political system to maximize their
benefits within this framework. It is worth reiterating that these actors are
typically aware of the potential repercussions of their actions, or inaction.
These activists may of course, like other agents, make miscalculations, and
may over-estimate the probability of state condemnation for instance, and
vice-versa. Nonetheless, that does not mean the decisions undertaken are
not based on rational calculations. These activists weigh the potential costs
and benefits of their actions – made based on available information to them
on state policy and ideologies, and precedents – and choose a particular
course of action. Their idea of what is a cost and a benefit is highly dependent
on their own worldviews and ideologies, and hence, even the very notion
of ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’ differs across individuals. Agency matters, and we
should not assume activists to be mere passive agents who do not know what
their decisions entail, and are completely constricted by external factors.
Yes, political opportunities are important, but so is the agency of activists.
Capitalizing on the system meant that for some activists, at times, painful
decisions had to be made, and certain causes had to be prioritized over
others, and other matters which may close to an activist’s heart be put
on the back burner, or even abandoned entirely. Because of the political
opportunity structures in Singapore, the activists who make the most
gains in the system are those who align themselves with the state, or at
least, do not challenge it, even when such an alliance could cost them some
credibility. These activists are able to push specific agendas which they find
appropriate under such circumstances.
However, in the process, these activists may have to accept that by not
challenging the state, they may end up strengthening authoritarianism. The
state’s core ideologies remain intact, as do most of the policies associated
with those fundamental underpinnings of governance. While these activists
may wish to enact social change, and often they do in fact manage to do so,
they do so within the parameters drawn by the state. Activists have generally
chosen to work within the system, and not dismantle it. As a result, the
system remains as secure as ever, contrary to predictions to the contrary
as embodied in the modernization-democratization theory explained in
Chapter 1. As remarked by Chan, Siddique, Masron, and Cooray:
It is almost impossible to view civil society in Singapore as an independent

social force. Registered NGOs are encouraged to promote the special
interests of their members, engage in social welfare activities, and oc-
casionally act as advocacy groups. The ground rules are as follows: no
entering the political arena and no activities that could lead to social
unrest. Groups which cross these out-of-bounds (OB) markers are sum-
marily dealt with. In the context of religion and state, there is not much
room for religious players to challenge the fabric of what is considered
to be secular. (Chan, et al. 2019, 93)
Herein lies the dilemma for activists: if they play by the rules of the game,
they are endorsing and strengthening the authoritarian state; on the other, if
they do not, they would be ‘summarily dealt with’ (Chan, et al. 2019, 93). This
is one of the reasons why, in spite of a huge middle-class population, there
has not been much clamour for greater democratization in Singapore. Civil
society, which usually leads the way in democratization processes elsewhere,
together with other allies in and outside the state, is pretty much regulated to
the point that it has become a partner in nation-building, not an adversary or

even a check and balance. Again, a contrast with Malaysia would be helpful.
Civil society organizations led calls for greater democratic transparency in
Malaysia prior to 2018, and in doing so, often were on the wrong end of the
law. They conducted open demonstrations, challenging key aspects of the
Barisan Nasional ruling foundations. In 2016, for example, activists in Malaysia
advocating electoral reform under the movement called Bersih (translated as
clean, in a reference to make elections fairer and ‘cleaner’), were arrested by
the police before a protest which was meant to urge Najib to resign.25 Such
brazenness from activists was becoming more commonplace after 2008, when
Barisan Nasional had lost its two-thirds majority of seats in Parliament for the
first time. In Singapore, activists do not undertake similar risks. Of course,
there could be several reasons for that. First, the political opportunities are
different. Even though activists in both countries did face similar risks, in
Malaysia, the opposition was much stronger than in Singapore, and bolder
too, and hence, these activists had allies in parliament. The PAP is also more
electorally popular than the BN was, which means that generally, the electorate
supported the major facets of PAP’s governance. This meant that civil society
could not easily tap into a pool of disgruntled citizens. The aforementioned
Kirsten Han, an activist who does challenge boundaries, admitted that her form
of activism is not exactly supported by the majority of Singaporeans. She said:
I am no longer afraid of being jailed, which is why I can do whatever

activism I want. And I know the majority of Singaporeans do not always
agree with me, which is why I am an activist. Otherwise, I would be a
PA member.26, 27
Second, it is true that for some activists in Singapore, they believe in the
system more than their counterparts in Malaysia did, and hence, do not see
a pressing need to uproot it, but rather, chose to work within it. At the same
time, there are activists who disagree with many fundamental aspects of
the PAP’s governance, but do not actively pursue their points of contention
out of pragmatic reasons. Whatever the reasons, it is definitely the case
that civil society in Singapore is far less confrontational than some of their
25 “Malaysian Police Arrest Bersih 2.0 Chairperson, ‘Red Shirts’ Leader Ahead of Rally,” Channel
News Asia, 18 November 2016. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/malaysian-police-
arrest-bersih-2-0-chairperson-red-shirts-leader-7705658. Accessed 1 August 2019.
26 My correspondence with Kirsten Han, 31 July 2019.
27 PA is the People’s Association, a grassroots body which is affiliated with the PAP.
peers elsewhere are. Activists who do adopt an adversarial approach are in

the small minority, and, by Han’s own admission, do not command support
from the majority of Singaporeans.
The net, perhaps unintended, effect is of such activism by the majority of
actors is that the PAP remains not only electorally secure, but competitive
authoritarianism remains intact too. There is no sustained and systematic
attempt by civil society to champion democratic freedoms and oppose
authoritarian institutions, apart from the spheres within which the PAP
allows for contestation. The concluding chapter will parse out these argu-
ments more, as will the subsequent chapters.
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4 The Ulama: Pragmatism and Political
Acquiescence
Abstract
This chapter investigates the position of the ulama within the political
system in Singapore. It interrogates the various cleavages amongst the
ulama, the strategies they undertake to further causes which they deem
important, the issues they shun, and the thought processes behind their
decisions. The ulama, just like other actors, are pragmatic creatures,
fully cognizant of the costs and benefits of their actions. Different ulama
prioritize various goals, depending on their own worldviews and ranking
of what is important to them. As a result, the ‘pragmatic alim’ is able to
operate within the political opportunity structures in an attempt to
maximize his/her gains, while being aware of what has to be given up in
order to achieve those objectives.
Keywords: ulama, pragmatic, acquiescence, hijab, madrasah, Religious

Rehabilitation Group
You will not find a single person in Singapore who considers himself to
be part of the ulama. You need a deep level of knowledge of the Islamic
tradition. At best, most of us are comfortable being called ustaz (religious
teacher).1
The statement quoted above was largely the sentiment of most, if not all,
of those interviewed for this project, when I had indicated to them that I
regarded them as being part of the ulama fraternity. For them, the term
ulama was enormously significant and carried with it connotations of deep
1 Interview with an ustaz, 19 August 2019. The term ‘ustaz’ will be used subsequently for both
male and female respondents from the ulama fraternity, even if technically, a female religious
teacher is referred to as an ustazah. This is to further ensure anonymity of the interviewees.
doi: 10.5117/9789463724012_ch04
knowledge, stellar character and immense responsibility. No doubt, part of

their reluctance is motivated by a sense of humility and knowing one’s place
within the Islamic tradition: it is quite unbecoming of righteous people to
consider themselves as righteous, since an important part of the Islamic
faith is the suppression of one’s own ego. These religious teachers are well
aware of the possibility of falling into such hubris. At the same time, they
also recognize the responsibilities, and perhaps burdens, of the ulama. It is
rare to see Muslim scholars who would readily and openly admit themselves
to be an alim (singular of ulama), even if they may personally feel that they
fulfil the requisites of being one.
This chapter investigates the position of the ulama within the political
system in Singapore. It interrogates the various cleavages amongst the
ulama, the strategies they undertake to further causes which they deem
important, the issues they shun, and the thought processes behind their
decisions. The ulama, just like other actors, are pragmatic creatures, fully
aware of the costs and benefits of their actions. Different ulama prioritize
various goals, depending on their own worldviews and ranking of what
is important to them. As a result, the ‘pragmatic alim’ is able to operate
within the political opportunity structures in an attempt to maximize his/
her gains, while being aware of what has to be given up in order to achieve
those objectives.
4.1 The Ulama: Roles and Responsibilities
As inheritors of the Prophets, the ulama are regarded as the authoritative

interpreters, and defenders, of the Islamic tradition. The Islamic tradition
is vast and more complex than many would believe, and hence, just like any
other discipline, proper scholarship and training is needed to fully fathom
the intricacies of Islamic jurisprudence and theology. As articulated by
Sheikh Ali Gomaa, a prominent contemporary Muslim alim who is also
the former Mufti of Egypt, ordinary Muslims cannot interpret religious
scripture on their own as the ‘elliptical style of the Qur’an and the Hadiths,
with their constant interaction with the shifting contexts of the Prophet’s
surroundings, makes them incomprehensible at times without context’
(Brown J. A., 2014, p. 287). Gomaa was not enunciating a new idea: he was
merely repeating the thoughts of Muslim scholars who preceded him. Since
a profound knowledge of both text and context is needed to have a sound
understanding of the tradition, the ulama have also – throughout Islamic
history – found themselves to be at the forefront of social change, or as
THE UL AMA: PRAGMATISM AND POLITICAL ACQUIESCENCE 105
Zaman (2002) terms it, they have been the ‘custodians of change’. This is
not to say that the ulama have always advocated change; indeed, at times,
the ulama have been at the forefront of resisting reform. Nonetheless, to
portray them as completely resistant to any form of alterations to the status
quo would be inaccurate. The Singapore experience is replete with instances
of how the ulama have embraced reform in some instances and eschewed
it in others. These will be detailed later.
If Islam is defined as a discursive tradition, as Asad argues, then the
ulama ‘are def ined as representatives of this discursive tradition, as it
has evolved over the centuries’ (Petersen 2009, 28). Drawing on the great
luminaries of the past, they ‘profess their dependence on and commitment
to a great Islamic scholarly tradition, of which they consider themselves
the contemporary representatives’ (Petersen 2009, 28). This means that the
legitimacy of the contemporary ulama rests on their predecessors, which
explains why, at times, the process of change can be laborious since it
would be difficult for them to disavow some of the religious rulings issued
by the ulama of the past. Similarly, in Singapore, many religious scholars
speak liberally of their associations with notable ulama of the previous
generation. Ustaz Syed Abdillah Al-Jufri, (d. 2003) – the former President of
Pergas and Principal of Madrasah Aljunied Al-Islamiah, the most famous
Islamic religious school in the country – for instance, is invoked by many
current ulama, as they attempt to boost their credentials.2 It is common
to hear them say something along the lines of ‘I was fortunate enough to
have studied under Ustaz Syed Abdillah.’ Al-Jufri is still widely respected
amongst both the lay Muslim populace and the scholarly class, which is
why it is not surprising to see him being mentioned often. A connection to
previous generations of ulama who were themselves connected to previous
generations, going all the way back to the Prophet, ensures the authenticity
of teachings and hence, one’s credentials as well.
As mentioned in previous chapters, the Asatizah Recognition Scheme
(ARS) is increasingly assuming greater significance in the bureaucratization
of Islam in Singapore. With the ARS, religious teachers have to get certified
before they teach Islam. Thus, those who are not deemed to be worthy of
being a religious teacher, cannot become one. The criteria here are not
merely academic: even if one has studied at an Islamic institution and has
2 An ustaz is a male religious teacher, and an ustazah is the female equivalent. The terms
are regularly used in the context of the Malay-speaking world, including in Singapore, to refer
to those who teach Islam. The term asatizahs is used to denote the community of religious
teachers.
the necessary educational credentials to be a religious teacher, one can be

denied/stripped of the ARS if one’s views are ‘inimical to social cohesion’, as
stated by Minister of Muslim Affairs Masagos Zulfkili.3 Even private Islamic
educational centres need to get accreditation from MUIS (Abdullah 2018a).
Social cohesion, of course, is dependent on socio-political considerations,
and in the context of Singapore, much of what is ‘inimical to social cohesion’
is defined by the PAP, as several examples given later in this chapter will
show. Those who contravene the law, and still teach Islam even without
getting accreditation, face the risk of being charged.4 The ARS is a powerful
tool at the disposal of the state, and the ulama have no doubts about its
potency. As said by an interviewee:
No doubt, we are all cautious because of the ARS. We would not dare
say anything that could get us into trouble, and get our ARS revoked.
So we just concentrate on non-controversial things. We are definitely
self-conscious and think many times before we speak, because our rice
bowls are on the line.5
Another, while commenting on the ARS, mentioned something similar and

outlined his strategy:
I know that I am at the mercy of MUIS and ARS. Which is why I try to
have a good relationship with the government.6
Dr. Abdullah Othman, the Director of Andalus, a private Islamic educational

centre, expressed his worry that the ARS may deter the ulama from speaking
candidly and bravely on issues facing the Muslim community, as they may
be too worried about their status as accredited religious teachers being
affected.7
The candid nature of the respondents’ replies was somewhat surprising,
but it is clear from the interviews conducted that the asatizahs were fully
3 Hariz Baharudin, “More Than 4000 Accredited Islamic Religious Teachers in Singapore,”
The Straits Times, 12 February 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-more-
than-4000-accredited-islamic-religious-teachers-in-singapore. Accessed 6 August 2019.
4 See the ARS handbook for a thorough explanation of the scheme. https://www.muis.gov.
sg/-/media/Files/ARS/Document/ARS--IECP-Handbook--Final.pdf. Accessed 15 August 2019.
5 Interview with an ustaz, 6 August 2019.
7 “Skim Pengiktirafan Asatizah (Asatizah Recognition Scheme),” Berita Minggu, 22 Septem-
ber 2019, p. 8.
aware of what could be the potential repercussions if they ran afoul of the
state. The cases of those who have suffered such ignominy are few and far
between, but they exist, and hence, the presence of these examples is enough
to have deterrent effects. Ustaz Murad Said and Ustaz Noor Deros are two
prominent examples of those who have been denied the ARS, for varying
reasons. The former was deemed to have preached ‘segregationist’ teachings,
had a ‘binary us versus them worldview’, and taught the ‘primacy of Syariah
law over Singapore’s secular nation-state system.’8 Murad was issued a
Restriction Order under the Internal Security Act – where a person is not
imprisoned but is subject to certain restrictions such as not being able to
travel abroad -9 after he was struck off the ARS list. Unlike Murad, however,
Noor was not considered a security threat. Rather, he was denied the ARS
because the Asatizah Recognition Board (ARB) deemed his teachings to
not be suitable in the Singapore context. This is because he has previously
been critical of capitalism and the modern banking system, and takes
a strict approach towards usury and interest rates.10 Both cases will be
elaborated later.
The duty of teaching the ‘correct’ version of Islam is foremost on the
agenda for the ulama: on this, there is no dispute within the fraternity.
They all agree that the primary responsibility of an alim is to teach Islam
to Muslims. The following quote encapsulates most of the respondents’
take on this responsibility:
It is the role of the ulama to guide the Muslim community with authentic
teachings. Nowadays, people can get their knowledge from everywhere,
especially the Internet. The ulama thus must be well-read and knowledge-
able, in order to perform this duty responsibly. The ulama need to advise the
community when they see something that goes against Islam. Amr ma’ruf
nahi mukar (enjoin good, forbid evil) is an important aspect of being an alim.11
Where there is slight disagreement, is on the secondary roles of the ulama.

For some, the ulama should be singularly focused on teaching Islam, and
8 Hariz Baharudin, “Former Religious Teacher and Student Placed on Restriction Order
under ISA,” The Straits Times, 16 January 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/former-
freelance-religious-teacher-and-student-placed-on-restriction-order-under-isa. Accessed
6 August 2019.
9 The Detention Order under the Internal Security Act, on the other hand, requires that a
person be imprisoned.
10 Correspondence with Ustaz Noor Deros, 5 September 2019.
nothing else should distract them from this focus. The politically quietist
approach adopted by some Muslims has already been discussed in Chapter 2.
In Singapore too, such an ideology exists amongst some of the ulama. A
respondent notes:
Our job is to reach as many people as possible through our teachings.

The ulama should focus on our job, which is to teach Islam, and leave
the rest to others.12
These ulama define their roles in simple terms, and in the process, eschew
any form of political involvement, or even activism.
For others, however, they have additional expectations of themselves and
their colleagues. Some view the ulama as champions of the Islamic faith too,
and therefore, see the articulation of certain rights of Muslims as part of their
job scope. Others see engagement with contemporary issues as necessary for
the ulama, together with reaching out to, and connecting with every segment
imaginable in the Muslim community. Consider the following quotes:
The ulama should be people who not only teach Islam, but also people
who defend Islam and champion the causes of the Muslim community.
While the ulama should not be directly involved in politics, they should
be a form of pressure group and articulate the rights of Muslims. In fact,
the Muslims expect this of people who call themselves ulama.13
The ulama should have a voice in the contemporary issues which intersect
with religion, such as in finance and bio-medicine. As such, the ulama
must not only be equipped with knowledge in the spiritual domain, but
the secular fields too.14
For me, the ulama must be able to reach out to every single Muslim, and
must be able to be very open toward understanding their struggles and
problems.15
From these, it is evident that some ulama have a broader idea of what their
roles entail. The first quote is especially interesting since there is an activist

13 Interview with Pergas member, 3 February 2012, as cited in (Abdullah 2013).
element to it: desiring the ulama to take up the roles of being a ‘pressure
group’ and championing Muslim issues, invariably means some form of
involvement in political affairs.
As mentioned in preceding chapters, while the ulama hold a special status
in the eyes of Muslims everywhere, and even in the legal apparatus of the
Singapore state via the codification and bureaucratization of Islam, their
authority is by no means unfettered. Throughout the history of Islam, the
ulama have had their authority challenged by state actors, other ulama, and
in modern times, Islamists and liberals (Lacroix 2004, Rahnema 2008, Hatina
2010). In Singapore, the ulama have on occasion been on the receiving end
of criticisms by both conservatives and liberals. Both groups have disputed
the validity of several fatwas or stances of the ulama. In 1973, a debate took
place between MUIS and Professor Syed Hussein Alatas, the then-Head
of Department of Malay Studies at the National University of Singapore,
on the issue of cornea transplant. After the then-Mufti Shaykh Isa Semait
issued a fatwa declaring such a procedure to be impermissible, Professor
Alatas wrote a piece in Berita Harian, disagreeing with the premise of the
fatwa (Alatas 2015 ). On another occasion, Shaykh Isa Semait’s statement
in 2002 which stated that seeking knowledge was more obligatory than
covering the aurah – in response to the hijab issue which will be discussed
in a while – was roundly criticized by many conservatives, up till today
(Abdullah 2013).16 The point here is that the ulama, though revered, are not
regarded as infallible.
4.2 Different Groups of Ulama in Singapore
From the self-understandings of the roles and responsibilities of the various

ulama interviewed, it can already be discerned that the ulama are not
homogenous. The ulama are not a monolithic group, even though they are at
times assumed to be. Chapter 2 has outlined the various fault-lines that exist
between ulama in general. This section will outline the cleavages specific
to the Singaporean ulama. A few main categories are identified. Firstly,
the ulama differ along ideological lines. The Sufi/traditionalist schism has
generated much discussion in the public sphere in recent years, and due
attention will be given on this divide since it has political ramifications.
Secondly, the ulama have various political positions. It has already been
16 The aurah refers to the parts of the body which Muslims are required to cover in Islamic
jurisprudence. For women, this includes their hair, which is why the headscarf/hijab is donned.
pointed out earlier that some ulama prefer a quietist stance, while others
see the need for more activism. Some are more amenable to the state, while
others are not as agreeable.
Traditionalist/Sufi-Salafi Cleavage
The traditionalist/Sufi-Salafi divide has indeed garnered much attention in

the popular consciousness, even amongst non-Muslims. Since 9-11 and the
rise of groups such as Al-Qaeda and later on, Daesh, Wahhabism has been
thrust into the limelight, as the rigidity and pedantic nature of this ideology
has been associated with terrorism. Indeed, many terrorists and Muslim
extremists do subscribe to some version of Wahhabism. However, many
Wahhabis are not violent, and are merely puritanical or ultra-conservative.
Moreover, there are non-Wahhabis who have become attracted to terrorist
ideology and have carried out acts of violence too (McCargo 2008). Nonethe-
less, this nuance is often lost on many commentators. Wahhabism has
been described as a threat to normative Islam, and even to the stability of
Singapore as a multiracial and tolerant society. Both Wahhabism’s Muslim
and non-Muslim detractors are vehemently against the ideology and decry
its potential to incite violence and cause harm. Academics Zoltan Pall and
Maarten Bruinessen sounded alarm bells and urged the Muslim community
to confront Salafism/Wahhabism.17 Salafism and Wahhabism are often used
synonymously, even though there are slight differences between the two
terms, as already elucidated in Chapter 2. Salafism is a broader category,
which seeks to reform Islam by going back to the original sources – the
Quran and Sunnah – and strip Islam of superstition and cultural practices
which were not practised by the Prophet. The Salaf refer to the (pious)
predecessors, which is taken to be the first three generations of Islam, based
on the hadith of the Prophet which states that the best people of the Muslim
ummah are the first three generations.18 As the hadith indicates that after
the first three generations, the quality of piety would deteriorate, which
is why for Salafis, the first three generations become the gold standard to
17 Faris Mokhtar, “Islamic Community ‘Must Act to Counter Growing Influence of Salafism’,”
Today, 18 June 2018. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/seen-promote-intolerance-salafism-
comes-under-renewed-scrutiny. Accessed 8 August 2019.
18 The hadith is: ‘The best people are those of my generation, and then those who will come
after them, and then those who will come after them, and then after them, there will come
people whose witness will precede their oaths, and whose oaths will precede their witness.’
Hadith is in Bukhari and a similar version can be found in Muslim. See Sunnah.com, https://
sunnah.com/search/?q=the+best+of+generation. Accessed 8 August 2019.
which Muslims must aspire.19 There are three main features of Salafism. 1)
An adherence to the Hanbali or Athari theology which believes in the literal
attributes of God. For example, when God says He sits on the throne, Salafis
would understand that to literally mean that He sits on the throne, without
any further queries on what that entails. Other Muslims would be more
inclined toward interpreting that phrase metaphorically, that God rules
from His throne. 2) A critical attitude toward rigid obedience to a madhab
of school of jurisprudence. 3) A focus on eliminating bidaah or innovations
from Islam. Because of their combined zeal for protecting the one-ness of
God (tawhid) and disdain for innovations, Salafis tend to adopt harsh stances
toward non-Sunni groups, especially the Shias. Ibn Taimiyyah is perhaps
the central figure of authority for Salafis (d. 1328). Wahhabism, as a subset
of Salafism, concurs on these three matters, but its followers tend to follow
a smaller group of ulama, usually those originating from Saudi Arabia or at
least who are trained there. Some of the ulama they revere include Ibn Baz
(d. 1999), the former Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Al-Uthaymeen (d. 2001), and
Nasiruddin Al-Albani (d. 1999). These ulama are followers of Muhammad
ibn Abdul Wahhab (d. 1792). The Saudi state had entered into a pact with
Wahhabi ulama – the ruling family agreed to adopt and spread Wahhabi
teachings, in exchange for political support from the Wahhabi ulama – and
till today, the religious leaning of the kingdom is Wahhabism (Al-Rasheed
2002). Salafis comprise more than just the strict Wahhabis. I had earlier
noted Tariq Ramadan’s typology which included three forms of Salafism:
the Literalists, the Reformists, and the Political Literalists. Wictorowicz’s
typology of Salafis takes a similar approach. He classifies Salafis into three
main categories. The first are the purists. These are typically politically
quietist, and are more interested in maintaining the purity of Islam, with
their main obsession being the eradication of deviant practices or innova-
tions. In Saudi Arabia, the purists are allies of the state and are given official
positions in the country’s religious bureaucracy. In return, their ‘apolitical’
stance is useful for the Saud family, since they are able to embark on what
would be otherwise controversial courses of action – such as the alliance
with the United States – and are able to snuff out domestic opposition by
claiming religious legitimacy. The ulama in this group use the justifications
provided in Chapter 2 with regard to obeying the ruler, and prioritizing social
order even under conditions of repression, as long as Islam can be practised.
The second group comprises the politicos. Wictorowicz uses the Muslim
19 Traditionalists/Sufis believe in this hadith too, and do regard the first three generations as
the best, but have different interpretations and methodologies on what their practices were.
Brotherhood as the archetypical example for this category. Even though

they generally subscribe to the Salafi school of thought, the Muslim Brothers
were more open to rationalization as a means to engage with contemporary
phenomena such as democracy and elections. The Brothers also were critical
of authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East, including the Saud
kingdom, which set them on a collision course with both the royal family
and the establishment ulama. In spite of their disagreements with various
Arab regimes, the Brothers typically advocated non-violent resistance and
civil disobedience, and tried to uproot the system via peaceful ways. The
third group consists of the Jihadis. The Jihadis were relentless in their criti-
cisms of the Saudi royal family and later on, of the purist ulama for their
complicity in sustaining the regime. The Jihadis advocated violence not only
against the external enemies of Islam, but also, its internal enemies, which
included other Muslims who disagreed with them and especially those who
were perceived to be in cahoots with the West (Wiktorowicz 2006). This
typology is definitely useful, especially if taken in tandem with Ramadan’s.
Although Wictorowitz emphasizes theology more than opportunities as
explanations for certain political outcomes, these trends do exist within the
Salafis, including in Singapore. A respondent informed me that according to
his Salafi teacher, it was impermissible for them to vote for the opposition,
as the leaders of a country must always be supported.20 The teacher was of
course trained in Saudi Arabia, and evidently, subscribes to quietist Salafism.
At the same time, there are other Salafis who actively comment on current
affairs. Salafism is as varied as other ideologies, and should not be assumed
to be a monolith. There is a misconception that Salafis do not allow room for
human reasoning in the formulation of laws (Pall 2018, 15-16). While it is true
that Wahhabis typically eschew independent reasoning as much as possible
and try to stick to the literal texts wherever possible, other Salafis – as the
example of the Muslim Brothers demonstrates – are more willing to engage in
rationalization exercises. In Southeast Asia, the influential Muhammadiyah
movement in Indonesia, and the great intellectual, Buya Hamka, had Salafi
leanings and yet encourage a critical re-thinking of the Islamic tradition
(Aljunied 2018). Of course, the ‘Salafism’ of Muhammadiyah is not at all akin
to other groups which are more extremist, but herein lies the point: under
the broad umbrella of Salafism, there exists a spectrum of approaches, from
the ultra-conservative to the more open-minded.
Traditionalists on the other hand, form the majority of Sunnis. They
adhere to one of the four schools of jurisprudence, adopt a theological stance
20 Interview with Muslim professional, 8 August 2019.

which allows room for more rational thinking and philosophical theorizing
to understand God, and have practices such as the Mawlid (the Prophet’s
birthday). Usually, they also place importance on tasawwuf, a discipline in
Islamic sciences which emphasizes the purification of the heart. Sufis are
traditionalists who are inducted into formal Sufi orders or tareqahs. In the
Malay world, including in Singapore, the traditionalists belong to the Shafii
school of jurisprudence and the Ash’aari school of theology.21
Salafis and traditionalists have often clashed in the Muslim world, and
in Southeast Asia, it has been no different. From the 1920s onwards, the
Salafi-reformists – inspired by Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida from
Egypt – embarked on multiple attacks on certain practices in the Malay
world, arguing that the malaise of the Muslims was partly due to them
abandoning the purity of their faith. Because of innovations such as the
Mawlid, the way Islam was practised in the region was no longer pure, the
Salafis asserted. The traditionalist-Salafi debates took place in the Kaum
Tua (Old Group) -Kaum Muda (New Group) discourse, where the Kaum
Muda was calling for a return to the purity of the Prophet’s teachings.
Post 9-11, Wahhabism was blamed for being the cause of terror and/or
exclusivism, including by Singaporean traditionalists. Ustaz TM Fouzy, a
prominent senior alim, publicly said in a forum that when a person exhibits
Salafi-Wahhabi traits such as not wanting to adhere to one madhab, he
is likely to become a violent extremist (Hassan and Pereire 2006).22 Even
more recently, former top diplomat and head of the Middle East Institute,
Bilahari Kausikan, averred that one of the three biggest threats to Singapore’s
social cohesion was the ‘Arabization’ of Islam. The tenuous nature of the
claim notwithstanding, Bilahari associated Arabization with the decline
of traditionalist and Sufistic Islam, insinuating that Wahhabi-Salafi beliefs
were problematic for the social fabric of the country.23 It is worth pointing out
that most important positions are held by traditionalists-Sufis in Singapore.
The Asatizah Recognition Board is headed by Ustaz Ali Mohamed, and
Pergas is headed by Ustaz Hasbi Hasan, while both of them co-lead the
Religious Rehabilitation Group: both are staunch Sufis. Dr. Fatris Bakaram,
the former Mufti, is a traditionalist too, as was his predecessor, Shaykh
Isa Semait. While there are Salafis represented in these organizations, it
21 The non-Malay speaking Indian Muslims are usually Hanafis and not Shafiis.
22 I was present at this forum.
23 Adrian Lim, “3 Forces Could Challenge Social Cohesion in Singapore: Bilahari,” The Straits
Times, 25 July 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/3-forces-could-challenge-social-
cohesion-bilahari. Accessed 8 August 2019.
is clear that the traditionalists wield more influence within the Muslim
community. There have been some tensions between Salafis and Sufis
within Pergas – the leading organization of the ulama in Singapore – to the
point that a few years ago, there were rumours that Salafis were about to
mount a challenge against Ustaz Hasbi’s leadership. The rumours started
after a senior alim of mild Salafi persuasion, Ustaz Kamal Mokhtar, had
given an interview to the Malay daily, Berita Harian, in which he argued for
leadership rejuvenation for Pergas. The Sufi-inclined ulama then galvanized
and attended the Annual General Meeting in large numbers, and made sure
that Ustaz Hasbi retained the presidency. In the process, they also voted
out Salafi ulama such as Ustaz Azmi Abdul Samad from the executive
committee.24
The battleground between the Salafis and Sufis/traditionalists takes
place on multiple levels. For one, the theological and jurisprudential differ-
ences are real, even if they are not as gargantuan as many would typically
assume. Salafis take issue with traditionalist understandings and teachings
of Islamic theology, and criticize their innovative practices. At times, the
critiques go beyond mild censures, and often venture into harsh labelling.
The term ‘ahlul bidaah’ (people of innovation) is bandied about by Salafis
to refer derogatorily to traditionalists. On their part, traditionalists-Sufis
have accused Salafis of causing divisions within the Muslim community,
and for even not loving the Prophet since they oppose the celebration of his
birthday. Apart from the mawlid, other contentious practices include the
kenduri arwah or tahlil, or prayers for the deceased, when family members
and friends gather in order to recite verses of the Quran for their loved ones
who have passed on; the majlis zikr, or occasions of remembrance of God
when people gather and recite certain chants to glorify God; the talkin, a
sermon that is recited to the deceased in anticipation of events that will
happen in the hereafter; the Nisfu Shaaban, or the middle of the month
Shaaban of the Islamic calendar, where traditionalists-Sufis would recite a
chapter of the Quran, Yaasin, three times; the Isra’ Mi’raj on the 27th of the
Islamic month Rajab, a date which Muslims believe is the anniversary of the
Prophet’s miraculous journey from Mecca to Palestine and ascension into
the seven heavens to meet God;25 the recital of Yaasin on every Thursday
24 This incident was narrated to me via multiple sources.

25 Muslim historians unanimously accept that this event took place, though they disagree on
the exact date. Salafis tend to believe that the precise date is not recorded and known, and thus
it does not make much sense to celebrate the occasion. For them, the fact that the Companions
did not care to preserve the date shows that the celebration of the event is not important. Rather,
deriving lessons from it is what matters.
night;26 inter alia. Traditionalists-Sufis have long accepted these as part

of the Islamic tradition, even if they were not explicitly performed by the
Prophet in the same exact way. For traditionalists and Sufis, the essence of
these events is the remembrance of God, which is indisputably encouraged
in Islam, and as long as the commemoration of these occasions does not
contain sinful activities, they should be encouraged. For Salafis, however,
as long as the Prophet and his companions did not practise something, it
should be duly avoided. Even though the differences are real, in the grander
scheme of things, Salafis and traditionalists-Sufis have more in common
than they would like to admit. They have similar beliefs on God, the Prophet,
the Companions and the major tenets of the faith. Yet, at times, the chasm
between the two is made out to be rather deep, by both sides. A Salafi alim
recognizes this, and said:
The differences between us (Sufis and Salafis) are not fundamental. But,
they are about identity. The mawlid has become a symbol of Sufism, and
a symbol against Salafism. Likewise, for the Salafis, opposing the mawlid
has become an identity marker for us. In reality, the mawlid is not the
biggest matter in Islam.27
It is a common misconception that Salafis form the conservative faction

within Muslim communities while Sufis-traditionalists are more liberal.
When commentators such as Bilahari lament the rise of ‘Arabization’ due to
Salafism, in actuality, what they are complaining against is conservativism,
or even Islamization. In reality, conservative thought exists within both
Salafi and Sufi traditions. Differences between Sufis and Salafis are of
theological and jurisprudential nature, but are not necessarily reflective of
their liberal leanings or lack thereof. Indeed, both traditionalists/Sufis hold
on to many views which could be considered conservative. For instance,
many ulama of both strands believe that shaking hands with members of
the opposite gender is disallowed in Islam; many disagree with the idea that
not wishing a person from another faith at their religious festive occasion is
un-Islamic;28 all of them agree that homosexual relationships are disallowed
26 The surah is recited on malam Jumaat, which translates literally as Friday night. However,
the Islamic day begins at sunset, which means that the night comes first. Malam Jumaat, a term
which is used by Singaporean and other Malay-speaking Muslims, is therefore Thursday night.
28 To be clear, there are different jurisprudential opinions on this matter within the Islamic
corpus of knowledge. The point here is even those who believe that wishing others to be present
is permissible would admit that the opinion which prohibits such an act exists within the Islamic
in Islam, even if they may differ on what approaches the ulama should take
toward the matter as a whole.29 Most, if not all of them, believe in salvific
exclusivity, which connotes that Islam is the only true religion in the eyes
of God, and therefore, is the only guaranteed path to salvation. This does
not mean that they believe non-Muslims automatically end up in hellfire;
in the vein of Al-Ghazali, many of them do believe that non-Muslims can
end up in paradise, if the true message of Islam did not reach them. Ghazali
had posited that the Christians of his time could attain salvation since for
some of them, what they had rejected was not Islam per se but the version of
Islam that was presented to them: for him, only the non-Muslims to whom
the Prophet had preached to were guaranteed to suffer eternal damnation,
since they had learnt about Islam in its unadulterated form. For everyone
else, they may or may not have been exposed to the ‘true’ Islam, and hence,
their position in hell is by no means guaranteed (Jackson 2002). However,
like Al-Ghazali, even the ulama who hold on to this position would state that
these non-Muslims would enter paradise in spite of their beliefs, not because
of them. Islam still remains the only assured path to paradise, and the only
religion with the ultimate truth. An interviewee encapsulates this belief:
Do you really think that the non-Muslims of today know the real Islam?
If all they see on television is violence, poverty, war, they would associate
Islam with all of that. You cannot then say they have rejected Islam.30
To be sure, not all of them hold on to this nuanced view. Some – both amongst
traditionalists/Sufis and Salafis – believe that as long as non-Muslims do
not accept Islam, they do not have a chance of salvation. Others, especially
amongst the more liberal-minded Muslims, argue that Islam is not the only
path to salvation. Alami Musa, the former President of MUIS and current
non-executive President of the same organization, and the Head of Studies
in Inter-Religious Relations in Plural Societies Programme at the Rajaratnam
School of International Studies (RSIS) based at Nanyang Technological
University – a highly influential figure within the community– argued in
tradition, and is not an ‘extremist’ position. Many, however, believe that such an opinion is less
suitable in the context of a multiracial, multi-religious society such as Singapore. This issue
will be revisited later on as it has taken on an extremely political dimension in the country.
29 Consider the following quote: ‘For me, it is clear that homosexual relations are haram. But
I adopt the approach of being close to such people (gay or lesbian Muslims), and many of them
attend my class. I do not turn them away. We should never turn such people away.’ Interview
with an ustaz, 6 August 2019.
30 Interview with an ustaz, 22 September 2019.
an op-ed in The Straits Times for an ‘inter-religious’, rather than a ‘multi-

religious’ Singapore:
The moderate position is to have an inclusive view of the “religious other”.

They believe that their religion provides the preferred way to salvation, but
do not discount the reality that other religions contain truths, goodness
and even pathways that may or can lead to salvation. Such a view is an
important condition for one to be inter-religious.31
Alami’s more ‘liberal’ view is definitely not shared by the ulama interviewed
for this project, traditionalist or Salafi alike. While traditionalists/Sufis and
Salafis disagree on many matters, they converge on many other issues as well.
Again, this is unsurprising since they both draw upon similar sources and
the Sunni corpus of knowledge, though for Salafis, their points of references
are narrower. Most of the ulama are more conservative than they are liberal.
MUIS’ own findings corroborate this: its 2019 report suggests that the ‘youths,
Malay Muslim Organizations (MMOs), leaders and professionals displayed
a more embracing and inclusive attitude towards diverse groups compared
to the asatizah. While the former called for more safe spaces for dialogue
and understanding, the latter showed a degree of anxiety with the growing
presence of Shias and LGBT, preferring more well-defined guidelines to
deal with such groups.’32 It must be repeated that this book does not make
a normative stance on whether being conservative or liberal is ‘better’ or is
more in line with the authentic teachings of Islam. Another caveat needs
to be made: just because many of the ulama are conservative, it does not
mean that they are resistant to change or do not modify their teachings to
fit with the modern world. In fact, many of these conservative ulama have
issued fatwas or edicts which can be seen as ‘progressive’ by others. These
include MUIS’ fatwa to allow human organ transplants in 2007,33 the revised
joint-tenancy fatwa in 2019 which allows spouses to own the house after
the death of their partners,34 instead of distributing proceeds from the sale
31 Mohammad Alami Musa, “Let’s Move from Being Inter-Religious to Being Multi-Religious,”
The Straits Times, 6 June 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/lets-move-from-being-
multi-religious-to-being-inter-religious. Accessed 15 August 2019.
32 MUIS (2019), “MUIS50 Conversations”, p. 29. https://www.muis.gov.sg/-/media/Files/
Corporate-Site/Publications/MUIS50-Conversations-Report.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2019.
33 Off ice of the Mufti (2007), “Fatwa on Organ Transplant,” https://www.muis.gov.sg/of-
ficeofthemufti/Fatwa/English-HOTA. Accessed 15 August 2019.
34 Off ice of the Mufti (2019), “Fatwa Joint Tenancy 2019,” https://www.muis.gov.sg/off i-
ceofthemufti/Fatwa/English-Joint-Tenancy. Accessed 15 August 2019.
of the house to one’s beneficiaries, and numerous statements by the ulama

on the impermissibility of beating one’s wife, amongst many others.35 As
scholars such as Zaman and Hallaq have argued, the ulama have never been
static in their religious pronouncements, and have always been somewhat
amenable to change (Hallaq 2009, Zaman 2002). Hallaq goes as far as saying
that the claims made by orientalist scholars regarding the closure of the
gates of ijtihad (independent reasoning) were never true; in fact, ijtihad
was perennially an important facet of the juristic exercise (Hallaq 1986).
Variations of Political Stances within the Ulama
Apart from ideological and theological differences, the ulama hold varying
ideas on cooperation with the state. Undoubtedly, some ulama are supportive
of the state and have no qualms working with it. An example would be Habib
Hasan Alatas. The notable alim has many PAP Muslim parliamentarians
visiting his mosque regularly, takes part in state-endorsed institutions such
as the Inter-Religious Organization, a body which promotes inter-faith
relations, and is willing to attend even slightly controversial events such
as an iftar (breaking of fast) gathering with the Israeli embassy.36 Other
ulama, include Ustaz Ali Mohamed, the chairman of the RRG and the
ARB, his son Ustaz Mohamed Ali, who is the vice-chairman of RRG and
an Assistant Professor at RSIS, a think tank within Nanyang Technological
University which has close ties with the state, and the various ulama at
MUIS. Some ulama may not express their support for the state outright,
but adopt language which does indicate their approval of it. For instance,
a popular young alim declared on his Instagram account that it was ‘obliga-
tory’ under Islamic law to love one’s country, ‘fullstop’, on the occasion of
Singapore’s national day in 2019. Incidentally, this alim, Ustaz Zahid Zin,
was mentioned by Prime Minister Lee in the 2019 National Day Rally as one
of the outstanding religious scholars in Singapore. Each year, the National
Day Rally – akin to the State of the Union address in the US – features
individuals who are considered as evidence for Singapore’s success story
35 “Ustaz Irwan Hadi jelaskan persoalan suami mengasari isteri (Ustaz Irwan Hadi Clarifies
the Question of Husbands Harming Their Wives,” Berita Harian, 15 October 2017. https://www.
beritaharian.sg/hidayah/ustaz-irwan-hadi-jelaskan-persoalan-suami-mengasari-isteri. Accessed
13 November 2019.
36 Walter Sim, “Embassy of Israel in Singapore Hosted Breaking-of-Fast Dinner with Muslim
Community,” The Straits Times, 16 July 2015. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/embassy-
of-israel-in-singapore-hosted-breaking-of-fast-dinner-with-muslim-community. Accessed
15 August 2019.
or those who should be emulated for various reasons. Zahid was singled
out for teaching views which are considered conducive to the multiracial
fabric of society: in particular, his post on Facebook, which detailed him
paying respects at a Chinese funeral, was highlighted by PM Lee. This was
of course in line with one of the themes of the speech in Malay – the Rally is
delivered in three languages, with the other two being Mandarin (Chinese)
and English – which focused on the distinctive brand of Islam in Singapore,
which was defined as tolerant and inclusive. For Lee, Zahid’s value-add to
the nation is seen through the ‘inclusive’ nature of his message, which is in
line with the state’s own multiracial proclamations.37
During the early days of Halimah Yacob’s presidency, then-Mufti Fatris
Bakaram spoke about his encounter with Halimah’s entourage on the road,
and recited some prayers for her.38 Halimah was a PAP stalwart for many
years, and the run-up to her Presidency was shrouded with much controversy
as the PAP amended the constitution to require the Presidential candidates
to be of ethnic Malay origin. The PAP said that it was a necessary safeguard
to ensure multiracial representation, since in a national election, it was
harder for non-Chinese candidates to win. Critics of the move decried the
constitutional change as a clear strategy to prevent Tan Cheng Bock – a
former PAP member who ran against the PAP-endorsed candidate, Tony
Tan, and almost won in the 2011 Presidential Election -39 from contesting
again (Osman and Waikar 2019). Dr. Fatris had not commented on the
groundswell of negative sentiment against the entire process, but instead,
seemed to endorse Halimah’s presidency. His post was accompanied by a
picture of Halimah foregrounding the Singapore flag.
Numerous ulama are involved with state projects such as the aforemen-
tioned Dadah itu Haram campaign, the Asatizah Youth Network (AYN),
which was set up by MUIS to promote young religious teachers as role
models for Muslim youths as a bulwark against extremist thought seeping
into impressionable minds, 40 the RRG, and others.
37 Ira Musfirah Mohamed Rashid, “Islam tunggak masyarakat Melayu; asatizah main peranan
penting pupuk umat progresif (Islam is a Pillar of the Malay Community; Religious Scholars
Play a Vital Role in Creating a Progressive Ummah),” Berita Mediacorp, 18 August 2019. https://
berita.mediacorp.sg/mobilem/singapura/islam-tunggak-masyarakat-melayu-asatizah-main-
peranan-penting/4324084.html. Accessed 19 August 2019.
38 See his Facebook post on 14 September 2017.
39 He lost by a razor-thin margin of about 0.2% of the votes.
40 The members of the AYN were chosen for their ‘online presence and influence’. See Yuen
Sin, “Parliament: Network of Young Religious Teachers to be Expanded, Says Yaacob Ibrahim,”
The Straits Times, 8 March 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-network-
of-young-religious-teachers-to-be-expanded-yaacob-ibrahim. Accessed 15 August 2019.
However, not all the ulama, even those who are involved in state-led or
state-endorsed projects, are effusive in their assessment of the state. Some
see cooperation with the state as in line with Islamic objectives on certain
matters. For instance, there are those who are not entirely agreeable with
certain state attitudes towards Muslim matters, yet are supportive of other
initiatives. An alim interviewed proclaimed his support for RRG, even
though he is not a part of it, because it is indeed what Islam enjoins. The
proliferation of extremism is a serious problem, and efforts like RRG’s are
needed to mitigate it. 41 The political differences between the ulama will be
discussed later in the following two sections. There will be intersections
between the ideological divide of the ulama and their political stances, but
the nuances between these nodes must be understood.
4.3 Political Acquiescence of the Ulama: Between Cooperation

and Ambivalence
Like other activists in Singapore, the positions of the ulama must be under-
stood within the wider eco-system of the country’s political system. Individual
freedoms must be subjugated to the over-riding needs of the nation, as defined
by the nation’s elites. Democracy is not as important as stability, and may
be deemed to even be a hindrance to social cohesion at times. Thus, not
only are democracy and liberty not priorities, they may even be detrimental
to the nation’s well-being. Religion and race are placed under even greater
scrutiny, as they are regarded as the forces that are most likely to upset societal
stability. As such, religious leaders and organizations have even less space to
manoeuvre, since their articulation of interests for their religious constituents
could easily be framed as attempts at interference of religion in politics.
Such a predicament can be discerned from Lee Kuan Yew’s quote when he
was commenting on the Marxist Conspiracy described earlier in Chapter 1:
I urge that churchmen, lay preachers, priests, monks. Muslim theologians,

all those who claim divine sanction or holy insights, take off your clerical
robes before you take on anything economic or political […] Come out
as a citizen or join a political party and it is your right to belabor the
government. But you use a church or a religion and your pulpit for these
purposes and there will be serious repercussions. (Lee Kuan Yew, as
quoted in (Haas 1989, 61-62))

