Professional Documents
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Pedagogy Power and Discourse Transformat
Pedagogy Power and Discourse Transformat
Pedagogy Power and Discourse Transformat
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Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse:
Transformation of Islamic Education
AZIZ TALBANI
Theoretical Framework
66
February 1996
TRANSFORMATIONOF ISLAMICEDUCATION
ComparativeEducationReview 67
TALBANI
68 February1996
TRANSFORMATIONOF ISLAMICEDUCATION
(fiqh), and the Arabic language. All forms of knowledge not patronized
by madarisand not part of Islamic learning, such as philosophy, chem-
istry, astronomy, and mathematics,were pursued privatelyand to an ex-
tent secretly under the guise of other subjects such as the traditions or
medicine.15
15
Makdisi, Rise of Colleges, pp. 281-82.
16
Pedersen and Makdisi, pp. 1123-24.
17 Ibid.
18G. E. Von
Grunebaum, Islam: Essaysin the Nature and Growthof a Cultural Tradition(Menasha:
American Anthropological Association, 1955), p. 114.
'9 Ibid., p. 118.
ComparativeEducationReview 69
TALBANI
ies and must turn them [instead]to the pronouncementsof religious law,
where there is sufficient proof for the believer to be content with."20This
rigid framing and classificationof knowledge based on religious law and
dogma inevitablymadejurists and traditionalists(muhdith) final authorities
in religious and worldlymatters.Religiousscholarsbecame self-appointed
interpretersand guardiansof religious knowledge. People were to follow
without questioning (taqlid)in all matters, and these scholarscondemned
all other forms of knowledge as well as inquiry and research. Even inde-
pendent study of the Qur'an and traditionswas forbidden. Hujwari(died
ca. 1077) argued, for example, that "knowledgeis obligatory only in so
far as is requisite for acting righteously. God condemns those who learn
useless knowledge."21In short,madrasalearningwasconfined to the trans-
mission of traditions and dogma, and was hostile to research and scien-
tific inquiry.
In traditional Islamic pedagogy, authoritativeacceptance of knowl-
edge is stressed, with learning often based on listening, memorization,
and regurgitation. The collection of traditions, including the Qur'an, is
termed "that which is listened" (al-sam');greater emphasis is placed on
listening to a teacher, who is active as a transmitterof knowledge, while
the student is passive.
As the result of this attitude, education became static during the
twelfth century. Curriculumconsisted mostly of scripturesand books of
the earlier theologians andjurists. Only commentariesand tributes were
written about these works, and the writing of explanation (sharh)and
marginal notes (hashiyah)on the text (matn)of earlier writersbecame the
dominant literaryactivity.Control over education was exercised through
various means. For instance, teachers were licensed (ijaza)to teach (actu-
ally, to transmit)particularbooks.22Because this meant the reproduction
of what had been said in the past, the rewriting and reinterpretation
of doctrine were hindered. Educational knowledge became increasingly
irrelevant to changing socioeconomic realities and to new expectations
and aspirations among Muslims. In other words, outside the madrasa
everything was changing and inside everything remained static.
This had far-reaching cultural and intellectual consequences for Is-
lamic civilization. With few exceptions, Muslims were apathetic toward
scientific and philosophical matters. In spite of the great contributions
their scientists had once made, Muslims failed to continue scientific en-
deavor and soon lagged far behind. All matters were studied within a
20 Ibid.
21Ibid.
22J. Pedersen, "Some
Aspects of the History of the Madrasah," Islamic Culture 3, no. 4 (1929):
525-37, at 528.
70
February1996
TRANSFORMATIONOF ISLAMICEDUCATION
ComparativeEducationReview 71
TALBANI
28Marshal
Hodgson, The Venture of Islam: Conscienceand History in a World Civilization, vol. 1
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).
29S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition,
Change and Modernity(New York: Wiley, 1973), p. 25.
30 A. L.
Tibawi, Islamic Education: Its Traditionsand Modernizationinto the Arab National Systems
(London: Luzac, 1972), p. 192.
72 February 1996
TRANSFORMATIONOF ISLAMICEDUCATION
ComparativeEducationReview 73
TALBANI
tutional level, where Islam was accepted as the religion of the state and
sovereignty was attributed to God. The "ObjectiveResolution and the
Principlesof State Policy"explicitlymentioned a knowledge of the Qur'an
and "Islamiat"as essential for Muslims.34In addition,the firstAll Pakistan
Education Conference in 1947 proposed that the educational system
should be inspired by Islamic ideology.35
The members of Pakistan'sinitial government were mostly Muslims
educated in the West, however. Because they emphasized values such as
socialjustice, democracy,equity, and individualismthat were Western in
characterand had never been part of traditionalMuslim societies, Islam
came to be interpreted in more liberal terms. To overcome the conflict
between the traditionalistsand modernists,the first independentPakistani
government suggested as a compromise that a course on Islamicreligion
and historybe establishedfor all grade levels. At the tertiarylevel, depart-
ments of Islamic studies were proposed.36However, ambiguity in the
Objective Resolution about the definition and role of Islam made the
religion a legitimate part of Pakistan'spolitical discourse. The 'ulama,
who had opposed the very idea of Pakistan, manipulated that Islamic
clause to change the nation into a theocracyits modernistleadershiphad
never envisioned.