The message from Lee, and the PAP, is clear: religion cannot be used for
political purposes. Even establishment-linked Muslims, such as the afore-
mentioned Alami Musa, subscribe to the same idea, perhaps showing its
ubiquity. In another op-ed, Alami wrote:
Raising issues of religion in Parliament for the sake of winning political

support or gaining political mileage is politicising religion and is against
secularism. 42
Alami was referring to the incident – also mentioned in Chapter 1 – when

opposition MP Faisal Manap raised the issue of the hijab for certain frontline
jobs. Even though Faisal was elected via the GRC system in order to be
a representative of the Malay-Muslim community and articulate their
concerns, for Alami, Faisal cannot do so as it would be ‘against secularism’.
The bizarre nature of the argument notwithstanding, the consistent message
of the government is unmistakably obvious: religious preachers, and even
politicians, must be circumspect whenever they wish to bring religion into
the political dialogue, no matter how well-intentioned they may be. Doing
so may threaten the fragile social fabric upon which the country is built.
The quandary is even more accentuated in the case of Islam and Muslim
preachers, for reasons already explained.
The ulama and other Muslim activists have to carefully navigate this. It is
evident from the interviews conducted that the ulama are well-aware of what
they can or cannot do, what the state expects of them, what are areas in which
they should not be commenting on, and how they should conduct themselves
in this regard. The ulama have to be even more cautious than other Muslim
activists for various reasons. First, as the quote by Lee Kuan Yew suggests, the
state would react differently to ordinary Muslims advocating certain issues
as compared to the ulama. The ulama have the gravitas of being the faith’s
representatives, in a way that other Muslim activists do not, and hence, they
are not ‘ordinary’ citizens. Secondly, due to the nature of the ulama class
and rising religiosity in Singapore, the ulama are assumed to possess more
influence than other Muslims. A cursory look at the social media accounts of
the young ulama in Singapore would bear this observation out: some of these
religious scholars boast tens of thousands of followers on their Instagram
account. Thirdly, the way the Singapore state deals with religious communities
42 Mohammad Alami Musa, “Religion’s Place in Parliament, Politics and Policy,” The Straits
Times, 12 May 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/religions-place-in-parliament-politics-
and-policy. Accessed 10 April 2018.
is essentially a top-down approach. In communicating with Muslims, the state

usually engages selected individuals, especially from the clergy. Apart from
MUIS and the Mufti, the government relies on certain trusted ulama and
has close relationships with them. As already mentioned, Habib Hasan and
Ustaz Ali are two such clerics. The state not only sees the ulama as legitimate
representatives of the community, but at the same time, anoints some of
them as the legitimate representatives. When the hijab issue resurfaced in
late 2013, PM Lee Hsien Loong held a dialogue with 100 Muslim leaders and
representatives, which included the usual participants, but excluded the
activists who were championing the issue in the first place. Those 100 were
selected by the government, and in the dialogue, the PM reassured them that
the issue was being looked at.43 The idea is that these representatives, many
of whom included the ulama, would be able to assuage the community on
whatever misgivings they may have on the issue. The approach by the state,
though understandable, has several obvious oversights. For one, as already
discussed, the authority of the ulama is never absolute or unchallenged.
Just because the ulama have decided to not publicly pursue a cause – in this
instance, the hijab issue –, does not mean that the Muslim public would
not. Moreover, associating with the state could cause some problems for the
ulama’s legitimacy. A common motif of the history of state-ulama relations
throughout Muslim lands is that religious scholars who are working with
the state are often met with much scepticism by both their peers and their
constituents (Al-Qaradawi 2002). The Arabic adage which says that ‘one who
has two masters cannot be loyal to both’ is often brought up in precisely such
a context: the idea is that an alim who is connected to the state may not be
able to speak ‘truth to power’ when it comes to defending Islamic principles.
This problem is compounded by the modern nature of societies, where social
media has allowed everyone to have a voice. The democratization of expertise,
which essentially leads to the devaluation of expertise, has taken place. It is
common to read on Facebook Muslims expressing critical thoughts of the
ulama and quoting various Quranic verses or Prophetic traditions to imply
that the religious scholars have deviated from the true path of Islam.
Many ulama have openly cooperated with the state, as mentioned in
the previous section. Amongst those who take part in state-led initiatives,
43 Robin Chan, “PM Lee Holds Dialogue on Tudung Issue, Says Change Must Be Gradual,” The
Straits Times, 25 January 2014. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pm-lee-holds-dialogue-
on-tudung-issue-says-change-must-be-gradual. Accessed 16 August 2019. Interestingly, though
perhaps not coincidentally, the picture of the dialogue featured by the Straits Times was of Habib
Hasan and Shaykh Isa Semait conversing with PM Lee.
various motivations are present. Some believe that indeed, Singapore is a

haven for Muslim minorities. These ulama would use both religious and
worldly justifications. It was even mentioned to me by an interviewee that
he had heard others praising the Singapore system, to the point that one of
them said that if non-Muslims could attain salvation, Lee Kuan Yew would
be the first person to be in that category, because of his steadfast commit-
ment to cleanliness, a corrupt-free system, and efficiency, all of which are
admirable Islamic values. 44 Another alim quoted the Prophetic tradition
of looking at others who are less well-off to be thankful to God for what we
have, and said that Singaporean Muslims are allowed to practise their faith
without much restriction, are allowed to have mosques, and have a direct
line with the government if required, and therefore should be grateful. 45
A conversation I had with an alim was fascinating: he said that since the
system largely works for Singaporean Muslims, it must be maintained. Even
if there may be unresolved issues such as the hijab, they are relatively small
matters in the grander scheme of things. If Muslims were to push too hard,
we might end up having a situation like Syria, where there is neither order
nor individual rights. 46 The invocation of Syria was intriguing for multiple
reasons. Firstly, it demonstrated the alim’s acceptance of, if not adherence to,
the principle of ‘a hundred years under tyranny is better than a day of chaos.’
Syria was used as the archetypical example of what could happen if those
in power were not obeyed. Secondly, even though comparisons between
the situations in Singapore and Syria are completely off the mark, the alim
in question had no qualms making them. For him, as long as there is a
possibility of disorder occurring from citizens’ demands, the comparison can
be made, even if the two countries possess wildly different characteristics
and systems. The point is, cooperation with the state is justified both on
theological and practical grounds. Such an appeal was a recurring theme
amongst the ulama interviewed. Indeed, one would not expect anything
less from a group of religious scholars: clearly, they would see themselves as
acting in accordance to Islamic principles and values. However, the sense
of self-awareness and understanding of the political climate was present
in all of these interviews. Practical considerations not only accompanied
theological ones, but in fact, practical concerns were considered to be part
of theological approaches. An alim should be wise enough to not get into
trouble with the state, not because he/she is afraid of punitive action, but

46 Interview with an ustaz, 3 October 2019.
because he/she is able to help the Muslim community more if he/she is able
to continue teaching the faith.
Earlier, I had talked about the phenomenon of ‘feel-good’ Islam, where
religious scholars discuss matters which are uncontroversial, non-political,
and are designed to address emotional or spiritual problems. Phrases like
‘learn to love yourself’, ‘work on you’, and ‘Islam is all about love’ abound
under this approach to religious instruction. Some of the ulama who are
involved in such efforts include Ustaz Mizi Wahid – the founder and Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Safinah Institute, a Muslim organization which
conducts talks and classes – and Ustazah Liyanah Musfirah, who is perhaps
the most recognized religious scholar amongst millennial women and
girls, and plenty more.47 A look at the past two Safinah-organized Spiritual
Summits – large-scale events with numerous lectures by mostly younger
asatizahs – would show that in 2018, the theme was ‘The Search for Meaning’
and in 2019, it was ‘In the Footsteps of the Beloved’. 48 For these individuals,
they are dealing with important issues which have been neglected by others,
such as the need to get Muslim youths involved with positive projects in
the age of disillusionment with the modern world, tackling mental health
and depression, and being relatable figures to young Muslims. The phrase
‘come as you are’, initially popularized by Ustaz Zahid Zin, to encourage
Muslim youths to attend his religious class no matter how they are dressed,
or whether they have any tattoos, is becoming more common for younger
religious scholars. 49 For them, it is important that there are ‘safe spaces’ for
anyone who wishes to study Islam, and exclusionary attitudes toward any
group are not useful, or indeed, Islamic.
There is a problem with our mosques with regard to inclusivity. I under-

stand that many well-intentioned Muslims seek to advise those whom
they feel are not dressed appropriately, but the way they advise these
youths may turn them off completely from our faith. This is why I feel it
is very important to be open to all sorts of Muslims […] In my classes, I
have members of the LGBT community attending as well. I treat them
with love and compassion, as I would treat any other Muslim.50
47 As of 16 August 2019, she has 35 500 followers on Instagram.

48 Safinah Institute, https://spiritualsummit.sg/. Accessed 21 August 2019.
49 Stories of Muslims being chided for not being ‘appropriately’ dressed or for having tattoos
in mosques are not uncommon. I myself have encountered occasions where a mosque-goer
castigated a person who was not wearing hijab on one occasion, and an ex-convict who had
tattoos on him, on another. These took place in different mosques.
Another defended the roles played by the younger religious scholars, dismiss-
ing the perception that they are not tackling important matters.
It is not fair to say that the asatizahs do not deal with important issues.
A lot of us are speaking up on mental health, and that is a serious matter
in this day and age.51
Indeed, these religious scholars have filled a gap within the Muslim com-
munity. A decade ago, the ulama speaking on mental health was almost
unheard of; religious classes have endeavoured to be more inclusive to fellow
Muslims, accepting different stripes and stages in the faith development;
and the ulama are now more accessible to the general public. In that regard,
these religious scholars are right to take credit for their approaches, for
reaching out to disenchanted youths, and for placing emphasis on issues
like mental health. No one could say that mental health is not a salient
issue. Nonetheless, the issue here is not one of importance: what needs to
be investigated and explained is amongst a plethora of important issues,
why are some given greater emphasis over others?
The phenomenon of ‘feel-good’ Islam can be explained by a few factors.
First, there is evidently a spiritual void in many Muslims today. This is due
to a few factors such as alienation, disenchantment with the world, stress
in coping with modern life, and the ubiquity of social media which has
led to younger people, especially millennials, to be in a perpetual state of
comparing their lives with others as they witness the seeming perfection
of others’ lives via their curated postings on social media. As mentioned
by a respondent:
Younger people are seeking spirituality. They have all sorts of emotional
problems due to stress at work, and with relationships. It is the job of
asatizahs to help them go through these problems.52
The second factor which can explain the rise in ‘feel-good’ Islam is political
opportunities. As delving into potentially controversial topics may get
preachers into unnecessary trouble, they stay away from them altogether.
The ulama, even those who are looked up to and followed by young Mus-
lims, rarely discuss more touchy topics which are indeed talked about in
the national discourse, especially by youths. A recent example would be

an incident involving racism. In July 2019, E-pay, an electronic payments

website, released an advertisement which was deemed racially insensitive
as it featured an ethnic Chinese person being depicted as four characters,
from each of the main racial groups in Singapore. For the Indian character
in the ad, his skin was darkened and his hair was made curly, playing on
the stereotypes associated with the ethnic group’s attributes. The advertise-
ment was swiftly condemned by many quarters online, as it was deemed as
insensitive at best, and racist at worst. The incident became known as the
‘brownface’ saga. In response to the ad, popular local Indian blogger and
online personality known as Prettipls – her actual name is Pretti Nair –,
released a rap video featuring herself and her brother, in which she chastised
the Chinese for always messing things up. The video used vulgarities which
were presumably intended to highlight the gravity of the matter. Following
the release of the video, state leaders came out to vociferously condemn the
Nair siblings. Minister Shanmugam argued that the video was unacceptable
and ‘crosses the line’, and that if the government did not take action, the
social fabric of the nation would be harmed. He said, in no uncertain terms:
And suppose you allow this video? Let’s say a Chinese now does a video
attacking Indians, Malays using four-letter words, vulgar gestures […]
And let’s say there are hundreds or thousands of such videos. How do you
think the Indians and Malays will feel? Would people feel safe? Will the
minorities feel safe? There are good reasons why Singapore is different,
why there is racial harmony here, why all races feel safe, why minorities
feel safe. And we must maintain that, we will maintain that.53
Other minority parliamentarians showed similar disgust toward the video.

Amrin Amin, former Senior Parliamentary Secretary for the Ministry of
Home Affairs and Ministry of Health, said that ‘If we don’t stand up and
condemn this offensive act now, if we keep silent, or worse, laugh and sing
along, remember it could be us next time.’54 Senior Minister of State for
Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Communications and Information
Janil Puthucheary wrote that the video was ‘vulgar, aggressive, and does
53 Adrian Lim, “Rap Video by Local YouTube Star Preetipls on ‘Brownface’ Ad Crosses the
Line, Not Acceptable: Shanmugam,” The Straits Times, 30 July 2019. https://www.straitstimes.
com/politics/rap-video-by-local-youtube-star-preetipls-on-brownface-ad-crosses-the-line-not-
acceptable. Accessed 21 August 2019.
54 Belmont Lay, “Ethnic minority MPs slam vulgarity-filled, race-baiting Preetipls response
video,” Mothership, 31 July 2019. https://mothership.sg/2019/07/mps-slam-preetipls-video-ad/.
nothing to help either the initial mistake nor the circumstances that al-
lowed it to happen.’55 Then-Minister of State for the Ministry of National
Development and Ministry of Manpower, Zaqy Mohamad, labelled the
video as ‘totally offensive and uncalled for.’56 While all of them did indeed
take issue with the ‘brownface’ ad, two things must be noted: firstly, no
condemnation of the ad was issued, until the response video by the Nair
siblings was released; and secondly, the castigation toward the video was
far harsher than that toward the advertisement. The government clearly
saw the video as dangerous and perhaps borderline seditious, and the ad
as insensitive or inappropriate. The Nair siblings were eventually issued
a conditional warning by the police. The police said that the video could
lead to more ‘racism, more racial tensions, and eventually violence,’ and
that ‘Singapore has taken a clear approach, to say no to offensive speech,
targeted at race and religion.’57 It is beyond the scope of this book to provide
a normative assessment on which of the two was more offensive, or whether
the government’s response was adequate or unnecessarily strict. Rather, what
this project is interested in is the response of the ulama to this incident.
The episode generated much debate, and minorities took to social media to
express their frustrations at both the advertisement and the government’s
perceived heavy-handed response to the video. In response to both the
state’s demeanour and claims by ordinary citizens that the ad was merely
comedic and should not be taken too seriously, playwright Alfian Sa’at wrote:
I’m actually starting to feel unsafe just existing as a minority in Singapore.

This keeps happening over and over again -- the ones perpetuating racism
get a wrist slap, the ones who call out acts of racism have the instruments
of the state used against them – through the weaponization of police
reports, as well as minority MPs lining up to perform overpolicing of their
own, as if to demonstrate to the majority that they’re still committed to
majoritarian interests […] I see so many of my Malay friends say the same
thing: ‘penatlah’. It means we’re tired.58
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Tessa Oh, “Siblings Preeti and Subhas Nair Given Conditional Warning for Rap Video: Police,”
Today, 14 August 2019. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/siblings-behind-controversial-
rap-video-given-conditional-warning-police. Accessed 21 August 2019.
58 Danisha Hakeem, “ “Penatlah”: Singaporean Playwright Alfian Sa’at, on Racism and Chinese
Majoritarianism in Singapore,” The Online Citizen, 2 August 2019. https://www.theonlinecitizen.
com/2019/08/02/penatlah-singaporean-playwright-alfian-saat-on-racism-and-chinese-major-
itarianism-in-singapore/. Accessed 21 August 2019.
The post by Alfian was shared widely, especially by young Malay and Indian
Singaporeans, and the hashtag #penatlah was used by many on their sub-
sequent social media posts on the incident. Alfian’s view was evidently not
an isolated one. Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh, a freelance author and another
influential counter-hegemonic voice, wrote against the idea propagated by
some defending the ad that the opposition to it was just mindless imitation
of Western liberal norms:
Yet, whenever Singaporean conservatives and chauvinists feel threatened,

they will trot out this ridiculous line of argument. It is actually dangerous,
a dog whistle to patriots to target people they don’t like – in this case,
Preeti and Subhas – for somehow being foreign agents.59
The tone and vocabulary used by personalities such as Alfian and Sudhir
reflected the emotive nature of the debates surrounding the ‘brownface’
incident in particular, and race in general. Throughout the entire discourse,
the ulama were conspicuously silent. While it would perhaps be unfair
to expect the senior ulama to partake in such conversations, since the
discussions mostly took place online and were of a nature that was more
likely to concern the younger generation, even the more junior religious
scholars refrained from commenting on the matter. The Asatizah Youth
Network did not comment, for instance, and even on the social media pages
of the younger asatizahs, the issue was not mentioned, even remotely. When
asked on this matter, a respondent candidly stated:
You know, this is Singapore, we cannot just comment on every single issue.
It is better for us to pick our battles and work on issues that we can solve.60
‘Feel-good’ Islam thus becomes the uncontroversial mode of expression

of Islamic teachings. To be sure, it is not the claim of this book that the
topics touched upon by such ulama are not part of the Islamic corpus
of knowledge. One can quite convincingly make a case that Islam has
always placed importance on a person’s overall well-being, which includes
emotional and mental states. That is not the point of contention here.
59 Kiara Xavier, “Author Sudhir Thomas Vadaketh Slams Individuals Who Say “Brownface”
Concept Originated in the West,” The Online Citizen, 8 August 2019. https://www.theonlinecitizen.
com/2019/08/08/author-sudhir-thomas-vadaketh-slams-individuals-who-say-brownface-concept-
originated-in-the-west/. Accessed 21 August 2019.
What I am arguing is that ‘feel-good’ Islam is, at least in part, a function

of the political opportunity structures. The ulama, though aware that
Muslims may have expectations that they would comment on issues of
the day which affect them, such as racism, rarely get involved in these
discourses. They make the prudent choice, or at least, what they consider
to be prudent, and do not discuss matters which may get them on the
wrong side of the law. In the ‘brownface’ saga, it was evident that the state
was taking a f irm stance against even the slightest whiff of potential
racial unrest, as evinced by the strongly worded statements of both
government off icials and the police; Singaporeans who commented
on the topic therefore clearly had to be judicious. Although there was
quite a groundswell of negative sentiment toward the state’s reaction,
and the time was opportune for an open and frank discussion on race
and racism in Singapore, the ulama chose not to participate. Again,
one could easily make a case that Islam has always been against racism
from the outset, so speaking up on the matter would not be out of the
purview of the religious scholars. Political considerations, not theological
or jurisprudential ones, made the ulama steer clear of commenting on
such issues.
In the previous section, the state’s preference for traditionalist-Sufi Islam
has been referred to. This is manifested through multiple ways. First, state
elites have on occasion directly or indirectly lamented the threat of Salafism-
Wahhabism and its associated mores. Bilahari Kausikan’s statements have
already been detailed earlier. In a speech which outlined three primary
challenges for the Malay community, Minister Masagos said that the spread
of ideas which consider traditional practices as such as the kenduri arwah as
innovations were signs of religious exclusivism which could lead to extrem-
ism.61 Evidently, what was alluded to was Salafism-Wahhabism. The thrust of
many speeches by government leaders, including this by Masagos, is similar:
traditionalist Islam has been peaceful and inclusive, and it is the spread
of Wahhabism which has overturned this. Secondly, the state maintains
extremely close relations with Sufi ulama. Habib Hasan regularly hosts senior
Ministers at his residence. Ustaz Hasbi and Ustaz Ali are two ulama who
have close ties with the state, in no small part due to their involvement in
RRG. Ustaz Hasbi is also the President of Pergas, while Ustaz Ali is the same
organization’s advisor, and both are senior ulama who wield a lot of influence
61 “Tiga cabaran perlu ditangani (Three Challenges Need to Be Tackled),” Berita Harian,
2 August 2017. https://www.beritaharian.sg/setempat/tiga-cabaran-perlu-ditangani. Accessed
21 August 2019.
within the religious clergy.62 Both have also served multiple terms on the
MUIS council, and have been bestowed multiple honours by the state.63 It is
common to see the two figures at events together with Ministers and political
elites. In fact, such is the close association between them and the state that
they have been labelled as lackeys of the state by their critics, a charge which
they vehemently deny.64 For them, their involvement with RRG and their
support for such state-endorsed projects is because these initiatives are in line
with Islamic principles, not because of any patronage. Indeed, RRG ulama do
not receive any financial remuneration, as their work is entirely voluntary.
However, one can also not deny that benefits from cooperation with state
entities do not have to be purely financial: having access to the corridors
of power are in some cases equally, if not more, pertinent. Indisputably,
ulama such as Ustaz Hasbi, Ustaz Ali and Habib Hasan have access to the
corridors of power. As mentioned by a Muslim professional who regularly
attends Masjid Ba’alwie and considers Habib Hasan in the highest regard:
Politicians come here often because they know Habib is influential in

the community. They have to rely on him for support. What this means
is that Habib gets to advise our leaders on many things, especially on
the Wahhabis.65
While the respondent was perhaps being hyperbolic on state elites’ reliance
on Habib for support, it is evident that there is a good relationship between
him and the government. What is more interesting is the admission of this
interviewee, which was corroborated with many other conversations I have
had with Ba’alwie mosque-goers, that Habib and those in the ‘Ba’alwie crowd’
are able to share their opinions with political leaders, including on Muslim
sectarian concerns. Some Sufis-traditionalists have identified Wahhabism
as a clear and present danger to both Singapore and Islam. On Facebook,
there is a group called Singapura Tolak Fahaman Wahabi/Salafi (Singapore
rejects Wahabi/Salafi ideologies) comprising more than 10,000 followers.
62 It was quite common for respondents to mention Ustaz Hasbi especially, but also Ustaz Ali,
as senior ulama who are respected by most of the religious scholars in Singapore.
63 Ummu Rabbisyfina Abdul Hamid, “Ustaz Ali dan Ustaz Hasbi dianugerahkan Pingat Jasa
Gemilang (Ustaz Ali and Ustaz Hasbi Bestowed Meritorious Service Medal),” Berita Harian,
9 August 2018. https://berita.mediacorp.sg/mobilem/singapura/ustaz-ali-dan-ustaz-hasbi-
dianugerahkan-pingat-jasa-gemilang/4097918.html. Accessed 22 August 2019.
64 Puad Ibrahim and Nazri Hadi, “Kami Ustaz Pemerintah? Astaghf irullah. (We Are the
Government’s Ustaz? God Forgive),” Berita Harian, 13 May 2006.
65 Interview with Muslim professional, 18 August 2019.
In numerous classes in mosques conducted by traditionalist/Sufi ulama,

it has become routine to hear them either directly or implicitly chastising
Wahhabism. The example of Ustaz TM Fouzy given earlier is most definitely
not an isolated affair. Other ulama are less explicit and challenge the ideology
of ‘exclusivism’, and not Wahhabism per se, but go on to associate certain
Wahhabi/Salafi beliefs with exclusivism.
To say that the state has a preference for Sufi Islam would thus be an
understatement. Many key positions within the Muslim community are
held by Sufi ulama. Some Salafi-Wahhabi beliefs are disavowed and labelled
as threatening the social fabric of the country, and even beliefs which are
shared by traditionalists are often dismissed as being a product of the spread
of Wahhabism-Salafism, such as the prohibition of saying Merry Christ-
mas, a point which will be discussed later. Books which have been banned
because they are deemed to be ‘detrimental to Singapore’s inter and intra
racial and religious harmony and relations’ are almost always exclusively of
the Wahhabi-Salafi bent.66 Fascinatingly, this particular statement by the
Ministry of Communication and Information included the phrase ‘intra racial
and religious harmony’, which is a veiled reference to the perceived divisive
nature of Salafism-Wahhabism within the Muslim community. While the
state maintains a relatively good relationship with all Muslim organizations,
including the Salafi-inclined Muhammadiyah, from the statements issued,
and the books which have been banned in Singapore, it is apparent that its
preference is for traditionalist-Sufi Islam. As admitted by a Salafi-inclined alim:
For sure, the government prefers Sufi Islam. Just look at (Minister) Masa-
gos’ statements where he talks about Wahhabism. Look at the three main
points of references amongst the ulama for the government: Ustaz Hasbi,
Ustaz Ali, and Habib Hasan. And to some extent, I can see why this is
justified. Sufi Islam is essentially Singapore Islam: traditionally, that is
how Islam has been practiced in Singapore. However, with globalization,
there is no way we can prevent the spread of ideas, including Salafism.
In fact, Salafism may provide a value-add to the Muslim identity […]
Besides, not all Salafis are the same. Some are more rigid than others. I
identify myself as a Salafi, but many Salafis who are stricter than I am
do not like me very much.67
66 “3 Books Banned in Singapore for Having Extremist Religious Views: MCI,” Channel News
Asia, 20 November 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/3-books-banned-
in-singapore-for-having-extremist-religious-views-10950106. Accessed 22 August 2019.
To be sure, the partiality toward Sufism is not at all unique to the Singapore
government. Especially since 9-11, there has been a theory that has been
advocated by many academics and Muslims throughout the world that Sufi
Islam is peaceful, whereas Salafism is violent and problematic. Governments
throughout the world have collaborated and worked closely with Sufis and
have tried to give legitimacy to this school of thought, in a bid to promote a
more pliant Muslim polity. On their part, some Sufis have embraced this co-
operation as they genuinely believe Wahhabism-Salafism to be an aberration
and not representative of the true Islam. Antagonism between the two sides
has of course existed because of the Salafis-Wahhabis attacks on many Sufi
practices described earlier. In the US, after the September 11 terrorist incidents
and the narrative that Wahhabism was responsible for transforming Islam
into a militant and violent force, Hisham Kabbani, leader of the Nasqshbandi
tareqah, adroitly positioned himself as an ally of the Bush administration and
as a representative of authentic and moderate Islam, slamming Wahhabism
at every opportunity he got (Leonard 2002). Similar tactics were adopted by
Sufis elsewhere too. Muedini argues that some Muslim states exploited the
Sufi-Salafi schism and began to ‘sponsor’ Sufism: in Morocco, Algeria, and
Pakistan, governments promoted Sufism and Sufi orders as they believed that
this strand of Islam was apolitical, docile and would give them a credibility
boost as they attempted to halt the rise of Islamist parties (Muedini 2015).
A few caveats must be made. Firstly, not all Sufis and Salafis are alike:
there exists great variation within the two categories. The aforementioned
Muhammadiyah is not a rigid Wahhabi-organization, even though it has
Salafi leanings. Some Sufis do not see Wahhabis as arch enemies to be
defeated, but rather as fellow Muslims to be advised, loved and tolerated.
Secondly, the Salafis-Wahhabis in Singapore generally do not attempt to
challenge the state in overt ways, even when their beliefs are questioned,
their books are banned, and preference for Sufism is stated. While there may
be murmurings on the perceived unfair singling out of Salafis-Wahhabis
by some, these do not translate into outright resistance. Rather, Salafis-
Wahhabis too work within the system. ‘Generally, we all try to have a good
relationship with the government,’ a Salafi alim remarked.68 Muhammadiyah
operates welfare homes for children between the ages of 10 and 19 who are
‘neglected, abused and homeless; are juvenile offenders and those beyond
parental control,’ which are supported by the government.69 This effort

69 Muhammadiyah Welfare Home, https://mwh.muhammadiyah.org.sg/about-us/. Accessed
23 August 2019.
is encouraged by the state, since it is ‘apolitical’ and fills an important

gap within the social sector. Other Salafi-inclined alim have also been
brought into the system. Ustaz Kamal Mokhtar is a member of the Asatizah
Recognition Board,70 and Ustaz Fathurrahman M Dawoed is part of the 18th
MUIS Council.71 Salafi ulama are not discriminated per se, even if the state
frowns upon Salafi-Wahhabi beliefs. The overall approach of the state is
consistent: as long as it can co-opt individuals and bring them into the state
machinery, it will do so. At the same time, it outlines its partiality toward
a particular brand of Islam.
The sum result of everything that has been described above is that the
ulama in Singapore are generally politically acquiescent. In other countries,
the ulama may form a strong bloc which may form counter-hegemonic
aspirations. In Syria, while Sheikh Ramadan Al-Buti – a revered alim in the
Sunni world – threw his weight behind the Assad regime before his death,
other ulama tried to cast aspersions on Buti’s political leanings as they
opposed the regime (Pierret 2013). In Malaysia and Indonesia, the ulama
generally comment publicly on political affairs, and are often in the news for
making their stances known (Hefner 2000, Bush 2009, Liow 2009b, Osman
2017). Even in Saudi Arabia, where dissent is scarcely tolerated, there are
pockets of ulama who challenge the political and religious establishment’s
articulated views, to the point that some of them are publicly chided, or
worse, punished: Salman Al-Odah, an activist cleric with considerable
following in the Middle East, was arrested and is due to face the death
penalty for charges of spreading corruption and causing discord.72 In Sin-
gapore, such a situation is not witnessed. This is not to say that the ulama
are chattel who uncritically follow the state’s guidance; indeed, such an
accusation would be thoroughly unfair. Rather, the ulama, just like other
activists, generally work within the system, even when they would prefer
to see different political outcomes. Even openly criticizing the state is a
rare occurrence amongst the ulama; for them, the political opportunities
are even more constricted than for others due to the state’s intolerance for
political interference from religious actors. When there are disagreements
with state policy, the normal course of action would be either silence or
70 Asatizah Recognition Board, https://www.muis.gov.sg/ARS-and-IECP/About/Asatizah-

Recognition-Board. Accessed 23 August 2019.
71 Council of MUIS, https://www.muis.gov.sg/About-MUIS/Council-of-MUIS. Accessed
23 August 2019.
72 Abdullah Alaoudh, “My Father Called for Reform in Saudi Arabia. Now He Faces Death,”
The Guardian, 13 August 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/aug/13/
saudi-arabia-salman-al-odah-arrest-death-sentence. Accessed 23 August 2019.
advising those in power ‘behind closed-doors’. Naturally, this approach is

met with cynicism by some observers, including from within the ulama
fraternity. As argued by a respondent:
The ulama and the government have a good relationship. In the area of
terrorism, it is beneficial for both sides. The ulama assist the government
through RRG. But in other areas, the case is not the same. Even though
the job of the ulama is to advise political personnel, sometimes, it seems
that political personnel are the ones advising the ulama.73
Now, we will turn to a few incidents which amply demonstrate the general
political acquiescence of the ulama, and how this relationship is the result
of conscious decisions undertaken by the religious clergy.
4.4 Case Studies
4.4.1 Pre RRG: The Hijab Issue and the Madrasah Controversy
It has been repeated throughout this book that the state jealously guards its
authority, and is particularly cautious of religion. At the same time, the book
has described the venerated status of the ulama within Muslim societies
everywhere, and in the historical evolution of Islam. Together with Singapore’s
unique circumstances – its history, geography and constitutional provisions
for the Malay-Muslims – the state of affairs becomes a mixed bag for the
ulama. The state is more wary of the potential of the ulama to be thought
leaders within the Muslim community, and at the same time, it realizes
that it cannot be seen as being too heavy-handed toward a respected group.
The ulama too realized this, as will be evident from this section’s analysis.
Having said that, two points are to be noted. One, the ulama still had to tread
cautiously since, as the Marxist Conspiracy event had shown, when push came
to shove, the government had no qualms using an iron-fisted approach if it
was required. Two, the conditions for the ulama were rather different before
the discovery of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group in Singapore. After
JI cells were exposed, what was an already constricting political opportunity
structure became even narrower, as will be detailed later.
Two incidents are of particular importance. The first happened in 1999
and will be referred to as the Madrasah saga. In 1999, then-Prime Minister

Goh Chok Tong created a stir in the Muslim community through his critique
of the madrasahs in Singapore, and their focus on Arabic and the Islamic
sciences. His concern was amplified by the revelation that between 1996
and 1998, roughly 65% of madrasah students did not complete Secondary 4
education (Kong 2005). He proposed the implementation of the Compulsory
Education (CE) scheme, whereby all students had to go through six years of
education (from primary one to primary six) in national schools. Fears grew
within the community that the scheme would, in effect, end the relevance
of the madrasahs in Singapore leading to their closure (Abdullah 2013).
The madrasah is a crucial institution in the community, both symbolically
and functionally, and unsurprisingly, emotive and boisterous responses
to Goh’s plans ensued. Pergas became the torch-bearer for the Muslim
community, and articulated that it did not agree with the plan, and asserted
the community’s right to choose its own educational path (Rahim 2009,
355). The ulama of Pergas, under the leadership of Ustaz Syed Abdillah,
and comprising members such as Ustaz Fatris Bakaram (who would go on
later to become the Mufti) and Ustaz Hasbi, mounted significant resistance
toward the proposal. Goh had to provide an explicit guarantee that the
government had no intention to close down the madrasahs.
I am aware that the Malay community may worry over the implication of
compulsory education for the madrasahs. I understand its concern. Let
me make it clear that there is no intention to close the madrasahs. But the
madrasahs may have to adjust their teaching hours should compulsory
education in national schools be introduced. We have not taken a decision
yet on compulsory education. We will factor in the concern of madrasahs
when we do.
Madrasahs fulfil an important role in the Malay/Muslim community. They
produce asatizahs, ulamas and imams which the Muslim community
needs, besides providing an Islamic education for those who want it. But
we have to find the balance between achieving this and optimizing our
manpower resources for a knowledge-based economy.74
Pergas did not accept the assurances and continued to pursue the matter,
and eventually, the two sides reached a compromise. Madrasahs would be
74 Ministry of Information and the Arts, “Speech by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong at the Majlis
Pusat 30th Anniversary Dinner on Saturday, 30 October 1999, at Orchid Country Club Ballroom,
at 8.00pm.” http://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/speeches/view-html?filename=1999103003.
htm. Accessed 23 August 2019.
exempted from the CE scheme for eight years, to give them adequate time
to prepare for its implementation (Mauzy and Milne 2002, 110-111). The
incident was a turning point of sorts for Pergas, as it turned the clerical
organization into ‘a forceful advocacy group representing Muslim interests’
(Rahim 2009, 355). It further showed the lobbying potential of the ulama.
Around three years later, another incident tested the relationship between
the state and the ulama. In 2002, the parents of four primary school girls
sent their children to national schools donning the hijab, in an open act of
defiance of state policy. PAP leaders were unsurprisingly not amused, and
began reprimanding those parents, and identified Zulfikar Shariff as the chief
instigator.75 Then-Mufti Shaykh Isa Semait tried to calm matters and issued a
statement saying that the injunction to seek education was more important
than covering the aurat, and that the ‘no-tudung rule lasts only for a few
hours when the pupils are in school’ (Hussain 2012, 159). He also accused the
agitators of politicizing the matter. Immediately after the Mufti’s intervention,
PAP MP Maidin Packer advised Muslims to heed the Mufti’s advice and to
stop championing the cause. Shaykh Isa’s statement was met with a swift,
and surprisingly stern, rebuttal from Pergas. Pergas’ statement said:
Although their children have not yet attained the age of puberty and
discernment (baligh), the (parents) view the inculcation of modesty to
be an important element of their children’s education that should be
instilled while still young. It is regretted that several people including
those regarded as community leaders, have made statements which
clamour for the closure of further discussions just because the Mufti had
made a statement. (Hussain 2012, 160)
In the Shaﬁi school of thought, and according to MUIS’ own fatwa committee,
wearing the hijab is compulsory for every Muslim female. Yet, Shaykh Isa
issued the above statement. This book does not make a normative judgment
on the jurisprudential validity of Shaykh Isa’s statement: even if the opinion
is sound from the Islamic perspective and it is true that Muslims place a high
priority on seeking knowledge, the question which was not addressed is why
there existed a false dichotomy between the two options. Why could Muslims
not both pursue knowledge and fulfil the religious obligation of covering
their aurah? Pergas’ response, and the thinly-veiled criticism toward PAP
Malay leaders such as Packer, demonstrated a willingness to take on both
75 Zulfikar was arrested in 2016 under the Internal Security Act for promoting extremist views,
in an unrelated incident.
the state and MUIS when it had to. There were obvious tensions between
the ulama of Pergas and the PAP leaders, as the hijab incident came not long
after another contentious matter, the madrasah saga. While there was no
concession from the state in the hijab incident, unlike during the madrasah
saga, Pergas’ strongly-worded statements and insistence on the right of Muslim
women to don the hijab displayed the confidence the organization had in
articulating Muslim interests. Moreover, it showed that although political
opportunities are constricted, they are not non-existent: this is a crucial point
that bears repeating. The ulama, especially those with the gravitas of Ustaz
Syed Abdillah Al-Jufri, had more room to pursue such causes, even if it meant
being mildly antagonistic toward the state. It is also worth pointing out that
Ustaz Abdillah was a traditionalist-Sufi, and under his leadership, Pergas was
more involved in advocacy efforts, being more willing to dabble in ‘political’
affairs. The ‘cooperative Sufi-aggressive Salafi’ dichotomy again breaks down.
Both these incidents, however, occurred prior to the formation of the RRG
in Singapore, which completely altered the picture as far as state-ulama
relations go.
4.4.2 Post RRG: Moving towards Greater Cooperation with the State
In 2002, Singapore was rocked with the revelation by the government that local
terrorist networks existed. The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) cells had been discovered
earlier, and in late 2001, the Internal Security Department (ISD) had arrested
13 Muslims for being part of this group. A second batch of 18 individuals were
arrested in September 2002 (Desker 2003). These arrests of course came on the
back of the September 11 attacks in New York, which proved to be a turning
point in the globalization of terror. JI was a transnational terrorist organization
with its Singapore branch. What was particularly pernicious about the JI in
Singapore, and which really shocked a lot of Singaporeans, was their plans to
bomb key installations in Singapore, including the airport and train stations
(Hastings 2008). The Muslim community was especially hit: this was the start
of a perpetual struggle to distance themselves from extremists in their midst
and assert their commitment to the fundamental values the country holds dear.
While some were initially suspicious of the arrests, especially since there were
no trials conducted to ascertain the detainees’ guilt, once mounting evidence
was presented by the ISD and the government, it became quite clear that the
arrests were not politically motivated or trumped-up charges. The incident
was traumatic for Muslims on many levels. One, as mentioned earlier, they
were put on the back foot as Islam came under trial: the association between
Islam and violence was now one which they had to perennially refute and
constantly engage with. Two, the relationship between the government and
the community had now changed too. The community had to develop more
trust with the state, since it was inexplicable that some of its members had
desired to cause harm to the country (Abdullah 2013). Following these arrests,
a different state-ulama dynamics ensued. The RRG was formed in 2003, under
the leadership of Ustaz Ali and Ustaz Hasbi, who took over the leadership of
Pergas following Ustaz Syed Abdillah in early that year, ostensibly for the aim
of rehabilitating terrorists and to counter the ideology of violent extremism.
Ustaz Hasbi had been till that point in time quite critical of certain state
policies, and was of course part of Pergas during the aforementioned incidents.
However, both he and Ustaz Ali decided to be part of RRG as they saw Muslim
extremism as a genuine problem. The RRG surmised that the ulama had to
take the lead in tackling this problem, since it is their duty to ‘adorn the earth
as beacons to show the right paths’ and to ‘repel those who mix truth with
falsehood and introduce wayward understanding of Islam.’76 Slowly, Pergas’
attention shifted from being an advocacy group which was audacious enough
to go head-on with the state, to one which was in close cooperation with it.
Extremism and terrorism brought both the ulama and the state together.
Once Pergas, the body representing the clergy, adopted this stance, the ulama
began to develop a working relationship with the state, which was much more
cordial than it was just a few years before. The formation of the RRG is perhaps
the most important juncture, in my estimation, in state-ulama relations in
Singapore. Through RRG, greater cooperation ensued between the two sides,
and Ustaz Hasbi, and thus Pergas, developed a special relationship with the
state. RRG works closely with the Ministry of Home Affairs, especially the
ISD, as it had to get the latter’s permission to enter detention centres and
counsel the terrorists. The government has openly and consistently reiterated
its support for the group. As observed by an ustaz:
Ustaz Hasbi has a really good relationship with the government now.
This is not like the past anymore, when Pergas was confrontational. Now,
Pergas and the government are on good terms.77
Indeed, nowadays, it is a common sight to see Ustaz Hasbi and Ustaz Ali
together with members of the ruling party. As already mentioned, apart
from the RRG, Pergas is also supportive of the state-initiated Dadah itu
Haram campaign.
76 Religious Rehabilitation Group, https://www.rrg.sg/about-rrg/. Accessed 26 August 2019.

For Pergas, practical considerations had to be made. At a time when

relations between both the state and the community, and Muslims and
the other ethnic communities, were potentially fraught because of the
discovery of homegrown terrorists, the ulama focused their priorities on
being partners in nation-building, in a bid to allay the fears that the state
and other Singaporeans may have toward Muslims. This does not mean
that Pergas was doing something which compromised its beliefs: for sure,
ulama such as Ustaz Hasbi and Ustaz Ali are absolutely convinced that the
mission of RRG is completely in line with Islamic teachings, and they are
not doing it just because the state is supportive of their efforts. Another
alim, who is not part of RRG, voices his support for the cause:
RRG is a noble effort. It is the job of Muslims to counter extremist ideology […]
If we do not have RRG, the government would probably not trust us as much.78
The worthiness of the cause aside, it is obvious that since Pergas’ involvement
with RRG, the organization is no longer quarrelsome with the government.
The interests of the two have intersected, and gradually, the familiarity
between the two sides has led to a more friendly relationship. Pergas has not
openly championed the hijab issue since then, for example, at least not to
the extent it did in the past. A ‘closed-door’ approach is now favoured: access
to state officials has increased following the improvement of relationships
between the two, and hence, some ulama believe it is more productive to
express their concerns directly to the government, away from the public eye.
The political capital Pergas has gained has definitely increased with Ustaz
Hasbi’s active involvement with RRG, and the consequent rapprochement
between the two sides. In some ways, Pergas is perhaps even better positioned
than before to pursue some causes such as the hijab more aggressively, but
the organization chooses to not jeopardize its relationship with the state.
Pergas is in a better position to pursue the hijab cause now. Ustaz Hasbi’s
position is unique, because the government has a lot of respect for him.
His motives would not be questioned if Pergas pursued the cause.79
While Pergas’ shift in approach toward the state and politics is undoubt-
edly significant, other developments demonstrate the changing dynamics
between the ulama and the government too, signifying a more cooperative

relationship. Again, power matters. The relationship between the two

sides is not between two entities of equal stature. At times, cooperation
may be perceived as subordination, due to the power imbalance. The state
definitely has a preferred brand of Islam it would like to promote, and one
which focuses on a more ‘inclusive’ Muslim identity.
Moving towards an ‘Inclusive’ Muslim Identity
In Singapore’s plural society, Islam is practised in a spirit of mutual respect,

tolerance and inclusiveness. Our asatizah are central to nurturing a
progressive Muslim community. One ustaz who exemplifies this is Ustaz
Zahid Zin. Ustaz Zahid also takes an active part in MESRA-led activi-
ties, and serves on the M3 Advisory Council. Recently, one of his distant
relatives passed away. Ustaz Zahid paid respects at the wake, which was
conducted in the Buddhist tradition. He posted on Facebook how all
cultures and beliefs must be respected, and how his attendance at the
Buddhist funeral was a teachable moment for his children. Actually, it
was a teachable moment for all of us, whatever our religion or our age.
(PM Lee Hsien Loong, 2019 National Day Rally)80
The quote by PM Lee in his National Day Rally Speech delivered in Malay
encapsulates the state’s expectations of the ulama, and concomitantly, of
Islam. A few characteristics are emphasized. Firstly, Islam which is practised
in Singapore must be ‘inclusive’, and must portray a multiracial image as
much as possible. Ustaz Zahid was praised specif ically for attending a
Buddhist wake and for writing on it on his social media accounts, extolling
the importance of respecting all belief systems in the country. Secondly, he
was further applauded for his involvement in state-sponsored committees,
such as M3. M3 is the brainchild of the current Minister for Muslim Affairs,
Masagos Zulkifli, whereby the three Malay-Muslim organizations, MUIS,
Mendaki and MESRA (which is the Malay Activities Executive Committees
Council, a grassroots entity linked to the ruling party) are supposed to
collaborate and organize projects and events together. Ustaz Zahid was thus
an example of an alim who works within the system and actively partakes
in state-led or state-endorsed projects. Third, the ulama must nurture a
‘progressive Muslim community’, exemplified by inclusivity (as defined by
the state) and tolerance, not exclusivity or narrow-mindedness.
80 National Day Rally 2019, “Malay Speech”, https://www.gov.sg/microsites/ndr2019/press-room/

news/content/ndr2019-malay. Accessed 28 August 2019.
To be sure, 2019 was not the first time such an exhortation was made.
Numerous statements and policies have reflected the state’s preference for
what it considers a more tolerant and inclusive Islam. The Singapore Muslim
Identity (SMI) Project is one such instance. While the SMI project was autono-
mously crafted by the bureaucrats in MUIS after consultation with members
of the religious clergy (Razak 2019), the endeavour is ultimately under the
auspices of MUIS, and can thus can be considered to be state-endorsed.
Being a statutory board comes with certain expectations, codes of conduct,
norms and even legal considerations, and it is unrealistic to expect that an
agency under the state would directly go against it, or openly contradict the
government, especially in a system like Singapore’s. The SMI was introduced
in 2004, against the backdrop of the discovery of the JI cells, and purported
to provide guidelines by which Singaporeans should live; ultimately, there
was supposed to be no contradiction between being Singaporean and being
Muslim. In addition, the project served to highlight a distinctive brand of being
Muslim, one which took into consideration the peculiarities and complexities
of Singapore’s socio-political realities, or what is commonly referred to as the
‘context’. It must be noted that the invocation of the term ‘context’ to justify
certain positions the ulama adopt is not unique to the Singaporean case,
and therefore should not be immediately dismissed as attempts to pander to
the acceptable norms of the society, and perhaps more crucially, the whims
of the state. Rather, it has always been incumbent upon the ulama to issue
fatwas which are socially relevant, while taking into account the texts. The
Damascene alim ‘Ibn Abidin (d. 1836) elegantly explained this duty:
The rigidity of the mufti and the qadi (judge) in following (only) the
apparent meaning of the reported text (zahir al-manqul), while neglecting
custom (‘urf) and context (al-qara’in al-wadiha), and his ignorance of
the (actual) circumstances of the people necessarily entails the loss of
numerous rights and (results in) injustice for numerous people. (Zaman
2002, 19)
The SMI was thus an effort at highlighting certain traits which Singaporean
Muslims were supposed to embody. Ten desired attributes were listed as
part of the SMI. A Singapore Muslim is ideally someone who:
1 Holds strongly to Islamic principles while adapting itself to changing

context.
2 Is morally and spiritually strong to be on top of challenges of modern
society.
3 Is progressive, practices Islam beyond forms/rituals and rides the

modernization wave.
4 Appreciates Islamic civilization and history and has a good under-
standing of contemporary issues.
5 Appreciates other civilizations and is conﬁdent in interacting with
and learning from other communities.
6 Believes that good Muslims are good citizens.
7 Is well-adjusted as a member of a multi-religious society and secular
state.
8 Is a blessing to all and promotes universal principles and values.
9 Is inclusive and practices pluralism, without contradicting Islam.
10 Is a model and inspiration to all.81
While formulated in 2004, the SMI has been referred to quite regularly since.
In 2019, MUIS said that the ‘SMI values of Religiously Resilient, Inclusive,
Contributive, Adaptive and Progressive (RICAP) will continue to form the
basis of Muis’ socio-religious programmes.’82 From these statements, one can
see the direction MUIS wishes Singaporean Muslims to take. It is evident
that the values of a good Muslim are in harmony with that of the state. A
good Muslim is someone who is ‘progressive’, accepts the ‘secular state’, is
a ‘good citizen’, ‘practices pluralism’, and ‘promotes universal principles
and values’. Of course, each of these points can be contentious, and much
unpacking is needed. For instance, what does being a good citizen entail?
Does that require obedience to the state, and working within the OB mark-
ers, or are contestations of the state’s core ideologies allowed? What does
being ‘progressive’ mean? What if Muslims lean toward a conservative
interpretation of Islam: does that make them less Singaporean, or even
less Muslim? What does ‘pluralism’ connote? Does that mean denouncing
salvific exclusivity, as Alami seems to suggest in the aforementioned Straits
Times article? What does acceptance of the secular state translate to in
reality: is it a philosophical acceptance of the privatization of faith, or is it
a practical approval of secularism as a political and governing principle?
And what are these ‘universal’ values? Any student of politics would know
that values are always being contested. What should Singaporean Muslims’
81 MUIS, Office of the Mufti (2006), “Risalah for Building a Muslim Community of Excellence,”
2nd Edition, https://www.muis.gov.sg/-/media/Files/OOM/Resources/Risalah-eng-lr.pdf. Accessed
2 September 2019.
82 MUIS (2019), “MUIS Work Plan Seminar 2019,” https://www.muis.gov.sg/-/media/Files/
Corporate-Site/Press-Releases/Fact-Sheet---Muis-Work-Plan-Seminar-2019.pdf, p. 4. Accessed
2 September 2019.
stance be toward gay marriage, for instance, and is recognition of that a

universal value? If so, why, and if not, why not? Like most values, the ones
suggested in the SMI project are up for contestation.
One would probably not notice that from the discourse prevalent
amongst the ulama today. In 2003, Pergas had released a publication
entitled Moderation in Islam in the Context of the Singapore Muslim Com-
munity. In the book, Pergas made nuanced arguments on the differences
between secularism as a philosophy and the secular state in practice,
as it argued that Islam rejects secularism as a philosophy since Islam
is Ad-Deen, or a way of life, and cannot be separated from any personal
exertions in one’s daily living. However, secularism as a political practice
is acceptable, since it does not require the trivializing of one’s faith, and as
long as Muslims are allowed to practice their faith. In a secular state too,
Muslims are not obliged to follow certain Islamic forms of governance to
the letter such as the implementation of hudud laws. However, Pergas did
say that Singaporean Muslims should continue to strive toward the hijab
being allowed in certain frontline positions in Singapore (Pergas, 2004,
pp. 108-115, 343-347). Since then, however, alternative discourses, or even
ones that may provide slight challenges to state-endorsed rhetoric, are
notably missing for the most part. Ever since Pergas’ rapprochement with
the government, discourses have centred around the need for Muslims
to be part of the multiracial and multicultural landscape. The SMI has
indeed acquired almost a hegemonic status within the community, even if
many of its members may not be too familiar with the project. Rather, the
values it espouses are most definitely the ones that are the most repeated,
oft emphasized, and outright promoted. Because of MUIS’ unique position
within the fabric of the community, and since Pergas has stopped being
a counter-hegemonic force, MUIS largely dominates the discourse in the
Muslim community.
Banning of Controversial Speakers

Perhaps the starkest example highlighting the preponderance of state-
endorsed ideas in def ining the Muslim identity is the controversy sur-
rounding the ‘Merry Christmas’ issue. In 2015, a well-known preacher
from Zimbabwe, Mufti Menk, was not allowed to enter Singapore to
preach to the Muslim community. Menk had previously been allowed to
give speeches here, but not on this occasion (Abdullah 2017b). A video
of Menk stating that it was impermissible for Muslims to wish their
Christian friends ‘Merry Christmas’ surfaced on social media. In the
video, Menk said that Muslims should substitute ‘Merry Christmas’ for
‘Happy Holidays’. Senior government leaders then highlighted a worrying

trend they observed amongst Muslims. Minister for Home Affairs and
Law, K. Shanmugam, asserted that there was a growing number of young
Muslim Singaporeans declining to wish their non-Muslim friends ‘Merry
Christmas’ or ‘Happy Deepavali’ as they believed the act was impermissible
in Islam. Dr. Maliki Osman, another PAP senior Malay leader, said that
in parliament that Habib Hasan had unequivocally stated that opinions
such as Menk’s were not right. 83 Minister Masagos Zulkifli, was even
more explicit. He said:
We have the guidance of our local religious scholars who allow and even
encourage us to develop the spirit of harmony and be compassionate
to other communities. In fact, when we wish others ‘Merry Christmas’,
we know that we are not Christians and will not become Christians
by saying ‘Merry Christmas’. So, this is important and we do not need
opinions which are not only contrary to what we uphold but can also
create a situation that is not harmonious. As I have said earlier, the ban
on foreign speakers is not just applicable to Muslims. This applies to all,
whether they are Christians or Buddhists and so on. We recognize that
the Government wants to create a harmonious, peaceful environment
for everyone. Anyone who threatens it, whether they are in this country
or overseas, we will stop it.84
The state took a strong and clear stance against opinions such as Menk’s, as
PAP leaders believed that, if left unchecked, such sentiments could lead to
greater distance between the Muslim community and other Singaporeans.
Ulama such as Habib Hasan gave religious advisories that it is permissible
to wish ‘Merry Christmas’ or ‘Happy Deepavali’ to those from other faith
traditions on their special occasions, as did MUIS. Mufti Fatris Bakaram
83 Ministry of Defence, Singapore, “Speech by Dr. Mohamed Maliki Bin Osman, Senior
Minister of State for Defence, at the Debate on the President’s Address 2016,” 26 Janu-
ary 2016. https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/
article-detail/2016/january/2016jan26-speeches-00792/!ut/p/z0/f Y27bsJAEEW_JYXL1QwrsJX-
SIUVA2KYwkdkmGsGAF8z4sQshf88CKaOU596Ze8BABUboYvfkbSvUBF6b-Csp3qcfONZ5MSl-
HmH6W5WLyls9WSQxzMP8fhAU9ZNNsD6YjXysruxYqjaNQHUjONPw8MYCOleuYNzU7hZi-
86vu3PfS9ScFsWvF89VCdrGx5px4sPsK6PXGEwt9OkWwVX0LqImzIs_Nq4IbJcQ jukgh_
nU_809kdzXq5SF9u5pVCpA!!/. Accessed 2 September 2019.
84 “Religion Must Be Practised Based on Local Context”, Channel News Asia, 11 February 2016.
http:// www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/religion-must-be/2504298.html. Accessed
3 April 2016.
has himself wished Catholics and other Christians ‘Merry Christmas’.85 But
what is interesting is not that Muslim leaders and ulama issued statements
urging Muslims to adopt what they viewed as a more tolerant approach;
indeed, in a multiracial and multi-religious society, one would expect many
ulama to encourage such an approach, especially since Muslims are in the
minority. Rather, what was perhaps more fascinating is that the state had
equated the act of not greeting others to extremism, or as something which
threatened the very fabric of Singapore society. Pergas, however, issued an
intriguing statement. While Pergas said that it believed Muslims in Singapore
should give good wishes to others, and that Islam permitted such an act, it
also provided a balanced argument by highlighting that there were Muslim
ulama who had forbidden the act. Pergas essentially stated that the latter
opinion, though not encouraged in Singapore, was one which existed within
the Sunni corpus of knowledge.86 Two ulama, Ustaz Haniff Hassan and Ustaz
Mustazah Bahri, both researchers at RSIS, wrote an online commentary
which is still available on Pergas’ website, arguing that Muslims who did
not subscribe to the state-endorsed opinion on well-wishing others should
not be classified as extremists. They said that many of their own teachers
of the senior ulama held on to the belief that well-wishing others on their
special occasions was not permissible.87 Ustaz Haniff in particular is an
important figure within the ulama circles: he is one of the more respected
senior ulama who was also active in Pergas during the madrasah saga and
first hijab issue.
However, the counter-narrative provided by Ustaz Haniff, Ustaz Mustazah
and the statement by Pergas did not challenge the predominance of the state’s
discourse. In the first place, both the article by the two ulama and Pergas’
statement did mention that wishing ‘Merry Christmas’ was encouraged in
Singapore’s context; what they disputed was the notion 1) that the opinion
forbidding such an act was ‘un-Islamic’ and 2) that those who subscribed to
85 Charissa Yong, “Muslim Leaders’ Christmas Greetings Call for Religious Unity,” The Straits
Times, 24 December 2016. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/muslim-leaders-christmas-
greetings-call-for-religious-unity. Accessed 2 September 2019.
86 See Pergas’ official Facebook Page, “Religious Guidance in Sending Greetings to Non-Muslims
on Their Festivals and Celebrations,”
https://www.facebook.com/Pergas.Singapore/photos/a.452274041491748/1072976906088122/?
type=3&theater. Accessed 2 September 2019.
87 Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Mustazah Bahri, “A Balance Approach to the Issue of
“Merry Christmas” Greeting by Muslims,” Wasat, 1 February 2019. https://blog.pergas.org.sg/
wasat/a-balance-approach-to-the-issue-of-merry-christmas-greeting-by-muslims/. Accessed
2 September 2019. Wasat is Pergas’ online journal. From my own conversations with these
ulama, I concur with Ustaz Haniff and Ustaz Mustazah’s observation.
this particular jurisprudential opinion were displaying unsavoury traits.88

Moreover, state elites continued to propagate the narrative, in spite of Pergas’
statement. The ulama did not subsequently challenge the state’s approach,
at least overtly. Many were either silent, or supported the idea that it was
positive for Muslims to express their happiness toward their friends from
other faiths on the latter’s religious festivals. Those who were silent were
not necessarily in support of the state’s narrative, but did not see much
value in challenging it. An alim interviewed said:
As believers, we wish to safeguard our beliefs. It is natural for some Mus-

lims to not be comfortable to greet others on their religious festivals, not
secular festivals, but just religious ones. A secular state should not impose
its idea of wishing ‘Merry Christmas’ onto religious people. If it has a
stance, it should educate people, not impose its view. But what can we do,
apart from express our views privately to our leaders when we see them.89
There was an air of resignation in the interviewee’s response. Although

the alim in question did not agree with the state’s approach, in spite of the
fact that he personally believed that it is permissible to give good wishes to
non-Muslims, he did not publicly express his disapproval. He was, of course,
not the only one. Other ulama who disagreed with it remained silent too.
The quietist approach, or one which favoured closed-door discussions or
private counsel, was preferred to overt dissent.
If one were to extend the logic behind the state’s argument for the
banning of Mufti Menk, even more uncomfortable questions arise. What
about ulama who believe in salvif ic exclusivity? Would that not be an
exclusivist view as well, since it requires that people believe in Islam to
be saved in the hereafter? Or even more fundamentally, what about the
belief that Islam is the only true faith, which is of course the stance of the
overwhelming majority of Muslim lay-persons and the ulama? Would that
be considered exclusivist in the future? For sure, if one is honest, one would
say that all religions, while they share basic premises and some universal
values about peace, love, and tolerance, differ on core tenets, and often,
propagate mutually exclusive beliefs. The Muslim and Christian cannot be
88 Some Muslims I conversed with said that they have good relationships with their non-Muslim
neighbours, and often exchange food or gifts with them. However, they do not greet them on
their religious festivals. One could certainly not make the claim that these people are somehow
extremists or exclusivists.
both simultaneously correct on the position of Jesus, for instance: either

Jesus is a Prophet and not God or the son of God, as the Muslims assert,
or he is God and/or the son of God. Both can be wrong, if Jesus is neither a
prophet nor God, but both cannot be correct at the same time. This is just
one example of theological exclusivity. Where thus, is the line between what
a Muslim, or an adherent to any faith for that matter, is allowed to believe
and socially exclusive theologies, as the state sees it? The ‘Merry Christmas’
saga seems to be a derivative of this question.
No doubt, the Singapore state is not the first to view theological exclusivi-
ties as problematic. Indeed, Jean-Jacques Rousseau had written:
Those who distinguish between civil and theological intolerance are

mistaken, in my opinion. The two intolerances are inseparable. It is
impossible to live in peace with people one believes to be damned; to
love them would be to hate God who punishes them; one must absolutely
bring them back (to the fold) or torment them. Wherever theological
intolerance is allowed, it is impossible for it to not have some civil effect;
and as soon as it does, the Sovereign is no longer Sovereign, even in the
temporal sphere; from then on, the Priests are the true masters; Kings
are but their officers. (Rousseau 1997, 151)
Rousseau makes the point that in cases of theological exclusivity, social

cohesion would be indisputably affected. In addition, the state would no
longer be truly in charge, since religious clerics would have the final author-
ity over their faith-adherents. The Singapore state’s approach to the ‘Merry
Christmas’ issue bore remnants of Rousseau’s thoughts on the matter.
Muslim scholars, however, had typically argued against such a view. To
be sure, there is a minority of Muslims who equate theological superiority
of Islam to an injunction to either convert or fight non-Muslims; however,
the vast majority of ulama throughout Islamic history had always written
treatises and issued edicts on how to co-exist with non-Muslim communities.
The parallel between theological intolerance and civil intolerance thus, for
many Muslims, is a false equivalence.
Yes, I believe that Islam is the ultimate truth, and hence, I believe other
faiths may contain beliefs which are wrong. But I also believe Islam enjoins
goodness to my neighbours. There is no contradiction between believing I am
right in my theology, and being nice to others who do not share my beliefs.90
90 Interview with Muslim professional, 11 November 2019.

The respondent enunciated a view which was shared by many ulama I

conversed with as well. The example given earlier was how some Muslims
exchange gifts with their non-Muslim neighbours, visit each other’s houses
on their special occasions, but do not greet them ‘Merry Christmas’ or
‘Happy Deepavali’. Evidently, for these Muslims, theological exclusivity does
not lead to socially exclusivist behaviours. Yet, while Muslims generally
believe this to be true, they did not, en masse, dissent with the state on its
interpretation of the ‘Merry Christmas’ saga.
Another case which demonstrates the state’s unflinching stance on po-
tential racial and religious divides is the Imam Nalla incident. In a Friday
sermon in early 2017, Indian National Imam Nalla made a supplication in
a mosque in Singapore, which translated as ‘give us victory over the Jews
and Christians.’ The supplication is not uncommon in the Muslim world:
it is heard in many countries. Typically, such prayers are understood to be
directed against those who wage war against Islam. However, a national
uproar ensued after a video of the Imam making the prayer was uploaded
online by a Muslim who was critical of the Imam. Many non-Muslims
expressed shock and even disgust that such a supplication was being
made in a mosque in Singapore; perhaps equally, many Muslims too
were unhappy at the uploader of the video, stating that the prayer did
not mean a call to war against Jews and Christians, but simply referred
to those who were oppressing Muslims. Then-Minister Yaacob Ibrahim
acknowledged the sentiments of some Muslims, saying that many ‘in
our community felt angry, because they believe that the postings could
be used to cast aspersions on Islam and the asatizah.’91 Pergas issued a
six-page statement which was nuanced, and even amorphous at times,
stating that Islam did not allow Muslims to pray for negative outcomes
against ordinary people, but did so for those who waged war against and
were oppressing Muslims. Pergas also acknowledged the Imam’s state-
ments and apology, but did not particularly come out either in support
or condemnation of the Imam.92 Yaacob’s candid admission was quite
revealing, as it showed how the stern rebuke of the Imam by state elites
was actually frowned upon by some Muslims. These Muslims felt that
91 Toh Yong Chuan, “No Room for Religious Extremism in Singapore,” The Straits Times,
5 March 2017. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/no-room-for-religious-extremism-in-
singapore-say-muslim-leaders. Accessed 4 September 2019.
92 Pergas, “Religious Guidance on Supplicating Against Those From Different Faiths,”
3 April 2017. http://www.pergas.org.sg/media/MediaStatement/mediarelease_ReligiousGuid-
anceonPrayingforThosefromDifferentFaithGroups_3April.pdf. Accessed 4 September 2019.
the community was at best, misunderstood again, or at worst, unfairly

targeted. A respondent said:
Look, every Muslim who hears that du’a (supplication) knows that it is
not a war cry against Jews and Christians. Singaporean Muslims have
always lived in harmony with our brothers and sisters from the other
faiths, including the Christians. The du’a was obviously directed toward
those who are at war with Muslims. The issue is, the du’a was done in
the setting of a mosque, where Muslims know exactly what it is for, but
was then taken outside the mosque. The act of uploading the video was
mischievous, as it could cause much misunderstanding.93
The respondent’s thoughts seem to confirm what Yaacob had said. But
what was even more illuminating was the Mufti’s reaction. When the video
first made its rounds on Facebook, Mufti Fatris wrote a Facebook post,
which apparently was directed toward the individual who uploaded it,
harshly criticizing him. The post was later removed by the Mufti, who
also deactivated or privatized his account for a while because he wanted
things to ‘cool things down’.94 While this was ongoing, a prominent Muslim
academic, Associate Professor Syed Khairudin Aljunied from the Malay
Studies Department at the National University of Singapore, wrote a satirical
post on Facebook mocking the uploader of the video. Minister Shanmugam
mentioned Aljunied by name in Parliament later for promoting a position
which is ‘quite contrary to the norms, values and laws in Singapore,’ adding
that his actions were ‘unacceptable’.95 Aljunied was suspended from NUS
for a brief period, while the police began investigations into whether he had
committed a criminal offence. When the investigation had been concluded,
both Aljunied and the uploader of the video were issued a warning by the
police.96 Mufti Fatris subsequently issued a statement censuring the Imam’s
supplication, saying that the ‘words used by the Imam have no place in
93 Interview with Muslim professional, 10 September 2019.

94 Toh Yong Chuan, “No Room for Religious Extremism in Singapore,” The Straits Times,
5 March 2017. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/no-room-for-religious-extremism-in-
singapore-say-muslim-leaders. Accessed 4 September 2019.
95 Pearl Lee, “NUS Suspends Academic While It Investigates His Involvement in Case of
Imam’s Remarks,” The Straits Times, 8 March 2017. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/
nus-suspends-academic-while-it-investigates-his-involvement-in-case-of-imams-remarks.
96 Toh Yong Chuan, “Duo Warned for Supporting, Uploading Video,” The Straits Times,
4 April 2017. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/duo-warned-for-uploading-supporting-
video. Accessed 5 September 2019.
today’s Singapore where we as communities live in peace and harmony.’97

However, the Mufti still condemned the act of uploading to the video on
social media as ‘irresponsible’ since it ‘will definitely sow discord within
and across communities.’98 Imam Nalla was charged in court, fined 4000
Singapore dollars, and then repatriated to India.99
What is arguably most interesting about the Imam Nalla incident was the
reaction of prominent Muslims such as Mufti Fatris and Dr. Aljunied, and
even ordinary members of the community. After the state had made clear
its stance and said that it would not tolerate comments of the nature of the
Imam’s supplication, these individuals directed their ire to the uploader of
the video, and not to state leaders. This is rather telling. It would appear
that these people decided that it was not possible to embark on the latter,
while the former was a better course of action since the person involved
was not directly associated with the state. In short, taking on the uploader
of the video was a less risky endeavour than disagreeing with the ruling
elites. Again, once the dust had settled, as was the case with the other issues
already mentioned earlier, there was no counter-narrative in public. The
ulama largely remained silent, even though many of them had expressed
concern in private over how the incident was handled by the state.100
The quietist, or politically acquiescent, stances of the ulama, can be
understood through the lens of political opportunity structures. Most
ulama have chosen to take the first two options described in Chapter 3:
either they cooperate with the state, as is the case with the ulama in MUIS,
RRG and to a large extent, Pergas too, or they do not antagonize the state
in potentially hazardous areas and remain publicly silent, in spite of their
disagreement. When there are contestations, these come in the form of mild
disagreements with the state’s position, as embodied in Pergas’ statement
and the article by Ustaz Haniff and Ustaz Mustazah, rather than a stern
rebuke of the government. As explained, this was not always the case: in the
past, Pergas was more willing to go toe to toe with the PAP leaders. One can
explain Pergas’ ability to challenge the state due to the social capabilities
97 MUIS, “Mufti of Singapore, Dr. Mohamed Fatris Bakaram’s Statement on the Case of Mr. Nalla
Mohamed Abdul Jameel,” 3 April 2017, https://www.muis.gov.sg/-/media/Files/Corporate-Site/
Press-Releases/03-Apr-2017--Media-Statement--Mufti-Statement-on-the-Case-of-Mr-Nalla-
Mohamed-Abdul-Jameel-Eng.pdf. Accessed 5 September 2019.
98 Ibid.
99 “Imam Fined $4k over Remarks, Will Be Repatriated,” The Straits Times, 4 April 2017. https://
www.straitstimes.com/singapore/imam-fined-4k-over-offensive-remarks-will-be-repatriated.
100 This sentiment was communicated to me by many of my respondents.
it possesses: as a body of Islamic religious scholars, it has a great deal of

credibility amongst its constituents, and the state cannot easily dismiss the
ulama of the caliber of Ustaz Syed Abdillah and Ustaz Hasbi. Not all ulama,
especially those outside Pergas, could do the same, and to a large degree,
they did not because they knew this too. To some extent, one can make a
similar case for Ustaz Haniff, for reasons outlined earlier. However, after
2003, the political opportunities became more constricted, even for Pergas,
as it had to shift its focus toward gaining the trust of both the state and the
wider Singapore community, after the spotlight had been shone on Muslim
extremism. Pergas now saw itself as an ally of the state in the war against
terrorism. Other ulama focused on uncontroversial aspects of the faith,
resulting in the popularity of ‘feel-good Islam’, especially those for whom
the political opportunities are more restrictive, and consciously stay away
from dabbling in contentious issues. Political opportunities must also be
seen through the lens of not only the strong state and its ideological stance
on multiracialism, but also electoral conditions. Post-2015, it was more able to
push through policies and take stances which were not too well-received by
some segments of Singapore society. This is largely due to the political capital
it derived from the 70% vote share it garnered in the 2015 election. Many of
the state’s uncompromising stances in the issue of Muslim identity – such
as the Imam Nalla and Merry Christmas episode – occurred after 2015.
The state was more able to act according to its ideological predisposition,
and not on electoral considerations, once it had accumulated significant
political capital.
4.4.3 The Ruptures
Occasional Points of Disagreement

It needs to be emphasized that this book does not make the claim that
the ulama have become agents of the state, useful idiots, or have ‘sold out’.
Instead, the argument is that the ulama are generally conscious of the
consequences of their political choices, just like the activists, and choose
to work within the system to change it. This does not mean that there
are no points of disagreement between the ulama and the state at times,
even in the post-2003 era. Pergas’ statements on the Merry Christmas and
Imam Nalla episodes, and the article by Ustaz Haniff and Ustaz Mustazah
mentioned earlier are examples. However, even in those instances, the
dissent is rather mild, and is expressed in a tactful, gentle way, and not
in an uncontrolled manner. Again, political opportunity structures could
explain this. Nevertheless, no matter how limiting political opportunities,
it is never the case that no dissent occurs. The following section deals with
the case of two clerics who have endured differing fates for operating outside
the mainstream.
The Odd Dissenter: Noor Deros and Murad Said

The examples of Ustaz Noor Deros and Ustaz Murad Said are important
to highlight for a couple of reasons. One, they show that ultimately, the
ulama have a choice to disagree with the state on the fundamentals; two,
there are consequences for not working within the system; and three, the
hegemony of the PAP goes beyond its formal institutional structures. From
the outset, it must be noted that this book does not make the claim that
the two clerics are alike. Indeed, there are significant differences between
the two: Noor Deros has Sufi leanings, while Murad can be described as
a Salafi. Noor was not branded by the state as an extremist, while Murad
was. Noor’s case did not garner national attention, though it was a point
of conversation amongst the ulama; while Murad’s did as he was deemed
a national security threat. The point of this section is not to challenge or
affirm the state’s characterization of Murad, or the denial of the ARS to
Noor; rather, I intend to highlight the occasional points of rupture between
the ulama and the state, by pointing out the non-monolithic nature of the
ulama, and even though the majority of them work within the confines of
the state, there is a small minority who do not.
Murad’s case is perhaps more straightforward. He was placed under
the Restriction Order for promoting ‘exclusivist’ interpretations of Islam,
especially when it came to non-Muslims and even Muslims from other
sects such as Shi’ites. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) also said in its
statement that Murad ‘encouraged his students to withdraw from Singapore’s
secular society, disregard secular laws and adhere to the rulings of Syariah
law instead.’101 MHA did not allege that Murad was a terrorist, however; its
assertion was that he was an exclusivist and his divisive views were detri-
mental to a multiracial and multi-religious society. Some of his controversial
social media posts include criticism of those who celebrate National Day
in Singapore, and warning of the dangers of having inter-faith dialogues.102
101 Hariz Baharudin, “Former Religious Teacher and Student Placed on Restriction Order
under ISA,” The Straits Times, 16 January 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/former-
6 August 2019.
102 Faris Mokhtar “Former Ustaz Was Spreading Extremist Ideas on Facebook,” Today, 16 Janu-
ary 2019. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/former-ustaz-spreading-extremist-ideas-
facebook. Accessed 5 September 2019.
For the Singapore state, those views are evidently unacceptable. Loyalty to
the nation is an integral part of being a citizen, as is supporting inter-faith
events which the state sees as vital to promoting harmony between different
religious communities. It is also clear that Murad knew precisely the dangers
of adhering to his views. Before he was placed under the Restriction Order,
his ARS had already been revoked, which meant that he knew his positions
on certain issues did not sit well with senior ulama within the community.
Even after the revocation, he continued to write postings of a similar nature,
according to the MHA.
For Noor Deros, he was denied the ARS not because his views were
extremist or exclusivist, but because they were deemed to not be suited to
the country’s realities. Noor takes a strong stance against usury, critiques
capitalism and secularism at a fundamental level, and used to promote the
Dinar and Dirham (gold and silver) in lieu of Fiat money. The ARB decided
that Noor ‘supported views that encourage Muslims to reject the system
of governance and economy practiced in Singapore as being unsuitable for
Singapore Muslims.’103 It does not appear that the state actively involved
itself in the decision to deny Noor the ARS; rather, the decision was made
by members of the ARB. A member of the ulama fraternity, who is not on
the ARB, commented on the decision:
He (Noor) is my friend, but I think there is a basis for the ARB to deny
him the ARS. His teachings may not be suited for a secular context.104
It is this author’s belief that there was indeed no injunction from the state
to deny Noor his ARS. However, the decision made by ARB must have taken
into account what is acceptable by the state’s standards: indeed, when one
talks about the context of Singapore, one’s understanding of what constitutes
the socio-political environment invariably includes the state’s principles.
Not everyone, of course, agreed with the ARB’s decision on Noor. Some
ulama interviewed stated that they believed Noor was wrongly denied the
ARS. However, they do not voice their opposition to the ARB’s decision
publicly. This reticence is for a couple of reasons. Firstly, it would perhaps be
unwise – from their perspective – to take on the board which can deny them
the license to teach, and secondly, since the ARB comprises senior ulama,
it would have not been appropriate for the dissenters to publicly question
103 Correspondence with Ustaz Noor Deros, 5 September 2019. He quoted the reason given by
ARS in their letter to him.
them. The ulama community is rather hierarchical, with seniority playing

a huge role in determining the level of respect accorded to someone. Murad,
on the other hand, had far fewer sympathizers amongst the religious clerics.
These two cases highlight the role of agency in understanding Muslim
activism in Singapore. It is true that most ulama operate within the political
structures in Singapore; but it is also true that the fact that they do is in
itself an indication of a political choice, not a lack thereof. Activists, in this
case the ulama, can always choose to challenge state ideologies, if they
are prepared to bear the brunt of the state reprisal. Noor’s case further
highlights how political opportunities are shaped not only by direct state
intervention, but by the ruling party’s ideological hegemony as well. The
government did not have to tell the ARB to not induct Noor; rather, the
body is fully aware of what is acceptable or otherwise in the context of
the city-state.
4.5 Conclusion
Much like the other categories of Muslim activists investigated in this book
– the liberals and conservatives – the ulama are not a homogenous entity,
as this chapter has endeavoured to show. Theological and jurisprudential
differences exist within the ulama, though ultimately, political opportunities
determine their stances. Even though political opportunities are limited in
the city-state, due to the competitive authoritarian regime and its disdain
of religious interference in politics, they are not non-existent. As Pergas’
encounters during the hijab and madrasah episodes demonstrate, the
ulama could provide a robust challenge to the state when they wish to,
even though the discovery of JI terrorist cells altered the calculations of
these religious clerics. Most ulama choose to operate within the system,
though a couple of notable exceptions make for an interesting comparison.
Unlike the liberals and conservatives, the ulama have a unique position
within any Muslim community, a fact that the PAP government recognizes.
State-ulama interactions thus provide a perspective through which we can
understand Singapore politics in general. From the answers given, one can
see similarities with theological justifications given by ulama elsewhere, in
determining their political positions. Theology informs politics; at times,
as much as politics informs theology.
The next chapter will discuss the liberal activists in Singapore and how
they have navigated the political system.
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5 Liberal Activists: Playing by the
System and Making Gains
Abstract
This chapter analyzes the relationships Muslim ‘liberal’ activists have
with the state. Just like the ulama, the liberals are not a monolithic group,
with various approaches taken by different actors. However, by and large,
the liberals, again like the ulama, play by the rules of the game set by the
state. In fact, I argue that liberals have managed to maximize their space
the most as compared to conservatives, for reasons which are explained
in the chapter.
Keywords: liberal Muslims, progressives, liberal-conservative divide,

LGBT rights
In this, ‘critical Islam’ as Muslim thinker Ziauddin Sardar argues, can

be a counter narrative for the Muslim public against the dominance of
fundamentalist Islam. Where the latter generated an intellectual mess and
a stagnation of Muslim sociopolitical thought, critical Islam can salvage
the situation by reconstructing a new, cosmopolitan vision of Islam that
is ethically grounded, socially committed, politically progressive and
intellectually sound for today’s world.1
The statement above was written by two Muslim thinkers in Singapore,

Nazry Bahrawi, a Senior Lecturer in Comparative Literature at the Singapore
University of Technology and Design (SUTD), and Imran Taib, a prominent
Muslim activist who is active in inter-faith dialogue circles. Both can be
said to be liberal-leaning Muslims; Imran in particular has been the subject
1 Nazry Bahrawi and Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib, “Counter Fundamentalism with
‘Critical Islam’,” Today, 11 September 2013. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/counter-
fundamentalism-critical-islam. Accessed 10 September 2019.
doi: 10.5117/9789463724012_ch05
of much ire and consternation by conservative Muslim activists, and has

been identified as the face of ‘liberal Islam’ in Singapore.2 But what exactly is
‘liberal Islam’, and who is a ‘liberal Muslim’? Is liberal Islam synonymous with
‘critical Islam’, as used by the two authors in the above-mentioned quote,
or ‘progressive Islam’, as is often heard in contemporary Muslim discourse?
This chapter analyzes the relationships Muslim ‘liberal’ activists have
with the state. Just as the ulama, the liberals are not a monolithic group,
with various approaches taken by different actors. However, by and large,
the liberals, again like the ulama, play by the rules of the game set by the
state. In fact, I argue that liberals have managed to maximize their space
the most as compared to conservatives, for reasons which will be outlined
later. Examples of liberals who are more willing to take on the state will also
be explored, to provide a fuller picture of the activist scene in Singapore.
But before going further, it is crucial to define, and problematize, the term
‘liberal Muslim’.
5.1 ‘Liberal’ Muslims: Complexities of the Category
I am liberal, both politically and religiously, but I really do not like to call
myself a liberal Muslim. The term has all sorts of negative connotations.
I prefer the term progressive […] Usually, people call us liberal Muslims
to delegitimize our views and portray us as some form of deviants.3
This quote by the liberal activist interviewed captures the diff iculties
involved in defining the term ‘liberal Muslim’. Often, the term is used in
a derogatory fashion by opponents. A conservative interviewed describes
liberal Islam as a ‘clear and present danger to the aqeedah (beliefs) of
Muslims.’4 ‘Liberal Islam’ is viewed with much suspicion, as the activists
interviewed themselves acknowledged. More so than the categories ulama
and conservatives, the term liberal is by far the most contentious concept
in this book. To understand why this is so, one must know what is at stake
when defining these terms: liberals seek to define, or redefine, Islam in
particular ways, which are often socially progressive, as the earlier quote
2 A few conservative activists interviewed made this point. Imran himself acknowledged
that there exist perceptions of him as a prominent liberal Muslim activist, but adds that many
people have made unfair judgments on his nuanced positions, often without reading his own
works. Interview with Imran Taib, 23 September 2019.
3 Interview with liberal activist, 19 August 2019.
4 Interview with conservative activist, 6 August 2019.
Liber al Ac tivists: Pl aying by the System and Making Gains 163
by Nazry Bahrawi and Imran Taib suggests, and they are often met with
opposition by Muslims who are more traditionalist or conservative. Any
attempt to undermine an established hierarchy of ideas would always be
met with resistance, and the case of the liberals is no exception. This chapter
will use the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ Muslim interchangeably.
Chapter 3 had already defined the term ‘liberal’, but it bears repeating
and expanding. A few characteristics are central to the identity of liberal
Muslims. Firstly, they challenge uncritical adherence to traditions found in
the Islamic corpus of knowledge, and call for a fundamental rethinking of
certain issues. This is especially true in the domain of gender and sexuality.
They question injunctions which they deem to be not in line with the Islamic
spirit and principle of equality. These include inheritance laws, where males
are usually understood to be entitled to a higher share of the wealth;5 the
question of female Imams, or whether females can lead congregational
prayers; the talaq or pronouncement of divorce issue, where males can
divorce their wives by declaration whereas females have to apply for a
divorce through a qadi or Islamic judge; the position of LGBT groups within
Muslim communities, inter alia. Liberal Muslims tend to be passionate on
these issues. Secondly, they emphasize the values of justice, equality and
individual liberty, more than tradition, authenticity, and hierarchy. For
liberals, it is the spirit of Islam which needs to be maintained and protected,
more so than the laws and traditions. Laws and traditions are merely the
means to achieve those goals, and not the ends themselves. When those
objectives cannot be attained through the laws, they should not be adhered
to. Shunning dogmatic interpretations of Islam, they are more likely to focus
on how Muslims should be co-existing with people of other/no faiths rather
than emphasizing Islam’s theological superiority.
It is not controversial to suggest that liberals do not constitute the
majority of Muslims. Many Muslim communities are still traditional and
conservative. However, their importance should not be undermined just
because they are in the numerical minority. For one, the allure of liberal or
progressive Islam is on the rise. Many young Muslims especially struggle
with the contradictions between being Muslim and living in a Western-
dominated world, and thus for them, liberal Islam becomes an appealing
way to reconcile between their faith tradition and socio-political realities.
Younger Muslims who believe in the equality of the genders, for instance,
5 Conservative Muslim scholars would argue that the financial responsibilities for Muslim
males also outweigh those of their female counterparts, which is why they are entitled to more
inheritance.
may find traditional Islamic inheritance laws difficult to accept, and may
attribute them to a misreading of Islamic tradition, and as a result, may prefer
a critical rendition of the faith. Furthermore, liberals and progressives are
prominent in the discourses on Islam. Many leading Muslim intellectuals
identify themselves as progressive, or at least, promote a version of Islam that
is more liberal-leaning. Some of these intellectuals will be mentioned later.
Liberal or progressive Muslims have also been given platforms, especially
in the West, in both politics and the media. It was earlier mentioned that
Irshad Manji and Ayaan Hirsi Ali get exposure that many conservative
Muslims do not receive in the West, precisely because the version of Islam
they promote is perhaps more palatable to Western sensibilities. Manji and
Ali, incidentally, are not the intellectuals whom liberal Muslims look up
to or derive inspiration from. Nevertheless, the point here is that liberal
Muslims are a group which should not be ignored.
The category liberal is controversial not just because the term is used by
other Muslims to delegitimize their thoughts; defining the term becomes
even more difficult since there are different strands of liberals. As mentioned
earlier, it is more worthwhile to think of the categories ‘liberals’ and ‘con-
servatives’ as existing on a spectrum, rather than viewing them as binaries.
This means that even amongst liberals, some are more liberal than others.
Take for instance the issue of gay marriage. Some liberal Muslims view
gay relationships as permissible in Islamic law, and regard the command
against it as either time-specific, which means that it was valid in the past
but not anymore, or misunderstood by the majority of Muslims. Scott Kugle,
a Professor in Islamic Studies at Emory University, and a leading progressive
Muslim, argues that the Quran is actually silent on the matter and adopts
a creative interpretation to the story of Lot, which will be expounded later
(Kugle 2010). Other progressives, however, do not believe that gay or lesbian
relationships are permissible, but challenge Muslims’ treatment of the LGBT
community. Thus, it can get quite murky when we are placing individuals
under the liberal banner. As with all categories, there are individuals who do
not fit neatly in these categories. The example of Tariq Ramadan was given
earlier: he is considered as ‘liberal’ by many of his detractors, as he himself
has acknowledged. Ramadan is an intriguing case which really highlights
the complexities of defining ‘liberal’: he has simultaneously been described
as a ‘liberal Muslim’ and a ‘closet fundamentalist’.6 The terms ‘liberal’ and
6 Henry Chu, “Islamic Scholar Tariq Ramadan Defends His Views,” Los Angeles Times, 16 Sep-
tember 2014. https://www.latimes.com/la-fg-ramadan-qa22-2009sep22-story.html. Accessed
11 September 2019.
‘fundamentalist’ can easily be weaponized to delegitimize one’s opponent.