In the 1959 Reportof theCommission on Education,Pakistan'spresident
stated that "there was a need for reorganizationand reorientationof the
existing educational system so that a national system could evolve which
would better reflect our spiritual,moraland culturalvalues."37This report
emphasized the inculcationof values such as universalbrotherhood,toler-
ance, self-sacrifice,social services,truth,justice, and so on. Religious edu-
cation (i.e., learning about religion) was a part of the curriculumfrom the
first to eighth grades.The teaching of religion was intendedto emphasize
justice, equality among individuals,the importanceof practicalgoodness,
piety, and virtue.
The sympathy toward Islam among modernists was partly political
rhetoricto cool off militanttendencies.Nevertheless,increasedunemploy-
ment among the educated, massive poverty, urban migration, and the
failure of modernistleaders'economic policies led youth to join political
34E. I.
J. Rosenthal, Islam in the ModernNational State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1965), p. 349. See also Anita M. Weiss, ed., Islamic Reassertionin Pakistan: The Applicationof Islamic
Laws in a Modern State (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1986).
35 Parveen
Shahid, Implementationof National Education Policies (Islamabad: Academy of Educa-
tional Planning and Management, 1985), p. 10.
36
U.S. Government, Area Handbookfor Pakistan (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Areas Studies Divi-
sion, 1965), p. 203.
37 Government of
Pakistan, Reportof the Commissionon Education (Karachi: Government of Paki-
stan, 1960).
74 February1996
TRANSFORMATIONOF ISLAMICEDUCATION
activist groups of either the extreme right or left. Consequently, the ortho-
dox influence in politics increased.
In the 1970s there was a rise of fundamentalism in Muslim countries,
with Pakistan a particular hotbed for this movement. The Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto regime (1971-77) was the target of this violent movement. To
please fundamentalists, Bhutto announced some measures of Islamization
such as declaring Friday a holiday, making the teaching of the Qur'an an
integral part of education, and establishing the Federal 'Ulama Academy.
However, fundamentalists considered these measures mere window
dressing.38
In 1977 the military-under General Mohammed Zia ul-Haq-ov-
erthrew the Bhutto government and became allied with the fundamental-
ists. One result of this staunch alliance was an effort to implement an
Islamic sociopolitical system and construct a new power relationship be-
tween the state and religion with new social realities based on medieval
categories of knowledge. The government devised an educational policy
aiming to establish a new discourse and to socialize students into the
official ideology of the state and of the religion of Islam.39 As stated in
"The National Education Policy and Implementation Program-1979,"
the primary aim of education was to "foster in students a loyalty to Islam,
a sense of being a dutiful citizen of the Pakistani nation as a part of
universal Ummah[Muslim community] with a full knowledge of the Paki-
stan movement, its ideological implications based on the precepts of
Qur'an and Sunnah."40
Immediate measures taken by the government included the design of
new syllabi and the writing of new textbooks. Other steps included the
enforcement of women wearing the head scarf (chadar) in educational
institutions, the organization of congregational afternoon prayers (zuhr)
during school hours, compulsory teaching of Arabic as a second language,
reading of the Qur'an (nazara) as a matriculation requirement, the use
of religious knowledge for selecting teachers at all levels of education,
and the revision of conventional subjects to emphasize Islamic values.41
38 M.
Geijbels, "Pakistan, Islamisation and the Christian Minority in the Islamic State of Pakistan,"
Al-Mushir (The Counsellor)21, no. 2 (1979): 31-51, at 41.
39Ibid., p. 46.
40Ahmad Hasan Dani, "Educational Progress in Pakistan: Challenge and Response (1947-
1985)," in Bulletin of Unesco Regional Officefor Education in Asia and Pacific, no. 27 (Hong Kong:
Unesco, 1986), p. 64.
41 P.
Hoodbhoy and A. Nayyar, "Rewriting the History of Pakistan," in Islam, Politics and the
State, ed. Asghar Khan (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 164.
ComparativeEducationReview 75
TALBANI
42A. A.
Engineer, "Islam and Reformation," Islam and the Modern Age 9, no. 1 (1978): 86-95;
W. M. Watt, "Cultural Clashes in a 'Perfect' World: The Challenge of Progressive Ideas to the Islamic
World," Times Higher Education Supplement(June 13, 1986), p. 13A.
43
Albert Hourani, ArabicThoughtin theLiberalAge, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1983), p. 83.