Nevertheless, cases such as Ramadan’s are instructive as well as they tell us
where the boundaries between what constitutes a liberal and otherwise are.7
In the Muslim world, there are some renowned and leading liberal/
progressive intellectuals. As already mentioned, while Ayaan Hirsi Ali and
Irshad Manji are given much attention, especially in the Western media,
they are not really considered as points of references by liberal Muslims
in Singapore.8 Muslim progressive intellectuals in the world include the
aforementioned Scott Kugle; Khaled Abou El Fadl, a Professor in Islamic Law
at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA); Farid Esack, the famous
anti-apartheid activist who is now a Professor in Religious (Islamic) Studies
at the University of Johannesburg; Ebrahim Moosa, a Professor of Islamic
Studies at the University of Notre Dame; Amina Wadud, a former Professor of
Quranic Studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia; Fatimah
Mernissi, a Moroccan sociologist and feminist writer who died in 2015; and
Ziauddin Sardar, a writer and literary critic born in Pakistan and based in
Britain. The volume edited by Omar Safi entitled Progressive Muslims: On
Justice, Gender, and Pluralism provides insights into not only the issues
which progressive Muslims hold dear, but also the identities of the foremost
liberal intellectuals (Safi 2003). Others who contributed to the volume are
Ahmet Karamustafa, Tazim R. Kassam, Sa’diyya Sheikh, Kecia Ali, and Farish
Noor, amongst others. Amongst these, only Farish Noor is from Southeast
Asia (Malaysia). But the region has had its fair share of progressive Muslim
intellectuals. These include Professor Farid Alatas, a Malaysian sociologist
based at the National University of Singapore, Nurcholish Madjid (d. 2005),
Ulil Abshar Abdalla and Syafiq Hasyim from Indonesia (Kersten 2011), and
many more.9 In fact, there is an organization called Jaringan Islam Liberal
(JIL), or The Liberal Islam Network, comprising intellectuals and activists
who promote progressive Islam (Nurdin 2005). The discourse on Liberal Islam
in Indonesia is particularly intense, due to the more democratic arena and
because of the political imperatives involved. Politicians eager to brandish
their Islamic credentials took it upon themselves to grouse about the threat
7 In this book, I do not consider Ramadan to be a liberal or progressive, as even though he

challenges conventional Muslim understandings of Islamic tradition, he does so by going back
to classical sources, instead of drawing on novel interpretations. However, someone else could
easily classify him as a liberal/progressive.
8 A liberal activist interviewed does not even consider these two to be intellectuals who
warrant serious attention, and said ‘I cannot stand that fraud’ in reference to Ayaan Hirsi Ali.
Interview with liberal activist, 19 August 2019.
9 See (Alatas 2009).
to Islam that came from progressives. Earlier, MUI’s fatwa which condemned
‘pluralism, liberalism and secularism’ was discussed (Gillespie 2007). The
fatwa was used by many conservatives to denounce progressive Muslims
in the country. The issuance of the fatwa resulted in a pushback by many
liberals, and generated many discussions on the nature of secularism in
Indonesia, what type of country it is, what the role of Islam should be, and
so on, even though it did legitimize some forms of violence toward minority
communities as well (Sirry 2013). In Malaysia too, one sees the politicization
of conservative and liberal identities. At various times, different political
parties have used ‘liberal’ Islam in varying ways. During Dr. Mahathir’s first
term as Prime Minister, he embarked on multi-faceted ways to out-Islamize
the Islamic Party of Malaysia (PAS), including affirming its commitment to
modern and ‘liberal’ Islam (Hamayotsu 2002, 362). However, after 2008, when
Prime Minister Najib Razak attempted to mend his ruling party’s electoral
fortunes by retreating to an ethno-religious agenda, the government began
to chastise the phenomenon of liberal Islam, as he courted the conserva-
tive vote (Hamid and Razali 2015). In both countries, the Muslim-majority
populations, coupled with a competitive electoral arena, made it ripe for
these identities to be politicized. Obviously, such a situation does not occur
in Singapore. First, the electoral arena is not nearly as competitive; and
second, the state is careful to ensure religion is not meshed with politics.
However, that does not mean that liberals and conservatives do not engage
in diatribes, and that they do not try to seek the government’s attention, as
subsequent sections will show.
The intellectuals mentioned earlier all seek to challenge established
understandings and interpretations of Muslim practices. Many of them
are explicitly cited by liberal Muslim activists interviewed, as sources of
inspiration. The quote cited at the beginning of this chapter utilized Ziaud-
din Sardar’s works, demonstrating how progressive Muslims in Singapore
engage with these authors. They share similar vocabulary and conceptions
of what Muslim societies ought to be, though of course, for Singaporean
progressives, they take into account the specific contexts within which
they operate, as will be discussed later. Many of these figures are unknown
to the average Muslim, with the possible exception of Amina Wadud. She
is infamous for having led congregational prayers on multiple occasions,
inviting the ire of many conservative Muslims who believe that only men can
lead mixed-congregational prayers.10 Such an act of defiance of traditional
10 This is the view of mainstream Sunni and Shi’ite Muslim scholars. Women are allowed to
lead prayers where congregants are entirely female.
norms was calculated and intended to send a message of gender equality

and the dismantling of patriarchal interpretations of Islam.11
For Farid Esack, Progressive Islam denotes ‘Muslim reformist attempts
that deal with the cultural and scientif ic challenges presented by the
encounter with Western modernity as well as internal socio-economic
stagnation’ (Esack 2018, 81). However, even though he was comfortable
using ‘Progressive Islam’ previously to describe his approach to Islam, after
9-11, ‘the term was consciously shifted beyond what I and many others
had recognized, promoted, and identified with, to the point where we no
longer desire any association with it’ (Esack 2018, 81). This was because the
US government began to promote certain narratives on what is acceptable
Islam, in its ‘good Muslim, bad Muslim’ project. Charles Kurzman views
liberal Islam as contrasting to ‘customary tradition’ and ‘calls upon the
precedent of the early period of Islam in order to delegitimate present-
day practices,’ in ‘the name of modernity’ (Kurzman 1998, 6). He further
argues that Liberal Islam is conducive for democracy and even ‘Western
sensibilities’, since it allows for, and even advocates, a contextualized reading
of the Sharia, where multiple valid interpretations of revealed texts are
possible (Kurzman 1998, 16-20). A key tenet of liberal Muslim thought is the
acceptance of secularism as a political system and philosophy. Abdullahi
Ahmed An-Naim, a progressive Muslim intellectual who is a Professor of
Law at Emory University, encapsulates this idea when he says:
In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice, which is the only

way one can be a Muslim, I need a secular state. By a secular state I mean
one that is neutral regarding religious doctrine, one that does not claim
or pretend to enforce Shariʿa – the religious law of Islam – simply because
compliance with Shariʿa cannot be coerced by fear of state institutions or
faked to appease their officials. This is what I mean by secularism in this
book, namely, a secular state that facilitates the possibility of religious
piety out of honest conviction. (An-Naim 2008, 1)
The debate on Islam and secularism has been a major theme in the
discussions between liberals and conservatives in Muslim societies. For
conservatives, as Olivier Roy notes, monotheistic religions, especially Islam,
claim ‘to speak the truth, to have something to say about all human actions
and conduct’ (Roy 2007, 38). For many conservatives, to accept secularism
11 “Woman Leads Controversial US Prayer,” Al-Jazeera, 19 March 2005. https://www.aljazeera.

com/archive/2005/03/200849145527855944.html. Accessed 11 September 2019.
means to relegate Islam to an unimportant sphere. Professor Syed Naquib

Al-Attas, one of the most pre-eminent Muslim intellectuals of this era,
forcefully argues against secularization of Muslim societies. He asserts
that Islam ‘totally rejects any application to itself of the concepts secular,
or secularization or secularism as they do not belong and are alien to it in
every respect’ (Al-Attas 1985, 23). Yusuf Qaradawi makes a similar argument,
saying that secularism is more compatible with Western societies because
of how Christianity had developed, but less so for Islam since the latter has
a revealed law which encompasses all facets of life (Hashemi 2009, 147).
Progressives, on the other hand, view the matter differently. Like An-Naim
and other progressives, Singapore liberal Muslims do believe in the principle
of secularism. Imran Taib says that a defining feature of Progressive Islam
is the belief in separation of church and state; he says that this is different
from the separation of religion and politics, since in reality, it is not possible
to dissociate the latter two. It is, however, not only possible, but desirable
to ensure that the church and the state remain separate.12 This is not to say
that conservatives reject the secular state in Singapore. Indeed, the previous
chapter documents how the ulama have accepted the secular state as a
political reality. What the conservatives reject is the idea that Islam should
theoretically be separate from the state, much in the vein of Al-Attas and
Qaradawi. Khaled Abou el-Fadl, though not discussing secularism directly,
critiques Muslims’ defensiveness toward Western ideas. He says:
Such groups ignore the Islamic civilizational experience, with all its
richness and diversity, and reduce Islam to a single dynamic – that of
power. They tend to define Islam as an ideology of nationalistic defiance
of the other, a rather vulgar form of obstructionism vis-à-vis the hegemony
of the Western world. Therefore, instead of Islam being a moral vision
to humanity, it becomes constructed into the antithesis of the West. In
the world constructed by these groups, there is no Islam; there is only
opposition to the West. (El-Fadl 2002, 11)
While el-Fadl is not really explicit on which Muslims he is referring to exactly,

he has his finger on the pulse of the issue: the battle between liberals and
conservatives and their interpretations of Islam, has as much to do with
religious predilections as it has to do with identity. As the debates between
liberals and conservatives take place on issues such as secularism, both sides’
positions become hardened, culminating in name-calling, delegitimizing,
12 Interview with Imran Taib, 23 September 2019.

and even excommunicating. Liberals are at times derided as ‘apostates’, for

holding unorthodox Islamic views (Kurzman 1998, 18). Conservatives are often
referred to as ‘bigots’ by their liberal counterparts. The identity battles are
manifested in specific incidents, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
To be sure, progressive Muslims do not claim that they reject scripture.
Rather, they adopt varying approaches toward scripture than the conserva-
tives, especially the hadith. Some liberals accept the Quran, but not the
hadith, arguing that the compilation of the hadith is suspect, a position which
is completely rejected by mainstream Muslims. Others are less dismissive
of the hadith tradition, but adopt a far more critical eye in accepting the
hadiths. Unlike conservative Sunni Muslims who mostly accept or reject the
authenticity of a hadith based on its chain of narration, progressives tend
to prioritize the text of the hadith. For them, if the text contradicts estab-
lished principles of the Quran, the hadith should be rejected (Kamali 2005).
Moreover, the Quran is understood not primarily as a source of legislation,
but as a basis for determining guiding principles. The focus for progressives
is usually the higher objectives of the Sharia, or the Maqasid Sharia (Duderija
2014). In the words of the late Fazlur Rahman, a liberal Muslim thinker
who was a Professor at the University of Chicago, conservatives believed in
the principle that ‘Although a law is occasioned by a specific situation, its
application nevertheless becomes universal’ (Rahman 2009, 48). Progressives,
on the other hand, are more willing to discard laws which they deemed to no
longer have served its original purpose of revelation, such as the inheritance
portions, or even the permissibility of polygamy for Muslim males.
While the term ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ are recent constructs, progressive
Muslims can be said to be the intellectual descendants of the Mu’tazilites.
The Mu’tazilites were a sect in early Islam which subscribed to the principle
of ethical rationalism, where ‘the values of human and divine actions are in
principle knowable by human reason’ (Hourani 1976, 59). In essence, what
was moral could be determined by the human mind. Reason, therefore,
does not contradict revelation, and revelation must be understood in light
of reason. In the early centuries of Islam, there was a theological battle
between Mu’tazilite thought and traditionalism, which really eschewed
the use of human reason. Traditionalists argued that human reason was
fundamentally flawed, and therefore could not be wholly relied upon to
understand a divine commandment, which is infallible. For ‘traditionalists’
in early Islam, revelation had to be prioritized over reason, and when there
is a conflict between the two – as there is bound to be if one accepts the
fallibility of human reason as they did – revelation always triumphed over
reason. Even though the ‘traditionalists’ won the theological battle that
constrained the use of reason in faith –Ahmad ibn Hanbal has been dubbed
the ‘Imam of Ahlussunnah’ (Sunnism) because he is credited with defeating
Mu’tazilism – mainstream Islam eventually evolved to accept the Asha’ri
version of theology, which is basically a combination of orthodox Sunni
traditionalism and Mu’tazilite rationalism (Brown 2014b). While Mu’tazilite
thought has ceased to exist in its original form, the modern progressive
Muslims can be argued to adhere to a similar tradition. Like the Mu’tazilites,
the progressives are sceptical of the hadith, especially if it conflicted with
reason (Brown, 2014a, p. 17). Additionally, both groups interpret revelation
in light of reason, and do not see major contradictions between the two. One
difference perhaps exists between progressives and Mu’tazilites: the latter
came out organically of the Islamic tradition, and was an internal response
to what they viewed as dogmatic understandings of Islam, while the former
operates in a world where Muslims are not dominant. Progressives, like other
Muslims, also live in a world of Western hegemony, where Western standards
of morality and norms are regarded as the benchmark via which all other
societies should be judged (Massad 2015). It is thus not inconceivable that
many modern Muslim progressives’ views are shaped by their acceptance
of these standards. A liberal respondent acknowledges this observation:
I have to be honest and say that some progressive Muslims believe in

the things they do because they are influenced by the West. Not all, but
some definitely.13
It is definitely not an exaggeration to say that most progressive Muslims

in Singapore are university-educated, and are often exposed to ideas and
debates in the social sciences on matters such as inequality, privilege, power,
traditionalism, and so on; and neither is that surprising. The heart of social
scientific discussions usually involves deep critiques of existing social and
power structures, of which religion is obviously a significant one. Many of
these progressives display familiarity with the issues discussed in Western,
especially American societies, and they tend to side with the politically
liberal, or leftist, arguments, such as criticisms against neoliberalism, male
and White ‘privilege’, supporting redistributive economics, and being pro-
LGBT communities, amongst others. A respondent notes:
Many progressives are university-educated. In fact, I myself was exposed to

progressive ideas at university. That was when I started thinking critically

about certain Islamic practices, and question the things I have been taught
by at my weekend madrasahs and my religious teachers.14
This book makes a conscious choice to utilize the term ‘liberal Muslim’, even
if it is eschewed by the progressives themselves. As acknowledged earlier,
the term liberal is often used by conservative Muslims to imply the impurity
of one’s doctrinal beliefs, and this makes using the term problematic. The
situation is compounded by the experiences of various progressives in
Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, where liberal Muslims are vilified
by the more conservative segments in society. In 2005, the Majelis Ulama
Indonesia (Council of Indonesian Ulama) issued a fatwa condemning the
ideologies of liberalism, secularism and pluralism (Menchik 2016, Fenwick
2016). The fatwa was an evident bid by the conservative ulama to extend their
influence in the Indonesian political scene, and as events in recent years
have shown, there are many within Indonesian society who are amenable
to the ideas underpinning it. Of course, the term ‘liberalism’ was not suf-
ficiently problematized within the fatwa, but that is beside the point here:
what is relevant for this discussion is that there exist negative connotations
associated with the term ‘liberal’ within the context of Islam and Muslims,
as the respondent quoted at the start of this section describes. Nevertheless,
I will use the term ‘liberal’, with a few caveats. Firstly, the term still carries
important descriptive elements within it: as already said earlier, many of
these progressive Muslims do admit to having liberal views on Islam and
politics, but do not use the term simply because it has been misunderstood
or weaponized by conservatives. Secondly, this book does not use the term
‘liberal’ to delegitimize the views of this segment of activists. I do not adopt
a normative stance on whether ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ Islam is more
faithful to the Islamic tradition: that would be a debate more suited for the
theological realm, not a political analysis. Rather, I am merely describing and
analyzing the stances of liberal and conservative activists in regard to the
state. In doing so, obviously I would have to problematize these categories,
but I do not go as far as backing one approach to Islam over the other.
A look at Omar Safi’s aforementioned edited volume would indicate
the topics and causes which progressives are passionate about, and my
interviews with liberal activists confirm this. Some of the issues discussed
in the book include feminism, the need to rethink marriage and divorce
14 Many Singaporean Muslims attend weekend madrasahs, where they spend a few hours
learning about Islam. Such educational institutions are quite common in the country, catering
to Muslim students who are not enrolled in full-time madrasahs.
law in Islam, sexuality, interfaith dialogue, pluralism, and democracy.

Liberals typically share an unwavering commitment to secularism, as
opposed to conservatives whose acceptance of secularism is more tem-
pered or lukewarm. The thrust of progressive Islam is the acceptance of a
multiplicity of ways to understand, implement and practice Islam, without
a rigid and dogmatic adherence to interpretations of Islam by previous and
contemporary ulama. All human beings are flawed, and so too would be
the ulama’s, the progressive argument goes. Abdullah Saeed, a Professor
in Islamic Studies at the University of Melbourne and another progressive
Muslim intellectual, argues that every single person is at least partially the
product of his or her own context, and therefore, the opinions of the ulama
can be subject to review (Saeed 2006, 53-56). The ulama of the past lived in
male-dominated societies, so for progressives, their interpretations of Islam
are conditioned by patriarchal understandings of the texts. Additionally,
progressives believe Islam should not be viewed in purely theological terms,
but rather, in cultural and more importantly, civilizational terms as well,
with a commitment to universal and humanistic values. Ahmet Karamustafa
articulates:
Viewed as civilizational project, Islam emerges as a dynamic, evolving

phenomenon, one that cannot be reified or fixed in any way. This is a
healthy reality, one that needs to be acknowledged and celebrated, and
not to be concealed from view under the banner of dubious calls issued by
some Muslim activists “to establish true Islam” (normally an unmistakable
sign of authoritarianism) or to ‘unify all Muslims’ (normally betraying an
extremely naïve political utopianism. When it is understood as an ongoing
civilizational construct, it is easier to highlight and to appreciate Islam
as a truly global tradition […] To put it in other words, the emphasis on
Islam’s globality enables us to acknowledge and cherish its transcultural,
transethnic, transracial, transnational, in short, its truly humanistic
dimensions. (Karamustafa 2003, 109)
Thus, the notion of Islam from the progressive’s perspective is less dogmatic
and more ‘inclusive’.
5.2 Liberal-Conservative Divide amongst Muslims
Needless to say, the progressives’ emphasis on the values and ideals

of Islam, as opposed to theology and legislation, does not sit well with
conservatives. For conservative Muslims, Islam is Ad-Deen, or a complete

way of life.15 This means Islam should feature in every facet of their lives,
wherever possible. Conservatives are concerned about authenticity –
which can be seen in the numerous and at times, convoluted (from the lay
perspective) debates on whether a hadith is authentic – and in adhering
to the rituals practiced and encouraged by the Quran and the Prophet.
Conservatives believe that Islam does not only specify the end-goal, it also
tells you how to get there. A conservative activist interviewed expresses
this opinion:
Yes, Islam teaches us values. But all religions do. In fact, even atheists can
come to similar conclusions on the importance of values such as peace,
tolerance, good neighbourly behavior, and so on. One does not need to
be a Muslim to attain all of that. What then is the difference between
Islam and the other religions? It is our theology.16
Another conservative, in a similar vein, says:
The first pillar of Islam is the shahadah.17 That is what determines whether
you are a Muslim or not in the first place. Before we even talk about values
or rituals, we must accept that Allah is our God and Prophet Muhammad
peace be upon him as His Messenger.18
Conservatives additionally perceive liberals to not prioritize rituals as part

of the faith, and to some extent, this perception is indeed valid. Progres-
sives criticize conservatives for excessively focusing on the minutiae of the
jurisprudence. A progressive respondent states:
What you hear conservatives always talk about is the hijab, how to do
prayers, what nullifies your fast […]19
15 Many progressive Muslims do accept the idea of Islam as Ad-Deen. However, they interpret
the notion in a different way; again, they focus on the universal and humanistic values aspect
of Islam.
16 Interview with conservative activist, 30 October 2019.
17 The shahadah is the Islamic declaration of faith which says that ‘I bear witness that there
is no God but Allah, and I bear witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.’ For most
Muslims, especially conservatives, the shahadah is what differentiates between a Muslim and
a non-Muslim.
A conservative provides a completely contrasting view. He notes:
Rituals are important in Islam. The mantra that Islam is not about rituals
is just false. Islam is about rituals. What would be correct is if liberals said
Islam is not all about rituals, to which we would agree. No conservative has
ever limited Islam to only rituals, but rituals and laws are part of Islam.
Look at the thousands of books written by our ulama on these subjects.
I do not know how liberals can sideline rituals and just focus on values.20
The liberal-conservative divide must be understood in a nuanced way. On

one hand, it is true that many times, liberals and conservatives speak past
each other. It is not entirely accurate that conservatives do not prioritize
values or that liberals discard rituals altogether; rather, the emphasis on both
differ in terms of degree. On the other, there are deep differences between
these two groups. It is also correct to say that theological, methodological
and consequently jurisprudential differences exist between the two, as has
already been described earlier. The progressives’ skepticism of the hadith
tradition, for instance, is a major difference that cannot be glossed over.
More importantly for the present study, the battle between liberal and
conservative Muslims is not merely ideological or theological: it further
encroaches on the political realm. In Malaysia and Indonesia, different
ideological factions have always competed and tried to gain the upper
hand over others, and have tried to capture the state, or at least, gain the
state’s favour (Saat 2018). In Singapore, while the political opportunities do
not allow for a state capture, liberals and conservatives vie for the state’s
attention. Especially in a state like Singapore where the government actively
attempts to shape the Muslim identity and polices certain expressions of the
Islamic faith, there exist opportunities for these groups. The liberals have
a slight edge over the conservatives in this regard: the state has shown an
apprehension, if not disdain, toward certain conservative interpretations
of Islam, providing liberals with more room to influence public discourse.
Various examples will be illustrated later. For now, it suffices to note that
both these groups, due to their differing, and in some spheres mutually
exclusive, beliefs, view the public arena as an ideological battleground. Both
would like to see their understanding of Islam being preferred by both the
state and Muslims in general. This is true even of progressives who make the
assertion, as Ahmet Karamustafa does, that Islam should not be viewed as
monolithic or as something that is fixed: indeed, the idea that Islam is not

unitary is a truth claim in itself. In essence, both liberals and conservatives

compete for what is the ‘true’ version of Islam, and both of them find some
interpretations of Islam as unacceptable. Many progressives would say that
patriarchal manifestations of Islam are, in essence, un-Islamic, as they do
not represent the true meaning behind Quranic injunctions. In this way, the
liberal-conservative divide is akin to the Sunni-Shia or Sufi/traditionalist-
Salaf i divide: different factions of Muslims battle it out for ideological
supremacy, and in the process, power relations matter. Some forms of Islam
are favoured by states over others. Earlier in the book, it was described how
some states promote a particular version of Sufism, in a bid to make Muslims
more apolitical (Muedini 2015). The Saudi state too promotes a version of
Islam that is pacifistic, even though it is completely antithetical to Sufism:
the quietist Salafism-Wahhabism brand of Islam encouraged by the Saudi
government discourages civil resistance and disobedience, and the ulama
linked to the establishment are called upon to spread this version of the faith
(Bligh 1985, Nevo 1998). The Sunni-Shia cleavage has been exploited by states
beyond the Middle East too: in Malaysia and Indonesia, the conservative
Sunni ulama have attempted, and have been successful to varying degrees,
to convince institutions and agents in their respective countries, to define
Shias as deviants and even threats to the national security (Schafer 2015,
Musa and Tan 2017). The liberal-conservative divide is similar in some ways.
In Malaysia and Indonesia, many ulama have come out against liberal Islam,
warning of the dangers it could bring for Muslim communities, as described
earlier. On some occasions, the conservatives have managed to influence
the government’s rhetoric and policies towards progressive Islam. Anwar
Ibrahim, a senior member of the current Pakatan Harapan government and
someone who is celebrated as a liberal reformer,21 criticized the group which
he deemed as ‘super liberal’.22 Even though liberals were most likely a voting
bloc of the PH, Anwar felt compelled to denounce the group as he probably
made the calculation that conservatives constituted a large portion of the
electorate. Indonesia’s fatwa by the MUI has already been documented
earlier. What we see in these two instances is the involvement of political
entities in favouring the conservatives over liberals. Although the political
opportunities are vastly different in Singapore, and Muslims do not constitute
21 Although Anwar has no formal cabinet position, he is expected to take over the premiership
from Dr. Mahathir as promised by PH in its election campaign, but recent events have shown
that the transition is by no means secure.
22 “Anwar Warns of ‘Super Liberal’ Group,” The Star, 25 September 2018. https://www.thestar.
com.my/news/nation/2018/09/25/anwar-warns-of-super-liberal-group.
a significant voting bloc on which elections can turn, the crux of the matter
remains the same: both liberal and conservative Muslim activists try to
expand their influence in the wider social sphere. The liberal-conservative
debate also manifests itself in differing ways in Malaysia and Indonesia. For
instance, in Malaysia, the issues that are contentious involve the position of
Islam in a secular state like Malaysia, or indeed whether Malaysia should
be a secular country in the first place, and the matter of special privileges
for the Malay-Bumiputera communities (Hoffstaedter 2013). In Singapore,
while there are discussions on the nature of secularism that is acceptable
within Islam, such discourses are not as central as in Malaysia since a secular
state is the reality that the minority Muslim population has to deal with.
Even the nature of discourse is thus determined by political opportunities:
for the PAP government, a rejection of the secular state is not acceptable,
which is why conservatives do not even venture into that realm. At best,
what is rejected is the philosophical reduction of faith to the private sphere,
not the political practice of separation of church and state.23
A note on the pervasiveness, or lack thereof, of the discourses between
liberals and conservatives is due. It is true that liberal-conservative debates
frequently do not occur in such explicit terms in the public discourse. However,
two points need to be noted. First, this study focuses on Muslim activists,
and not the Muslim population in general. There are multiple reasons for
this: these activists are at times thought leaders who may be in positions to
influence other segments of the Muslim community; and more importantly,
these individuals and groups also actively engage with the state, who can then
affect Muslims on a real, tangible level. Second, at times, liberal-conservative
debates do spill over in the public sphere and ordinary Muslims participate
in them, even if they do not use the liberal-conservative terminology. One
example would be the LGBT-Section 377A debate, in which many Muslims
actively took sides, as will be described later. Others include the permissibility
of marrying persons from other faiths: conservatives tend to restrict marriages
to within the Muslim community whereas liberals are more open to such an
idea; the consumption of halal food: conservatives have a narrow definition
of what food is permissible, whereas liberals are willing to accept a broader
understanding which includes the permissibility of eating meat which was
slaughtered by Jews and Christians; the donning of the hijab: conservatives see
this as an explicit command by God, whereas liberals do not; the permissibility
of apostasy or leaving the faith: conservatives would see this as an abomination
23 The example of Pergas’ stance on secularism given in the previous chapter highlights this
distinction.
while liberals would be comfortable with the notion; the practice of korban or
animal sacrifice on the Eidul Adha, where Muslims in the region traditionally
slaughter lambs, goats or cows in commemoration of Prophet Abraham’s
willingness to sacrifice his son Prophet Ishmael in obedience of God’s decree:
conservatives see this ritual as part of the faith, whereas liberals view it as not
necessary;24 and the issues mentioned before pertaining to divorce, gender
roles, and salvific exclusivity.25 From these areas of contestation, one can
discern the priorities of liberals: they are concerned with justice, equality and
conceptions of human rights that are akin to Western notions. This does not
mean that liberals are uncritically accepting of ideas originating in the West.
Indeed, many of them also display skepticism toward Western political and
economic hegemony. A liberal respondent explains:
We adopt causes which mirror our counterparts in the West. Even if

they (the ideas) may have begun there, they are universal, which is why
we champion them. That does not mean we follow the West blindly. We
take only what is good.26
Earlier, a list of leading Muslim progressives round the world was provided.
The list is, of course, not exhaustive, but nevertheless, instructive. In Singa-
pore, there are a few individuals who can be described as prominent liberal
or progressive thinkers. A good starting point to identify these activists,
and the causes they are interested in pursuing, would be the volume, Budi
Kritik, edited by Imran Taib and a young researcher, Nurul Fadiah Johari.
The book comprises 22 essays by progressives. A collection of provocative
essays, most of which can be said to be liberal-leaning, the book has been
derided by some conservatives. One conservative activist interviewed
described it as an ‘open effort to undermine traditional Islamic values.’27
A mere look at the book’s synopsis gives a glimpse into why conservatives
who were aware of the book greeted it with such contempt.
Why is it important to imbibe a thinking culture? What can contemporary

Malays contribute by way of an active intellectual and social life towards
24 See Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib, “The Story of Abraham and Ishmael: A Reassess-
ment,” https://dialogosphere.wordpress.com/2016/09/11/the-story-of-abraham-and-ishmael-a-
reassessment/. Accessed 26 September 2019.
25 This is evident not only from the writings by progressives which I have highlighted earlier,
but also my own interviews with them.
reform and progress? Where are the loci of critical thought in Malay
public life?
In a revealing book of essays edited by Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib
and Nurul Fadiah Johari, writers from various backgrounds – academics,
researchers, community organisers, and social activists – offer insights
and critical reflections into contemporary Malay society. These essays
span wide-ranging fields – from culture to religion, identity to literature,
faith to governance – with a shared objective: to promote the will to think
and challenge dominant perspectives.
By actively engaging in the identification of problems in society, defin-
ing and diagnosing them, Budi Kritik offers ways to overcome these
problems through deep thinking, cogent analysis, perceptive insights,
and an unwavering commitment to lasting peace and progress. This is
a necessary and urgent book for anyone asking where the Malay voices
are in public discourse.28
The volume purported to ‘challenge dominant perspectives’ on issues related

to the Malay community. Naturally, that meant questioning conventional
understandings of Islam practised by the community in Singapore. Some
of the topics the book delves into include compatibility of human rights
with Malay society, Islamic feminism, gender equality, toxic masculinity,
inter-faith efforts, the danger of believing in a monolithic ‘true Islam’, and
the problem of rising religious conservatism in the region (Taib and Johari
2018). The topics involve some of the key ‘battlegrounds’ between liberals
and conservatives. As the book’s editors make clear, the volume intends
to question existing understandings of Islamic and Malay practices. The
book is also part of a drive to ramp up the culture of intellectualism, which
liberals see as necessary to develop a ‘progressive Islam’. Progressive Mus-
lims in Singapore have long embraced the need for intellectual discourse,
as evinced by their writings. Of particular interest are publications by
The Reading Group which comprises prominent progressive Muslims in
Singapore. They have published several books, including Islam, Religion
and Progress: Critical Perspectives (Alwee and Taib 2006), and Moral Vision
and Social Critique: Selected Essays of Syed Hussein Alatas (Alwee and Taib
2007), and the aforementioned Budi Kritik. The groups holds seminars and
reading circles, with the eventual aims of having a ‘critical appreciation
of our Muslim intellectual traditions’, engaging ‘contemporary discourses
28 See the synopsis on Ethos Books’ website, https://www.ethosbooks.com.sg/products/

budi-kritik. Accessed 13 September 2019.
on Islam’, inculcating ‘a diagnostic and re-constructionist thinking’, and

addressing ‘Malay intellectual and cultural identity’.29 To say that progressive
Muslims have been engaging in, and pushing for, intellectual discourse
in the Singapore Muslim community would not be an exaggeration at all.
Another useful resource would be the Beyond the Hijab website, a platform
for Muslim women to share their stories on ‘their experiences as women
reconciling the demands of their religion and the pressures of the modern
world.’30 The site does not avoid discussing controversial issues such as
divorce in Islam, intra-faith matters, and the problems with the Madrasahs
in Singapore, inter alia. From these, one may be able to recognize some of
the prominent progressive Muslim activists in Singapore, which include
but are not limited to, Imran Taib, Nazry Bahrawi, Azhar Ibrahim Alwee
(a lecturer at the Department of Malay Studies at the National University of
Singapore), Zuby Eusofe (founder of The Healing Circle, a support group for
LGBT Muslims), Fadiah Johari, and Diana Rahim, editor of Beyond The Hijab.
A point which this section intends to emphasize is that there are real
differences in the way progressive and conservative Muslims understand
and interpret Islam, and that there exists real antagonism between the two
factions, even if this resentment is not at a worrying level nor is it any cause
for concern for the state in terms of maintaining societal order. The two
groups of activists are also aware of their foils: progressives know exactly
who they would potentially annoy when they pursue certain causes, as do
conservatives. No doubt, there exist mischaracterizations of each other’s
stances on issues, especially when one side holds a nuanced view on a
matter. However, generally, these activists are cognizant of not only the
presence of the other, but what their preferences and understandings of
Islam are. The state did not construct these identities: these leanings are
present because of varying interpretations of Islamic texts, and perhaps
more crucially, the different methodological approaches to comprehending
scripture. It is true that the state, as repeated throughout this book, has a
predilection toward the version of Islam that is preferred, which resembles
the liberal interpretation more so than the conservative understanding.
However, the state did not create these identities. It is an important point to
emphasize as it has been a common trope to blame states around the world
for politicizing Muslim identities in their bids to retain and expand power
(Hashemi and Postel 2017). No doubt, states would always do their best to
stay in power, and in the process, may use religious identities to boost their
29 The Reading Group, http://www.thereadinggroup.sg/about.htm. Accessed 26 September 2019.

30 Beyond the Hijab, https://beyondhijab.sg/about/. Accessed 27 September 2019.
electoral credentials, or even in executing particular agendas. However,

while the state tries to construct, deconstruct, define, and redefine Muslim
identities, it is vital to acknowledge agency. These ideological differences
exist independently of the state. As I have argued earlier, progressive Islam
can be said to be the intellectual descendant of Mu’tazilites. A corollary of
this argument is that these differences, or at least some variant of them,
can be traced to early Islam, and predate the formation of the modern
nation-state. Muslim activists subscribe to a particular version of Islam
which they find most intellectually compelling and emotionally appealing.
Thus, differences between Muslims cannot be said to be simply products of
state politicization of identities, even though states most definitely matter
in political analyses of Muslim identities.
Having discussed the liberal identity and the tensions between this group
and the conservatives, it is now timely to talk about how liberals conduct
themselves vis-à-vis the state.
5.3 Choosing the Battles to Fight: Playing by the Rules of the

Game
We know which battles we can win, and which we cannot. Better for us
to focus on those which we can win.31
A progressive activist candidly expressed the view articulated above, which

is a rather pragmatic enunciation of his/her position. For this person, it
is more worthwhile spending time on causes on which may bear fruit,
which is why many liberals do not take up the cause of fighting for the
abolition of the Internal Security Act (ISA). For persons who are zealous
about personal liberties and freedoms, the ISA stands out as a clear atrocity.
For the Singapore state, collective security always outweighs individual
liberty, which is why it has no qualms about using the ISA when necessary.
For liberals, however, the ISA should affect their sensibilities. However, the
situation is such that progressive Muslims almost never openly express their
dissatisfaction toward the law, or campaign against it. To be fair to them,
even non-Muslim liberals or left-leaning individuals in civil society have
never organized sustained resistance toward the draconian law. Therefore,
just like other liberals, Muslim progressives have been calculated in their

approaches, and have studiously avoided championing issues that would

earn the wrath of the state.
Realizing that political opportunities are constricted in the country, and
unlike in a liberal democracy where activists can take up causes which they
find salient, progressive Muslims in Singapore choose their battles wisely.
In some instances, these Muslims even have no problems working with the
state on a close basis. In doing so, they have to either give up, or not place
too much emphasis, on what would be considered traditional liberal causes.
Professor Chua Beng Huat, one of Singapore’s most eminent intellectuals and
a sociologist at the National University of Singapore, remarked in a forum
at Yale-NUS that he was disappointed that the liberals did not take up the
cause of the abolition of the ISA.32 For progressive Muslims, however, there
are other efforts more worth going through the hassle for. Working within
the system requires that some ‘liberal’ causes have to take a backseat. The
ISA is just one example, albeit a crucial one that highlights not only the
difficulties of being an activist in Singapore, but the agency of individuals
when faced with constricting choices. It further demonstrates the realpolitik
that actors have to deal with.
Many progressive Muslims are also not openly critical of the state when it
comes to extremely touchy policies. There is one obvious exception, Alfian
Sa’at, who is known to be a staunch critic of the PAP government. Alfian
pulls no punches in admonishing the state, even on sensitive matters such
as the state’s treatment of the Malays. Alfian’s case will be elaborated later.
Others are not as brazen, and tend to be more circumspect in their approach.
In many ways, the activism of progressive Muslims mirrors that of liberals
in Singapore in general. Apart from the few activists who are more willing
to take on the state, such as PJ Thum, Kirsten Han, Jolovan Wham – whose
examples were mentioned earlier – and a few others, most prefer to either
cooperate with the state or challenge it in ways which do not upset the
political elites too much.
Here, it bears emphasizing that liberals’ unwillingness to pursue certain
causes must be analyzed with respect to their ideological preferences. For
instance, it would not be fair to discuss an absence of public discourse
facilitated by progressive Muslims on the matter of the hijab. Progressives
do not champion the hijab cause not because of fear of state reprisal, but
because for them, the matter is not important. It would be fair, however,
to point out that liberals do not call for the abolition of the ISA, or do not
32 Forum organized by Singapore Undergraduate Research Conference, “Change and Continuity:

Capital, Culture, Climate,” 23 August 2019. See https://www.surconference.com/.
chastise the state for its avowed policy of excluding Muslims from some
top positions in the military, since those are issues that progressives are
supposed to care about. Additionally, it would not be accurate to say that all
liberal Muslims do not say things which would potentially antagonize the
state. No doubt, there are progressive activists who castigate the state for
some of their policies, even on sensitive issues, from time to time. What is
meant when I say that liberals generally do not challenge the state on core
issues is that there is no sustained opposition to the government on those
fronts, unlike in other areas where they actively mobilize. Clearly, it is not
coincidental that these activists are most lively in arenas which are not
particularly frowned upon by the state. Here, I will give a few instances in
which progressives have chosen to direct their efforts towards.
Inter-Faith and Intra-Faith Activities
It is no secret that the Singapore state views inter-faith dialogues and activi-
ties in an extremely favourable light. The Inter-Religious Organization (IRO),
a body founded in 1949 by religious leaders of different faiths with the
purpose of fostering social harmony, is supported by the government, and
state leaders regularly attend events organized by the IRO.33 The govern-
ment’s obsession with maintaining racial and religious harmony has been
documented earlier, and inter-faith activities are one such avenue to realize
that objective. The state is further wary of any potential mobilization based
on religion, or any theological divide which could lead to social discontent-
ment. As such, inter-faith dialogues prove to be a worthy cause for support,
as far as the government is concerned.
To be sure, both conservative and liberal Muslims are involved in
inter-faith activities. Many mosques throughout Singapore have events
which cater to non-Muslims as well. However, comparatively, progres-
sive Muslims tend to be more involved in inter-faith activities. The
aforementioned Imran Taib is one example, as is another young liberal
activist, Ashraf Anwar, who is part of the asatizah community. Both are
active in the inter-faith circles. Ashraf even attended an Iftar (breaking
of fast) session hosted by the Israeli Ambassador, when he gave a short
speech on the positive historical relations between Jewish and Islamic
communities. Such a move was of course potentially controversial, since
Muslim communities typically have a fraught relationship with the state
33 See Inter-Religious Organization website, https://iro.sg/. Accessed 16 September 2019.

of Israel. Nevertheless, the point here is not to assess whether having an

event with the Israeli Ambassador is wise or Islamic: that is for a different
discussion. Rather, it is to show that liberal activists are more willing to
embrace undertakings which they view as promoting harmony between
various groups.
Indeed, involvement with inter-faith activism is a cause one would expect
liberals to be passionate about. Progressive Muslims are usually concerned
with the social values promoted by Islam, rather than the theological
facets, and Muslims’ roles in co-existing with other communities. However,
the cause cannot be said to be uniquely liberal. Conservative Muslims
too are concerned with social cohesion. Perhaps the difference between
the two groups when it comes to inter-faith dialogue is in the approach.
Conservatives are less willing to compromise on the theological supremacy
of Islam: for them, Islam is the right and only true way to God. That does
not mean that Muslims should make enemies of those who live around
them; Muslims are enjoined to live in peace with their neighbours and
friends. However, it does mean that the primacy of Islamic theological
beliefs is emphasized by conservatives in a way that is not done by liberals.
Progressives are thus more willing to embrace the possibility of salvation
existing outside of Islam, as the earlier chapter had discussed. Alami Musa
had written that Singaporeans needed to embrace the idea that other
faiths ‘can or may lead to salvation’, a point which most conservatives are
not ready to concede. It is thus not a surprise to see Alami being heavily
involved in inter-faith efforts too, especially given his position as a senior
civil servant.
The point here is not to say that inter-faith activism is a wholly liberal
cause. As already discussed, the passion for inter-faith events is not exclusive
to liberals or conservatives. Rather, liberals have become involved in inter-
faith dialogues to a much greater degree. What perhaps distinguishes the
liberals from the conservatives is the formers’ involvement in intra-faith
dialogues in Singapore. Progressives have been at the forefront of pushing
for acceptance of the Shia and Ahmadi communities by the Sunnis. Again,
for progressives, theological differences between Sunnis and Shias are not
particularly important, at least not to the extent that it should affect any
facet of the relationship between the two groups. In Singapore, there are two
main groups of Shias: the Dawoodi Bohras (Ismailis) and the Twelver Shias.
The Dawoodi Bohras are a group of Indian Shias who have been in Singapore
since the mid-1800s, and have been part of the Singaporean landscape for
a long time. In fact, the community’s contributions to nation-building are
well-known.34 The community comprises about 1000 members, and has a

mosque in town, known as Masjid Burhani. There have largely been no ten-
sions between the Sunni community and the Dawoodi Bohras. The Twelver
Shias are a more recent addition to the Singapore Muslim community. Many
of them either became Shias in the post-1979 era, having been inspired by
the Iranian Revolution, or are children of those who did. There seems to be
more wariness toward the Twelver Shias on the part of the conservatives.
A conservative interviewee says:
Dawoodi Bohras have never caused any trouble for Sunnis. The Malay
Shias (Twelver) are different. Yes, they have not caused any trouble for
us, but in other countries, they can be evangelical. We just need to guard
against that here and ensure that Sunni beliefs are not affected.35
Again, the response indicates conservatives’ emphasis on purity, theology and

orthodoxy. Even though privately, some conservatives express a mild disap-
proval, if not caution, toward Twelver Shias, overtly, there has been virtually no
Sunni-Shia tension to speak of. This does not mean that no resentment exists
between the two sides. One can make a case that the constricting political
opportunities and the state’s no-nonsense approach to any religious strife is
what prevents anti-Shia or anti-Sunni sentiments from being articulated in
the open. A respondent remarks that there ‘is tension between the two (Sunnis
and Shias), but there is no opportunity for people to act on those tensions.’36
Liberals are far better-positioned to pursue the cause of intra-faith
activism precisely because of their acceptance of various ‘orthodoxies’, or
the lack of orthodoxy, and in reality, that is what pans out in Singapore.
Inter-faith activists such as those mentioned above and others also tend to
be involved in building bridges between the Sunni community and the Shias.
The Twelver community has a centre which opened in 2017 under the Jaafari
Muslim Association of Singapore (JMAS) which organizes various events
and an annual iftar event. JMAS was approved as a registered organization
in 1998, and moved to its current location in 2017.37 Often, individuals from
the progressive Muslim groups are active participants of these events. A few
34 On 15 October 2015, Straits Times ran an article entitled “Dawoodi Bohra Members who
Contributed to Singapore Society.” See https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/dawoodi-bohra-
members-who-contributed-to-singapore-society. Accessed 16 September 2019.
36 Interview with Muslim professional, 18 October 2019.
37 See Jaafari Muslim Association of Singapore, https://www.jaafarimuslim.com/about-jmas/
singapore-shia/. Accessed 17 September 2019.
articles have been written by liberal Muslims, arguing for the acceptance
of Shias. Imran Taib writes in one such piece:
Today, I will not stay silent when an untruth is spoken against Shi’ism
in general. That is the very least that I can do as a fellow Muslim who
acknowledges his Shi’a brothers and sisters as belonging to the same
ummah. Sectarianism has no place in Singapore, nor anywhere in the
world, and I hope more voices will emerge to provide guidance for a new
generation of Muslim youths who are trying to make sense of diversity,
while remaining vigilant of the rise of extremist discourses that are
divisive and promoting a supremacist, exclusivist and monolithic version
of Islam.38
Another article in the liberal-leaning Beyond the Hijab website claims:
In full-time Madrasahs, the hate Sunnis have for Shias is incredibly

prominent. Time and time again they remind us how Shias are astray
and are not considered as Muslims until that very exclusivist ideology is
embedded in our minds and becomes a part of our beliefs as Muslims.
Unfortunately, this ideology has become so widespread in the Malay-
Muslim community that we dehumanise Shia Muslims. It’s a disease that
blinds us from the fact that even scholarly consensus (under the Amman
Message) has agreed that Ja’fari and Zaydi Shias are recognised as Muslims,
and declaring them as disbelievers or transgressors is impermissible.39
While Amber’s account is perhaps hyperbolic, it is true that many Sunnis find
some Shia beliefs to be objectionable, and vice-versa. The more important point
to be highlighted here is that liberals are at the forefront of calling for treating
Shias as part of the mainstream Muslim community. Conservatives are less
involved in such initiatives, because firstly, there exists some apprehension
toward legitimizing the beliefs of other sects within Islam, and secondly,
because intra-faith events are simply not a priority for them within the context
of Singapore. An estimated 5,000 Shias live in the country, which comprises
38 Mohamed Imran Mohamed Taib, “My Encounters with Shi’ism: The Lessons That
I Learnt,” The Muslim Vibe, 21 December 2017. https://themuslimvibe.com/faith-islam/my-
encounters-with-shiism-the-lessons-that-i-learnt?fbclid=IwAR1Y04FcEbAcwKWqB32ZZo2_
2u-ZP-OgGdPd3gchT9ldytQP9xyDdGxMsv4. Accessed 17 September 2019.
39 Amber, “I Wanted to Teach Islam in a Madrasah,” beyondhijab.sg, 6 May 2019. https://
beyondhijab.sg/2019/05/06/i-wanted-to-teach-islam-in-a-madrasah/. Accessed 17 September 2019.
about 1% of the Muslim population. 40 There is no urgency, conservatives

believe, for intra-faith rapprochement, especially in the absence of overt
Sunni-Shia conflict. For liberals, the cause is important as a matter of principle:
minority communities need to be protected, acknowledged and included.
An undoubtedly more controversial endeavour embarked on by progres-
sives is activities held with the Ahmadi community. While Shias are generally
accepted as Muslims by the Sunnis, Ahmadis are not considered as Muslims.
In fact, both mainstream Sunnis and Shias regard Ahmadis as heretics and the
Ahmadi belief to be outside of Islam. Differences between the Sunni and Shia
creeds have been explained in earlier chapters. What is important to reiterate
here is that while there are immense theological and jurisprudential differences
between the two major groups, those differences do not undercut the Islamic
declaration of faith, which is ‘there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his
(final) messenger’. For Ahmadis, however, the same cannot be said. Sunnis and
Shias usually consider the Ahmadi creed to be heretical for a couple of reasons:
first, they deny Prophet Muhammad is the seal of the Prophets, and second,
they allege that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, the founder of their faith, was both a
Prophet and the Messiah (Burhani 2014, 135-136). Mainstream Muslims find both
beliefs to be objectionable. The official fatwa by MUIS is that Ahmadis are not
considered Muslim. A fatwa issued in 1969, which has not been rescinded, reads:
Based on the beliefs of the Qadiyan as explained above, it is concluded

that the Qadiyan (Ahmadiyah) and those who are similar to them are
not Muslims and are deviant. This is in line with the fatwas issued by all
other Islamic countries, that the Ahmadiyah Qadiyan are not considered
to be within the folds of Islam. The bodies of their dead cannot be buried
in Muslim burial grounds. 41
Ahmadis number about 300 in Singapore. Again, the numbers are too
small for there to be significant Sunni-Ahmadi tension, nor is there any
noteworthy discourse in the mainstream Sunni community on the Ahmadis.
Conservatives do not seem particularly bothered by the Ahmadis, probably
of the miniscule number. However, because conservatives do not consider
Ahmadis to be Muslim, there is no impetus to engage in any meaningful
40 Azil Haziq Mahmud, “A Singaporean in Iran: Life in a Shi’ite Seminary,” The Straits Times,
1 January 2017. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/a-singaporean-in-iran-life-in-a-shiite-
seminary. Accessed 18 September 2019.
41 Office of the Mufti, MUIS, “Fatwa Decided by the Fatwa Committee of MUIS, 23 June 1969.”
https://www.muis.gov.sg/-/media/Files/OOM/Fatwa/Ahmadiyah-English.pdf. Accessed
18 September 2019.
dialogue with them. Progressives, on the other hand, find it quite important
to dialogue with Ahmadis, as they are a minority sect. A group of liberals
have initiated some engagement with the Ahmadi community. Maryam
Khan, a progressive activist involved in such efforts, states:
Some of my friends are members of the Ahmadi community. Yes, I consider

Ahmadis to be Muslim, even though I know many Muslims do not. I
think they misunderstand the Ahmadis’ impression of Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad. They don’t see him as a Prophet. But you know what most of the
activists I know are concerned about? To be honest, there is very little
debate about theology because Muslims will never agree. But what they
focus more on is the protection of a vulnerable minority group. What is
important to us, is that we treat them as equals, and don’t treat/see them
differently from everybody else. 42
The priorities for progressives are obviously different. As they focus on

defending minority rights, they are more likely to pursue the cause of
intra-faith activism, even when it involves a group that is considered to be
deviant and/or heretical.
A point that needs mentioning is that intra-faith activism, while it may
be slightly controversial within the Muslim community, is something which
is not at all contentious for the state. In fact, it is something the government
would be pleased about. The government has explicitly cautioned Muslims
against getting embroiled in sectarian divisions which originate in the Middle
East, especially the Sunni-Shia divide. Some extremists who were arrested
under the ISA in recent years have professed hatred for non-Sunni groups, and
the government has in no uncertain terms condemned ‘exclusivist’ religious
mindsets.43 The political opportunities in this regard allows progressives to
truly act on their liberal ideologies of inclusivity and minority protection.
LGBT issues and the Section 377A Debate
Perhaps no other issue today demarcates the line between liberal and
conservative Muslims in a more explicit manner than the debate on LGBT
rights. Like the other Abrahamic faiths, traditionally, Muslim scholars
42 Correspondence with Maryam Khan, progressive activist, 18 September 2019.

43 Lee U-Wen, “PM Lee Urges Muslims to Help Fight Extremism and Self-Radicalisation,”
The Business Times, 21 June 2017. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/
pm-lee-urges-muslims-to-help-fight-extremism-and-self-radicalism. Accessed 18 September 2019.
have interpreted Islam to be against homosexual relationships and sexual

activities (Auda 2015, 24-25). The story of Lot in the Quran, and various
Prophetic traditions make it quite explicit, for these ulama, that Islam views
gay sexual relations to be impermissible. Conservative Muslims tend to hold
on to these opinions of the ulama. Most view homosexual acts as sinful. It is
important to note that what the ulama have generally forbidden is acting on
homosexual inclinations, just as they have disallowed heterosexuals acting
on their sexual desires outside the institution of marriage. That is to say,
being attracted to a person of the same gender is not wrong; what is sinful
is to act on those attractions in a physical and sexual way. Nevertheless, it
is quite clear that at least the overwhelming majority, and in all likelihood
the entirety, of the pre-modern ulama believed homosexual acts to be
impermissible. All conservative Muslims believe this as well. No doubt, many
conservatives conflate the idea of homosexual inclination and homosexual
act. Some still espouse the idea that having homosexual inclinations in
itself is a sin, which has never been the scholarly view. And undeniably,
discrimination toward LGBT individuals exists in Muslim communities,
as in many other societies, in spite of the ulama’s constant exhortations to
separate the sin from the sinner, and to condemn the sin but love the sinner.44
But at the heart of the issue is not just a conflation of homosexual inclination
and homosexual act: even if conservatives do not misunderstand the two
and hold a nuanced position, and even if they do treat LGBT individuals
with respect and love, the point remains that it is their belief – and the
conviction of the vast majority of Muslim scholars past and present – that
gay and lesbian sexual relationships are impermissible (Dennerlein 2017).
There are differences within the progressive Muslim movement on this
particular issue. As mentioned earlier, liberal Muslim intellectual Scott Kugle
argues for the acceptance of gay relationships as permissible in Islamic jurispru-
dence, and calls for a creative reinterpretation of the Quranic story of Lot. Even
though the story seems quite obvious in its message to the reader, Kugle writes:
The story is really about infidelity and how the Tribe of Lot schemed for
ways to reject his Prophethood and his public standing in their community.
Same-sex acts were only one of a range of actions that constituted their
44 Pergas released a statement saying that it supports the retention of Section 377A since
Islam did not allow homosexual acts, but urged Muslims to treat LGBT individuals with love
and compassion. See Pergas media statement released on 19 September 2018, available on its
official Facebook page. https://www.facebook.com/Pergas.Singapore/posts/2018791921506611.
infidelity – from murder and robbery (as mentioned in Q. 29:29) to other

repugnant acts in their assemblies […] In putting forward this interpretation,
gay and lesbian Muslims are not rejecting the whole classical tradition of tafsir,
as some opponents have accused. Rather, they renew the tradition by fueling
debate, through which the tradition was originally built. (Kugle 2010, 51)
For context, the story of Lot is mentioned numerous times throughout the
Quran. The narrative in the Quran shares similar characteristics with the
Biblical story, though there are significant differences too, as is the case
with all the Prophetic accounts which are shared between the two holy
books. In the Quran, the story essentially goes like this: God sends a couple
of angels, in the form of human beings to the people of Lot, because they are
engaged in wickedness. When the angels come, the people of Lot are still
unrepentant. They rejected his message and were subsequently punished
by God. For conservatives, the sin in question is engaging in homosexual
activities. For people like Kugle, the sin was the rejection of Prophet Lot,
and anal rape, not same-sex relations per se. The verses that conservatives
point to is found in Chapter 11 of the Quran, verses 77-78:
And when our messengers (the angels) came to Lot, he was anguished for
them and felt for them great discomfort and said, “This is a trying day.”
And his people came hastening to him, and before [this] they had been
doing evil deeds. He said, “O my people, these are my daughters; they
are purer for you. So fear Allah and do not disgrace me concerning my
guests. Is there not among you a man of reason?”45
Conservatives aver that progressives like Kugle are at times practising

‘intellectual gymnastics’ by reinterpreting the Quran in such a radically
different way, when the texts show otherwise. A respondent says:
The verses are so clear, there is really no way to interpret the story in any
other way. If the people of Lot were practicing rape, why was he offering
his daughters to them? Was he asking them to rape his daughters? And
we have not even gotten into the hadith on homosexuality yet. 46
Again, the purpose of this section is not to assess which position is more
intellectually sound or valid from the Islamic perspective. The point is
45 Quran, Chapter 11, Verses 77-78., Sahih International. See https://quran.com/11.

instead, to show that conservatives take a much more firm stance on the
issue of homosexual relationships than liberals, and that the scholarly
opinion is indeed in line with conservatives’ interpretation of the matter.
Same-sex relations in Islam has been a hot-button issue facing many
Western Muslim communities, and increasingly, Muslims in other parts of
the world as well. There have been gay imams who have founded mosques
in America, Canada, Germany, and elsewhere. 47 To no one’s real surprise,
these imams and mosques have been greeted with some level of disdain
by conservative Muslims, who view the normalization of gay and lesbian
relationships as antithetical to ‘pure’ Islamic teachings.
In Singapore, we see a similar battle between the conservatives and
progressives, though a nuanced understanding is needed. From the outset, it
needs to be said that progressives do not all believe what Kugle argues. There
are differences within liberal Muslims themselves on the issue of same-sex
relations. Some progressives view gay relationships to be impermissible,
based on the text of the Quran, but not lesbian relationships, since these
were not mentioned. This group reject the hadiths which seem to prohibit
same-sex relations between women.48 Others are like Kugle and believe that
traditional stances should be reinterpreted, if not discarded. Zuby Eusofe
of The Healing Circle, a progressive Muslim, writes:
I read the Story of Lot time and time again. It mentions in both the holy
scriptures (Quran and Bible). To me, it wasn’t making sense. Why would
God or Allah destroy a whole town or city including women and children
if the menfolk were homosexual? If we were to look at the issues, the
mortal heterosexual men desired Angels in the guise of men and there
were other issues at play too – power, gluttony, control, rape, promiscuity,
incest, consent, tests of faith and loyalty to Allah or God, idolatry and
worship of deities, intoxication, and amongst other issues, which had no
bearings on being gay itself. 49
47 Finbarr Toesland, “Affirming Mosques Help Gay Muslims Reconcile Faith, Sexuality,” NBC
News, 2 April 2019. https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/affirming-mosques-help-gay-
muslims-reconcile-faith-sexuality-n988151. Accessed 8 November 2019.
48 An example of such a hadith is found in the Sunan Abi Dawud: “A man should not look at
the private parts of another man, and a woman should not look at the private parts of another
woman. A man should not lie with another man without wearing lower garment under one
cover, and a woman should not lie with another woman without wearing lower garment under
one cover.” See https://sunnah.com/abudawud/33/10. Accessed 19 September 2019.
49 Zuby Eusofe, “Speak Up or Be Forgotten,” The Healing Circle, 24 February 2019. https://www.
thehealingcircle.sg/. Accessed 20 September 2019.
Another group holds on to a jurisprudential position that is more akin to

the conservatives, in that Islam does not permit homosexual relations,
but is not at all critical of people who are homosexuals. All three groups,
however, agree that Section 377A should be repealed as it has no place in
a secular state.
Section 377A is a colonial relic. It is a law which criminalizes homosexual
relations between men, and was a commonwealth legislation inherited by
Singapore. In the past decade or so, there has been a vibrant discussion in
Singapore society about the existence of the law. Liberals have called for
its repeal, while conservatives have lobbied to retain it. The issue attained
national prominence in 2007, when a Nominated Member of Parliament
(NMP), Siew Kum Hong, sponsored a petition to repeal Section 377A, sparking
a debate in the legislative body (Abdullah 2016b). NMPs are members of
parliament who are not elected and do not belong to any political party,
but are instead chosen by a Parliamentary Select Committee based on.
The PAP introduced the scheme in 1990 in order to diversify parliamentary
representation, and to enable talented Singaporeans who may not like to
go through the rough and tumble of elections, but still can and want to
contribute to Singapore’s governance (Abdullah 2016b). No doubt, the scheme
was also an adroit method of co-optation (Rodan 2009). What is significant
here is that it was an NMP who raised the issue in Parliament. Interestingly,
the parliamentarian who vigorously opposed calls for repeal was Siew’s
fellow NMP, Professor Thio Li-Ann. While the PAP MPs were generally
reticent and equivocal in the discussion, and the opposition MPs did not
even participate, it was the NMPs who took clear stances either in favour
of or against repeal (Abdullah 2019a). This is because NMPs do not have
to pander to any segment of the electorate, since they are not elected and
will not be running for re-election, and can instead voice their conscience.
The PAP government has explicitly stated that it will not enforce the
law, both in response to the debate and subsequently, and retaining it is
merely a symbolic gesture since Singapore society was deemed to be ‘not
ready’ for the change. PM Lee Hsien Loong said in 2017 on the government’s
position:
My personal view is that if I don’t have a problem – this is an uneasy

compromise – I’m prepared to live with it until social attitudes change.50
50 He said this in an interview with BBC Hard Talk host, Stephen Sackur. See “Govt Has No
Plans to Repeal Section 377a for Now,” Today, 2 March 2017. https://www.todayonline.com/
singapore/govt-has-no-plans-repeal-section-377a-now. Accessed 19 September 2019.
While retaining the law but not enforcing it does not seem to be congruent
with the intent of rule of law and constitutionality, politically, it is an
astute move. Through this ‘uneasy’ compromise, the government is
able to suff iciently appease both the liberal and conservative factions
of society, or at the very least, not antagonize both to a large extent
(Abdullah 2019a).
It is not surprising at all to find that activism in the LGBT-rights and
Section 377A sphere is vibrant. LGBT activists have managed to deftly
manoeuvre their way around the political system and have made signifi-
cant strides. While the topic was considered taboo a couple of decades
ago, now, Section 377A is routinely discussed, and perceptions towards
LGBT individuals have definitely changed to a significant degree. Lynette
Chua argues that the gay lobby has been able to do all of this because
they have avoided the politics of confrontation with the state, and have
instead engaged in pragmatic resistance (Chua 2014). More importantly,
the LGBT lobby has made advancements in this area because the state has
allowed for contestations in this matter. Section 377A is not integral to the
PAP’s credibility. The party has not built its legitimacy on the protection
of individual freedoms; rather, it has always maintained that it should be
judged on the ability to deliver security and prosperity to Singapore, both
internally and externally. One of the major components of internal security
revolves around the multiracialism principle. Here, one can see a contrast
between how the government treats criticisms towards its policies on race
versus its stance on the LGBT matter. It is more amenable to critiques on the
latter as opposed to the former, since its legitimacy is tied to multiracialism
(Mauzy and Milne 2002). One can look to an op-ed by Constance Singam,
a women’s rights activist, in which she made the bold claim that the state’s
decision in 2010 to choose Christian groups as vendors for sex education
programs in national schools, and the National Arts Commission’s decision
to not fund projects which went against the government’s ‘core values’ were
completely wrong. In fact, the article was entitled State’s Decisions a Threat
to Secular Society.51
Perhaps the impact of the gay lobby’s efforts is most clearly reflected in
the annual Pink Dot event. Pink Dot began in 2009, and is an event which
celebrates LGBT individuals and promotes the freedom to love. When it
began, the event had about 1,000 attendees; by 2015, more than 20,000 people
51 Constance Singam, “State’s Decisions a Threat to Secular Society,” AWARE, 10 May 2010.
https://www.aware.org.sg/2010/05/states-decisions-a-threat-to-secular-society/. Accessed
7 October 2019.
attended the gathering.52 The tremendous increase is at least partially

indicative of how society has moved on this issue. This is not to say that
there is widespread acceptance of homosexual relationships: according to
a survey in 2018, around 55% of Singaporeans support Section 377A. The
same study also showed that around one-third of Singaporeans are more
accepting of same-sex relationships than they were five years before.53 The
Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) released in 2018 showed similar results:
while Singapore society generally remains conservative, it is becoming more
liberal in its acceptance of gay and lesbian relationships.54
However, it is not just the liberal-leaning activists who have taken advan-
tage of the state’s ambivalence. Conservative activists too have been vocal
in expressing their opposition to calls for the repeal of the law, arguing for
the sanctity of marriage, the protection of the nuclear family/traditional
family unit, and the preservation of conservative values. A particular group
of Christians, with Pastor Lawrence Khong as the face of their movement,
was one of the earliest groups to express their dissatisfaction toward the
gay lobby. The leader of Faith Community Baptist Church (FCBC), Khong
has been unapologetic about his views on Section 377A and homosexuality.
He says in an interview:
First of all, I want to very clearly state that I don’t believe in discriminating
against anybody in terms of the basic human rights […] And there is a
difference between loving people, including homosexuals, and allowing
the homosexual lifestyle to become normalised in society. The reason I
stand firm on asking that this law not be repealed is that Section 377A
is a standard that is written down. The history of many countries tells
us that if you remove it, the homosexual community is not going to stop
there. They f irst ask for tolerance. Tolerance means: Don’t bully me,
don’t make me a criminal. The minute you take that away, they will ask
for acceptance, in the form of gay marriage. And then, before long, they
52 Wan Ting Koh, “Pink Dot 2017 Draws Thousands Despite New Restrictions,” Yahoo!
News, 1 July 2017. https://sg.news.yahoo.com/pink-dot-2017-draws-thousands-despite-new-
restrictions-152411039.html. Accessed 8 November 2019.
53 Gilaine Ng, “55 Per Cent of Singapore Residents Support Section 377A: Ipsos Survey,” The
Straits Times, 10 September 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/55-per-cent-of-
singapore-residents-support-section-377a-ipsos-survey. Accessed 20 September 2019.
54 Tham Yuen-C, “Singapore Society Still Largely Conservative But Becoming More Liberal on
Gay Rights: IPS Survey,” The Straits Times, 2 May 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/
singapore-society-still-largely-conservative-but-becoming-more-liberal-on-gay-rights-ips.
will go for celebration of the lifestyle. Singapore does not need to go that
way. I do not believe this is good for any society. And I will stand firm
because I love my nation very much. This homosexual agenda is being
pushed with great aggression. For example, inasmuch as they ask for
tolerance, they are some of the most intolerant people that I have ever
met. Anytime you disagree with them, you are said to be homophobic,
you are said to have made hate speech.55
Khong’s words are extremely prescient as conservative Muslims who oppose

Section 377A use almost the exact same language. They argue against the
slippery slope of the gay agenda, which would one day lead to a marginaliza-
tion of religious groups who disagree with homosexuality, while maintaining
that they love LGBT individuals. Note that Khong’s disagreement is with the
gay lobby, not with the government. In fact, he goes out of his way to say that
he loves Singapore. The conservative Muslims’ response to Section 377A will
be described in the next chapter. For now, it suffices that both conservatives
and liberals are strident in their opposition to and support of Section 377A
respectively. In their attempts, both sides do not confront the state, but in
fact, court it, and each portrays itself as more worthy of the government’s
support.
Singapore’s progressive Muslims are involved in efforts to ensure ac-
ceptance of the LGBT community and the repeal of Section 377A as well.
A few groups which provide support for LGBT Muslims exist, and are run
by progressive Muslims. They are: Jejaka, a support group for gay, bisexual
and queer Malay-Muslim men;56 The Healing Circle, which provides ‘a
safe space for queer Muslims to embrace their sexuality’;57 and Pelindung,
another support group for queer people. For the liberals, the protection of
LGBT groups is a crucial cause worth fighting for, because these people are
at the receiving end of significant discrimination from their fellow Muslims.
A Muslim LGBT activist says:
I don’t really care about religion. I care more about justice […] Religion
plays a powerful role in people’s lives, but like anything with power, it
55 Elgin Toh, “Lawrence Khong: There Are No Ex-Chinese, But There Are Ex-Homosexuals,”
AsiaOne, 9 September 2013. https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/lawrence-khong-there-are-
no-ex-chinese-there-are-ex-homosexuals. Accessed 19 September 2019.
56 See their Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/JejakaSGR/. Accessed 20 September 2019.
57 See their Facebook page, https://www.facebook.com/pg/thehealingcircle.sg/about/?ref=page_
internal. Accessed 20 September 2019.
can be weaponized. You see Islam being weaponized against the LGBTQ
community.58
The aforementioned Zuby Eusofe, who identif ies as an LGBT Muslim,

articulates her own struggle in this regard:
Going back to the issue of religious spaces for LGBT muslims here in
Singapore, I can simply state that it is difficult for us to be in the mosque
and commune in religious congregations with other Muslims as their ‘fear’
leads to discrimination towards LGBT muslims. They have the privilege
to be with the rest of the Muslim community who are already a minority
in this country. Us LGBT muslims do not have that privilege. We are the
minority within the minorities.59
Just as with the general liberal activism on the LGBT issue in Singapore,
progressive Muslims have been vigorous in pursuing this cause too. Numer-
ous blog and online posts deal with this matter, and in fact, as alluded to
in the earlier chapter, even MUIS’ own report has included the need to be
more inclusive of minority groups, including the LGBT community.60 This
is precisely because of the discourse that has been generated by liberal
non-Muslim and Muslim activists, to the point that the matter cannot be
ignored by the ulama and religious organizations. Progressive Muslims
have been able to capitalize on the state’s indifference on this matter, and
have actively pushed for more acceptance of LGBT Muslims. And as the
respective surveys by Ipsos and IPS show, as does the MUIS 50 report, many
Singaporeans’ perceptions on LGBT issues have been modified, proving
that the efforts of these activists have been fruitful in moving the needle
on public opinion.
Women’s Issues
Another domain in which Muslim progressives have been very active is in

the arena of women’s rights. Many Muslim feminists have long been critical
of what they view as patriarchal interpretations of Islam. Fatimah Mernissi,

59 Zuby Eusofe, “Mercy to All Creations: The Muslim LGBT’s Dilemma in Religious Spaces,”
Beyond the Hijab, 25 October 2018. https://beyondhijab.sg/2018/10/25/mercy-to-all-creations-
the-muslim-lgbts-dilemma-in-religious-spaces/. Accessed 20 September 2019.
one of the giants of the modern progressive Islam movement, labels some
hadiths and aspects of classical Islamic jurisprudence as part of a ‘tradition of
misogyny’ (Mernissi 1991, 49-81). In Singapore, liberal Muslims have carried
the mantle of their counterparts elsewhere, and devote a significant portion
of their activism toward women’s rights. A few main issues have surfaced in
the discourse by progressives in this sphere. They are: the issues surrounding
the hijab, including whether it is obligatory to wear it in the first place; female
circumcision; and domestic abuse, among others. Many progressive Muslims
argue that the hijab is not compulsory, and is merely an Arab tradition. Zuby
Eusofe’s article entitled The Hijab Syndrome – in which she quotes Fatimah
Mernissi – is instructive in this regard, as she enunciates the thoughts of many
progressives interviewed. She says that the hijab ‘is a traditional dress that in
origin has nothing to do with Islam or any other religion.’61 A liberal Muslim
expressed that ‘the hijab is an Arab tradition, not Islamic law. People have
misunderstood it.’62 Both Zuby and the respondent’s argument centred about
the fact that the Quran did not mention the hijab, and that the verse which
Muslim ulama typically use to justify their view that the hijab is mandatory
was misunderstood. The verse in question is in the 24th Chapter of the Quran:
And tell the believing women to reduce [some] of their vision and guard their
private parts and not expose their adornment except that which [necessarily]
appears thereof and to wrap [a portion of] their head-covers over their chests
and not expose their adornment except to their husbands, their fathers,
their husbands’ fathers, their sons, their husbands’ sons, their brothers, their
brothers’ sons, their sisters’ sons, their women, that which their right hands
possess, or those male attendants having no physical desire, or children who
are not yet aware of the private aspects of women. And let them not stamp
their feet to make known what they conceal of their adornment. And turn
to Allah in repentance, all of you, O believers, that you might succeed.63
The word for head-covers in Arabic is khumur, the plural for khimar. Ac-
cording to progressives like Zuby, the word does not actually mean head
coverings, but instead, is translated as such by Muslim scholars. For her,
the khimar can mean ‘a dress, coat, shawl, shirt, blouse, tie or scarf’.64 Apart
61 Zuby Eusofe, “The Hijab Syndrome,” Beyond The Hijab, 5 January 2017. https://beyondhijab.
sg/2017/01/05/the-hijab-syndrome/. Accessed 23 September 2019.
63 Quran, Chapter 24, verse 31. Sahih International. https://quran.com/24.
64 Zuby Eusofe, “The Hijab Syndrome,” Beyond The Hijab, 5 January 2017. https://beyondhijab.
from the differing interpretation of this word, progressives also do not seem
to engage with the hadiths on the subject, which is consistent with their
overall approach of hadith scepticism. The official fatwa issued by MUIS
is that hijab is indeed obligatory for females, as is the opinion of the vast
majority of ulama. One hadith which conservatives point to is the following:
Asma, daughter of Abu Bakr, entered upon the Messenger of Allah (‫)ﷺ‬
wearing thin clothes. The Messenger of Allah (‫ )ﷺ‬turned his attention
from her. He said: O Asma’, when a woman reaches the age of menstrua-
tion, it does not suit her that she displays her parts of body except this
and this, and he pointed to his face and hands.65
Again, the ‘correct’ Islamic position on the matter is not the subject of
contention. Rather, this book suggests that the hijab has been a significant
battleground between conservative and progressive Muslims: progressives
not only mostly see the hijab as not obligatory, they further see conservatives’
obsession with the matter as an attempt to police the clothing of Muslim
women.66 Conservatives view the hijab as a clear obligation given in the
Quran and the hadith, and attempts to reinterpret the Quran are symbolic
of progressive Islam’s scant regard for authenticity and tradition.67
A similar prism of analysis can be adopted for the issue of female circumci-
sion in Singapore. The practice is still quite prevalent amongst Muslim
girls. While erroneously equated to other extreme forms of female genital
mutilation, it is quite clear that progressives display disdain toward this
particular practice. Filzah Sumartono argues that:
Sunat perempuan (female circumcision) is no different from other forms

of violence against women. It is just one of the many ways society tries to
control the female body, sexuality and being. In our Malay community,
we begin the process at infancy. To not see it as a problem is to deny that
this is part of a bigger picture of how society condones violence against
women and removes women’s rights to live on their own terms.68
65 Hadith in Sunan Abi Daw ud, https://sunnah.com/abudaw ud/34/85. Accessed

23 September 2019.
66 This sentiment was conveyed by multiple liberal activists.
67 This was communicated to me by numerous conservative activists.
68 Filzah Sumartono, “The Problem of Sunat Perempuan,” Beyond The Hijab, 5 Febru-
ary 2016. https://beyondhijab.sg/2016/02/05/the-problem-of-sunat-perempuan/. Accessed
23 September 2019.
A mother who had her daughter circumcised, however, evidently disagrees

with the position:
It is just circumcision. Even my sons go through it. I really do not know

what the big deal is. It does not affect my daughter at all. She is already
a teenager now, and she is healthy.69
However, unlike the LGBT and hijab issues, conservatives are less particular
about female circumcision: in fact, there is disagreement between the
conservatives themselves on it. This is probably due to the differing opinions
which exist in traditional Islamic jurisprudence on the matter, unlike on
same-sex relationships and the hijab, which most ulama generally come to
a consensus on. Many conservatives interviewed mentioned that they do
not believe in female circumcision, nor did they do so for their daughters.
One exclaimed:
The act (female circumcision) is permanent. Also it can be argued it is

one way the ‘patriarchy’ exerts control to subjugate women. Don’t get me
wrong. I don’t support feminists at all. Having said that, the (feminist)
movement arose because of a lot of zulm (oppression) on women.70
A few other conservatives interviewed said that they do not prescribe it for
their family members because there are differing opinions on this matter
within Islamic jurisprudence. Thus, the issue of female circumcision is not
a huge battleground between progressive and conservative Muslims, since
there is more room for agreement, unlike matters pertaining to homosexual-
ity and the hijab. This is the case for domestic abuse too: while progressives
are definitely more vocal on the matter, and have sought to highlight cases of
domestic violence, conservatives are receptive to such moves, and typically
do not oppose the calls for the ulama to condemn such violence. Here, again
there is convergence between progressives and conservative Muslims.
So far, what we have are essentially the major causes which are picked
up by the progressive Muslim faction: inter and intra-faith activism,
LGBT rights advocacy, and the protection of women’s rights. These are
obviously causes which are in line with liberal values of protection of
the vulnerable and marginalized classes in society, the emphasis on
justice, tolerance and inclusivity. What is notably missing is activism in
69 Interview with conservative Muslim, 23 September 2019.

spheres which are typically the arena of progressive activism. The ISA
has been discussed a lot in this book, but it is worth repeating since the
state considers the ISA as a tool to solve existential problems. Progressive
Muslims, like liberals in general, have not taken it upon themselves to
pursue the abolition of the act, even though in recent years, those who
have been arrested under the ISA have been almost exclusively Muslim.
In the words of a liberal activist:
We are silent on this because the state silences dissent on security matters.
Also, the majority of progressive Muslims are university-educated, and
thereafter, they hold jobs in the public sector. This makes it difficult for
them to speak on such matters.71
Furthermore, the fact that the ISA has been, since 1988 and the Marxist
Conspiracy saga, largely used on Muslim extremists and not on political
opponents give a tremendous deal of legitimacy to the law, in the eyes of
many Singaporeans. Most Singaporeans, including activists, do not actively
champion the abolition because of pragmatic reasons – the fear of state
sanction – and also because they do not believe that the law has been
significantly abused in recent years (Abdullah 2018c).
Progressive activists have also been silent on certain forms of censorship,
especially the clamping down on certain Muslim speakers and publications,
or in fact, supportive of it at times. In recent years, Mufti Menk has been disal-
lowed from entering Singapore to preach Islam, for reasons which have been
detailed in the preceding chapter. Islamic books which have been deemed to
be problematic have also been banned. In 2018, three books were regarded by
the government to have contained ‘exclusivist or extremist religious views that
promote enmity among different religious communities’, and for encouraging
a ‘culture of violence’.72 Not all of the three books advocate violence directly,
but the concern of the state is that the book would sow elements of discord
between the Muslims and other religious communities, by denigrating other
faiths. A progressive Muslim interviewed said that he supports the book ban,
but the reasons behind the decision must be explained clearly so that the
public does not think it is an authoritarian manoeuvre. A couple of others said
that Menk is an extremist, and he should not be allowed in Singapore to spread
71 Correspondence with liberal activist, 23 September 2019.

72 “3 Books Banned in Singapore for Having Extremist Religious Views: MCI,” Channel News
Asia, 28 November 2018. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/3-books-banned-
in-singapore-for-having-extremist-religious-views-10950106. Accessed 24 September 2019.
his views.73 Interestingly, these progressives do not believe in unfettered

protection of freedom of speech. For them, since the books cover dangerous
material and since Menk – in their estimation – supports extremist views, they
take no issue with the ban. Such a position is arguably not entirely ‘liberal’.
Typically, one would expect conservatives to be more pliable to restrictions
to free speech, on the basis of protecting public order. Liberals, on the other
hand, are expected to defend one’s right to say whatever he/she wishes, no
matter how repulsive one may find those comments to be, as long as they
do not directly call for violence. The maxim ‘I may disapprove of what you
say but I will defend to the death your right to say it’ comes to mind (Kinne
1943).74 Yet, progressive Muslims in Singapore are either not perturbed by
the ban on Menk and the books, or in some cases, even supportive of it. This
could be due to a few reasons. First, there may be some realization that on the
matters related to security, the state is uncompromising in its approach and
activists are pragmatic enough to not rock the boat in such issues. Second,
it could be that progressives are fine with the ban because the ones who
are affected are not fellow progressive intellectuals, but rather, people who
espouse conservative positions like Mufti Menk. One cannot imagine that
these progressives would be similarly ambivalent if progressive intellectuals
were affected.75 Third, the fact that some liberals support the ban shows
that they accept the language of the state when it comes to securitization of
certain Muslim expressions of faith (Razak 2019, 424).
Progressive Muslims: Not a Monolithic Group
In general, it is true that progressive Muslims have not been vocal about the
ISA, about the state’s narratives on survival of the nation, and on matters
like the ban on people such as Menk. However, it is also crucial to note
that the group is not monolithic. There are differences between categories
of activists, and highlighting them helps us understand the activist scene
better. Two sub-topics will be discussed in this section: first, the difference
in approach between the younger progressive Muslims (under the age of
35) and the rest; and second, the case of Alfian Sa’at, arguably the most
prominent Muslim dissenter in the country.
73 These sentiments were conveyed through multiple interviews.

74 The quote is often used in defence of free speech. While often misattributed to Voltaire,
Kinne (1943) argues that Evelyn Beatrice Hall was the one who coined the phrase.
75 Of course, these progressives would probably say that liberal intellectuals would not spout
rhetoric like Menk’s.
There seems to be some form of generational divide between younger

and more senior progressive Muslims. The younger liberals are more willing
to be critical of the state on some sensitive issues, namely race. Apart from
championing the causes described above pertaining to gender, sexuality
and women’s rights, and taking on conservative interpretations of Islam,
these progressives are also involved in the wider national discourse on
‘Chinese privilege’. The concept of Chinese Privilege was popularized by
Sangeetha Thanapal, an online race activist who is quite well-known. She
utilizes the theoretical lens developed by Peggy Mcintosh, who compares the
unearned advantages White Americans enjoyed by virtue of their ethnicity
to an ‘invisible knapsack’ (Mcintosh 1988). Younger progressive Muslims
have displayed more willingness to enter discussions on racial privilege in
the country. An article on New Mandala, for instance, identifies the PAP
government’s policies as directly responsible for the perpetuation of Chinese
privilege.76 Others have been critical of the state’s racial policies on their
own social media feed.77 While some of these liberals say they recognize
that there is a possibility of them facing state censure – Sangeetha was after
all investigated by the police for promoting ‘ill will between races’ with her
feisty Facebook posts and was subsequently issued a warning – they believe
that the discourses in Singapore have moved to a stage where such open
discussions are necessary, the number of people who discuss these issues
openly have been increasing, which do not make their views isolated, and
thus are not particularly worried about their social media posts. The more
‘seasoned’ progressives, however, are more cautious in their approaches,
especially on the matter of race. In the words of a progressive Muslim
activist:
The new activists lack institutional memory and knowledge. They do not
experience what we have gone through, what had been achieved […] They
have the enthusiasm, but the grounding in context is lacking […] They do
not have deeper reflection on nuances over the issues […] For us (senior
progressives), the battle was always about principles and the betterment
of the community. It seems to me for them (younger progressives), the
politics of the self matters more.78
76 Hydar Saharudin, “Confronting ‘Chinese Privilege’ in Singapore,” The New Mandala,

2 November 2016. https://www.newmandala.org/brief-history-chinese-privilege-singapore/.
78 Interview with liberal activist, 23 September 2019.
This generational divide is not unique to progressive Muslims in Singapore,

quite evidently. It is rather common that younger people believe their
predecessors were not bold or brave enough. Nonetheless, it shows the
diversity of thought and approaches within the progressive Muslims as
well.
The case of Alfian Sa’at further bolsters the point of heterogeneity within
the liberal Muslim movement. While Alfian is more of a ‘national’ than a
community activist, he nonetheless identifies himself as Malay-Muslim
(Poon 2016). Alfian is a playwright and engages in provocative critiques of
the state, especially when it comes to racial policies. Alfian’s reaction to
the Prettipls incident – which generated a national conversation on race
and racism in Singapore – was documented in Chapter 4. He was stinging
in his critique of the state and even the PAP’s minority MPs, arguing that
they conduct ‘overpolicing’ of their own volition and that people who call
out racism have ‘the instruments of the state used against them’.79 Alfian
even criticized the legacy of Lee Kuan Yew right after the latter’s death in
2015, causing him to receive abuse and even death threats.80
To be sure, Alfian’s is a fascinating case. He has been allowed some space
to operate in Singapore, even as he regularly directs plays some of which are
obviously critical of the state. At the same time, he has been denied certain
opportunities too. In 2003, the National Arts Council (NAC) withdrew its
funding for a project which Alfian was involved in: he had written an article
which the NAC took issue with in the journal which was to be funded.
NAC denied that the withdrawal was because of censorship, but rather,
‘funding re-prioritization’.81 Alfian applied to be a relief teacher for the
Ministry of Education in 2007, and got denied, in spite of his stellar academic
qualifications. MOE did not state why his application was not approved.82
More recently, a programme which was supposed to be taught at Yale-NUS
college, a liberal arts tertiary institution, was cancelled. The course was
originally entitled “Dissent and Resistance in Singapore”, and was to be led
79 Danisha Hakeem, “ “Penatlah”: Singaporean playwright Alfian Sa’at, on racism and Chinese
majoritarianism in Singapore,” The Online Citizen, 2 August 2019. https://www.theonlinecitizen.
com/2019/08/02/penatlah-singaporean-playwright-alfian-saat-on-racism-and-chinese-major-
itarianism-in-singapore/. Accessed 21 August 2019.
80 Akshita Nanda, “Playwright Alf ian Sa’at Questions LKY’s Legacy,” The Straits Times,
27 March 2015. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/playwright-alf ian-saat-questions-
lky-legacy. Accessed 25 September 2019.
81 National Library Board, “Alf ian Sa’at,” http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/
SIP_1299_2007-12-26.html. Accessed 25 September 2019.
82 Ibid.
by Alfian himself.83 Aflian was later criticized in parliament by state elites

such as the Minister of Education, Ong Ye Kung.84 Cases like his serve as
examples – whether in perception or reality – for other activists, just as the
cases of Kirsten Han, PJ Thum, Jolovan Wham, Sangeetha Thanapal and
others do. Activists do know that there is a possibility of strong-arm actions
toward them if they run afoul of the state.
Unlike the other progressive Muslims mentioned earlier, Alfian can be
more accurately termed as an activist who happens to be a progressive
Muslim, and not a progressive Muslim activist per se. This distinction is made
because Alfian’s raison d’être is not causes based on the reinterpretation of
Islam per se, but rather, he delves into issues which are of broader national
significance (such as authoritarianism, gender, sexuality and racism), and
not Muslim-specific subjects.
The general assessment of progressive Muslim activism is one which is
pragmatic and political opportunities-dependent: liberals are strategic in
their championing of issues, and shun discussing and championing causes
which, though consistent with their worldviews, may venture beyond the
OB markers set by the state. Nevertheless, cases like Alfian and the younger
progressives show that there is diversity within this category. Still even
Alfian and the rest do not conduct activism through unlawful means, such
as organizing demonstrations. Even when they champion causes which may
be controversial to the state, they still do it within legal limits.
5.4 Gains Made in the Public Domain
Some scholars have described Singapore’s political system in harsh terms,

to the point of declaring it a ‘dictatorship’, as mentioned earlier. As such,
it becomes difficult to conceive of any form of activism bearing fruit in
terms of political outcomes. However, what these authors fail to consider
are: 1) the existence of opposition parties who can and do win in free but
rather unfair elections; and 2) the presence of activists who have managed
to move the state in a different direction on some of its policy positions.
83 Seow Bei Yi, “Yale-NUS Cancels Course on Dissent and Resistance,” The Straits Times,
15 September 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/education/yale-nus-cancels-course-
on-dissent-and-resistance. Accessed 25 September 2019.
84 Ang Hwee Min, “Yale-NUS Course: Schools Should Not Be Misused for Partisan Politics, Says
Ong Ye Kung,” Channel News Asia, 7 October 2019. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/
singapore/yale-nus-course-schools-should-not-be-misused-for-partisan-11975994. Accessed
9 October 2019.
To be sure, I do not claim that activism is free-flowing, that censorship –

actual or self-censorship – does not exist, or that the government is always
extremely responsive to differing points of view. The analyses so far should
make that clear. Rather, what I am proposing is that it is useful to look at
Muslim activism through the lens of political opportunities. The fact there
are fewer political opportunities for activists in Singapore does not mean
that there are no opportunities. Even the political opportunities which exist
are different from actor to actor. The last two chapters (4 and 5) have amply
demonstrated these points. This section serves to highlight the gains which
liberal Muslims have made in the public arena in Singapore. Again, by no
means am I suggesting that progressive activism has been an unqualified
success, or that most of the causes they champion are eventually accepted
by the state and wider society. I am merely postulating that because of the
political opportunities available to them which may not be accessible to
conservatives in some spheres, progressives have made certain strides.
Consider the matter of Section 377A. Just ten years ago, the issue was not
even discussed by Muslims, and when the topic of homosexuality was raised,
it was mostly done in a way which LGBT individuals found demeaning.
Today, the discourse has moved considerably. MUIS’ report mentioned
earlier talks about the need for Muslims to be more embracing of the LGBT
community.85 This is not to say that LGBT individuals do not encounter
discrimination from some Muslims, because they do. The point is that
the progressive discourse has helped to move the needle in favour of the
LGBT community. Ustaz Irwan Hadi, a Deputy Director at MUIS, said in
a public forum:
I do not condemn them, but I will say that I do not condone it. I will make
this clear. We do not excommunicate, denigrate, or disparage LGBTQ
Muslims in our community. We sit down with them to understand the
challenges they go through, and the fact that they still want to turn to
God – I see it as a positive development.86
It is unclear from Ustaz Irwan’s comments what exactly he does not ‘condone’,
since he used the word ‘it’, but the point remains that the conciliatory

86 Jonathan Lee, “Ask Them Anything About Inter-Faith Discourse,” The New Paper, 9 May 2018.
https://www.tnp.sg/news/singapore/ask-them-anything-inter-faith-discourse. Accessed
25 September 2019.
approach he and MUIS take is in line with what has been advocated by
progressives. Another example would be the repeal of immunity for marital
rape. Women’s rights groups had been campaigning for such a move for a long
time, and in 2019, the government announced that the law would change to
criminalize marital rape. Minister Shanmugam said that his consultations
with Muslim ulama showed that they too believed that marital rape should
be disallowed, and the move was indeed subsequently supported by the
religious clergy.87 Yet another instance would be when President Halimah
Yacob lauded MUIS’ move to include a female into the fatwa council as a
permanent member, lauding the step as a ‘progressive and inclusive one.’88
Even more relevant is the state’s overall approach toward the version
of Islam it prefers. For the state, Islam as practised in Singapore must be
‘inclusive’, not ‘exclusivist’, ‘tolerant’ and even ‘progressive’. The state frowns
upon certain conservative interpretations of Islam, as evinced from the
‘Merry Christmas’ episode. Razak’s careful analysis of seventeen speeches
which touched on Muslim identity delivered by government leaders – namely
K. Shanmugam, Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim, Masagos Zulkifli and Amrin Amin – is
useful here. The period of study is 2015-2018. She finds that conservative
expressions of Muslim faith were securitized, as they were deemed to
be exclusivist, and were almost always mentioned in conjunction with
extremism. Three characteristics were mentioned specifically: first, the
refusal to exchange greetings on others’ religious occasions; second, not
eating together with non-Muslims; and third, not wanting to shake hands
with members of the opposite gender. Basically, the idea is possessing these
traits ‘sets the stage, the framework, the foundation’ for Muslims to become
susceptible to radicalization (Razak 2019, 422-423). Thus, the progressive
versions of Islam become more palatable to the state in some aspects, from
the tolerance of different theological positions in Islam (such as the Shias
and Ahmadis) to the desire for Muslims to patronize ‘markets and eating
places’ together with other Singaporeans.89 And because of the way that the
87 Kevin Kwang, “Marital Immunity for Rape Set to Be Repealed as Part of Changes to Singapore’s
Penal Code,” Channel News Asia, 11 February 2019. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/
singapore/marital-immunity-for-rape-set-to-be-repealed-as-part-of-changes-11229224. Accessed
26 September 2019.
88 “First Woman in Fatwa Committee as Full Member,” The Straits Times, 27 September 2019.
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/first-woman-in-fatwa-committee-as-full-member.
89 Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, “Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s Written Interview
with Berita Harian,” 11 July 2009. https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/prime-minister-lee-hsien-
loongs-written-interview-berita-harian. Accessed 25 September 2019.
political system is set in place in Singapore, the state’s preferred narrative

is often the dominant one.
Some progressives challenge this interpretation. They would say that
liberal Muslims are still very much on the margins of the community, and
have not been able to translate their causes into tangible policy prescriptions.
I disagree with such an assessment. At the very least, the state’s prescribed
version of Muslim identity is extremely close to what progressives would
prefer, in the spheres mentioned above. The emphasis on pluralism, less
theological rigidity, and inclusivity of all creeds is welcomed by liberals. Of
course, one can make the case that the state’s emphasis on those interpreta-
tions of Islam is not a result of progressive discourse and activism. I do
not make a causal argument here: it is difficult to properly assess whether
the state’s decisions to adopt a harsh approach toward what they view as
exclusivist interpretations of Islam as entirely a result of its own predisposi-
tions, or if it was influenced – in small part – by liberal discourse. Whatever
the cause (s), the end result is that the progressive discourse has come to
be dominant, in these few spheres.
The changes made to the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA)
further strengthen my argument. Under the proposed amendments, religious
leaders will be subjected to a higher level of scrutiny as they are in more
influential positions. Acts which are criminalized are when people:
a Incite violence on the basis of religion, or against a religious group or
its members;
b Incite feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility against a religious
group; and
c Insult the religion or wound the religious feelings of another person.
For the latter two, special consideration is given to religious leaders who
commit the offence. The government’s rationale is that these members of the
clergy exercise greater influence over their faiths’ adherents, and therefore
must be more accountable than the ordinary citizen.90 Again, this is a change
which progressive Muslims would presumably not be uncomfortable with.
For them, Islam is not an ‘exclusive path to God’, even if they believe in the
truth of Islam’s message.91 For conservatives, however, they typically believe
90 Ministry of Home Affairs Singapore, “First Reading of Maintenance of Religious

Harmony (Amendment) Bill,” 2 September 2019. https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/press-
release/news/first-reading-of-maintenance-of-religious-harmony-(amendment)-bill. Accessed
26 September 2019.
91 Many liberals interview articulated this sentiment.
in the uniqueness of Islam’s claim to truth. It is amorphous how the changes

would be translated in reality. Would a Muslim or Christian preacher who
teaches salvific exclusivity be liable to a criminal charge, if members of
other faiths are offended at such a message? What about atheists who say
publicly that the idea of a God is not rational, as some do,92 causing religious
adherents to feel insulted? However the amended legislation pans out in
practice, it is evident that progressive Muslims would be more comfortable
with these changes than conservatives, because of the differing ways in
which they approach religion.
The bottom-line here is that, whether the state was influenced by liberal-
progressive discourse is irrelevant: what matters is that progressives have
gained the upper hand in the arenas which I have described above. The
progressive interpretation when it comes to exchanging greetings, shak-
ing hands with the opposite gender, theological tolerance and so on, is
congruous with the state’s desired Muslim identity. In fact, in some cases,
the conservative interpretation is not only the less-preferred option, it
is not an option at all. Conservative interpretations of the faith may be
deemed as security threats. In this sense, the Singapore state too, like many
others throughout the world (especially in the West), has a ‘good Muslim,
bad Muslim’ narrative (Mamdani 2008). Here, the concept of discursive
opportunities discussed earlier becomes relevant too. Liberal ideas have
acquired visibility, resonance, and legitimacy, in large part because of state
approval of those concepts. The hegemony – institutional and ideological
– the state possesses further means that many non-Muslim Singaporeans
accept liberal positions as ‘moderate’ and ‘inclusive’ and certain conservative
stances as ‘problematic’, even if many members of the Muslim community
are conservative themselves.
5.5 Conclusion
Much like the ulama, the liberals are not homogenous, and have largely
been pursuing their activism within the confines of what is deemed ac-
ceptable by the state, with few exceptions. The liberal category though,
unlike the other two studied in the book, is the hardest to def ine, as
‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ Islam is often used in a pejorative way by its
92 See this article, for instance. Melody Zaccheus, Pang Xue Qiang, and Ng Keng Gene, “Youth
in Singapore Shunning Religion,” The Straits Times, 21 March 2016. https://www.straitstimes.
com/singapore/youth-in-singapore-shunning-religion. Accessed 26 September 2019.
detractors. Nevertheless, there are real theological, jurisprudential and

methodological differences in the way liberals and conservatives approach
Islam. These differences are translated in the political sphere, but not
in the manner which Indonesia and Malaysia experience. Rather, the
state here is by far the most dominant actor, and there is no question of
state capture by other entities, especially religious actors. However, the
activists operate in the political scene by attempting to affect discourse,
and by cooperating with the state, or operating in the realms which the
state is not particularly averse to. The liberals have been able to make
gains in the public arena because in the state’s attempts to def ine the
‘good Muslim’ and the ‘bad Muslim’, the ‘good Muslim’ is someone who
adheres to norms which progressives are supportive of, as long as the
state’s core ideologies are not infringed upon. At the same time, because
liberals play by the rules of the game, they are not ‘pure’ liberals, and have
to be pragmatic or strategic in the causes they pursue. In other words,
political opportunities determine liberal activists’ adherence to ‘liberal’
values, and those opportunities have favoured liberal activists more than
conservatives in Singapore.
The next chapter will deal with conservative activists and juxtapositions
with the liberals will be made.
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6 The Conservative Dilemma:
To Challenge or Accept State
Proclamations?
Abstract
This chapter interrogates the relationships between conservative activists
and the state. By now, there is perhaps no need to belabour the point that
each category of activists is not homogenous, as the previous chapters have
shown. The conservatives are a varied group, with some actively cooperating
with the state and others adopting a more pragmatic approach. I argue that
just like the ulama and the liberals, conservative activists typically work
within the system, even when they disagree with state pronouncements.
Unlike the liberals, however, the space is more constricted for conservatives
to influence discourse and policy in many areas. The political opportunities
for these activists are limited because of the government’s preference
for more ‘inclusive’ interpretations of Islam. As in the previous chapters,
cases of dissident conservatives are discussed so as to provide a more
comprehensive picture of Muslim activism in Singapore. Causes which
conservatives champion and duly avoid will be investigated in depth, to
comprehend the nexus between political opportunities and activism.
Keywords: conservative Muslims, traditionalist, Muslim identity, hijab,