44 Pervez
Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan," in Islam, Politics and the
State, ed. Asghar Khan (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 174.
45 Zial
Haq, "Islamisation of Society in Pakistan," in Islam, Politicsand the State, ed. Asghar Khan
(London: Zed Books, 1985).
46A. R. S. Abdullah, Educational Theory:A Qur'anicOutlook(Makkah: Umm ul-Qura
University,
n.d.), p. 83.
76 February1996
TRANSFORMATIONOF ISLAMICEDUCATION
47 A. L.
Tibawi, "Philosophy of Muslim Education," IslamicQuarterly4, no. 2 (July 1957): 78-89.
48 Modern
Maryam Jameelah, Technologyand the Dehumanisationof Man (Lahore: El-Matbaat
ul-Arabia, 1983), p. 8.
49 S. S. Hussain and A. A.
Ashraf, Crisisin MuslimEducation(Jeddah: King Abdul Aziz University/
Hodder & Stoughton, 1979).
5oIbid.
51
Abdullah (n. 46 above), p. 35.
52
Engineer; Watt (both cited in n. 42 above).
53 Watt, p. 13.
54
Jameelah, Modem Technologyand the Dehumanisationof Man, p. 8. See also, by the same author,
Islam and WesternSociety:A Refutationof theModernWayof Life (Lahore: Mohammed Yusuf Khan, 1976).
55
G. N. Saqeb, "Modernisation of Muslim Society and Education: Need for a Practical Ap-
proach," in Education and Societyin the Muslim World,ed. M. W. Khan (London and Jeddah: Hodder
& Stoughton and King Abdul Aziz University, 1981), pp. 48-49. See also Hussain and Ashraf (n.
49 above), p. 59.
56A. Maudoodi, Talimat (Lahore: Islamic Publications, n.d.),
p. 20.
57 Ibid.
58
Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan" (n. 44 above), p. 183.
78 February1996
TRANSFORMATIONOF ISLAMICEDUCATION
59
Maudoodi, p. 93.
60Watt, p. 13.
61
Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan," p. 190.
62
Paul Hurst, "Critical Education and Islamic Culture," in CulturalIdentityand EducationalPolicy,
ed. Colin Brock and Witold Tulasiewicz (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 1-2.
63
K. R. Popper, "Normal Science and Its Dangers," in Criticismand the Growthof Knowledge,ed.
I. Lakatos and A. Musgraw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 281.
64 W. N.
J. Watkins, "Against 'Normal Science,'" in Criticismand the Growthof Knowledge, ed.
I. Lakatos and A. Musgraw (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 29.
ComparativeEducationReview 79
TALBANI
65
Hoodbhoy and Nayyar (n. 41 above), p. 165.
66Qutubuddin Khan, Social Studies, bk. 5 (Karachi: Rehber Publishers, n.d.), p. 1.
67
Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan," p. 174.
68 Rafi
Raza, "The Continuous Process of Rewriting the Constitution," in Pakistan in Its Fourth
Decade, ed. Wolfgang-Peter Zungel and Stephanie Zingel-Ave Lallemant (Hamburg: Deutsches
Orient-Institut, 1983), p. 9.
80 February1996
TRANSFORMATIONOF ISLAMICEDUCATION
Conclusion
In the past, Islamic discourse excluded non-Islamic forms of knowl-
edge and was used by political regimes to foster their power and control.
In modern times, traditional Muslims seek hegemony over political, eco-
nomic, and educational domains, leading to the establishment of authori-
tarian regimes in some Muslim countries and widespread violence in
others.
Since Zia's death in 1988, democratic governments have ruled in Paki-
stan. The legacy of the military regime he headed lingers, however,
through a number of repressive laws introduced in the guise of religion
during his tenure. Subsequent governments have been unable to rescind
these religion-based laws because of the concerted opposition of funda-
mentalists. The introduction of Islamic laws has resulted in the oppression
of vulnerable groups in Pakistani society, especially women and religious
minorities. In contrast, the 'ulama, the military, and elites all benefited
69 Abbas
Rashid, "Pakistan: The Ideological Dimension," in Islam, Politicsand the State, ed. Asghar
Khan (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 81.
70M. D.
Zafar, Pakistan Studiesfor Medical Students(Lahore: Aziz, 1982), p. 147.
71Quoted in
Hoodbhoy, "Ideological Problems for Science in Pakistan," p. 173.
ComparativeEducationReview 81
TALBANI
72Pervez
Hoodbhoy, Muslims and Science: Religious Orthodoxyand the Struggle for Rationality
(Lahore: Vanguard, 1991), p. 50.
73
Rafique Zakaria, The Struggle within Islam: The ConflictbetweenReligion and Politics (New York:
Penguin, 1989).
74 In
1948, Urdu was made the national language and the medium of instruction in public
schools. For a further discussion on the increasing popularity of English-medium schools, see Hoodb-
hoy, Muslims and Science.
82 February1996