Arabization
There have been many policies which the government has pursued which are
not the best. The Arabization narrative is clearly wrong. The ‘Merry Christmas’
incident was narrowly understood by the government and their supporters.
However, there is a limit to what we can do, what we can oppose. Sometimes,
we just have to accept that there are some battles which we cannot win.1
doi: 10.5117/9789463724012_ch06
The above quote – from a conservative activist – mirrors much of the

language used by progressive Muslims described in the earlier chapter,
even if the issues of concern vary. For liberals, the ‘Arabization’ narra-
tive or the ‘Merry Christmas’ incident are not matters in which they
disagree with the state’s stance: in fact, ideologically, they agree with
the government’s approach in these matters. Where they do agree with
conservatives, however, is in the understanding that there are ‘some
battles’ which activists cannot win. The acceptance of the disparity in
power between the citizens and the state, and the potential detrimental
repercussions of straying beyond acceptable activism, is evident on both
sides of the ideological aisle.
One key difference between the categories ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ is
that the former is far less fractious. Many conservative activists are willing
to embrace the term, and there is not much ‘baggage’ associated with it,
unlike the term ‘liberal’ which is often used to summarily dismiss a person’s
argument. Having said that, generally, they do not consider themselves as
‘conservative Muslims,’ but rather, as just ‘Muslims’ or ‘mainstream Muslims’,
which will be expounded in the next section.
This chapter interrogates the relationships between conservative
activists and the state. By now, there is perhaps no need to belabour the
point that each category of activists is not homogenous, as the previous
chapters have shown. The conservatives are a varied group, with some
actively cooperating with the state and others adopting a more pragmatic
approach. I argue that just like the ulama and the liberals, conservative
activists typically work within the system, even when they disagree with
state pronouncements. Unlike the liberals, however, the space is more
constricted for conservatives to influence discourse and policy in many
areas. The political opportunities for these activists are limited because
of the government’s preference for more ‘inclusive’ interpretations of
Islam. As in the previous chapters, cases of dissident conservatives will
be discussed so as to provide a more comprehensive picture of Muslim
activism in Singapore. Causes which conservatives champion and duly
avoid will be investigated in depth, to comprehend the nexus between
political opportunities and activism.
6.1 Conservative Muslims: Understanding the Category
It was mentioned in Chapter 3 that conservatives usually uphold tradi-

tions of the ‘ingroup’, place a lot of emphasis on showing respect for
The Conservative Dilemma: To Challenge or Accept State Procl amations? 215
f igures of authority, which in this case refers to the ulama, and believe
in the ‘purity’ of the faith. (Kugler, Jost and Noorbaloochi 2014, 416). It
must further be repeated that it is not that liberals do not care about
the values conservatives prioritize, or vice-versa. Conservatives value
justice, just as liberals do believe in purity and authenticity. However,
it is the degree to which one group emphasizes certain principles over
others. Furthermore, definitions may differ amongst the two groups. For
conservatives, justice may mean ‘putting each thing in its proper place’
(Al-Attas 2015), whereas for liberals, it may mean equality of treatment
for every group. Conservatives thus def ine justice and equality in light
of authentic traditions, whereas it can be said that liberals ascertain the
authenticity of traditions through their understandings of ‘justice’ and
‘equality’.
Conservatives differ from liberals in their relationship with Islamic texts
and religious authority. Since the liberal position has been described in much
detail in the preceding chapter, the conservative stance will be the focus
here. They tend to ‘adhere to traditional understandings of jurisprudence,
accept the authority of the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet, and
abide by the religious authority of the ulama as authoritative interpreters
of religious scripture’ (Abdullah 2017b, 346). Conservatives are also more
protective of the hadith tradition than progressives.
A few points are to be emphasized here. Firstly, it was already mentioned
earlier that the ulama are mostly conservative, as acknowledged by MUIS
too. The focus of this chapter, however, are conservative activists who are
not part of the ulama. They tend to be mostly Muslim professionals who are
secular-educated. These activists warrant a separate category of analysis
since unlike the ulama, they do not have the gravitas of religious authority
behind them, which means that both the state and the public may act in
a different way toward them. However, they are also theoretically less
bounded by affiliation to the state, since they are mostly independent actors.
Secondly, a few terms are typically conflated and used interchangeably.
These include ‘conservatives’, ‘traditionalists’, and ‘Islamists’. Traditionalists
are usually juxtaposed with ‘modernists’ or ‘reformists’. In Southeast Asia,
the traditionalist-reformist debate took place in the form of the Kaum
Muda-Kaum Tua polemics. The Kaum Muda (New Group) represented the
reformists who called for a critical reassessment of Islamic practices, whereas
the Kaum Tua referred to the traditionalists who mostly wanted to retain
the way Islam manifested itself in Southeast Asia. The debate, which was
essentially a Sufi-Salafi divide, concerned itself with who were the rightful
heirs to the Prophetic tradition, and whose version of Islam was ‘purer’. It is
a mistake, however, to conflate the Kaum Muda-Kaum Tua, or Sufi-Salafi,

or traditionalist-reformist, cleavage with the liberal-conservative divide.
It has been mentioned elsewhere that conservatives comprise both Sufis
and Salafis. In fact, most Sufis and Salafis are conservative. While it is
true that many liberals draw on Sufism and display little affinity toward
Salafis-Wahhabis who tend to be more pedantic, it cannot be said that
Sufis are generally liberal. Sufis and Salafis share similar methodological
approaches toward ascertaining and understanding Islamic legislation.
Many of the conservative activists interviewed for this project were Sufis/
traditionalists, and they displayed some contempt for progressive Muslim
ideas. Likewise, liberals direct their frustrations toward both Salafi and
traditionalists for their unwillingness to reconsider established Muslim
practices. Both Sufis and Salafis accept the authority of the Islamic sources
and the ulama, believe in the exclusivity of the truth of the totality of
Islam’s message,2 and prioritize authenticity or purity of Islam. Where the
two depart is in which ulama they find authoritative (Hassan 2010), as was
discussed in Chapter 4. Conservatism encompasses Sufism and Salafism,
and in fact, Shi’ism as well.3 The term ‘Islamist’ requires some elaboration.
The term is often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalist’, usually
in a pejorative way designed to discredit Islamic movements. The term
Islamist is used to denote Muslims with political ambitions, using Islam
as a rallying cry (Iqtidar 2011). Tibi defines Islamism as a ‘political ideology
based on the politicising of religion for sociopolitical and economic goals
in the pursuit of establishing a divine order’ (Tibi 2002, 20). However, the
term encounters a few problems as well, as with most definitions. Since it
is often accompanied with normative judgments, does it become abhorrent
then for a Muslim to have political ambitions, with Islam as a motivating
factor? Just as the term ‘liberal Muslim’ is used to delegitimize opponents,
the term ‘Islamist’ is used for the same purpose. However, the term can
arguably be more malicious since there may be security implications when
one is called an Islamist: states may feel more threatened when there is
an ‘Islamist threat’, and may adopt all sorts of draconian measures against
those who are deemed to be Islamists. In Egypt, for instance, it has been a
strategy of successive governments to nullify a political threat by labelling
2 This is not to say that Sufis and Salafis do not believe that other faiths may contain truths in
them. Indeed, conservatives generally do think that other religions contain goodness in them.
What conservatives believe in, however, is that the totality of Islam’s message is correct, which
is not the case for other religions.
3 Just as in the Sunni community, most Shi’ites are conservative, though some are liberal too.
an individual or organization as an Islamist, or an affiliate of the Muslim

Brotherhood (Abed-Kotob 1995, Campagna 1996, Munson 2001). President
Trump vowed to help Egypt leader Al-Sisi fight ‘Islamist militants’ together
in 2017, illustrating the instrumental usage of the term, and the equating of
Islamism and militancy. 4 Again, these problems do not negate the utility
of the term: it is just that more caution needs to be applied when under-
standing it, especially after knowing what is at stake. Using the definition
by Tibi, it is safe to say that there is an absence of Islamists in the political
scene in Singapore, as the political opportunities simply do not allow for
such an occurrence. People who attempt to pursue a ‘divine order’ via
politics would be dealt with by the state in no uncertain terms, as the cases
of the JI terrorists have shown. However, this is not to say that activists
are not motivated by their faith, or sense of what is right and wrong, as
defined by their understanding of Islam. Indeed, unlike the progressives,
conservative activists are more likely to hold a particular position because
of their deep commitment to enacting their religious beliefs. The outcomes
pursuant to this commitment may be similar to what liberals envisage the
political-religious scene to be, but the intent is not the same. For instance,
conservatives may engage in inter-faith dialogues precisely because of
their commitment to peace and harmony in multiracial societies, which
is driven by their understanding of Islam; while liberals do the same, but
because they believe in the multiplicity of paths to the one true God. As
noted by a conservative activist:
We do whatever we do because of Islam. The causes we pursue, the ideas

we have […] All of these are because of the Islamic worldview.5
This book thus uses the term conservatives, as opposed to ‘fundamentalist’

or ‘Islamist’, because the latter two are accompanied with negative connota-
tions pertaining to security threats. Furthermore, there is no significant
movement to replace the secular state with an Islamic polity, which is
usually the mark of an Islamist movement. It is true, however, that some
progressives refer to conservative activists as ‘fundamentalists’ or ‘Islamists’.
‘Traditionalists’ are a subset of the category conservatives, since as explained
earlier, Salafis or non-traditionalists can be conservative too.
4 Steve Holland, “Trump Tells Sisi U.S., Egypt Will Fight Islamist Militants Together,”
Reuters, 4 April 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-egypt-idUSKBN1751WT. Accessed
1 October 2019.
As mentioned earlier, many conservatives do not call themselves that,

but are usually more willing to embrace the term. In the words of a few
respondents:
It is very hard (to define conservative Muslim) because the label doesn’t
really fit in our understanding of Muslims. But I often think about what
others think is a conservative Muslim, which is one who adheres to
mainstream traditional interpretations of Islam, and doesn’t really care
much for their acceptance in the non-Muslim world.6
My colleagues tell me I’m very religious, just because they see me going
for Friday prayers and fast during Ramadhan.7
Conservative Muslims are practising Muslims. Practising Muslims to the

dot. Not cherry picking anything.8
For these three interviewees, the practices which conservative Muslims

are associated with are just Islamic, not necessarily conservative. This is
why they do not refer to themselves as conservative, even though they do
not necessarily vehemently oppose the label. One of them said that while
he/she does not use that label, if he/she were to identify himself/herself
in those terms, he/she would use ‘conservative’. The first response was
interesting as it indicates that some form of siege mentality exists, or at
least, that conservatives acknowledge or believe that their understanding
of Islam is different from what others would like them to adhere to. Another
respondent echoed similar thoughts:
Conservative Muslims believe in practising Islam without assimilat-

ing into the currently more popular ways to practise it –without state
intervention or popular media or Islamophobia – I think that is more
true to a traditional form.9
For some, however, the usage of the term ‘conservative’ opens the door
toward the acceptance of unorthodox Muslim views as within the spectrum
of Islam.
6 Correspondence with conservative activist, 15 September 2019.

7 Correspondence with conservative, 15 September 2019.
There is no conservative Muslim. Muslim is Muslim.10
Once you assume there is a “conservative Muslim”, that means you can
measure religiosity. To that effect, that means there is a spectrum (of
Islam) to accept even liberal or LGBT Muslims.11
From these responses, it becomes evident that conservatives are interested

in ‘purity’ and orthodoxy more so than progressives. Conservative activists
also do define themselves in opposition to progressives, just as the converse
is true. It is also true that while undoubtedly, there are liberals-progressives
who make caricatures of the conservative set of arguments, by and large,
both sets of actors are aware of what is at stake in the issues they discuss
and debate. A respondent remarked:
It (conservative Muslim) is a term non-Muslims or liberal Muslims use

to refer to Muslims who practice their faith religiously. Outsider’s idea
of conservative Muslims are those who are pretty strict and still follow
“dated” or “backwards” rulings. I am not following anything backwards
with regards to religion.12
Another said something similar:
I perceive a conservative as someone who generally practises – rituals and

adheres to Islamic norms (traditional marriages; no fluidity in gender)13
Ustaz Zhulkiflee Haji Ismail, an alim who has been vocal against the
phenomenon of liberal Islam and who passed away recently in 2016, writes:
Well, there are some who may label me and my fellow asaatidza as ‘tra-
ditional’. We believe that those who are wont to label us may not have
understood our concern, may Allah give them guidance […] Let them be
reminded that this tradition belongs to Islam and the Muslims. They who
styled themselves as ‘liberal & progressive’ who are anti-traditionalist
ought to know that they are mere servants (don’t know, servants of

whom? They should do muhaasabah),14 and they do not have the right
to exchanging our tradition on behalf of Islam and Muslims. To insist in
doing so is treachery.15
Ustaz Zhulkiflee’s harsh words, labelling those who insist on discarding the
tradition as being treacherous, is reflective of the liberal-conservative divide
amongst Muslims, as are the other responses quoted above. Conservatives
define themselves in opposition to liberals/progressives, as is the case the
other way round too. A Facebook group called “Singapore Muslims against
Liberal Islam” regularly posts comments and articles warning against
individuals who are deemed to be liberals.16
Many other respondents identified a few traits which they associate
with being conservative. These include: paying particular attention to food
consumption and eating only at halal-certified eateries; having family-
oriented values; defining marriage as a union between male and female
and being uncompromising on that; not shaking hands with members of
the opposite gender, let alone giving them hugs which is semi-common
amongst colleagues and friends in Singapore; inter alia. This is in addition
to characteristics and beliefs which have already been explicated in the
previous chapter, such as believing in the obligation of putting on the hijab
for females, believing in Islam as the ultimate and exclusive path to God;
and so on.
There is also a misconception on the part of some that conservative
Muslims are ‘literalists’. Liberal Islam has been contrasted with ‘Literal
Islam’, with the former obviously being celebrated more than the latter
(Rahim 2006). However, a clarification is due. Conservatives are not neces-
sarily literalists. It is true that some Salafis-Wahhabis are more literalist
than others; however, for other Salafis, and traditionalists-Sufis, to label
them as ‘literalist’ would be slightly inaccurate. Traditionalists-Sufis and
other Salafis (such as the reformists) do allow for the exercise of ijtihad, or
independent reasoning, and do not interpret every single verse in the Quran
and Prophetic tradition literally. In fact, one can make the argument that
even the staunchest of literalists could never interpret all of the Islamic texts
literally (Jackson 2002). Rather, they differ from liberals in this regard on
14 Muhaasabah means self-introspection.

15 See his comments on this website, https://miftahuljannah.forumotion.com/t5-ilm-first-
pillar-of-da-wah-lesson-on-adab?f bclid=IwAR2gFO03mzNuVzjmsDClu9mGwEQJqlg94B
ac427-UOCewc7cmD1tyOZZFLc. Accessed 9 October 2019.
16 The group is a closed group and has about 2000 members.
two counts. First, liberals are definitely less literalist than conservatives.
The example of Scott Kugle’s reinterpretation of the story of Lot comes to
mind. While conservatives are not literalists all the time, they are more
careful in construing scripture, whereas liberals/progressives allow for
more interpretative leeway. At the same time, even though conservatives
believe that figurative and metaphorical language are used in the Quran and
hadith, they do believe that some verses can only be interpreted literally.
As a respondent noted:
Liberals like to say traditionalists are literal all the time. This is obviously
not true. The Ashaaris,17 who are the majority of Muslims in Southeast
Asia, do not believe in the literal attributes of God. Traditionalist ulama
adopt sophisticated modes of tafseer (exegesis), but they accuse us of being
simplistic […] But also, some verses are indeed literal, and one reading
would prove that. How metaphorical can “you shall not worship a God
other than Allah” be?18
Second, conservatives are stricter in ascertaining who can exercise ijtihad.

For them, the ulama who are equipped with the tools of religious expertise
should be the people who use their independent reasoning to deal with
contemporary and modern issues which the classical religious clergy may
not have, for instance in the field of biomedical science (stem cell research,
cloning inter alia). Liberals are less restrictive in their criteria for determining
who can conduct ijtihad.
As mentioned earlier, some conservatives shun the term – much like
their liberal colleagues – for a couple of reasons. First, the term may be
problematic, as it can be used to delegitimize them and their brand of
Islam. A ‘conservative Muslim’ may be equated to an ‘Islamist’ or ‘extrem-
ist’ by others, and as mentioned earlier, this is not a matter to be taken
lightly as it may have real-life detrimental consequences. Chapter 4 had
already discussed how conservative expressions of the Muslim faith may
be conflated with extremism. Some conservatives lament that their choices
and ideas about certain matters are similar to their Jewish and Christian
counterparts – for instance, on the traditional family unit – but when
17 The Ash’aris are a theological school within Sunni Islam – which majority of Muslims
in Southeast Asia, and perhaps the world – subscribe to Ash’ari thought, which is basically
a compromise between Mu’tazilite rationalism and Hanbali literalism, as mentioned in the
preceding chapter.
Muslims are referred to as conservatives, the term is accompanied by

derision, if not suspicion.19 Second, many conservatives see their practices
as mainstream or orthodox Islamic practices, which is why for some of
them, there is no need for these ‘labels’.20 Labels are needed for those who
are not part of the orthodoxy, and for those who are, the term ‘Muslim’
suffices. Third, the term ‘conservative’ itself can mean different things to
different people. A respondent notes:
To me, a conservative Muslim is someone who has very traditional views

about Islam – no TV, daughters must wear hijab before puberty, someone
who wears the niqab.21 So someone way stricter than how I practice. I
believe I’m already quite liberal though I have had this discussion with
my friends, and they think my family is quite conservative (between
liberal and conservative).22
For this respondent, even though she believes in many things that conserva-
tives typically do – and using the definition given earlier, she would be
classified as a conservative – she believes that many of her actions are
not ‘conservative’ enough. Just like the liberals, there is variation amongst
conservatives too: some are more conservative than others.23 Thus, due to
all of these factors and potential difficulties, while the term ‘conservative
Muslim’ is less contentious than ‘liberal Muslim’, it still requires some nu-
anced comprehension.
6.2 (Potential) Areas of Clashes with the State
As detailed in the previous chapters, the state has a preference toward more
‘inclusive’ expressions of Islam, which at times, can be at odds with certain
conservative beliefs. The ‘Merry Christmas’ episode has been described in
depth, and will not be repeated here, apart from saying that the incident

20 It was mentioned a few times by conservatives that they did not like ‘labels’. This is probably
because they regard their version of Islam as the default, and do not see a pressing need for
additional descriptors.
21 The niqab is the face veil, which is worn by some female Muslims, although the numbers
are rather miniscule.
22 Correspondence with conservative, 1 October 2019.
23 Even though self-identification is important, it is not the defining factor in determining
the categories employed in this book.
demonstrates how conservativism is not only frowned upon in this case, but
can be conflated with extremism. Other areas of clashes include the hijab
and Imam Nalla incidents, which have also been discussed in Chapter 4,
but require more explanation since the centre of attention in that chapter
was the ulama, and not the conservative activists per se. Potential areas
of disagreement include the state’s stances on certain racial-religious poli-
cies or statements which have been made by government leaders will be
described below.
Hijab Saga
The hijab episode, especially the one in 2013, was initiated primarily
by activists who operated online. After the discussion was triggered
by a question at a public forum, sentiments online spread quickly and
soon enough, there was an organic movement which requested that the
government reconsider its position. Conservative activists began writing
Facebook posts which talked about how allowing the hijab would not
affect social harmony whatsoever, but in fact, may even strengthen it
since children would be exposed to differing faiths at an earlier stage of
their lives; on how Sikh men were allowed to wear the turban and it has
not resulted in any form of racial dissatisfaction, and pointed out the
seeming double standards that Muslim women were not permitted to
do so for some frontline jobs; and how the fears that non-Muslims would
be uncomfortable with the act were unfounded.24 For these people, the
hijab was a religious obligation that had to be fulf illed, and the state’s
unwillingness to budge on its position was troubling. The hijab is of
course a common point of disputation between governments and Muslim
communities elsewhere too, since the hijab was not only a symbol of
commitment to Islam, but for those who opposed it in the West, it was a
symbol of oppression of women, or the intrusion of faith into the public
arena (Edmunds 2012). In Singapore, the state has never made the claim
that the hijab is a repressive symbol, but does invoke the ‘common space’
argument that resembles Western arguments against it. A conservative
activist interviewed said:
Honestly, how would wearing the hijab change anything? We already

have numerous hijabis (hijab-wearing females) in prominent positions.
24 Interviews with multiple hijab activists.

Our President is a hijabi! Many MPs are as well.25 It is not affecting social
cohesion, is it? So why would school-going children wearing the hijab
affect anything? Or nurses? Or policewomen?26
Another concurred, saying:
For us, the issue is quite simple. We are not asking for a lot, or something
which is not possible. We are realistic, and we know what is possible in
this country. We are just asking for the tudung. That’s it.27
A Facebook page was started at the height of activism during the 2013-2014
episode, entitled “Singapore Hijab Movement”. Within a week, the page
had garnered around 26,000 likes, which is a significant number given the
country’s size and political scene (Teo 2019, 150). The page was mysteriously
shut down soon after. Nevertheless, the conversations kept going online
and activists continued to pursue the matter. It is worth iterating that the
activism took place largely online, simply because the political space was
restrictive for this issue. The state jealously guards its authority as the
arbiter on all racial and religious affairs (Tan 2016, Velayutham 2017). The
mainstream media is largely government-aligned, and self-censorship is
widespread amongst journalists, such that discussions on politically sensitive
matters are not abound in newspapers and the TV channels (George 2012).
As discussed earlier, the ulama were not involved too much in the online
conversations, with a few exceptions, but many were privately supportive
of the cause, according to the activists interviewed. In fact, Mufti Fatris
Bakaram wrote a lengthy Facebook note in which he said the Muslim com-
munity essentially shared the same goal of wanting its adherents to be given
the opportunity to don the hijab in these jobs.28 In the same note, however,
25 For the record, in the previous Parliament, there were two hijab-wearing MPs: Dr. Intan
Azura and Ms Rahayu Mahzam. Rahayu is still an MP while Intan is not.
28 See his Facebook Note, “Isu Tudung dan Media Sosial: Membela Maruah dengan Memijak
Maruah? (The Tudung Issue and Social Media: Defending Honour by Trampling on Honour?”,
28 October 2013. https://www.facebook.com/notes/fatris-bakaram/isu-tudung-dan-media-sosial-
membela-maruah-dengan-memijak-maruah/10151948546233480/?fref=mentions&__xts__[0]=68.
ARD-4hUmWtXSBDbOdq-hn6PoDBnH_MesH_vozhhaZcf6YgGll0kvUuMWlFOTkiZ6mAN-
4BTGh9_aqatqcMZNwrZT5L8nuO20PG_iQBdCNViSh-q52I6KlVBCPhRqxwUKHqhsMsVmmD-
sqm8Ki1RsOT3dHRcAV6uTc1ATLwH3s9Pl-o8DYQGqtvWH7_lSfLAHMgf8hHv83boXHokppN8k-
GmN8HT_RcKHmjWgg1OB4e_5hCWnXQLddiBBxUU1-BBhd4pLPKbOt08-OonWFeCVDi2Rlvjb-
dhdzlJKu_cQCTWkrhlwQq6Fdmybe9_o4w544M0qQqg&__tn__=K-R. Accessed 2 October 2019.
he began chastising activists who had displayed rude and unbecoming

attitudes towards his predecessor, Shaykh Isa.29 Although his piece was
basically supporting the hijab cause, the fact that it began with such a
castigation meant that the message was lost on some people; indeed, media
outlets picked up on the first part of the note more than the second. One
such headline in a mainstream media outlet covering Dr. Fatris’ note was
entitled Mufti Criticises Online Vitriol over Tudung Issue.30 The piece of course
did not highlight his actual support for the cause.
The state responded publicly to the online demands, demonstrating its
cautious approach toward anything religion-related, and simultaneously,
its recognition of the groundswell associated with the movement. MP Zaqy
Mohamad took issue with the online petition on the hijab, saying that it
permitted fake e-mail addresses to be used.31 Zaqy was of course conveni-
ently ignoring the numerous people who actually used their real accounts
to champion the issue, and did not really address the demands properly,
choosing instead to cast aspersions on the online petition. The fact that this
was not the first time the matter was raised was further not acknowledged
by him. Then-Minister of Muslim Affairs Yaacob Ibrahim claimed that it was
‘problematic’ to allow the hijab for some jobs, especially in the uniformed
groups.32 Then-Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean said that ‘every com-
munity, when it presses for its own concerns, must bear in mind how that
affects other communities and how others might see it… That is the reality of
living in a multiracial, multi-religious society that we all have to internalise.’33
Citing the example of the Jehovah’s Witnesses who do not believe in National
29 Some of those activists had labelled Shaykh Isa a ‘stooge’ or a ‘sell-out’ for not pushing the
matter with the government during his time as Mufti, and brought up the 2002 incident in
which he had said seeking knowledge was more of an obligation than covering the aurah. This
was after Shaykh Isa gave an interview to Berita Harian which seemed to indicate he was not
fully supportive of the online movement. See “Mufti Raps Netizens over Tudung Issue,” AsiaOne,
30 October 2013. https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/mufti-raps-netizens-over-tudung-issue.
Accessed 2 October 2019.
30 Tham Yuen-C, “Mufti criticises online vitriol over tudung issue,” The Straits Times, 29 Octo-
ber 2013. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/mufti-criticises-online-vitriol-over-tudung-
issue. Accessed 2 October 2019.
31 Ibid.
32 Robin Chan, “Personal attacks on Muslim leaders over hijab issue uncalled for: Dr. Yaa-
cob Ibrahim,” The Straits Times, 31 October 2013. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/
personal-attacks-on-muslim-leaders-over-hijab-issue-uncalled-for-dr-yaacob-ibrahim. Accessed
2 October 2019.
33 Kok Xing Hui, “Hijab Issue: Govt Must ‘Balance Community Requirements’,” Today,
6 November 2013. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/hijab-issue-govt-must-balance-
community-requirements. Accessed 2 October 2019.
Service because they do not want to carry weapons, MP Zainal Sapari argued
that ‘We cannot underestimate […] that other religious groups might make
similar demands if the Government were to give leeway to the requests of a
particular community.’34 The government’s arguments were premised upon
a few notions: the ‘common space’ must be protected; if the government
acquiesced to Muslim demands it would have to do so for others, and the door
would never be shut for religious communities to pressure the government;
and that other communities may view Muslims to be too aggressive in their
demands, causing tensions between the various faith-groups.
Conservative activists were not particularly assuaged by the explanations
of government leaders. The President of the Fellowship of Muslim Students
Association (FMSA), Hairudin Hamid, responded:
However, we feel, respectfully, the comments did not explain the reason
(justifying) the Government’s view that a change of policy (would) affect
overall social harmony, which is being implied. In our statement (on
Monday), we explained that there is much evidence in other advanced
societies to show that allowing Muslim girls to wear the tudung […] does
not affect integration and social cohesiveness. And, in the case of nurses,
who don the hijab in Western countries […] they are able to perform their
(duties) professionally […] The Muslim community deserves a more open
and objective explanation and we appeal again for the Government to
allow for a forum to discuss this matter directly and openly.35
Others continued to ask questions on how allowing the hijab to be worn

would open the door to requests from other communities, as MP Zainal
Sapari asserted, and enquired as to what these demands are. Even after the
Prime Minister personally held a dialogue with 100 selected representa-
tives of the community, the issue did not die down immediately. Online
activists continued to pursue the matter. This is not unexpected. Of the 100
representatives chosen to engage with the PM, none of them were amongst
the vocal online activists. A dialogue which excluded them would not have
abated their dissatisfaction, but in fact may have accentuated it. As noted
by one of these activists:
If they (the government) was sincere in understanding the matter, they

should have gotten people who were going to give a different viewpoint.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
Instead, they selected the Muslim “representatives”. Well, they do not

represent me […] How do I know it was not an echo chamber in there?36
After the Singapore Hijab Movement page disappeared, other similar pages
such as I Want Hijab, Embrace Hijab, World Hijab Day Singapore and others
popped up, demonstrating that the issue remained a sore point of contention
between some Muslims and the government. Aljunied likens the online hijab
activism to movements elsewhere, especially the ‘velvet jihadists’ talked
about by Shirazi, as they believe that ‘agitating for women’s rights is a step
towards widening the scope of cosmopolitanism in a society.’ (Shirazi 2009,
Aljunied 2017, 121) An activist says:
The hijab is a garment that is a part of a Muslim woman and how she
feels wearing it is only for herself. Not people to tell her how she should
feel. A woman should have all the freedom on what she wants to wear,
not to be dictated by men or society […] Have you seen Mendaki award
presentations? So many of those smart girls are wearing hijab and what
is going to happen to them if they are denied of jobs? Isn’t that a waste
to our motherland, Singapore?37
The hijab episode reveals many things about the nature of Muslim activism.
Firstly, as to be expected, liberals or progressive Muslims were not generally
involved in the championing of the hijab cause. For progressives, the hijab is
not the most important aspect of a Muslim’s existence, and in fact, many of
them criticize the conservative obsession with the hijab. Additionally, some
of them do not even consider the donning of the hijab to be compulsory
for female Muslims. Secondly, from the strategies and rhetoric of the activ-
ists, it is manifest that they utilize language which invokes state symbols,
displaying their eagerness to portray themselves as good citizens and the
cause as in line with national interests. Conservative activists changed their
Facebook profile picture to a silhouette of a lady wearing a hijab which bore
the colours of the national flag (Abdullah 2016c, 219). The quote by a hijab
activist given earlier, where he/she talks about benefits to the ‘motherland’
further typifies this point. Thirdly, the state was quick to react to online
sentiments on the issue, underscoring the gravity of religious dissatisfaction,
if kept unchecked, in the government’s eyes. Its interventionist approach
was apparent from the outset. Not only did government leaders such as

37 Correspondence with conservative activist, 15 October 2019.
Zaqy try to delegitimize the online petition, they simultaneously engaged

with community leaders in a bid to mitigate the visible discontent. While
the statement from PM Lee which said that the government’s stance was
‘evolving’ was perhaps amorphous,38 if not evasive, it still represented an
attempt by the government to quell any form of religious disgruntlement,
through dialogue and persuasion. Interestingly, the state’s approach is
to engage with the community through its selected leaders, ignoring the
heterogeneous nature of the Muslims in Singapore. Since Muslims did not
elect these individuals, there is no guarantee that Muslim leaders, as anointed
by the state, are truly representative of the varying aspirations of a diverse
collection of Muslims. Most importantly, what this incident demonstrates
is that in spite of the constricting political opportunities, space still exists
for some dissent, especially when it occurs in such an organic manner.
The 2002 episode described in Chapter 4 was different as a leader, Zulfikar
Shariff, was identified, and subsequently vilified, putting a temporary halt
to the activism on the hijab issue. After such a stern admonition from the
state, the message was abundantly clear that the state was not going to let
activism in this sphere go unchecked. When the matter resurfaced in 2013,
however, the online movement was leaderless, and therefore it was doubly
difficult for any punitive action to be taken toward the activists. However, the
drawback of such activism is that without proper leaders, there is a tendency
for the demands to be disparate and unsustainable, as people’s interest in
the matter fizzles out. That is essentially what happened here. After a while,
activism on the matter died down. The attention span of activists, in this age
of instant gratification, and a 24-hours news cycle where focus shifts from
one story to another in a heartbeat, is not easily maintained. Lupia discusses
the problems of attracting and maintaining the attention of citizens for
political issues, since ‘human attentive capacity is extraordinarily limited’
(Lupia 2016, 66). I argue that the problem is made more acute when activism
does not yield immediate reward, and people become either discouraged
or more ambivalent toward it, as is the case in the hijab issue. It becomes
easy for people who champion a cause to adopt a defeatist attitude when
they do not see their efforts bearing fruit. The phrase ‘what is the point’ was
commonly heard in conversations with conservatives who believe that the
hijab should be allowed for frontline positions, but simply did not see the
state budging on its stance. Furthermore, the ulama were not as vociferous as
38 Amir Hussain, “Govt’s Stance on Tudung Issue Evolving, says PM Lee,” Today, 25 January 2014.
https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/govts-stance-tudung-issue-evolving-says-pm-lee.
they were during the first incident, and without the support of the religious
leadership, it was even more tenuous for the movement. It is important to
recall that the first hijab incident drew active interest and support from
Pergas, and thus the activists had significant religious legitimacy lent to
their cause. A hijab activist comments:
I think right now the tudung issue is dead. The only way for it to happen
is if something significant changes in the political scene, which I doubt
it will […] Many of us (Muslims) are still government supporters.39
To say that the issue is ‘dead’ is perhaps a bit of an exaggeration, since it

is likely that as long as the matter remains unresolved, it would be raised
from time to time, depending on critical occurrences. Opposition MP Faisal
Manap’s raising of the issue in Parliament described earlier, which drew
Minister Masagos’ unyielding refutation, represents one such occasion.
Nonetheless, the activist’s point is valid in that sustained activism on the
hijab is difficult to achieve for reasons mentioned above. The difficulties of
maintaining activism here are associated with the problems of Collective
Action, where each person’s rational behaviour prevents him/her from
participating in collective action which would have benefitted everyone.
In the absence of selective incentives or disincentives, and/or leaders who
could rouse people toward a cause, collective action becomes unlikely (Oliver
1980, Muller and Opp 1986, Tee, Paulsen and Ashkanasy 2013).
Imam Nalla Episode
The Imam Nalla incident was another signif icant point of contention
between conservative activists and the state, though the dynamics were
slightly different as compared to the hijab episode. In the latter, government
leaders sent mixed signals, wavering between understanding that the hijab
was a genuine concern for Muslims, and taking issue with the way the
demand was articulated. For the Imam Nalla episode, however, the state was
unequivocal on the unacceptable nature of the Imam’s prayers. The fate of
Associate Professor Khairudin Aljunied, a prominent conservative Muslim
intellectual, has already been discussed in Chapter 4. Even though he was
let off with a warning by the police, and his position at NUS was reinstated,
the fact that he was investigated by the police and named in Parliament as
a provocateur made many conservatives upset. It was documented earlier

that Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim acknowledged many Muslims felt troubled by the
episode. Khairudin’s satirical post was ‘shared’ and ‘liked’ by many people,
giving credence to Yaacob’s observation. 40 An activist interviewed said:
I feel that Dr. Khairudin was treated unfairly. He was merely pointing
out that many Muslims who heard the Imam’s du’a (supplication) did
not interpret it as a command to hate others. Which is true! I think he
was misunderstood. 41
After investigations began on Khairudin’s Facebook post, conservative

activists online displayed much more circumspection. There was no massive
uproar, nor was there any significant criticism toward the state or discussions
on whether the government’s call was the right one. Unlike the hijab episode,
this incident directly involved the nation’s security and well-being, or so
it was said. The state was not willing to budge on its strong-arm approach
toward any potential threats to social harmony, which in its estimation,
the Imam’s supplication palpably was. Conservative activists realized that
the stakes were different this time round. An activist said:
I was active during the hijab incident. But for Khairudin, I just kept quiet.
I knew that the government had already decided […] Khairudin was
investigated by the police, so it is very different. 42
Another agreed:
He (Khairudin) did not receive the support from the community because
of a confluence of factors. First, the issue can be linked to racial harmony,
violence, and of course terrorism. Second, the Minister chastised him.
As a community, we are averse to going against what a minister said. 43
The nature of the issues, and the manner in which the government reacted
to both, determined the responses from conservative activists. When it was
evident that the state was ready to wield its stick, conservative reactions
were more measured, or even non-existent. Again, political opportunities
40 He subsequently removed his Facebook account, which is why the exact numbers cannot be
ascertained. However, I did closely follow the episode and saw his note gaining traction online.
matter most in determining, and perhaps predicting, activism; and not a

person’s ideological convictions. While the conservative activist may have
been equally passionate about the right to wear the hijab for Muslim women
and the right of Khairudin to articulate his displeasure at the person who
uploaded the video of the Imam’s supplication, the former was a cause that
was far easier to champion, whereas the latter was thornier. The support
Khairudin did not receive in this incident can be contrasted with another
incident, in which Khairudin was again the main protagonist, which will be
discussed later. In the latter, conservative activists rallied behind Khairudin
in large numbers, including the ones quoted above. In a sense, the state had
drawn the boundaries of acceptable activism via the rhetoric it employed.
When Khairudin was singled out in Parliament by name, and his actions
were deemed unacceptable, conservatives knew precisely where the state
stood, and what it was willing to tolerate or otherwise.
Merry Christmas: To Wish or not To Wish?
The jurisprudential opinions of the ulama on greeting others on their religious

occasions have been discussed earlier. To summarize, there are differing
opinions on the permissibility of such an act. In fact, a few decades ago, one
could perhaps safely say that the majority opinion amongst the ulama was that
such greetings were not permissible. However, in today’s environment where
religious pluralism is expected to be the norm and exclusivity is discouraged,
especially in a context like Singapore’s, the ulama have revisited the issue and
updated their guidelines. Nonetheless, there remain some who are adamant
that Islam does not permit the exchanging of greetings. Note that the ulama
who forbid giving such greetings do not claim that Muslims cannot be nice to
their neighbours and friends, or should not respect them; rather, the debate
is about the precise wording of the greetings. Mufti Menk said Muslims
should replace the term ‘Merry Christmas’ with ‘Happy Holidays’. The idea
propounded by these individuals is that wishing Christians ‘Merry Christmas’
would be tantamount to tacitly accepting that Jesus is the son of God, a belief
which Islam fundamentally rejects. A conservative activist concurs:
The Quran says that the heavens and earth is almost rent asunder because
of the enormity of what they claim: that Allah has a son. I feel that is a
strong enough reason not to acknowledge the kufr (disbelief). 44 What is
44 The respondent is referring to the final few verses of the 19th Chapter of the Quran, which
is incidentally entitled the Chapter of Mary (mother of Jesus), where God rebukes the belief
wrong with (saying) Season Greetings? But this issue is probably one where
there is genuine khilaf (disagreement amongst the scholars). I will try my
best not to wish it. But I would not criticise a Muslim who does that. 45
For this person, the problem was not that other Muslims were wishing
Christians ‘Merry Christmas’; even though he personally did not believe in
doing so, he had no problems if other Muslims wanted to. The problem was
that it was considered to be wrong to not exchange greetings with others.
Another activist said something along similar lines:
The main issue the government telling us what is okay and what is not […]
and Muslims not respecting that there are differences in opinions on that
matter […] The Minister gave the impression that it was either their way
or the highway. And to even say that there are multiple views in Islam
with regard to this would be challenging the government because of the
way they have set up the discourse in public. That is why many people
who disagreed with the stance remained silent too. 46
Remarkably, this activist actually says ‘Merry Christmas’ to his/her Christian

friends, and subscribes to the opinion that it is permissible to do so. The
problem he/she had with the government’s approach was that people who
did not agree were branded as exclusivists. This person also identified the
reason why many in the community did not dissent with the narrative.
Their perception was that the government had taken a decidedly clear and
forceful stance, which was non-negotiable. Another respondent interviewed
sarcastically quipped that the government had issued a fatwa on the matter,
closing the door to any contestation. The activist further adds:
Do you really think people had a choice to disagree, once the government
had linked this (not wishing others) to extremist tendencies?47
that He has a son in the harshest terms. The verses in question are from 88-93, which can be
translated as: ‘And they say, the Most Merciful has taken (for Himself) a son. You have done
an atrocious thing. The heavens almost rupture therefrom and the earth split open and the
mountains collapse in devastation. That they attribute to the Most Merciful a son. And it is
not appropriate for the Most Merciful that He should take a son. There is no one in the heavens
and earth but that he comes to the Most Merciful as a servant.’ See Quran, Sahih International.
47 Interview with conservative activist, 1 November 2019.
As these responses and that of the ulama explained in Chapter 4 show, there
were conservatives who were not on board with the government’s stand.
However, many of them chose not to say anything in public, out of fear that
a counter-narrative was not acceptable. These individuals did not have the
backing of organizations such as Pergas, and thus felt they were not in a position
to go against the state. The matter in question was, rightly or wrongly, linked
to extremism, which made it much harder for dissent to be openly expressed.
Conservatives were unsure if they would themselves be labelled as ‘extremists’
if they were to challenge the state’s narrative. This response is similar to the
Imam Nalla incident. In both cases, where ‘security’ and ‘harmony’ were
invoked to an extent which is not always seen, the political opportunities
for contrarian views were exponentially reduced. Conservatives have to then
keep their preferences to themselves, and not act on them in public. In other
words, they could not have been overtly conservative in these instances. The
nature of their ‘conservatism’ had to be moulded by the political realities:
conservative activists could be conservative if, and only if, the state allowed it.
6.3 Strategic Advance and Retreat of Conservatives: Pragmatism

in Practice
Moving on from the previous section, I will now discuss the areas in which
conservatives have shown resolve in championing issues which they hold
dear, and at the same time, deftness in avoiding topics which they otherwise
would have liked to discuss. Some of these decisions have already been
touched on in the preceding section, but will be made more explicit. First,
however, a discussion on the conservative response to the LGBT rights and
Section 377A debate is due.
LGBT issues and the Section 377A Debate
It was said earlier that the topic of homosexuality has quite possibly be-
come the defining debate between liberal and conservative Muslims. Even
non-Muslim societies outside the Western world grapple with the issue of
homosexuality. Asian countries such as India and Taiwan have made strides
in the realm of LGBT acceptance: India decriminalized gay sex in via a
Supreme Court ruling,48 whereas Taiwan’s parliament passed a bill allowing
48 “India Court Legalises Gay Sex in Landmark Ruling,” BBC News, 6 September 2018. https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-45429664. Accessed 4 October 2019.
gay marriage.49 Both decisions did not come about without opposition from
within the countries, however, showing just how contentious the issue can
be. In many other countries, the topic of gay marriage and LGBT rights
still evokes strong sentiments, as various forms of justifications based on
religious and cultural values are invoked to oppose liberal activism. In
Muslim societies, the debate on this matter is probably even more intense,
since there is scholarly consensus by the ulama on the impermissibility
of gay relationships. Modern thinkers and progressive activists of course
challenge this opinion in multiple ways, as already discussed. Conservative
Muslims find the efforts by progressives to redefine traditional Islamic
jurisprudence in this regard as simply intolerable. An activist commented:
You know, our ulama disagree on so many things. It is quite difficult to

get ijma’ (scholarly consensus) on Islamic rulings, except for instances
in which the evidences are crystal-clear. And there is ijma’ on the topic
of same-sex relationships.50
This view was shared by many respondents, in terms of how they saw the
topic of gay relationships as one on which there is little ambiguity. For them,
resistance toward established rulings on the matter represented something
alien: an attempt to discard the Islamic tradition entirely.
The genesis of the Section 377A and LGBT debate in Singapore was
discussed in detail in the previous chapter, and does not need repeating.
What is necessary here is to detail the conservative Muslim response to
the issue, and place it within the understanding of political opportunities.
As previously stated, the initial backlash to the push for LGBT acceptance
came from conservative Christians, such as Professor Thio Li-Ann who
expressed her view in Parliament as a Nominated MP, and from churches and
pastors such as Lawrence Khong. Thio was cacophonous in her description
of homosexuality saying:
Anal-penetrative sex is inherently damaging to the body and a misuse

of organs, like shoving a straw up your nose to drink […] Opposite-sex
sodomy is harmful, but medical studies indicate that same-sex sodomy
carries a higher price tag for society because of higher promiscuity and
frequency levels […] 377A serves public morality; the argument from
49 “Taiwan Gay Marriage: Parliament Legalises Same-Sex Unions,” BBC News, 17 May 2019.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48305708. Accessed 4 October 2019.
community reminds us we share a way of life which gives legal expression

to the moral repugnancy of homosexuality.51
The argument put forth by Thio was based on the premise of both the
immorality of homosexuality, and its consequences for public health. That
is to say, conservatives opposed repealing Section 377A for both moral and
instrumental reasons. Khong’s thoughts on the subject were documented
previously. A point to note here is that conservative Muslim activists were
not really involved in the public discussions in the early days of the public
discourse, and instead, left the pushback to their Christian counterparts.
That situation changed in February 2014 when Associate Professor Khairu-
din Aljunied was embroiled in a controversy regarding a Facebook post he
made entitled “Liberal Islam, Lesbianism, and the Likes of It.” Being a Muslim
professor at the country’s top university, Khairudin had amassed quite a fol-
lowing in the Muslim community, especially among the more conservative/
traditionalist Muslims.52 He had, up to this point, been regularly invited to
give talks at mosques or Muslim organizations. Khairudin had a website,
‘Deen Revival’, which purported to share ‘his reflections on the history and
social life of Muslims to help us Reflect, Rejuvenate and Reform our way of
life.’53 The Facebook post which generated the controversy in 2014 reads:
Question: Dear Prof, could you share about what we should do with this
new development called liberal Islam which is now supporting the lesbian
movement?
Answer: We must adopt a comprehensive and systematic strategy in deal-
ing with such phenomenon which would inevitably affect our children’s
faith and social lives. Here are my recommendations:
1) Scholars and religious teachers (asatizahs) must speak up and write
against these ideologies and practices. They are obligated to explain to
the public the true meaning of what Islam is and sexuality as defined by
the Quran and Sunnah. When the scholars and asatizahs are silent about
these issues, corruption will spread like wild fire.
2) Parents and school teachers must be made aware of these challenges.
They must detect early signs of waywardness from their children and
51 Singapore Parliament No. 11, Session No. 1, Vol. 83, Sitting No. 4, 22 October 2007. https://
sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/topic?reportid=024_20071022_S0004_T0007. Accessed 4 October 2019.
52 Liberals interviewed were not particularly fond of Khairudin’s past statements and actions,
with one even referring to him as an ‘Islamist’.
53 See http://www.deenrevival.com/. The last post on the website is dated 2 May 2017, however,
indicating that it is dormant.
students. Give advice, send them to proper religious classes and seek help
from counsellors, if necessary. Win over the hearts of the misled youths
and explain to them what’s right with knowledge and wisdom. All social
issues must be dealt with at home, if not, in schools.
3) The youths must assist scholars, asatizahs, parents and teachers to
spread the message of true Islam in all media platforms. They have the
power of technology in their hands and could play the crucial role of
alerting groups and movements that are spreading the ideologies of
liberal Islam and lesbianism and all other ideologies. Make the pure
message of Islam viral to cleanse liberal Islam and lesbianism from the
hearts of the faithful.
Together, we will stop these developments in their tracks through educa-
tion and reasoned arguments.54
Khairudin’s post requires some unpacking. First, he explicitly made the link
between liberal Islam and lesbianism, and identified both as threats to the
message of true Islam. The conservative emphasis on purity of message is on
display in this posting. It is obvious that, for conservatives, liberal Islam is
an abomination to ‘true’ Islam. Second, he identified the ulama as bastions
of the faith, placing the responsibility of declaring the faith’s true teachings,
including on gay relationships, on the religious clergy. This is consistent with
conservatives’ adherence to the religious hierarchy. Third, he had no qualms
describing lesbianism as ‘waywardness’ and ‘corruption’, using language akin
to Thio Li-Ann’s. Initially, the post had even alluded to lesbianism as ‘cancers’
and ‘diseases’, but was amended to the one above, as he later acknowledged
the original post reflected ‘poor judgment’.5556 Predictably, Khairudin’s
post sparked a backlash from many liberals, with many condemning him
as being irresponsible, if not outright bigoted. Three NUS students (past
and present, at the time) – one of whom was a Muslim – wrote a letter of
protest against him, saying that what he posted was ‘tantamount to hate
speech’ and displayed ‘hostility toward sexual minorities, and which we
54 Pearl Lee, “NUS Prof’s Comments on Lesbians Spark Protests from Past and Present Students,”
The Straits Times, 1 March 2014. https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/nus-profs-comments-
lesbians-spark-protests-past-and-present-students. Accessed 4 October 2019.
55 Jeanette Tan, “NUS Prof Acknowledges ‘Poor Judgment’ in FB ‘Lesbianism’ Posts,” Yahoo!
News, 1 March 2014. https://sg.news.yahoo.com/nus-professor-controversially-likens-lesbianism-
to--cancer---sparks-protest-letter-from-graduates-014042548.html. Accessed 4 October 2019.
56 It is unclear why Khairudin mentioned lesbianism specifically and not male homosexual-
ity. One could only assume that the question that was posed to him specifically asked about
lesbianism, which is why he singled it out.
believe is unbecoming of a university professor.’57 A back and forth then

ensued online between conservative Muslim activists – who were backed
by their conservative Christian counterparts – and liberals, comprising
both non-Muslim and Muslims. A counter petition was set up in support
of Khairudin, and the hashtag #supportkhairudinaljunied was used. The
petition took issue with the students’ attempts to stifle Khairudin’s right
to express his views on homosexuality, via ‘intimidation’ tactics.58 After a
meeting between Khairudin and NUS’ Provost, Professor Tan Eng Chye, Tan
said that Khairudin had been ‘counselled’, and that he himself agreed that
his post ‘contained provocative, inappropriate and offensive language.’59
The stance taken by NUS did little to calm the situation online, as conserva-
tives felt that Khairudin had been hard done by.60 Even though Khairudin
himself had admitted poor judgment in the choice of language, he did not
apologize for the broader point made in his post, which is that lesbianism
and liberal Islam are antithetical to pure Islamic teachings. It was also
clear that Khairudin had the support of many members of the Muslim
community (Radics 2019). Throughout these developments, state leaders
stayed away from the fray, and did not take any particular side. They did
not explicitly endorse or condemn Khairudin, nor did they abandon their
politically neutral approach toward the issue of gay marriage and same-sex
relationships in general. The Khairudin episode dominated headlines for
many days, online and in the mainstream media, which makes it all the
more intriguing that state elites, who normally comment on every national
issue, did not participate in the controversy.
Amid this backdrop, another incident occurred which heightened Muslim
involvement in the Section 377A debate. The promotional video for the
Pink Dot event, which was to take place in June the same year, included
a Muslim woman wearing the hijab. The event was supposed to coincide
57 Pearl Lee, “NUS Prof’s Comments on Lesbians Spark Protests from Past and Present Students,”
The Straits Times, 1 March 2014. https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/nus-profs-comments-
58 “Letter of Concern Regarding Benjamin Seet, Melissa Tsang and Khairulanwar Zaini,”
https://www.thepetitionsite.com/357/463/602/concern-over-academic-expression-and-religious-
freedom-jeopardized-by-lbgt-activist-singapore/?src=referrer&campaign=https%3A%2F%2F
www.facebook.com%2F. Accessed 4 October 2019.
59 June Yang, “Nus Professor Acknowledges ‘Poor Judgment’ in Posts on Sexuality,” Today,
5 March 2014. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/nus-professor-acknowledges-poor-
judgement-posts-sexuality. Accessed 4 October 2019.
60 While conservatives may not have been comfortable with the language Khairudin used,
they agreed that the normalization of homosexuality, which was what Khairudin was taking
aim at, was not acceptable in Islam.
with the first day of Ramadhan, a month which Muslims consider to be

holy. Having just been through the Khairudin episode, many conservative
activists felt that the video and the timing of Pink Dot were signals that
the gay lobby had its sights on the Muslim community, which meant that
a response was urgently needed. Ustaz Noor Deros launched the ‘Wear
White’ campaign, a movement which was intended to urge LGBT Muslims
to ‘return to fitrah’. Fitrah is the Arabic word for ‘natural’ or ‘original’; for
the Wear White activists, the ‘natural’ state for a human is to be attracted to
persons of the opposite gender. According to Ustaz Noor, ‘The natural state
of human relationships is now under sustained attack by LGBT activists,’ and
the fact that Pink Dot was to be held on the first day of Ramadhan showed
gay activists’ ‘disdain for Islam and the family.’61 The campaign had its own
website, urged Muslims to don white on the first day of Ramadhan, and
released videos discussing the issue of homosexuality in Islam. Wearing
white was supposed to symbolize the ‘purity’ of Islam and the natural state
of humanity. The idea was supported by many Muslims, as many did turn
up in white on purpose in mosques throughout the country.62 The mes-
sage of protecting the traditional family unit, and the idea of heterosexual
marriages as integral to the Islamic concept of the family, resonated with
the supporters of the movement. The fact that Khairudin’s brush with the
progressives came just before the Wear White-Pink Dot controversy helped
in mobilizing conservatives too, as there was a sense either of injustice,
and/or fears of an impending resistance to traditional Muslim lifestyle.
MUIS issued an advisory to mosques ‘not to be seen as being involved in
the crossfire’, in a bid to appear neutral. This was in spite of its stand, which
is also stated in the same circular:
We do not agree (or) approve (of) the pervasiveness of the LGBT lifestyle
and we cannot agree to the efforts in promoting such a lifestyle. Neverthe-
less, we have to plan for something which will not only strengthen the
resilience of our community to the LGBT lifestyle, but also help those
who have been leading this lifestyle abstain from it and, at the same time,
61 Rachel Au-yong and Nur Asyiqin Mohamad Salleh, “Religious Teacher Launches ‘Wear White’
Campaign Online,” The Straits Times, 20 June 2014. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/
religious-teacher-launches-wear-white-online-campaign. Accessed 4 October 2019.
62 Not all who turned up in white were supporting the movement, however. Muslims have
traditionally believed in wearing white as it is part of the Prophetic dressing too. See Maryam
Mokhtar and Nur Asyiqin Mohamad Salleh, “Muslim Turn Up in White – For Many, It’s Tradition,”
The Straits Times, 1 July 2014. https://www.asiaone.com/singapore/muslims-turn-white-many-
its-tradition. Accessed 7 October 2019.
help those who have inclinations towards this lifestyle overcome those
inclinations by providing support to them.63
Soon after Wear White was founded, Lawrence Khong announced that
he was supporting Wear White, and urged Christians to turn up in white
for their church events, the week of the Pink Dot occasion. In subsequent
years, Wear White and Pink Dot continued to battle it out in the court of
public opinion. Khong later said of his decision to stand in solidarity with
conservative Muslims:
I want to pray that we will continue to wear white as long as there is

pink, and we will wear white until the pink is gone, and even if the pink
is gone we will continue to wear white. My prayer, my dream is that the
day will come where in this weekend half or three-quarters of Singapore’s
population will be wearing white as a statement of commitment to the
family.64
Again, throughout the conservative-liberal battle which took place on the

national stage, the state did not clearly take sides, and projected itself as
a neutral arbitrator. The fact that the government did not rebuke any one
side for the stance it took, and that the issue was not framed as a security
concern, emboldened both sides to pursue their causes vigorously. In other
words, the state’s more permissive stance on LGBT rights and Section 377A,
provided more political opportunities for activists to manoeuvre.
Conservative Muslims have displayed a particular aversion to attempts
by others to argue for the acceptance of gay relationships. A few supporters
of the Wear White movement expressed their views:
This is a slippery slope. It (the gay lobby’s demands) will not end with the
repeal of 377A. LGBT has a radical agenda of undermining the traditional
family unit as the building block of society. Also, there are end time
prophecies of men marrying men and women marrying women. Support-
ing this may inadvertently impact one’s aqeedah (creed/belief system).65
63 Laura Elizabeth Philomin, “Muis Urges Mosques Not to Take Confrontational Stand on LGBT
Lifestyles,” Today, 21 June 2014. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/muis-urges-mosques-
not-take-confrontational-stand-lgbt-lifestyles. Accessed 7 October 2019.
64 Kintan Andanari and Ng Yi Shu, “Pastor Lawrence Khong: ‘We Will Wear White Until the
Pink is Gone,” Mothership, 14 June 2015. https://mothership.sg/2015/06/pastor-lawrence-khong-
we-will-wear-white-until-the-pink-is-gone/
Since the law is not enforced, and the LGBT community is not discrimi-
nated, and society is conservative, just retain Section 377A.66
We should not repeal the section since it is the first step toward gay mar-
riage. I do not support legalizing gay marriage because it is not natural.67
The replies above were typical and repeated by many other conservative
activists. In general, the conservative opposition to the repeal of Section 377A
is predicated upon a few arguments: 1) Singapore society is largely con-
servative; 2) it would harm the traditional family unity; and 3) homosexual
relationships are not natural. To be sure, conservative Muslim activists
believe that gay relationships are not allowed in Islam, but in their public
discourse, being fully aware of Singapore’s status as a secular state and the
reality that Muslims are a minority, they invoke other justifications as well.
For these conservatives, the LGBT issue represents the starkest example of
modern-Western ideologies taking root in Muslim societies, to the point of
usurpation. The worry for these people is that if something as blatant and
unambiguous as the impermissibility of gay relationships in the Islamic
tradition is being undermined, it was a matter of time before other matters
were challenged too. In fact, many of these conservatives view the challenge
to traditional Islamic understanding of same-sex relationships as part of a
package: rarely, did a person only challenge the conservative interpretation
of the story of Lot by itself. If there was a call for a reinterpretation of this
Quranic narrative, there would be concomitant demands for re-examining
other aspects of the tradition. In this regard, the conservatives are right:
liberals do not just want a critical re-examination of the Islamic stand on
homosexuality; usually it comes with other requests, as discussed in the
previous chapter.
The conservatives’ passion on this subject, and their dynamic defence of
Professor Khairudin, someone whom they consider to be a leading conserva-
tive Muslim intellectual, can be juxtaposed with their reactions in the Imam
incident. In this instance, after Minister Shanmugam had taken a decisive
stance and had rebuked Khairudin in public, the ulama did not publicly
support the academic, and neither was there conservative activism in his
favour. This was in spite of private grumbling at the heavy-handed approach
of the state. In contrast, when Khairudin was the target of the liberal activ-
ists, the conservatives were galvanized and threw their weight behind him.

The protagonist was the same in these two issues, but the conservative
response was different. Evidently, they had made the calculation that the
LGBT matter was one in which there was wiggle room, where the state
was concerned, while in the Imam Nalla saga, there was little to none. The
government had after all indicated that it had a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to
religious exhortations which were harmful to societal fabric, in reference
to the comments made by the Imam and Khairudin.68
The Section 377A and LGBT debate is not one which is likely to fizzle
out anytime soon. Conservatives and liberals will probably stay in their
corners, and in fact, harden their positions on the matter, in the face of
stiff opposition. Such polarization is more accentuated in the case of liberal
and conservative Muslims, as they have differing theological approaches
toward the acceptance of same-sex relationships. The conservative activist
quoted above mentioned that the progressive position on the matter can
pose a threat to the Muslim’s aqeedah, or creed. This is because for him/
her, liberals are advocating a position which has clearly and unequivocally
been denounced by God. To dispute that would be tantamount to challeng-
ing God himself.69 Progressives have long argued that the conservative
obsession with condemning same-sex relationships has resulted in younger
Muslims turning away from the faith altogether (Minwalla, et al. 2005, 113).
Conservatives maintain that they can ‘love the sinner, hate the sin’, and in
fact, must do both. For them, if they do not make it clear that Islam does not
permit homosexual acts, younger Muslims would be even more confused
and may think that Islam is amenable to such behaviour.
A Facebook group “We are against Pinkdot in Singapore” (WAAPD), which
comprises some Christians and Muslims, is at the forefront of the conservative
side of the debate. Members of the group actively post information or statuses
which are critical of the progressive position. These range from disparaging
the notion of gender fluidity and neutrality, to underscoring the importance
of traditional, heterosexual relationships.70 The group still exists, unlike the
Singapore Hijab Movement, in spite of its critiques toward certain elements
of state policy. Again, the continued existence of the WAAPD Facebook group
highlights the non-critical nature of the LGBT issue, from the perspective
of the state. The Christian opposition to the repeal of Section 377A and the
68 Kelly Ng, “ ‘Zero Tolerance’ for Religious Preaching that Fans Violence: Shanmugam,” Today,
3 March 2017. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/shanmugam-chides-nus-academic-
comments-over-imam-incident. Accessed 7 October 2019.
70 See https://www.facebook.com/groups/waapd/. As of 7 October 2019, the group had over
7000 members.
‘normalization’ of LGBT lifestyles not only predates conservative Muslim

activism, but is also more ubiquitous. Both the National Council of Churches
of Singapore (NCCS), a body of churches which states that its primary task
is evangelism, and the Catholic Church, for example, took issue with the
Disney movie Beauty and the Beast, in which there was a ‘gay moment’.71 The
NCCS said that Christian leaders saw the scene as ‘an attempt to influence
young children and socialize them at an early age into thinking that the
homosexual lifestyle is normal.’72 Such culture wars are likely to continue,
and one can expect both conservative Christians and Muslims to be leading
the charge against the normalization of homosexuality.
No doubt, the conservative enthusiasm on this topic, while motivated
from ideological and religious predispositions, is tactical and strategic too.
Conservative Muslim activists are evidently thoroughly aware of the pitfalls
involved in their activism, as evinced from the interview responses. Here,
conservative passions are a result of pragmatism: because the state allows
for contestations of the Section 377A issue, and is even willing to tolerate
criticism of itself, conservative activists display boldness in entering the
public sphere. WAAPD, for instance, is a publicly accessible group, which
means that the posts usually can be seen even by non-members of the
group. Wear White represented a coordinated and concerted effort by
conservative Muslim activists to resist progressive attempts to redefine the
traditional Islamic notions of morality, and it was willing to take part in the
national debate. Such dedication is not displayed by these activists when
it comes to issues such as the Imam Nalla and Merry Christmas incidents,
demonstrating the importance of political opportunities as a conceptual
tool via which we can understand Muslim activism.
Defining the Muslim Identity: Side-lining Conservative Expressions
Throughout this book, the state’s official approach toward religion has been
explained. The state makes no apologies for its ‘social engineering’, as its
worldview which perceives racial and religious differences as perpetual
fault-lines requires shrewd management of faith and ethnicity. The state also
has no qualms in prescribing the Muslim identity which good Singaporean
Muslims are supposed to adhere to. The ‘good Muslim, bad Muslim’ narrative
71 Kelly Ng, “ ‘Gay moment’ in Beauty and the Beast totally unnecessary: National Council of
Churches,” Today, 14 March 2017. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/gay-moment-beauty-
and-beast-totally-unnecessary-national-council-churches. Accessed 7 October 2019.
72 Ibid.
was introduced in the preceding chapter. States with both Muslim-majority

and Muslim-minority populations have sought to define the features of a
‘good Muslim’ and a ‘bad Muslim’. This is in servitude of multiple political
purposes, be it the pursuit of votes, to bolster a developmental agenda, or
simply to put potential opposition in check (Mamdani 2008, Al-Rasheed
2015). In Singapore, the defining of the Muslim identity is done in a par-
ticular way because the government is obsessed with maintaining racial
and religious stability. The state would always err on the side of caution, to
the point of introducing laws which ostensibly could deter citizens from
engaging in productive debates on religious differences. The previous chapter
dealt with the changes made to the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act
(MRHA), which criminalizes the act of wounding the religious feelings of
others. This piece of legislation could be problematic for some conservatives,
since they believe in the exclusive truth of Islam (in totality). If a Muslim
says that Jesus is not the son of God or divine, and a Christian feels offended,
would that be an offence? Such a concern was actually raised in Parliament
by PAP backbencher and former Minister, Dr. Yaacob Ibrahim, who said:
Insults are clear. But what about genuine differences of opinion or views? I
adopt a certain religion because I believe it to be the truth and everything
else to be untrue. And if I utter my views about what I understand and
believe to be untrue of other religions publicly, will I be guilty of an
offence? And what if the “wounded person” can claim publicly on social
media that his religion has been insulted and others from his religion
feel equally wounded, would that make it an offence?73
Minister Shanmugam’s response was not particularly elucidating, as he

pointed out that:
People are free to express their views. This has to be done responsibly.
Statements that denigrate another religion will of course cross the line.74
It is unclear how the propagation of theological exclusivity would be

interpreted under this act, or whether it can be considered as ‘denigrating
73 Zhaki Abdullah, et al., “Concerns Raised about Separation of Religion and Politics, Foreign
Influence under MRHA,” Channel News Asia, 7 October 2019. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/
news/singapore/concerns-raised-separation-of-religion-and-politics-mrha-11978926. Accessed
9 October 2019.
74 Ibid.
another religion’. The fact that Dr. Yaacob, a former Minister and member
of the establishment, raised this point demonstrates the concern that some
Muslims have on the vague wording of the bill.
Nonetheless, one could quite easily discern the state’s preferences when
it comes to theological exclusivity and certain conservative expressions.
The ‘Merry Christmas’ and Imam Nalla incidents highlight that the PAP
government will not tolerate any whiff of religious disharmony, even if
conservative Muslims may have a different perspective on the issue. In
the former, conservative Muslims were not saying that Islam forbids its
adherents from being nice to non-Muslims – in which case there would be
serious problems for the entire societal fabric of the country – but rather,
were just expressing discomfort with the specifics of the greeting itself.
Interestingly, some conservatives interviewed stated that they had no
problems at all wishing their Chinese friends ‘Happy New Year’ on the
occasion of the Lunar New Year, but would not say ‘Happy Deepavali’ or
‘Merry Christmas’ to their Hindu or Christian friends. This is because the
former is a cultural occasion whereas the latter two are religious festivals.
Nevertheless, everyone interviewed agreed that it is perfectly acceptable
to say ‘Happy Holidays’ or something to that effect, for others’ religious
festivals. For the state, the prohibition of exchanging specific greetings
was something it had to put a stop to, since it could bring Muslims down
the slippery slope of exclusivism and extremism. Bans of speakers such as
Mufti Menk (who has a significant following in Singapore, as evinced from
the huge crowds at events which he spoke at in the country prior to his ban,
and from the constant re-sharing of his Facebook posts by Singaporean
Muslims), were necessary to send a message that the state would not tolerate
certain forms of Muslim expression. The Imam Nalla incident was similar
in this regard. Even if Muslims were to say that the supplication made was
not understood by them as a call for action against Jews and Christians, for
the government, the fact that it could be misconstrued by some Muslims
and non-Muslims was enough for it to be a major problem that had to be
promptly dealt with.
Minister Shanmugam outlined the government’s concerns in a speech
he made at the International Conference on the Role of Muslim NGOs in
Promoting Culture of Peace organized by Jamiyah Singapore. An excerpt
reads:
So one of the practical things that conferences like these with moderate
Islamic religious organisations can give guidance on, is the practices. To
what extent should we become more and more exclusive?
To what extent should we become more and more integrated, without

compromising our religious principles? For example, how do we eat
together? How do we sit?
If communities are distanced, they don’t eat together, they don’t mix,
they can’t shake hands, they can’t exchange greetings, and there are some
Islamic scholars who say that you cannot say “Merry Christmas” or “Happy
Deepavali”, to what extent do we have those policies within Singapore?75
The state is worried not only about extremist forms of Muslim understanding,
but ‘exclusive’ ones as well. He views the acts of not eating together with non-
Muslims, not mixing with others, and not shaking hands – presumably with
the opposite gender – as potential problems toward achieving an inclusive
community. Elsewhere, Minister Masagos had highlighted similar examples
(Razak 2019). The concern for these state officials is not the ‘authenticity’
of Islamic teachings, but rather, whether certain understandings of the
faith lead to exclusivism. PM Lee’s National Day Rally speech praising the
‘progressive’ Singaporean Muslim identity had already been referred to in
Chapter 4. For the government, the ‘good Muslim’ is one who is ‘inclusive’,
which denotes particular characteristics which have already been discussed,
and prioritizes national interests above all else. A good Muslim is a good
Singaporean, and thus someone who is not a good Singaporean cannot be
a good Muslim. Projects like the Singapore Muslim Identity illustrate the
efforts to portray the ‘Singaporean’ and ‘Muslim’ identities as congruent
and not at odds with each other.
Of late, another thread to the Muslim identity debate has been the
‘Arabization’ narrative which has been propounded by individuals such
as Bilahari Kausikan. As mentioned earlier, he identifies ‘Arabization’ as a
threat to the local Muslim identity. To be sure, the ‘Arabization’ narrative
as articulated by Kausikan is rather flawed on several levels. Firstly, he
talks about the ‘Arabization of Islam’ as a problem, seemingly neglecting
that Islam did come from and to the Arabs first, the Prophet of Islam was
an Arab, the language of the Quran is Arabic, and societies which embrace
Islam have always adopted some facets of Arabic culture (such as using
the term ‘Allah’ to refer to God, eating dates to break their fast, inter alia).
Secondly, the examples he gave were rather superficial and did not seem
to indicate Arabization as a threat to the country, as he avers. Kausikan
75 K. Shanmugam, “Fostering Closer Inter-Religious Ties Has to Be an Effort By All: Shanmugam,”

Today, 7 March 2017. https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/fostering-closer-inter-religious-
ties-has-be-effort-all-shanmugam. Accessed 9 October 2019.
points out that some of the evidence for Arabization includes more Muslim
women donning the head-scarf, Malays referring to the headscarf as ‘hijab’
instead of ‘tudung’, and Malays saying ‘Eid Mubarak’ instead of ‘Selamat
Hari Raya’ on their festive occasions. Muslim women donning the head-scarf
can actually be better understood as a rise in Islamic consciousness, while
Malays using ‘hijab’ and ‘Eid Mubarak’ are, in reality, reflective of globaliza-
tion and Anglicization of language rather than Arabization: hijab and Eid
Mubarak are words/phrases that are used throughout the English-speaking
world, and may in fact reflect Malay-Muslims’ desire to be more inclusive,
since not all Muslims speak Malay. Kausikan’s diagnosis was that Malays
were becoming more Arabized because of a ‘lack of cultural confidence’
may be even more puzzling, since there has been no data given to support
the claim, and that in the past, elements of the cultural deficit hypothesis
was actually propagated by state elites (Rahim 1998). But what is perhaps
most noteworthy is that the ‘Arabization of Islam’ is described as a threat
to social cohesion: an explicit link is made between how Muslims practise
their faith, and the social and religious fabric of the nation.76 To be fair to
Kausikan, he was not the first voice to discuss Arabization as a problem.
Minister Masagos had earlier identified a similar trend too. He argues that
the ‘cultural erosion’ of Malays was a problem that had to be addressed, as
the worry is that if the trend persists, Malays may become more exclusivist
and in the worst case scenario, more extremist.77 While the causal link
between a Malay using the word ‘hijab’ instead of ‘tudung’ and becoming an
exclusivist is tenuous, to say the least, the point here is that the government
officials have identified certain forms of Muslim expression as problematic,
not only because they are exclusivist – in the case of the Merry Christmas
example – but because they can potentially lead someone to exclusivism
and extremism.
To somehow link using Arab words and wearing the thobe to extremism
and terrorism is bizarre. Where does it end? Should we dispense of Arabic
terms like arnab (rabbit) and kursi (chair)? What about Arabic numerals?
And coffee even? Doesn’t make sense. Also, it is okay to be anglicised
and wear coat and tie, use English […] Absolutely no logic. Knee jerk
76 Adrian Lim, “3 Forces Could Challenge Social Cohesion in Singapore: Bilahari,” The Straits
Times, 25 July 2019, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/3-forces-could-challenge-social-
77 Norsharil Saat, “Arabisation and the Threat to Singapore Culture,” Today, 14 August 2018.
https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/arabisation-and-threat-singapore-culture. Accessed
10 October 2019.
reaction […] Decoupling all things Arabic may lead to a dilution of Quranic
understanding too.78
The state concern over ‘Arabization’ but not ‘Westernization’ was raised
by many conservatives. If the issue at hand was the preservation of Malay
culture, one could easily make a more potent argument on how West-
ernization has been more detrimental to Malay culture, yet, it is never
described in such terms. The fact of the matter is since Westernization,
which one could argue is no less hegemonic than ‘Arabization’, is not
accompanied with religious connotations, which is why it is not deemed
as too problematic by a government who is at times singularly focused
on snuffing out threats to racial-religious harmony. Furthermore, as the
respondent above points out, the Malay ‘culture’ has been infused with
Arabic and/or Islamic elements ever since Malays embraced Islam many
centuries ago. Many words in the Arabic language are adopted and adapted
into Malay, many Malay cultural practices have Arabic and/or Islamic
elements to it, and all Muslims are required to learn some Arabic (for the
recitation of certain prayers).
The ‘Arabization’ narrative is in fact not new, even if the terminology
may be. In 2011, then Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew created quite a stir
amongst Muslims when he commented on the Muslim community. He said:
I have to speak candidly to be of value but I do not want to offend the

Muslim community. I think we were progressing nicely until the surge of
Islam came and if you asked me for my observations, the other communi-
ties have easier integration – friends, intermarriages and so on, Indians
with Chinese, Chinese with Indians – than Muslims. That’s the result of
the surge from the Arab states […] I would say today, we can integrate all
religions and races except Islam […] I think the Muslims socially do not
cause any trouble, but they are distinct and separate. The generation that
worked with me – Othman Wok, Rahim Ishak – that was before the wave
came sweeping back; that generation integrated well. We drank beer, we
went canvassing, we went electioneering, we ate together. Now they say,
“Are the plates clean?” I said, “You know, same washing washing.” Halal,
non-halal and so on, I mean, they are all divisive. They are distinguishing
me from you: “I’m a believer, you are not.” […] (To integrate, Muslims need
to) Be less strict on Islamic observances and say, “Okay, I’ll eat with you.”
(Kwang, et al. 2011, 228-229)

Although Lee did not use the term ‘Arabization’, it is apparent that his views
correspond with Kausikan’s, or the other way round, in that the rise in
Islamic consciousness is due to the ‘surge from the Arab states’. Similarly, Lee
views these forms of Islamic expression as problematic to social cohesion.
For Lee, however, the issues he identified were actually more ‘Islamic’ than
‘Arab’: not drinking alcohol is a clear Quranic injunction on which there
is no debate amongst the ulama in Islam, as is eating halal food (though
Islamic scholars do differ on what constitutes halal).
After a pushback from the Muslim community, with many taking issue
with the comments Lee made, the government distanced itself from Lee’s
comments, marking one of the rare moments where PAP cabinet members
publicly disagreed with each other. PM Lee Hsien Loong said that Kuan
Yew’s views were his own, and not the government’s. He added that the
community ‘has made great efforts to integrate with the other communities
and with Singapore society to join the mainstream’, though at the same time,
he cautioned that religious norms ‘evolve so that differences in food, dress,
customs, and so on keep us apart or reduce our common space.’79 What is
clear from all the comments of these state elites is that Muslim expressions
of piety can be a problem if they are not in line with the norms of Singapore
society, which are of course, determined by the state.
Stringency in adhering to Islamic principles is thus seen as problem-
atic by some state elites. More significantly, conservative expressions of
faith are described as inimical to societal integration. The connection is
made – sometimes implicitly, often explicitly – between these forms of
understanding Islam, and extremism.
Conservatives are thus often caught in this bind. On one hand, if they
challenge the state’s narrative of conflating conservatism and extremism,
they run the risk of state reprisal, as had happened with Khairudin in the
Imam episode. On the other, if they do not, they have to accept that the
narrative would slowly but significantly shift against them, so that what
they consider as ‘normal’ Islamic practices would be described as ‘Arabized’,
or worse, ‘exclusive’. The responses by conservatives are thus predictably
mixed, dependent on the political opportunities. Where conservative activists
sense that the state is unwilling to tolerate dissent, there is no significant or
sustained pushback. In the Imam and ‘Merry Christmas’ incidents, the state
did take punitive action toward individuals (Mufti Menk, Imam Nalla and
79 Kenny Chee, “MM’s Views on Muslims Not Govt’s,” My Paper, 31 January 2011. https://www.
asiaone.com/print/News/AsiaOne%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1Story20110131-261196.html.
Khairudin), signalling its intent and resolve, and thus conservatives largely
remained silent after the message was sent. For the ‘Arabization’ narrative,
there has been some dissent, though not to the level of the backlash against
the gay lobby. Some conservatives have written Facebook posts criticizing the
idea that Malays are becoming more ‘Arabized’. A forum letter was published
in The Straits Times, where one Osman Sidek argued against Bilahari’s points,
stating that striving to understand ‘Islam from original sources’ should
not be deemed as Arabization.80 There is more room for dissent for several
reasons. Firstly, as influential as Bilahari is, he is not a senior member of the
cabinet or anything of that sort, and thus, perhaps more conservatives are
able to disagree with him. Secondly, and more importantly, no one has been
reprimanded openly by the state for challenging the narrative, which gives
some licence for conservative activists to manoeuvre. Nevertheless, because
the issue has been framed in security terms, they still have to navigate
carefully around it, which explains the reticence on the part of some activists.
For many conservatives, the identification of certain traits as ‘progressive’
and celebrated represents a worrying development. They express concern on
whether some basic tenets of Islam, as they view it, are going to be acceptable
in the future. Here are a few responses to illustrate this anxiety:
The way we are going, one day, we cannot even say Islam is the true
religion! I don’t understand why they want to say all religions are the
same. If they (religions) are all the same, why don’t they (people from
other faiths) become Muslim?81
The fact of the matter is that there are differences between the religions,
which is why there are different religions. I am a Muslim because I believe
Islam is true and other religions are not. That does not mean I disrespect
others. I just disagree with them.82
I believe Islam is a peaceful religion. Islam teaches me to be kind to my

neighbours […] So if today, they tell me I must wish ‘Merry Christmas’
to others, I cannot recite certain du’as (supplications), I have to attend
religious events organized by others (non-Muslims), tomorrow, what will
80 Osman Sidek, “Understanding Islam From Original Sources Not Arabisation,” The Straits
Times, 31 July 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/forum/letters-on-the-web/understanding-
islam-from-original-sources-not-arabisation. Accessed 10 October 2019.
81 Interview with conservative, 18 October 2019.
they say? I have to believe in gay marriage? I cannot believe in one God?
Where will this end?83
I think the hijab issue has been politicized, and my worry is that it is used
to control and determine the identity of a religion.84
Nonetheless, in spite of their reservations, conservatives do not actively adopt

the state’s narrative on these matters, once the government has decisively
clarified its stance. A conservative activist attributes this to the following:
Singaporeans have a very low tolerance for troublemakers. Even lower

tolerance when the issue can be somewhat linked to the dreaded words:
extremism and terrorism.85
The activist in question candidly explains the tentative approach conserva-

tives like him/her undertake. When it comes to matters pertaining to the
Islamic faith which have been securitized, much more caution is needed
in proceeding with activism. The point here is that the activist believes
that not only would the state be unhappy with certain forms of activism,
other Singaporeans would be too. One need only to look to the reaction
from Singaporeans towards the protests in Hong Kong. While many in
Southeast Asia were lauding the demonstrators’ resolve in standing up to
a powerful entity, many in Singapore were either mocking the protestors or
even calling for the Chinese government to take castigatory action against
them.86 The idea put forth by these Singaporeans is that the demonstrators
were disrupting the public peace and consequently, the economic potential
of Hong Kong, with some even suggesting that they had no jobs and were
funded by the Americans to engage in the protests. No doubt, there were
some Singaporeans who were supportive of the civil disobedience in Hong
Kong, but these were in the minority.87 Generally, there was more criti-

86 Bhavan Jaipragas and Phila Siu, “Scoffing in Singapore, Praise in Philippines: How Asia sees
Hong Kong’s Extradition Bill Protests,” South China Morning Post, 22 June 2019. https://www.
scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3015618/scoffing-singapore-praise-philippines-how-asia-
sees-hong-kongs. Accessed 11 October 2019.
87 It is my assessment that Singaporeans’ attitudes toward the Hong Kong protests corresponded
with their support toward the establishment. The more one was supportive of the PAP, the less
likely one would view the Hong Kong protests favourably.
cism of the protestors than there was support. Cherian George writes that
‘Singaporeans have peculiarly low tolerance for troublemakers’. Citing the
family feud between PM Lee Hsien Loong and his siblings over the will of
their late father, Lee Kuan Yew (a dispute which was played out in public
to the point that a special Parliamentary session was called by the PM to
address allegations of impropriety made by his siblings),88 George notes
that many Singaporeans were criticizing the PM’s siblings for questioning
him in public, and hurting the reputation of the country, with one online
commenter even likening the siblings to Islamic State terrorists (George
2017). If that is the case for ‘troublemakers’ in general, the situation is even
more problematic for Muslims. The potential for being deemed ‘Islamists’ or
‘extremists’ is real. One instance is the exchange between MP Faisal Manap
and Minister Shanmugam in parliament on the role of religion in politics
in October 2019. Faisal had said that since Islam is a complete way of life,
nothing can ever be truly separate from religion, from the perspective of
Muslims. Minister Shanmugam repeatedly cornered Faisal and asked him
to answer whether he thought religion and politics should be separate, to
which Faisal eventually said yes. Online commenters began to proscribe
Faisal for insinuating that religion and politics should not be separate.
Examples of comments read:
Abrahamic religion are constantly at war regardless internal or external.

Any gov under such influence has and will continue to contribute hostility
towards non believer. We cannot allow such mentality to sprout here All
religion must be regulated under the law to prevent misuse or abuse.89
Things that people are really concern about especially costs of living
should be brought up rather than talking about religion whereby all the
different faith is being practised freely in peace n harmony […] didn’t he
understand that in the first place that Singapore is a secular country […]
really stupid n unnecessary things to be debated […]
88 The incident created a national buzz after Lee Hsien Yang and Lee Wei Ling, the PM’s younger
brother and sister, alleged that the PM used his position as leader of the country inappropriately,
after he asked a ministerial committee to look into the options for the late Lee Kuan Yew’s
property at Oxley Road. The siblings are still on antagonistic terms. See “Running Dispute
over Oxley House,” The Straits Times, 8 January 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/
running-dispute-over-oxley-house. Accessed 15 October 2019.
89 Mathhias Ang, “Shanmugam Repeatedly Questions WP’s Faisal Manap over Separation
of Religion from Politics,” Mothership, 10 October 2019. https://mothership.sg/2019/10/news-
parliament-shanmugam-faisal-manap-religion-politics-separation/. Accessed 11 October 2019.
In western Europe, religion and politics are not allowed to be mixed.

Religion is meant to act as a guide. If religious happen to control political,
religious influencing rules will restrict everything harshly. Look at good
example: Aceh of Indonesia and Malaysia.90
Such comments were by no means isolated.91 The notion that Singapore

was a secular state and any form of interference of faith in politics had to
not only be guarded against, but swiftly dealt with, was ubiquitous. The
‘peaceful’ socio-political situation in Singapore was often juxtaposed with
the more chaotic and fractious political scenes in neighbouring Malaysia
and Indonesia, which commenters attributed to the mingling of politics
and religion in the two countries. As I have said previously, Singaporeans
have generally internalized PAP’s ideologies, with secularism being one
of them. Even though technically, Singapore’s brand of secularism does
involve the meshing of politics and religion in some areas – the existence of
MUIS, the appointment of the Mufti, AMLA, ARS and others are examples
of this phenomenon – Singaporeans still have an aversion toward the idea
that religion should involve itself in politics. This background is one which
conservative activists are fully aware of. Conservative activists realize that
in a country where around 85% of the population is not Muslim, where the
government adopts an interventionist approach toward religion and is wary
of any challenges emanating from faith adherents, and where the ruling
party has the support of the overwhelming majority of the people, Muslim
causes are not always easy to pursue, and if done so wrongly, public opinion
could turn against them quite easily. The absence of allies in wider society
affects political opportunities adversely, as described in the theory chapter.
A recent incident which further contributes toward shaping the prudent
nature of conservative activism is the arrest of Zulfikar Shariff under the
ISA. Zulf ikar was of course the leader of the hijab protest in 2002, and
went into self-imposed exile in Australia following the incident as he was
worried that he was going to be arrested (Mutalib, 2012b, 38). He returned
to Singapore occasionally subsequently, and was involved in the 2013 hijab
movement, and the Wear White initiative as well, even though he was
90 See the comments on Mothership’s Facebook page covering the article above. Similar
comments were found on articles from other news sites covering the incident.
91 For more online comments, see Rubaashini Shunmuganathan, “Netizens React Strongly over
the Heated Debate on Politics and Religion by Law Minister and WP’s Faisal Manap,” The Online
Citizen, 10 October 2019. https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2019/10/10/netizens-react-strongly-
over-the-heated-debate-on-politics-and-religion-by-law-minister-and-wps-faisal-manap/.
not the one leading those efforts. Online, he had a large following, and
his Facebook posts regularly attracted a few hundred ‘likes’ and ‘shares’.
Zulfikar continued to agitate on Muslim issues, and was seen as a prominent
conservative activist. His arrest in 2016 shook other conservatives. Although
he was arrested on security grounds and not because of his activism per
se – he had written Facebook posts in 2014 which seemed to indicate his
approval of ISIS –,92 the arrest nonetheless made conservative activists
more careful. An activist said that ‘post-Zul, the situation has regressed,’
in reference to non-Muslims’ perceptions of Muslim activism.93 The fact
that Zulfikar was the most prominent conservative activist meant that his
arrest did conservatives no favours. Zulfikar was also not only associated
with the conservative cause, but many conservative activists themselves.
Now, the feeling they have is that they must be extra vigilant when they
are pursuing a particular cause.
The contrasting conservative activism seen in the LGBT debate on one
hand, and the Muslim identity, on the other, reflects their pragmatism.
For the LGBT rights and Section 377A debate, activists were more vocal,
more willing to justify their opposition to repeal Section 377A on religious
grounds, and were more active in organizing against the liberal camp. When
it came to the state’s demarcation of acceptable Muslim practices, however,
conservatives were more circumspect. The difference can be attributed to
two reasons. One, the LGBT debate was not one in which the state had a
clear stance on, and since the issue does not affect the PAP’s core governing
ideologies, it allows for disagreement. Conservative Muslims, like other
conservatives, took advantage of the state’s non-intervention, as did liberals.
For the Muslim identity discourse, however, the state made manifest its
preferences, and hence had outlined the boundaries of acceptable activism.
Two, the LGBT debate was not accompanied by potential security complica-
tions. The fact that the divide is based on a longstanding difference, even
outside the Muslim community, between two camps, and that conservative
Christians too lobbied against Pink Dot and the repeal, meant that Muslim
activism could not be misconstrued as assertiveness of Muslim religious
expressions. However, the issues surrounding Muslim identity can, and were,
linked to security, and hence, political opportunities were much narrower
92 Lim Yan Liang, “Singaporean Zulf ikar Mohamad Shariff, 44, Detained under ISA for
Promoting Violence and ISIS, Radicalising Others,” The Straits Times, 29 July 2016. https://
www.straitstimes.com/singapore/44-year-old-singaporean-detained-under-isa-for-promoting-
violence-and-isis-radicalising. Accessed 11 October 2019.
for conservative activists. Disagreements were not always legitimate in

this sphere, from the perspective of the state and possibly, even from some
non-Muslims. In the Imam Nalla episode, for instance, many non-Muslims
expressed incredulity online at the supplication after it was made public. A
non-Muslim who hears a prayer being recited calling for victory over Jews
and Christians would be entitled to some uncertainty, since he would not
know the context and how Muslims would understand the meaning of
the prayer. Muslims, on the other hand, may view the prayer differently,
and in fact, many do. Thus, even though conservatives may have been
sympathetic toward Khairudin, or even the Imam, once the government
said their behaviour was unacceptable, and additionally, non-Muslims were
exhibiting unease at the entire situation, they had to make some pragmatic
decisions. Their hearts may have been with Khairudin and the Imam, but
their efforts most certainly were not, as they choose to play by the rules
set by the state. Conservatives were therefore not truly conservative, but
pragmatically conservative.
6.4 Ceding the Public Space to Liberals
The previous chapter has already outlined the gains liberals have made in
the public domain. Just a couple of decades ago, there would have scarcely
been a problem if Muslims chose not to exchange specific greetings on
the occasion of other religious festivals. Now, however, the situation has
completely changed. Again, the claim here is not causal: it is not that liberal
activism has caused the state to favour progressive interpretations of Islam,
though of course, it does help. Rather, what I am asserting is that the state’s
preference toward more inclusive practices confers advantages on the liberal
cause, and provides a ripe space for progressive activism to flourish.
This is not due to conservatives being less pragmatic than liberal Muslim
activists, or the latter being more strategic than the former. Rather, as these
two chapters have shown, both sets of actors demonstrate ample pragmatism
in their forays into the public sphere. They are under no illusions as to which
causes would be likely to get them into trouble, and which ones are more
plausible for them to champion. Rather, in spite of pragmatism from both
sides, the political opportunities are more favourable for progressive activists.
This is especially after the discovery of terrorist cells in Singapore, the advent
of ISIS, and the phenomenon of self-radicalized individuals in Singapore,
which has resulted in numerous arrests including that of Zulfikar Shariff.
These events have constricted political opportunities for conservative
activists in multiple ways. The ulama have become more scrupulous in their
relationship with the state, generally preferring a cooperative dynamic,
rather than a confrontational one which was evinced in the past, especially
in the stances taken by Pergas during the madrasah and hijab controversies.
Without the public support of the ulama, conservative activists have to be
even more judicious. The rise of home-grown extremism has further affected
the way conservative activists operate, since the wider Singaporean society
is now even more hesitant of any incursions of religion into the public space.
The state’s conflation of conservatism and extremism has also contributed to
this apprehension. Zulfikar’s arrest was further detrimental to conservative
activism, not only because he was associated with many of the activists,
but because he was involved in the causes as well.
On the matter of Muslim identity, there is little doubt that the state has
a preference for progressive interpretations of the Muslim faith. Liberal
interpretations of the faith intersect with the state’s worldviews on religious
harmony and potential threats to societal stability. The earlier chapter had
talked about liberal enthusiasm in conducting inter and intra-faith activities.
The preservation of religious harmony is crucial for the state, as it is an
existential matter. Intra-faith dialogues, an arena where progressive Muslims
are more likely to dabble in compared to their conservative counterparts,
become more important in an age where sectarian conflicts are taking place
around the world. Government leaders have warned about the importation
of the Sunni-Shia conflict into the country.94 Even if conservatives may
display apprehension about not being able to publicly express their concerns
about Shi’ism, increasingly, the political opportunities for them to do so
are limited. The updates to the MRHA essentially further cement this
fact.95 Conservatives are then left championing particular causes, which are
not as important to the state in the grander scheme of things, such as the
liberal zeal to repeal Section 377A, while they have all but given up in some
areas, such as the ‘Merry Christmas’ issue. In spite of some murmurs from
conservatives on the subject of exchanging greetings, the dominant narrative
still persisted that wishing ‘Merry Christmas’ was not only encouraged,
but it was almost a marker of an integrated Muslim. Even on Section 377A,
where conservatives find some room to manoeuvre, it is quite apparent
94 See speech by Professor Yaacob Ibrahim on the MRHA bill in Parliament, https://www.
channelnewsasia.com/news/parliament/videos/october/yaacob-ibrahim-on-maintenance-of-
religious-harmony-amendment-11976270. Accessed 14 October 2019.
95 As said, most Sunni conservatives consider Shi’ism to be part of Islam, even though they
disagree with many tenets of Shi’ism and find them to be false or problematic. Most Sunnis (and
Shias), however, consider Ahmadis to be outside the fold of Islam.
that the state is gradually adopting a more progressive approach, in spite

of its attempts to remain as neutral as possible. A few examples over recent
years would illustrate this. Apart from the explicit guarantee given by the
PAP that Section 377A would not be enforced, PAP leaders such as Minister
Shanmugam have had dialogues with LGBT activists.96 The fact that there
is state engagement with these activists implies a certain recognition of
their cause, and that the government has in some way legitimized LGBT
activism. This is a marked change from approaches in previous years. In
addition, even though the Supreme Court ruled in 2014 that Section 377A
was not unconstitutional, in 2018,97 a ruling was made which allowed a
Singaporean father to adopt his surrogate son, whom he had fathered in
America.98 The court’s judgment was described as a ‘landmark move’,99
and was celebrated by the LGBT community. For the amendments to the
aforementioned MRHA legislation, an Explanatory Statement was added
to specify that targeting persons ‘who share a similar sexual orientation’
would be an offence.100 Naturally, the move was lauded by LGBT activists.
These show that the state has indeed shifted ever so slightly on the particular
matter of LGBT rights, even if these movements are not nearly enough from
the perspective of LGBT activists.
For conservatives, however, these signify an erosion of traditional values,
perhaps in a way which no other change does. One can expect conservative
activism – both Muslim and non-Muslim – on Section 377A, to be even
more intensified over the next few years. As long as the law is not repealed,
conservatives will try their hardest to ensure it remains that way. For them,
since the state allows for differing opinions on this matter, and the fact that
they believe these gradual changes are an affront to their religious and/
or moral compass, they can and have to preserve the current way of life.
96 Tessa Wong, “Shanmugam Meets Gay Activists,” The Straits Times, 7 January 2013. https://
www.asiaone.com/print/News/Latest%2BNews/Singapore/Story/A1Story20130105-393573.html.
97 Multiple challenges to the constitutionality of Section 377A are put forward in court.
See Shaff iq Alkhatib, “Gay Rights Champion Makes Legal Challenge Against Section 377A,”
The Straits Times, 23 January 2019. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/
gay-rights-champion-makes-legal-challenge-against-section-377a. Accessed 14 October 2019.
98 K. C. Vijayan, “Landmark High Court Case Allows Singaporean Gay Dad to Adopt Surrogate
Son,” The Straits Times, 17 December 2018. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/courts-crime/
landmark-high-court-case-allows-gay-dad-to-adopt-surrogate-son. Accessed 14 October 2019.
99 Ibid.
100 Matthias Ang, “Shanmugam: LGBTQ Community Will Be Protected from Religious
Violence, By Law,” Mothership, 12 October 2019. https://mothership.sg/2019/10/shanmugam-
lgbtq-community-mrha-protection-from-violence/. Accessed 14 October 2019.
The alterations that progressives are suggesting when it comes to gender

and sexuality matters are simply not acceptable to conservatives. Yet, they
are able to act on their conservative inclinations because the political op-
portunities are there for them do so. One can expect the liberal-conservative
dispute of Section 377A to be louder and not dissipate.
It is unlikely that the state’s preference for progressive interpretations
of Islam would abate anytime soon, which further widens the political
opportunities for liberals, and narrows them for conservative activists. To
be clear, the state’s method of making sure that a certain form of Muslim
identity dominates is not wholly reliant on draconian legislation and
strong-arm tactics, though it has no problems utilizing those means too.
The state relies on co-optation, both of Muslim elites and the ulama, and on
persuasion as well. The PAP is adept at making arguments which appeals
to the average citizen’s sense of reason, by invoking points which are in
line with its ideological predispositions. It must be reminded that many of
these ideologies have been accepted by most Singaporeans as the natural
state of affairs, and how life (and politics) should be structured. Minister
Shanmugam’s exchange with Faisal Manap, and Singaporeans’ responses
to it, demonstrate this. Singaporeans’ aversion to public dissent further
means that conservatives’ have less room to operate. Since conservative
Muslims are more likely to differ with the state on certain interpretations
of Islam than progressives, they have more to quibble with. Yet, without
the support of other Singaporeans, the minority Muslim population cannot
effectively pursue any cause. The majority of Singaporeans have a penchant
for ‘self-preservation in authoritarian environment’ (George 2017, 106).
Cherian George argues that Singaporeans, even those who claim to not
support the government, are always quick to turn on those who are dis-
sidents, either by casting doubts on the character of the person in question
or by dismissing him/her as too idealistic. Therefore, ‘anyone who stands
up to the government must expect not only punishment by the state but
also social condemnation and isolation’ (George 2017, 107). He attributes
this to a ‘psychological defence mechanism’, where there are Singaporeans
who ‘know deep down that there’s something wrong in our politics, but
who won’t do anything about it’ (George 2017, 107). This is an important
observation to note, especially in the context of discussions on Muslim
activism. The moment conservative activists step out of line, they can
expect to face ostracism not just by the state and its supporters, which is
to be expected, but even by people who say that they are not establishment
allies. The messenger is always never good enough, and the message is often
secondary. Activists are acutely aware of this. They know that in many of
the causes they champion, they cannot rely on support from those outside
their circle. Even from within their circle, the fear of admonition from the
state may make activists self-censor, as evinced from the Imam episode
and activists’ reluctance to publicly defend Khairudin. The end result is
the pragmatic retreat of conservatives in these spheres, ceding the public
space to the liberals.
6.5 Conclusion
Just as with the other two categories, the nature of conservative Muslim
activism must be understood within the larger political system of the coun-
try. Conservatives, like liberals and the ulama, tend to play by the rules of
the game. The political opportunities for the conservatives are even more
constricted than the others for a couple of reasons: one, the state favours
progressive interpretations of the faith in some areas – inter and intra-faith
engagement, exchanging greetings, ‘inclusive’ identities, inter alia – and
consequently, conservative expressions are either side-lined or discouraged
completely; and two, they do not have the gravitas of the ulama. Although
the term conservative is not as contentious as ‘liberal’, there are still some
complications in using it. Some Muslims dislike ‘labels’, even if they may
use them in other contexts. Some conservatives see conservative Islam
as the norm, and other forms such as liberal Islam as a deviation, which
is why they do not like the term. Nevertheless, this chapter has chosen
to utilize the term ‘conservatives’ as a valid category, with the associated
characteristics. The liberal-conservative divide, as made clear elsewhere in
this monograph, is a real cleavage, and liberals and conservatives do compete
for the same crowd. In Singapore, they additionally are in competition for
the state’s attention.
When conservative activists go outside the bounds of acceptable behav-
iour, as in Khairudin’s case, and face state censure, the message is sent to
others that the particular issue against which such reprisal occurs is not
one in which the state is willing to tolerate dissent. Conservative activists,
more often than not, duly fall in line subsequently. The interviews with these
individuals, as is the case with the ulama and liberals as well, demonstrate
clearly that activists are not unaware of the potential pitfalls associated with
their choices. Their acts are rarely random and irrational, but rather, are
usually calculated and thought through. Just like the liberals, conservatives
cannot be said to be ‘pure’ conservatives, since they are guided not only
by their ideological predispositions, but by their pragmatic considerations
as well. That is, they are conservative insofar as the state allows them to
be. The fact that conservative activism is loudest in the gay rights debate
highlights this very salient point.
The next chapter will conclude this book, with some thoughts on the
implications of the nature of Muslim activism in Singapore – as has been
described – on the concept of civil society, the broader lessons one can learn
from this book beyond the case of Singapore, and some suggestions for areas
of future research, considering the limitations of this study.
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7 Conclusion
Abstract
The concluding chapter revisits the argument, and states its relevance
beyond the city-state of Singapore. I further discuss the implications
of my argument for our understanding of civil society in competitive
authoritarian regimes. Recommendations for future research are also
put forth.
Keywords: civil society, future research, competitive authoritarian

regimes, management of religion, Islam
This book has attempted to outline the various forms of Muslim activism,
and Muslim identities, in Singapore, and has detailed their concomitant
relationships with the state. In a state where dissent is discouraged, and at
times, clamped down upon, religion is meticulously managed, and where
the ruling party has a large electoral majority in relatively free but rather
unfair elections (which basically translates as the government having the
mandate of the majority of Singaporeans in enacting its policies and in
support of its ideologies), political opportunities are limited for activists
to make strides. Yet, limited opportunities do not mean no opportunities
at all. Much in the vein of James Scott’s and Joel Migdal’s works, this book
has tried to show that no matter how preponderant a state’s power is, other
actors still have some cards to play, the government is never wholly insulated
from public pressure, and ultimately, non-state actors can make gains in
the political realm (Scott 1985, Migdal 2001).
As with all works, this study faces some limitations as well. The first has
to do with the general climate of self-censorship amongst Singaporeans,
especially when it comes to issues which they perceive as even more sensitive
than usual. It is common to get respondents saying that ‘I do not want this
to be on the record’, even after anonymity has been guaranteed. Criticisms
of the state, particularly those which are stinging and pertains to the state’s
core ideologies, are in the first place rare, and in the second, preferred by
doi: 10.5117/9789463724012_ch07
interviewees not to be recorded. As frustrating as that is to a researcher,

the wishes of the participants must be respected, and hence, any such
request – of which there were many – was accommodated. Any academic
who works on Singapore politics would have encountered such a problem,
with the refrain ‘This is Singapore’ being used by respondents to explain
their reticence in having their critical thoughts expressed. Whether the
justification is grounded in reality, is a different matter. No doubt, there
exist real problems facing those who are critical of the state, as has been
documented in the incidents involving critics such as Alfian Sa’at, PJ Thum,
and others. Nonetheless, it is also true that often, Singaporeans miscalculate
the boundaries of permissible dissent, and believe them to be much nar-
rower than they actually are, resulting in self-censorship (George 2012).
Another obvious challenge is more academic in nature, and involves the
contentious nature of definitions. Not only are there intellectual concerns
about the parameters of the categories ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ Muslims
– which can be said of most definitions in the social sciences – but there
are existential and political considerations too. The terms are not only used
differently by various people, but are used as tools of de-legitimization.
Nonetheless, the decision to apply them was made as, in my estimation,
they still convey the characteristics of religious trends in a specific way,
which other terminologies do not.
This chapter will summarize the findings from the book, discuss the
implications of my findings beyond the shores of Singapore, place this discus-
sion within civil society in general, and suggest areas for future research.
7.1 Revisiting the Argument
The utility of the concept of political opportunities has been argued for
throughout the book. As I have posited, political opportunities provide an
instructive lens via which Muslim activism can be understood. Four aspects
of political opportunities have been identified: the state’s approach toward
religion, especially Islam; the availability of allies within and outside the
state; specific electoral contexts, or the level of political capital which the
ruling party possesses at any particular time; and the capabilities of the
actor in question. Generally, political opportunities are limited for non-state
actors in Singapore, considering the state’s obsession with maintaining
order and stability, and its worry that religious strife can be a potent source
of division. The matter is compounded further considering that the ruling
party has largely remained unified, and there has never been a major split
Conclusion 265
since Singapore’s independence (Abdullah 2016a). However, for Muslim

activists specifically, their causes can gain more traction if they get non-
Muslim allies on their side, as previous chapters have shown. Furthermore,
electoral conditions since 2015 have made the political space narrower,
constricting the opportunities for activists. Yet, for liberal Muslim activ-
ists, they are able to take advantage of the state’s aversion toward certain
conservative interpretations of Islam, and position themselves better within
the political system. Thus, political opportunities vary from ‘actor to actor
and situation to situation’ (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2009, 264). Even
if political opportunities are limited, they are never non-existent, in any
society, no matter how powerful the state is. No regime is ever omnipotent.
Furthermore, even within the limited space actors have to operate within,
some actors have more space than others. Liberal Muslim activists most
definitely have greater room to manoeuvre than conservatives in the areas
that have been outlined.
What then does this book tell us about Muslim activism? Firstly, and
obviously, Muslim activists are not a monolith. Muslim activists have various
causes which they are passionate about, and many times, activists disagree
on not only strategy, but principles as well. Secondly, following from the first
point, amongst the multiple cleavages which exist within Muslim societies,
the liberal-conservative divide is one of the most under-explored. Sectarian
cleavages such as the Sufi/traditionalist-Salafi or Kaum Tua-Kaum Muda
divide, and the Sunni-Shia strife have been discussed a lot in the literature
and popular discourse, and as salient as these are, more contemporary
cleavages need to be understood too. Liberal and conservative activism is
explored in this book, within the context of Singapore, but with reference
to the wider Muslim world too. Both liberal and conservative activists have
reference points from other parts of the globe, and their stories cannot
be understood without comprehending the bigger debates on authority,
ontology and methodology in contemporary Islam. The liberal-conservative
cleavage intersects with the others too, but warrant separate elucidation.
Third, the book has teased out the relationship between religion and politics.
No doubt, a person’s religious understandings are not solely affected by
politics, since theology, upbringing, family and social environment, all play
a role in shaping them, but so does politics. Politics often can and does have
an impact on theology, as states do try to define the contours of what are
acceptable religious practices. Thus, the notion of ‘Islam’ itself is affected
by political developments. It is not just that states attempt to shape what
faith is; religious actors themselves, in anticipation or estimation of what
governments deem to be within the boundaries of acceptable normative
behaviour. The reluctance of both conservative and liberal activists to

champion certain causes is reflective of this. More significantly, the ulama’s
prescriptions of certain recommended practices – such as the exchanging
of greetings – are inextricably linked to socio-political circumstances.
The question then arises as to whether there are ‘pure’ liberals or conserva-
tive activists in the city-state. Of course, one would be hard-pressed to find
pure liberals or conservatives anywhere (Naverson 2000). Human beings
are often complex creatures, and do not fit neatly into fixed categories
(Horowitz 1978). One may be liberal on some issues but conservative on
others. Moreover, within each category, there is variation too: Bernie Sanders
and Hillary Clinton are both liberal, but one is decidedly more so than
the other. One could then argue that to subject Singaporean liberal and
conservative Muslim activists to a ‘purity’ test would be unfair. However,
the point here is not that to challenge that liberal and conservative Muslims
in Singapore have nuanced views on many issues, which they obviously
do. Rather, the point here is to claim that liberals and conservatives do not
pursue their causes even when they desire to or believe in them, precisely
because they have accepted the state’s terms of engagement. In this sense,
the activists are liberal or conservative to the extent that the state allows
them to be. Of course, there are exceptions, but those cases are helpful
in ascertaining the general rule, which is that activists play by the rules
of the game. The activists who do not almost always face repercussions
of some nature, and those instances help define the OB markers which
other activists should not cross. Most activists, of whichever ideological
inclination, understand where the borders of acceptable activism end, and
operate within this framework.
The ulama and their activism were also studied. One may question the
choice of ulama as objects of study since they are not usually regarded as
activists per se; however, as mentioned earlier, the ulama are not only an
important bloc within any Muslim community, but they also engage in
activism of their own. In Singapore, they have been involved in causes
such as the hijab and madrasah, and thus deserve to be studied. Moreover,
even though many of the ulama are conservative, they require a separate
discussion from conservative activists since they possess a level of gravitas
which the latter do not, by virtue of their status as the ‘custodians’ of the
Islamic faith (Zaman 2002). Even within the ulama fraternity, some have
more standing than others, and hence for these people, the political op-
portunities were wider. Ulama in Pergas had more leeway to disagree, even
forcefully, with the state at times. However, after the discovery of terrorist
networks in Singapore, political opportunities became narrower for activism
Conclusion 267
from the ulama, and their priorities changed too as altering the perceptions
others had toward Islam became the priority. The ulama in Pergas became
partners of the state in the battle against Muslim extremism, through formal
arrangements such as the Religious Rehabilitation Group. Cooperation and
accommodation soon replaced confrontation, in what can be described as
a conscious process of co-optation.
It is often thought, especially by foreign observers and some Singapo-
reans too, that the Singapore state maintains its rule largely by wielding
a big stick and resorting to draconian measures. My argument is that
this perception is not entirely accurate. No doubt, while the state has no
qualms in resorting to these harsh measures when needed, as evinced
from multiple cases which have been described, that is not the first go-to
tactic for the state, nor is it even the most prominent. The PAP employs
co-optation, both formal and informal, at an astute level, and does this
more so than resorting to heavy-handed action. The co-optation of the
ulama illustrates this point perfectly (Abdullah 2016d). The PAP is not
the only regime to have f igured the importance of co-opting the reli-
gious clergy, as numerous other governments, past or present, Muslim
or otherwise, have done so as well (Islam 1981, Barraclough 1985, Pierret
2013, Al-Rasheed 2015, Lord 2017). Apart from bringing critics, or potential
opposition, into the state mechanism, the PAP has essentially managed to
shape Singaporeans’ preferences, and even tolerance for dissent, through
many years of education, persuasion, and controlling the discourse. This
means that it possesses signif icant ideational hegemony. Through this
dominance, it no longer needs to consistently use its ‘stick’, and yet still
have Singaporeans falling in line, and even when they disagree with the
party, they do so on the PAP’s terms (Abdullah 2017a). Rarely does activism
which utilizes the rallying call of individual freedoms and liberty garner
much traction. Instead, many activists frame their causes using language
which is palatable to both the state and other Singaporeans. Gay activists
have attained the most success, in part because their cause is not too
controversial from the state’s point of view, but also because they have
done precisely this, and appropriated state discourses on inclusivity and
stability (Chua 2014). Basically, even activists have been conditioned to
pursue activism in particular ways.
The adroit method of identifying the ‘bad activist’ and juxtaposing it
with the ‘good activist’ is also used as a discipline. The Alfian Yale-NUS
incident highlights this succinctly. Minister Ong Ye Kung outlined why the
course proposed by Alfian was eventually not approved by Yale-NUS. In
doing so, he talked about the type of activism that was not only acceptable,
but encouraged among faculty members at local tertiary institutions. He

said:
To realise the impact of research and your work, faculty are encouraged
to be active. So, translate your findings into patents, enterprises or, if it
is in the social sciences, discuss with the Ministries your ideas and see if
you can contribute to policy making […]
In some societies, individuals are more concerned about how far can
I extend my f ist; but in Singapore, Singaporeans worry when my f ist
will reach your nose. I have tried to explain Singapore’s approach. In an
increasingly globalised world, we must not try to impose one country’s
values and culture on others, or unthinkingly import values and culture
from elsewhere into our society. We must certainly work across boundaries
and learn from one another, but we must do so while understanding and
respecting each other’s contexts and norms.1
Indeed, Ong was accurate in depicting the state’s over-arching approach

to activism. It is not activism that the PAP is opposed to per se; rather,
activisms which are deemed to be foreign-influenced or not in line with
Singapore’s values are disallowed. The ruling party is the ultimate adjudica-
tor on what is good activism or otherwise. At the same time, one cannot
deny that since the regime constantly gets the lion’s share of votes in
elections, it can credibly claim to represent the will of the people, and
therefore whatever it deems to be unacceptable is merely a reflection of
societal sensibilities. It is further true that many Singaporeans do express
concerns at activism which can be seen as affecting the stability of the
country; many online commenters did agree with Ong, validating Cherian
George’s observation that Singaporeans ‘do not like troublemakers’ (George
2017).
Just as the ‘good activist’ and ‘bad activist’ are defined, so too are the
‘good Muslim’ and ‘bad Muslim’. Good Muslims are those who exchange
greetings, attend the funerals of other faith adherents, dine at the same
table with those who do not eat halal food, partake in inter and intra-faith
activities, and proclaim their love for the country. The preferred Muslim
identity is shaped both through discourse and legislation, both through
engaging with Muslim leaders and communities and drawing the boundaries
of acceptable jurisprudential opinions.
1 Singapore Parliamentary Official Report (2019), Parliament No. 13, Session No. 2, 7 October.
https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/sprs3topic?reportid=oral-answer-2069. Accessed 31 October 2019.
Conclusion 269
7.2 Relevance of Study beyond Singapore
The arguments made in this book speak to wider debates in the literature,
especially on the nature of non-democratic regimes and reasons for their
persistence. To be sure, this book does not involve itself directly in the debate
on what has been termed the field of ‘transitology’, a body of works in politi-
cal science which deals with when, or if, regimes transition to democracies
(Geddes 1999, Carothers 2002, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, Greene 2007,
Miller 2015). However, much of what has been discussed pertains to this
work. In discussing the conscious strategies of activists to adhere to the
regulations and norms set by the state, implications for the survival of the
regime naturally follow. The next section will talk about how the state has
actually been strengthened because of this. Activism within state-sanctioned
boundaries is both an effect and cause of the competitive authoritarian state.
Such activism is evidently the result of wariness toward state reprisal, and
at the same time, it contributes further to the perpetuation of such a system
since if there were no resistance to it, there would be no impetus for change.
Scholars of comparative politics have identified many factors which
contribute to the perpetuation of an authoritarian regime. Two broad
categories of reasons have been argued for authoritarian durability: the
first talks about the strengths of the regime, and the second deals with
weaknesses of the opposition. These are, of course, two sides of the same
coin, since weakness of the opposition is directly tied to the strengths
of the ruling elites. Strengths of the regime include its ability to provide
material welfare, or its performance-legitimacy, elite unity, its ideological
stranglehold over the populace, and control over institutions (Mutalib 2003,
Slater 2003, Gandhi and Przeworski 2007, George 2012, Osman and Waikar
2019). Weaknesses of the opposition involve its inability to project a unified
front against the regime, and their failure to mobilize the people through
sophisticated mechanisms (Epstein 1989, Wegner 2011, Gandhi and Ong 2019,
Ufen 2019). When authoritarian regimes fail to deliver on material-economic
welfare, are not unified, and do not maintain strong institutional control,
they are more likely to be toppled. Similarly, when the opposition is capable
of rousing sentiments amongst the populace to the point that they feel
inspired to protest against the regime, in whatever way, and when they
are united, they are able to mount a serious challenge to those in power.
This book is, at least tangentially, related to the discussion in comparative
politics about authoritarian longevity. Undeniably, the nature of activism
in Singapore is the consequence of the PAP’s strengths: from its dominance
over institutions, to elite unity, and even its ideological hegemony. Yet, the
activists’ stances further entrench those forms of dominance, as already

mentioned earlier.
Broader lessons which can be learnt here involve how the effects and
causes of authoritarianism are often causally linked in both directions.
Comparisons between the types of activism between different authoritarian
regimes, and different types of authoritarian regimes, can be made to
further widen our understanding of authoritarianism. For instance, civil
society within competitive authoritarian regimes – which is the subject of
this book – could manifest itself in completely different ways to military,
personalist or monarchical regimes. Even within competitive authoritarian
regimes, activism may vary in states in which the ruling party has ideological
hegemony, as is the case in Singapore, compared to others where they do
not. In fact, this study could even tell us more about the very nature of
ideological hegemony: what it is, how it is constructed, how it is manifested,
how it is sustained, and how it could be eroded. The fact that Singaporeans,
and even activists who are expected to be more politically conscious, have
internalized the boundaries of acceptable activism, shows how successful
the PAP has been in its ideological project. The unforgiving reactions of
ordinary citizens toward activists who are deemed to have transgressed
these frontiers further bolster this point. In this way, the ruling party has
performed a remarkable task in shaping citizens’ preferences and beliefs.
A few questions could arise from this observation. Is the PAP’s ideological
hegemony a result of its performance-legitimacy, or is the converse true?
Are the PAP’s ideologies – survival, meritocracy, multiracialism, secularism
and pragmatism – more internally consistent and externally validated than
other regimes’ ideologies, which is why they have withstood the test of time,
to the point that even the most successful opposition party in the country
propagates largely the same notions (Cunha 2012, Abdullah 2017a)?2 Although
this book does not claim to provide the answers to these questions, it lays
some groundwork toward answering them.
Apart from comparative politics scholars, those with an interest in Islamic
studies would be able to benefit from this study as well. Comparative studies
can be made with other countries, both Muslim-majority and Muslim
minority nations, to see how the definitions of ‘Islam’ shift, or are affected,
2 Compare this to the Barisan Nasional’s Malay-led multiracialism ideology in Malaysia, which
was not entirely sustainable in a multi-ethnic population, especially for the third-generation
Chinese and Indians who do not see themselves as immigrants. Even though BN only lost power
in 2018, its ideological hegemony had been challenged by the then-opposition and had been on
the wane since 2008. See (Abdullah 2017a).
Conclusion 271
by political opportunities and conditions. In fact, within these countries,

much can be said about the understandings of Islam propounded by dif-
fering groups of ulama and activists, to ascertain the intersection between
politics and theology. This is not unique to Islam, which is why scholars
of religion may generally find this study to be of some use. Definitions of
religion and what it propagates, or what is the ‘true’ version of the faith,
are always contested, from within and without. The point here is to detail
how exactly politics could affect the very comprehension of what a faith
tradition stands for.
7.3 Implications for Civil Society
The conclusions derived from this book may paint a bleak picture of civil
society. It has been mentioned earlier that as long as most activists do not
provide a sustained and credible challenge to the boundaries of acceptable
activism, and instead work within the set system, they end up strengthening,
not weakening the state. However, I do not make a normative judgment on
what civil society should be or do. I have merely attempted to explain the
nature and implications of activism in Singapore. A reader who believes in
the present system may think that it is a good thing that activism is of this
sort, whereas someone who is more critical of the establishment may think
otherwise. Either way, that debate is not the concern of this book, although
I do accept that such judgments naturally follow from the arguments I have
made. That is a conclusion, based on a prior ideological position, which the
reader is entitled to arrive at.
A conundrum for the activist would be apparent: if one challenges the
state too much, one would suffer serious consequences; but if one does not,
one makes gains but ultimately reinforces the system. Most activists choose
the latter, either by overtly cooperating with the state, or just operating in
uncontroversial spheres. As a result, the PAP’s hegemony is as secure as
before, as there is no significant counter-narrative coming from the activist
scene. A comparison to Malaysia can be made, since the two countries
have been argued to ‘have long had authoritarian regimes that looked like
no others in the world – except for each other’ (Slater 2012, 19). Malaysian
activists had, for over two decades, engaged in street demonstrations and
protests, subjecting themselves to arrests and other punitive actions by the
government (Lim 2017). Similar draconian laws exist in Malaysia to those
in in Singapore (Slater 2012). They have also been able to hurl all types of
criticisms at the government, many of which would not be acceptable in
the Singapore context. In the medium-term, in spite of the difficulties that

those activists went through, activism of that nature became commonplace
and perhaps normalized, and awareness of state excesses proliferated. Over
two decades of activism culminated in the fall of BN to the Pakatan Harapan
(Alliance of Hope) coalition in 2018.
However, there are some differences between the two countries. Firstly,
activism really took a turn in Malaysia after the expulsion and subsequent
arrest of Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister, from the ruling
party and government. Anwar was a charismatic figure who commanded
significant support from Malaysians, especially the majority Malay com-
munity. Essentially, a major elite split allowed the widening of political
opportunities, and emboldened activists and other opposition parties,
who immediately threw their weight behind Anwar (Nadzri 2018). Such
an opening has never existed in post-independence Singapore, due to the
extraordinary unity the PAP has managed to ensure. Secondly, even though
both BN and PAP had been ruling with super-majorities in Parliament since
independence (BN only lost its two-thirds majority for the first time in 2008),
the PAP has far more credibility amongst its citizens. BN had always been
riddled with accusations of corruption and financial mismanagement, in
spite of the rapid economic growth and modernization which the country
had experienced, and thus there were underlying concerns about the ruling
coalition’s standing (Dettman and Gomez 2019). The PAP does not face such
problems. Even if there have been concerns about the party’s authoritarian
bent, the government has largely remained corrupt-free, while maintaining
high living standards. The strength of the PAP in projecting legitimacy thus
constricts political opportunities for activists in a way that the situation
in Malaysia does not. Finally, in Malaysia, there was a higher possibility of
a dissident type of activism bearing fruit, simply because the opposition
was stronger than in Singapore. Thus, even if activists were threatened
with imprisonment and other forms of punishment, they could sense light
at the end of the tunnel, no matter how long the tunnel was. Singapore is
radically different, as not many seriously anticipate that the PAP would lose
power anytime soon. Activists are fully cognizant that they operate within
a PAP-dominated system, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable
future. As such, they are typically more reticent than their counterparts
in neighbouring Malaysia.
However, it is also true that Malaysian activists’ willingness to go beyond
what the state views as acceptable activism, or their willingness to be ‘bad
activists’, caused a dent in BN’s hegemony. Likewise, Singaporean activists’
reluctance to do so protects PAP hegemony. Again, the nature of activism is
Conclusion 273
both an effect and cause of the perpetuation of hegemony, or lack thereof,

in both countries.
How then could we assess the state of civil society in Singapore? As
argued throughout this book, Muslim activism is simply a mirror image of
civil society activism in general in the city-state. Even groups which have
been traditionally regarded as more confrontational, such as Aware and the
Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP), have successfully been formally
or informally co-opted by the state, and are more cooperative than quar-
relsome today, as is the case with Pergas. Civil society has been regulated,
through legislation, punishment, and opportunities for cooperation.
7.4 Future Areas for Research
Much work still needs to be done in understanding the relationship between

civil society organizations and the state in Singapore. For instance, the
historical evolution of groups such as Aware and AMP are worth exploring,
to document the difficulties of operating within a system such as Singapore’s.
More ethnographic work could be done to ascertain the decision-making
calculations of the activists involved in organizations such as these. The
state’s usage of particular incentives or disincentives at particular points
of time is also worthy of note.
Perhaps more important is further identifying the various groups within
the ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ Muslim crowds. The categories can further
be refined and understood through even more nuance. It has been more
than alluded to in the relevant chapters that the categories of liberal and
conservative are not homogenous themselves; there exists much variety
within each. Future studies can investigate these precise differences and
offer new typologies. This is not an endeavour which should be unique to
Singapore; in fact, such a study would be more useful in the wider Muslim
world. I have emphasized several times that the liberal-conservative cleavage
in Muslim communities is one which cannot be ignored, and will only
become more relevant in the coming years. This study, while touching on
the theological and jurisprudential differences between the two groups,
has focused more on the political. Future works could further discuss the
religious aspect of this divide, detailing the sources, methodologies, and
justifications for different theological and jurisprudential attitudes between
the two groups.
More fascinating insights can also be derived from interviewing state
elites on their perceptions of civil society, especially specific activists and
organizations. Although the state’s official and public stances would not
differ too much from what its leaders would say in interviews, it would still
be advantageous to get their insights. More significantly, interviews can be
done with PAP MPs who are not office-holders, as they may proffer views
which are contrary to the party line in private, though of course, there is
no guarantee this would be the case.
It is hoped this book has made a worthy contribution to the literature
on state-religion and state-Islam relations, social movements, Muslim
identities, and Singapore politics. While it is often thought that Singapore
politics is mundane, this study has attempted to show that there are plenty of
interesting phenomena that warrant investigation, and politics in Singapore
is far more vibrant than many believe. Politics may manifest itself in more
ways than just in the electoral arena, and those must be studied. This book
is a contribution toward demonstrating the vitality of Singapore politics.
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Index
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi 40 Fatimah Lateef 22
ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia) 56 Fatimah Mernissi 165, 195-196
Administration of Muslim Law Act Fatris Bakaram 21, 113, 119, 135, 144, 224
(AMLA) 21-22, 252 fatwa 20, 109, 117, 136, 166, 171, 175, 186, 197,
Ahmad ibn Hanbal 40, 170 205, 232
Ahmadi 28, 183, 186-187, 205 feel-good Islam 93, 124-125, 128-129, 151
Alami Musa 22, 116, 121, 183 feminist 52, 165, 195, 198
Al-Bukhari 40 First-past-the-post (FPTP) 86-87
Alfian Sa’at 94-95, 127-128, 181, 200-203, 267
Al-Ghazali 74, 116 George Yeo 59
Ali Gomaa 40, 104 Goh Chok Tong 14, 60, 135
Aljunied, Khairudin 149-150, 227-237 Group Representation Constituency
Amina Wadud 165 (GRC) 13-14, 24, 86, 121
AMP (Association of Muslim Profession-
als) 22, 273 Habib Hasan Alatas 58, 118, 122, 129-131, 144
Amrin Amin 91, 126, 205 hadith 11, 39-42, 73-75, 104, 110, 169-170,
An-Nawawi 40 173-174, 189, 196-197, 215, 221
Anwar Ibrahim 37, 56, 175, 272 halal 20-21, 23, 176, 220, 247-248, 268
Arab Spring 89 Halimah Yacob 119, 205
Arabization 113, 115, 213-214, 245-249 Hamza Yusuf 40, 43, 92
Asatizah Recognition Board (ARB) 22, 76-77, Hanafi 74, 113
107, 113, 133 Hanbali 40, 74, 111
Asatizah Recognition Scheme (ARS) 22-23, Harussani Zakaria 40
105-107, 152-153 Hasan Al-Banna 44
Asatizah Youth Network 119 hegemonic 85, 128, 133, 143, 247
Asha’ri 170 Hijab/Tudung 8, 20, 24, 85, 89, 109, 121-122,
134-145, 173-181, 196-198, 220-255, 266
Baalwie Mosque 58
Barisan Nasional 23, 40, 86, 97, 270 Ibn Taimiyyah 40, 111
Ijtihad 118, 220-221
cadre 85 Imam Nalla 148-151, 223, 229-254
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 56 Indonesia 15, 17, 28, 46-49, 55, 112, 133, 166, 171,
Chinese Privilege 201 175-176, 208, 252
Christian, Christianity 19, 69, 71-73, 116, 143- inter-faith 118, 152-153, 162, 178, 182-184, 217
149, 168, 176, 193, 207, 221, 232-244, 253-254 Internal Security Act (ISA) 14, 59, 77, 95, 107,
civil society 9-11, 27, 30, 53-61, 73, 87, 90, 136, 180
96-98, 180, 259, 263-273 intra-faith 179, 182-187, 198, 255, 258
companions 38, 42, 48, 115 Isa Semait 20, 77, 92, 109, 113, 136
Compulsory Education (CE) 135 Islamist 28, 46-47, 55, 89, 109, 132, 215, 217,
co-optation 14, 22, 27, 37, 54-62, 88-90, 191, 221, 251
257, 267
Critical Islam 161-162 Janil Puthucheary 127
culture wars 71, 242 Jaringan Islam Liberal (Liberal Islam Network,
JIL) 165
Dadah Itu Haram 91-92, 119, 138 Jehovah’s Witnesses 225
Dawoodi Bohra 183-184 jurisprudence 12, 40, 42-43, 49-50, 73-74, 81,
dominant one-party 80-81, 86 104, 111-113, 173, 188, 196-198, 215, 234
Ebrahim Moosa 165 Kaum Muda 113, 215-216, 265

exceptionalism 9-10 Kaum Tua 113, 215-216, 265
extremism 28, 51, 95, 120, 138, 246, 250, 255 Khaled Abou El Fadl 165
Facebook 93, 119, 122, 130, 140, 149, 201, 220, Lee Hsien Loong 15, 18, 59, 122, 140, 191, 248,
223-224, 227, 230, 235, 241, 244, 249, 253 251
Faisal Manap 23, 84, 121, 229, 251, 257 Lee Kuan Yew 13-14, 16-19, 58, 120-123, 202,
Farid Esack 165, 167 247, 251
Index 303
LGBT 60-61, 71, 73, 85, 89, 92, 117, 124, 163, Party Block Vote (PBV) 13, 86
170, 176, 179, 187-195, 198, 204, 219, 233-242, Pergas (Persatuan Ulama dan Guru-
253-256 guru Agama Singapura, Singapore Islamic
Lot 164, 188-190, 221, 240 Scholars and Religious Teachers Associa-
tion) 22, 58, 105, 113-114, 129, 135-154, 229,
madrasah 76, 134-137, 145, 154, 171, 179, 185, 233, 255, 266-267, 273
255, 266 Pink Dot 192, 237-239, 253
Aljunied Al-Islamiah 105 populist/populism 15, 69-70
Mahathir Mohamad 54, 56 pragmatism 103, 233, 242, 253-254
Malaysia 14-18, 21-23, 28, 37, 40-43, 47-49, 54, progressive 73, 117, 140-142, 162-208, 214-227,
73, 83, 86-87, 97, 133, 165-166, 174-176, 208, 234, 238, 241-249, 254-258
252, 271-272
Maliki (school of thought) 42, 74 Quran 11, 20, 37, 50, 73-74, 82, 110, 114, 122, 169,
Maliki Osman 23-24, 144 173, 175, 188-190, 196-197, 215, 221, 231, 235,
Martin Luther 69 240, 245-248
Marxist Conspiracy 18-19, 120, 134, 199
Masagos Zulkifli 22, 24, 106, 129, 131, 140, 144, Raeesah Khan 23
205, 229, 245-246 Ramadan Al-Bouti 44
Mawlid 50, 81-82, 113-115 Rashid Rida 113
meritocracy 15, 60, 88, 270 Reformation 69-73
Merry Christmas 131, 143-148, 214, 222, 232, reformist 111, 113, 167, 215-216, 220
242, 244-245, 249, 255 Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) 91-92,
Moderate Muslim 70 118-120, 129-130, 134-139, 150
modernist 215 RSIS (S. Rajaratnam School of International
MRHA (Maintenance of Religious Harmony Studies) 116, 118, 145
Act) 19, 23, 206, 243, 255-256
Mu’tazilite 169-170, 180 Salafi 10, 29, 48-51, 74, 77, 89, 110-117, 129-133,
Mufti Menk 143, 146, 199-200, 231, 244, 248, 137, 152, 175, 215-217, 220, 265
252 salvific exclusivity 116, 142, 146, 177, 207
Mufti 20-21, 40, 42, 77, 92, 104, 109, 111, 113, 119, Saudi 40, 50, 54, 111-112, 133, 175
122, 136, 141, 144, 149-150, 224-225 Scott Kugle 164-165, 188, 221
Muhammad Abduh 113 Section 377A 85, 92, 176, 187-204, 233-257
MUIS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, Islamic secularism 16, 24, 58, 80, 84, 121, 142-143, 153,
Religious Council of Singapore) 21-23, 166-172, 176, 252, 270,
58, 76, 106, 109, 116-119, 122, 130, 133, 137, Shafii 74, 136
140-144, 150, 186, 195, 197, 204-205, 215, 238, Shanmugam, K. 16-17, 93-94, 126, 144, 149, 205,
252 240, 243-244, 251, 256-257
Muslim Brotherhood 44, 217 Shia 10, 29, 49, 74, 81, 111, 117, 175, 183-187, 205
Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) 60
National Council Churches of Singapore Singapore Muslim Identity (SMI) 141-143
(NCCS) 242 Southeast Asia 11, 19, 27, 40, 42, 46, 54, 94,
National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) 57 112-113, 165, 171, 215, 221, 250
Ng Eng Hen 23 Sufi/Sufism 10, 29, 48-51, 81, 109-117, 130-137,
niqab 222 152, 175, 216, 220, 265
Nisfu Shaaban 82, 114 Sunnah 48-50, 73, 111, 215, 235
Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) 13, Sunni 10, 29, 40-45, 48-51, 74, 81-82, 111-112, 117,
58, 191 133, 145, 160-170, 175, 183-187, 255, 265
Non-Constituency Member of Parliament survival 15, 21, 61, 95, 200, 270
(NCMP) 13 Syariah
Court 21-22
OB (Out-of-Bounds) markers 23, 85, 93, 95, Law 107, 152
142, 203, 266
Ong Ye Kung 203, 267 Tan Cheng Bock 119
Operation Cold Store 83 Teo Chee Hean 8, 225
orthodoxy 82, 184, 219, 222 terrorist/terrorism 19-20, 28, 46, 50-51, 70, 110,
132, 134, 137-139, 151-152, 154, 217, 230, 246,
Pakatan Harapan 175, 272 254, 266
PAP (People’s Action Party) 8, 13-25, 57-61, The Straits Times 22, 30, 117, 142, 249
81-98, 106, 119-121, 137, 144, 151-154, 176, 181, traditionalists 29, 48-51, 73, 110-117, 129-131,
191-192, 202, 243-244, 252-257, 267-274 137, 163, 169, 175, 215-221, 235, 265
Umayyad 38, 48 Yaacob Ibrahim 22, 148, 205, 225, 230, 243
Ustaz Ali 58, 113, 118, 122, 129-131, 138-139 Yaasin 114
Ustaz Hasbi Hasan 114, 129-139, 151 Yusuf Qaradawi 42, 45, 168
Wahhabi 29, 50-51, 110-113, 129-133, 175, 216, 220 Zaqy Mohamad 127, 225
Wear White 238-242, 252
Workers’ Party (WP) 14, 60

(Religion and Society in Asia_ 9) Walid Jumblatt Abdullah - Islam in a Secular State_ Muslim Activism in Singapore-Amsterdam University Press (2021)

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(Religion and Society in Asia_ 9) Walid Jumblatt Abdullah - Islam in a Secular State_ Muslim Activism in Singapore-Amsterdam University Press (2021)

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Islam in a Secular State

Religion and Society in Asia

This series contributes cutting-edge and cross-disciplinary academic research on

Walid Jumblatt Abdullah

Amsterdam University Press

Cover design: Coördesign, Leiden

isbn 978 94 6372 401 2

© Walid Jumblatt Abdullah / Amsterdam University Press B.V., Amsterdam 2021

1 Introduction: The State, Islam, and Muslim Activism in Singapore 7

2 Muslim Activism: A Survey across the World 37

3 Argument: Political Opportunities and Muslim Strategies 69

4 The Ulama: Pragmatism and Political Acquiescence 103

5 Liberal Activists: Playing by the System and Making Gains 161

Combined Bibliography 277

Keywords: Introduction, Islam, Muslims in Singapore, activists, People’s

1.1 Background of Project and Wider Relevance

causes. They are more interested in challenging existing norms within

given are wholly Singapore-centric; it has been a common theme amongst

a tendency in political science to adopt statist approaches in explaining

1.2 Singapore’s Political Context

Singapore can best be described as a ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime.

4 World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ny.gdp.pcap.cd. Accessed 7 September 2018.

The state has always been interventionist, and unapologetically so.

In spite of the apparent varying styles of leadership of the three Prime

1.3 Islam in Singapore

The government will not interfere in doctrinal matters within each

outcomes. The PAP has no qualms interfering in the religious affairs of a

In such an environment, to maintain harmony in our multiracial and

10 Singapore Statutes Online, https://sso.agc.gov.sg/Act/PC1871?ValidDate=20171001&ProvId

It cannot be coincidental that fatwas issued by MUIS are always either

The perception some Muslims have toward MUIS being an instrument

16 Interview with conservative activist, 15 September 2019.

Muslims in their countries, inheriting such a system from their colonial

multiracialism and secularism, which Singapore considers sacrosanct. The

1.4 Arguments in Brief

This book draws upon the concept of political opportunity structures to

willing to tolerate dissent; and 3) challenge the state in fundamental areas

& Richards, 2000, p. 283). Their definition, however, is restrictive as it limits

1.5 Case Selection and Methodology

useful case study in comparative politics and sociology. Second, in spite of

21 This will be explained further in Chapter 5.

it is neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ to be liberal or conservative. Secondly, they are

be valuable. Perhaps more importantly, social media postings were looked

1.6 Outline of Book

Keywords: Theological justif ications, social movements, activism,

As protesters were gathering in Tahrir Square in Egypt in early 2011, the

2.1 Muslim Activism: Theological Positions

Classical Muslim scholars have tended to favour a cautious approach toward

Salama b. Yazid al-ju’afi asked the Messenger of Allah: Prophet of Allah,

2 Sahih Muslim, Book 20, Hadith 4524. https://sunnah.com/muslim/33/52. Accessed

Muhammad Haniff Hassan’s study on Islamic attitudes toward civil

Fawzan’s exposition, hyperbole aside, points toward an extremely constrict-

that it is impermissible to overthrow the government.7 The overwhelming

The best of jihad (struggle) is a just word spoken to an unjust ruler.8

7 “Tindakan guling kerajaan haram – Mufti Perak (Act of Overthrowing Government is

Here, the Prophet explicitly mentioned that obedience is not required in

9 Sahih Al-Bukhari, Book 93, Hadith 9. https://sunnah.com/bukhari/93/9. Accessed

Considering the theological differences of opinion on the matter, it is not

2.2 Brief Literature Review

1 Introduction: The State, Islam, and Muslim Activism in Singapore 7

2 Muslim Activism: A Survey across the World 37

3 Argument: Political Opportunities and Muslim Strategies 69

4 The Ulama: Pragmatism and Political Acquiescence 103

5 Liberal Activists: Playing by the System and Making Gains 161

Combined Bibliography 277